Commentary: Constructive Approaches to Law, Culture, and Identity

Author(s): Carol J. Greenhouse

Source: Law & Society Review, Vol. 28, No. 5, Symposium: Community and Identity in
Sociolegal Studies (1994), pp. 1231-1242
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Law and Society Association
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 12
Comnary

Culture, and Identity

ConstructiveApproaches to LLaw,

CarolJ. Greenhouse

This commentary responds to the essays by Espeland and Gooding as eth-

nographic studies of the cultural construction of identity with a discussion of
the concept of Zcultural construction." Sophocles' Antione provides an ex-
tended illustrative example of how the poetics of identity are tied to the maten-
ality of power. In the world of events, the concept of cultunl construction is
useful as Espeland's and Gooding's essays show as an alternative (and rem-
edy) for the overuse of the concept of Zchoice." To refer to identities as "cul-
tural constructions" focuses attention on how powerful institutions and subjec-
tivities are mutually implicated, without implying that people's needs and
world-views are commensurable or that the outcomes of their contests are
fated.

v he articles by Espeland and Gooding in this section are

ethnographic studies of the law's role in the cultural construc-
tion of identities. Both essaysoffer extended case studies of legal
disputes between the federal government and-in federal par-
lance Indian Tribes.The conceptual strand I want to drawfor-
ward from the essaysis the idea of gculturalconstructions"- a
relationshipbetween the poetics of identity politics, the material
forces of real-worldstruggles for recognition, and modes of in-
quirywithin and beyond sociolegal scholarship.
In this commentary,and following the authors' leads, I ex-
plore the concept of gculturalconstructions"from two reflexive
ethnographic vantage points: first, as a means of widening the
conceptual distance between culture and choice and, second, as
a means of narrowingthe practicaldistance between the inter-
pretive and reformist aspects of cultural analysis.These are re-
For constructive dialogues on the suyect of Ismene and Antigone over the years, my
thanks to Fred Aman, David Engel, F>nk Munger, Austin Sarat, Barbara Yngvesson and,
especially in the present context, Elizabeth Mertz. Address correspondence to Carol J.
Greenhouse, Department of Anthropology, Indiana University, Student Bldg. 130,
Bloomington, IN 47405.

Law & Socieq Review, Volume 28, Number 5 (1994)

i) 1994 by The Law and Societ Association. All rights reseIved.
 1232 CowIstucdveApproachesto Law, Culture, and Identity

lated points, in that the idea that culturaldifferencesare "about"

aggregate choices is- as the essaysthemselves show-a fiction;
however, the stakes in confronting that fiction are potentially
very high and very real.
"Culturalconstructions"name that fiction and what is at
stake in it. Culturalconstructionsof identity are, as the essays
show, central to both oppressiveand liberatoryuses of the law.
For this reason, among others, it is also useful to comparative
ethnography, since it commits us to examining how social
processesproduce and concealtheir effects.Mydiscussionpursues
these themes of the relationshipsbetween law, choice, and cul-
tural constructions first in an illustrativeliteraryexample, and
then in Espeland'sand Gooding's essays.We begin in the thea-
ter, and move from there to the stages of current real-worlddra-
mas involvingstrugglesover rights,identities, and other forms of
property.
Such a juxtaposition is only quasi-playful.The familiar nb
tions of social roles, cost-l;enefit,transaction,social actors, and
social action (among others) suggestthe extent to which the the-
ater, markets,and social science readilytrade key words. It is no
coincidence that social science, marketsand the theater should
share a certainvocabulaxy.Agnew (1986) tracksthe common lex-
icons to shared origins in the earlymodern development of mar-
kets, theater and conceptions of the person-or, as he puts it,
"artificialpersons" in Europe. As the meanings of transaction
and representation borrowed heavily from each other in the
early modern period, misrepresentation,concealment, illusion,
and deception became fashionableobjectsof anxiety.Today,the
concept of "culturalconstructions"gives social scientistsa way of
placing their own analyticalcategories in some relation to the
epistemologicaland politicaltensionswithin the social fields they
investigate.There, misrepresentationyields productiveintexpre-
tive, comparative, and reflexive issues, rather than (merely)
methodological unease.
"Choice"should probablylead the roster of terms that social
science shares with commodity exchange and dramaticcanons.
Choice is the main theme of this commentary,since both the
fictional illustrationand the ethnographic cases involve circum-
stances that mask constraintas choice. Under these conditions,
"choice"has an ironic ring since it can be no more than a rhetor-
ical device for converting institutionalclaims to legitimacyinto
an idiom of individualagency- or vice versa. The pervasiveness
of gchoice"in social science narrative(or social narrativemore
broadly)is an importantculturaltechnologyfor defining individ-
ual agency as confixming collective social structures;however,
this is a predefinition, as if sociegrwere a congress in which indi-
viduals represent themselvesby their (chosen) acts. The main
argumentof the literaryillustrationis that the conditions of free-
 Greenhouse 1233

dom under which we might be assured that choices are self-rept

resentationsin this sense cannot exist. The ethnographic essays
have shown with particularclarity, although in different ways,
that "culturalconstructions"are not self-representationsin some
fictional legislature, but self-identificationswith active struggles
whose tactical requirements transformthe very idea of identity
for participantsin a varietyof ways.

Fictional Choices, Mythical Dramas

Antigone, Sophocles' play about Oedipus' daughter, is about
choices-or, to be more precise, the difference between being
and choosing. The play is easilysummarized:King Creon's army
has just won a militaxyvictory,defending Creon's crown. Antig-
one, who lives in Creon'spkingdom, performs the burial rites for
her brother, who had fought in the opposing army. The burial
flouts King Creon's order. Although the command is unambigu-
ously lawfulboth to Antigone and the audience, it is also unam-
biguously unjust. Mindful of the injustice but also the penalties
attached to the order, Ismene (Antigone's sister) tries to per-
suade Antigone to desist, but Antigone performs the rites any-
way, invoking "the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws"(1. 456)
against the frailer timeliness of a king's law.l Creon's son
Haemon, who is Antigone's fiance, pleads her cause before the
king, and Antigone -alsopresents her case to no avail. Creon
condemns her to imprisonment in a sealed cave; there, she
hangs herself. Haemon, in grief and protest, commits suicide;
when she hears this news, his mother Eurydicealso kills herself.
Feeling the force of his own grief, Creon realizes the justice of
Antigone's act, and the injustice that he has committed.
As the play opens, Antigone is alreadycommitted to proceed-
ing with the rites;importantly,the audience never sees Antigone
decicle.2Ismene warnsher of the risks although Antigone is al-
ready fully aware of them but fails to persuade her to change
her mind. Indeed, the sisters'positions are so opposite that later
in the play, Antigone's selfMefensebefore Creon is almost the
exact inverse of Ismene's speech in this scene. For example, and
most crucially,where Ismene presents compliance as the corol-
laxy of their gender ("Wemust remember that we two are wo
men/ so not to fight with men"; 11.61-62), Antigone presents
her own defiance as the corollaryof her birth: it is "to serve the
children of my mother's womb" (11.511-23, esp. 512) that she
defies the law and givesherself over to thejudgment of the sover-
1 All quotations from Antigotu are from Elizabeth Wyckoff's translation, in Sophocles
I (Grene & Lattimore 1954:157-204).
2 Similarly, at the play's close, the audience learns of Antigone's death without wit-
nessing a decision to hang herself.
 1234 ConstxuctiveApproadhesto Law, Culture, and
T¢lenlity
eign.3 Ismene cannot
order could compel her persuadeAntigone any more
to than Creon's
which, to Antigone, involvesdeny the actualityof her own birzch,
forms of action. an ongoing
commitmentto specific
In Antigone'smany
tivelyunsettled. Ismeneversions, the characterof Ismene is rela-
play(Steiner 1984:144);does not appear in everyversion of the
rangingfrom subservient where she does appear,
readIsmene and to insurgent (ibid., her role varies,
Antigone as the doubled pp. 144-48).4 I
They,like all the characters figure of a woman.
arefigurations of and their relationshipsin
the
notindividuals.To putparticular propositions about social action,
this another way,the reality-
tiesof Ismene and separateindividuali-
Antigone
kind of mythicreading) than are less important (at least, to this
contrast their statusas the
between human conditions. embodiment of a
mene is the only character The fact that
doubled in this way Antigone-Is-
centrality in the play. underscores"her"
The action of the play
itself
andAntigone in this way.They lends supportto twinningIsmene
from the large door stage open the playtogether,
center. emerging
crucialscene with Creon (after 1. They exit together from the
in
theplay'sfinal scenes. 581). They are absent
Once Antigone together
is led to her inevitable
deathin the cave, Ismene
inside
the palace. never reappearsfrom her
living death
These parallels extend to
the
necessarilyinvolving political acts sisters' view of femininity as
but here the parallels
Their
sense of their own stop.
political
(literallyand figuratively). significance diverges dramati-
cally
Creon'scommand as the corollary Ismene views compliance
with
Creon's law in favorof her of her gender.Arltigonediso-
bey's
corollaxy
of her birth.In the obligationsas a sister
them play's action, the debate as the
heightens the contrast
does
not imply that their between their positions, between
but this
positions
courses of action. Such a are actuallyavailableas alter-
native
play
is "about"whether to reading would mean that
obey the law. In that case, the
it offers a
3The inversion
beneath continues:Ismenearguesfor
the earth"(l. 65); compliance,risking
(ll.458-60). Ismene Antigone arguesfor defiance, riskingof theoffense to "them
living
power" refers to their being "subjectto strong outrage of the
(11.63, 67); Antigone power"
didI thinkyour orders specificallydismissesthe strength of and "themen in
("Nor
were so strong/ that you, Creon's
the
gods'
unwrittenand unfailinglaws"; a mortalman, could command
ll. 453-55). over-run/
4Bothelements
from appear in Sophocles'
her
insurrection, Ismenepresentsherself version.After failing to
oneto accept her dissuadeAntigone
refuses act of solidarity,andforjudgmentas an accomplice,but Antig
Atthe end of the Sophocles rejectsher (ll.
to
Ismene's version,Ismenesurvives,but 536-60).
end" (Steiner1984:148).
and (p.notes Steiner
151n.) the interpretiveand (p. 151) refersto"[m]ythographers waveras
sane and or is she
ethical? moraldebateover herher"classicalfemininity"
the pitiable, character:Is she heroic,
of femininityis less ascrushed?
significance In the readingI offer
here, I suggestthat
the
difference an attributeof either
between them in relation sisterthan as a focal point
to Creon'spower. to
 Gwenhouse 1235

very mixed message, since Andgone dies for her disobedience,

and Creon is also destroyed.
By reading the gtwoXwomen as one doubled feminine figure,
the play deliversa unified message on the theme of justice. Spe-
cifically,the doubled figure permits the audience to see the dif-
ferencebetween being and choosing as the sign of boththe suS
ject's vulnerabilityto the king's power and authority and the
vulnerabilityof the king to the force of justice. The figurationof
this vulnerabilityin women makes the message legible and the
play's action credible, as Ismene is made to explain to Antigone
in the speech cited above (at 1. 61). Eventually,Creon, the king,
is made to embody his own twin, as husband and father, parallel-
ling the women's subject/sister figures, but this twinning is veiy
tentative,as Creon begins to awakento the idea of justice. The
moment comes in Creon's remorsefulspeech at the veiy end of
the play but the difference between power and justice, which
he has onlyjust realized,has been defined and embodied in the
difference between the two women's positions.
The difference between being and choosing is the play'sful-
crum. Although Antigone says to Ismene (in 1. 555): you chose
to live when I chose death," their choicesX are fundamentally
different. Ismene accepts the conditions imposed by Creon as a
moral dilemma, imagining herself by virtue of her vulnerabili-
ties as a woman as necessarily choosing between the laws of
men and the laws of the gods. Antigone consistentlyrefuses this
dilemma, since she never considers abandoning her brother for
the sake of her king's command. As noted above, Antigone's
course of action is defined before the play begins. Ismene does
find a choice to make and her choosing unfolds before our
eyes once she conceives of her femininity in relation to the
state. Antigone refuses to consider her own femininity except as
an extension of her birth as her brother's sister.
Choosing between two unchosen courses, Ismene is trans-
formed into a simulacrumof her self. Her gender defined (in
her own words) by the law's power over her becomes the en-
gine of her removalfrom her own life. Her identity remains ac-
cessible to herself, to us only through the law;her actions are
comprehensible only in its context. Choosing in the universe
Creon made, she dies from hersel£ Antigone, on the other hand,
refusesto pexmitthe law to have explanatorypower in relation to
her own sense of agency.
Creon himself plays cruelly on these meanings of ZchoiceX
and Antigone's commienent when he invenicsa prison for her
where she will Zchoose"her own death (11.773-76): Ztakeher
where the foot of man comes not. / There shall I hide her in a
hollowed cave / living, and leavejust so much to eat / as clears
the city from the guilt of death." Since Ismene is in a sense al-
 1236 ConstxuctiveApproachesto Law, Culture, and Idenlity

ready among the dead, she does not appear at the end of the
play with the other charactersto mourn the death of Antigone.
The action of the playsharpensthe focus on particulardiffer-
ences in the relationshipbetween Ismene's and Antigone's rela-
tionship to the state as women. Ismene is a sympatheticcharac-
ter, but Antigone is heroic. Ismene's choice is an ordinaryone.
She prefers to live.Antigone, in refusingchoice, places herself in
a literally impossible unlivable position. Importantly (and
this is essential to what follows here), we need bothcharactersto
understandthe course that eqwt)r takes. In other words,we need
bothcharactersand their respective tragedies to comprehend the
force of circumstancesupon their spirits, and to take the mea-
sure of their loss in our own lives.
Ismene and Antigone live in the world Creon made: choices
frame events, events shape experience, experiences add up to
(or cancel) a lifetime, and so on but the world is still Creon's.
In such a world, Creon will alwaysinsist that Antigone's act was a
choice; this is how he legitimates his punishing authority. But
Antigone has notchosen; she has acted. Her act is the extension
of her birth. Her act is not an event;it is her meaning as a self, a
"meaning-event"(Foucault 1977:174). Antigone insists on her
own sel£referentiality;she enters the play alreadyjustifed.5
By a fatal confusion, Creon himself is blocked from seeing
the connections in which Antigone constitutesher claims to per-
sonhood. Creon cannot see the justice in Antigone's act because
he views her act as her choice;he cannot imaglne otherwise be-
cause he also mistakesher beingfor her gender.Twice,he saysthat
he will not be ruled by a woman (11.526, 678-80), in the context
of sealing his case againsther. Creon'snotion of a woman'sgen-
der is the one that Ismene embodies in the play constituted in
obedience to laws,or, to be even more specific, in events in time
(e.g. acts of law or lawmaking,acts of obedience). Antigone re-
fuses to acknowledgethis specific concept of "woman"because it
would subdivideher personhood (pitting subject against sister),
makingit impossiblefor her to act in accordwith timeless princi-
ples of justice.
These inflections of gender, agency, power and temporality
develop aroundAntigone's character.Antigone alone in the play
5 In Sophocles' version of the play, Antigone's self-sufficiency is underscored by her
exalted liminality: she is between girlhood and womanhood (see, e.g., 11.578-79), and
between betrothal and marriage; the action of the play is staged outdoors, outside palace
doors and city gates, and, ultimately, at the mouth of a cave. At the same time, though she
might be self-sufficient, Antigone's self is not autonomous. Her self encompasses the
"children of [her] mother's womb", and all the citizens who are too "cowed" by Creon to
speak (1. 509; see also Haemon's speech, 11. 683-723). While her self-referentiality
removes her from the realm of choice, her inclusion of others within her personal mean-
ing hints at other (rival) canvases of self-realization. Similarly, she explains her "defiant"
act as an acknowledgment of the compass of divine agency, especially in her sense of the
burial rite as a sacred personal duty. Her act is her own, but her agency is not individual,
as Creon would have it.
 Greenhouse 1237

never refers to her gender, nor even to the man she was to have
married (withthe exception of her lament en route to her death,
11.813-14). She does not "have"a gender. Shets.And Antigone is
the first to point to the temponalflaw in Creon's reasoning, in
her distinction between his order and the "unfailinglaws"of the
gods (1.455). The Chotus reiteratesher temporal distinctionbe-
tween laws in time and timeless laws (11.602-13).6 Again, Creon
sees a distinctionbetween Antigone's logic and his own, but, see-
ing Antigone as a woman, he initiallyunderstandsher insurrec-
tion only in relation to her disobedience. Only later does he see
that her insurrectionwas lodged against more than his rule it
was also against his injustice.
Until the end of the play, the disobedient act is all-important
for Creon, since his own centralityas the ordering principle of
the kingdom prerequiresa worldof events,constitutedin choices.
It is only by this means that he can interpellate himself in the
autobiographies of his subjects, short of sentencing them to
death. For Antigone, too, meaning is constituted in acts; how-
ever, the origin of her actions is not in her choices, but her per-
sonhood. Ismene's agency is of the other kind. Their doubled
figure puts the disjunctionbetween being and choosing squarely
at stage center. This disjuncturereturnsus to the essaysby Espe-
land and Gooding.

Real-World
Choicesand ie Myi of Freedom
Thinking in terms of"cultural constructions"is the begin-
ning of a challenge to the pervasivenotion that social life consists
of a succession of individual decisions occasioned by the need
and opportunityto maximize self-interest.There might seem to
be little room around this notion-and less need for it given its
centrality as an organizing principle of many institutions and
practices associated with dominant formulations of modernity.
Yet room must be found, if people's "choices"are to be under-
stood for what they are, animatedby powerfulneeds and hedged
by powerfillconstraints. At issue in the problem of the law'srole
in the culturalconstructionof identities is a series of distinctions:
between being and choosing, power and politics, meanings and
events, names and things, agency and organization,demands for
justice and practicesof recognition.
Espeland and Gooding, in different ways,address this proW
lem by making questions of identity secondary to a prior ques-
6 The full passage (11.452-57) reads:uNordid I thinkyour orderswere so strong/
thatyou, a mortalman, could over-run/ the gods' unwrittenand unfailinglaws./ Not
now, nor yesterday's,they alwayslive, / and no one knows their origin in time."The
Chonssechoes this temporal distinctionlater (11.602-13): uWhatmadness of man, O
Zeus,can bind your power?/ . . . Unaged in time / monarch you rule of Olympus'
gleaminglight. / Near time, far future,and the past, / one law controlsthem all: / any
greatnessin human life bringsdoom."
1238 ConstlucJdve
Approachesto Law, Culture,and Idelltit,r

tion as to how strugglestake shape in and around legal institu-

tions, and how legal institutionsand processes are implicated in
people's sense of who they are as social actors.Byfocusing on the
detailsof litigationas each case unfolded in practice (ratherthan
on the individualparties), the authors are able to account for
both the ongoing interaction between the government and the
tribes and the ongoing salience of the incommensurabilitiesthat
divide the parties.
Appreciating the law's role in the cultural construction of
identities allows the the authors scope to probe the cultural,sb
cial and legal technologies that filse issues of representationin-
delibly to issues of practice and power. Focusing on the legal
cases as an event-seriesof choices would have tended to flatten
differences that are clearlyof pressing relevance to the Yavapai
and Colvillepeople whose concerns are at the heart of the essays.
Accordingly,the authorsdo not expect the law to resolvecultural
incommensurabilities,butSrather, explore how the legal process
is implicated both positively and negatively in the formula-
tion of collective self-identity.
The essaysby Espeland and Gooding are rich ethnographic
explorationsof legal contests between the United States and In-
dian Tribes the Yavapai(Arizona) in Espeland's case and the
Colvilles (Oregon and Washington) in Gooding's. The authors'
attention to legal disputes yields detailed accounts of the law's
role in the culturalconstructionof identity.Espeland'sexamina-
tion of Yavapairesistanceto federal implementation of the Na-
tional EnvironmentalPolicy Act of 1969 concentrates on the
forms and content of the legal dispute and transformationsof
Yavapaipeople's affirmativeself-identity in relation to these.
Gooding's investigation of a current treaty case involving the
Colvilles'fishing rightsyields a multilayeredportrayalof how, in
this context, Colvilledemandswere effectivelymobilized in avail-
able rightsidioms, yet in terms that restrictedtheir room for ma-
neuverwithin the culturalassumptionsabout race, language,and
identity inscribed in those idioms.
While both case studies involve federal-Indiandisputes over
tribal use of land and natural resources, these essaysmake two
quite different accounts of relationshipsbetween "lawand soci-
ety."The differencesare important,in that it is the particularities
of the disputes the bureaucratic forms and substantive de-
mands in practice that are salient to the authors' analysesand
broader intentions. And the situations of the Yavapaiand the
Colvilles differ culturally,historically,legally and in terms of
the practical immediacies of their grievances. As the authors
make abundantlyclear, understandingthese particularitiesas ir-
reducible complexities in the case studies is essential to appreci-
ating how, in practice, the terminology, concepts, and practices
 Greenhouse 1239

that make up the legal disputesin question shift and circulateas

cultural expressions.
In their different contexts and from their different points of
view, then, Espeland and Gooding track the circulation of the
law'ssigns and practices,emphasizingthe perspectivesof Indian
litigants and their supporters.The law'stransformativepower in
relation to Yavapaior Colville people's cultural identity inheres
in the practicaluses to which they put the law's idioms, limits,
and opportunitiesas theirownculturalexpressions.This does not
make these essayscase studies of modernization,legal pluralism,
or cultural change; any of these would presuppose that there is
some a priori entity that can be knownas authenticallyYavapaior
Colville. That is precisely the view of culture that both authors
contest in differentways and that the Yavapaiand Colvillesalso
contest through a legal process built on the premise of primor-
dial bauthenticity. "
Both authors draw parallels between their case studies and
other recent ethnographic reassessmentsof colonialism in and
beyond North America.7Their referencesto these worksindicate
the broadersignificancethey attachto their respectiveprojects
in showing law, evexydaysocial experience, and social science to
be mutuallyimplicatedin specificways.For Espeland,the signifi-
cance of the Yavapaisituationleads her to consider the law'slan-
guage of interestsand the limits of commensurability.For Good-
ing, the wider implications of the study are in the domain of
rights language, and the assumptionsabout nature, culture, and
society inscribed in them. In both case studies as in the wider
literature reassessing colonial experience lexicons of cultural
identityand social process, including legal process, are shown to
travel easily across legal, academic, and evexyday discursive
genres and institutionaldomains and these are also part of the
stoxy.
Espeland's and Gooding's references to collective identities
as cultural constructions"is not to be confused with some pre-
givencollective subjectiveexperience of solidarityor culturalho-
mogeneity,though solidaritiesare part of the stoxythese authors
tell. The term itself bespeaks a determined effort to avoid both
the romantic and racialistmisreadingsof the modern word cul-
ture and, yet, equally important, also to avoid confusing dis-
criminationor disadvantagewith identity. Espeland'sand Good-
ing's approachesto experience through "culturalconstructions"
point to waysin which institutionsof the state are implicated in
subjectiveexperience, as well as to how people whose subjectivi-
tiesare recognized and acknowledgedonly beyond the margins
7 Clifford 1988; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991; Mertz 1988; see also Cooper & Stoler
1989. For specific attention to the law's availability as an idiom of resistance in colonial
andpostcolonial contexts, see Iazarus-Black 1994 and In7nius-Black & Hirsch 1994.
1240 ConstmcdveApproaz:hesto Law, Culture, and Islenffq

of official recognition marshallforces to put their needs foIward

as legal demands.
Yet, the very notion of subjectivityis also (by implication)
repositioned in these works since both authors have rejected a
concept of culture as a bounded collective entity and, presuma-
bly with it, the corollaxynotion of persons as bounded individual
entities. The ethnographic reassessmentsof colonial experience
from which Espeland and Gooding drawsome of their own en-
ergy for reflexive critique emphasize agency and resistance as
fresh startingpoints from which to reread colonial encounters.
In those contexts, as in the preceding articles,the analyiicalrele-
vance of "identity"emerges as socialaction as experience, not as
a representationalspace or, even less, a categoryor type.
It is no more possible to conceive of cultural identity apart
from the arenas of contest in which questions of identity arise
and are perforce answeredsomehowthan it is to imagine Ismene
and Antigone without each other, Creon, or the war that made
the dead man a traitor.In the drama,Antigone's tragedyserves
to illuminate what would otherwise be invisible by virtue of its
taken-for-granted everydayquality,and that is the constructionof
Ismene'sautobiographywithin the premise of her vulnerabilityto
the law. Ismene despairs of preciselywhat Antigone embodies,
that is, the efficacyof her personal agency beyond the terms the
law allows.This situation does not make Ismene's life inevitably
tragic (although it is tragicin the play). It does make her charac-
ter's identity incomprehensible apart from play of power and
force on which it is contingent; she drawsthis contingency her-
self, in her appeal to Antigone to obey the law.
In the world of events, as Espeland and Gooding suggest, a
reference to the culturalconstructionof identities also places in
the foreground the contingencies that link signs of self-recogni-
tion and solidarityto fields of power. "Culturalidentity"is a dy-
namic and composite set of signs by which the potency of cul-
tural solidarity might be registered and confirmed within
pariicularsocial fields and contests by participantsand observers
alike (although not necessarilyin the same way), and incorpo-
rated into narrative,formulationsof agency (e.g., in lawsuits,or
in social science). In this sense, identitycan be said to be subjec-
tive and privatewithout being somehow "interior"or utterlybe-
yond the limits of ethnography;subjectivityand privacyare polit-
ical and legal relations,in these contexts.
More than political,identity is politics in the foregroundings
Espeland and Gooding provide for us. Neither construals nor
structures,"culturalconstructions"(in Espeland'sand Gooding's
pens) connect social inquiryto legal and local processes as well
as to a vital mythos of selves, persons, and groups. Never the re-
ciprocal of deconstruction,the "culturalconstruction of identi-
ties"in these articlesrefers to a doubling of the registersin which
 Greenhouse 1241

human experience can be felt, known,and recorded by both par-

ticipants and social scientists.The two registersare in the world
of events and in an imagined world of pure, yet still social, free-
dom. In Antigone, these two worlds and the connecting "space"
between them is figured in the two sisters. Crucially,both worlds
are on stage; otherwisethe connection between the play'saction
and the one of justice would be lost. In the world of events, as
Espelandand Gooding portrayit, the horizon between the world
of events and the imaginaxyworld of pure freedom materializes
as demands for justice before the law, and as cultural analysis.
And, as in Antigone,the light from that horizon is well within our
field of vision, illuminatingthe action. bCulturalconstructions,"
then, markconceptual sites where the empirical,interpretive,re-
flexive and reformistdimensions of social inquity are inextrica-
blyjoined.
As in relation to Antigone, if we can talk about cultural con-
structionsin real life, it is not to imply that some things are not
cultural constructions,but to garner some means of registering
the social effects positive,negative,and ambiguous of individ-
ual and collective agency in a highly uncertain world. The foot-
ing under "culturalconstructions"is neither "natural"nor "au-
thentic" (as some usageswould seem to imply), but the possibility
of justice and the promise of change a mythicfreedom without
which the world of events would be inconceivable as a stage for
social analysis, its powers unnameable. Cultural construciions
might peld others, but there is no escaping them altogether, any
more than Antigone could escape from the stage, or we can van-
ish into the mythic realm of freedom that makes social science
thinkable and relevant.

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