Why Anything? Why This?

Derek Parfit

Why does the Universe exist? There are two questions here.
First, why is there a Universe at all? It might have been true
that nothing ever existed: no living beings, no stars, no atoms,
not even space or time. When we think about this possibility,
it can seem astonishing that anything exists. Second, why does
this Universe exist? Things might have been, in countless
ways, different. So why is the Universe as it is?

These questions, some believe, may have causal answers.

Suppose first that the Universe has always existed. Some
believe that, if all events were caused by earlier events,
everything would be explained. That, however, is not so.
Even an infinite series of events cannot explain itself. We
could ask why this series occurred, rather than some other
series, or no series. Of the supporters of the Steady State
Theory, some welcomed what they took to be this theory’s
atheistic implications. They assumed that, if the Universe had
no beginning, there would be nothing for a Creator to explain.
But there would still be an eternal Universe to explain.

Suppose next that the Universe is not eternal, since nothing

preceded the Big Bang. That first event, some physicists
suggest, may have obeyed the laws of quantum mechanics, by
being a random fluctuation in a vacuum. This would causally
explain, they say, how the Universe came into existence out of
nothing. But what physicists call a vacuum isn’t really
nothing. We can ask why it exists, and has the potentialities it
does. In Hawking’s phrase, ‘What breathes fire into the
equations?’

Similar remarks apply to all suggestions of these kinds.

There could not be a causal explanation of why the Universe
exists, why there are any laws of nature, or why these laws are
as they are. Nor would it make a difference if there is a God,
who caused the rest of the Universe to exist. There could not
be a causal explanation of why God exists.
 Many people have assumed that, since these questions cannot
have causal answers, they cannot have any answers. Some
therefore dismiss these questions, thinking them not worth
considering. Others conclude that they do not make sense.
They assume that, as Wittgenstein wrote, ‘doubt can exist only
where there is a question; and a question only where there is an
answer’.

These assumptions are all, I believe, mistaken. Even if these

questions could not have answers, they would still make sense,
and they would still be worth considering. I am reminded
here of the aesthetic category of the sublime, as applied to the
highest mountains, raging oceans, the night sky, the interiors of
some cathedrals, and other things that are superhuman,
awesome, limitless. No question is more sublime than why
there is a Universe: why there is anything rather than nothing.
Nor should we assume that answers to this question must be
causal. And, even if reality cannot be fully explained, we may
still make progress, since what is inexplicable may become less
baffling than it now seems.

1
One apparent fact about reality has recently been much
discussed. Many physicists believe that, for life to be possible,
various features of the Universe must be almost precisely as
they are. As one example of such a feature, we can take the
initial conditions in the Big Bang. If these conditions had been
more than very slightly different, these physicists claim, the
Universe would not have had the complexity that allows living
beings to exist. Why were these conditions so precisely
right?1

Some say: ‘If they had not been right, we couldn’t even ask this
question.’ But that is no answer. It could be baffling how we
survived some crash even though, if we hadn’t, we could not
be baffled.

1In my remarks about this question, I am merely summarizing, and

oversimplifying, what others have claimed. See, for example, John Leslie,
Universes, Routledge, 1989.

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Others say: ‘There had to be some initial conditions, and the
conditions that make life possible were as likely as any others.
So there is nothing to be explained.’ To see what is wrong
with this reply, we must distinguish two kinds of case.
Suppose first that, when some radio telescope is aimed at most
points in space, it records a random sequence of incoming
waves. There might be nothing here that needed to be
explained. Suppose next that, when the telescope is aimed in
one direction, it records a sequence of waves whose pulses
match the number π, in binary notation, to the first ten
thousand digits. That particular number is, in one sense, just
as likely as any other. But there would be something here that
needed to be explained. Though each long number is unique,
only a very few are, like π, mathematically special. What
would need to be explained is why this sequence of waves
exactly matched such a special number. Though this
matching might be a coincidence, which had been randomly
produced, that would be most unlikely. We could be almost
certain that these waves had been produced by some kind of
intelligence.

On the view that we are now considering, since any sequence

of waves is as likely as any other, there would be nothing to be
explained. If we accepted this view, intelligent beings
elsewhere in space would not be able to communicate with us,
since we would ignore their messages. Nor could God reveal
himself. Suppose that, with some optical telescope, we saw a
distant pattern of stars which spelled out in Hebrew script the
first chapter of Genesis. This pattern of stars, according to this
view, would not need to be explained. That is clearly false.

Here is another analogy. Suppose first that, of a thousand

people facing death, only one can be rescued. If there is a
lottery to pick this one survivor, and I win, I would be very
lucky. But there might be nothing here that needed to be
explained. Someone had to win, and why not me? Consider
next another lottery. Unless my gaoler picks the longest of a
thousand straws, I shall be shot. If my gaoler picks that
longest straw, there would be something to be explained. It
would not be enough to say, ‘This result was as likely as any
other.’ In the first lottery, nothing special happened: whatever
the result, someone’s life would be saved. In this second
lottery, the result was special, since, of the thousand possible
results, only one would save a life. Why was this special result

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also what happened? Though this might be a coincidence, the
chance of that is only one in a thousand. I could be almost
certain that, like Dostoyevsky’s mock execution, this lottery
was rigged.

The Big Bang, it seems, was like this second lottery. For life to
be possible, the initial conditions had to be selected with great
accuracy. This appearance of fine-tuning, as some call it, also
needs to be explained.

It may be objected that, in regarding conditions as special if

they allow for life, we unjustifiably assume our own
importance. But life is special, if only because of its
complexity. An earthworm’s brain is more complicated than
a lifeless galaxy. Nor is it only life that requires this fine-
tuning. If the Big Bang’s initial conditions had not been almost
precisely as they were, the Universe would have either almost
instantly recollapsed, or expanded so fast, and with particles so
thinly spread, that not even stars or heavy elements could have
formed. That is enough to make these conditions very special.

It may next be objected that these conditions cannot be claimed

to be improbable, since such a claim requires a statistical basis,
and there is only one Universe. If we were considering all
conceivable Universes, it would indeed be implausible to make
judgments of statistical probability. But our question is much
narrower. We are asking what would have happened if, with
the same laws of nature, the initial conditions had been
different. That provides the basis for a statistical judgment.
There is a range of values that these conditions might have had,
and physicists can work out in what proportion of this range
the resulting Universe could have contained stars, heavy
elements, and life.

This proportion, it is claimed, is extremely small. Of the range

of possible initial conditions, fewer than one in a billion billion
would have produced a Universe with the complexity that
allows for life. If this claim is true, as I shall here assume,
there is something that cries out to be explained. Why was
one of this tiny set also the one that actually obtained?

On one view, this was a mere coincidence. That is

conceivable, since coincidences happen. But this view is hard
to believe since, if it were true, the chance of this coincidence
occurring would be below one in a billion billion.

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Others say: ‘The Big Bang was fine-tuned. In creating the
Universe, God chose to make life possible.’ Atheists may reject
this answer, thinking it improbable that God exists. But this is
not as improbable as the view that would require so great a
coincidence. So even atheists should admit that, of these two
answers to our question, the answer that invokes God is more
likely to be true.

This reasoning revives one of the traditional arguments for

belief in God. In its strongest form, this argument appealed to
the many features of animals, such as eyes or wings, that look
as if they have been designed. Paley’s appeal to such features
much impressed Darwin when he was young. Darwin later
undermined this form of the argument, since evolution can
explain this appearance of design. But evolution cannot
explain the appearance of fine-tuning in the Big Bang.

This argument’s appeal to probabilities can be challenged in a

different way. In claiming it to be most improbable that this
fine-tuning was a coincidence, the argument assumes that, of
the possible initial conditions in the Big Bang, each was equally
likely to obtain. That assumption may be mistaken. The
conditions that allow for complexity and life may have been,
compared with all the others, much more likely to obtain.
Perhaps they were even certain to obtain.

To answer this objection, we must broaden this argument’s

conclusion. If these life-allowing conditions were either very
likely or certain to obtain, then – as the argument claims – it
would be no coincidence that the Universe allows for
complexity and life. But this fine-tuning might have been the
work, not of some existing being, but of some impersonal force,
or fundamental law. That is what some theists believe God to
be.

A stronger challenge to this argument comes from a different

way to explain the appearance of fine-tuning. Consider first a
similar question. For life to be possible on the Earth, many of
the Earth’s features have to be close to being as they are. The
Earth’s having such features, it might be claimed, is unlikely to
be a coincidence, and should therefore be regarded as God’s
work. But such an argument would be weak. The Universe,
we can reasonably believe, contains many planets, with
varying conditions. We should expect that, on a few of these

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planets, conditions would be just right for life. Nor is it
surprising that we live on one of these few.

Things are different, we may assume, with the appearance of

fine-tuning in the Big Bang. While there are likely to be many
other planets, there is only one Universe. But this difference
may be less than it seems. Some physicists suggest that the
observable Universe is only one out of many different worlds,
which are all equally parts of reality. According to one such
view, the other worlds are related to ours in a way that solves
some of the mysteries of quantum physics. On the different
and simpler view that is relevant here, the other worlds have
the same laws of nature as our world, and they are produced
by Big Bangs that are broadly similar, except in having
different initial conditions.

On this Many Worlds Hypothesis, there is no need for fine-

tuning. If there were enough Big Bangs, we should expect
that, in a few of these, conditions would be just right to allow
for complexity and life; and it would be no surprise that our
Big Bang was one of these few. To illustrate this point, we
can revise my second lottery. Suppose my gaoler picks a
straw, not once, but very many times. That would explain his
managing, once, to pick the longest straw, without that being
an extreme coincidence, or this lottery’s being rigged.

On most versions of the Many Worlds Hypothesis, these many

worlds are not, except through their origins, causally related.
Some object that, since our world could not be causally affected
by such other worlds, we can have no evidence for their
existence, and can therefore have no reason to believe in them.
But we do have such a reason, since their existence would
explain an otherwise puzzling feature of our world: the
appearance of fine-tuning.

Of these two ways to explain this appearance, which is better?

Compared with belief in God, the Many Worlds Hypothesis is
more cautious, since its claim is merely that there is more of the
kind of reality that we can observe around us. But God’s
existence has been claimed to be intrinsically more probable.
According to most theists, God is a being who is omnipotent,
omniscient, and wholly good. The uncaused existence of such
a being has been claimed to be simpler, and less arbitrary, than
the uncaused existence of many highly complicated worlds.

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And simpler hypotheses, many scientists assume, are more
likely to be true.

If such a God exists, however, other features of our world

become hard to explain. It may not be surprising that God
chose to make life possible. But the laws of nature could have
been different, so there are many possible worlds that would
have contained life. It is hard to understand why, out of all
these possibilities, God chose to create our world. What is
most baffling is the problem of evil. There appears to be
suffering which any good person, knowing the truth, would
have prevented if he could. If there is such suffering, there
cannot be a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly
good.

To this problem, theists have proposed several solutions.

Some suggest that God is not omnipotent, or not wholly good.
Others suggest that undeserved suffering is not, as it seems,
bad, or that God could not prevent such suffering without
making the Universe, as a whole, less good.

We must ignore these suggestions here, since we have larger

questions to consider. I began by asking why things are as
they are. Before returning to that question, we should ask how
things are. There is much about our world that we have not
discovered. And, just as there may be other worlds that are
like ours, there may be worlds that are very different.

2
It will help to distinguish two kinds of possibilities. Cosmic
possibilities cover everything that ever exists, and are the
different ways that the whole of reality might be. Only one
such possibility can be actual, or be the one that obtains.
Local possibilities are the different ways that some part of
reality, or local world, might be. If some local world exists,
that leaves it open whether other worlds exist.

One cosmic possibility is, roughly, that every possible local

world exists. This we can call the All Worlds Hypothesis.
Another possibility, which might have obtained, is that nothing
ever exists. This we can call the Null Possibility. In each of
the remaining possibilities, the number of local worlds that

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exist is between none and all. There are countless of these
possibilities, since there are countless combinations of possible
local worlds.

Of these different cosmic possibilities, one must obtain, and

only one can obtain. So we have two questions: Which
obtains, and Why?

These questions are connected. If some possibility would be

easier to explain, we may have more reason to believe that this
possibility obtains. This is how, rather than believing in only
one Big Bang, we have more reason to believe in many.
Whether we believe in one or many, we have the question why
any Big Bang has occurred. Though this question is hard, the
occurrence of many Big Bangs is not more puzzling than the
occurrence of only one. Most kinds of thing, or event, have
many instances. We also have the question why, in the Big
Bang that produced our world, the initial conditions allowed
for complexity and life. If there has been only one Big Bang,
this fact is also hard to explain, since it is most unlikely that
these conditions merely happened to be right. If instead there
have been many Big Bangs, this fact is easy to explain, since it
is like the fact that, among countless planets, there are some
whose conditions allow for life. Since belief in many Big
Bangs leaves less that is unexplained, it is the better view.

If some cosmic possibilities would be less puzzling than others,

because their obtaining would leave less to be explained, is
there some possibility whose obtaining would be in no way
puzzling?

Consider first the Null Possibility, in which nothing ever exists.

To imagine this possibility, it may help to suppose first that all
that ever existed was a single atom. We then imagine that
even this atom never existed.

Some have claimed that, if there had never been anything,

there wouldn’t have been anything to be explained. But that
is not so. When we imagine how things would have been if
nothing had ever existed, what we should imagine away are
such things as living beings, stars, and atoms. There would
still have been various truths, such as the truth that there were
no stars or atoms, or that 9 is divisible by 3. We can ask why
these things would have been true. And such questions may

8
have answers. Thus we can explain why, even if nothing had
ever existed, 9 would still have been divisible by 3. There is
no conceivable alternative. And we can explain why there
would have been no such things as immaterial matter, or
spherical cubes. Such things are logically impossible. But
why would nothing have existed? Why would there have
been no stars or atoms, no philosophers or bluebell woods?

We should not claim that, if nothing had ever existed, there

would have been nothing to be explained. But we can claim
something less. Of all the cosmic possibilities, the Null
Possibility would have needed the least explanation. As
Leibniz pointed out, it is much the simplest, and the least
arbitrary. And it is the easiest to understand. It can seem
mysterious, for example, how things could exist without their
existence having some cause, but there cannot be a causal
explanation of why the whole Universe, or God, exists. The
Null Possibility raises no such problem. If nothing had ever
existed, that state of affairs would not have needed to be
caused.

Reality, however, does not take its least puzzling form. In

some way or other, a Universe has managed to exist. That is
what can take one’s breath away. As Wittgenstein wrote, ‘not
how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.’ Or, in the
words of a thinker as unmystical as Jack Smart: ‘That anything
should exist at all does seem to me a matter for the deepest
awe.’

Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, on which every

possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this
may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling
possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as – though it
includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis. On that more
cautious view, the many other worlds have the same elements
as our world, and the same fundamental laws, and differ only
in such features as their constants and initial conditions. The
All Worlds Hypothesis covers every conceivable kind of world,
and most of these other worlds would have very different
elements and laws.

If all these worlds exist, we can ask why they do. But,
compared with most other cosmic possibilities, the All Worlds
Hypothesis may leave less that is unexplained. For example,

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whatever the number of possible worlds that exist, we have the
question, ‘Why that number?’ That question would have been
least puzzling if the number that existed were none, and the
next least arbitrary possibility seems to be that all these worlds
exist. With every other cosmic possibility, we have a further
question. If ours is the only world, we can ask: ‘Out of all the
possible local worlds, why is this the one that exists?’ On any
version of the Many Worlds Hypothesis, we have a similar
question: ‘Why do just these worlds exist, with these elements
and laws?’ But, if all these worlds exist, there is no such
further question.

It may be objected that, even if all possible local worlds exist,

that does not explain why our world is as it is. But that is a
mistake. If all these worlds exist, each world is as it is in the
way in which each number is as it is. We cannot sensibly ask
why 9 is 9. Nor should we ask why our world is the one it is:
why it is this world. That would be like asking, ‘Why are we
who we are?’, or ‘Why is it now the time that it is?’ Those, on
reflection, are not good questions.

Though the All Worlds Hypothesis avoids certain questions, it

is not as simple, or unarbitrary, as the Null Possibility. There
may be no sharp distinction between worlds that are and are
not possible. It is unclear what counts as a kind of world.
And, if there are infinitely many kinds, there is a choice
between different kinds of infinity.

Whichever cosmic possibility obtains, we can ask why it

obtains. All that I have claimed so far is that, with some
possibilities, this question would be less puzzling. Let us now
ask: Could this question have an answer? Might there be a
theory that leaves nothing unexplained?

3
It is sometimes claimed that God, or the Universe, make
themselves exist. But this cannot be true, since these entities
cannot do anything unless they exist.

On a more intelligible view, it is logically necessary that God,

or the Universe, exist, since the claim that they might not have

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existed leads to a contradiction. On such a view, though it
may seem conceivable that there might never have been
anything, that is not really logically possible. Some people
even claim that there may be only one coherent cosmic
possibility. Thus Einstein suggested that, if God created our
world, he might have had no choice about which world to
create. If such a view were true, everything might be
explained. Reality might be the way it is because there was no
conceivable alternative. But, for reasons that have been often
given, we can reject such views.

Consider next a quite different view. According to Plato,

Plotinus and others, the Universe exists because its existence is
good. Even if we are confident that we should reject this
view, it is worth asking whether it makes sense. If it does, that
may suggest other possibilities.

This Axiarchic View can take a theistic form. It can claim that
God exists because his existence is good, and that the rest of the
Universe exists because God caused it to exist. But in that
explanation God, qua Creator, is redundant. If God can exist
because his existence is good, so can the whole Universe. This
may be why some theists reject the Axiarchic View, and insist
that God’s existence is a brute fact, with no explanation.

In its simplest form, this view makes three claims:

(1) It would be best if reality were a certain way.

(2) Reality is that way.

(3) (1) explains (2).

(1) is an ordinary evaluative claim, like the claim that it would

be better if there was less suffering. The Axiarchic View
assumes, I believe rightly, that such claims can be in a strong
sense true. (2) is an ordinary empirical or scientific claim,
though of a sweeping kind. What is distinctive in this view is
claim (3), according to which (1) explains (2).

Can we understand this third claim? To focus on this

question, we should briefly ignore the world’s evils, and
suspend our other doubts about claims (1) and (2). We should
suppose that, as Leibniz claimed, the best possible Universe

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exists. Would it then make sense to claim that this Universe
exists because it is the best?

That use of ‘because’, Axiarchists should admit, cannot be

easily explained. But even ordinary causation is mysterious.
At the most fundamental level, we have no idea why some
events cause others; and it is hard to explain what causation is.
There are, moreover, non-causal senses of ‘because’ and ‘why’,
as in the claim that God exists because his existence is logically
necessary. We can understand that claim, even if we think it
false. The Axiarchic View is harder to understand. But that
is not surprising. If there is some explanation of the whole of
reality, we should not expect this explanation to fit neatly into
some familiar category. This extra-ordinary question may
have an extra-ordinary answer. We should reject suggested
answers which make no sense; but we should also try to see
what might make sense.

Axiarchy might be expressed as follows. We are now

supposing that, of all the countless ways that the whole of
reality might be, one is both the very best, and is the way that
reality is. On the Axiarchic View, that is no coincidence. This
claim, I believe, makes sense. And, if it were no coincidence
that the best way for reality to be is also the way that reality is,
that might support the further claim that this was why reality
was this way.

This view has one advantage over the more familiar theistic
view. An appeal to God cannot explain why the Universe
exists, since God would himself be part of the Universe, or one
of the things that exist. Some theists argue that, since nothing
can exist without some cause, God, who is the First Cause,
must exist. As Schopenhauer objected, this argument’s
premise is not like some cab-driver whom theists are free to
dismiss once they have reached their destination. The
Axiarchic View appeals, not to an existing entity, but to an
explanatory law. Since such a law would not itself be part of
the Universe, it might explain why the Universe exists, and is
as good as it could be. If such a law governed reality, we
could still ask why it did, or why the Axiarchic View was true.
But, in discovering this law, we would have made some
progress.

It is hard, however, to believe the Axiarchic View. If, as it

12
seems, there is much pointless suffering, our world cannot be
part of the best possible Universe.

4
Some Axiarchists claim that, if we reject their view, we must
regard our world’s existence as a brute fact, since no other
explanation could make sense. But that, I believe, is not so. If
we abstract from the optimism of the Axiarchic View, its claims
are these:

Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one both has some

very special feature, and is the possibility that obtains.
That is no coincidence. This possibility obtains because
it has this feature.

Other views can make such claims. This special feature need
not be that of being best. Thus, on the All Worlds Hypothesis,
reality is maximal, or as full as it could be. Similarly, if
nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal, or
as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were
either maximal, or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would
be most unlikely to be a coincidence. And that might support
the further claim that this possibility’s having this feature
would be why it obtained.

Let us now look more closely at that last step. When it is no

coincidence that two things are both true, there is something
that explains why, given the truth of one, the other is also true.
The truth of either might make the other true. Or both might
be explained by some third truth, as when two facts are the
joint effects of a common cause.

Suppose next that, of the cosmic possibilities, one is both very

special and is the one that obtains. If that is no coincidence,
what might explain why these things are both true? On the
reasoning that we are now considering, the first truth explains
the second, since this possibility obtains because it has this
special feature. Given the kind of truths these are, such an
explanation could not go the other way. This possibility could
not have this feature because it obtains. If some possibility
has some feature, it could not fail to have this feature, so it
would have this feature whether or not it obtains. The All

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Worlds Hypothesis, for example, could not fail to describe the
fullest way for reality to be.

While it is necessary that our imagined possibility has its

special feature, it is not necessary that this possibility obtains.
This difference, I believe, justifies the reasoning that we are
now considering. Since this possibility must have this feature,
but might not have obtained, it cannot have this feature
because it obtains, nor could some third truth explain why it
both has this feature and obtains. So, if these facts are no
coincidence, this possibility must obtain because it has this
feature.

When some possibility obtains because it has some feature, its

having this feature may be why some agent, or some process of
natural selection, made it obtain. These we can call the
intentional and evolutionary ways in which some feature of
some possibility may explain why it obtains.

Our world, theists claim, can be explained in the first of these

ways. If reality were as good as it could be, it would indeed
make sense to claim that this was partly God’s work. But,
since God’s own existence could not be God’s work, there
could be no intentional explanation of why the whole of reality
was as good as it could be. So we could reasonably conclude
that this way’s being the best explained directly why reality
was this way. Even if God exists, the intentional explanation
could not compete with the different and bolder explanation
offered by the Axiarchic View.

Return now to other explanations of this kind. Consider first

the Null Possibility. This, we know, does not obtain; but, since
we are asking what makes sense, that does not matter. If
there had never been anything, would that have had to be a
brute fact, which had no explanation? The answer, I suggest,
is No. It might have been no coincidence that, of all the
countless cosmic possibilities, what obtained was the simplest,
and least arbitrary, and the only possibility in which nothing
ever exists. And, if these facts had been no coincidence, this
possibility would have obtained because – or partly because –
it had one or more of these special features. This explanation,
moreover, could not have taken an intentional or evolutionary
form. If nothing had ever existed, there could not have been
some agent, or process of selection, who or which made this

14
possibility obtain. Its being the simplest or least arbitrary
possibility would have been, directly, why it obtained.

Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, which may obtain. If

reality is as full as it could be, is that a coincidence? Does it
merely happen to be true that, of all the cosmic possibilities, the
one that obtains is at this extreme? As before, that is
conceivable, but this coincidence would be too great to be
credible. We can reasonably assume that, if this possibility
obtains, that is because it is maximal, or at this extreme. On
this Maximalist View, it is a fundamental truth that being
possible, and part of the fullest way that reality could be, is
sufficient for being actual. That is the highest law governing
reality. As before, if such a law governed reality, we could
still ask why it did. But, in discovering this law, we would
have made some progress.

Here is another special feature. Perhaps reality is the way it is

because its fundamental laws are, on some criterion, as
mathematically beautiful as they could be. That is what some
physicists are inclined to believe.

As these remarks suggest, there is no clear boundary here

between philosophy and science. If there is such a highest law
governing reality, this law is of the same kind as those that
physicists are trying to discover. When we appeal to natural
laws to explain some features of reality, such as the relations
between light, gravity, space, and time, we are not giving
causal explanations, since we are not claiming that one part of
reality caused another part to be some way. What such laws
explain, or partly explain, are the deeper facts about reality that
causal explanations take for granted.

There would be a highest law, of the kind that I have sketched,

if some cosmic possibility obtained because it had some special
feature. This feature we can call the Selector. If there is more
than one such feature, they are all partial Selectors. Just as
there are various cosmic possibilities, there are various
explanatory possibilities. For each of these special features,
there is the explanatory possibility that this feature is the
Selector, or is one of the Selectors. Reality would then be the
way it is because, or partly because, this way had this feature.

There is one other explanatory possibility: that there is no

Selector. If that is true, it is random that reality is as it is.

15
Events may be in one sense random, even though they are
causally inevitable. That is how it is random whether a
meteorite strikes the land or the sea. Events are random in a
stronger sense if they have no cause. That is what most
physicists believe about some features of events involving sub-
atomic particles. If it is random what reality is like, the
Universe not only has no cause. It has no explanation of any
kind. This claim we can call the Brute Fact View.

Few features can be plausibly regarded as possible Selectors.

Though plausibility is a matter of degree, there is a natural
threshold to which we can appeal. If we suppose that reality
has some special feature, we can ask which of two beliefs
would be more credible: that reality merely happens to have
this feature, or that reality is the way it is because this way has
this feature. If the second would be more credible, this feature
can be called a credible Selector. Return for example to the
question of how many possible local worlds exist. Of the
different answers to this question, all and none give us, I have
claimed, credible Selectors. If either all or no worlds existed,
that would be unlikely to be a coincidence. But suppose that
58 worlds existed. This number has some special features,
such as being the smallest number that is the sum of seven
different primes. It may be just conceivable that this would be
why 58 worlds existed; but it would be more reasonable to
believe that the number that existed merely happened to be 58.

There are, I have claimed, some credible Selectors. Reality

might be some way because that way is the best, or the
simplest, or the least arbitrary, or because its obtaining makes
reality as full and varied as it could be, or because its
fundamental laws are, in some way, as elegant as they could
be. Presumably there are other such features, which I have
overlooked.

In claiming that there are credible Selectors, I am assuming that

some cosmic and explanatory possibilities are more probable
than others. That assumption may be questioned. Judgments
of probability, it may again be claimed, must be grounded on
facts about our world, so such judgments cannot be applied
either to how the whole of reality might be, or to how reality
might be explained.

This objection is, I believe, unsound. When we choose

between scientific theories, our judgments of their probability

16
cannot rest only on predictions based on established facts and
laws. We need such judgments in trying to decide what these
facts and laws are. And we can justifiably make such
judgments when considering different ways in which the
whole of reality may be, or might have been. Compare two
such cosmic possibilities. In the first, there is a lifeless
Universe consisting only of some spherical iron stars, whose
relative motion is as it would be in our world. In the second,
things are the same, except that the stars move together in the
patterns of a minuet, and they are shaped like either Queen
Victoria or Cary Grant. We would be right to claim that, of
these two possibilities, the first is more likely to obtain.

In making that claim, we would not mean that it is more likely

that the first possibility obtains. Since this possibility is the
existence of a lifeless Universe, we know that it does not obtain.
We would be claiming that this possibility is intrinsically more
likely, or that, to put it roughly, it had a greater chance of being
how reality is. If some possibility is more likely to obtain,
that will often make it more likely that it obtains; but though
one kind of likelihood supports the other, they are quite
different.

Another objection may again seem relevant here. Of the

countless cosmic possibilities, a few have special features,
which I have called credible Selectors. If such a possibility
obtains, we have, I have claimed, a choice of two conclusions.
Either reality, by an extreme coincidence, merely happens to
have this feature, or---more plausibly---this feature is one of the
Selectors. It may be objected that, when I talk of an extreme
coincidence, I must be assuming that these cosmic possibilities
are all equally likely to obtain. But I have now rejected that
assumption. And, if these possibilities are not equally likely,
my reasoning may seem to be undermined.

As before, that is not so. Suppose that, of the cosmic

possibilities, those that have these special features are much
more likely to obtain. As this objection rightly claims, it
would not then be amazing if such a possibility merely
happened to obtain. But that does not undermine my
reasoning, since it is another way of stating my conclusion. It
is another way of saying that these features are Selectors.

These remarks do show, however, that we should distinguish

two ways in which some feature may be a Selector.

17
Probabilistic Selectors make some cosmic possibility more
likely to obtain, but leave it open whether it does obtain. On
any plausible view, there are some Selectors of this kind, since
some ways for reality to be are intrinsically more likely than
some others. Thus of our two imagined Universes, the one
consisting of spherical stars is intrinsically more likely than the
one with stars that are shaped like Queen Victoria or Cary
Grant. Besides Probabilistic Selectors, there may also be one
or more Effective Selectors. If some possibility has a certain
feature, this may make this possibility, not merely intrinsically
more likely, but the one that obtains. Thus, if simplicity had
been the Effective Selector, that would have made it true that
nothing ever existed. And, if maximality is the Effective
Selector, as it may be, that is what makes reality as full as it
could be. When I talk of Selectors, these are the kind I mean.

5
There are, then, various cosmic and explanatory possibilities.
In trying to decide which of these obtain, we can in part appeal
to facts about our world. Thus, from the mere fact that our
world exists, we can deduce that the Null Possibility does not
obtain. And, since our world seems to contain pointless evils,
we have reason to reject the Axiarchic View.

Consider next the Brute Fact View, on which reality merely

happens to be as it is. No facts about our world could refute
this view. But some facts would make it less likely that this
view is true. If reality is randomly selected, what we should
expect to exist are many varied worlds, none of which had
features that, in the range of possibilities, were at one extreme.
That is what we should expect because, in much the largest set
of cosmic possibilities, that would be what exists. If our world
has very special features, that would count against the Brute
Fact View.

Return now to the question whether God exists. Compared

with the uncaused existence of one or many complicated
worlds, the hypothesis that God exists has been claimed to be
simpler, and less arbitrary, and thus more likely to be true.
But this hypothesis is not simpler than the Brute Fact View.
And, if it is random which cosmic possibility obtains, we
should not expect the one that obtains to be as simple, and

18
unarbitrary, as God’s existence is claimed to be. Rather, as I
have just said, we should expect there to be many worlds, none
of which had very special features. Ours may be the kind of
world that, on the Brute Fact View, we should expect to
observe.

Similar remarks apply to the All Worlds Hypothesis. Few

facts about our world could refute this view; but, if all possible
local worlds exist, the likely character of our world is much the
same as on the Brute Fact View. That claim may seem
surprising, given the difference between these two views.
One view is about which cosmic possibility obtains, the other is
about why the one that obtains obtains. And these views
conflict, since, if we knew that either view was true, we would
have strong reason not to believe the other. If all possible
worlds exist, that is unlikely to be a brute fact. But, in their
different ways, these views are both non-selective. On neither
view do certain worlds exist because they have certain special
features. So, if either view is true, we should not expect our
world to have such features.

To that last claim, there is one exception. This is the feature

with which we began: that our world allows for life. Though
this feature is, in some ways, special, it is one that we cannot
help observing. That restricts what we can infer from the fact
that our world has this feature. Rather than claiming that
being life-allowing is one of the Selectors, we can appeal to
some version of the Many Worlds Hypothesis. If there are
very many worlds, we would expect a few worlds to be life-
allowing, and our world is bound to bee one of these few.

Consider next other kinds of special feature: ones that we are

not bound to observe. Suppose we discover that our world
has such a feature, and we ask whether that is no coincidence.
It may again be said that, if there are many worlds, we would
expect a few worlds to have this special feature. But that
would not explain why that is true of our world. We could not
claim – as with the feature of being life-allowing – that our
world is bound to have this feature. So the appeal to many
worlds could not explain away the coincidence. Suppose, for
example, that our world were very good, or were wholly law-
governed, or had very simple natural laws. Those facts would
count against both of the unselective views: both the All
Worlds Hypothesis and the Brute Fact View. It is true that, if

19
all worlds exist, or there are very many randomly selected
worlds, we should expect a few worlds to be very good, or
wholly law-governed, or to have very simple laws. But that
would not explain why our world had those features. So we
would have some reason to believe that our world is the way it
is because this way has those features.

Does our world have such features: ones that count against the
unselective views? Our world’s moral character seems not to
count against these views, since it seems the mixture of good
and bad that, on the unselective views, we should expect. But
our world may have the other two features: being wholly law-
governed, and having very simple laws. Neither feature
seems to be required in order for life to be possible. And,
among possible life-containing worlds, a far greater range
would not have these features. Thus, for each law-governed
world, there are countless variants that would fail in different
ways to be wholly law-governed. And, compared with simple
laws, there is a far greater range of complicated laws. So, on
both the unselective views, we should not expect our world to
have these features. If it has them, as physicists might
discover, that would give us reasons to reject both the All
Worlds Hypothesis and the Brute Fact View. We would
have some reason to believe that there are at least two partial
Selectors: being law-governed and having simple laws.

There may be other features of our world from which we can

try to infer what reality is like, and why. But observation can
take us only part of the way. If we can get further, that will
have to be by pure reasoning.

6
Of those who accept the Brute Fact View, many assume that it
must be true. According to these people, though reality
merely happens to be some way, that it merely happens to be
some way does not merely happen to be true. There could
not be an explanation of why reality is the way it is, since there
could not be a causal explanation, and no other explanation
would make sense.

20
This assumption, I have argued, is mistaken. Reality might be
the way it is because this way is the fullest, or the most varied,
or obeys the simplest or most elegant laws, or has some other
special feature. Since the Brute Fact View is not the only
explanatory possibility, we should not assume that it must be
true.

When supporters of this view recognize these other

possibilities, they may switch to the other extreme, claiming
that their view’s truth is another brute fact. If that were so, not
only would there be no explanation of reality’s being as it is,
there would also be no explanation of there being no such
explanation. As before, though this might be true, we should
not assume that it must be true. If some explanatory
possibility merely happens to obtain, the one that obtains may
not be the Brute Fact View. If it is randomly selected whether
reality is randomly selected, and there are other possibilities,
random selection may not be selected.

There is, moreover, another way in which some explanatory

possibility may obtain. Rather than merely happening to
obtain, this possibility may have some feature, or set of
features, which explains why it obtains. Such a feature would
be a Selector at a higher level, since it would apply not to
factual but to explanatory possibilities. It would determine,
not that reality be a certain way, but that it be determined in a
certain way how reality is to be.

If the Brute Fact View is true, it may have been selected in this
way. Of the explanatory possibilities, this view seems to
describe the simplest, since its claim is only that reality has no
explanation. This possibility’s being the simplest might make
it the one that obtains. Simplicity may be the higher Selector,
determining that there is no Selector between the ways that
reality might be.

Once again however, though this may be true, we cannot

assume its truth. There may be some other higher Selector.
Some explanatory possibility may obtain, for example, because
it is the least arbitrary, or is the one that explains most. The
Brute Fact View has neither of those features. Or there may be
no higher Selector, since some explanatory possibility may
merely happen to obtain.

21
These alternatives are the different possibilities at yet another,
higher explanatory level. So we have the same two questions:
Which obtains, and Why?

We may now become discouraged. Every answer, it may

seem, raises a further question. But that may not be so.
There may be some answer that is a necessary truth. With
that necessity, our search would end.

Some truth is logically necessary when its denial leads to a

contradiction. It cannot be in this sense necessary either that
reality is a brute fact, or that there is some Selector. Both
these claims can be denied without contradiction.

There are also non-logical necessities. The most familiar,

causal necessity, cannot give us the truth we need. It could not
be causally necessary that reality is, or isn’t, a brute fact.
Causal necessities come lower down. Similar remarks apply to
the necessities involved in the essential properties of particular
things, or natural kinds. Consider next the metaphysical
necessity that some writers claim for God’s existence. That
claim means, they say, that God’s existence does not depend on
anything else, and that nothing else could cause God to cease to
exist. But these claims do not imply that God must exist, and
that makes such necessity too weak to end our questions.

There are, however, some kinds of necessity that would be

strong enough. Consider the truths that undeserved
suffering is bad, and that, if we believe the premises of a sound
argument, we ought rationally to believe this argument’s
conclusion. These truths are not logically necessary, since
their denials would not lead to contradictions. But they could
not have failed to be true. Undeserved suffering does not
merely happen to be bad.

When Leslie defends the Axiarchic View, he appeals to this

kind of non-logical necessity. Not only does value rule reality,
Leslie suggests, it could not have failed to rule. But this
suggestion is hard to believe. While it is inconceivable that
undeserved suffering might have failed to be in itself bad, it is
clearly conceivable that value might have failed to rule, if only
because it seems so clear that value does not rule.

Return now to the Brute Fact View, which is more likely to be

true. If this view is true, could its truth be non-logically

22
necessary? Is it inconceivable that there might have been
some Selector, or highest law, making reality be some way?
The answer, I have claimed, is No. Even if reality is a brute
fact, it might not have been. Thus, if nothing had ever existed,
that might have been no coincidence. Reality might have
been that way because, of the cosmic possibilities, it is the
simplest and least arbitrary. And, as I have also claimed, just
as it is not necessary that the Brute Fact View is true, it is not
necessary that this view’s truth be another brute fact. This
view might be true because it is the simplest of the explanatory
possibilities.

We have not yet found the necessity we need. Reality may

happen to be as it is, or there may be some Selector.
Whichever of these is true, it may happen to be true, or there
may be some higher Selector. These are the different
possibilities at the next explanatory level, so we are back with
our two questions: Which obtains, and Why?

Could these questions continue for ever? Might there be, at

every level, another higher Selector? Consider another version
of the Axiarchic View. Reality might be as good as it could be,
and that might be true because its being true is best, and that in
turn might be true because its being true is best, and so on for
ever. In this way, it may seem, everything might be
explained. But that is not so. Like an infinite series of
events, such a series of explanatory truths could not explain
itself. Even if each truth were made true by the next, we could
still ask why the whole series was true, rather than some other
series, or no series.

The point can be made more simply. Though there might be

some highest Selector, this might not be goodness but some
other feature, such as non-arbitrariness. What could select
between these possibilities? Might goodness be the highest
Selector because that is best, or non-arbitrariness be this
Selector because that is the least arbitrary possibility? Neither
suggestion, I believe, makes sense. Just as God could not
make himself exist, no Selector could make itself the one that,
at the highest level, rules. No Selector could settle whether it
rules, since it cannot settle anything unless it does rule.

If there is some highest Selector, this cannot, I have claimed, be

a necessary truth. Nor could this Selector make itself the
highest. And, since this Selector would be the highest,

23
nothing else could make that true. So we may have found the
necessity we need. If there is some highest Selector, that, I
suggest, must merely happen to be true.

Supporters of the Brute Fact View may now feel vindicated.

Have we not, in the end, accepted their view?

We have not. According to the Brute Fact View, reality merely

happens to be as it is. That, I have argued, may not be true,
since there may be some Selector which explains, or partly
explains, reality’s being as it is. There may also be some
higher Selector which explains there being this Selector. My
suggestion is only that, at the end of any such explanatory
chain, some highest Selector must merely happen to be the one
that rules. That is a different view.

This difference may seem small. No Selector could explain

reality, we may believe, if it merely happened to rule. But this
thought, though natural, is a mistake. If some explanation
appeals to a brute fact, it does not explain that fact; but it may
explain others.

Suppose, for example, that reality is as full as it could be. On

the Brute Fact View, this fact would have no explanation. On
the Maximalist View, reality would be this way because the
highest law is that what is possible is actual. If reality were as
full as it could be, this Maximalist View would be better than
the Brute Fact View, since it would explain reality’s being this
way. And this view would provide that explanation even if it
merely happened to be true. It makes a difference where the
brute fact comes.

Part of the difference here is that, while there are countless

cosmic possibilities, there are few plausible explanatory
possibilities. If reality is as full as it could be, that’s being a
brute fact would be very puzzling. Since there are countless
cosmic possibilities, it would be amazing if the one that
obtained merely happened to be at the maximal extreme. On
the Maximalist View, this fact would be no coincidence. And,
since there are few explanatory possibilities, it would not be
amazing if the Maximalist highest law merely happened to be
the one that rules.

We should not claim that, if some explanation rests on a brute

fact, it is not an explanation. Most scientific explanations take

24
this form. The most that might be true is that such an
explanation is, in a way, merely a better a description.

If that were true, there would be a different defence of the kind

of reasoning that we have been considering. Even to discover
how things are, we need explanations. And we may need
explanations on the grandest scale. Our world may seem to
have some feature that would be unlikely to be a coincidence.
We may reasonably suspect that this feature is the Selector, or
one of the Selectors. That hypothesis might lead us to
confirm that, as it seemed, our world does have this feature.
And that might give us reason to conclude either that ours is
the only world, or that there are other worlds, with the same or
related features. We might thus reach truths about the whole
Universe.

Even if all explanations must end with a brute fact, we should

go on trying to explain why the Universe exists, and is as it is.
The brute fact may not enter at the lowest level. If reality is the
way it is because this way has some feature, to know what
reality is like, we must ask why.

7
We may never be able to answer these questions, either
because our world is only a small part of reality, or because,
though our world is the whole of reality, we could never know
that to be true, or because of our own limitations. But, as I
have tried to show, we may come to see more clearly what the
possible answers are. Some of the fog that shrouds these
questions may then disappear.

It can seem astonishing, for example, how reality could be

made to be as it is. If God made the rest of reality be as it is,
what could have made God exist? And, if God does not exist,
what else could have made reality be as it is? When we think
about these questions, even the Brute Fact View may seem
unintelligible. It may be baffling how reality could be even
randomly selected. What kind of process could select whether,
for example, time had no beginning, or whether anything ever
exists? When, and how, could any selection be made?

25
This is not a real problem. Of all the possible ways that reality
might be, there must be one that is the way reality actually is.
Since it is logically necessary that reality be some way or other,
it is necessary that one way be picked to be the way that reality
is. Logic ensures that, without any kind of process, a selection
is made. There is no need for hidden machinery.

Suppose next that, as many people assume, the Brute Fact View
must be true. If our world has no very special features, there
would then be nothing that was deeply puzzling. If it were
necessary that some cosmic possibility be randomly selected,
while there would be no explanation of why the selection went
as it did, there would be no mystery in reality’s being as it is.
Reality’s features would be inexplicable, but only in the way in
which it is inexplicable how some particle randomly moves.
If a particle can merely happen to move as it does, reality could
merely happen to be as it is. Randomness may even be less
puzzling at the level of the whole Universe, since we know that
facts at this level could not have been caused.

The Brute Fact View, I have argued, is not necessary, and may
not be true. There may be one or more Selectors between the
ways that reality might be, and one or more Selectors between
such Selectors. But, as I have also claimed, it may be a
necessary truth that it be a brute fact whether there are such
Selectors, and, if so, which the highest Selector is.

If that is a necessary truth, similar remarks apply. On these

assumptions, there would again be nothing that was deeply
puzzling. If it is necessary that, of these explanatory
possibilities, one merely happens to obtain, there would be no
explanation of why the one that obtains obtains. But, as
before, that would be no more mysterious than the random
movement of some particle.

The existence of the Universe can seem, in another way,

astonishing. Even if it is not baffling that reality was made to
be some way, since there is no conceivable alternative, it can
seem baffling that the selection went as it did. Why is there a
Universe at all? Why doesn’t reality take its simplest and least
arbitrary form: that in which nothing ever exists?

If we find this astonishing, we are assuming that these features

should be the Selectors: that reality should be as simple and

26
 unarbitrary as it could be. That assumption has, I believe,
great plausibility. But, just as the simplest cosmic possibility is
that nothing ever exists, the simplest explanatory possibility is
that there is no Selector. So we should not expect simplicity at
both the factual and explanatory levels. If there is no Selector,
we should not expect that there would also be no Universe.
That would be an extreme coincidence.2

2Of several discussions of these questions, I owe most to John Leslie's

Value and Existence, (Blackwell, 1979) and to Robert Nozick's
Philosophical Explanations (Oxford, 1981); then to Richard Swinburne's
The Existence of God, (Oxford, 1979), John Mackie's The Miracle of
Theism, (Oxford, 1982), Peter Unger's article in Mid-West Studies in
Philosophy, Volume 9 (1989), and some unpublished work by Stephen
Grover.

27