PEOPLE v. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA.

pdf
Saved to Dropbox • Aug 25, 2021 at 6:05 AM

Cases Laws Notebooks SIGN IN 

 Digest  Add to Casebook  Share

Show opinions
Show as cited by other cases (27 times)
Show printable version with highlights

EN BANC

[ GR NO. 170236, Aug 31, 2006 ]

PEOPLE v. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA +

DECISION
532 Phil. 414

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed
as follows:

On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor, against
her will and consent.

Contrary to law.[1]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his arraignment, appellant,
duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11-year old son
of appellant; Rowena Quiachon, the victim and appellant's daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta.
Romana Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus.

Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however, that he no longer

wanted to use his father's surname describing him as "masama" for raping his
(Rowel's) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used to sleep in the same bedroom
occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling. Rowel slept beside his youngest
sibling while their father, appellant, and Rowena slept together in one bed.

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and
they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's buttocks were moving up and
down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything, however,
because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the room but the following
morning, he, forthwith, told his mother's sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate
Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police
to report what had transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel executed a
sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using the surname Mateo.[2]

Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual intercourse with
her and even touched her breasts against her will. She was only eight years old at the
time. She cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what appellant did to her. She
consistently declared that she does not love her father and wants him to be punished
for what he did to her.[3]

Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital Health Services testified that she received a letter request from the PNP
Crime Laboratory to conduct an examination on Rowena. While she was about to
proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed that Rowena was deaf and mute,
hence, could not verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani proceeded to conduct
a physical examination and, based thereon, she submitted her medico-legal report.

Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a "contusion
hematoma" on her left cheek, which was compatible with her claim that she was
slapped by her father. Rowena also had an "ecchymosis" or "kissmark" at the antero-
lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital injuries suggestive of chronic
penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show any sign of
sexual abuse, when it was opened up, the following were discovered: "markedly
hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis and markedly
hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal
margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation." Further, the labia was
"very red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa
and a very red perineum."[4] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible
with the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have
happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the hymenal
attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock notch.[5]

For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto Quiachon.

He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by their
barangay chairman. He did not know then the reason for the invitation. At the
barangay hall, he was surprised to see the two sisters of his deceased live-in partner
and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his daughter Rowena had accused
him of raping her. Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police Station. He
suffered hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he recovered, he was
taken to the Pasig City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He
denied raping Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both
sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held a grudge against him because he
abandoned his family and was not able to support them. His common-law wife died of
cancer and her relatives were allegedly all interested in his house and other
properties. The said house was being leased and they were the ones getting the rental
income. Further, the nephew of his deceased partner was sending financial support of
US$100 a month for his child.

According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his son Rowel
was already hostile to him because he was closer to his daughters. He disclaimed any
knowledge of any reason why his children, Rowel and Rowena, accused him of a very
serious offense.[6]

After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and defense, the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered its Decision[7] dated
September 9, 2003, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B[8] of the Revised
Penal Code. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH,
including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, PI00,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death penalty
imposed on appellant. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the
case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August 25, 2005, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court. In affirming appellant's conviction, the CA
held that there was no justification to make a finding contrary to that of the trial court
with respect to the credibility of the witnesses. The CA particularly pointed out that
the trial court, after having "meticulously observed" the prosecution witness Rowel
and complainant Rowena, had declared that "their narration palpably bears the
earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material points involved. When the
testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-
examination, and unflawed by an inconsistency or contradiction as in the present
case, the same must be given full faith and credit."[12]

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena recounting the
bestial act perpetrated by appellant on the latter were corroborated by physical
evidence as presented by Dr. Guialani in her medico-legal report.

On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a bare denial. On
this matter, it applied the salutary rule that denial is not looked upon with favor by
the court as it is capable of easy fabrication. Consequently, the CA held that
appellant's bare denial could not overcome the categorical testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, including Rowena, the victim herself.

The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so grave as rape
against her father because "it is very unlikely for any young woman in her right mind
to fabricate a story of defloration against her own father, undergo a medical
examination of her private parts, and subject herself to the trauma and scandal of
public trial, put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well unless she was
motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her."[13]

In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and in imposing the supreme penalty
of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated September 10, 2001, the prosecution
and the defense agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;
2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and
3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]

According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her
relationship to the offender were alleged in the Information and were duly proved
during trial. These circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim and her relationship to
appellant, are special qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape that warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

The CA, however, modified the trial court's decision with respect to the damages
awarded to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The decretal portion of the CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 120929-H finding the
accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y Bayona guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape and imposing upon him the DEATH penalty is AFFIRMED,
 with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the
victim, Rowena Quiachon, the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as
moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004,
amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let
the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[15]

In this Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were required to
submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General
manifested that it would no longer be filing a supplemental brief. Similarly, appellant,
through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested that he would no longer file a
supplemental brief.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the conviction of
appellant.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three (3) well-
entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility and while
the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16] Accordingly, the primordial
consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of
complainant's testimony.[17]

Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses,
the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses'
deportment and manner of testifying.[18]

In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on the record that would
impel this Court to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless these were reached
arbitrarily or when the trial court misunderstood or misapplied some facts of
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[19]

In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the
testimonies of Rowel and Rowena. The trial court observed that Rowel and Rowena
"never wavered in their assertion that accused sexually abused Rowena. Their
narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material
points involved."[20] Further, the trial court accorded great evidentiary weight to
Rowena's testimony. It justifiably did so as it characterized her testimony to be
"simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by
inconsistency or contradiction."[21]

Significantly, Rowel and Rowena's respective testimonies were corroborated by Dr.

Guialani's medico-legal report:[22]
Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm noted
at the left mandibular area of the left
PERTINENT PHYSICAL cheek compatible with the disclosed
FINDINGS/PHYSICAL INJURIES slapping of the cheek by her father; 2x2
cm ecchymosis (kissmark) noted at the
antero-lateral border of the left breast

ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
Tanner 2
Pubic hair - none
Labia majora - no evident sign of injury at
EXTERNAL GENITALIA the time of examination
Labia minora - no evident sign of injury
at the time of examination

URETHA
Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus and
AND
periurethral area
ERIURETHRAL AREA
PERIHYMENAL
AREA Markedly hyperemic perihymenal area,
AND and pale fossa navicularis
FOSSA NA VICULARIS

Tanner 2
Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted at
HYMEN 5 o 'clock with attenuation of the hymenal
rim from 5 o 'clock to 7 o 'clock; very
hyperemic hymen

PERINEUM Hyperemic perineum

 Whitish, foul-smelling discharge,
DISCHARGE minimal in amount noted
IE AND SPECULUM EXAM Not indicated
No evident sign of injury at the time of
ANAL EXAMINATION examination;
REMARKS
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
None
COLLECTED
LABORATORY Requested a) Urinalysis
EXAMINATION b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
IMPRESSIONS
No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)

For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and competence to

appear in court.

Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and ecchymosis

on the antero-lateral border of the left breast show clear evidence of Physical
Abuse.

Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings were
consistent with Rowena's claim of sexual abuse. Specifically, her internal genitalia
showed signs of sexual abuse such as: "markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-
hymenal area with fossa navicularis, markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly
hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal
notch with attenuation." Further, Rowena's labia was "very red all throughout, with
hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum."[23]
All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic
penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a day before the
examination. She pointed out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was
almost in the 6 o'clock notch.[24] Dr. Guialani, likewise, confirmed that Rowena was
deaf and mute.

Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellant's simple denial of
the charge against him must necessarily fail. The defense of denial is inherently weak.
A mere denial, just like alibi, constitutes a self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[25]

All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his
daughter Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special
qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to appellant,
which were properly alleged in the Information and their existence duly admitted by
the defense on stipulation of facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on appellant.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[27] on June 24,
2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on
appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the
principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws
which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied
under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.[28]

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not
be eligible for parole."

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence,[29] correctly awarded the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is
assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in light
of the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper
because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows
"not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court
of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the Court
has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals finding appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty of death meted on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Corona. J., on leave.

[1] Information dated May 21, 2001, records, p. 1.

[2] TSN, September 10, 2001, pp. 10-31.

[3] TSN, September 17, 2001, pp. 3-5.

[4] TSN, November 12, 2001, pp. 4-14.

[5] Id.

[6] TSN, May 20, 2003, pp. 2-10.

[7] Penned by Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio; rollo, pp. 12-25.

[8] The said provision was introduced by Republic Act No. 8353 entitled The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997 which classified rape as a crime against persons. It effectively
repealed Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 266-B pertinently reads:

Art. 266-B. Penalties. -

xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx

[9] Rollo, p. 25.

[10] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

[11] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita Q. Tolentino, with Associate Justices

Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 118-134.

[12] Rollo, p. 127.

[13] Id. at 131, citing People v. Obquia, 430 Phil. 65 (2002).

[14] Id. at 132.

[15] Id. at 133.

[16] People v. Del Mundo, Sr., G.R. No. 132065, April 3, 2001, 356 SCRA 45, 50.
[17] People v. Turco, Jr., 392 Phil. 498, 507 (2000).

[18] People v. Adajio, 397 Phil. 354, 359-360 (2000).

[19] People v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).

[20] Rollo,p. 127.

[21] RTC Decision, p. 10; records, p. 130.

[22] Exhibit "D," id. at 76.

[23] TSN, November 12, 2001, pp. 4-14.

[24] Supra notes 4 and 5.

[25] People v. Geraban, G.R. No. 137048, May 24, 2001, 358 SCRA 213, 223-224.

[26] Rollo, p. 14.

[27] Entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
Section 1 thereof reads:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,

Republic Act No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose
the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

[28] People v. Zervoulakos, G.R. No. 103975, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 625,
citing U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5(1917).

[29] See, for example, People v. Barcena, G.R. No. 168737, February 26, 2006, p. 15.

[30] G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186, 201.

Copyright Notice | Disclaimer | Terms of Service | Privacy | Content Policy | Contact Us