Ahmad Najib Bin Aris V Public Prosecutor

Ahmad Najib bin Aris v Public Prosecutor
[2009] 2 MLJ (Zulkefli FCJ) 613
A Ahmad Najib bin Aris v Public Prosecutor
FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 05–25

OF 2007(B)
B
ARIFIN ZAKARIA CJ (MALAYA), NIK HASHIM, AUGUSTINE
PAUL, HASHIM YUSOFF AND ZULKEFLI FCJJ
27 MARCH 2009
C Criminal Procedure — Accused — Right to silence — Whether infringed by

principle of ‘if unrebutted would warrant a conviction’ — Criminal Procedure
Code s 180
D Criminal Procedure — Appeal — Appellate court, power and duty of — Whether

empowered to review and re-evaluate all evidence adduced — Scope and nature
of Court of Appeal’s appellate powers
E Criminal Procedure — Trial — Close of prosecution’s case — Whether court

obliged to convict accused if accused remains silent at close of prosecution’s case
where prima facie case established — Whether accused’s right to remain silent
infringed by principle of ‘if unrebutted would warrant a conviction’ — Criminal
Procedure Code s 180
F
Evidence — Confession — Rejection of — Appellate court rejecting confession of
accused — Whether approach of appellate court proper — Whether convictions
ought to be set aside on basis of rejected confession — Whether proper to order
retrial
G
Evidence — Documentary evidence — Computer printout — Admissibility —

Manner of proving such document — Whether deeming provision under s 90A(6)
applicable — Whether certificate under s 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 only
H method to prove document produced by a computer ‘in the course of its ordinary
use’ — Whether document may be proved through oral evidence that document
was produced by a computer in course of its ordinary use and proof of matters
specified under s 90A(4) — Evidence Act 1950 s 90A
I
Evidence — Documentary evidence — Video tapes and/or recordings —
Admissibility — Whether CCTV tapes and images were documents produced by
computer — Whether subject to requirements of s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950
— Evidence Act 1950 ss 3, 90A
614 Malayan Law Journal [2009] 2 MLJ
Evidence — Identification evidence — Quality of identification evidence — A

Accused positively identified by witnesses — Slight discrepancies in evidence
concerning clothes worn by accused — Whether material
Evidence — Identification parade — Irregularity in conduct of parade — B

Whether prosecution obliged to conduct identification parade in every case —
Circumstances when Turnbull guidelines applicable
Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Deeming provision — C

Evidence Act 1950 s 90A(6) — Scope and application of — Document not
produced by computer in course of its ordinary use — Manner of proving such
document — Evidence Act 1950 s 90A
D
Words and Phrases — ‘Computer’ — Evidence Act 1950 s 3
Words and Phrases — ‘Document’ — Evidence Act 1950 s 3

E
Words and Phrases — ‘If unrebutted would warrant a conviction’ — Criminal
Procedure Code s 180
F
The appellant was convicted of rape and murder in the High Court. For the
offence of rape, he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment and to 20 strokes
of the cane. In respect of the murder he was sentenced to death. The
appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal found the
decision of the High Court to be of no assistance, undertook its own G
examination and evaluation of the evidence, but maintained the High Court’s
convictions and sentences. The appellant thus appealed to the Federal Court.
In the Federal Court several grounds of appeal were raised. The significant
issues, inter alia, concerned: (i) the appellate powers of the Court of Appeal;
(ii) the nature and quality of the identification evidence against the appellant; H
(iii) the admissibility of documents produced by a computer pursuant to
s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘Act’); and (iv) the approach of the court
when an accused person chose to remain silent after a prima facie case was
established by the prosecution.
I
Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The Court of Appeal was empowered to review or re-evaluate all the
A evidence adduced by the prosecution, notwithstanding the High

Court’s decision lacked specific findings and contained no reasons for
its findings. In a case involving purely questions of fact, the Court of
Appeal was free to determine whether the various findings of the trial
court were correct. In the instant case, although the High Court’s
B decision was of no assistance, the Court of Appeal had considered and
subjected all the evidence adduced by the prosecution to a critical
re-examination. The Court of Appeal gave sound reasons why the
evidence was admitted and how it implicated the appellant. No
miscarriage of justice was caused to the appellant as the Court of
C Appeal’s decision was based on evidence adduced from the witnesses
called by the prosecution as recorded in the appeal records (see para 20).
(2) The prosecution’s evidence clearly showed that its witnesses (PW4 and
PW5) had positively identified the appellant. Indeed, the Court of
D
Appeal did not err in deciding that PW4 and PW5 had identified the
appellant. The discrepancies in the identification evidence of the
witnesses concerning the clothes worn by the appellant were not
material. The important matter was the witnesses’ positive
identification of the appellant’s face. Further, the Court of Appeal had
E
given a reasonable explanation on the point in its grounds of judgment
(see paras 21, 24 & 26).
(3) The Court of Appeal had correctly arrived at a finding of fact on the
issue of the appellant’s lost identity card. This finding of fact was based
on evidence adduced by the prosecution (see para 28).
F
(4) The prosecution was not required to conduct an identification parade
in every case. Where the primary issue concerns the identity of the
accused or whenever the case against an accused person depends wholly
or substantially on the correctness of one or more identification of the
G accused, which the defence alleged to be mistaken, the guidelines laid
down in Regina v Turnbull & Anor [1977] 1 QB 224 need to be
followed and an identification parade conducted. In instant case the
identification of the appellant by the witnesses was not based on a
fleeting glimpse. There was also other forensic and supporting evidence
H connecting the appellant with the crime. In the instant case, the quality
of the identification evidence was good and remained good throughout
the prosecution’s case. The question of mistaken identity could not
therefore arise. Even discounting the identification parade, the
prosecution witnesses had positively identified the appellant (see
I para 29).
(5) A certificate under s 90A(2) of the Act is not the only method to prove
that a document was produced by a computer ‘in the course of its
ordinary use’ under s 90A(1) of the Act. Section 90A(6) deals with the
admissibility of a document which was not produced by a computer in
the course of its ordinary use and is only deemed to be so. The fact that A
a document was produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary
use may be proved by the tendering in evidence of a certificate under
s 90A(2) or by way of oral evidence. Such oral evidence must consist
not only of a statement that the document was produced by a computer
in the course of its ordinary use but also of the matters presumed under B
s 90A(4). The presumption contained in s 90A(6) of the Act could be
resorted to only when the document was not produced by a computer
in the course of its ordinary use, Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v
Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 (referred); Hanafi Mat Hassan v Public
Prosecutor [2006] 4 MLJ 134 (followed) (see paras 31–33). C
(6) In the instant case, no certificate was tendered under s 90A(2) for proof
of the chemist report. Further, no oral evidence was adduced to show
that the report was produced by a computer. However, the report could
be presumed to be produced in the course of the computer’s ordinary D
use under s 90A(6). Proof of the matters referred to under s 90A(4) was
also adduced through the evidence of a witness (PW27). The chemist
report, which directly linked the appellant to the commission of the
crimes charged, was thus admissible (see para 34).
E
(7) CCTV tapes were documents produced by a computer by virtue of the
definition ascribed to the words ‘document’ and ‘computer’ under s 3
of the Act. In the instant case, since the CCTV tapes tendered by the
prosecution did not satisfy the requirements of s 90A, they were
inadmissible as evidence (see paras 37–40).
F
(8) The Court of Appeal did not err in finding that the ‘muslin cloth’ seized
from the appellant’s office was of the same type as the cloth found
wrapped around the deceased victim’s neck and tied around her hands.
This was a reasonable finding of fact considering: (i) the opportunity of
access that the appellant had to such cloth which was readily obtainable G
from his workplace; (ii) the evidence of the storekeeper (PW26) at the
appellant’s workplace; and (iii) the evidence of the chemist (PW27) who
was an academically qualified expert with vast experience in fabric
analysis. The Court of Appeal did not also err in its finding of fact that
there was nobody else involved in the crime other than the appellant H
himself (see paras 41–43).
(9) The appellant had the opportunity to commit the crimes as charged.
The evidence led by the prosecution led to the inference that it was
probable that the appellant would take advantage of such opportunity I
(see para 45).
(10) The appellant’s contention that the Court of Appeal had erred by
affirming the convictions after rejecting his confession was without
basis. There was no legal principle that a conviction should be set aside
A when a confession of an accused was rejected by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had the discretion to re-evaluate the remaining
evidence and to scrutinise in totality such other evidence, apart from
the confession to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy all the elements of the charges against the appellant. After taking
B such steps, the Court of Appeal was also obliged to scrutinise whether
the evidence was sufficient to affirm the convictions against the
appellant. In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence available
before the Court of Appeal to support the finding of guilt made by the
trial judge. There was thus no question of a retrial (see para 46).
C (11) In the instant case the court had no choice but to convict the appellant
on both charges as he had failed to rebut the evidence adduced by the
prosecution’s witnesses. The High Court had ruled that a prima facie
case had been made out at the end of the prosecution’s case. In coming
to that decision, the High Court had relied on the maximum evaluation
D principle, Looi Kow Chai & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 MLJ 65.
An accused person’s right to remain silent is not at all infringed by the
principle of ‘if unrebutted would warrant a conviction’. The evidence
adduced must be such that it would warrant a conviction if unrebutted.
In the instant case, the appellant’s failure to call other witnesses to rebut
E the prosecution’s case left the court with no other alternative but to
convict him, Balachandran v Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ 301
(referred) (see paras 48 & 50).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
F
Perayu telah disabitkan atas kesalahan merogol dan membunuh
di Mahkamah Tinggi. Bagi kesalahan merogol, dia telah dihukum 20 tahun
penjara dan 20 sebatan rotan. Berkenaan dengan pembunuhan dia telah
dihukum mati. Perayu telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah
G Rayuan telah mendapati keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tidak membantu,
menjalankan pemeriksaan dan menilai keterangan secara tersendiri, tetapi
mengekalkan sabitan dan hukuman Mahkamah Tinggi. Oleh itu perayu telah
merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan. Di Mahkamah Persekutuan, beberapa
alasan rayuan telah dibangkitkan. Isu-isu yang penting, antara lain,
H berkenaan dengan; (1) kuasa rayuan Mahkamah Rayuan; (ii) sifat dan kualiti
keterangan pengecaman terhadap perayu; (iii) penerimaan
dokumen-dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh komputer menurut s 90A Akta
Keterangan 1950 (‘Akta’); dan (iv) pendekatan mahkamah apabila tertuduh
memilih untuk berdiam diri selepas kes prima facie telah dibuktikan oleh
I
pihak pendakwaan.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan:

(1) Mahkamah Rayuan telah diberikan kuasa untuk menyemak atau,
menilai semula semua keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak A

pendakwaan, walaupun keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi kekurangan
dapatan spesifik dan tidak mempunyai alasan bagi keputusannya.
Dalam kes yang melibatkan persoalan fakta semata-mata, Mahkamah
Rayuan adalah bebas untuk menentukan sama ada kepelbagaian
keputusan hakim bicara adalah betul. Di dalam kes ini, walaupun B
keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tidak membantu, Mahkamah Rayuan
perlu mempertimbangkan dan membuatkan kesemua keterangan yang
dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan kepada satu pemeriksaan semula
secara kritikal. Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan alasan-alasan
yang kukuh, mengapa keterangan telah diterima dan bagaimana ia C
membabitkan perayu. Tiada kegagalan keadilan dilakukan terhadap
perayu kerana keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan adalah berdasarkan
keterangan yang dikemukakan daripada saksi-saksi yang dipanggil oleh
pihak pendakwaan seperti mana di dalam rekod rayuan (lihat
D
perenggan 20).
(2) Keterangan pihak pendakwaan jelas menunjukkan bahawa
saksi-saksinya (PW4 dan PW5) telah secara positif mengecam perayu.
Malah, Mahkamah Rayuan tidak terkhilaf di dalam memutuskan
bahawa PW4 dan PW5 telah mengecam perayu. Percanggahan E
di dalam keterangan pengecaman oleh saksi-saksi berkenaan dengan
pakaian yang dipakai oleh perayu adalah tidak material. Perkara yang
penting adalah pengecaman yang positif oleh saksi-saksi berkenaan
dengan wajah perayu. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah Rayuan telah
memberikan penjelasan yang munasabah berkenaan perkara tersebut F
di dalam alasan penghakimannya (lihat perenggan 21, 24 & 26).
(3) Mahkamah Rayuan telah secara betul membuat dapatan fakta atas isu
kad pengenalan perayu yang hilang. Dapatan fakta ini adalah
berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak G
pendakwaan (lihat perenggan 28).
(4) Pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu menjalankan perbarisan pengecaman
dalam setiap kes. Di mana isu utama berkenaan dengan identiti
tertuduh atau apabila kes terhadap tertuduh bergantung secara
keseluruhan atau sebahagian besarnya atas benarnya satu atau lebih H
pengecaman ke atas tertuduh, yang mana pihak pembelaan
mendakwanya adalah satu kesilapan, garis panduan yang dinyatakan
di dalam kes Regina v Turnbull & Anor [1977] 1 QB 224 perlu diikuti
dan satu perbarisan pengecaman perlu dijalankan. Dalam kes ini,
pengecaman perayu oleh saksi-saksi tidak berdasarkan secara sepintas I
lalu. Terdapat juga keterangan forensik dan sokongan lain yang
mengaitkan perayu dengan jenayah. Dalam kes ini, kualiti keterangan
pengecaman adalah baik dan kekal baik sepanjang kes pendakwaan.
Oleh itu, persoalan kesilapan identiti tidak timbul. Walaupun tanpa
A perbarisan pengecaman, saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan telah secara

positif mengecam perayu (lihat perenggan 29).
(5) Perakuan di bawah s 90A(2) Akta, bukan satu-satunya cara untuk
membuktikan bahawa dokumen tersebut telah dikeluarkan oleh
B
komputer ‘dalam perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa’ di bawah
s 90A(1) Akta. Seksyen 90A(6) memperkatakan berkenaan dengan
penerimaan dokumen yang tidak dikeluarkan oleh komputer dalam
perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa dan hanya dianggap sebegitu
sahaja. Fakta bahawa dokumen tersebut telah dikeluarkan oleh
C
komputer dalam perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa boleh
dibuktikan dengan mengemukakan perakuan di dalam keterangan
di bawah s 90A(2) atau secara keterangan lisan. Keterangan lisan
tersebut mestilah mengandungi bukan saja pernyataan bahawa
dokumen telah dikeluarkan oleh komputer dalam perjalanan
D
penggunaannya yang biasa tetapi juga perkara yang dianggap di bawah
s 90A(4). Anggapan yang terkandung di dalam s 90A(6) Akta hanya
boleh diselesaikan apabila dokumen tersebut tidak dikeluarkan oleh
komputer dalam perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa, Gnanasegaran
a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 (dirujuk); Hanafi
E
Mat Hassan v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 MLJ 134 (diikut) (lihat
perenggan 31–33).
(6) Dalam kes ini, tiada perakuan diserahkan di bawah s 90A(2) bagi
membuktikan laporan kimia. Selanjutnya, tiada keterangan lisan
dikemukakan untuk menunjukkan bahawa laporan dikeluarkan oleh
F komputer. Walau bagaimanapun, laporan tersebut boleh dianggap telah
dikeluarkan dalam perjalanan penggunaan komputer yang biasa
di bawah s 90A(6). Pembuktian perkara tersebut yang dirujuk di bawah
s 90A(4) juga dikemukakan melalui keterangan saksi (PW27). Laporan
ahli kimia, yang melibatkan perayu secara terus kepada perlakuan
G jenayah yang dipertuduh, oleh itu adalah diterima (lihat perenggan 34).
(7) Pita-pita CCTV adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh
komputer menurut anggapan definisi kepada perkataan ‘dokumen’ dan
‘komputer’ di bawah s 3 Akta. Di dalam kes ini, oleh kerana pita-pita
H CCTV yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan tidak memenuhi
keperluan s 90A ia tidak diterima sebagai keterangan (lihat perenggan
37–40).
(8) Mahkamah Rayuan tidak terkhilaf di dalam dapatannya bahawa ‘kain
muslin’ yang dirampas dari pejabat perayu adalah jenis yang sama
I seperti kain yang dijumpai membalut leher mangsa si mati dan yang
mengikat tangannya. Ini adalah dapatan fakta munasabah dengan
mempertimbangkan; (i) peluang akses bahawa perayu memiliki kain
tersebut yang mana mudah diperolehi dari tempat kerjanya; (ii)
keterangan penjaga stor (PW26) di tempat kerja perayu; dan (iii)
keterangan ahli kimia (PW27) seorang pakar yang berkelayakan A

akademik dengan pengalaman luas di dalam menganalisa fabrik.
Mahkamah Rayuan juga tidak terkhilaf di dalam dapatan faktanya
bahawa tiada orang lain yang terlibat di dalam jenayah tersebut selain
daripada perayu sendiri (lihat perenggan 41–43).
B
(9) Perayu mempunyai peluang untuk melakukan jenayah seperti yang
dipertuduh. Keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan
menunjukkan inferens bahawa adalah berkemungkinan bahawa perayu
akan mengambil kesempatan atas peluang tersebut (lihat perenggan
45). C
(10) Penegasan perayu bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah terkhilaf dengan

mengesahkan sabitan selepas menolak pengakuannya adalah tidak
berasas. Tiada prinsip perundangan bahawa sabitan mestilah
diketepikan apabila pengakuan tertuduh ditolak oleh Mahkamah D
Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan mempunyai budi bicara untuk menilai
semula keterangan yang tinggal dan meneliti secara keseluruhan
keterangan yang lain, selain daripada pengakuan tersebut untuk
menentukan sama ada keterangan adalah mencukupi untuk memenuhi
E
kesemua elemen yang dipertuduhkan terhadap perayu. Selepas
mengambil langkah tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan juga
bertanggungjawab untuk meneliti sama ada keterangan adalah
mencukupi untuk mengesahkan sabitan terhadap perayu. Di dalam kes
ini, terdapat keterangan yang mencukupi di hadapan Mahkamah F
Rayuan untuk menyokong dapatan bersalah yang telah dibuat oleh
hakim bicara. Oleh itu tidak terdapat persoalan untuk perbicaraan
semula (lihat perenggan 46).
(11) Di dalam kes ini, mahkamah tidak mempunyai pilihan selain daripada G
mensabitkan perayu atas kedua-dua pertuduhan apabila dia gagal untuk
mematahkan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi-saksi pihak
pendakwaan. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa kes prima
facie telah pun dibuktikan di akhir kes pendakwaan. Dalam sampai
kepada keputusan tersebut, Mahkamah Tinggi telah bergantung kepada H
prinsip penilaian yang maksimum, Looi Kow Chai & Anor v Public
Prosecutor [2003] 2 MLJ 65. Hak seseorang tertuduh untuk berdiam
diri tidak langsung melanggar prinsip ‘if unrebutted would warrant a
conviction’. Keterangan yang dikemukakan mestilah sesuatu yang
menyebabkan sabitan jika tidak dipatahkan. Di dalam kes ini, I
kegagalan perayu untuk memanggil saksi-saksi lain untuk mematahkan
kes pendakwaan membiarkan mahkamah dengan tanpa pilihan
melainkan mensabitkan tertuduh, Balachandran v Public Prosecutor
[2005] 2 MLJ 301 (dirujuk) (lihat perenggan 45 & 50).]
A Notes
For a case on irregularity in conduct of parade, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest
(4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) para 1732.
For a case on right to silence, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue)
para 53.
B
For cases on appellate court, power and duty of appeal, see 5(1) Mallal’s
Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 189–256.
For cases on close of prosecution’s case, see 5(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007
Reissue) paras 4644–4707.
C For cases on computer printout, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006
Reissue) paras 1152–1162.
For cases on construction of statutes generally, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,
2006 Reissue) paras 1836–2049.
For cases on confession generally, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006
D Reissue) paras 674–822.
For cases on documentary evidence generally, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,
2006 Reissue) paras 1090–1274.
For cases on quality of identification evidence, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest
(4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) paras 1090–1274.
E
Cases referred to
Aziz bin Muhamad Din v PP [1966] 5 MLJ 473, HC (refd)
Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 301; [2005] 1 AMR 321, CA (refd)
Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 1, CA (refd)
F
Hanafi Mat Hassan v PP [2006] 4 MLJ 134, CA (folld)
Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP [2003] 2 MLJ 65; [2003] 1 CLJ 734, CA (folld)
Mohamed Mokhtar v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 122, HC (refd)
PP v Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 5 MLJ 1; [2007] 4 CLJ 337, FC (refd)
G Regina v Turnbull & Anor [1977] 1 QB 224, CA (refd)
Legislation referred to
Criminal Procedure Code s 180
Evidence Act 1950 ss 3, 7, 90A, 90A(1), (2), (4), (6), illustration (c)
H Penal Code ss 302, 376
Appeal from: Criminal Appeal No B-05–28 of 2003 (Court of Appeal,

Putrajaya)
I Mohamed Haniff bin Khatri Abdulla (Mohamad Nadzim bin Ibrahim, Rosal
Azimin bin Ahmad & Amir Asree bin Meor Nordin with him) (Shamsuddin
& Co) for the appellant.
Nordin bin Hassan (Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers) for
the respondent.
A
Zulkefli FCJ (delivering judgment of the court):
INTRODUCTION
[1] The appellant was charged in the High Court at Shah Alam on the B
following two charges:
First charge:
Bahawa kamu pada 14 Jun 2003, antara jam lebih kurang 1.00 pagi hingga
5.00 pagi, di Batu 7, Jalan Klang Lama, di dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri C
Selangor Darul Ehsan telah melakukan bunuh dengan menyebabkan kematian
ke atas ONG LAY KIAN (P) (KP NO 740718-08-5204) dan oleh yang demikian
kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302
Kanun Keseksaan.
Second charge: D
Bahawa kamu pada 14 Jun 2003, antara jam lebih kurang 1.00 pagi hingga
5.00 pagi, di Batu 7, Jalan Klang Lama, di dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri
Selangor Darul Ehsan telah melakukan rogol ke atas ONG LAY KIAN (P)
(KP NO. 740718-08-5204) dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu
kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 376 Kanun Keseksaan. E
[2] The learned judge of the High Court found the appellant guilty and
convicted him on both charges. He was sentenced to death for the offence
under s 302 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to twenty years F
imprisonment and ordered to be given 20 strokes of the rottan for the offence
under s 376 of the Penal Code. He appealed to the Court of Appeal against
the decision of the High Court. The learned judges of the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence in respect of
both the charges. Being dissatisfied with the decision, the appellant now G
appeals to this court against the whole decision of the Court of Appeal.
THE CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION
[3] The evidence adduced by the prosecution from the relevant prosecution H
witnesses may be summarised as follows.
[4] On the night of 13 June 2003, Pearly a/p Visvanathan (‘PW3’) together
with her two daughters, Ong Lee Cheng and Canny Ong Lay Kian (‘the
deceased’) had dinner together with friends of the deceased at Restoran I
Monte, Bangsar Shopping Centre (‘BSC’) as a farewell for her before she
returned to the United States on 14 June 2003. They went to BSC in a
Proton Tiara bearing registration No WFN 6871 (‘P145’). They arrived at
BSC at about 8.30pm and had dinner there until about 10.30pm. When they
A were ready to leave, the deceased went to the basement car park alone to take
the parking ticket which was left behind in the car P145 to make payment
at the autopay station at the lower floor of BSC. PW3 and her other daughter,
Ong Lee Cheng waited for the deceased at the lower floor. PW3 waited for
about twenty minutes but the deceased still did not show up and when Ong
B Lee Cheng called the deceased’s mobile phone, no answer was received and
the call went to ‘voice mail’. PW3 and Ong Lee Cheng then went down to
the basement but failed to find the deceased. PW3 also discovered that their
car P145 was not there. PW3 then lodged a report with a BSC guard, PW10
and later lodged a police report P10.
C
[5] On the same day, at about 11.15pm L/Cpl Ravichandran a/l
Subramaniam (‘PW4’), a police officer together with a colleague were on
crime prevention patrol duty at the Taman Perindustrian Jaya, Kelana Jaya
D area near Subang. There, PW4 noticed that a car had stopped beside the
roadside. Half an hour later, PW4 and his colleague passed the same route
again and noticed that the car P145 was still there. PW4 and his colleague
stopped their motorcycle. PW4 then knocked on the glass window on the
driver’s side of the car P145. When the glass window was lowered, PW4 saw
E that the driver was a male Malay and on the passenger seat was a female
Chinese. PW4 shone his flashlight towards both of them and introduced
himself as a police officer and showed them his authority card. PW4 then
asked for the identity cards of the driver and the passenger. When the driver
gave his identity card (‘P12’), PW4 shone his flashlight at the identity card
F and asked the driver for his name. The driver answered that his name was
Ahmad Najib bin Aris. PW4 then looked at the identity card (‘P11’) given by
the passenger and asked ‘awak Ong Lay Kian?’ (‘You are Ong Lay Kian?’).
The passenger only nodded. At that time, the driver was wearing a cap. PW4
asked him to remove his cap. After the driver had removed his cap, PW4
G compared the driver’s face with the photograph in the driver’s identity card
and found them to be the same. PW4 identified the driver as the appellant
and the female Chinese as the deceased. PW4 then asked the appellant to get
out of the car but the appellant refused.
H [6] Meanwhile, PW4 saw the deceased gesture to him by pressing both her
palms together to her chest with the palms outwards facing the appellant and
then making a prayer-like gesture. The deceased made this gesture when the
appellant was looking at PW4 but when the appellant turned towards the
deceased, the deceased stopped her gesture. When the appellant refused to get
I out of the car, PW4 tried to open the door of the car but at that time, the
appellant sped off. PW4 fired two shots at the tyres of the car. PW4 and his
colleague also attempted to pursue the car with their motorcycles but failed.
The car seen by PW4 was similar to the photographs of the car P145 which
are P7A and P7B which were shown to PW4. The appellant’s identity card
P12 and the deceased’s identity card P11 were still with PW4 when the A
appellant sped off in the car. PW4 then lodged a police report (‘P13’) about
the incident.
[7] At about 12 midnight, Aminah bt Ishak (‘PW5’) was on her way to

B
KLIA to pick up her sister in a Kancil car driven by her brother-in-law. They
stopped their car in front of Bangunan Bali at Jalan Sungai Way. They
stopped there to wait for another van which would also make the trip to
KLIA but had turned back home to get a milk bottle. About twenty feet in
front of the Kancil car PW5 saw a Proton Tiara (‘P145’) car by the roadside. C
A man whom PW5 identified as the appellant then came out from the said
car towards the Kancil car and asked whether he could borrow a car jack.
PW5 could see the man’s face clearly as the surrounding area was well lit by
street lights even though the appellant was wearing a cap. PW5 also saw a
woman in the car P145 but the woman did not get out of the car. PW5 D
identified the woman as the deceased. PW5 noticed that the deceased
appeared to gesture to her and also appeared to be frightened. The deceased
gestured with her face in the direction of the appellant but when the
appellant turned towards her, the deceased stopped her gesturing. PW5 then
noted down the registration number of the Proton Tiara WFN 6871 on a E
piece of paper. When the appellant failed to open the screws to one of the
tyres of the car P145, the appellant went off in the said car. PW5 then made
a police report at the Subang Jaya police station about the suspicious incident
and gave the registration number of the Proton Tiara to a police officer L/Kpl
Ruslan bin Hamzah (‘PW11’). PW11 then took down the report and the F
registration number in his Station Diary (‘P21’).
[8] At about 1am on 14 June 2003, Azizam bin Ismail (‘PW12’), a

technician with Syarikat UTIC (‘Utility Information Centre’) was driving his
company van to his office by way of Jalan Klang Lama. At a road construction G
area at Jalan Klang Lama, PW12 stopped the van to relieve himself. PW12
then scoured the area looking for a piece of wood to support the back seat of
the van which was broken. PW12 then saw a Proton Tiara in the area which
was later identified as P145. Inside the car P145, PW12 saw a woman with
fair skin lying down at the back seat without her clothes and her breasts H
exposed. PW12 also saw the driver of the car who was a man with light hair
and a wide forehead hurriedly running away from PW12. PW12 also saw
that the front right tyre of the car had become deflated. The car P145 was
then driven away from there. PW12 then went to his company office at Bukit
Lanjan, Damansara. When PW12 came back from his office using the same I
Jalan Klang Lama route, he saw the same car P145 parked at the same place
but a bit forward from before. PW12 then stopped the van and saw that
nobody was in the car P145. PW12 then took a mobile phone (‘P129’)
belonging to the deceased and a sling-on bag with a Maybank Yippie logo
A (‘P23’) from the back seat of the car P145. The sling-on bag with a Maybank
Yippie logo (‘P23’) contained:
(i) three condoms;
(ii) a lighter;
B
(iii) cigarettes;
(iv) a ball pen; and
(v) paper.
C
[9] PW12 then returned to his house at Jalan Gasing and then drove to
Penang to meet his wife. PW12 also called his wife using the telephone P129
which he had taken from the car P145. On his way to Penang, PW12 sold
D the telephone P129 to a telephone vendor in Ipoh while the sim card P24 in
P129 was sold to PW13.
[10] On 14 June 2003 at about 8pm, the car P145 was found by Constable
Mohd Zulkefli bin Abdul Ghani (‘PW8’) behind shop No 49, Jalan Petaling
E Utama 1. He saw a lot of blood stains at the back seat of the car. The car P145
was then brought to the Petaling Jaya Police Station for further investigation.
On 17 June 2003 at about noon, a burnt body was found by E Soon Tai
(‘PW6’) in a manhole at Batu 7, Jalan Klang Lama. PW6 then called the
police and informed them of his finding.
F
[11] DNA tests with a blood sample from the mother (‘PW3’) and father
(‘PW36’) of the deceased confirmed that the body was that of Ong Lay Kian
(the deceased). Pathology expert Kasinathan Nadeson (‘PW30’) who
G
conducted an autopsy on the deceased found a piece of cloth tied around the
deceased’s neck at least three rounds.
[12] Both the deceased’s hands were tied with a cloth folded two or three
times. The cause of death was strangulation by the cloth around the
H deceased’s neck and PW30 did not dismiss the theory that the deceased died
as a result of bleeding in the abdomen caused by a sharp weapon. On 20 June
2003 Supt Ahmad Razali bin Yaacob (‘PW32’) inspected the appellant’s
house at Lot 122, Jalan Pantai Permai 6, Kg Kerinci, Pantai Dalam, Kuala
Lumpur. In the appellant’s room under a table a pair of Jack Blue Classic
I jeans (‘P68A’) with a Calvin Klein belt (‘P68B’) and a blue cap were found.
The jeans had blood stains and DNA tests confirmed that it is the deceased’s
blood. PW30 who conducted the autopsy also took a vaginal swab from the
deceased and DNA tests by Primulapathi a/l Jayakrishnan (‘PW27’) showed
that it is the appellant’s semen.
[13] The blood stains on the back seat (‘P57A’) and driver’s seat (‘P55A’) A
of the car (‘P145’) were confirmed to belong to the deceased. Six strands of
hair (‘P56C’) found in the car, based on DNA tests were also confirmed to
be the deceased’s hair. Besides that, DSP Amidon bin Anan (‘PW15’) also
found an unpaid BSC parking ticket (‘P20’) on the dashboard of the car
P145. B
[14] A CCTV is installed at the basement of BSC and two CCTV tapes
P19C and P19D were analysed by forensic experts PW15 and PW16.
(a) On the analysis of the CCTV tape P19C, PW15 found: C
(i) on 13 June 2003 at 8.24pm until 8.26pm, a Proton Tiara was seen
as if searching for a parking lot (P29A, B & C);
(ii) at 8.39pm an image of PW3 and the deceased walking near the 9C
pillar towards the lift is seen (P29E); D
(iii) on 13 June 2003 at 8.49pm, an image of a man was seen walking at
the parking area (P29F);
(iv) on 13 June 2003 between 10.22pm and 10.24pm, the man is seen
walking around the 9C pillar area; E
(v) on 13 June 2003 at 10.32pm, an image of a Proton Tiara car is seen
moving out of the parking area (P29K).
PW15 confirmed that the man in the CCTV tape P19C looks like the
appellant. The appellant’s image is seen carrying a sling bag with a strap F
and wearing a baseball cap.
(b) DSP Mohd Noor bin Ahmad (‘PW16’) also video-captured the images
(still photo) and used a ‘video investigator system’ for ‘zooming’ and
‘enhancement’ on the images. G
[15] The cloth tying the deceased’s hand (‘P62A’) was found to have the
same colour, texture and composition with the muslin cloth (‘P82A’) from
the appellant’s workplace at MAS which is used to clean airplanes. Sivakumar
a/l Ramiah (‘PW26’), a MAS storekeeper, said in his evidence that he H
normally saw the appellant coming to work carrying a sling bag with a
Maybank logo similar to P29.
FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

I
[16] The High Court having considered the oral and documentary
evidence tendered by the prosecution at the close of the prosecution case
ruled that a prima facie case had been made out by the prosecution. The
learned judge of the High Court accepted the evidence of the prosecution
A witnesses PW4, PW5 and PW12 as to the identification of the appellant at

the various scenes or locations where the appellant was found to have been
with the deceased. The learned judge, after a trial within a trial to determine
the admissibility of the confession (‘P122’) made to the magistrate by the
appellant ruled that the confession was admissible in evidence. The learned
B judge also accepted the evidence of the chemist (‘PW27’) and the evidence of
the DNA analysis and results (‘P83’) with regard to the relevant exhibits
produced by the prosecution. Based on the circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution the learned judge came to the conclusion that a prima
facie case had been made out and called for the defence of the appellant. The
C appellant chose to remain silent after the three alternatives were explained to
him. Upon the appellant choosing to remain silent the learned judge duly
convicted the appellant on the two charges framed against him and passed
sentence on him accordingly.
D
FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
[17] The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the confession (‘P122’)
given by the appellant to the magistrate which was held by the learned trial
E judge as being admissible was inadmissible. In arriving at the conclusion the
Court of Appeal considered the evidence of what had transpired between the
time when the appellant was given to the charge of ASP Muniandy a/l
Shanmugam (‘PW44’), the investigating officer until the time when he made
the confession. This was to show the existence of circumstances that raised a
F strong suspicion that the appellant had been pressured by the police into
making the confession. The appellant did not make the confession in a state
of contrition but in the hope of getting a light sentence. Further, the Court
of Appeal took the view that since the confession was inadmissible, it became
necessary to undertake an examination and evaluation of the rest of the
G evidence in order to consider whether it warranted the conviction of the
appellant for the rape and murder of the victim. The Court of Appeal
accepted the evidence on the identification of the appellant by PW4 and
PW5. The Court of Appeal also accepted the evidence of the chemist
(‘PW27’), the DNA (‘P83’) evidence and its results as being in compliance
H with the requirement of s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the Act’). Relying
on circumstantial evidence the Court of Appeal found that the evidence in its
entirety led only to one conclusion, that it was the appellant and no one else
who was responsible for what happened to the victim on that night. The
Court of Appeal therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction
I and sentence of the appellant.
THE APPEAL
[18] Before this court the appellant in his petition of appeal had put
forward 27 separate grounds of appeal for argument. The grounds in the A

petition of appeal were combined under six distinct headings by learned
counsel for the appellant in his submission before us. They are as follows:
(a) in the light of the findings of the Court of Appeal that the High Court
judgment was of no assistance to the Court of Appeal, the Court of B
Appeal thereafter erred, in undertaking an examination and evaluation
on the rest of the evidence, on its own to consider whether it was safe
to maintain the conviction, a process which is against the principles on
appellate powers of the Court of Appeal in hearing an appeal;
(b) the dissatisfactory manner in which the Court of Appeal accepted the C
issue of identification of the appellant by PW4 and PW5, and the
reliance on the CCTV images (P19A–P19B and P29A–P29K) and the
cursory manner in which the Court of Appeal disregarded the accepted
discrepancies with regard to the attire of the man (purportedly
identified as the appellant); D
(c) the acceptance of the DNA report (‘P83’) in breach of the requirements
of s 90A of the Act and the acceptance of the chemist (‘PW27’)
testimony on the issue that the muslin cloth (‘P82A’) was of the same
kind of fabric that was found around the neck or wrists of the victim E
(P59A and P61A);
(d) the erroneous findings that the appellant and no one else was possibly
responsible for the crimes from all available evidence;
(e) upon rightly rejecting the admissibility of the confession (‘P122’), the F
Court of Appeal erred in its failure to consider setting aside the
conviction, or at the very least to order a retrial after the end of the
prosecution’s case, and to allow the appellant to make a fresh decision
as to whether to exercise his option to give sworn evidence or to remain
silent; G
(f ) the need for this court to revisit the law on the burden of proof vis-à-vis
the right to remain silent.
[19] I shall now deal with the above main grounds of appeal and other H
ancillary issues related to them.
POWER OF APPELLATE COURT TO REVIEW OR TO RE-EVALUATE

ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
I
[20] As regards the first main ground of appeal raised by the appellant, I am
of the view that the Court of Appeal has the power to review or to re-evaluate
all the evidence available as adduced by the prosecution. The Court of Appeal
is in a position to do so in the present case even though the grounds of
A decision of the trial judge as appearing in the appeal records is found lacking
in specific findings and with no reasons for the findings. In a case involving
purely a question of fact, the Court of Appeal is free to determine whether or
not the various findings of the trial court are correct (see Mohamed Mokhtar
v Public Prosecutor [1972] 1 MLJ 122). In the present case even though the
B Court of Appeal took the view that the High Court judgment was of no
assistance, it nevertheless had considered and subjected all the evidence
adduced by the prosecution to a critical re-examination. The Court of Appeal
had given sound reasons as to why the evidence was admitted and how it had
implicated the appellant. There was no miscarriage of justice against the
C appellant as the Court of Appeal’s decision was based on evidence adduced
from the witnesses called by the prosecution as appearing in the appeal
records. I am therefore of the view that the Court of Appeal did not err on
this issue.
D IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT
[21] On the second ground of appeal in respect of the contention of the

appellant that the Court of Appeal had erred in arriving at its finding of fact
on the identification of the appellant by PW4 and PW5, I find that the
E evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that PW4 and PW5 had
positively identified the appellant. The relevant facts from the evidence of
PW4 in relation to the identification of the appellant by PW4 can be narrated
as follows:
F (a) on 13 June 2003, at 11.15pm, PW4 saw a car at Taman Perindustrian
Jaya, Kelana Jaya which was similar to the car P145;
(b) half an hour later, after seeing that the car P145 was still there, PW4
inspected the car. When the car window was lowered, PW4 saw a male
Malay and a Chinese woman in the car. PW4 shone his torchlight at
G
both of them;
(c) PW4 then asked for both their identity cards. When PW4 received the
identity card from the man, PW4 shone his torchlight at the identity
card and asked the man what his name was. The man answered ‘Ahmad
H Najib bin Aris’. After seeing the woman’s identity card, PW4 asked
‘awak Ong Lay Kian’ (‘you are Ong Lay Kian’) and the woman nodded
her head;
(d) PW4 then asked the man to take off his cap so that he could compare
I the driver’s face with the photograph in the identity card and found the
face to be the same;
(e) when PW4 was inspecting the car P145, there were street lights and
even without the torchlight, PW4 could identify the person in the car.
PW4 questioned the man for about five minutes before the man sped
off in the car P145, leaving behind his identity card P12 and the A
deceased’s identity card P11 with PW4;
(f ) when PW4 questioned the man, PW4 noticed that the Chinese woman
in the car (the deceased) was nervous and it was as if she was trying to
gesture to him for help and pointing at the appellant but when the B
appellant turned towards her, the deceased would stop making any
gestures. This incident made it possible for PW4 to recognise the
deceased and the appellant;
(g) in court, PW4 identified the appellant as the man in the car P145; and
C
(h) during the identification parade, PW4 was also able to identify the
appellant.
[22] From the evidence explained above, it is clear that PW4 had positively
identified the appellant as the person who was with the deceased on the night D
of 13 June 2003.
[23] The relevant facts from the evidence of PW5 in relation to the
identification of the appellant by PW5 can be narrated as follows:
E
(a) at about 12 in the morning of 14 June 2003, PW5 and his family were
on their way to KLIA in a car and a van to pick up his sister who was
arriving from Sabah. However, the car they were travelling in stopped
at Bangunan Bali, Sungai Way to wait for the van which had turned
back to get a milk bottle left at home; F
(b) while waiting for the van, PW5 saw a Proton Tiara parked about 25 feet
in front of the Kancil car PW5 was in. PW5 saw a man coming out
from the Proton Tiara to the Kancil car PW5 was in. The surrounding
area was clearly lit by street lamps;
G
(c) the man came straight to PW5’s brother-in-law and wanted to borrow
a car jack. While speaking to PW5’s brother-in-law, the man stood
outside the car PW5 was in. PW5 was able to see the man’s face clearly;
(d) PW5 also saw a woman seated at the front passenger seat but she did H
not come out of the Proton Tiara car. PW5 saw the woman from a close
distance which was immediately in front of the Proton Tiara car;
(e) when the woman saw PW5, the woman looked as if she was making a
gesture. Her eyes, face and mouth looked as if she was in fear and she
was pointing with her face to the man who was borrowing the car jack. I
However, when the man turned towards her, the woman immediately
stopped gesturing. The man however failed to open the screw to the tyre
of the Proton Tiara and the man then hurriedly left the place in the
Proton Tiara car;
A (f ) PW5 was in front of the Bangunan Bali for about twenty minutes.
During cross-examination, PW5 maintained that she could identify the
man’s face, (see p 97 of the appeal records);
(g) in court, PW5 identified the appellant as the said man;
B (h) PW5 had also noted down the Proton Tiara registration number as
WFN 6871 on a piece of paper (‘P145’). PW5 then lodged a police
report at the Subang Jaya Police Station. PW11 then received PW5’s
complaint and took it down in PW11’s Station Diary; and
C
(i) PW5 also identified the appellant in an identification parade.
[24] From the detailed evidence of PW5, it is clear that PW5 identified the
appellant on that night in front of the Bangunan Bali. The issue of PW4 and
PW5 identifying the appellant was considered by the Court of Appeal and
D based on the facts and the evidence, it is my considered view that the Court
of Appeal did not err in deciding that PW4 and PW5 had identified the
appellant.
DISCREPANCY
E
[25] On the discrepancy in the evidence of PW4 and PW5 with regard to
the attire of the appellant as alleged by him, I am of the view that there can
be inferences drawn from a set of facts and evidence. The evidence of PW4
was that the appellant wore a dark blue sweater and a dark coloured cap. The
F evidence of PW5 was that the appellant wore a light coloured shirt, a bright
coloured pants and a bright coloured cap. The evidence of PW15 on the
other hand when seeing the CCTV image was that the appellant wore a
bright coloured shirt and a dark coloured pants.
G [26] In my view the above discrepancies are not material as what is

important is the positive identification by PW4 and PW5 of the appellant’s
face. Regarding the clothes PW4 saw the appellant wearing, which was a dark
blue sweater as compared to the evidence of PW5 who saw the appellant
wearing a light coloured shirt, the logical explanation is that when PW4 saw
H the appellant in the car on the night of 13 June 2003, it was a cold night with
the appellant wearing a sweater. However, when PW5 saw the appellant in
front of Bangunan Bali, the appellant could have taken off the sweater as he
wanted to change a flat tyre. The appellant was also proved to have had a sling
bag with a Maybank logo on it and the sweater could have been kept in the
I bag. In any event, it is normal for different witnesses to give different
descriptions about what a person was wearing as each witness’s observation
and recollection varies from each other. The learned judges of the Court of
Appeal had given a reasonable explanation based on the facts and inferences
derived from the evidence as shown in their grounds of judgment on this A

point.
THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDENTITY CARD OF THE APPELLANT

AND POLICE REPORT LODGED BY THE APPELLANT
B
[27] For the appellant it was also argued that the learned judges of the
Court of Appeal had erred in arriving at their finding of fact that with the
existence of the identity card and police report lodged by the appellant, it
proved that the appellant was at the said locations as stated in the evidence. C
On this issue it is to be noted that on 14 June 2003, at 3.10pm, the appellant
had lodged a police report (‘P18’) about his missing identity card. This was
confirmed by PW9 who took the complaint from the appellant and identified
the appellant. A copy of P18 was found and seized from a table in the
appellant’s house. The fact that the appellant had lost his identity card and D
had lodged a report clearly showed that the appellant’s identity card was not
with him. This is consistent with the evidence of PW4 who said that he held
the appellant’s and the deceased’s identity card when he asked the appellant
some questions before the appellant sped away in the car P145 when PW4
asked the appellant to get out of the car. E
[28] It is my judgment that the Court of Appeal had arrived at a correct

finding of fact on the issue of the lost identity card and concluded that the
appellant had lodged a false report on its loss. This finding of fact is based on
evidence adduced by the prosecution. PW4 could not have been in possession F
of both the identity cards of the appellant and the deceased if he did not
receive it from the appellant and the deceased themselves.
THE IDENTIFICATION PARADE

G
[29] On the issue of the identification parade raised by the appellant that
the police did not comply with accepted procedure in this case, it is my view
that it is not in all cases that the prosecution is required to conduct an
identification parade. I am of the view that it is only where the primary issue
is the identity of the accused or whenever the case against an accused person H
depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more
identification of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken that the
principles or the guidelines as laid down in the case of Regina v Turnbull &
Anor [1977] 1 QB 224 need be followed and the identification parade
conducted. In the present case it is to be noted that the identification of the I
appellant by PW4, PW5 and PW12 was not based on a fleeting glimpse as
in Turnbull’s case. Unlike the facts in Turnbull’s case there are also other
forensic and supporting evidence connecting the appellant with the crime in
the present case. It is my considered view that the quality of the identification
A evidence of PW4, PW5 and PW12 in the present case is good and remains
good throughout the prosecution’s case and that the question of a mistaken
identity cannot arise. Therefore even discounting the identification parade,
the prosecution witnesses PW4, PW5 and PW12 had indeed positively
identified the appellant.
B
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CHEMIST REPORT (P83) AND THE
CCTV TAPES (P19A-D)
(a) Chemist report (‘P83’)
C
[30] Learned counsel for the appellant argued that under s 90A of the Act,
the prosecution must produce a certificate under s 90A(2) of the Act to
confirm that the chemist report (‘P83’) was produced by a computer ‘in the
course of its ordinary use’ before P83 can be admitted as evidence. Section 90A
D of the Act reads as follows:
Section 90A
(1) In any criminal or civil proceeding a document produced by a
computer, or a statement contained in such document, shall be
E admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein if the document was
produced by the computer in the course of its ordinary use, whether
or not the person tendering the same is the maker of such document
or statement.
F
(2) For the purposes of this section it may be proved that a document was
produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use by tendering
to the court a certificate signed by a person who either before or after
the production of the document by the computer is responsible for
the management of the operation of that computer, or for the
conduct of the activities for which the computer was used.
G
(3)
(a) It shall be sufficient, in a certificate given under subsection (2), for

a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the
H person stating it.
(b) A certificate given under subsection (2) shall be admissible in
evidence as prima facie proof of all matters stated in it without
proof of signature of the person who gave the certificate.
I (4) Where a certificate is given under subsection (2), it shall be presumed
that the computer referred to in the certificate was in good working
order and was operating properly in all respects, throughout the
material part of the period during which the document was
produced.
(5) A document shall be deemed to have been produced by a computer A

whether it was produced by it directly or by means of any appropriate
equipment, and whether or not there was any direct or indirect
human intervention.
(6) A document produced by a computer, or a statement contained in B
such document, shall be admissible in evidence whether or not it was
produced by the computer after the commencement of the criminal
or civil proceeding or after the commencement of any investigation
criminal or civil proceeding or such investigation or inquiry, and any
document so produced by a computer shall be deemed to be
C
produced by the computer in the course of its ordinary use.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, a document
produced by a computer, or a statement contained in such document,
shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding, where
it is given in evidence by or on behalf of the person who is charged D
with an offence in such proceeding the person so charged with the
offence being a person who was —
(a) responsible for the management of the operation of that computer

or for the conduct of the activities for which that computer was E
used; or
(b) in any manner or to any extent it involved, directly or indirectly,
in the production of the document by the computer.
F
[31] I am of the view that a certificate under s 90A(2) of the Act is not the
only method to prove that a document was produced by a computer ‘in the
course of its ordinary use’. On this point I would first like to cite the case of
Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 where
Shaik Daud JCA said at p 11: G
On reading through s 90A of the Act, we are unable to agree with the construction
placed by learned counsel. First and foremost, s 90A which had seven subsections
should not be read disjointedly. They should be read together as they form one
whole provision for the admissibility of documents produced by computers. As
H
stated earlier, s 90A was added to the Act in 1993 in order to provide for the
admission of computer-produced documents and statements as in this case. On
our reading of this section, we find that under sub-s (1), the law allows the
production of such computer-generated documents or statements if there is
evidence, firstly, that they were produced by a computer. Secondly, it is necessary
also to prove that the computer is in the course of its ordinary use. In our view, I
there are two ways of proving this. One way is that it ‘may’ be proved by the
production of the certificate as required by sub-s (2). Thus, sub-s (2) is permissive
A and not mandatory. This can also be seen in sub-s (4) which begins with the words
‘Where a certificate is given under sub-s (2).
These words show that a certificate is not required to be produced in every case.
It is our view that once the prosecution adduces evidence through a bank officer
that the document is produced by a computer, it is not incumbent upon them to
B also produce a certificate under sub-s (2) as sub-s (6) provides that a document
produced by a computer shall be deemed to be produced by the computer in the
course of its ordinary use.
C [32] In appreciating the above passage it must first be observed that

s 90A(1) deals with the admissibility of a document which was produced by
a computer in the course of its ordinary use as a matter of fact. It refers to a
document that was produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use.
It is this requirement that must be proved. On the other hand s 90A(6) deals
D with the admissibility of a document which was not produced by a computer
in the course of its ordinary use and is only deemed to be so. This distinction
is not recognised in the above passage and is addressed by Augustine Paul JCA
(as he then was) in Hanafi Mat Hassan v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 MLJ 134
at pp 151–154:
E
A careful perusal of s 90A(1) reveals that in order for a document produced by a
computer to be admitted in evidence it must have been produced by the computer
in the course of its ordinary use. It is therefore a condition precedent to be
established before such a document can be admitted in evidence under s 90A(1).
The manner of establishing this condition has been prescribed. It can be proved by
F
tendering in evidence a certificate as stipulated by s 90A(2) read with s 96A(3).
Once the certificate is tendered in evidence the presumption contained in s 90A(4)
is activated to establish that the computer referred to in the certificate was in good
working order and was operating properly in all respects throughout the material
part of the period during which the document was produced. Section 90A(4) must
G therefore be given its full effect as it has a significant role to play in the
interpretation and application of s 90A. Ordinarily a certificate under s 90A(2)
must be tendered in evidence in order to rely on the provisions of s 90A(3) and (4).
However, the use of the words ‘may be proved’ in s 90A(2) indicates that the
tendering of a certificate is not a mandatory requirement in all cases. In Public
H Prosecutor v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705, a plethora of authorities was
referred to in ruling that facts to be presumed can, instead, be proved by other
admissible evidence which is available (at pp 722–723). Thus the use of the
certificate can be substituted with oral evidence as demonstrated in R v Shepherd
[1993] 1 All ER 225 in dealing with a provision of law similar to s 90A. Needless
to say, such oral evidence must have the same effect as in the case of the use of a
I certificate. It follows that where oral evidence is adduced to establish the
requirements of s 90A(1) in lieu of the certificate the presumptions attached to it,
in particular, the matters presumed under s 90A(4) must also be proved by oral
evidence. In commenting on the nature of the evidence required to discharge the
burden in such an event Lord Griffiths said in R v Shepherd at p 231:
The nature of the evidence to discharge the burden of showing that there has A
been no improper use of the computer and that it was operating properly will
inevitably vary from case to case. The evidence must be tailored to suit the needs
of the case. I suspect that it will very rarely be necessary to call an expert and that
in the vast majority of cases it will be possible to discharge the burden by calling
a witness who is familiar with the operation of the computer in the sense of
B
knowing what the computer is required to do and who can say that it is doing
it properly.
It must be added that the condition precedent in s 90A(1) coupled with the
stipulation on the manner of its proof makes it clear in unmistakable terms that a
document made admissible by the section is only one that was produced by a C
computer in the ordinary course of its use; and inapplicable to one that was not so
produced. The resultant matter for consideration is the proper meaning to be
ascribed to the deeming provision in s 90A(6) in order to determine whether it can
be a substitute for the certificate. A deeming provision is a legal fiction and is used
to create an artificial construction of a word or phrase in a statute that would not D
otherwise prevail. As Viscount Dunedin said in CIT Bombay v Bombay Corporation
AIR 1930 PC 54 at p 56:
Now when a person is ‘deemed to be’ something the only meaning possible is
that whereas he is not in reality that something the Act of Parliament requires
him to be treated as if he were. E
In commenting on the words ‘deemed to be’ The Law Lexicon (7th Reprint Ed) by
Ramanatha Aiyar says at p 302:
No doubt the phrase ‘deemed to be’ is commonly used in statutes to extend the F
application of a provision of law to a class not otherwise amenable to it.
Its primary function is to bring in something which would otherwise be excluded

(see Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Lim Kheng Kim & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 175). In
Ex parte Walton, In re Levy (1988) 17 Ch D 746, it was held that in interpreting
G
a provision creating a legal fiction the court is to ascertain for what purpose the
function is created, and after ascertaining this, the court is to assume all those facts
and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect
of the fiction. It would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on
which alone the fiction can operate (see Shital Rai v State of Bihar AIR 1991 Pat 110
(FB)). In so construing a fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for H
which it is created (see In re Coal Economising Gas Company (1875) 1 Ch D 182)
or beyond the language of the section by which it is created (see CIT Bombay City
II v Shakuntala AIR 1966 SC 719). The fiction in the realm of law has a defined
role to play and it cannot be stretched to a point where it loses the very purpose for
which it is invented and employed (see Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes (9th Ed) I
p 72). It is required by its very nature to be construed strictly and only for the
purpose for which it was created; and its application cannot be extended (see FCT
v Comber (1986) 64 ALR 451). Thus it cannot be pushed so far as to result in a
most anomalous or absurd position (see Ashok Ambu Parmar v Commr of Police,
Badodara City AIR 1987 Guj 147).
A It must be remembered that the purpose of tendering in evidence a certificate under

s 90A(2) is to establish that a document was produced by a computer in the
ordinary course of its use. On the other hand s 90A(6) deems a document produced
by a computer to have been produced by the computer in the course of its ordinary
use. They are incompatible and inconsistent with each other. A fact cannot be
deemed to have been proved which specific provision has been made for the mode
B
of proof of the same fact. If therefore s 90A(6) is to function as a substitute for the
certificate it will render nugatory s 90A(2). This will not accord with the basic rules
of statutory construction. It is perhaps pertinent to bear in mind Madanlal
Fakirchand Dudhediya v Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd AIR 1962 1543 where
Gajendragadkar J said at p 155:
C
In construing s 76(1) and (2), it would be necessary to bear in mind the relevant
rules of construction. The first rule of construction which is elementary, is that
the words used in the section must be given their plain grammatical meaning.
Since we are dealing with two subsections of s 76, it is necessary that the said two
subsections must be construed as a whole ‘each portion throwing light, if need be,
D
on the rest’. The two subsections must be read as parts of an integral whole and
as being inter-dependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to
reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. If
repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of
the two should prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be
E avoided.
Every effort must thus be made to reconcile both the subsections in order to avoid
a conflict between them.
Such a reconciliation exercise will be greatly facilitated by a consideration of the
F object of s 90A(6). Section 90A(1) provides for the admissibility of a document
produced by a computer in any criminal or civil proceeding. Such a document is in
fact a reference to a document whether or not it was produced by a computer after
the commencement of any criminal or civil proceeding. Accordingly, the
applicability of s 90A(6) to documents produced by a computer ‘... whether or not
...’ They were produced after the commencement of any criminal or civil proceeding
G
etc. will strike at the very foundation of s 90A(1) as those documents constitute the
very basis of the section. It will result in s 90A(1) being rendered otiose. Such
documents cannot therefore be within the contemplation of s 90A(6). So s 90A(6)
must have some other purpose to serve. Its true scope and meaning will become
clear if it is read in the light of s 90C. It provides that the provisions of ss 90A and
H 90B shall prevail over any other provision of the Evidence Act 1950 thereby making
s 90A the only law under which all documents produced by a computer are to be
admitted in evidence. There may be instances when a document which is sought to
be admitted in evidence may not have been produced by a computer in the course
of its ordinary use even though it is one that is contemplated by s 90A(1). The
I document, even though produced by the computer, may not have anything to do
with the ordinary use of the computer. It may, for example, be a letter produced by
the computer which has no bearing on the ordinary use of the computer. Yet it is
still a document produced by a computer. How is this document to be admitted in
evidence bearing in mind the prevailing effect of s 90C in making all documents
produced by a computer admissible only under s 90A if the condition precedent to
its admissibility under s 90A(1) cannot be fulfilled by virtue of it not having been A
produced by the computer in the course of its ordinary use? It is this question that
is answered by s 90A(6). The sub-section does not contain the condition precedent
and, instead, contains a deeming provision to the same effect. As its purpose is to
render a document produced by a computer to be one that is produced by the
computer in the ordinary course of its use it can only apply to a document which
B
is not produced by the computer in the ordinary course of use. It is incongruous to
deem a document to have been produced by a computer in the ordinary course of
its use when it is such a document already. This will become clear if it is recalled that
the object of a deeming provision is to create an artificial status for something when
in reality it is not. As stated earlier the function of a fiction is to extend the
application of a provision of law to a class not otherwise amenable to it. Thus s C
90A(6) can only apply to a document which was not produced by a computer in
the ordinary course of its use, or, in other words, to a document which does not
come within the scope of s 90A(1). Thus it cannot apply to a document which is
already one that is produced by a computer in the ordinary course of its use. It
cannot therefore be used as a mode of proof to establish that such a document was D
so produced. The document must be proved in the manner authorised by s 90A(2).
It can now be discerned with ease that s 90A(6) has its own purpose to serve and
can never be a substitute for the certificate.
[33] I agree with the views expressed in the above passages from Hanafi E
Mat Hassan v Public Prosecutor in the analysis of s 90A. In substance therefore
the fact that a document was produced by a computer in the course of its
ordinary use may be proved by the tendering in evidence of a certificate under
s 90A(2) or by way of oral evidence. Such oral evidence must consist not only
a statement that the document was produced by a computer in the course of F
its ordinary use but also the matters presumed under s 90A(4). On the other
hand the presumption contained in s 90A(6) can be resorted to only when
the document was not produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary
use.
G
[34] In this case no certificate was tendered as required by s 90A(2) for
proof of the chemist report (‘P83’). Neither was any oral evidence adduced
to show that the report was produced by a computer in the course of its
ordinary use. It therefore remains that the only evidence available is that the
report was produced by a computer. It is thus appropriate to resort to H
s 90A(6) to presume that the report was produced by the computer in the
course of its ordinary use. With regard to proof of the matters under s 90A(4)
the oral evidence of PW27 is relevant when he said:
Saya tidak setuju saya tidak boleh sahkan komputer, program dan kit DNA itu I
tidak berfungsi dengan teratur (proper working order). Saya boleh sahkannya.
Sekurang-kurangnya saya telah buat ujian enam kali dengan genotyper dalam kes
ini. Sebelum buat ujian saya telah periksa sama ada komputer itu dalam keadaan
baik atau tidak (see p 338 of the appeal records).
A The chemist report (‘P83’) is therefore admissible in evidence.
[35] The contents of the chemist report (‘P83’) have the direct effect of
linking the appellant to the commission of the offence of murder and rape by
him of the deceased. Firstly, in the appellant’s room at his house in
B Kg Kerinci, Pantai Dalam, Kuala Lumpur a pair of Jack Blue Classic Jeans
was found. It had blood stains and the DNA tests confirmed that it is the
deceased’s blood. Secondly, PW30 who conducted the autopsy on the
deceased took a vaginal swab from her. The DNA tests of the swab by PW27
proved that it is the appellant’s semen. Thirdly, the blood stains on the back
C seat (‘P57A’) and driver’s seat (‘P55A’) of the car (‘P145’) were confirmed to
be that of the deceased. Fourthly, six strands of hair (‘P56C’) found in the car,
based on DNA tests, were also confirmed to be that of the deceased.
(b) The CCTV tapes (P19A-D)

D
[36] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court of Appeal
erred in law in admitting the CCTV tapes (‘P19A-D’) as evidence against the
appellant. In the Court of Appeal the arguments focused by the appellant and
the prosecution principally on the weight to be attached to these CCTV tapes
E
and the images of the appellant produced from them. The appellant
contended that the CCTV images of the appellant cannot be relied on for his
identification as there were many discrepancies as regards the attire of the
man purportedly identified as him besides the images being unclear. The
prosecution on the other hand contended that the images may be quite
F
unclear but that did not mean that the CCTV tapes could not be admitted
as evidence. It was further contended by the prosecution that only the ‘weight
to be attached’ needs the court’s consideration and the prosecution is relying
on the CCTV tapes merely as corroboration of the evidence given by PW4,
PW5 and PW6.
G
[37] Notwithstanding the above arguments advanced on behalf of the

appellant and the prosecution, I am of the view that before the CCTV tapes
can be admitted as evidence it must be considered whether they are
H documents produced by a computer. A CCTV tape clearly falls within the
definitions of ‘document’ and ‘computer’ under s 3 of the Act.
[38] Under s 3 of the Act ‘document’ is defined as follows:
I ‘document’ means any matter expressed, described, or howsoever represented,

upon any substance, material, thing or article, including any matter embodied in
a disc, tape, film, sound track or other device whatsoever, by means of —
(a) letters, figures, marks, symbols, signals, signs or other forms of
expression, description, or representation whatsoever;
(b) any visual recording (whether of still or moving images); A

(c) any sound recording, or any electronic, magnetic, mechanical or
other recording whatsoever and howsoever made, or any sounds,
electronic impulses, or other data whatsoever;
(d) a recording, or transmission, over a distance of any matter by any, or B
any combination, of the means mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or
(c),
or by more than one of the means mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d),
intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of expressing,
describing, or howsoever representing, that matter. C
[39] A ‘computer’ is defined in the same section as follows:

‘Computer’ means any device for recording, storing processing, retrieving or D
producing any information or other matter, or for performing any one or more of
those functions, by whatever name or description such device is called; and where
two or more computers carry out any one or more of those functions in
combination or in succession or otherwise howsoever conjointly, they shall be treat
as a single computer.
E
[40] A CCTV tape is therefore a document produced by a computer. It

follows that the CCTV tapes (P19A-D) must satisfy the requirements of
s 90A of the Act before they can be admitted in evidence. As this had not
been done they are inadmissible. F
WHETHER THE ‘MUSLIN CLOTH’ (‘P82A’) WAS OF THE SAME

KIND OF FABRIC THAT WAS FOUND AROUND THE NECK OR
WRISTS OF THE DECEASED
G
[41] The appellant has also alleged that the Court of Appeal erred in
arriving at their finding of fact that the ‘muslin cloth’ (‘P82A’) which was
seized from the appellant’s office is the same as the cloth wrapped around the
deceased’s neck or tied around the deceased’s hands (‘P59A’) and (‘P61A’).
On this issue I am of the view that the Court of Appeal did not err because H
it had made a reasonable finding of fact based on the opportunity of access
that the appellant had to the ‘muslin cloth’ (‘P82A’) which could be obtained
from the appellant’s workplace. The evidence of MAS storekeeper PW26 on
this issue was accepted by the Court of Appeal in proving this fact. The Court
of Appeal had also discussed this issue in detail regarding the access to this I
cloth. The Court of Appeal had also given detailed reasons as to why PW26’s
evidence was accepted.
A [42] Still on the issue of the ‘muslin cloth’, there is the evidence of the
Chemist (‘PW27’) to be considered. He is an expert based on his academic
qualification, the courses he undertook, the training and his vast experience
in fabric analysis. Therefore, PW27 is qualified to give evidence on the
texture and composition of the ‘muslin cloth’ (‘P82A’). PW27 had conducted
B several tests such as the microscopic test, sulphuric acid test, quantitative test,
burning test and weave pattern test and arrived at a finding and conclusion
that the ‘muslin cloth’ (‘P82A’) which was obtained by the investigating
officer from the appellant’s workplace is of the same type of cloth as that tied
to the deceased’s wrist. This evidence is another link between the appellant
C and the deceased. It is to be noted that PW27, during cross-examination, did
say that the ‘dissolvent and burning test’ was not conclusive but the
microscopic test was conclusive as based on such test, the ‘pattern of weave of
the materials’ can be determined. The appellant’s counsel did not
cross-examine PW27 on the microscopic test in terms of its ‘reliability of
D comparison by pattern of weave’. I am of the view that all the tests conducted
by PW27 when combined lead to the conclusion that the ‘muslin cloth’
(‘P82A’) is of the same type as the cloth found tied around the deceased’s
wrists.
E WHETHER THERE WAS ANY ONE ELSE INVOLVED IN THE

COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
[43] On the contention of the appellant that the Court of Appeal erred in
arriving at their finding of fact that there was nobody else involved in the
F
crime other than the appellant himself, I am of the view that the Court of
Appeal is justified in making such a finding. The appellant alleged that the
heavy concrete tyre covering the deceased’s body showed that many people
were involved. On this point I find that the evidence of the investigating
officer (‘PW44’) clearly shows that it is possible that the tyre was pulled and
G
dragged before it was pushed into the manhole. This can be done as there is
a handle on the tyre which makes it possible for the tyre to be pulled and
dragged. In fact, PW44 even demonstrated in court how it could be done.
H [44] The appellant claimed that it is impossible for him to lift the concrete
tyre to the manhole where the body was found. The appellant argued that as
the concrete tyre was beside the road divider it was impossible for the
appellant to lift it. There is no evidence to show the tyre’s exact origin before
it was put on top of the manhole. Therefore, the appellant has no basis to
I raise this issue. The Court of Appeal had considered this issue carefully and
had reached a finding which is supported by evidence. It is my view that
undue consideration should not be given to this evidence as the act of
covering the body is an act ‘after the event’ which is after the deceased died
from strangulation and/or massive loss of blood. The concrete tyre could not A
have caused any internal bleeding as blood stains were found even in the car.
EVIDENCE OF EXISTENCE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT

THE CRIME B
[45] It must also be noted that the appellant had the opportunity to have
committed the crime, (see s 7 and illustration (c) of the Evidence Act 1950].
The evidence of opportunity in this case has been supplemented by proof of C
circumstances of such a nature as to lead to the inference that it was probable
that advantage would be taken by the appellant of the opportunity (see Aziz
bin Muhamad Din v Public Prosecutor [1966] 5 MLJ 473). The evidence
adduced by the prosecution showed that the appellant was seen together with
the deceased by the prosecution witnesses, PW4, PW5 and PW12 through D
the sequence of events taking place at the various locations.
WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A RETRIAL UPON THE

REJECTION OF THE APPELLANT’S CONFESSION
E
[46] The appellant further contended that the learned judges of the Court
of Appeal erred in their evaluation of the prosecution evidence after having
rejected the appellant’s confession (‘P122’) and thereafter affirming the
conviction. It was argued that the Court of Appeal should have set aside the
conviction or alternatively made an order for a retrial after the end of the F
prosecution’s case and allowing the appellant to make a fresh decision as to
whether to exercise his option to give sworn evidence or to remain silent. On
this issue it is my considered view that the appellant’s contention is without
basis as there is no legal principle that a conviction should be set aside when
a confession by the accused is rejected by the Court of Appeal. The Court of G
Appeal has the discretion to re-evaluate the remaining evidence and to
scrutinise in totality such other evidence, apart from the confession to
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy all the elements of the
charges against the appellant. After all such steps have been taken, the Court
of Appeal is obliged to scrutinise whether the evidence is sufficient to affirm H
the conviction against the appellant (see Public Prosecutor v Abdul Rahman
Akif [2007] 5 MLJ 1; [2007] 4 CLJ 337). The question of whether an order
for a retrial should be made at the end of the prosecution’s case therefore does
not arise in this case since the evidence available before the Court of Appeal
is sufficient to support the finding of guilt made by the trial judge. On the I
same issue it is untenable for learned counsel for the appellant to contend that
the appellant should be allowed to make a fresh decision as to whether to
exercise his option to give sworn evidence or to remain silent if this court is
to order a retrial at the end of the prosecution’s case. The appellant has been
A accorded the advantage of a full trial process under the law before the trial
judge. Whatever rights and option he has as to whether to give sworn
evidence or to remain silent must be exercised in that trial unless an appellate
court on appeal had made an order setting aside the conviction and ordering
a retrial.
B
BURDEN OF PROOF VIS-A-VIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
[47] Learned counsel for the appellant had also argued of the need for this
C court to revisit the law on the burden of proof vis-à-vis right to remain silent.
It is the contention of the appellant that the insertion of the phrase ‘prima
facie case’ in the new s 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’)
(Act 593), upon the deletion of the phrase ‘if unrebutted would warrant a
conviction’ as in the old s 180 of the CPC, had created a further problem in
D the absence of a clear definition of the phrase ‘prima facie case’ within the
new s 180 of the CPC. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
problems will arise as to the effect of applying the test of maximum
evaluation of the prosecution evidence, upon an accused exercising his right
to remain silent. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the
E position of the law in relation to an accused person exercising his right to
remain silent, as pronounced by the Court of Appeal in the case of Looi Kow
Chai & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 MLJ 65; [2003] 1 CLJ 734 would
not only be in defiance of the correct burden of proof under the new s 180
of the CPC, but also would reduce the coronated status of the substantive
F right to remain silent to a mere illusory right.
[48] With respect to the above argument of learned counsel for the
appellant, I am of the view that when the appellant chooses to remain silent,
the court is put in a situation where it has no other choice but to convict the
G
appellant on both charges as the appellant had failed to rebut the evidence
adduced by prosecution’s witnesses. The High Court in the present case at the
end of the prosecution’s case had ruled that a prima facie case has been made
out and in coming to that decision, the court had relied on the maximum
H evaluation principle as laid down in the earlier decided cases of the appellate
courts. In the case of Looi Kow Chai & Anor v Public Prosecutor the Court of
Appeal at p 80 (MLJ), p 752 (CLJ) said:
It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under
s 180 of the code has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case.
I
He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and asks himself
the question, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence
contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then, no prima
facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal.
[49] It was also explained in that case that there is no burden on the A
prosecution to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt at the end of the
prosecution’s case. This was stated at p 84 (MLJ), p 757 (CLJ) as follows:
If the passage is meant to suggest that the evidence led by the prosecution must
receive maximum evaluation, then we would agree with it. But if what is meant is B
that the court ought to go further and determine whether the prosecution at the
end of its case has proved the case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
then we find ourselves in disagreement with the learned judge in that case. In our
view, subjecting the evidence of the prosecution to maximum evaluation to
determine if the defence is to be called does not mean that the prosecution has to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt at this intermediate stage. C
[50] It is my view that an accused’s right to remain silent is not at all

infringed by the principle of ‘if unrebutted would warrant a conviction’. It
means what it says. The evidence adduced must be such that it must warrant D
a conviction if it is unrebutted. Therefore, the appellant’s failure to call other
witnesses to rebut the prosecution’s case leaves the court with no other
alternative but to convict him.
[51] In dealing with the question as to the position of the law at the end E
of the prosecution’s case and the steps to be taken by the trial judge, useful
reference may be made to the judgment of this court in Balachandran v Public
Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ 301; [2005] 1 AMR 321 where the following
pronouncements were made:
F
(a) in deciding whether a prima facie case has been established under the
new s 180 of the CPC, a maximum evaluation of all the evidence
adduced by the prosecution must be done and a prima facie case is one
that is sufficient for the accused to answer, and the evidence adduced
must be such that it can only be surmounted by evidence in rebuttal; G
(b) if the evidence is unrebutted, and the accused remains silent, he must
be convicted. Therefore, the test to be applied at the end of the
prosecution’s case is whether there is sufficient evidence to convict the
accused if he chooses to remain silent, which if answered in the
affirmative, means that a prima facie case has been made out; and H
(c) whenever the accused has chosen to remain silent, there is no necessity
to re-evaluate the evidence to determine whether there is a reasonable
doubt in the absence of any further evidence.
I
CONCLUSION
[52] It is my judgment that the Court of Appeal had made a correct finding
in relying on the contents of the chemist report (‘P83’), the circumstantial
A evidence and the evidence in its entirety to come to the conclusion that it was
the appellant and no one else who was responsible for what happened to the
deceased on that night. For the reasons already stated I would dismiss the
appellant’s appeal. The conviction recorded and the sentence on the two
charges passed by the High Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal are
B hereby affirmed.
[53] My learned brothers Arifin bin Zakaria CJ (Malaya), Nik Hashim bin
Nik Ab Rahman, Augustine Paul and Hashim bin Dato’ Hj Yusoff FCJJ, have
seen this judgment in draft and have expressed their concurrence.
C
Appeal dismissed.
Reported by Andrew Christopher Simon

D

Ahmad Najib Bin Aris V Public Prosecutor

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Ahmad Najib bin Aris v Public Prosecutor

[2009] 2 MLJ (Zulkefli FCJ) 613

A Ahmad Najib bin Aris v Public Prosecutor

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 05–25

C Criminal Procedure — Accused — Right to silence — Whether infringed by

D Criminal Procedure — Appeal — Appellate court, power and duty of — Whether

E Criminal Procedure — Trial — Close of prosecution’s case — Whether court

Evidence — Documentary evidence — Computer printout — Admissibility —

Evidence — Identification evidence — Quality of identification evidence — A

Evidence — Identification parade — Irregularity in conduct of parade — B

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Deeming provision — C

Words and Phrases — ‘Document’ — Evidence Act 1950 s 3

Held, dismissing the appeal:

A evidence adduced by the prosecution, notwithstanding the High

A when a confession of an accused was rejected by the Court of Appeal.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan:

menilai semula semua keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak A

A perbarisan pengecaman, saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan telah secara

keterangan ahli kimia (PW27) seorang pakar yang berkelayakan A

(10) Penegasan perayu bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah terkhilaf dengan

Appeal from: Criminal Appeal No B-05–28 of 2003 (Court of Appeal,

THE CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION

[7] At about 12 midnight, Aminah bt Ishak (‘PW5’) was on her way to

[8] At about 1am on 14 June 2003, Azizam bin Ismail (‘PW12’), a

FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

A witnesses PW4, PW5 and PW12 as to the identification of the appellant at

forward 27 separate grounds of appeal for argument. The grounds in the A

POWER OF APPELLATE COURT TO REVIEW OR TO RE-EVALUATE

D IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT

[21] On the second ground of appeal in respect of the contention of the

G [26] In my view the above discrepancies are not material as what is

derived from the evidence as shown in their grounds of judgment on this A

THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDENTITY CARD OF THE APPELLANT

[28] It is my judgment that the Court of Appeal had arrived at a correct

THE IDENTIFICATION PARADE

(a) It shall be sufficient, in a certificate given under subsection (2), for

(5) A document shall be deemed to have been produced by a computer A

(a) responsible for the management of the operation of that computer

C [32] In appreciating the above passage it must first be observed that

Its primary function is to bring in something which would otherwise be excluded

A It must be remembered that the purpose of tendering in evidence a certificate under

A The chemist report (‘P83’) is therefore admissible in evidence.

(b) The CCTV tapes (P19A-D)

[37] Notwithstanding the above arguments advanced on behalf of the

[38] Under s 3 of the Act ‘document’ is defined as follows:

I ‘document’ means any matter expressed, described, or howsoever represented,

(b) any visual recording (whether of still or moving images); A

[39] A ‘computer’ is defined in the same section as follows:

[40] A CCTV tape is therefore a document produced by a computer. It

WHETHER THE ‘MUSLIN CLOTH’ (‘P82A’) WAS OF THE SAME

E WHETHER THERE WAS ANY ONE ELSE INVOLVED IN THE

EVIDENCE OF EXISTENCE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT

WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A RETRIAL UPON THE

[50] It is my view that an accused’s right to remain silent is not at all

Reported by Andrew Christopher Simon

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