This article was downloaded by: [University of South Florida]

On: 14 October 2014, At: 08:43

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:
1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK

Australasian Journal of
Philosophy
Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajp20

On the definition of sexual

harassment
a
Iddo Landau
a
University of Haifa
Published online: 02 Jun 2006.

To cite this article: Iddo Landau (1999) On the definition of sexual

harassment, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77:2, 216-223, DOI:
10.1080/00048409912348971

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409912348971

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all
the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our
platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors
make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of
the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and
Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,
demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in
relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study
purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,
reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
 form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access
and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014
 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 216-223; June 1999

ON THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Iddo Landau

In a recent article in this journal [4] Jan Crosthwaite and Graham Priest suggest a
definition and analysis o f sexual harassment. It runs as follows:

[A]ny form of sexual behaviour by members of a dominant gender group towards

Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

members of a subordinate gender group whose typical effect is to cause members of

the subordinate group to experience their powerlessness as a member of that group. [4,
p. 72]

I find Crosthwaite and Priest's suggestion problematic on a number of accounts.

I. The Definition is Too Broad

The definition does not exclude numerous activitieswhich many, including, I would think,
the authors themselves, would not like to sec as sexual harassment. I Take an example of a
w o m a n and a man kissing. Both want the kiss and enjoy it;both have initiateditmore or
less equally; and no violence or coercion is involved. They do not work in the same work
place, nor is one of them a professor and the other his or her student. However, the woman
is influenced by the many popular Harlequin and Mills and Boon novels, and films of the
same genre, that she has read and seen. A m o n g her many emotions, she emphasises to
herself the real or imagined strength of the man with w h o m she is, and contrasts it with
her own true or imagined powerlessness. Influenced by these romantic novels and films,
she feels that he will protect her in case of danger; he will take care of her in general; she
can lean on him. He can now think for both of them and tell her what to do. He is so
clever, tough, and able to cope with that mean world out there. He is a man; he is strong.
And she is weak, powerless, a woman...
Some readers may be smiling by now, feeling these emotions to be cheap and kitschy.
But their evaluation is beside the point, which is that the man's behaviour, welcomed and
even encouraged by the woman, is according to Crosthwaite and Priest sexual harassment.
It is a case of sexual behaviour (holding gently, slowly bringing his lips to hers, kissing)
by a member of the dominant gender (the man) towards a member of the subordinate
gender (the woman) whose typical effect is to cause the member of the subordinate group
to experience her powerlessness as a member of that group. However, I believe that most
people, including Crosthwaite and Priest, would not think that this behaviour is an
instance of sexual harassment. If we do classify it as sexual harassment, it would follow

To avoid confusion between their notion of sexual harassment and that which sees it as a
harassment that is sexual, Crosthwaite and Priest refer to their notion as 'SH'. [4, p. 70] Since I
believe the confusion unlikely, I do not follow their practice.

216
 Iddo Landau 217

that many women are sexually harassed of their own free will; that a high proportion of
women want to be sexually harassed, eagerly wait for it to happen, encourage and initiate
it, and are heartbroken when it stops; and that almost all men sexually harass.
This is not the only sexual behaviour that Crosthwaite and Priest's definition would
include under sexual harassment. If, having received a proposal of marriage, a woman
who believes in the traditional model of the patriarchal family decides to quit her job in
order to be what she conceives as 'his little housewife', the man's act of proposing should
be seen as sexual harassment, even if he himself opposes her move. Similarly, the
script-writer, producer, director, actors, and distributors of 'Harlequinite' films such as
Pretty Woman, if they are men, also sexually harass women merely by fulfilling their
respective functions in the films, since they too are members of the dominant gender
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

group who are involved in sexual behaviour which is directed, in part, towards women,
and whose typical effect (as in the 'kissing couple' example above) is to cause women to
experience their powerlessness as members of that group.
Defenders of Crosthwaite and Priest may argue that the men in the examples above do
not commit sexual harassment since they do not intend their activities to have such an
effect on women, and that much liability for the women's feelings lies with prevalent
social norms. However, Crosthwaite and Priest declare that the existence or inexistence of
intentions is irrelevant for their account, and that social norms indeed inform and effect
sexual harassment [4, pp. 68-9, 81]. Likewise, supporters of Crosthwaite and Priest may
claim that the scriptwriter of Pretty Woman cannot be seen as committing sexual
harassment since his behaviour is not directed towards any particular woman. But this
criterion is irrelevant for Crosthwaite and Priest's definition, and some of the behaviours
they do present as examples of sexual harassment (e.g. of the worker who hangs sexually
explicit images on the walls of his office) are also not directed towards particular women
[4, pp. 68-9]. Partisans of the definition may also claim that writing a script for Pretty
Woman cannot count as sexual harassment since this is not a sexual behaviour. But the
term 'sexual behaviour' is vague and broad, and Crosthwaite and Priest do not clarify it
[4, n. 10]. The man who hangs sexually explicit images on the walls of his office, or tells a
sexist joke, is also not clearly indulging in sexual activity, at least no more so than the
man who writes the script. Finally, defenders of Crosthwaite and Priest may claim that the
reactions of the women in the examples above are not that typical. However, they are not
any less typical than the reactions of women in Crosthwaite and Priest's own examples of
sexual harassment. If Crosthwaite and Priest's definition and examples of sexual
harassment are accepted, so should those I present here.

II. The Definition is Too Narrow

The definition not only includes many behaviours it ought to exclude, but also excludes
many it ought to include. These are behaviours whose characteristics are similar to those
Crosthwaite and Priest see as sexual harassment, but are performed by women and
directed towards women, performed by women and directed towards men, or performed
by men and directed towards men.2 Crosthwaite and Priest acknowledge that many

z The authors cite some exceptions to the last category, to be considered below.
 218 On the Definition of Sexual Harassment

behaviours not included in their analysis and definition are, in common linguistic and
legal use, referred to as sexual harassment. But they maintain that they are not interested
in a lexicographical or legal definition; they are interested, rather, in understanding a
certain social phenomenon [4, pp. 66-7, 76].
But even from a non-lexicographical and a non-legal perspective there are good
reasons for seeing the behaviours that Crosthwaite and Priest include and those they
exclude as of the same type. Behaviours should be grouped and analysed as examples of
one social phenomenon, and seen as of the same type, if all or most of their characteristics
are the same. But the behaviours excluded from Crosthwaite and Priest's analysis because
they are not committed by men and directed towards women have many characteristics in
common with those included. This similarity can be seen, for example, in the ability to
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

describe both included and excluded behaviours in the same ways (except for the
pronouns). Likewise, both excluded and included behaviours can be divided into the same
categories (e.g. sexual coercion, sexual bribery, persistent sexual invitations, etc.). This is
true both for Crosthwaite and Priest's own classification of sexual harassment types [4,
pp. 67-9], and the other categorisations prevalent in the literature ([2], [5], [6] and [7,
23-4], for example). Similarly, both excluded and included behaviours are equally
vulnerable or impervious to general criticisms of the notion of sexual harassment ([7, pp.
97-163], for example). Both excluded and included behaviours are morally wrong.
Crosthwaite and Priest do not make it clear whether they take the excluded behaviours to
be more or less wrong than the included ones. The same questions arise concerning both
included and excluded behaviours: to what extent is sexual harassment a result of
unclarity or miscommunieation? Would laws against sexual harassment not make society
too puritanical? The advice usually given to company directors on procedures to follow
upon a complaint (such as maintaining secrecy, discussing the complaint with both
parties, weighing the evidence; see [1] and [3], for example) are as applicable to the
behaviours Crosthwaite and Priest exclude as it is to the conduct they include. The same is
true for other means for fighting these behaviours, such as notices on billboards, fliers,
group discussions, and other ways of explaining company policy [ibid.]. The
characteristics of the behaviours that Crosthwaite and Priest include and those they
exclude are similar in so many ways, that it makes more sense to see them as one social
phenomenon.
Of course, Crosthwaite and Priest could respond that these points of similarity are
insignificant for their concept of sexual harassment. But such a response would relate to
another, deeper problem with their discussion: they consciously ignore the legal and
practical aspects of sexual harassment [4, pp. 66-7]. They explicitly distance themselves
from the issues as to what the laws and regulations about sexual harassment should be,
how these laws actually work, or how the moral problems involved in implementing
sexual harassment legislation should be solved. However, the legal and moral features of
sexual harassment are central to it. The term 'sexual harassment' was invented in the
mid-seventies for the very purpose of influencing law, and, through it, moral reality, and it
now primarily functions as a legal and moral term in legal and moral discussions. Once
Crosthwaite and Priest uproot the concept from the context of law and morality, it
becomes unclear what is it that they are defining, and consequently it is unclear by what
standards their definition should be judged. The concept of 'sexual harassment which has
nothing to do with legal and moral considerations' is their own, and this ensures that it
 lddo Landau 219

will be up to them to decide how to define it. This means that they can always make their
definition immune to objection by responding that it misses the concept they are defining.
But this also makes their definition uninteresting.

III. Crosthwaite and Priest's Motivation

Why are Crosthwaite and Priest committed to excluding from their analysis behaviours so
similar to those they do include in it7 They answer this question themselves: if the
definition of sexual harassment were to include behaviours beyond those perpetrated by
men and directed towards women, it would not be clear why feminists should be
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

especially concerned about sexual harassment. After all, although men commit such
behaviours more frequently than women do, and more women than men are victims of
such behaviours, there are also women who adopt such behaviours, and men who are
victims. The high proportion of men among perpetrators of sexual harassment and that of
women among its victims is insufficient, according to Crosthwaite and Priest, to
encourage women to be especially concerned with sexual harassment, or to explain why
they have been so concerned with it up to now [4, p. 79].
This claim seems to me mistaken. Leaders of the black community may be especially
concerned about welfare cuts even if they do not think that these are related to racism, and
although they know that some of the poor are not black; they can be concerned because
there are relatively many poor among blacks. Similarly, although gays are not the only
people who have AIDS, leaders of the gay community may be especially concerned about
cuts in AIDS research because the problem is more severe for the gay community.
Likewise, a person from India may be more sensitive about world-hunger problems. The
relatively high incidence of problematic phenomena in their communities is sufficient to
make these activists, as it would make feminists in the context of sexual harassment,
especially concerned.
Crosthwaite and Priest also wish to locate sexual harassment as a form of oppression
[4, p. 80], to emphasise that sexual harassment can be in continuum with rape [ibid.], and
to present a definition which does not limit sexual harassment to discriminatory
behaviours in the work place and educational institutions, but also includes behaviours in
the street or at home [4, p. 79]. But these motivations likewise do not necessitate the
exclusion of cases in which men harass men, women men, and women women. 3
Another claim by Crosthwaite and Priest is that to group together the behaviours they
see as sexual harassment with those they do not would not acknowledge how patriarchy
both constitutes sexual harassment and is preserved by it [4, pp. 76, 81-2]. However, it
seems to me that this claim is wrong; including the behaviours Crosthwaite and Priest
exclude from their notion of sexual harassment could recognise the major effect that

The authors take oppression to be 'a relation between social groups which involves one group
wielding power which is illegitimate...over another group...it involves limitation of the prospects
for self-development, realisation of goals and material success...'. [4, p. 71] Their notion is thus
limited to cases which involve relations between social groups, and excludes those where
individuals per se wield illegitimate power over other individuals. According to their notion, even
severe cases in which men harass men, women women, or women men, if they do not involve
relations between social groups, should not be seenas examples of oppression. Bat I see no reason
for limiting the notion of oppression to activities related to social groups.
 220 On the Definition of Sexual Harassment

patriarchy has on sexual harassment, as well as the effect that sexual harassment has on
patriarchy. It would merely not admit patriarchy as the only influence on sexual
harassment, or as the only social construct influenced by sexual harassment. It would not
deny the importance of patriarchy in relation to sexual harassment, only its exclusiveness.
Indeed, cases of sexual harassment---even if we take only those that Crosthwaite and
Priest include in their analysis---seem to spring from many factors besides patriarchy.
Such factors can be racism (when a purpose of the activity is to humiliate a member of
another race), sadism, peer pressure, pursuit of sexual gratification, institutional power
relations, and even miscommunication. Some factors (e.g. racism, institutional power
relations) both produce sexual harassment and are affected by it. In many eases several of
these factors are at work at the same time. The overriding proportion of eases in which
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

women are the victims of sexual harassment, and men the perpetrators, suggests that
patriarchy is an important factor in many sexual harassment cases; but not that it is the
only factor which should be taken into account. 4 A more multi-dimensional definition and
analysis of sexual harassment seems more plausible once it is remembered, e.g., that
sexual harassment of women of other ethnicities or races is considered, in some groups,
more permissible than that of women of one's own group. Similarly, women of some age
groups are harassed more frequently than those of others. Such characteristics of sexual
harassment suggest that it is influenced by other factors besides patriarchy.

IV. Specific Differences

To sustain their view, Crosthwaite and Priest claim that women harassed by men
experience different feelings than those of men harassed by women. Even if this were
true, I believe it would not justify excluding all behaviours not perpetrated by men and
directed towards women, as Crosthwaite and Priest suggest. To do so would endow one
characteristic of sexual harassment with disproportionate weight, while completely
ignoring the importance of all others. Moreover, some of their claims seem wrong. For
example, according to them part of the helplessness felt by women harassed by men,
unlike that felt by men harassed by women, has to do with the standard views in our
society about a woman's complete sexual availability to any interested male:

[F]eminine 'no-saying' is not to be taken seriously, particularly in the domain of sexual

behaviour. Standard sexual stereotypes take sexual predation of women to be a natural
expression and prerogative of masculinity. Any aggression or stridency in response is
held to be unfeminine, and to diminish a woman's right to respectful treatment. No
acceptable response allows the victim of sexual harassment to make clear her view that
the behaviour is quite unacceptable and often humiliatingly inappropriate. [4, p. 74]

This is an unrealistic description of standard social norms in our society. Pace

Crosthwaite and Priest, it is not considered unfeminine or not respectable for a woman to

Surprisingly, in their classification of types of sexual harassment Crosthwaite and Priest do note
that sexual gratification, peer pressure, or miscommunieation affect sexual harassment. [4, pp.
67-9] But then they completely ignore these factors, and define the phenomenon only with
reference to patriarchy and its relation to women's feelings of helplessness.
 Iddo Landau 221

reject a sexual initiative by a man. Perhaps the contrary; it is considered inappropriate and
unfeminine to accept such initiatives too frequently and 'easily'. Nor do men find it
exceptional or bewildering when their initiatives are rejected, or when they hear that other
men's are. Such rejections are thought to be a usual and normal component of romantic
and sexual activity. It is also untrue that sexual predation is taken to be a 'prerogative of
masculinity'. In more sexually permissive circles as in conservative ones, rape is seen as
abhorrent. Crosthwaite and Priest's assertions that 'feminine "no-saying" is not to be
taken seriously, particularly in the domain of sexual behaviour', and that 'no acceptable
response allows the victim of sexual harassment to make clear her view' are equally false.
These notions fall under what Naomi Wolf [10] describes as 'victim feminism', i.e.
viewing men as beasts of prey on the loose, and women as helpless weaklings, thus
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

encouraging in women a 'victim identity' which, besides being unrealistic, frightens and
disempowers them. 5
Crosthwaite and Priest also discuss the reaction of a man subjected to wolf-whistles
and comments about his sexual attractiveness: 'though possibly mixed with
embarrassment, [his reaction] will normally be one of some pleasure. He does not feel any
lack of power, and the experience is not an unpleasant one.' [4, pp. 74-5] However, some
women also feel pleasure--although mixed with some embarrassment--in such
circumstances. And not all women feel lack of power in this context; some of them feel
the power either to respond to the wolf-whistles, or to ignore them and thus give the
whistlers the feeling that they are not worth even a nod. I am not sure that Jan Buckwald's
reaction of 'your face bums red in that confounding mix of anger and embarrassment and
helplessness' [4, n. 17] is so typical. On the other hand, many men in such circumstances
will feel their faces 'burn red in that confounding mix' of Buckwald's description, as well
as experience the other feelings Crosthwaite and Priest attribute only to women. Men too
will experience the situation as unpleasant, wish the shouting and whistles to cease, feel
frustration at not being able to stop it, and powerlessness in face of this noisy,
semi-appreciative semi-jeering group. The same is true for another example Crosthwaite
and Priest suggest, that of persistent and unwanted sexual invitations [4, p. 75]. They think
that men, unlike women, will only enjoy and be flattered by these, while women, it seems
to them, will only feel displeasure and frustration. But I think that again these claims will
be untrue both for many men and for many women. Crosthwaite and Priest make
unwarranted generalisations concerning all women and all men.
It would probably take men---on average---more time and persistent invitation to feel
frustration and displeasure. Similarly, although a large proportion of men will feel
powerlessness when wolf-whistles are directed at them, probably an even higher
proportion of women will feel this way in similar circumstances. But the larger number of
women does not justify the complete disregard of all the many men, as Crosthwaite and
Priest suggest. The greater number of women who will feel powerless should be taken into
account in the analysis, and can be explained by reference to patriarchy. But, again, the
importance that should be given to patriarchy in such an analysis should not lead to seeing
it as the only factor at work.

Crosthwaite and Priest suggest that whatever weight women's 'no saying' does have today has
been achieved through the growing awareness to sexual harassment issues [4, n. 15]. I believe that
this claim too is unrealistic.
 222 On the Definition of Sexual Harassment

V. Men Harassing Men; Women Harassing Women

As a rule, Crosthwaite and Priest do not consider cases in which men harass men as sexual
harassment. They make, however, an exception: rape and other coercive sexual
interactions in prisons and boarding schools where the victims are forced to behave
generally in an effeminate way, and are treated by everyone as women, are cases of sexual
harassment [4, p. 78]. Crosthwaite and Priest claim that in terms of gender, even if not
sex, the victims are, in fact, women, and since their analysis refers to gender, these would
be cases of sexual harassment. Other men-to-men cases of rape, sexual molestation, sexual
blackmail, unwanted sexual exposure, etc. are not considered by Crosthwaite and Priest as
sexual harassment.
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

Based on the many similarities between men-women and men-men harassments, I

believe there are good reasons for including the latter in the definition of sexual
harassment. (Crosthwaite and Priest do not even try to show, for cases where men harass
men, that the feelings of the harassees differ from those in which men harass women.) But
curiously, even according to Crosthwaite and Priest's own definition and analysis many
men-men harassments may be seen as sexual harassment. They assert, for example, that a
case in which 'a gay man...[is] the butt of unpleasant jokes, verbal abuse, or physical
assault (including some sexual acts...)' should not be seen as sexual harassment [4, p. 77].
However, if gay men are seen as a subordinate gender group, and heterosexual men as a
dominant gender group, such cases should be seen as sexual harassment even according to
Crosthwaite and Priest's own definition. These would be cases of a sexual behaviour by
members of a dominant gender group towards members of a subordinate gender group
whose typical effect is to cause members of the subordinate group to experience their
powerlessness as a member of that group. Viewing such cases as sexual harassment would
also accord with Crosthwaite and Priest's deeper analysis, since patriarchal views (e.g.
concerning the way 'real' men should behave, and how those deviating from this norm
should be treated) influence the harassment of gay men by heterosexual men.
Crosthwaite and Priest neglect to discuss any eases in which women harass women.
This is a pity, since according to some studies ([8] and [9], for example), the proportion of
some forms of harassment among women is not low. I believe that the considerations I
have presented above concerning women-men and men-men harassments apply here as
well.

VI. Conclusion

Crosthwaite and Priest's failure to exclude from their definition of sexual harassment
behaviours they too would not like to see included, and their resistance to including,
notwithstanding the obvious similarities, behaviours that should be included, are related to
the same problem. Their analysis takes account only of one factor in sexual harassment:
patriarchy. Wishing to emphasise its importance, they ignore all other factors, and present
a definition based on a reductionist understanding. They are thus like a person who,
wishing to emphasise the importance of racism on black poverty, would deny that it is
affected by any other factor. It is hard to think of any social phenomenon which is
influenced only by one factor. It would be surprising if sexual harassment were an
exception to this rule. A definition based on a more sensitive, multi-dimensional
 Iddo Landau 223

understanding o f this intricate phenomenon, and which takes several factors into account,
is advisable. 6

UniversiO, o f Haifa Received: August 1998

Revised: September 1998

REFERENCES

1. C. B. Bryson, 'The Internal Sexual Harassment Investigation: Self-Evaluation Without

Self-lncrimination', Employee Relations Law Journal 15 (1990), pp. 551-559.
Downloaded by [University of South Florida] at 08:43 14 October 2014

2. L. Cammaert, 'How Widespread is Sexual Harassment on Campus?', International Journal of

Women Studies 8 (1985), pp. 388-397.
3. M. Corum, Combating Sexual Harassment (Arlington, VA: Dewey, 1993).
4 J. Crosthwaite and G. Priest, 'The Definition of Sexual Harassment', Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 74 (1996), pp. 66-82.
5. J. E. Gruber, 'A Typology of Personal and Environmental Sexual Harassment: Research and
Policy Implications for the 1990s', Sex Roles 26 (1992), pp. 447--464.
6. E. Lafontaine and L. Tredeau, 'The Frequency, Sources, and Correlates of Sexual Harassment
among Women in Traditional Male Occupations', Sex Roles 15 (1986), pp. 433-441.
7 L. LeMoncheck and M. Hajdin, Sexual Harassment: A Debate (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1997).
8. G-Y. Lie and S. Gentlewarrier, 'Intimate Violence in Lesbian Relationships: Discussions of
Survey Findings and Practical Implications', Journal of Social Service Research 15 (1991), pp.
41-59.
9. C.M. Renzetti, Violent Betrayal: Partner Abuse in Lesbian Relationships (Newbury Park, CA:
Sage, 1992).
10. N. Wolf, Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How to Use It (New York: Fawcett
Columbine, 1993).

6 I am very grateful to Saul Smilansky, Mira Reich, and two anonymous referees of the Australasian
Journal of Philosophy for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.