Foreign Affairs November December 2021 Issue

THE END OF THE AGE OF INTERVENTION
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2021
november/december 2021 • volume 100 • number 6 •
The
Divided
World
America’s
Cold Wars
the divided world
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Volume 100, Number 6
THE DIVIDED WORLD

The New Cold War 10
America, China, and the Echoes of History
Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis
Containment Beyond the Cold War 22

How Washington Lost the Post-Soviet Peace
M. E. Sarotte
The Kremlin’s Strange Victory 36

How Putin Exploits American Dysfunction and Fuels American
Decline
Fiona Hill
COVE R: BELA JU D E
The Inevitable Rivalry 48

America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics
John J. Mearsheimer
November/December 2021
ESSAYS
The Last Days of Intervention 60

Afghanistan and the Delusions of Maximalism
Rory Stewart
Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy 74

A Force for Good in the Changing International Order
Tsai Ing-wen
The Age of America First 85

Washingtoní s Flawed New Foreign Policy Consensus
Richard Haass
The Coming Democratic Revival 99

Americaí s Opportunity to Lead the Fight Against
Authoritarianism
Madeleine K. Albright
The Technopolar Moment 112

How Digital Powers Will Reshape the Global Order
Ian Bremmer
Americaí s Crypto Conundrum 129

Protecting Security Without Crushing Innovation
Justin Muzinich
The Myth of Russian Decline 142

Why Moscow Will Be a Persistent Power
Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
ON FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM
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Order Before Peace 153
Kissinger’s Middle East Diplomacy and Its Lessons for Today
Martin Indyk
The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis 166
The Case for a New Planetary Politics
Stewart M. Patrick
REVIEWS & RESPONSES

Market Prophets 178
The Path to a New Economics
Felicia Wong
How Apartheid Endures 184

The Betrayal of South Africa
Sisonke Msimang
Liars in High Places 190

Who’s to Blame for Misinformation?
Jameel Jaffer
The Imperial Presidency’s Enablers 195

Why Executive Power Grows Unchecked
Stephen I. Vladeck
Recent Books 203
Letters to the Editor 230
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Volume 1, Number 1 • September 1922
November/December 2021 · Volume 100, Number 6
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CONTRIBUTORS
FIONA HILL is a leading expert on modern Russia. After
receiving a Ph.D. in history from Harvard, Hill served as an
intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia on the National
Intelligence Council in the George W. Bush and Obama
administrations and as deputy assistant to the president and
senior director for European and Russian affairs on the
National Security Council in the Trump administration.
Now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, she argues
in “The Kremlin’s Strange Victory” (page 36) that Vladimir
Putin is capitalizing on corruption, inequality, and political
divisions in the United States to accelerate American decline.
The son of a British intelligence officer, RORY STEWART

studied at Eton and Oxford before serving as an infantryman
in the British army and later as a diplomat. While on leave
from the British foreign service, he walked for 21 months
across Nepal, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan—a story
he partly told in his best-selling book The Places in Between.
Stewart went on to serve in Parliament and in various
ministerial positions and now teaches at Yale. In “The Last
Days of Intervention” (page 60), he blames the tragic
outcome in Afghanistan on the international community’s
inability to chart a path between overreach and neglect.
TSAI ING-WEN is the president of Taiwan. Born and raised in

Taipei, Tsai went on to earn a Ph.D. from the London
School of Economics and become an expert on international
political economy. Before becoming Taiwan’s first female
head of state, in 2016, Tsai spent 15 years working on
trade-related issues and then ran the agency that handles
relations with China. In “Taiwan and the Fight for Democ-
racy” (page 74), she argues that Taiwan owes its success to its
commitment to democracy—and that it is ready to join the
fight in the global struggle for democratic values.
From 1997 to 2001, MADELEINE ALBRIGHT served as the first

female U.S. secretary of state; she had earlier served as U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations. Born in Prague, she,
with her family, was forced to escape her Czech homeland
twice—first from the Nazis and later from the commu-
nists—and they eventually settled in Denver when Albright
was 11 years old. She is the author of multiple best-selling
books and now teaches at Georgetown University. In “The
Coming Democratic Revival” (page 99), she argues that
democracy is poised for a global comeback.
Return to Table of
Return to Table of Contents
Contents
THE DIVIDED WORLD
I
n September, in his first address to archives to reveal how and why Washing-
the UN General Assembly as presi- ton’s relationship with Moscow so rapidly
dent, Joe Biden pledged that the regressed after the dissolution of the
United States was not “seeking a new Soviet Union. Hill, reflecting on her
cold war or a world divided into rigid experience as both a longtime Russia
blocs.” That pledge was echoed, in watcher and the senior Russia official on
different words, by Biden’s Chinese Donald Trump’s National Security
counterpart, Xi Jinping, and reinforced Council, shows how effectively and
by warnings from a slew of other leaders advantageously the Kremlin has exploited
about the grim consequences of a world American dysfunction—above all during
split into warring camps. Yet rather than the administration in which she served.
offering reassurance, this chorus served Finally, John Mearsheimer contends
mostly to highlight just how dismal the that sharpening U.S.-Chinese competi-
geopolitical reality has become, with tion is just the latest act in what he has
suspicion and acrimony threatening to called “the tragedy of great-power
sink trust and cooperation even in the politics.” The mystery, he argues, is not
face of shared existential challenges. why the relationship between Washing-
Is it too late? Has a new cold war ton and Beijing has so dramatically
already begun? Despite some clear deteriorated but why Americans ever
differences between the U.S.-Soviet thought a different outcome was possi-
contest then and the U.S.-Chinese ble; now, in his view, a darker, less
contest now, Hal Brands and John Lewis delusional worldview offers the best
Gaddis argue that the time has come to chance of averting disaster.
carefully study the lessons of the former In the decades since the onset of what
in order to prevent catastrophe in the we may someday come to call the First
latter. “The greatest unfought war of Cold War, historians and policymakers
our time,” they write, can “enhance resil- have endlessly studied its opening moves
ience in a Sino-American rivalry whose and argued over what, if anything, could
future, hot or cold, remains unclear.” have been done differently. To invoke the
In their respective essays, M. E. Cold War parallel is not to endorse it as
Sarotte and Fiona Hill explore the lost either desirable or inevitable. Instead, it
opportunities and dashed hopes of the should serve as a reminder: that now is
Cold War’s aftermath: how a moment of the time to bring scrutiny, care, and
both American triumph and new global wisdom to the opening moves of this new
possibility gave way to competition and competition, before it truly is too late.
disarray. Sarotte digs deep into the —Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Editor
Now is the time to bring
scrutiny, care, and
wisdom to the opening
moves of this new
competition, before it
truly is too late.
The New Cold War The Kremlin’s Strange Victory

Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis 10 Fiona Hill 36
BELA JUDE
Containment Beyond the Cold War The Inevitable Rivalry

M. E. Sarotte 22 John J. Mearsheimer 48
I L L U ST R AT I O N S BY T K
It’s no longer debatable that the

The New United States and China, tacit allies
THE DIVIDED WORLD
during the last half of the last Cold War,

Cold War are entering their own new cold war:
Chinese President Xi Jinping has
declared it, and a rare bipartisan con-
America, China, and the sensus in the United States has accepted
Echoes of History the challenge. What, then, might
previous contests—the one and only
Hal Brands and John Cold War and the many earlier cold
wars—suggest about this one?
Lewis Gaddis The future is, of course, less know-
able than the past, but it’s not in all
respects unknowable. Time will con-
I
s the world entering a new cold tinue to pass, the law of gravity will still
war? Our answer is yes and no. Yes apply, and none of us will outlive our
if we mean a protracted interna- physiological term limits. Are similarly
tional rivalry, for cold wars in this sense reliable knowns shaping the emerging
are as old as history itself. Some became cold war? If so, what unknowns lurk
hot, some didn’t: no law guarantees within them? Thucydides had such
either outcome. No if we mean the Cold predictabilities and surprises in mind
War, which we capitalize because it when he cautioned, 24 centuries ago,
originated and popularized the term. that the future would resemble the past
That struggle took place at a particular but not in all respects reflect it—even as
time (from 1945–47 to 1989–91), among he also argued that the greatest single
particular adversaries (the United war of his time revealed timeless truths
States, the Soviet Union, and their about all wars to come.
respective allies), and over particular Our purpose here, then, is to show
issues (post–World War II power how the greatest unfought war of our
balances, ideological clashes, arms time—the Soviet-American Cold
races). None of those issues looms as War—as well as other prior struggles,
large now, and where parallels do might expand experience and enhance
exist—growing bipolarity, intensifying resilience in a Sino-American rivalry
polemics, sharpening distinctions whose future, hot or cold, remains
between autocracies and democracies— unclear. That history provides a frame-
the context is quite different. work within which to survive uncer-
tainty, and possibly even thrive within
HAL BRANDS is Henry A. Kissinger Distin-
guished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns
it, whatever the rest of the twenty-first
Hopkins University and a Senior Fellow at the century throws our way.
American Enterprise Institute. He is the author
of The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War
Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry Today.
THE BENEFITS OF BOUNDARIES
Our first known is geography, which
JOHN LEWIS GADDIS is Robert A. Lovett
Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale continental drift will in time alter, but
University and the author of On Grand Strategy. not in our time. China will remain
10 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S PACKAGE ILLUSTRATIONS BY BENEDET TO CRISTOFANI

The New Cold War
November/December 2021 11
chiefly a land power, beset by an ancient forms of hybrid hegemony. President

dilemma. If, in search of strategic Woodrow Wilson had that prospect in
depth, it tries to expand its perimeters, mind when he declared war on imperial
it is likely to overstretch its capabilities Germany in 1917, and President Franklin
and provoke resistance from anxious Roosevelt took the argument one step
neighbors. If, to regain solvency, it further in 1940–41, insisting—correctly,
contracts its perimeters, it risks inviting historians have now confirmed—that
in enemies. Even behind great walls, Adolf Hitler’s ultimate target was the
uneasy lie the heads of those whose United States itself. So when the Ameri-
boundaries remain unfixed. can diplomat George Kennan, in 1947,
The United States, in contrast, called for “containing” an emboldened
benefits from boundaries that geogra- World War II ally, the Soviet Union, he
phy has determined. That’s why the had long legacies on which to draw.
United Kingdom, after 1815, chose not Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (bri)
to contest its offspring’s primacy in evokes similar concerns. The “belt” is to
North America: sustaining armies across be a network of rail and road corridors
3,000 miles of ocean would have been across Eurasia. The “road” will be sea
too costly even for the world’s greatest routes in the Indo-Pacific and, if global
naval power. Geography gave the warming permits, also in the Arctic,
Americans hybrid hegemony: control of sustained by bases and ports in states
a continent and unimpeded access to made friendly by the bri’s “benefits.”
two vast oceans, which they quickly Nothing Germans or Russians ever
connected with a transcontinental attempted combined such ambition with
railroad. That allowed them to develop such specificity: China seeks hybrid
the military-industrial means with hegemony on an unprecedented scale.
which to rescue Europeans in World Which brings us to our first unknown:
War I, World War II, and the Cold War What might that imply for Eurasia and
from the attempted continental consoli- the world beyond?
dations they confronted.
Why, though, from so safe a perch, XI’S WORLD ORDER
did the Americans undertake such There’s a remarkable record, over the
daunting commitments? Perhaps they past three centuries, of offshore balanc-
looked in the mirror and feared what ers thwarting aspirants to onshore
they saw: their own example of a coun- domination: first Great Britain against
try dominating a continent and its France in the eighteenth and early
oceanic approaches. The trigger warning nineteenth centuries, then an Anglo-
was Russia’s completion of its trans- American coalition against Germany
Siberian railroad in 1904, a slapdash twice during the first half of the twenti-
project soon overtaken by war and eth century, followed by a U.S.-led
revolution—but not before eliciting the coalition against the Soviet Union in
British geopolitician Halford Mackin the second half. It’s too easy to claim
der’s portentous warning that “heartland” that maritime states project power
control of Eurasian “rimlands” could without generating resistance, for if
empower new and globally ambitious that were the case, colonialism would
12 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
The New Cold War
still thrive. But the relationship be- pressing minorities in ways defunct
tween geography and governance is Russian and Chinese emperors might
clear enough to be our second known. have applauded. Most significant, he
Continents—North America ex- has sought to secure these reversals by
cepted—tend to nurture authoritarians: abolishing his own term limits.
where geography fails to fix boundaries, Hence our second unknown: Why is
harsh hands claim the right and duty to Xi undoing the reforms, while abandon-
do so, whether as protection from ing the diplomatic subtlety, that allowed
external dangers or to preserve internal China’s rise in the first place? Perhaps
order. Liberty, in these situations, is he fears the risks of his own retirement,
decreed from the top down, not evolved even though these mount with each
from the bottom up. But that holds such rival he imprisons or purges. Perhaps he
regimes responsible for what happens. has realized that innovation requires but
They can’t, as democracies regularly do, may also inspire spontaneity within his
spread the blame. Autocracies that fall country. Perhaps he worries that in-
short—such as the Soviet Union—risk creasingly hostile international rivals
hollowing themselves out from within. won’t allow him unlimited time to
China’s post–Cold War leaders, achieve his aims. Perhaps he sees the
having compulsively studied the Soviet prevailing concept of world order itself
example, sought to avoid repeating it by as at odds with a mandate from Heaven,
transforming Marxism into consumer Marx, or Mao.
capitalism without at the same time Or it could be that Xi envisions a
allowing democracy. They thereby world order with authoritarianism at its
flipped what they saw as Soviet Presi- core and with China at its center.
dent Mikhail Gorbachev’s greatest Technology, he may expect, will make
error: permitting democracy without human consciousness as transparent as
ensuring prosperity. This latest “rectifi- satellites made the earth’s surface during
cation of names”—the ancient Chinese the Cold War. China, he may assume,
procedure of conforming names to will never alienate its foreign friends.
shifting realities—seemed until recently Expectations within China, he may
to have succeeded. The Chinese leader suppose, will never find reasons not to
Deng Xiaoping’s post-Mao pro-market rise. And Xi, as he ages, will gain in the
reforms solidified support for the wisdom, energy, and attentiveness to
regime and made China a model for detail that only he, as supreme leader,
much of the rest of the world. Xi, on can trust himself to provide.
taking power, was widely expected to But if Xi really believes all of this,
continue along that path. then he’s already losing sight of the gaps
But he hasn’t. Instead, Xi is cutting between promises and performance that
off access to the outside world, defying have long been Catch-22s for authoritar-
international legal norms, and encourag- ian regimes. For if, like Gorbachev’s
ing “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, none of predecessors did, you ignore such
which seems calculated to win or retain fissures, they’ll only worsen. But if, like
allies. At home, he is enforcing ortho- Gorbachev himself, you acknowledge
doxy, whitewashing history, and op- them, you’ll undermine the claim to
infallibility on which legitimacy in an recovered quickly enough to join the

autocracy must rest. That is why graceful European predators victimizing China
exits by authoritarians have been so rare. at the end of the nineteenth century
and has continued doing so ever since.
THE ROOTS OF RESILIENCE Leave aside issues of accuracy in this
Democracy in America has its own gaps view of history. Our point is that Xi’s
between promises and performance, so growing reliance on this narrative and
much so that it seems at times to suffer the nationalism it stokes implies an
from Brezhnev-like paralysis. The inflammability in Chinese culture that
United States differs from China, is currently useful to the regime—but
though, in that distrust of authority is that might not be easily extinguished.
constitutionally mandated. The separa- Hence our third unknown: Can Xi
tion of powers secures a center of turn internal outrage on and off, as Mao
gravity to which the nation can return did repeatedly during his years in
after whatever bursts of activity crises power? Or is Xi locking himself into the
may have demanded. The result is what same dependence on external hostility
evolutionary biologists call “punctuated without which Joseph Stalin, as Kennan
equilibrium”: a resilience rooted in put it in 1946, did not know how to
rapid recovery from unforeseen circum- rule? Because nothing could reassure
stances. China has it the other way such a regime, Kennan insisted, only
around. Respect for authority perme- cumulative frustrations would convince
ates its culture, but stability is punctu- Stalin or, more likely, his successors that
ated by protracted upheavals when it was in their best interests to alter
authority fails. Recovery, in the absence their system’s worst aspects. That
of gravity, can require decades. Autocra- strategy depended, however, on neither
cies often win sprints, but smart inves- side setting deadlines: Kennan carefully
tors put their marathon money on pointed out that it would never have
democracies. Our third known, then, is worked with Hitler, who had a fixed
sharply different roots of resilience. timetable, dictated by his own mortality,
The pattern emerges clearly from for achieving his aims.
the two costliest civil wars of the Mao, craftily, gave his regime 100
nineteenth century. The Taiping years to recover Taiwan. Xi has ruled out
Rebellion of 1850–64 took some 20 passing that problem from generation to
million Chinese lives, about five generation, although he has not yet set a
percent of the population. The Ameri- date for resolving it. Nonetheless, his
can Civil War of 1861–65 killed 750,000 increasingly aggressive rhetoric adds to
combatants, 2.5 percent of a much less the risk that the Taiwan issue could cause
crowded country. And yet by the a Sino-American cold war to become hot,
testimony of its current leaders, China for the United States has deliberately left
after the Taiping Rebellion underwent its own Taiwan policy unclear. All of
decades of turmoil from which it which eerily evokes how Europe went to
emerged only with Mao’s proclamation war in 1914: an ambiguity of great-power
of the People’s Republic in 1949. The commitments combined with the absence
United States, by that same account, of an escalation off switch.
ANOTHER LONG PEACE?
Except that we have, in the Cold War,
an intervening known to draw on: how
that conflict transformed itself into a
“long peace.” The first half of the
twentieth century offered no support
for the idea that great-power rivalries
could be resolved peacefully. “A future
war with Soviet Russia,” the American
diplomat Joseph Grew predicted in
1945, “is as certain as anything in the
world can be certain.” What allowed the
Cold War superpowers to escape that
prospect, and how relevant are those
circumstances today?
One answer is that history itself
during those years became prophecy.
Given what most leaders had experi-
enced in a second world war, few
anywhere were eager to risk a third. It
helped also that those in Washington
and Moscow, if for different reasons,
saw time as an ally: the Americans From The Wall Street Journal:
because the strategy of containment “The Publisher as Storyteller”:
relied on time to thwart Soviet ambi- “He takes us on a personal journey...
tions, Stalin because he expected time brimming with inside stories from the
to produce fratricidal capitalist wars world of journalism, letters and politics...
that would ensure proletarian revolu- There is no doubt, either that he’s an
tionary triumphs. Once Stalin’s succes- astute man of books —even a moral one.”
—Tunku Varadarajan
sors realized the extent of his miscalcu-
lations, it was too late to reverse their
effects. The Soviet Union spent the rest From Paul Volcker in his
of the Cold War failing to catch up. memoir: Keeping At It:
But what if determinations to avoid “To Peter Osnos. It’s all your fault”
the next war fade with the memories of
the last one? That’s how some historians Go to PlatformBooksLLC.net
have explained World War I: a century for links to interviews on NPR’s
had passed without a European great Morning Edition, PBS Newshour and
war. Does it matter that three-quarters C-Span’s Q-A and more.
of a century now separate American and
Chinese leaders from the great wars of
their predecessors? Americans have had
some combat experience in the “lim- [email protected]
ited” and “low-intensity” conflicts in
which they have been involved—with Kennedy had been planning. The
decidedly mixed results—but the United States has lived ever since with
Chinese, except for their brief invasion its own adjacent anomaly: a communist
of Vietnam in 1979, haven’t fought any island in the middle of its self
significant wars for more than half a proclaimed Caribbean sea of influence.
century. That may be why Xi, with his It’s even less plausible today that the
“heads bashed bloody” rhetoric, seems United States would use nuclear weap-
to celebrate bellicosity: he may not ons to defend Taiwan, for that island is
know what its costs can be. more important to Beijing than Cuba
A second way in which historians or Berlin ever was to Moscow. Yet that
have explained the “long peace” is that implausibility could lead Xi to believe
nuclear weapons suppressed optimism that he can invade Taiwan without
about how wars might end. There’s no risking a U.S. nuclear response. China’s
way to know for sure what deterrence in growing cyber- and antisatellite capa-
the Cold War deterred: that’s a history bilities may also encourage him, for
that didn’t happen. But this in itself they bring back possibilities of surprise
suggests a balanced lack of resolve, for attacks that the Cold War’s reconnais-
whatever Soviet Premier Nikita Khru sance revolution seemed, for decades,
shchev and U.S. President John F. to have diminished.
Kennedy may have said publicly, neither But then what? What would Xi do
wanted to die for Berlin. Instead, they with Taiwan if he captured it? The
accepted a walled city inside a parti- island is not Hong Kong, an easily
tioned country in the middle of a di- controlled city. Nor is it Crimea, with a
vided continent. No grand design could largely acquiescent population. Nor are
have produced such an oddity, and yet it other big islands in the region—Japan,
held up until the Cold War evolved its the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia,
own peaceful, if equally unexpected, end. and New Zealand—teetering dominoes.
None of this could have happened Nor would the United States, with its
without nuclear capabilities, for only unmatched power-projection capabili-
they could put lives on the line simulta- ties, be likely to “sit idly by,” as the
neously in Washington and Moscow. Chinese might put it: “ambiguity”
So what about Washington and means keeping options open, not ruling
Beijing? Even with recent enhance- out any response at all.
ments, the Chinese deploy less than ten One such response might be to
percent of the number of nuclear exploit the overstretch that comes from
weapons the United States and Russia China’s forcefully expanding its perim-
retain, and that number is only 15 eters, the self-created problem that once
percent of what the two superpowers plagued Moscow. Suppressing the
had at the height of the Cold War. “Prague Spring” was simple enough for
Does this matter? We doubt it, given the Soviet Union in 1968, until military
what Khrushchev achieved in 1962: morale plummeted when the Czechs
despite a nine-to-one disadvantage in made it clear to their occupiers that
nuclear weapons, he deterred the post– they didn’t feel “liberated.” The
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba that Brezhnev Doctrine—the commitment
The New Cold War
to act similarly wherever else “social- we have a strong, healthy United States,
ism” might be at risk—alarmed more Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan,
than it reassured the leaders of other each balancing the other.”
such states, notably Mao, who secretly
began planning his 1971 “opening” to VARIETIES OF SURPRISE
Washington. By the time the Soviet Our final known is the inescapability of
Union invoked the doctrine again, in surprises. International systems are
Afghanistan in 1979, it had few allies anarchic, theorists tell us, in that no
left anywhere and none on whose component within them is fully in
reliability it could count. control. Strategy may reduce uncer-
Xi’s threats to Taiwan could have a tainty but will never eliminate it:
similar effect in states surrounding humans are fallible, and artificial
China, which may in turn look for their intelligences will surely be also. There
own “openings” to Washington. Extrav- are, though, patterns of competition
agant Chinese claims in the South across time and space. It may be pos-
China Sea have already increased sible to derive from these—especially
anxieties in that region: witness Austra- from the Soviet-American Cold War—
lia’s unexpected alignment with the categories of surprises likely to occur in
Americans and the British on nuclear the Sino-American cold war.
submarines, as well as India’s expanded Existential surprises are shifts in the
cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies. arenas within which great powers
Central Asians may not indefinitely compete, for which neither is respon-
ignore repressions of Tibetans and sible but that endanger them both. U.S.
Uyghurs. Debt traps, environmental President Ronald Reagan had this in
degradation, and onerous repayment mind when he surprised Gorbachev at
terms are souring recipients on the bri’s their first meeting, in 1985, with the
benefits. And Russia, the original source claim that a Martian invasion would
of early-twentieth-century concerns force the United States and the Soviet
about the “heartland,” could now find Union to settle their differences over-
itself surrounded by Chinese “rimlands” night: Weren’t nuclear weapons at least
in Asia, eastern and southeastern as dangerous? Martians haven’t yet
Europe, and even the Arctic. arrived, but we do face two new existen-
All of which raises the possibility that tial threats: the accelerating rate of
American unipolarity may end not with climate change and the almost overnight
a precarious Sino-American bipolarity outbreak, in 2020, of a global pandemic.
but with a multipolarity that restrains Neither is unprecedented. Climates
Beijing by making assertiveness self- have always fluctuated, which is why it
defeating. Metternich and Bismarck used to be possible to walk from Siberia
would have approved. So would a crafty to Alaska. Thucydides described the
American Cold Warrior who, following plague that struck Athens in 430 bc.
their example, hoped to deploy a similar What is new is the extent to which
strategy. “I think it will be a safer world globalization has accelerated these
and a better world,” President Richard phenomena, raising the question of
Nixon told Time magazine in 1972, “if whether geopolitical rivals can collab-
oratively address the deep histories that plishing this on its own with Russian
are increasingly altering their own. President Vladimir Putin, who has long
The Soviet-American Cold War complained about U.S. “containment” of
showed that cooperation to avoid Russia. Chinese “containment,” from the
catastrophe need not be explicit: no Kremlin’s perspective, may ultimately
treaty specified that nuclear weapons, become the greater danger.
after 1945, would not again be used in One other form of intentional
war. Instead, existential dangers pro- surprise comes from supposed subordi-
duced tacit cooperation where negoti- nates who turn out not to be. Neither
ated formalities almost surely would Washington nor Moscow wanted the
have failed. Climate change may present offshore island crises of 1954–55 and
similar opportunities in the Sino- 1958: Chiang Kai-shek, in Taipei, and
American cold war, even if covid-19 has Mao, in Beijing, made them happen.
so far spurred only Chinese abrasiveness. The communist leader Walter Ul-
The point should be to keep landing bricht’s warnings of an imminent East
sites for Martian equivalents open—not German collapse forced Khrushchev to
to welcome existential problems but to provoke the Berlin crises of 1958–59
explore whether collaborative outcomes and 1961. Smaller powers pursuing
can result from them. their own agendas derailed Soviet-
Intentional surprises originate in American détente in the 1970s: Egypt
efforts by single competitors to startle, by attacking Israel in 1973; Cuba by
confuse, or dismay their adversaries. intervening in Africa in 1975–77; and
Surprise attacks, as on Pearl Harbor, fit Hafizullah Amin in Afghanistan, whose
this category, and intelligence failures reported contacts with U.S. officials
can never be ruled out. The Cold War’s triggered a self-defeating Soviet inva-
greatest surprises, however, arose from sion in 1979. None of this, though, was
reversals of polarity, of which Mao was a unprecedented: Thucydides showed
master. When he leaned east, in 1949–50, Corinth and Corcyra doing something
he blindsided the Truman administra- similar to the Spartans and the Athe-
tion and opened the way for the nians 24 centuries earlier.
Korean War and a communist offensive The potential for tails wagging dogs
in Asia. When he leaned west, in in the Sino-American cold war is
1970–71, he made the United States an already evident: rising tensions in the
ally while rendering the Soviet Union Taiwan Strait have resulted as much
vulnerable on two fronts, a disadvantage from changes in Taiwanese politics in
from which it never recovered. recent years as from deliberate decisions
That’s why an American “opening” to in Washington or Beijing. And while
Moscow might someday turn it against China is trying, through the bri, to
Beijing. The original Sino-Soviet split create a system that maximizes its power,
took two decades to develop, with the it may end up building, through its
Eisenhower administration seeking to relationships with insecure and unstable
speed the process by driving Mao into a regimes, just the sort of inverse depen-
mutually repulsive relationship with dency that vexed the Cold War super-
Khrushchev. Xi’s bri may be accom- powers. That can be a formula for volatil-
The New Cold War
ity: history is full of instances in which STRATEGY AND UNCERTAINTY

local actors embroiled larger powers. This aggregation of knowns, unknowns,
Finally, there are systemic surprises. and surprises leaves us with the histori-
The Cold War ended in a way no one at cal equivalent of a three-body problem:
the time had expected: with the sudden given the coexistence of predictability
collapse of a superpower and its accom- and its opposite, we’ll know the out-
panying ideology. Two visionaries who come only when we’ve seen it. Strategy,
had foreseen such a possibility, however, however, doesn’t have that luxury. Its
were that doctrine’s mid-nineteenth- success requires living with uncertain-
century founders, Karl Marx and Fried- ties, of which the future will not be in
rich Engels. Capitalism, they were sure, short supply. The strategy of contain-
would eventually destroy itself by ment, although imperfect in its accom-
creating too great a gap between the plishments and at times tragic in its
means of production and the benefits it failures, did successfully manage its
distributed. Kennan, a century later, own contradictions while buying the
turned Marx and Engels upside down. time necessary for those within the
The gap between productive means and Soviet system to become obvious, even,
distributed benefits would instead, he in the end, to its own leaders.
insisted in 1946–47, bring about the It did this chiefly by combining
collapse of communism within the simplicity of conception with flexibility
Soviet Union and its post–World War II in application, for even the clearest of
satellite states. Kennan didn’t welcome destinations may not always, or even
what finally happened in 1990–91: the often, reveal the paths by which to reach
implosion of the Soviet Union itself was them. It may be necessary, for example,
too great a disruption in the balance of to cooperate with Stalin to defeat Hitler,
power even for him. But he did under- or with Tito to resist Stalin, or with Mao
stand how stresses within societies can to confound Brezhnev: not all evils are
themselves greatly surprise. equally so at all times. Nor are arms
No one can predict when some new buildups always bad or negotiations
geopolitical earthquake might occur: always good: Eisenhower, Kennedy,
geological earthquakes are difficult Nixon, and Reagan employed both to
enough to anticipate. Geologists do begin transformations of the adversaries
know, however, where to expect them: confronting them. Kennan distrusted
that is why California gets earthquake such elasticities in the pursuit of contain-
warnings but Connecticut does not. ment, but it was precisely this maneuver-
Does the very brittleness of authoritar- ability that ensured the strategy’s safe
ian regimes—their strange belief in the arrival at its intended destination.
immortality of top-down command A second way in which containment
structures—leave them similarly vulner- succeeded was by treating spontaneity as
able? Or does the entrenched recalci- a strength. The North Atlantic Treaty
trance of democracies—their resistance Organization was as much a European as
to being commanded—pose even an American creation, in striking
greater dangers to them? Only time will contrast to its Moscow-dominated rival,
tell, probably sooner than we expect. the Warsaw Pact. Nor, outside of Eu-
rope, did the United States insist on effect” on external enemies. To defend
ideological uniformity among its friends. its external interests, then, “the United
The objective instead was to make States need only measure up to its own
diversity a weapon against a rival bent best traditions and prove itself worthy
on suppressing it: to use the resistance of preservation as a great nation.”
to uniformity embedded within distinc- Easily said, not easily done, and
tive histories, cultures, and faiths as a therein lies the ultimate test for the
barrier against the homogenizing United States in its contest with China:
ambitions of would-be hegemons. the patient management of internal
A third asset, although it didn’t threats to our democracy, as well as
always seem so at the time, was the tolerance of the moral and geopolitical
American election cycle. Quadrennial contradictions through which global
stress tests for containment unnerved its diversity can most feasibly be defended.
architects, upset sympathetic pundits, The study of history is the best compass
and alarmed overseas allies, but they we have in navigating this future—even
were at least safeguards against ossifica- if it turns out to be not what we’d
tion. No long-term strategy can succeed expected and not in most respects what
if it allows aspirations to outrun its we’ve experienced before.∂
capabilities or capabilities to corrupt its
aspirations. How, though, do strategists
develop the self-awareness—and the
self-confidence—to acknowledge that
their strategies are not working? Elec-
tions are, for sure, blunt instruments.
They are better, though, than having no
means of reconsideration apart from the
demise of aged autocrats, the timing of
whose departure from this world is not
given to their followers to know.
There are thus, in the United States,
no exclusively foreign affairs. Because
Americans proclaim their ideals so
explicitly, they illustrate departures
from them all the more vividly. Domes-
tic failures such as economic inequality,
racial segregation, sexual discrimination,
environmental degradation, and top-
level extraconstitutional excesses all go
on display for the world to see. As
Kennan pointed out in the most quoted
article ever published in these pages,
“Exhibitions of indecision, disunity and
internal disintegration within this
country” can “have an exhilarating
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November 19, 1991, he had asked one of

Containment Gorbachev’s advisers, Alexander Yakovlev,
THE DIVIDED WORLD
if Ukraine’s breaking away would prompt

Beyond the violent Russian resistance. Yakovlev was
skeptical and responded that there were
Cold War 12 million Russians in Ukraine, with
“many in mixed marriages,” so “what sort
of war could it be?” Baker answered
How Washington Lost the simply: “A normal war.”
Post-Soviet Peace Now, with Yeltsin upping the ante by
calling for the Soviet Union’s complete
M. E. Sarotte destruction, Baker had a new fear. What
would happen to the vast Soviet nuclear
arsenal after the collapse of centralized
O
n December 15, 1991, U.S. command and control? As he counseled
Secretary of State James Baker his boss, President George H. W. Bush,
arrived in Moscow amid a disintegrating empire with “30,000
political chaos to meet with Russian nuclear weapons presents an incredible
leader Boris Yeltsin, who was at the time danger to the American people—and
busy wresting power from his nemesis, they know it and will hold us account-
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. able if we don’t respond.”
Yeltsin had recently made a shocking Baker’s goal for his December 1991
announcement that he and the leaders of journey was thus to ascertain who, after
Belarus and Ukraine were dismantling the Soviet Union’s dissolution, would
the Soviet Union. Their motive was to retain the power to authorize a nuclear
render Gorbachev impotent by trans- launch and how that fateful order might
forming him from the head of a massive be delivered. Soon after arriving, he cut
country into the president of nothing. to the chase: Would Yeltsin tell him?
In the short run, it was a brilliant Remarkably, the Russian president
move, and within ten days, it had did. Yeltsin’s openness to Baker was
succeeded completely. Gorbachev partly a gambit to win U.S. help in his
resigned, and the Soviet Union col- struggle with Gorbachev and partly an
lapsed. The long-term consequences, attempt to secure financial aid. But it was
however, were harder to grasp. also a sign that he wanted a fresh start in
Even before Yeltsin’s gambit, Baker Moscow’s relations with the West, one
had begun worrying about whether the characterized by openness and trust.
desire of some Soviet republics to become Yeltsin and Baker soon began working in
independent might yield bloodshed. On tandem to ensure that only one nuclear
successor state—Russia—would ulti-
M. E. SAROTTE is Marie-Josée and Henry R.
Kravis Distinguished Professor at the Johns mately emerge from the Soviet collapse.
Hopkins School of Advanced International This collaboration survived Bush’s
Studies and the author of the forthcoming book 1992 election loss. Yeltsin continued the
Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making
of Post–Cold War Stalemate (Yale University effort with President Bill Clinton, U.S.
Press, 2021), from which this essay is adapted. Secretaries of Defense Les Aspin and
22 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
M. E. Sarotte
William Perry, and Strobe Talbott, the Yeltsin era and on cooperative
Clinton’s top Russia adviser, among ventures with Washington. Although
others, to ensure that former Soviet there were notable episodes reprising the
atomic weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, spirit of the early 1990s—expressions of
and above all Ukraine were either sympathy after the September 11, 2001,
destroyed or relocated to Russian soil. terrorist attacks and a nuclear accord in
During a 1997 summit, Yeltsin even 2010—the basic trend line was negative.
asked Clinton whether they could cease The relationship reached frightening
having nuclear triggers continually at new lows during Russia’s 2008 conflict
hand: “What if we were to give up with Georgia and its 2014 invasion of
having to have our finger next to the Ukraine, and it has sunk even further
button all the time?” Clinton responded, since 2016, owing to the revelation of
“Well, if we do the right thing in the Russia’s cyberattacks on U.S. businesses,
next four years, maybe we won’t have to institutions, and elections.
think as much about this problem.” Why did relations between Washing-
By the end of the 1990s, however, that ton and Moscow deteriorate so badly?
trust had largely vanished. Vladimir History is rarely monocausal, and the
Putin, Yeltsin’s handpicked successor, decay was the cumulative product of
divulged little in grudging 1999 conversa- U.S. and Russian policies and politics
tions with Clinton and Talbott. Instead of over time. But it is hard to escape the
sharing Russia’s launch protocols, Putin fact that one particular U.S. policy
skillfully played up his perceived need for added to the burdens on Russia’s fragile
a harder Kremlin line by describing the young democracy when it was most in
grim consequences of reduced Russian need of friends: the way that Washing-
power: in former Soviet regions, he said, ton expanded nato.
terrorists now played soccer with decapi- Expansion itself was a justifiable
tated heads of hostages. response to the geopolitics of the 1990s.
As Putin later remarked, “By Nato had already been enlarged a
launching the sovereignty parade”—his number of times. Given that former
term for the independence movements Soviet bloc states were now clamoring to
of Soviet republics in 1990–91—“Rus- join the alliance, it was neither unprec-
sia itself aided in the collapse of the edented nor unreasonable to let them in.
Soviet Union,” the outcome that had What was unwise was expanding the
opened the door to such gruesome alliance in a way that took little account
lawlessness. In his view, Moscow of the geopolitical reality. The closer
should have dug in, both within the nato moved its infrastructure—foreign
union and abroad, instead of standing bases, troops, and, above all, nuclear
aside while former Soviet bloc states weapons—to Moscow, the higher the
jumped ship to join the West. “We political cost to the newly cooperative
would have avoided a lot of problems if relationship with Russia. Some U.S.
the Soviets had not made such a hasty policymakers understood this problem
exit from Eastern Europe,” he said. at the time and proposed expanding in
Once firmly in power, Putin began contingent phases to minimize the
backtracking on the democratization of damage. That promising alternative
Containment Beyond the Cold War
mode of enlargement would have rizes nato enlargement as either good

avoided drawing a new line across or bad and instead focus on the manner
Europe, but it faced strong opposition in which the alliance grew. After the
within Washington. collapse of Soviet power in Europe—
Instead, advocates of a one-size-fits- and in response to urgent requests from
all manner of expansion triumphed. states emerging from Moscow’s domi-
Washington’s error was not to enlarge nation, now justifiably eager to choose a
the alliance but to do so in a way that security alliance for themselves—nato
maximized Moscow’s aggravation and swelled in multiple rounds of enlarge-
gave fuel to Russian reactionaries. In ment to 30 states, which together were
2014, Putin justified his takeover of home to nearly one billion people.
Crimea as a necessary response to New historical evidence shows that
nato’s “deployment of military infra- U.S. leaders were so focused on enlarg-
structure at our borders.” ing nato in their preferred manner that
Cold wars are not short-lived affairs, they did not sufficiently consider the
so thaws are precious. Neither country perils of the path they were taking or
made the best possible use of the thaw how their choices would magnify Russia’s
in the 1990s. Today, as the United own self-harming choices. Put simply,
States and Russia spar over sanctions, expansion was a reasonable policy; the
cyberwarfare, and much else, the problem was how it happened.
choices made three decades ago carry Although nato is an alliance of many
enduring significance. The two coun- countries, it is ultimately the United
tries still possess more than 90 percent States’ views that matter most when the
of the world’s nuclear warheads and Article 5 guarantee—the pledge to treat
thus the ability to kill nearly every an attack on one as “an attack against
living creature on earth. Yet between them all”—is at stake. Hence, a U.S.-
them, both states have shredded nearly centric, one-size-fits-all approach
every remaining arms control accord, prevailed, despite the concerns of other
and they have shown little willingness members about a crucial geographic
to replace them with new agreements. problem: the closer the alliance’s bor-
Understanding the decay in U.S.- ders moved to Russia, the greater the
Russian relations—and how the manner risk that nato expansion would derail
of nato expansion contributed to the newfound cooperation with Moscow
it—can help the United States better and endanger the dramatic progress
manage long-term strategic competition being made on arms control.
in the future. As the 1990s showed, the Scandinavian alliance members, such
way that Washington competes can, as Norway, savvy about living in a
over time, have just as profound an neighborhood that was Soviet-adjacent
impact as the competition itself. but not Soviet-controlled, had in earlier
decades wisely customized their nato
WHAT WENT WRONG? memberships. As the only original
To grasp what went wrong in U.S.- nato member sharing a border with the
Russian relations, it is necessary to look Soviet Union, Norway had decided
beyond the familiar binary that catego- against either the stationing of foreign
M. E. Sarotte
bases or the deployment of foreign Bosnia, that “the big babies in Mos-
forces on its territory in peacetime and cow,” although “a real head case,” had
had ruled out nuclear weapons either on immense “capacity for doing harm.”
its land or in its ports. All of this was
done to keep long-term frictions with CROSSING THE LINE
Moscow manageable. That approach Understanding the collapse in U.S.-
could have been a model for central and Russian relations requires returning to a
eastern European states and the Baltics, time when things were going right:
since they, too, occupy a region close to the 1990s. The devil, in this case, really is
but not controlled by Russia. Some in the details—specifically, in three
policymakers understood this dynamic choices that Washington made about
at the time and supported the creation nato expansion, one under Bush and
of a framework under which new allies two under Clinton, each of which
might gain contingent memberships in cumulatively foreclosed other options
phases through the so-called Partner- for European security.
ship for Peace (PfP), an organization The first choice came early. By
launched in 1994 to allow non-nato November 24, 1989, just two weeks after
European and post-Soviet states to the Berlin Wall’s unexpected fall, Bush
affiliate themselves with the alliance. was already sensing the magnitude of
But American hubris, combined with more changes yet to come. As protesters
tragic decisions by Yeltsin—most nota- toppled one government after another
bly, to shed the blood of his opponents in central and eastern Europe, it seemed
in Moscow in 1993 and in Chechnya in clear to him that new leaders in that
1994—provided ammunition to those region would abandon the Warsaw Pact,
arguing that Washington did not need the involuntary military alliance with
phased enlargement to manage Russia. the Soviet Union. But what then?
Instead, they maintained, the United According to U.S. records, Bush put
States needed to pursue the policy of the issue to the British prime minister,
containment beyond the Cold War. Margaret Thatcher: “What if [the] East
By the mid-1990s, “not one inch”—a European countries want to leave [the]
phrase originally intended to signal Warsaw Pact. Nato must stay.”
that nato’s jurisdiction would not Thatcher replied with her startling
move one inch eastward—had gained preferred option: she was in favor of
the opposite meaning: that no territory “keeping . . . the Warsaw Pact.” Accord-
should be off-limits to full-membership ing to British records, she saw the pact
enlargement and that there should be as an essential “fig leaf for Gorbachev”
no binding limitations on infrastruc- amid the humiliation of the Soviet
ture of any sort. And this happened collapse. She also “discouraged [Bush]
just as Yeltsin was succumbing to from coming out publicly at this stage
illness and Putin was rising through in support of independence for the
the ranks in Russia. But U.S. leaders Baltic Republics,” since now was not the
persisted, despite knowing, as Talbott time to question European borders.
put it in an internal U.S. memo on the Bush, however, was unconvinced. He
alliance’s role in quelling violence in “expressed concern about seeming to
consign Eastern Europe indefinitely to Hence, if Gorbachev had asked the

membership of the Warsaw Pact.” The Germans to trade those nuclear weapons
West “could not assign countries to stay” for Soviet permission to reunify, a sizable
in that pact “against their will.” Bush number would have gladly agreed. Even
preferred to solve this problem by push- better for Moscow, 1990 was an election
ing nato beyond the old Cold War line. year in West Germany. The chancellor,
The West German foreign minister, Helmut Kohl, had to be particularly
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, subsequently attuned to voter sentiment on reunifica-
proposed another option: combine nato tion and the nuclear issue. As Baker’s
and the Warsaw Pact into a “composite top aide, Robert Zoellick, put it at the
of common, collective security,” within time, if Kohl decided to signal a willing-
which the two alliances “could both ness to pay Moscow’s price, whatever
finally dissipate.” Former dissidents in that was, in advance of the election and
central Europe went even further, “the Germans work[ed] out unification
suggesting the most far-reaching option: with the Soviets,” nato would get
their region’s complete demilitarization. “dumped.” This reality gave Moscow the
All these options were anathema to ability to undermine the established
Bush, who most certainly did not want order of transatlantic relations.
nato to dissipate or the United States’ There were speculative discussions
leading role in European security to between the U.S. State Department
disappear with it. In 1990, however, and the West Germans on February 2,
Gorbachev still had leverage. Thanks to 1990, about how best to proceed in this
the Soviet victory over the Nazis in delicate moment and what nato might
World War II, Moscow had hundreds of do beyond the Cold War line, such as
thousands of troops in East Germany “extend[ing] its territorial coverage to
and the legal right to keep them there. . . . eastern Europe.” Genscher raised
Germany couldn’t reunify without this idea in a negative sense, meaning
Gorbachev’s permission. And the he was certain that Moscow would not
Soviet leader had another source of allow reunification unless such coverage
power: public opinion. was explicitly ruled out. But Bush and
As the Cold War’s frontline, a divided his National Security Council sensed
Germany had the highest concentration that they might be able to finesse the
of nuclear arms per square mile anywhere way nato moved eastward, namely by
on the planet. The weapons in West restricting what could happen on
Germany had been installed to deter a eastern German territory after Ger-
Soviet invasion, given how difficult it many joined the alliance. Although they
would have been for nato’s conventional did not use the term, they were follow-
forces alone to stop a massive advance. ing the Scandinavian strategy.
Had deterrence failed, the missiles’ use But a week later, Baker—out of the
would have rendered the heart of Europe loop with evolving White House think-
uninhabitable—a terrifying prospect to ing because of his extended travels—un-
Germans, who, because they were living wittingly overstepped his bounds by
at ground zero, arguably had more skin in offering Gorbachev a now infamous
the game than their nato allies. hypothetical bargain that echoed Gen-
M. E. Sarotte
scher’s thinking, not Bush’s: What if NO SECOND-TIER GUARANTEES

Gorbachev allowed reunification to By December 1991, the Soviet Union
proceed and Washington agreed “that was gone. Soon, Bush would be gone as
nato’s jurisdiction would not shift one well, after he lost to Clinton in the
inch eastward from its present position?” 1992 U.S. presidential election. By the
The secretary soon had to drop this time the new president got his team in
wording, however, after realizing that it place, in mid-1993, hyperinflation and
was inconsistent with Bush’s prefer- corruption were already weakening the
ences. Within a couple of weeks, Baker prospects of democracy in Russia.
was having to advise allies quietly that Worse, Yeltsin soon made a series of
his use of “the term nato ‘jurisdiction’ tragic decisions that cast doubt on the
was creating some confusion” and country’s ability to develop into a
“should probably be avoided in the peaceful, democratic neighbor to the
future.” It was a sign that nato would new states on its borders.
shift eastward after all, with a special In October 1993, clashing with
status for eastern Germany, which anti-reform extremists in the parliament,
ultimately would become Europe’s only Yeltsin had tanks fire on the parliamen-
guaranteed nuclear-free zone. tary building. The fighting killed an
Through this move to limit nato estimated 145 people and wounded 800
infrastructure in eastern Germany, and more. Despite, or perhaps because of,
by playing on Moscow’s economic the attack, extremists did well in the
weakness, Bush shifted Gorbachev’s subsequent parliamentary elections, on
attention away from the removal of December 12, 1993. The party that won
nuclear weapons in the western terri- the most votes was the Liberal Demo-
tory and toward economic inducements cratic Party of Russia, which was “nei-
to allow for German reunification. In ther liberal nor democratic, but by all
exchange for billions of deutsche marks appearances fascist,” as the historian
in various forms of support, the Soviet Sergey Radchenko has put it.
leader ultimately allowed Germany to For a while, a budding friendship
reunify and its eastern regions to join between “Bill and Boris” distracted the
nato on October 3, 1990, thus permit- world from these troubling events. The
ting the alliance to expand across the two leaders developed the closest rela-
old Cold War frontline. tionship ever to exist between an Ameri-
By October 11, 1991, Bush could even can president and a Russian leader, with
indulge in speculation about a more Clinton visiting Moscow more times
ambitious goal. He asked Manfred than any U.S. president before or since.
Wörner, then nato’s secretary-general, But Clinton also wanted to respond
whether the alliance’s efforts to establish to demands from central and eastern
a liaison organization for central and European countries seeking to join
eastern European states might also nato. In January 1994, he launched a
“include the Baltics.” Wörner’s feelings novel plan for European security, one
were clear, and Bush did not contradict aimed at putting those countries on the
him. “Yes,” Wörner said, “if the Baltics path to nato membership without
apply they should be welcomed.” antagonizing Russia. This was PfP, an
Timely.
Topical.
Free.
Read the latest macroeconomic research and analysis from the IMF
IMF.org/pubs
M. E. Sarotte
idea largely conceived of by General even opened its door to Russia as well,
John Shalikashvili, the Polish-born which would eventually join the part-
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nership. Clinton later noted to nato
and his advisers. It resembled the Secretary-General Javier Solana that
Scandinavian strategy—but writ large. PfP “has proven to be a bigger deal
PfP’s connection to nato member- than we had expected—with more
ship was intentionally left vague, but countries, and more substantive coop-
the idea was roughly that would-be eration. It has grown into something
nato members could, through military- significant in its own right.”
to-military contacts, training, and Opponents of PfP within the Clin-
operations, put themselves on a path to ton administration complained that by
full membership and the Article 5 making central and eastern European
guarantee. This strategy offered a countries wait to gain the full Article 5
compromise sufficiently acceptable to guarantee, the partnership gave Mos-
key players—even Poland, which cow a de facto veto over when, where,
wanted full membership and did not and how nato would expand. They
like the idea of having to spend time in argued instead for extending the alli-
the waiting room, but understood that ance as soon as possible to deserving
it had to follow Washington’s lead. new democracies. And in late 1994,
PfP also had the benefit of not Yeltsin gave PfP critics ammunition by
immediately redrawing a line across approving what he reportedly thought
Europe between states with Article 5 would be a high-precision police action
protection and those without. Instead, a to counter separatists in the Chechnya
host of countries in disparate locations region. Instead, he started what became
could join the partnership and then a brutal, protracted, and bloody conflict.
progress at their own pace. This meant Central and eastern European states
that PfP could incorporate post-Soviet seized on the bloodshed to argue that they
states—including, crucially, Ukraine— might be next if Washington and nato
even if they were unlikely to become did not protect them with Article 5. A
nato allies. As Clinton put it to the new term arose internally in the Clinton
visiting German chancellor, Kohl, on administration: “neo-containment.” Such
January 31, 1994: “Ukraine is the linch- thinking, along with the relationships that
pin of the whole idea.” The president Polish President Lech Walesa and Czech
added that it would be catastrophic “if President Vaclav Havel established with
Ukraine collapses, because of Russian Clinton, increasingly made an impact on
influence or because of militant nation- the American president.
alists within Ukraine.” Clinton contin- So, too, did domestic political
ued: “One reason why all the former pressures. In the November 1994 U.S.
Warsaw Pact states were willing to midterm elections, the Republican Party
support [PfP] was because they undertook the Senate and the House. Voters
stood” that it could provide space for had endorsed nato enlargement as part
Ukraine in a way that nato could not. of the Republicans’ winning platform,
The genius of PfP was that it bal- the “Contract with America.” Clinton
anced these competing interests and wanted to win a second term in 1996,
and the midterm results factored into form of nato expansion that Moscow
his decision to abandon the option of would find far more threatening.
expanding nato through an individual- Perry held on but later regretted that
ized, gradual process involving PfP. He he “didn’t fight more effectively for the
shifted instead to a one-size-fits-all delay of the nato decision.” As he
enlargement with full guarantees from wrote in 2015, “The descent down the
the start. Reflecting this strategy, nato slippery slope began, I believe, with the
issued a public communiqué in Decem- premature nato expansion,” and the
ber 1994 stating outright: “We expect “downsides of early nato membership
and would welcome nato enlargement for Eastern European nations were even
that would reach to democratic states to worse than I had feared.” As an unfor-
our East.” Yeltsin, conscious of these tunate corollary, the Russians immedi-
words’ significance, was enraged. ately concluded that PfP had been a
Privately, the State Department ruse, even though it had not.
sent the U.S. Mission to nato a text
“which the U.S. believes should COST PER INCH
emerge from the alliance’s internal The significance of Clinton’s shift
deliberations on enlargement.” The would become apparent over time. On
text declared that “security must be his first European trip as president, in
equal for all allies” and that “there will January 1994, Clinton had asked nato
be no second-tier security guaran- leaders, “Why should we now draw a
tees”—shorthand for contingent new line through Europe just a little
memberships or infrastructure limits. further east?” That would leave a
With that, although it continued to “democratic Ukraine” sitting on the
exist, PfP was marginalized. wrong side. The partnership was the
Clinton’s shift almost caused his best answer, because it opened a door
secretary of defense to resign. In but also gave the United States and its
Perry’s view, the progress on arms nato allies “the time to reach out to
control in the early 1990s had been Russia and to these other nations of the
nothing short of astounding. A nuclear former Soviet Union, which have been
superpower had fallen apart, and only almost ignored through this entire
one nuclear-armed country had debate.” Once PfP was abandoned, a
emerged from its ruins. Other post- new dividing line became inevitable.
Soviet successor states were joining the Having jettisoned PfP’s method of
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. No allowing a wide array of countries to join
weapons had detonated. There were as loose affiliates, the Clinton adminis-
new agreements on safeguards and tration now needed to decide how many
transparency about the number and countries to add as full nato members.
location of warheads. These were The math seemed simple: the more
matters of existential importance, on countries, the greater the damage to
which the United States and Russia had relations with Russia. But that decep-
made historic progress, and now PfP’s tively simple calculation hid a deeper
opponents were, in his view, throwing a complication. Given Moscow’s sensitivi-
spanner into the works by pursuing a ties, expansion to former Soviet repub-
M. E. Sarotte
lics, such as the Baltics and Ukraine, or stop at the former Soviet border.
to countries with particular features, Washington brushed aside quiet expres-
such as bases that hosted foreign forces sions of concern from Scandinavian
and nuclear weapons, would yield a leaders, who noted the desirability of
much higher cost per inch. sticking with more contingent solutions
This raised two questions: To de- for their neighborhood.
crease the cost per inch, should full- Coming on top of the alliance’s
membership enlargement avoid moving March 1999 military intervention in
beyond what Moscow considered to be Kosovo—which Russia fiercely op-
a sensitive line, namely the former posed—this turned 1999 into an inflec-
border of the Soviet Union? And should tion point for U.S.-Russian relations.
new members have any binding restric- Moscow’s decision to again escalate the
tions on what could happen on their brutal combat in Chechnya later that
territory, echoing the Scandinavian year added to the sense that the post–
accommodations and the East German Cold War moment of cooperation was
nuclear prohibition? collapsing. An ailing Yeltsin reacted with
To both questions, the Clinton team’s bitterness to U.S. criticism of the
answer was a hard no. As early as June renewed violence in Chechnya, com-
1995, Talbott had already begun point- plaining to journalists that “Clinton
edly telling Baltic leaders that the first permitted himself to put pressure on
countries to enter nato as new members Russia” because he had forgotten “for a
would certainly not be the last. By June minute, for a second, for half a minute,
1997, he could be blunter. The Clinton forgotten that Russia has a full arsenal of
administration “will not regard the nuclear weapons.” And in Istanbul on
process of nato enlargement as finished November 19, 1999, on the margin of an
or successful unless or until the aspira- Organization for Security and Coopera-
tions of the Baltic states have been tion in Europe summit, Yeltsin’s verbal
fulfilled.” He was so consistent in this attacks on Clinton were so extreme that
view that his staff christened it “the Talbott, as he recalled in his memoirs,
Talbott principle.” The manner of decided that Yeltsin had become “un-
enlargement was set: it should proceed hinged.” According to the U.S. transcript
without regard for the cost per inch—the of a brief private conversation between
opposite of the Scandinavian strategy. Clinton and Yeltsin, the Russian leader
In April 1999, at nato’s 50th anni- made sweeping demands. “Just give
versary summit in Washington, D.C., Europe to Russia,” Yeltsin said, because
the alliance publicly welcomed the “the U.S. is not in Europe. Europe
interest of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu- should be the business of Europeans.”
ania (along with six more countries) in Clinton tried to deflect the tirade, but
full membership. The United States Yeltsin kept pressing, adding, “Give
could insist, correctly, that it had never Europe to itself. Europe never felt as
recognized the Soviet Union’s 1940 close to Russia as it does now.” Clinton
occupation of the Baltics. But that did replied, “I don’t think the Europeans
not change the significance of the move: would like this very much.” Abruptly,
full-membership expansion would not Yeltsin stood up and announced, “Bill, the
meeting is up. . . . This meeting has gone relieved to have no obligations for the
on too long.” Clinton would not let his first time in decades, and told his driver
Russian counterpart go, however, without to take him to his family. En route, his
asking who would win the upcoming limousine’s phone rang. It was the
Russian election in 2000. A departing president of the United States. Yeltsin
Yeltsin replied curtly, “Putin, of course.” told Clinton to call back at 5 pm, even
The two presidents had patched up though the American president was
relations after spats before, but now preparing to host hundreds of guests at
Clinton was out of time. The meeting the White House that day for a lavish
in Istanbul would be his last with millennial celebration.
Yeltsin as president. Returning home to Meanwhile, the new leader of Russia
Moscow, Yeltsin decided to exit the made Clinton wait a further 26 hours
political scene. Serious heart disease, before making contact. On January 1,
alcoholism, and fear of prosecution had 2000, Putin finally found nine minutes
worn the Russian president down. for a call. Clinton tried to put a good
Yeltsin had already decided that Putin face on the abrupt transition, saying, “I
was his preferred successor, because he think you are off to a very good start.”
believed that the younger man would, in
the words of the Russia expert Stephen DASHED HOPES
Kotkin, protect his interests, “and maybe It soon became apparent that Putin’s
those of Russia as well.” On December 14, rise, in terms of Moscow’s relations with
1999, according to his memoirs, Yeltsin Washington, was more an end than a
confided to Putin that, on the last day of start. The peak of U.S.-Russian coopera-
the year, he would make the younger tion was now in the past, not least as
man acting president. measured in arms control. Letting a
As promised, on New Year’s Eve, decades-long trend lapse, Washington
Yeltsin shocked his nation with the and Moscow failed to conclude any
broadcast of a brief, prerecorded major new accords in the Clinton era.
resignation speech. The president’s Instead, nuclear targeting of U.S.
stiff, weak delivery of his scripted and European cities resumed under a
words intensified the atmosphere of Russian leader who, in December 1999,
melancholy. Seated against the back- had started a reign that would be
drop of an indifferently decorated measured in decades. For U.S. relations
Christmas tree, he asked Russians for with Russia, these events signaled, if
“forgiveness.” He apologized, saying not a return to Cold War conditions
that “many of our shared dreams didn’t precluding all cooperation, then cer-
come true” and that “what we thought tainly the onset of a killing frost.
would be easy turned out to be pain- Of course, for central and eastern
fully difficult.” Putin would subse- Europeans who had suffered decades of
quently uphold his end of the bargain brutality, war, and suppression, enter-
by, in one of his first official acts, ing nato on the cusp of the twenty-
granting Yeltsin immunity. first century was the fulfillment of a
Yeltsin left the Kremlin around 1 pm dream of partnership with the West.
Moscow time, feeling immensely Yet the sense of celebration was muted.
M. E. Sarotte
As U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine The all-or-nothing expansion strat-

Albright remarked, “A decade earlier, egy also incurred those costs without
when the Berlin Wall had come down, locking in democratization. Former
there was dancing in the streets. Now Warsaw Pact states succeeded in joining
the euphoria was gone.” nato (and eventually the European
The world created in the 1990s never Union), only to find that membership
fulfilled the hopes that arose after the did not automatically guarantee their
collapse of both the Berlin Wall and the democratic transformations. Subsequent
Soviet Union. Initially, there was a research has shown that the prospect of
widespread belief that the tenets of incrementally gaining membership in
liberal international order had suc- international organizations—the process
ceeded and that residents of all the offered by PfP—would likely have more
states between the Atlantic and the effectively solidified political and
Pacific, not just the Western ones, could institutional reforms.
now cooperate within that order. But Even as strong a supporter of nato
both U.S. and Russian leaders repeat- enlargement as Joe Biden, then a U.S.
edly made choices at odds with their senator, sensed in the 1990s that the way
stated intentions to promote that the alliance was enlarging would cause
outcome. Bush talked about a Europe problems. As he put it in 1997, “Continu-
whole, free, and at peace; Clinton ing the Partnership for Peace, which
repeatedly proclaimed his wish to avoid turned out to be much more robust and
drawing a line. Yet both ultimately much more successful than I think anyone
helped create a new dividing line across thought it would be at the outset, may
post–Cold War Europe. Gorbachev arguably have been a better way to go.”
sought to save the Soviet Union; Yeltsin
sought lasting democratization for FOCUS ON THE HOW
Russia. Neither one succeeded. What should Washington learn from
Nato expansion was not the sole this history? One of the biggest contem-
source of these problems. But the porary challenges for the United States
manner of the alliance’s enlargement— is the way that confrontation between
in interaction with tragic Russian the West and Russia has once again
choices—contributed to their extent become the order of the day. During
and impact. Put differently, it is not Donald Trump’s divisive presidency,
possible to separate a serious assess- Democrats and Republicans agreed on
ment of enlargement’s role in eroding little, but at least some segment of the
U.S.-Russian relations from how it gop was never comfortable with Trump’s
happened. Washington’s error was not embrace of Putin. A shared sense of
to expand the alliance but to do so in a mission in dealing with Moscow offers a
way that maximized friction with path toward a rare U.S. domestic
Moscow. That error resulted from the consensus—one that leads back to nato,
United States misjudging both the still standing despite Trump’s toying
permanence of cooperative relations with the idea of a U.S. withdrawal.
with Moscow and the extent of Putin’s Even with Trump gone, however,
willingness to damage those relations. critics continue to question the alliance’s
worth. Some, such as the historian process, can undermine even a reason-
Stephen Wertheim, do so in general able strategy—as the withdrawal from
terms, arguing that Washington should Afghanistan has shown. Even worse,
no longer “continue to fetishize military mistakes can yield cumulative damage
alliances” as if they were sacred obliga- and scar tissue when a strategy’s imple-
tions. Other critics have more specific mentation is measured in years rather
complaints, particularly regarding the than months. Success in long-term
recent chaotic withdrawal of Western strategic competition requires getting
forces from Afghanistan. Even Armin the details right.∂
Laschet, at the time the candidate for
German chancellor from the right-of-
center Christian Democratic Union (a
party normally strongly supportive of
the Atlantic alliance), condemned the
withdrawal as “the biggest debacle that
nato has suffered since its founding.”
European allies lamented what they saw
as an unconscionable lack of advance
consultation, which eviscerated early
hopes of a new, Biden-inspired golden
age for the alliance.
Pundits should think twice about
writing off nato, however, or letting
the chaos in Kabul derail post-Trump
attempts at repairing transatlantic
relations. European concerns are valid,
and there is clearly a need for a vigor-
ous debate over what went wrong in
Afghanistan. But critics need to think
about how a call to downgrade or
dismantle the alliance will land in a
time of turmoil. The Trump years, the
covid-19 pandemic, and Biden’s Afghan
pullout have all damaged the structure
of transatlantic relations. When a house
is on fire, it is not time to start renova-
tions—no matter how badly they were
needed before the fire started.
There is also a larger takeaway from
this history of nato expansion, one
relevant not just to U.S. relations with
Russia but also to ties with China and
other competitors. A flawed execution,
both in terms of timing and in terms of
cil. Like everyone else who worked in

The Kremlin’s the White House, I had, by then,
THE DIVIDED WORLD
learned a great deal about Trump’s

Strange Victory idiosyncrasies. We all knew, for in-
stance, that Trump rarely read the
detailed briefing materials his staff
How Putin Exploits prepared for him and that in meetings
American Dysfunction and or calls with other leaders, he could
Fuels American Decline never stick to an agreed-on script or his
cabinet members’ recommendations.
This had proved to be a major liability
Fiona Hill during those conversations, since it
often seemed to his foreign counterparts
as though Trump was hearing about the
D
onald Trump wanted his July issues on the agenda for the first time.
2018 meeting in Helsinki with When Trump was winging it, he
his Russian counterpart, Vladi- could be persuaded of all kinds of
mir Putin, to evoke memories of the things. If a foreign visitor or caller was
momentous encounters that took place in one of his favored strongmen, Trump
the 1980s between U.S. President Ronald would always give the strongman’s views
Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail and version of events the benefit of the
Gorbachev. Those arms control summits doubt over those of his own advisers.
had yielded the kind of iconic imagery During a cabinet meeting with a visiting
that Trump loved: strong, serious men Hungarian delegation in May 2019, for
meeting in distant places to hash out the example, Trump cut off acting U.S.
great issues of the day. What better way, Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan,
in Trump’s view, to showcase his prowess who was trying to make a point about a
at the art of the deal? critical European security issue. In front
That was the kind of show Trump of everyone, Trump told Shanahan that
wanted to put on in Helsinki. What the autocratic Hungarian prime minis-
emerged instead was an altogether ter, Viktor Orban, had already explained
different sort of spectacle. it all to him when they had met in the
By the time of the meeting, I had Oval Office moments earlier—and that
spent just over a year serving in the Orban knew the issue better than
Trump administration as deputy Shanahan did, anyway. In Trump’s mind,
assistant to the president and senior the Hungarian strongman simply had
director for European and Russian more authority than the American
affairs on the National Security Coun- officials who worked for Trump himself.
The other leader was his equal, and his
FIONA HILL is Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at
the Center on the United States and Europe staff members were not. For Trump, all
in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings pertinent information trickled down
Institution and the author of There Is Nothing for from him, not up to him. This tendency
You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-
first Century (Mariner Books, 2021), from which of Trump’s was lamentable when it
this essay is adapted. played out behind closed doors, but it
The Kremlin’s Strange Victory
Fiona Hill
was inexcusable (and indeed impossible pressed Trump: “Would you now, with
to explain or justify) when it spilled out the whole world watching, tell President
into public view—which is precisely Putin—would you denounce what
what happened during the now legen happened in 2016 and would you warn
darily disastrous press conference after him to never do it again?”
Trump’s meeting with Putin in Helsinki. Trump balked. He really didn’t want
Before the press conference, Trump to answer. The only way that Trump
was pleased with how things had gone in could view Russia’s broad-based attack
his one-on-one meeting with Putin. The on the U.S. democratic system was
optics in Finland’s presidential palace through the lens of his own ego and
were to Trump’s liking. The two men image. In my interactions with Trump
had agreed to get U.S.-Russian arms and his closest staff in the White House,
control negotiations going again and to it had become clear to me that endors-
convene meetings between their coun- ing the conclusions of the U.S. intelli-
tries’ respective national security coun- gence agencies would be tantamount to
cils. Trump was keen to show that he and admitting that Trump had not won the
Putin could have a productive, normal 2016 election. The questions got right to
relationship, partly to dispel the prevail- the heart of his insecurities. If Trump
ing notion that there was something said, “Yes, the Russians interfered on
perverse about his ties to the Russian my behalf,” then he might as well have
president. Trump was eager to brush said outright, “I am illegitimate.”
away allegations that he had conspired So as he often did in such situations,
with the Kremlin in its interference in Trump tried to divert attention elsewhere.
the 2016 U.S. presidential election or He went off on a tangent about a convo-
that the Russians had somehow compro- luted conspiracy theory involving Ukraine
mised him—matters that at the time of and the emails of his 2016 opponent,
the meeting, Special Counsel Robert Hillary Clinton, and then produced a
Mueller was actively investigating. muddled, rambling answer to Lemire’s
Things went wrong as soon as the question, the crux of which was this:
press conference began. Trump expected
My people came to me. . . . They
public praise for meeting with Putin and
said they think it’s Russia. I have
tackling the nuclear threat. But the U.S. President Putin; he just said it’s not
journalists in attendance were not Russia. I will say this. I don’t see any
interested in arms control. They wanted reason why it would be. . . . But I
to know about the one-on-one meeting have confidence in both parties. . . . I
and what Putin might have said or not have great confidence in my intelli-
said regarding 2016 and election inter- gence people, but I will tell you that
ference. Jonathan Lemire of the Associ- President Putin was extremely strong
ated Press asked Trump whether he and powerful in his denial today.
believed Putin, who had repeatedly
denied that his country had done The outcome of the Helsinki press
anything to meddle in the election, or conference was entirely predictable,
the U.S. intelligence agencies, which which was why I and others had coun-
had concluded the opposite. Lemire seled against holding it at all. But it was
still agonizing to watch. I was sitting in plenty of evidence of an extensive and

front of the podium as Trump spoke, sophisticated Russian political influence
immediately behind the U.S. national operation against the United States.
security adviser and the secretary of state. The Mueller report also sketched the
I saw them stiffen slightly, and I contem- contours of a different, arguably more
plated throwing a fit or faking a seizure pernicious kind of “Russian connection.”
and hurling myself backward into the row In some crucial ways, Russia and the
of journalists behind me. I just wanted to United States were not so different—and
end the whole thing. Perhaps contrary to Putin, for one, knew it. In the very early
the expectations of many American years of the post–Cold War era, many
observers, even Putin was somewhat analysts and observers had hoped that
dismayed. He reveled in the national and Russia would slowly but surely converge
personal humiliation that Trump was in some ways with the United States.
courting, but he also knew that Trump’s They predicted that once the Soviet
careless remarks would provoke a back- Union and communism had fallen away,
lash in the United States and thus further Russia would move toward a form of
constrain the U.S. president’s already liberal democracy. By the late 1990s, it
limited room to maneuver on Russia was clear that such an outcome was not
policy. The modest agreements for on the horizon. And in more recent
further high-level meetings were already years, quite the opposite has happened:
out the window. As he exited the room, the United States has begun to move
Putin told his press secretary, within closer to Russia, as populism, cronyism,
earshot of our interpreter, that the press and corruption have sapped the strength
conference had been “bullshit.” of American democracy. This is a devel-
Trump’s critics immediately opment that few would have foreseen 20
pounced on his bizarre conduct in years ago, but one that American leaders
Helsinki. It was more evidence that should be doing everything in their
Trump was in league with Putin and power to halt and reverse.
that the Kremlin held sway over the Indeed, over time, the United States
American president. The following and Russia have become subject to the
year, Mueller’s final investigative report same economic and social forces. Their
determined that during the 2016 U.S. populations have proved equally suscep-
presidential election, the Trump tible to political manipulation. Prior to
campaign had in fact been willing to the 2016 U.S. election, Putin recog-
exploit any derogatory information nized that the United States was on a
about Clinton that came its way from path similar to the one that Russia took
whatever source, including Russia. In in the 1990s, when economic dislocation
seeking to thwart Clinton’s bid to and political upheaval after the collapse
become the first female American of the Soviet Union had left the Rus-
president, the Trump campaign and the sian state weak and insolvent. In the
Kremlin had been acting in parallel; United States, decades of fast-paced
their goals had aligned. Mueller con- social and demographic changes and the
cluded that although this did not amount Great Recession of 2008–9 had weak-
to a criminal conspiracy, there was ened the country and increased its
Fiona Hill
vulnerability to subversion. Putin Referendums, plebiscites, and executive

realized that despite the lofty rhetoric orders are the preferred tools of the
that flowed from Washington about populist leader, and Putin has used
democratic values and liberal norms, them all over the past 20 years. When
beneath the surface, the United States he came to power on December 31,
was beginning to resemble his own 1999, at the end of a decade of crisis and
country: a place where self-dealing strife in Russia, Putin promised to fix
elites had hollowed out vital institutions everything. Unlike his predecessor,
and where alienated, frustrated people Boris Yeltsin, Putin did not belong to a
were increasingly open to populist and formal political party. He was the
authoritarian appeals. The fire was champion of a looser, personalized
already burning; all Putin had to do was movement. After 2000, Putin turned
pour on some gasoline. Russian presidential elections into
national referendums on himself by
A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP making sure his rivals were obscure (or
When Trump was elected, Putin and wholly manufactured) opposition
the Kremlin made no attempt to conceal candidates. And at every critical junc-
their glee. They had thought that ture during his time in power, Putin has
Clinton would become president and adjusted Russia’s political system to
that she would focus on criticizing entrench himself in the Kremlin.
Putin’s style of governance and con- Finally, in 2020, he formally amended
straining Russia. They had steeled the constitution so that in theory (and
themselves and prepared for the worst. health permitting), he can run for
Instead, they got the best possible reelection and stay in power until 2036.
outcome from their perspective—a All of Putin’s machinations greatly
populist, nativistic president with no impressed Trump. He wanted to “get
prior experience in foreign policy and a along” with Russia and with Putin
huge, fragile ego. Putin recognized personally. Practically the only thing
Trump as a type and grasped his politi- Trump ever said to me during my time
cal predilections immediately: Trump, in his administration was to ask, in
after all, fit a mold that Putin himself reference to Putin, “Am I going to like
had helped forge as the first populist him?” Before I could answer, the other
leader to take power in a major country officials in the room got up to leave, and
in the twenty-first century. Putin had the president’s attention shifted; such
blazed the trail that Trump would was life as a female adviser in the
follow during his four years in office. Trump White House.
The essence of populism is creating a Trump took at face value rumors
direct link with “the people” or with that Putin was the richest man in the
specific groups within a population, world and told close associates that he
then offering them quick fixes for admired Putin for his presumed wealth
complex problems and bypassing or and for the way he ran Russia as if it
eliminating intermediaries such as were his own private company. As
political parties, parliamentary repre- Trump freely admitted, he wanted to
sentatives, and established institutions. do the same thing. He saw the United
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Fiona Hill
States as an extension of his other his most formidable opponents, Joe

private enterprises: the Trump Organi- Biden, ahead of the 2020 presidential
zation, but with the world’s largest election. And Trump imported Putin’s
military at its disposal. This was a style of personalist rule, bypassing the
troubling perspective for a U.S. presi- professional civil servants in the federal
dent, and indeed, over the course of his government—a nefarious “deep state,”
time in office, Trump came to more in Trump’s eyes—to rely instead on the
closely resemble Putin in political counsel and interventions of cronies.
practice than he resembled any of his Foreign politicians called in chits with
American predecessors. celebrities who had personal connec-
At times, the similarities between tions to the president and his family,
Trump and Putin were glaringly obvi- avoiding their own embassies in the
ous: their shared manipulation and process. Lobbyists complained to
exploitation of the domestic media, whomever they could reach in the West
their appeals to their own versions of Wing or the Trump family circle. They
their countries’ “golden age,” their were quick to set attack dogs on anyone
compilation of personal lists of “na- perceived as an obstacle and to rile up
tional heroes” to appeal to their voters’ pro-Trump trolls on the Internet,
nostalgia and conservatism—and their because this always seemed to work.
attendant compilation of personal lists Influence peddlers both domestic and
of enemies to do the same for their foreign courted the president to pursue
voters’ darker sides. Putin put statues of their own priorities; the policymaking
Soviet-era figures back on their pedes- process became, in essence, privatized.
tals and restored Soviet memorials that The event that most clearly revealed
had been toppled under Gorbachev and the convergence of politics in the
Yeltsin. Trump tried to prevent the United States and Russia during
removal of statues of Confederate Trump’s term was his disorganized but
leaders and the renaming of American deadly serious attempt to stage a
military bases honoring Confederate self-coup and halt the peaceful transfer
generals. The two men also shared of executive power after he lost the
many of the same enemies: cosmopoli- 2020 election to Biden. Russia, after all,
tan, liberal elites; the American finan- has a long history of coups and succes-
cier, philanthropist, and open society sion crises, dating back to the tsarist
promoter George Soros; and anyone era, including three during the past 30
trying to expand voting rights, improve years. In August 1991, hard-liners
electoral systems, or cast a harsh light opposed to Gorbachev’s reforms staged
on corruption in their countries’ respec- a brief putsch, declaring a state of emer-
tive executive branches. gency and placing Gorbachev under
Trump also aped Putin’s willingness house arrest at his vacation home. The
to abuse his executive power by going effort fizzled, and the coup was a
after his political adversaries; Trump’s debacle, but it helped bring down the
first impeachment was provoked in part Soviet Union. Two years later, violence
by his attempt to coerce the govern- erupted from a bitter dispute between
ment of Ukraine into smearing one of the Russian parliament and Yeltsin over
the respective powers of the legislature backs of the thousands of little lies that
and the president in competing drafts Trump uttered nearly every time he
of a new constitution. Yeltsin moved to spoke and that were then nurtured
dissolve parliament after it refused to within the dense ecosystem of Trumpist
confirm his choice for prime minister. media outlets. This was yet one more
His vice president and the Speaker of way in which, under Trump, the United
the parliament, in response, sought to States came to resemble Russia, where
impeach him. In the end, Yeltsin Putin has long solidified his grip on
invoked “extraordinary powers” and power by manipulating the Russian
called out the Russian army to shell the media, fueling nationalist grievances,
parliament building, thus settling the and peddling conspiracy theories.
argument with brute force.
The next coup was a legal one and I ALONE
came in 2020, when Putin wanted to Trump put the United States on a path
amend Yeltsin’s version of the constitu- to autocracy, all the while promising to
tion to beef up his presidential pow- “make America great again.” Likewise,
ers—and, more important, to remove Putin took Russia back toward the
the existing term limits so that he could authoritarianism of the Soviet Union
potentially stay on as president until under the guise of strengthening the
2036. As a proxy to propose the neces- state and restoring the country’s global
sary constitutional amendments, Putin position. This striking convergence
tapped Valentina Tereshkova, a loyal casts U.S.-Russian relations and the exi-
supporter in parliament and, as a gencies of Washington’s approach to
cosmonaut and the first woman to travel Moscow in a new light.
to outer space, an iconic figure in Historically, U.S. policies toward
Russian society. Putin’s means were Russia have been premised on the idea
subtler than Yeltsin’s in 1993, but his that the two countries’ paths and expec-
methods were no less effective. tations diverged at the end of the Cold
It would have been impossible for War. In the immediate aftermath of the
any close observer of recent Russian collapse of the Soviet Union, Western
history to not recall those episodes on analysts had initially thought that Russia
January 6, when a mob whipped up by might embrace some of the international
Trump and his allies—who had spent institutional arrangements that Wash-
weeks claiming that the 2020 election ington and its allies had long champi-
had been stolen from him—stormed the oned. That, of course, did not happen.
U.S. Capitol and tried to stop the And under Putin, U.S.-Russian relations
formal certification of the election have become more frazzled and fraught
results. The attack on the Capitol was than at any point in the 1990s.
the culmination of four years of con- There is something confounding
spiracies and lies that Trump and his about the ongoing confrontation be-
allies had fed to his supporters on social tween the two countries, which seems
media platforms, in speeches, and on like an artifact from another era.
television. The “Big Lie” that Trump During the Cold War, the stakes of the
had won the election was built on the conflict were undeniable. The Soviet
Fiona Hill
Union posed an existential threat to the Washington is hell-bent on invasion

United States and its allies, and vice and regime change and also has Russia
versa. The two superpowers faced off in and Putin in its cross hairs.
an ideological clash between capitalism In truth, most American policymak-
and communism and a geopolitical ers simply wish that Russia would just
tussle over spheres of influence in go away so they can refocus their
Europe. Today, Russia maintains the attention on what really matters. For
capacity to obliterate the United States, their Russian counterparts, however, the
but the Soviet Union and the commu- United States still represents the main
nist system are gone. And even though opponent. That is because, as a populist
foreign policy circles in Washington leader, Putin sees the United States not
and Moscow still view U.S.-Russian just as a geopolitical threat to Russia
relations through the lens of great- but also as a personal threat to himself.
power competition, the struggle for For Putin, foreign policy and domestic
Europe is over. For the United States, policy have fused. His attempt to retain
China, not Russia, poses the greatest Russia’s grip on the independent
foreign policy challenge of the twenty- countries that were once part of the
first century, along with the urgent Soviet Union and to reassert Moscow’s
existential threats of climate change and influence in other global arenas is
global pandemics. inseparable from his effort to consoli-
Yet a sense of confrontation and date and expand his authority at home.
competition persists. Americans point Putin sits at the apex of a personalized
to a pattern of Russian aggression and and semi-privatized kleptocratic system
provocation: Russia’s invasion of Geor- that straddles the Russian state and its
gia in 2008, its annexation of Crimea in institutions and population. He has
2014 and its subsequent assaults on embedded loyalists in every important
Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty, its Russian institution, enterprise, and
intervention in Syria in 2015, the industry. If Putin wants to retain the
Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidency until 2036—by which time he
presidential election, and the frequent will be 84 years old and will have become
ransomware attacks and email hacks the longest-serving modern Russian
attributed to Russian actors. Russians, ruler—he will have to maintain this level
for their part, point to the expansion of of control or even increase it, since any
nato into eastern Europe and the slippage might be perceived as weakness.
Baltic states, the U.S. bombing of To do so, Putin has to deter or defeat any
Belgrade during the Kosovo war in opponents, foreign or domestic, who have
1999, Washington’s decision to invade the capacity to undermine his regime.
Iraq in 2003, U.S. support for the “color His hope is that leaders in the United
revolutions” that took place in post- States will get so bogged down with
Soviet states such as Georgia and problems at home that they will cease
Ukraine in the first decade of this criticizing his personalization of power
century, and the uprisings in the Mid- and will eschew any efforts to transform
dle East during the Arab Spring. In Russia similar to those the U.S. govern-
Moscow, all of these serve as proof that ment carried out in the 1990s.
Putin also blurs the line between charismatic, patriotic, and defiant. He
domestic and foreign policy to distract poses a threat to Putin not only owing
the Russian population from the to their differences but also because of a
distortions and deficiencies of his rule. few key similarities: like Putin, Navalny
On the one hand, he stresses how is a populist who heads a movement
decadent and dissolute the United rather than a party, and he has not been
States has become and how ill suited its averse to playing on nationalist senti-
leaders are to teach anyone a lesson on ments to appeal to the same Russian
how to run a country. On the other voters who form Putin’s base. Navalny
hand, he stresses that the United States has survived an audacious assassination
still poses a military threat and that it attempt and has humiliated Putin on
aims to bring Russia to its knees. numerous occasions. By skillfully using
Putin’s constant refrain is that the digital media and slick video skills to
contest between Russia and the United highlight the excesses of the Russian
States is a perpetual Darwinian struggle leader’s kleptocratic system, Navalny
and that without his leadership, Russia has gotten under Putin’s skin. He has
will not survive. Without Putin, there is forced the Kremlin to pay attention to
no Russia. He does not want things to him. This is why Navalny is in jail and
get completely out of hand and lead to why Putin has moved swiftly to roll up
war. But he also does not want the his movement, forestalling any chance
standoff to fade away or get resolved. that Navalny might compete for the
As the sole true champion of his coun- presidency in 2024.
try and his people, he can never be seen
to stand down or compromise when it THE TASK AT HAND
comes to the Americans. The current U.S.-Russian relationship
Similarly, Putin must intimidate, no longer mirrors the Cold War chal-
marginalize, defuse, or defeat any lenge, even if some geopolitical con-
opposition to his rule. Anyone who tours and antagonisms persist. The old
might stand in his way must be crushed. U.S. foreign policy approach of balanc-
In this sense, the jailed Russian opposi- ing deterrence with limited engagement
tion leader Alexei Navalny and Clinton is ill suited to the present task of
fall into the same category. In Putin’s dealing with Putin’s insecurities. And
view, if Clinton had become U.S. after Trump’s disastrous performance at
president, she would have continued to Helsinki, it is also clear that the arms
hound him and hold him to task, just as control summitry that took the edge off
she did when she served as secretary of the acute phase of the Cold War and
state in the Obama administration, by nuclear confrontation can provide little
promoting democracy and civil society guidance for how to anchor the future
to root out corruption in Russia. relationship. The primary problem for
Of course, Navalny is far more the Biden administration in dealing
dangerous to Putin than Clinton would with Russia is rooted in the domestic
have been. Navalny is a Russian, not a politics of the United States and Russia
foreigner. He is a next-generation rather than their foreign policies. The
alternative to Putin: young, handsome, two countries have been heading in the
Fiona Hill
same political direction for some of the decades as an intelligence operative

same reasons over the last several years. before ascending to office—is a product
They have similar political susceptibili- of Russia’s very real deep state. Unlike
ties. The United States will never Trump, who saw the U.S. state appara-
change Putin and his threat percep- tus as his enemy and wanted to rule the
tions, because they are deeply personal. country as an outsider, Putin rules
Americans will have to change them- Russia as a state insider. Also unlike
selves to blunt the effects of Russian Trump, Putin rarely dives into Russia’s
political interference campaigns for the social, class, racial, or religious divisions
foreseeable future. Achieving that goal to gain political traction. Instead,
will require Biden and his team to although he targets individuals and
integrate their approach to Russia with social groups that enjoy little popular
their efforts to shore up American support, Putin tends to promote a
democracy, tackle inequality and single, synthetic Russian culture and
racism, and lead the country out of a identity to overcome the domestic
period of intense division. conflicts of the past that destabilized
The polarization of American society and helped bring down both the Rus-
has become a national security threat, sian empire and the Soviet Union. That
acting as a barrier to the collective Putin seeks one Russia while Trump
action necessary for combating catastro- wanted many Americas during his time
phes and thwarting external dangers. in office is more than just a difference
Partisan spectacles during the global in political styles: it is a critical data
covid-19 pandemic have undermined point. It highlights the fact that a
the country’s international standing as a successful U.S. policy approach to
model of liberal democracy and eroded Russia will rest in part on denying
its authority on public health. The Putin and Russian operatives the
United States’ inability to get its act possibility to exploit divisions in
together has hindered the projection of American society.
American soft power, or what Biden has The United States’ vulnerability to
called “the power of our example.” the Kremlin’s subversion has been
During my time in the Trump adminis- amplified by social media. American-
tration, I watched as every peril was made technology has magnified the
politicized and turned into fodder for impact of once fringe ideas and subver-
personal gain and partisan games. sive actors around the world and become
Successive national security advisers, a tool in the hands of hostile states and
cabinet members, and their professional criminal groups. Extremists can network
staffs were unable to mount coherent and reach audiences as never before on
responses or defenses to security issues platforms such as Facebook and Twitter,
in the face of personalized, chaotic, and which are designed to attract people’s
opportunistic conduct at the top. attention and divide them into affinity
In this regard, Putin actually offers groups. Putin has weaponized this
an instructive contrast. Trump railed technology against the United States,
against a mythological American deep taking advantage of the ways that social
state, whereas Putin—who spent media undermines social cohesion and
erodes Americans’ sense of a shared strife and populist proclivities among

purpose. Policymakers should step up their citizens. Biden should base a new
their cooperation with the private sector transatlantic agenda on the mutual fight
in order to cast light on and deter against populism at home and authori-
Russian intelligence operations and tarianism abroad through economic
other efforts to exploit social media rebuilding and democratic renewal.
platforms. They also need to figure out Most important, Biden must do
ways to educate the American public everything in his power to restore trust
about the perils of posting personal and in government and to promote fairness,
political information online. equity, and justice. As many Americans
Making the United States and its learned during Trump’s presidency, no
society more resilient and less vulnerable country, no matter how advanced, is
to manipulation by tackling inequality, immune to flawed leadership, the
corruption, and polarization will require erosion of political checks and balances,
innovative policies across a huge range of and the degradation of its institutions.
issues. Perhaps the highest priority Democracy is not self-repairing. It
should be given to investing in people requires constant attention.∂
where they reside, particularly through
education. Education can lower the
barriers to opportunity and accurate
information in a way that nothing else
can. It can help people recognize the
difference between fact and fiction. And
it offers all people the chance not only to
develop knowledge and learn skills but
also to continue to transform themselves
and their communities.
One thing U.S. leaders should avoid
in seeking to foster domestic unity is
attempting to mobilize Americans
around the idea of a common enemy,
such as China. Doing so risks backfiring
by stirring up xenophobic anger toward
Americans and immigrants of Asian
heritage and thus fueling more divisions
at home. Instead of trying to rally Amer-
icans against China, Biden should rally
them in support of the democratic U.S.
allies that Trump spurned and derided.
Many of those countries, especially in
Europe, find themselves in the same
political predicament as the United
States, as authoritarian leaders and
powers seek to exploit socioeconomic
inevitable triumph and the obsolescence

The Inevitable of great-power conflict, both Demo-
THE DIVIDED WORLD
cratic and Republican administrations

Rivalry pursued a policy of engagement, which
sought to help China grow richer.
Washington promoted investment in
America, China, and the China and welcomed the country into
Tragedy of Great-Power the global trading system, thinking it
Politics would become a peace-loving democ-
racy and a responsible stakeholder in a
U.S.-led international order.
John J. Mearsheimer Of course, this fantasy never materi-
alized. Far from embracing liberal
values at home and the status quo
I
t was a momentous choice. Three abroad, China grew more repressive and
decades ago, the Cold War ended, and ambitious as it rose. Instead of fostering
the United States had won. It was harmony between Beijing and Washing-
now the sole great power on the planet. ton, engagement failed to forestall a
Scanning the horizon for threats, U.S. rivalry and hastened the end of the
policymakers seemed to have little cause so-called unipolar moment. Today,
for concern—and especially not about China and the United States are locked
China, a weak and impoverished country in what can only be called a new cold
that had been aligned with the United war—an intense security competition
States against the Soviet Union for over a that touches on every dimension of
decade. But there were some ominous their relationship. This rivalry will test
signs: China had nearly five times as U.S. policymakers more than the
many people as the United States, and its original Cold War did, as China is likely
leaders had embraced economic reform. to be a more powerful competitor than
Population size and wealth are the main the Soviet Union was in its prime. And
building blocks of military power, so this cold war is more likely to turn hot.
there was a serious possibility that China None of this should be surprising.
might become dramatically stronger in China is acting exactly as realism would
the decades to come. Since a mightier predict. Who can blame Chinese
China would surely challenge the U.S. leaders for seeking to dominate Asia
position in Asia and possibly beyond, the and become the most powerful state on
logical choice for the United States was the planet? Certainly not the United
clear: slow China’s rise. States, which pursued a similar agenda,
Instead, it encouraged it. Beguiled rising to become a hegemon in its own
by misguided theories about liberalism’s region and eventually the most secure
and influential country in the world.
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell And today, the United States is also
Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of acting just as realist logic would predict.
Political Science at the University of Chicago
and the author of The Great Delusion: Liberal Long opposed to the emergence of
Dreams and International Realities. other regional hegemons, it sees China’s
John J. Mearsheimer
ambitions as a direct threat and is was a nightmare. Not only would it mean
determined to check the country’s the end of unipolarity; a wealthy China
continued rise. The inescapable out- would surely also build a formidable
come is competition and conflict. Such military, as populous and rich countries
is the tragedy of great-power politics. invariably convert their economic power
What was avoidable, however, was the into military power. And China would
speed and extent of China’s extraordi- almost certainly use that military to
nary rise. Had U.S. policymakers during pursue hegemony in Asia and project
the unipolar moment thought in terms power into other regions of the world.
of balance-of-power politics, they would Once it did, the United States would
have tried to slow Chinese growth and have no choice but to contain, if not try
maximize the power gap between to roll back, Chinese power, spurring a
Beijing and Washington. But once dangerous security competition.
China grew wealthy, a U.S.-Chinese Why are great powers doomed to
cold war was inevitable. Engagement compete? For starters, there is no
may have been the worst strategic higher authority to adjudicate disputes
blunder any country has made in recent among states or protect them when
history: there is no comparable example threatened. Furthermore, no state can
of a great power actively fostering the ever be certain that a rival—especially
rise of a peer competitor. And it is now one with abundant military power—will
too late to do much about it. not attack it. Competitors’ intentions
are hard to divine. Countries figure out
REALISM 101 that the best way to survive in an
Soon after the Sino-Soviet split of the anarchic world is to be the most power-
1960s, American leaders—wisely—worked ful actor of all, which in practice means
to integrate China into the Western order being a hegemon in one’s own region
and help it grow economically, reasoning and making sure no other great powers
that a more powerful China would be dominate their regions.
better able to help contain the Soviet This realist logic has informed U.S.
Union. But then the Cold War ended, foreign policy since the very beginning.
raising a question: How should U.S. Early presidents and their successors
policymakers deal with China now that it worked assiduously to make the United
was no longer needed to check Moscow? States the most powerful country in the
The country had a per capita gdp that Western Hemisphere. After achieving
was one-75th the size of the United regional hegemony around the start of
States’. But given China’s population the twentieth century, the country
advantage, if its economy grew rapidly in played a key role in preventing four
the decades ahead, it could eclipse the great powers from dominating either
United States in sheer economic might. Asia or Europe: it helped defeat impe-
Simply put, the consequences of an rial Germany in World War I and both
increasingly wealthy China for the global imperial Japan and Nazi Germany in
balance of power were enormous. World War II and contained the Soviet
From a realist perspective, the pros- Union during the Cold War. The
pect of China as an economic colossus United States feared these potential
The Inevitable Rivalry
hegemons not only because they might harbored extensive revisionist goals in
grow powerful enough to roam into the East Asia. Chinese policymakers have
Western Hemisphere but also because consistently stated their desire to
that would make it harder for Washing- reintegrate Taiwan, take back the
ton to project power globally. Diaoyu Islands (known in Japan as the
China is acting according to this Senkaku Islands) from Japan, and
same realist logic, in effect imitating the control most of the South China Sea—
United States. It wants to be the most all aims destined to be fiercely resisted
powerful state in its backyard and, by China’s neighbors, not to mention
eventually, in the world. It wants to the United States. China has always had
build a blue-water navy to protect its revisionist goals; the mistake was
access to Persian Gulf oil. It wants to allowing it to become powerful enough
become the leading producer of ad- to act on them.
vanced technologies. It wants to create
an international order that is more THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
favorable to its interests. A powerful Had U.S. policymakers accepted the
China would be foolish to pass up the logic of realism, there was a straightfor-
opportunity to pursue these goals. ward set of policies they could have
Most Americans do not recognize pursued to slow economic growth in
that Beijing and Washington are follow- China and maintain the wealth gap
ing the same playbook, because they between it and the United States. In the
believe the United States is a noble early 1990s, the Chinese economy was
democracy that acts differently from woefully underdeveloped, and its future
authoritarian and ruthless countries such growth depended heavily on access to
as China. But that is not how interna- American markets, technology, and capi-
tional politics works. All great powers, tal. An economic and political Goliath
be they democracies or not, have little at the time, the United States was in an
choice but to compete for power in what ideal position to hinder China’s rise.
is at root a zero-sum game. This impera- Beginning in 1980, U.S. presidents
tive motivated both superpowers during had granted China “most favored nation”
the Cold War. It motivates China today status, a designation that gave the coun-
and would motivate its leaders even if it try the best possible trade terms with the
were a democracy. And it motivates United States. That favoritism should
American leaders, too, making them have ended with the Cold War, and in its
determined to contain China. place, U.S. leaders should have negoti-
Even if one rejects this realist ated a new bilateral trade agreement that
account, which emphasizes the struc- imposed harsher terms on China. They
tural forces driving great-power compe- should have done so even if the agree-
tition, U.S. leaders still should have ment was also less favorable to the United
recognized that turning China, of all States; given the small size of the Chi-
countries, into a great power was a nese economy, it would have taken a far
recipe for trouble. After all, it had long bigger hit than the U.S. economy.
sought to settle its border dispute with Instead, U.S. presidents unwisely kept
India on terms favorable to itself and granting China most-favored-nation
John J. Mearsheimer
status annually. In 2000, the error was trade, Washington could have enlisted
compounded by making that status such allies as Japan and Taiwan, remind-
permanent, markedly reducing Washing- ing them that a powerful China would
ton’s leverage over Beijing. The next year, pose an existential threat to them.
the United States blundered again by Given its market reforms and latent
allowing China to join the World Trade power potential, China would still have
Organization (wto). With global markets risen despite these policies. But it
now open, Chinese businesses expanded, would have become a great power at a
their products became more competitive, much later date. And when it did, it
and China grew more powerful. would still have been significantly
Beyond limiting China’s access to the weaker than the United States and
international trading system, the United therefore not in a position to seek
States should have strictly controlled the regional hegemony.
export of sophisticated U.S. technologies. Because relative, rather than abso-
Export controls would have been espe- lute, power is what ultimately matters in
cially effective in the 1990s and the early international politics, realist logic
years of the next decade, when Chinese suggests that U.S. policymakers should
companies were mainly copying Western have coupled efforts to slow China’s
technology, not innovating on their own; economic growth with a campaign to
denying China access to advanced maintain—if not increase—their coun-
technologies in areas such as aerospace try’s lead over China. The U.S. govern-
and electronics would almost certainly ment could have invested heavily in
have slowed its economic development. research and development, funding the
But Washington let technology flow type of relentless innovation required to
with few limits, allowing China to preserve American mastery over cutting-
challenge U.S. dominance in the critical edge technologies. It could have actively
realm of innovation. U.S. policymakers discouraged manufacturers from moving
also made the mistake of lowering overseas, in order to bolster the United
barriers to direct U.S. investment in States’ manufacturing base and protect
China, which was tiny in 1990 but its economy from vulnerable global
mushroomed over the next three decades. supply chains. But none of these
If the United States had played hard- prudent measures were adopted.
ball on trade and investment, China
would surely have turned to other DELUSIONAL THINKING
countries for help. But there were limits Given the liberal triumphalism that
to what it was able to do in the 1990s. pervaded the Washington establish-
Not only did the United States produce ment in the 1990s, there was little
the bulk of the world’s most sophisti- chance that realist thinking would
cated technologies, but it also had inform U.S. foreign policy. Instead,
several levers—including sanctions and U.S. policymakers assumed that global
security guarantees—that it could have peace and prosperity would be maxi-
used to persuade other countries to take mized by spreading democracy, promot-
a harder line on China. As part of an ing an open international economy, and
effort to constrain China’s role in global strengthening international institu-
tions. Applied to China, this logic permanent most-favored-nation status,

prescribed a policy of engagement, which laid the groundwork for its entry
whereby the United States would into the wto. “If you believe in a future
integrate the country into the global of greater openness and freedom for the
economy in the hopes that it would people of China,” he maintained in 2000,
become more prosperous. Eventually, it “you ought to be for this agreement.”
was thought, China would even mature George W. Bush also embraced
into a rights-respecting democracy and efforts to bring China into the global
a responsible global actor. Unlike economic fold, promising as a presiden-
realism, which feared Chinese growth, tial candidate that “trade with China
engagement welcomed it. will promote freedom.” In his first year
For such a risky policy, the breadth in office, he signed the proclamation
and depth of support for engagement granting China permanent most-fa-
was remarkable, spanning four adminis- vored-nation status and took the final
trations. U.S. President George H. W. steps to guide the country into the wto.
Bush was committed to engaging with The Obama administration was
China even before the Cold War ended. more of the same. “Since I’ve been
At a press conference after the 1989 president, my goal has been to consis-
Tiananmen Square massacre, Bush tently engage with China in a way that
justified remaining economically en- is constructive, to manage our differ-
gaged with China by arguing that ences and to maximize opportunities
U.S.-Chinese “commercial contacts [had] for cooperation,” Barack Obama said in
led, in essence, to this quest for more 2015. “And I’ve repeatedly said that I
freedom” and that economic incentives believe it is in the interests of the
made democratization “inexorable.” Two United States to see China grow.” One
years later, when he was criticized for might think that the “pivot to Asia,”
renewing China’s most-favored-nation unveiled by Secretary of State Hillary
status, he defended engagement by Clinton in 2011, represented a shift
claiming that it would “help create a away from engagement and toward
climate for democratic change.” containment, but that would be wrong.
Bill Clinton criticized Bush for Clinton was a committed engager, and
“coddling” China during the 1992 her Foreign Policy article making the
presidential campaign and tried playing case for the pivot was filled with liberal
tough with Beijing after moving into rhetoric about the virtues of open
the White House. But he soon reversed markets. “A thriving China is good for
course, declaring in 1994 that the America,” she wrote. Moreover, save for
United States should “intensify and placing 2,500 U.S. marines in Australia,
broaden its engagement” with China, no meaningful steps were taken to imple-
which would help it “evolve as a respon- ment a serious containment strategy.
sible power, ever growing not only Support for engagement was also
economically, but growing in political deep and wide within the U.S. business
maturity so that human rights can be community, which viewed China as a
observed.” Clinton led the way in manufacturing base as well as a giant
convincing Congress to grant China market, with more than one billion
John J. Mearsheimer
potential customers. Trade groups such would simply be a less capable country.
as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the The prospect that it would become
Business Roundtable, and the National more powerful and no less authoritar-
Association of Manufacturers undertook ian did not appear to enter their
what Thomas Donohue, the Chamber of calculations. Besides, they believed that
Commerce’s president at the time, called realpolitik was old thinking.
a “nonstop lobbying blitz” to help China Some engagers now maintain that the
get into the wto. Leading lights in the United States hedged its bets, pursuing
media also embraced engagement, containment side by side with engage-
including the editorial boards of The ment in case a friendship with China did
Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, not flourish. “Just to be safe, . . . we
and The Washington Post. The columnist created an insurance policy in case this
Thomas Friedman spoke for many when bet failed,” Joseph Nye, who served in
he wrote, “Over time, China’s leaders the Pentagon during the Clinton admin-
simply can’t control and monitor their istration, wrote in these pages in 2018.
bursting free markets, or prevent little This claim is at odds with the frequent
people from getting cheated and then refrain from U.S. policymakers that they
rioting against the government, without were not containing China. In 1997, for
the other institutions that must go with example, Clinton described his policy as
free markets—from an effective [securi- “not containment and conflict” but
ties and exchange commission] to a free “cooperation.” But even if U.S. policy-
and responsible press backed by the rule makers were quietly containing China,
of law.” Engagement was equally popular engagement undermined their efforts,
in academia. Few China experts or because that policy ultimately shifted the
international relations scholars ques- global balance of power in China’s favor.
tioned the wisdom of helping Beijing Creating a peer competitor is hardly
grow more powerful. And perhaps the consistent with containment.
best indicator of the foreign policy
establishment’s overwhelming commit- A FAILED EXPERIMENT
ment to engagement is that both Zbig- Nobody can say that engagement wasn’t
niew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger— given ample opportunity to work, nor
respectively, the most prominent can anyone argue that China emerged
Democratic and Republican Cold War as a threat because the United States
hawks—supported the strategy. was not accommodating enough. As the
Defenders of engagement argue that years went on, it became clear that
their policy allowed for the possibility engagement was a failure. China’s
of failure. Clinton admitted in 2000, economy experienced unprecedented
“We don’t know where it’s going,” and economic growth, but the country did
George W. Bush said the same year, not turn into a liberal democracy or a
“There are no guarantees.” Doubts like responsible stakeholder. To the con-
these were rare, however. More impor- trary, Chinese leaders view liberal
tant, none of the engagers foresaw the values as a threat to their country’s
implications of failure. If China re- stability, and as rulers of rising powers
fused to democratize, they believed, it normally do, they are pursuing an
increasingly aggressive foreign policy. mittee and in the Obama administra-

There is no way around it: engagement tion. In fact, as president, he has
was a colossal strategic mistake. As embraced containment and has been as
Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner—two hard-nosed toward China as his prede-
former Obama administration officials cessor was, pledging “extreme competi-
who recognized that engagement had tion” with China shortly after taking
failed and now serve in the Biden office. Congress, too, has come around.
administration—wrote in these pages In June, the U.S. Innovation and
in 2018, “Washington now faces its Competition Act sailed through the
most dynamic and formidable competi- Senate with bipartisan support. The bill
tor in modern history.” labels China “the greatest geopolitical
Obama vowed a tougher line against and geo-economic challenge for United
Beijing during his presidency, contest- States foreign policy” and controver-
ing its maritime claims and filing suits sially calls for treating Taiwan as a
against it within the wto, but these sovereign state of “vital” strategic
halfhearted efforts amounted to little. importance. The American public
Only in 2017 did the policy truly appears to share this view: a 2020 Pew
change. After Donald Trump became Research Center poll found that nine in
U.S. president, he quickly abandoned ten Americans considered China’s
the engagement strategy that the power a threat. The new U.S.-Chinese
previous four administrations had rivalry is not ending anytime soon. In
embraced, pursuing containment fact, it is likely to intensify, no matter
instead. As a White House strategy who is in the White House.
document released that year explained,
great-power competition had returned, THE DANGER OF A HOT WAR
and China now sought to “challenge Engagement’s remaining defenders now
American power, influence, and inter- portray the downward spiral in U.S.-
ests, attempting to erode American Chinese relations as the work of indi-
security and prosperity.” Determined to viduals who are bent on creating a
stop China from succeeding, Trump U.S.-Soviet-style confrontation—“New
initiated a trade war in 2018 and tried Cold Warriors,” in the words of the
to undermine the technology giant former George W. Bush administration
Huawei and other Chinese corporations official Robert Zoellick. In the engag-
that threatened the United States’ ers’ view, the incentives for further
technological dominance. His adminis- economic cooperation outweigh the
tration also developed closer relations need to compete for power. Mutual
with Taiwan and challenged Beijing’s interests trump conflicting interests.
claims in the South China Sea. Cold Regrettably, the proponents of engage-
War II was underway. ment are whistling in the wind. Cold
One might have expected President War II is already here, and when one
Joe Biden to abandon containment and compares the two cold wars, it becomes
return to engagement, given that he apparent that the U.S.-Chinese rivalry
staunchly supported that policy as chair is more likely to lead to a shooting war
of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- than the U.S.-Soviet rivalry was.
John J. Mearsheimer
The first point of contrast between contrast, last fought a war in 1979
the two conflicts concerns capabilities. (against Vietnam) and in the ensuing
China is already closer to the United decades became an economic juggernaut.
States in terms of latent power than the There was another drag on Soviet
Soviet Union ever was. At the height of capabilities that is largely absent in
its power, in the mid-1970s, the Soviet China’s case: troublesome allies.
Union had a small advantage in popula- Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet
tion (less than 1.2 to 1) and, using gnp Union maintained a huge military
as a rough indicator of wealth, was presence in Eastern Europe and was
almost 60 percent as wealthy as the deeply involved in the politics of almost
United States. In contrast, China now every country in that region. It had to
has four times as many people as the contend with insurrections in East
United States and is about 70 percent as Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
wealthy. If China’s economy continues Czechoslovakia. Albania, Romania, and
growing at an impressive rate of around Yugoslavia routinely challenged Mos-
five percent annually, it will eventually cow’s economic and security policies.
have more latent power than the United The Soviets also had their hands full
States. It has been projected that by with China, which switched sides
2050, China will have a population midway through the Cold War. These
advantage of approximately 3.7 to 1. If allies were an albatross around Mos-
China has half of the United States’ per cow’s neck that distracted Soviet leaders
capita gdp in 2050—roughly where from their principal adversary: the
South Korea is today—it will be 1.8 United States. Contemporary China has
times as wealthy as the United States. few allies and, except when it comes to
And if it does better and reaches three- North Korea, is far less tied to its
fifths of U.S. per capita gdp by then— friends than the Soviets were to theirs.
roughly where Japan is today—it will be In short, Beijing has greater flexibility
2.3 times as wealthy as the United to cause trouble abroad.
States. With all that latent power, What about ideological motivations?
Beijing could build a military that is Like the Soviet Union was, China is led
much more powerful than the United by a nominally communist government.
States’, which would be contesting But just as Americans during the Cold
China’s from 6,000 miles away. War were wrong to view Moscow as
Not only was the Soviet Union primarily a communist threat, deter-
poorer than the United States; during mined to spread its malign ideology
the height of the Cold War, it was also around the globe, it would be a mistake
still recovering from the horrific devasta- to portray China as an ideological
tion wreaked by Nazi Germany. In menace today. Soviet foreign policy was
World War II, the country lost 24 influenced only on the margins by
million citizens, not to mention more communist thinking; Joseph Stalin was
than 70,000 towns and villages, 32,000 a hardcore realist, as were his successors.
industrial enterprises, and 40,000 miles Communism matters even less in
of railroad track. It was in no position to contemporary China, which is best
fight the United States. China, in understood as an authoritarian state that
embraces capitalism. Americans should Berlin, for example, making Washington’s

wish that China were communist; then commitment to defend it all the riskier.
it would have a lethargic economy. Finally, the geography of the new
But there is an “ism” that China has in cold war is more war-prone than that of
spades, one that is likely to exacerbate its the old one. Although the U.S.-Soviet
rivalry with the United States: national- rivalry was global in scope, its center of
ism. Normally the world’s most powerful gravity was the Iron Curtain in Europe,
political ideology, nationalism had limited where both sides had massive armies
influence in the Soviet Union because it and air forces equipped with thousands
was at odds with communism. Chinese of nuclear weapons. There was little
nationalism, however, has been gathering chance of a superpower war in Europe,
steam since the early 1990s. What makes because policymakers on both sides
it especially dangerous is its emphasis on understood the fearsome risks of
China’s “century of national humiliation,” nuclear escalation. No leader was
a period beginning with the First Opium willing to start a conflict that would
War, during which China was victimized likely have destroyed his own country.
by great powers, especially Japan but also, In Asia, there is no clear dividing line
in the Chinese narrative, the United like the Iron Curtain to anchor stability.
States. The effects of this potent nation- Instead, there are a handful of potential
alist story were on display in 2012–13, conflicts that would be limited and would
when China and Japan skirmished over involve conventional arms, which makes
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, igniting war thinkable. They include fights for
anti-Japanese protests across China. In control over Taiwan, the South China
the coming years, the intensifying Sea, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and
security competition in East Asia will the maritime routes that run between
surely ramp up Chinese hostility toward China and the Persian Gulf. These
Japan and the United States, increasing conflicts would be fought mainly in open
the likelihood of a hot war. waters between rival air and naval forces,
Also raising the odds of war are and in those instances in which control
China’s regional ambitions. Soviet of an island was at play, small-scale
leaders, busy recovering from World War ground forces would likely take part.
II and managing their empire in Eastern Even a fight over Taiwan, which might
Europe, were largely content with the draw in Chinese amphibious forces,
status quo on the continent. China, by would not involve huge nuclear-equipped
contrast, is deeply committed to an armies crashing into each other.
expansionist agenda in East Asia. Al- None of this is to say that these
though the main targets of China’s limited-war scenarios are likely, but
appetite certainly have strategic value for they are more plausible than a major
China, they are also considered sacred war between nato and the Warsaw Pact
territory, which means their fate is bound was. Still, one cannot assume that there
up with Chinese nationalism. This is would be no nuclear escalation should
especially true of Taiwan: the Chinese Beijing and Washington fight over
feel an emotional attachment to the Taiwan or the South China Sea. Indeed,
island that the Soviets never felt for if one side were losing badly, it would at
John J. Mearsheimer
least consider employing nuclear would require Washington to maintain

weapons to rescue the situation. Some formidable conventional forces in East
decision-makers might conclude that Asia to persuade Beijing that a clash of
nuclear weapons could be used without arms would at best yield a Pyrrhic
an unacceptable risk of escalation, victory. Convincing adversaries that
provided the attacks took place at sea they cannot achieve quick and decisive
and spared the territory of China and wins deters wars. Furthermore, U.S.
the United States and its allies. Not policymakers must constantly remind
only is a great-power war more likely in themselves—and Chinese leaders—
the new cold war, but so is nuclear use. about the ever-present possibility of
nuclear escalation in wartime. Nuclear
A RIVAL OF AMERICA’S MAKING weapons, after all, are the ultimate
Although their numbers have dwindled, deterrent. Washington can also work to
advocates of engagement remain, and establish clear rules of the road for
they still think the United States can waging this security competition—for
find common ground with China. As late example, agreements to avoid incidents
as July 2019, 100 China watchers signed at sea or other accidental military
an open letter to Trump and members of clashes. If each side understands what
Congress rejecting the idea that Beijing crossing the other side’s redlines would
was a threat. “Many Chinese officials mean, war becomes less likely.
and other elites know that a moderate, These measures can only do so
pragmatic and genuinely cooperative much to minimize the dangers inher-
approach with the West serves China’s ent in the growing U.S.-Chinese
interests,” they wrote, before calling on rivalry. But that is the price the United
Washington to “work with our allies and States must pay for ignoring realist
partners to create a more open and logic and turning China into a power-
prosperous world in which China is ful state that is determined to chal-
offered the opportunity to participate.” lenge it on every front.∂
But great powers are simply unwill-
ing to let other great powers grow
stronger at their expense. The driving
force behind this great-power rivalry is
structural, which means that the prob-
lem cannot be eliminated with clever
policymaking. The only thing that could
change the underlying dynamic would
be a major crisis that halted China’s
rise—an eventuality that seems unlikely
considering the country’s long record of
stability, competence, and economic
growth. And so a dangerous security
competition is all but unavoidable.
At best, this rivalry can be managed
in the hope of avoiding a war. That
ESSAYS
Many of the United States’ plans

in Afghanistan contained barely
concealed prophecies of failure.
– Rory Stewart
The Last Days of Intervention America’s Crypto Conundrum

Rory Stewart 60 Justin Muzinich 129
Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy The Myth of Russian Decline
DAM ON WI N T E R / T H E N EW YO R K T I M ES
Tsai Ing-wen 74 Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-

Taylor 142
The Age of America First
Richard Haass 85 Order Before Peace
Martin Indyk 153
The Coming Democratic Revival
Madeleine K. Albright 99 The International Order Isn’t Ready
for the Climate Crisis
The Technopolar Moment Stewart M. Patrick 166
Ian Bremmer 112
The Last Days of

Intervention
Afghanistan and the Delusions
of Maximalism
Rory Stewart
T
he extravagant lurches of the U.S. intervention in Afghani-
stan—from a $1 trillion surge to total withdrawal, culminat-
ing in the reestablishment of a Taliban government 20 years
after the 9/11 attacks—must rank among the most surreal and disturb-
ing episodes in modern foreign policy. At the heart of the tragedy was
an obsession with universal plans and extensive resources, which sty-
mied the modest but meaningful progress that could have been
achieved with far fewer troops and at a lower cost. Yet this failure to
chart a middle path between ruinous overinvestment and complete
neglect says less about what was possible in Afghanistan than it does
about the fantasies of those who intervened there.
The age of intervention began in Bosnia in 1995 and accelerated
with the missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Over this period,
the United States and its allies developed a vision of themselves as
turnaround CEOs: they had the strategy and resources to fix things,
collect their bonuses, and get out as soon as possible. The symbol of
the age was the American general up at 4 AM to run eight miles be-
fore mending the failed state.
Had the same U.S. and European officials been seeking to improve
the lives of people in a poor ex-coal town in eastern Kentucky or to
work with Native American tribes in South Dakota, they might have
RORY STEWART is a Senior Fellow at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale
University and a co-author, with Gerald Knaus, of Can Intervention Work? He is former
British Secretary of State for International Development, served as a coalition official in
Iraq, and ran a development organization in Afghanistan.
The Last Days of Intervention
been more skeptical of universal blueprints for societal transformation,

paid more attention to the history and trauma of local communities,
and been more modest about their own status as outsiders. They might
have understood that messiness was inevitable, failure possible, and pa-
tience essential. They might even have grasped why humility was better
than a heavy footprint and why listening was better than lecturing.
Yet in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq—places far more trau-
matized, impoverished, and damaged than anywhere at home—
U.S. and European officials insisted that there could be a formula
for success, a “clearly defined mission,” and an “exit strategy.” Any
setback, they reasoned, could be blamed only on a lack of interna-
tional planning or resources.
These ideas were damaging in Bosnia and Kosovo. But in the inter-
ventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—unstable hybrids of humanitarian-
ism and counterterrorism that soon became even more unstable hybrids
of state building and counterinsurgency—they proved fatal. From the
very beginning, the international plans were surreally detached from the
local reality. The first draft of the development strategy for Afghanistan,
written by international consultants in 2002, described the Afghans as
committed to “an accountable, broad-based, multi-ethnic, representa-
tive government” based on “respect for human rights.” That same year,
then U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice claimed that
terrorism from Afghanistan posed “an existential threat to our security.”
Such hyperbolic untruths, which multiplied with each new strategy
or plan, were designed to win resources and defend the intervention
at home. By exaggerating both the potential for success and the risks
of failure in Afghanistan, they made it difficult to resist calls for more
troops. And when troops were killed (and more of them were killed
than at any time since the Vietnam War), domestic politics dictated
ever more strident mission statements, increasingly inflated plans,
and additional troop deployments.
Eventually, the rhetorical Ponzi scheme collapsed. But having
failed to fulfill their fantasies and realize their power as saviors, the
United States and its allies now seemed unable to recognize or value
the progress that was actually occurring on the ground—in part, be-
cause it was slow, unfamiliar, and often not in line with their plans.
Political leaders had so overstated their case that once they were re-
vealed to be wrong, they could not return to the moderate position
of a light footprint and instead lurched from extreme overreach to
Rory Stewart
denial, isolationism, and withdrawal. In the end, they walked out,

blaming the chaos that followed on the corruption, ingratitude, and
the supposed cowardice of their former partners.
THE AGE OF INTERVENTION

The obsession with universal plans backed by heavy resources that led to
the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq stemmed in part from a misunder-
standing of an earlier success. The first act in the 20-year age of interven-
tion, the nato operation in Bosnia, was largely effective. Not only did it
end the war and preserve the peace for decades at almost no cost to the
United States and its nato allies, but it achieved things that not long
before had seemed impossible: the protection of civilians, the demobili-
zation of vicious militias, the safe return of refugees to ethnically cleansed
areas, and the imprisonment of war criminals. Today, the Bosnian state
remains fragile, ethnically divided, and corrupt—but also peaceful.
This success, which emerged from a large but very restrained inter-
national presence, was misinterpreted as an argument for bold inter-
national interventions grounded in universal state-building templates
and backed by overwhelming resources. Paddy Ashdown, the British
politician who was the senior international representative in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, asserted that Bosnia demonstrated seven “pillars of
peace-making” that “apply more or less universally” and provided a
plan to create everything from security to water supplies, prisons, and
an efficient market-based economy. In his view, an international ad-
ministration with absolute executive power was needed to achieve
these things. Local elections or consultations should be avoided. The
intervening powers should, he said, “go in hard from the start,” estab-
lishing the rule of law as quickly and decisively as possible, “even if
you have to do that quite brutally.”
Many embraced Ashdown’s vision and developed similar blueprints.
James Dobbins, a former U.S. special envoy to Bosnia and a future
special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, co-authored The
Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, published by the RAND Corporation,
which asserted that “heavy” peace-enforcement operations required 13
soldiers for every 1,000 inhabitants and “light” peacekeeping opera-
tions required two. The future president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani,
matched this with a co-authored textbook titled Fixing Failed States that
defined ten functions of a state and laid out a universal state construc-
tion scheme that could be applied from the Horn of Africa to the Urals.
In Kosovo and Iraq, ever-greater power was deployed to advance

such plans. In Kosovo, the UN administration assumed the authority to
jail anyone, change the constitution, appoint officials, and approve the
government’s budget (although it used these powers relatively cau-
tiously). In Iraq, Paul Bremer, the American administrator of the Co-
alition Provisional Authority, assumed full executive power and sent
American and British officials—I was one of them—to govern the Iraqi
provinces. They rewrote university
curricula, remade the army, and fired
hundreds of thousands of members of At the heart of the tragedy
Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and in Afghanistan was an
detained tens of thousands more.
Afghanistan—the third of the four
obsession with universal
great interventions of the age—was plans and extensive
the exception. There, the senior UN resources.
official, Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld proposed a light footprint. Although they came from very differ-
ent political traditions (Brahimi was an anticolonial independence
leader in Algeria), they both mocked Kosovo as a neocolonial farce.
Both feared that a heavy footprint in Afghanistan would make the gov-
ernment too dependent on foreign money and troops and provoke an
insurgency. Rumsfeld initially authorized only 2,000 U.S. troops and
forbade any nation building. No attempt was made to create anything
comparable to the mission in Kosovo or, later, that in Iraq. And in order
to ensure that his idealistic UN staff was not tempted into running Af-
ghanistan, Brahimi blocked the opening of UN field offices in many of
the provinces. Instead, the lead was given to the Afghan transitional
government under President Hamid Karzai.
By 2004, three years into the intervention, most of Afghanistan
was safer, freer, and more prosperous, with better services and oppor-
tunities than it had had in 30 years. But there was a dark side to this
story: the corruption was far worse than during the Soviet occupation
or Taliban rule, the police were brutal, and the judicial system worked
only for those who could afford the bribes. The production of opium
poppies—which had been nearly eliminated by the Taliban by 2000—
soared, with profits flowing to the most senior government officials.
Helmand Province was perhaps the most extreme failure. It was
controlled by local strongmen—confirmed in government positions by
Rory Stewart
Karzai—whose families had run the province in the 1980s and early
1990s and who used their newfound power to reignite a decades-long
civil war over land and drugs. (Helmand was then producing 90 per-
cent of Afghanistan’s opium and much of the heroin that found its way
to Europe.) Regularly robbed and tortured by these commanders, Af-
ghans in some parts of the province became nostalgic for the Taliban.
Many commentators blamed these setbacks on the light footprint,
arguing that the United States had been distracted by Iraq, had failed
to plan properly, and had not deployed enough resources or troops.
Un officials, counternarcotics agents, journalists, and human rights
and anticorruption campaigners all called for the toppling of the war-
lords. Academics warned that the lack of good governance would
alienate the local population and undermine the credibility of the Af-
ghan government. Practically everyone assumed that there was a real-
istic plan to fix governance in Afghanistan—and that the missing
ingredients were more resources and international troops. As one
2003 rand report on nation building argued: “The United States and
its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops, on
a per capita basis, into post-conflict Kosovo than into post-conflict
Afghanistan. This higher level of input accounts in significant meas
ure for the higher level of output measured in terms of democratic
institutions and economic growth.”
These ideas led nato to launch what was in effect a second, heavier
intervention: a regime-change operation aimed this time not at the
Taliban but at the power structures that had been established by the
coalition’s ally Karzai. By 2005, nato “provincial reconstruction teams”
had sprouted up across the country, the un had begun to disarm and
demobilize the warlords and their militias, and the number of nato
troops had begun to climb. General John Abizaid, the head of U.S.
Central Command, predicted that 2005 would be “the decisive year.”
By 2006, the most powerful warlords had been stripped of their
posts in Helmand, and the United Kingdom had deployed thousands
of troops to the province. Their aim was not to fight the Taliban, per-
ceived at the time as a weak force. Rather, the troops focused on im-
proving governance and justice and on stamping out corruption and
drugs. This plan, dubbed “the comprehensive approach,” demanded
an ever-heavier international footprint. Few seemed to doubt its fea-
sibility. The commander of the nato-led operation, British General
David Richards, insisted that the mission was “doable if we get the
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Rory Stewart
formula right, and it is properly resourced.” He increased the number

of troops under his command from 9,000 to 33,000 and claimed that
2006 would be “the crunch year.”
But as the troop counts rose, the problem of good governance be-
came a problem of insurgency. In 2006, the number of Taliban bomb
attacks increased fivefold, and the number of British casualties increased
tenfold. This, too, was blamed on an imperfect plan and insufficient
resources. In 2007, a new general announced another strategy, requiring
still more resources. The same thing happened in 2008. Nato troop
increases were followed by U.S. troop increases. In 2009, U.S. General
Stanley McChrystal announced a new plan for 130,000 U.S. and nato
soldiers, claiming he was “knee-deep in the decisive year.”
FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION

By this point, tens of thousands of Afghans and thousands of interna-
tional troops had been killed, and Afghanistan was considerably less
safe than it had been in 2005. But the interveners still insisted that
somewhere out there was a formula for state building and counterin-
surgency that could succeed. Counterinsurgency experts began to
suggest that perhaps 700,000 troops would do it.
As the U.S. presence in Afghanistan increased, so did the tempera-
ture of the political rhetoric in Washington. In 2003, when 30 U.S.
service members were killed in Afghanistan, it was possible to justify
the mission as one of a number of small U.S. operations stretching
from Asia to the Horn of Africa. But by 2008, with five times as many
U.S. soldiers dying per year and tens of billions of dollars being spent,
more extreme justifications were demanded. Officials now argued
that if Afghanistan fell to the Taliban, Pakistan would, too, and ex-
tremists would get their hands on nuclear weapons. Catching Osama
bin Laden, President Barack Obama insisted, required “winning” in
Afghanistan. Failure was not an option.
None of this was true, of course. Pakistan and much of the Middle
East were more important threats in terms of terrorism and regional
instability. Catching bin Laden required only catching bin Laden. But
the savage and changeable winds of public opinion demanded ever more
paranoid and grandiose statements. U.S. plans for state building and
counterinsurgency became tissues of evasion and euphemism, justified
with contorted logic, dressed in partial statistics, and decorated with
false analogies. They were inflexible, simplistic, overly optimistic, and
shrilly confident. And because these plans remained obsessed with fix-
ing the Taliban-dominated areas of southern Afghanistan, they diverted
investment from the stable, welcoming areas of central and northern
Afghanistan, where significant development progress was still possible.
Many of these optimistic plans contained barely concealed prophe-
cies of failure. McChrystal, for example, maintained that no amount of
U.S. military power could stabilize Afghanistan “as long as pervasive
corruption and preying upon the people continue to characterize gov-
ernance.” Obama himself acknowledged that such misconduct was un-
likely to change—but he nonetheless authorized a slightly pared-down
version of McChrystal’s request for almost 40,000 additional troops.
While the United States continued to refine its plans, the Taliban
implemented their own vision for how to establish security, gover-
nance, and the rule of law. They called it sharia, and they sold it not
from a military fort but from within tribal structures, appealing to
rural habits and using Islamic references, in Pashto. And the more
military power the interveners deployed against them, the more they
could present themselves as leading a jihad for Afghanistan and Islam
against a foreign military occupation.
To the Americans and their allies, it seemed impossible that the
U.S. military, with its fleets of gunships and cyberwarfare capabilities,
its cutting-edge plans for counterinsurgency and state building, and
its billions of dollars in aid and investment, could be held off by a
medieval group that lived in mud huts, carried guns designed in the
1940s, and rode ponies. The interveners continued to believe that the
international community could succeed in nation building anywhere
in the world, provided that it had the right plan and enough resources.
THE FALSE LESSONS OF BOSNIA

This view reflected a tragic misreading of the experience in Bosnia,
which was a much more cautious and constrained intervention than
many recall. The number of international troops was higher there
than in the early days of the war in Afghanistan, but both foreign sol-
diers and foreign civilians in Bosnia were severely limited in what
they could do. (Ashdown’s vision of an omnipotent international state
builder, overruling local voices and implementing the perfect plan,
was what he wished for, not what he found.)
Scarred by memories of Vietnam and the more recent failed inter-
vention in Somalia, senior U.S. and European officials did not wish to
Rory Stewart
be drawn into the long history of ethnic strife in the Balkans and so
approached the conflict with immense caution. When the United
States belatedly mounted a military intervention, it was focused on
air operations to bomb the Bosnian Serb artillery around Sarajevo.
The ground fighting was conducted by the Sarajevo-based Bosnia au-
thority and by Croatian soldiers, who received their training from
U.S. contractors. When international troops were deployed after the
Dayton peace accords, they spent most of their time on their bases.
More U.S. soldiers were injured playing sports than in action.
The Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
had much less power than its equivalent would be given in Kosovo
and could not order military or police officers to enforce its decrees.
The Dayton agreement handed 49 percent of the country’s territory
to the Bosnian Serb aggressors and enshrined their power in areas
that they had ethnically cleansed. The cautious international presence
also initially left the Croatian and Serbian paramilitaries, special po-
lice forces, and intelligence services in place and did not disarm them.
Instead of doing the equivalent of “de-Baathifying,” as Bremer did in
Iraq, or toppling the warlords, as U.S. and coalition forces did later in
southern Afghanistan, the high representative for Bosnia and Herze-
govina was required to work with the war criminals. The party of the
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who was responsible for the
massacre in Srebrenica, was allowed to participate in elections (and
won the first postwar one, in 1996).
Bosnia was ultimately transformed not by foreign hands but by
messy and often unexpected local solutions that were supported by
international diplomacy. The first breakthrough came when Bosnian
Serb President Biljana Plavsic split from her mentor, the war crimi-
nal Karadzic, and then requested international support. Plavsic was
herself a war criminal who had described Bosnian Muslims as “ge-
netically deformed material.” But the international forces worked
with her to disarm the special police forces, Bosnian Serb units that
acted as de facto militias. Later, the death of Croatian President
Franjo Tudjman and the toppling of Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic fatally weakened their proxies in Bosnia. Neither of these
events was part of a planned strategy by the international commu-
nity, but both helped what had initially been a tiny and apparently
toothless war crimes tribunal in The Hague expand its operations,
leading eventually to the capture and prosecution not only of
Karadzic but also of Plavsic herself. Cautious compromises ulti-

mately led not to appeasement but to justice.
The reversal of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia also owed very little
to international plans. Despite the Dayton agreement’s commitment
to refugee return, many international experts considered it reckless to
allow refugees to go back to villages that had been burned to the
ground and occupied by hostile militias. Nonetheless, small groups of
Bosnians tried to move back to their homes. Some were ejected im-
mediately by armed groups, but others held on and persuaded inter-
national troops to follow and protect them. These small Bosnian-led
initiatives—improvised, incremental, and following no international
plan—opened the door for the return of over a million refugees.
Within a decade of the intervention, more than 200,000 homes had
been given back to their owners, over 400,000 soldiers from three
armies had been disarmed, and Bosnia had built a unified army of
15,000 soldiers. All the major war criminals were caught and tried,
and Bosnia’s homicide rate fell below that of Sweden. All of this was
achieved at a cost of almost zero American and nato lives. And as
Gerald Knaus, the chair of the European Stability Initiative, a Euro-
pean think tank specializing in the Balkans, has argued, such successes
were due not to the strength of the international presence but to its
comparative weakness: a relatively restrained intervention forced lo-
cal politicians to take the lead, necessitated often uncomfortable com-
promises, and made foreign civilians and troops act cautiously to
reinforce unexpected and improvised local initiatives.
THE VANISHING MIDDLE GROUND

Could a light footprint in Afghanistan have eventually led to similar
successes? Perhaps, but with greater difficulty. Afghanistan was much
poorer when the United States invaded than Bosnia was at the time of
the nato intervention: adult life expectancy was about 48, one in
seven children died before the age of five, and most men (and almost
all women) were unable to read or write. Afghan communities were
far more conservative, religious, and suspicious of foreigners than
Bosnian communities had been (thanks in part to cia efforts to de-
velop their identity as heroic resisters of foreign occupation during
the Soviet period). But the initially limited and restrained interna-
tional presence in Afghanistan still enabled far more progress than
most critics of the war have acknowledged.
Rory Stewart
The violence and poor governance—particularly in Helmand, else-

where in southern Afghanistan, and in eastern Afghanistan—that
were used to discredit the light-footprint approach were not represen-
tative of all of rural Afghanistan. In Bamiyan, for example, a province
of three million people in the center of the country, military strong-
men retained power, but there was peace. Between 2001 and 2004,
locals established excellent schools, even in outlying settlements, pro-
viding most girls with their first ex-
perience of formal education and
A light and sustained laying the foundation for some of
footprint modeled on the them to attend college. The people of
Bosnian intervention Bamiyan—long a marginalized com-
munity—began to take senior posi-
should have been the tions in universities, the media,
approach for Afghanistan. ministries, and other government
agencies. The government extended
paved roads and electricity to villages
that had never seen them before. Life was much better than it had
been under the Taliban, which had led genocidal attacks against
Bamiyan communities. (In the winter of 2001–2, I walked through
village after village that had been burned to the ground by the Taliban.)
All this progress occurred with only a few dozen foreign soldiers in
the province and no international civilian administrators.
There also was progress in other central regions and in areas to the
north, including in Herat, much of Mazar-e Sharif, the Panjshir Val-
ley, the Shomali Plain, and Kabul. In all these places, a light interna-
tional footprint meant fewer international casualties, which in turn
reduced the pressure on American and European politicians and gen-
erals to make exaggerated claims. It also compelled the international
community to engage in a more modest discussion with the Afghan
people about what kind of society they themselves desired and to ac-
cept ideas and values that Americans and Europeans did not always
share. In short, it forced a partnership.
By 2005, the Afghan economy was almost twice as big as it had
been in 2001. The population of Kabul had quadrupled in size, and
new buildings were shooting up. On television, young female and
male presenters had the confidence to satirize their rulers. And the
progress was not confined to the capital: across the country, 1.5 mil-
lion girls went to school for the first time. Mobile phones spread like
wildfire. Health and life expectancy improved. There was less vio-
lence than at any point in the previous 40 years, and no insurgency
remotely comparable to what had exploded in Iraq. Perhaps most en-
couraging of all was that although millions of people had fled in the
wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, millions of Afghan refugees
were choosing to return home during this period.
What would have happened if the United States and nato had
tried to retain a light footprint and a restrained approach beyond
2005? What if they had deployed fewer troops, invested in generous
development aid, and resisted fighting the drug trade, toppling war-
lords, and pursuing a counterinsurgency campaign against the Tali-
ban? The answer would have depended to a great extent on the
initiatives of local actors and the competition among them, the devel-
opments in neighboring countries, and luck—just as the outcome in
Bosnia did. In many parts of Afghanistan, there would have been pov-
erty, a lack of democratic representation, and strongman rule. In re-
gions controlled by drug lords and racked by Pashtun infighting and
Pakistani meddling, there probably would have been continued hor-
ror, especially if U.S. special operations forces and their proxies had
continued to hunt for terrorists. But across much of the country, from
Bamiyan to Panjshir, there could have been continued improvements
in health, education, and employment—particularly if an overambi-
tious surge had not diverted development funds away from these re-
gions and to the insurgency areas. And for millions of people in Herat
and Kabul, this progress could have been combined with an increas-
ingly open and democratic civil society.
Most important, however, many of the problems caused by the
heavier international presence and the surge would have been avoided.
Well meaning though they were, the attempts to depose local war-
lords in the name of good governance created power vacuums in some
of the most ungovernable regions of the country, alienated and under-
mined the elected government, and drove the warlords and their mi-
litias to ally with the Taliban. The counternarcotics campaigns
alienated many others who lost their livelihoods.
The United States did attempt to return to a lighter footprint in
2014, but by then, immense damage had been done. The surge had
formed an Afghan army that was entirely reliant on expensive U.S.
aircraft and technology, created a new group of gangster capitalists fed
from foreign military contracts, and supercharged corruption. Military
Rory Stewart
operations had killed thousands of people, including many civilians,

deepening hatred. And the presence of more than 100,000 interna-
tional troops in rural villages had allowed the Taliban—which had been
a weak and fragile group—to present themselves as fighting for Af-
ghanistan and Islam against a foreign occupation. In 2005, under the
light footprint, a British intelligence analyst told me there were be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Six years later,
after tens of thousands of Afghans had been killed and half a trillion
dollars had been spent, General Richard Barrons of the British army
estimated that there were 36,000 Taliban fighters in the country.
But just as the initial light footprint was better than the surge, so
the later light footprint was better than a total withdrawal. A few
thousand international troops, supporting air operations, were still
capable of preventing the Taliban from holding any district capi-
tal—much less marching on Kabul. And by preventing a Taliban
takeover, the troops were able to buy valuable time for health and
educational outcomes to improve, development assistance to con-
tinue, income and opportunity to grow, and rights to be more firmly
established for millions of Afghans.
Although the cost of the surge had been immense, the cost of re-
maining beyond 2021 would have been minimal. The United States
could have supported 2,500 soldiers in Afghanistan almost indefi-
nitely—and with little risk. So long as U.S. airpower and support for
the Afghan air force remained in place, the Taliban would have posed
a minimal threat to U.S. troops in their heavily defended air bases.
(Eighteen U.S. service members were killed in 2019, perhaps the
fiercest year of the fighting, before the cease-fire agreement.) The
Taliban were not on the verge of victory; they won because the United
States withdrew, crippled the Afghan air force on its way out, and left
Afghan troops without air support or resupply lines. In other words,
the decision to withdraw was driven not by military necessity, the in-
terests of the Afghans, or even larger U.S. foreign policy objectives
but by U.S. domestic politics.
Yet many Americans welcomed the end of the U.S. war in Af-
ghanistan because their leaders had not properly explained to them
how light the U.S. presence had become or what it was protecting.
Politics in the West seems to abhor the middle ground, swinging in-
exorably from overreach and overstatement to isolationism and with-
drawal. A light and sustained footprint modeled on the Bosnian
intervention should have been the approach for Afghanistan—and,

indeed, for interventions elsewhere in the world. Yet instead of argu-
ing that failure in Afghanistan was not an option, former U.S. Presi-
dent Donald Trump behaved as though failure had no consequences.
He showed no concern for how a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan
would affect the United States’ reputation and alliances, regional sta-
bility, terrorism, or the lives of ordinary Afghans. And he responded
to exaggerated claims about Afghanistan’s importance not with mod-
erate claims but with a refusal to maintain even the smallest presence
there or to bear the slightest cost.
President Joe Biden has followed Trump’s Afghan policy in every
detail, despite having famously advocated a light footprint—and ar-
gued against the surge—when he was Obama’s vice president. Some-
how, over the years, he seems to have convinced himself that such an
approach had failed. But the light footprint did not fail. What failed
was the political culture of the West and the imagination of Western
bureaucrats. The United States and its allies lacked the patience, real-
ism, and moderation needed to find the middle path.∂
Taiwan and the Fight

for Democracy
A Force for Good in the Changing
International Order
Tsai Ing-wen
T
he story of Taiwan is one of resilience—of a country uphold-
ing democratic, progressive values while facing a constant
challenge to its existence. Our success is a testament to what
a determined practitioner of democracy, characterized by good gover-
nance and transparency, can achieve.
Yet the story of Taiwan is not only about the maintenance of our
own democratic way of life. It is also about the strength and sense of
responsibility Taiwan brings to efforts to safeguard the stability of the
region and the world. Through hard work and courage, the 23.5 mil-
lion people of Taiwan have succeeded in making a place for them-
selves in the international community.
Emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, authoritarian regimes are
more convinced than ever that their model of governance is better
adapted than democracy to the requirements of the twenty-first cen-
tury. This has fueled a contest of ideologies, and Taiwan lies at the
intersection of contending systems. Vibrantly democratic and West-
ern, yet influenced by a Chinese civilization and shaped by Asian tra-
ditions, Taiwan, by virtue of both its very existence and its continued
prosperity, represents at once an affront to the narrative and an im-
pediment to the regional ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party.
Taiwan’s refusal to give up, its persistent embrace of democracy,
and its commitment to act as a responsible stakeholder (even when its
exclusion from international institutions has made that difficult) are
TSAI ING-WEN is President of Taiwan.
Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy
now spurring the rest of the world to reassess its value as a liberal
democracy on the frontlines of a new clash of ideologies. As countries
increasingly recognize the threat that the Chinese Communist Party
poses, they should understand the value of working with Taiwan. And
they should remember that if Taiwan were to fall, the consequences
would be catastrophic for regional peace and the democratic alliance
system. It would signal that in today’s global contest of values, au-
thoritarianism has the upper hand over democracy.
INDO-PACIFIC FUTURES
The course of the Indo-Pacific, the world’s fastest-growing region, will
in many ways shape the course of the twenty-first century. Its emergence
offers myriad opportunities (in everything from trade and manufactur-
ing to research and education) but also brings new tensions and systemic
contradictions that, if not handled wisely, could have devastating effects
on international security and the global economy. Chief among the driv-
ers of these tensions is the rise of more assertive and self-assured au-
thoritarianism, which is challenging the liberal democratic order that has
defined international relations since the end of World War II.
Beijing has never abandoned its ambitions toward Taiwan. But af-
ter years of double-digit investment in the Chinese military, and ex-
pansionist behavior across the Taiwan Strait and in surrounding
maritime areas, Beijing is replacing its commitment to a peaceful
resolution with an increasingly aggressive posture. Since 2020, Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army aircraft and vessels have markedly increased
their activity in the Taiwan Strait, with almost daily intrusions into
Taiwan’s southern air defense identification zone, as well as occasional
crossings of the tacit median line between the island and the Chinese
mainland (which runs along the middle of the strait, from the north-
east near Japan’s outlying islands to the southwest near Hong Kong).
Despite these worrying developments, the people of Taiwan have
made clear to the entire world that democracy is nonnegotiable. Amid
almost daily intrusions by the People’s Liberation Army, our position
on cross-strait relations remains constant: Taiwan will not bend to
pressure, but nor will it turn adventurist, even when it accumulates
support from the international community. In other words, the main-
tenance of regional security will remain a significant part of Taiwan’s
overall government policy. Yet we will also continue to express our
openness to dialogue with Beijing, as the current administration has
Tsai Ing-wen
repeatedly done since 2016, as long as this dialogue proceeds in a spirit

of equality and without political preconditions. And we are investing
significant resources to deepen our understanding of the administra-
tion in Beijing—which will reduce the risks of misinterpretation and
misjudgment and facilitate more precise decision-making on our
cross-strait policies. We look to maintain a clear-eyed understanding
of the external environment, both threats and opportunities, in order
to ensure that Taiwan is prepared to meet its challenges.
At the same time, Taiwan is fully committed to working with other
regional actors to ensure stability. In March, for example, Taiwan and
the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on the
establishment of a coast guard working group. This working group
will improve communication and information sharing between the
U.S. and Taiwanese coast guards, while also facilitating greater col-
laboration on shared objectives, such as preserving maritime resources
and reducing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Such an
understanding should serve as a springboard for greater collaboration
on nonmilitary matters with other partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Taiwan has also launched a series of initiatives to modernize and reor-
ganize its military, in order to be better prepared for both present and
future challenges. In addition to investments in traditional platforms
such as combat aircraft, Taiwan has made hefty investments in asymmet-
ric capabilities, including mobile land-based antiship cruise missiles. We
will launch the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency in 2022, a military
reform intended to ensure that a well-trained and well-equipped mili-
tary reserve force stands as a more reliable backup for the regular mili-
tary forces. Such initiatives are meant to maximize Taiwan’s self-reliance
and preparedness and to signal that we are willing to bear our share of
the burden and don’t take our security partners’ support for granted.
Taiwan’s efforts to contribute to regional security do not end there.
We are fully committed to collaborating with our neighbors to pre-
vent armed conflict in the East China and South China Seas, as well
as in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan lies along the first island chain, which
runs from northern Japan to Borneo; should this line be broken by
force, the consequences would disrupt international trade and desta-
bilize the entire western Pacific. In other words, a failure to defend
Taiwan would not only be catastrophic for the Taiwanese; it would
overturn a security architecture that has allowed for peace and ex-
traordinary economic development in the region for seven decades.
Tsai at a campaign rally in Chiayi City, Taiwan, September 2015

Taiwan does not seek military confrontation. It hopes for peace-
ful, stable, predictable, and mutually beneficial coexistence with its
neighbors. But if its democracy and way of life are threatened, Tai-
wan will do whatever it takes to defend itself.
THE TAIWAN MODEL

Taiwan’s history is filled with both hardship and accomplishments, and
the authors of this history are the people of Taiwan. Over the past few
decades, we have overcome adversity and international isolation to
achieve one of modern political history’s most successful democratic
transitions. The key ingredients of this achievement have been patience,
resourcefulness, pragmatism, and a stubborn refusal to give up. Under-
B I L LY H . C . K W O K / T H E N E W Y O R K T I M E S
standing both the delicate balance of power in the region and the need
for support, the Taiwanese know that practical collaboration is often
better than being loud or adventurous and that a willingness to lend a
hand is better than trying to provoke or impose a system on others.
While the people of Taiwan have not always achieved consensus,
over time, a collective identity has emerged. Through our interactions
with the rest of the world, we have absorbed values that we have made
our own, merging them with local traditions to create a liberal, pro-
gressive order and a new sense of what it means to be Taiwanese.
Tsai Ing-wen
At the heart of this identity is our embrace of democracy, reflect-

ing a choice that the Taiwanese made and fought for after decades of
authoritarian rule. Once the Taiwanese had made that choice, there
was no looking back. Imperfect though it may be, democracy has
become a nonnegotiable part of who we are. This determination gives
Taiwan the resilience to meet the challenges of the twenty-first cen-
tury and provides a firewall against
forces, both internal and external,
If Taiwan were to fall, the seeking to undermine its hard-won
consequences would be democratic institutions.
catastrophic. A fundamental part of this em-
brace of democracy is a firm belief
that the future of Taiwan is to be de-
cided by the Taiwanese through democratic means. Although Taiwan-
ese in some ways differ in their sense of what exactly this future should
look like, we are united in our commitment to democracy and the
values and institutions that allow us to fight back against external ef-
forts to erode our identity and alter the way of life we cherish. The
great majority of us regard democracy as the best form of government
for Taiwan and are willing to do what is necessary to defend it. Those
beliefs are tested every day, but there is no doubt that the people
would rise up should the very existence of Taiwan be under threat.
Civil society has always played a major role in Taiwan. During the
period of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang, the Dangwai move-
ment pushed to lift martial law and democratize Taiwan; even after being
instrumental in ending martial law, it continued to offer an active and
effective check on government power. Today, the extent of Taiwanese
civil society’s role in governance is unmatched anywhere in the region—
a reflection of the trust between elected officials and citizens, who as a
result are able to influence policy both through and between elections.
Taiwan’s civil society has also proved integral to the island’s in-
ternational standing. Taiwan’s exclusion from the United Nations
and most other international institutions could have led to isola-
tion, but Taiwan instead tapped into the tremendous creativity and
capacity of its people, allowing us to establish global connections by
other means—through small businesses, nongovernmental organi-
zations, and various semi-official groupings. Rather than being an
impediment, the refusal of many countries to officially recognize
Taiwan compelled us to think asymmetrically, combating efforts to
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Tsai Ing-wen
negate Taiwan’s existence by deepening our engagement with the

world through nontraditional channels.
In short, despite decades of isolation, the people of Taiwan have suc-
ceeded in making a place for themselves within the international com-
munity—and transforming Taiwan itself into an economic powerhouse
and one of the most vibrant democracies in the Indo-Pacific.
CHANGING THE RULES

Taiwan’s ability to survive and even thrive as a liberal democracy de-
spite the extraordinary challenges to its existence has important im-
plications for the prevailing rules of international relations. Our bid
to play a more meaningful role in the international community is
evolving in the context of changing regional politics, with more asser-
tive challenges to the liberal international order, backed by the eco-
nomic and political power to turn those ambitions into action. With
increasing awareness of the potential impact of such authoritarian
ambitions, more and more countries have been willing to reexamine
their long-standing assumptions about, and self-imposed limitations
on, engagement with Taiwan.
Through its evolution as an economic powerhouse and a participa-
tory democracy, Taiwan seeks to be—and in many ways already is—
part of the solution to emerging challenges with ramifications on a
planetary scale, from climate change and new diseases, to proliferation
and terrorism, to human trafficking and threats to supply chains. The
covid-19 pandemic has shown that the world is now so interconnected
that the outbreak of a disease in one corner of the planet can, within a
matter of months, reach pandemic proportions. In many cases, the
speed with which new emergencies arise and spread is beyond the abil-
ity of states and existing international institutions to respond. To pre-
pare for future emergencies, the international community must move
toward inclusiveness rather than rigidly adhering to current structures.
Even as it experienced a flare-up in covid-19 cases last spring, Tai-
wan has demonstrated to the world that democratic systems can re-
spond effectively to a pandemic, harnessing the powers of artificial
intelligence, big data, and surveillance networks while ensuring that
the information gathered is used responsibly. The pandemic has also
given Taiwan an opportunity to share its experience with the world and
to provide much-needed medical assistance to struggling countries.
This is so despite its long exclusion from global institutions such as the
World Health Organization, which has left Taiwan little choice but to
develop its own methods of cooperating and communicating with in-
ternational partners. Being left out of the United Nations and other
multilateral institutions has encouraged resilience and spurred novel
approaches to dealing with challenges and crises of all kinds.
Despite being kept out in the cold, Taiwan has strived to adhere to
international protocols, such as the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, amending its domestic
laws and seeking its own formulas for
meeting increasingly complex chal- The people of Taiwan have
lenges. Taiwan is also working proac- made clear to the entire
tively with its partners on the
development of its region. In 2016, we world that democracy is
launched the New Southbound Policy, nonnegotiable.
which facilitates regional prosperity
through trade and investment partner-
ships, educational and people-to-people exchanges, and technological
and medical cooperation with countries in South and Southeast Asia, as
well as Australia and New Zealand. Taiwan is also making investments
in these partners through its business community, simultaneously fos-
tering secure supply chains and regional development.
Indeed, with its high-tech leadership and educated and globalized
workforce, Taiwan is well positioned to help create secure global sup-
ply chains in sectors such as semiconductors, biotechnology, and re-
newable energy—all areas where international cooperation is needed
now more than ever. Our semiconductor industry is especially signifi-
cant: a “silicon shield” that allows Taiwan to protect itself and others
from aggressive attempts by authoritarian regimes to disrupt global
supply chains. We are working to further strengthen our role in secur-
ing global supply chains with a new regional high-end production hub
initiative, which will solidify our position in the global supply chain.
Besides making computer chips, Taiwan is active in high-precision
manufacturing, artificial intelligence, 5G applications, renewable en-
ergy, biotechnology, and more, helping create more diverse and global
supply chains that can withstand disruption, human or otherwise.
Taiwan derives additional soft power from expertise and capabilities
in a variety of other fields, including education, public health, medi-
cine, and natural-disaster prevention. And these are fields in which our
experts and institutions are taking on a growing regional role. Our
Tsai Ing-wen
universities, for example, are prepared to work with other universities

in the region to develop Chinese-language training. Our medical fa-
cilities are sharing expertise in medical technology and management
with partners around Asia. And we are ready to work with major coun-
tries to provide infrastructure investment in developing countries, lev
eraging efficiency while promoting good governance, transparency,
and environmental protection. Similar efforts are being made through
an agreement with the United States to enhance cooperation on infra-
structure financing, investment, and market development in Latin
America and Southeast Asia. In short, Taiwan can be a crucial force in
the peaceful development and prosperity of our region and the world.
DEMOCRATIC VALUES
Sitting on the frontlines of the global contest between the liberal
democratic order and the authoritarian alternative, Taiwan also has an
important part to play in strengthening global democracy. In 2003,
we established the region’s first nongovernmental organization de-
voted to democracy assistance and advocacy, the Taiwan Foundation
for Democracy. Following the models set by the United States’ Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy and the United Kingdom’s West-
minster Foundation for Democracy, the tfd provides funding for
other nongovernmental organizations, international and domestic,
that advocate democratic development and human rights. It also
works to promote public participation in governance through mecha-
nisms such as participatory budgeting and to encourage youth en-
gagement through initiatives such as the annual Asia Young Leaders
for Democracy program. In 2019, the tfd organized its inaugural re-
gional forum on religious freedom, and my government appointed its
first ambassador-at-large for religious freedom.
Taiwan’s strong record on democracy, gender equality, and press and
religious freedom has also made it a home for a growing number of
global nongovernmental organizations, which have faced an increas-
ingly difficult environment in Asia. Organizations including Reporters
Without Borders, the National Democratic Institute, the International
Republican Institute, the European Values Center for Security Policy,
and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom have set up re-
gional offices in Taiwan. From Taiwan, they are able to continue their
important work in the region without the constant threats of surveil-
lance, harassment, and interruptions by authorities. We have also made
ourselves hospitable to international institutions interested in estab-

lishing a presence in the Indo-Pacific, helping turn Taiwan into a hub
for advancing the interests of the democratic community.
Meanwhile, the Global Cooperation and Training Framework—a
platform jointly administered by Taiwan, the United States, and other
partners that allows us to share our expertise with countries around
the world—has fostered creative cooperation on issues such as law
enforcement, public health, and good governance. One recent round
of gctf activity, for example, focused on media literacy and how de-
mocracies can combat disinformation—an area in which Taiwan has
an abundance of experience.
Over the past five years, more than 2,300 experts and officials from
more than 87 countries have attended gctf workshops in Taiwan, and
the forum will continue to expand—offering a path to greater collabo-
ration between Taiwan and countries around the world, including the
United States. Indeed, Taiwan works closely with the United States on
many issues, in the service of regional peace and stability. Our hope is
to shoulder more responsibility by being a close political and economic
partner of the United States and other like-minded countries.
A FORCE FOR GOOD

The threat posed by authoritarian regimes has served as an important
wake-up call for democracies, spurring them to emerge from their
complacency. Although extraordinary challenges remain, democracies
around the world are now working to safeguard their values and re-
new their ossified institutions. Alliances are being rekindled to serve
the interests of the international community.
Taiwan may be small in terms of territory, but it has proved that it
can have a large global presence—and that this presence matters to
the world. It has persevered in the face of existential threats and
made itself an indispensable actor in the Indo-Pacific. And through
it all, the Taiwanese commitment to democracy has never been
stronger: the people of Taiwan know that democracy is the lasting
path and the only game in town.
Over the past two years, our handling of the covid-19 pandemic,
and our assistance to and collaboration with countries around the
world, has offered one more example of the crucial role that Taiwan
can play and of why Taiwan matters. Going forward, our high-tech
industries, and especially our production of advanced semiconduc-
Tsai Ing-wen
tors, will continue to fuel the global economy. And Taiwan’s ability to
balance ties to various countries while defending its democratic way
of life will continue to inspire others in the region.
We have never shied away from challenges. Although the world
faces an arduous journey ahead, this presents Taiwan with opportuni-
ties not seen before. It should increasingly be regarded as part of the
solution, particularly as democratic countries seek to find the right
balance between the need to engage and trade with authoritarian
countries and the need to defend the values and democratic ideals that
define their societies. Long left out in the cold, Taiwan is ready to be
a global force for good, with a role on the international stage that is
commensurate with its abilities.∂

Washington’s Flawed New Foreign
Policy Consensus
Richard Haass
D
onald Trump was supposed to be an aberration—a U.S. pres-
ident whose foreign policy marked a sharp but temporary
break from an internationalism that had defined seven dec-
ades of U.S. interactions with the world. He saw little value in alli-
ances and spurned multilateral institutions. He eagerly withdrew
from existing international agreements, such as the Paris climate ac-
cord and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and backed away from new ones,
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). He coddled autocrats and
trained his ire on the United States’ democratic partners.
At first glance, the foreign policy of U.S. President Joe Biden could
hardly be more different. He professes to value the United States’ tra-
ditional allies in Europe and Asia, celebrates multilateralism, and hails
his administration’s commitment to a “rules-based international order.”
He treats climate change as a serious threat and arms control as an es-
sential tool. He sees the fight of our time as one between democracy
and autocracy, pledging to convene what he is calling the Summit for
Democracy to reestablish U.S. leadership in the democratic cause.
“America is back,” he proclaimed shortly after taking office.
But the differences, meaningful as they are, obscure a deeper truth:
there is far more continuity between the foreign policy of the current
president and that of the former president than is typically recog-
nized. Critical elements of this continuity arose even before Trump’s
presidency, during the administration of Barack Obama, suggesting a
longer-term development—a paradigm shift in the United States’ ap-
proach to the world. Beneath the apparent volatility, the outlines of a
post–post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy are emerging.
RICHARD HAASS is President of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The
World: A Brief Introduction.
Richard Haass
The old foreign policy paradigm grew out of World War II and
the Cold War, founded on the recognition that U.S. national secu-
rity depended on more than just looking out for the country’s own
narrowly defined concerns. Protecting and advancing U.S. inter-
ests, both domestic and international, required helping shepherd
into existence and then sustaining an international system that,
however imperfect, would buttress U.S. security and prosperity
over the long term. Despite missteps (above all, the misguided at-
tempt to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force and the war in Viet-
nam), the results largely validated these assumptions. The United
States avoided a great-power war with the Soviet Union but still
ended the Cold War on immensely favorable terms; U.S. gdp has
increased eightfold in real terms and more than 90-fold in nominal
terms since the end of World War II.
The new paradigm dismisses the core tenet of that approach: that
the United States has a vital stake in a broader global system, one that
at times demands undertaking difficult military interventions or put-
ting aside immediate national preferences in favor of principles and
arrangements that bring long-term benefits. The new consensus re-
flects not an across-the-board isolationism—after all, a hawkish ap-
proach to China is hardly isolationist—but rather the rejection of that
internationalism. Today, notwithstanding Biden’s pledge “to help lead
the world toward a more peaceful, prosperous future for all people,”
the reality is that Americans want the benefits of international order
without doing the hard work of building and maintaining it.
The hold of this emerging nationalist approach to the world is
clear, accounting for the continuity across administrations as differ-
ent as those of Obama, Trump, and Biden. Whether it can produce a
foreign policy that advances American security, prosperity, and val-
ues is another matter entirely.
THE SQUANDERING
As with any paradigm shift, the one taking place now is possible only
because of the failures—both real and perceived—of much of what
came in the years before. The Cold War ended 30 years ago, and the
United States emerged from that four-decade struggle with a degree
of primacy that had few, if any, historical precedents. U.S. power was
immense in both absolute and relative terms. It may have been an
exaggeration to hail a “unipolar moment,” but not by much.
Contrasts and continuities: Trump and Biden debating in Cleveland, September 2020
Historians who look back on these three decades will be rightly
critical of a lot that the United States did, and did not do, with its
position. There were some important accomplishments: the reunifica-
tion of Germany within NATO, the disciplined handling of the 1990–91
Gulf War, the U.S.-led military and diplomatic effort to help end the
war and slaughter in the former Yugoslavia, the fashioning of new
trade agreements, the millions of lives saved thanks to the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, known as PEPFAR.
But these achievements must be weighed against American failures,
both of commission and omission. Washington managed little in the
way of relationship and institution building, lacking the creativity and
ambition that characterized U.S. foreign policy in the wake of World
War II. It wasn’t considered much of a stretch when Dean Acheson, who
D OUG M I L L S / T H E N EW YO R K T I M ES
was secretary of state during the Truman administration, titled his

memoir Present at the Creation; no recent secretary of state could credibly
include the word “creation” in his or her memoir. Despite its unmatched
power, the United States did little to address the widening gap between
global challenges and the institutions meant to contend with them.
The list of missteps is long. Washington largely failed to adapt to
China’s rise. Its decision to enlarge NATO, in violation of Churchill’s
dictum “In victory, magnanimity,” fanned Russian hostility without
Richard Haass
sufficiently modernizing or strengthening the alliance. Africa and

Latin America received only intermittent, and even then limited, at-
tention. Above all, the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were
failures of both design and execution, resulting in costly overreach,
part of a broader U.S. focus on the greater Middle East that defied
strategic logic. The George W. Bush and Obama administrations ded-
icated a high percentage of their foreign policy focus to a region home
to only about five percent of the world’s population, no great powers,
and economies dependent on the wasting asset of fossil fuels.
The word that comes to mind in assessing U.S. foreign policy after
the Cold War is “squander.” The United States missed its best chance
to update the system that had successfully waged the Cold War for a
new era defined by new challenges and new rivalries. Meanwhile,
thanks to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American public largely
soured on what was widely seen as a costly, failed foreign policy. Amer-
icans came to blame trade for the disappearance of millions of manu-
facturing jobs (despite new technologies being the main culprit), and
growing inequality, exacerbated by both the 2008 financial crisis and
the pandemic, fueled populist suspicion of elites. In the face of loom-
ing domestic problems, including decaying infrastructure and falter-
ing public education, foreign involvement came to be viewed as a costly
distraction. The stage for a new foreign policy paradigm was set.
EXTREME COMPETITION
The first and most prominent element of continuity between Trump
and Biden is the centrality of great-power rivalry—above all, with
China. Indeed, U.S. policy toward China has hardly changed since
Biden became president: as Matthew Pottinger, a senior official on the
National Security Council during the Trump administration who was
the lead architect of that administration’s approach to China, rightly
noted in these pages, “The Biden administration has largely maintained
its predecessor’s policy.” Biden himself has spoken of “extreme compe-
tition” with China, and his coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs has pro-
claimed that “the period that was broadly described as engagement has
come to an end.” This new posture reflects the pervasive disillusion-
ment in the American foreign policy establishment with the results of
efforts to integrate China into the world economy and the broader in-
ternational system, along with heightened concern about how Beijing is
using its growing strength abroad and engaging in repression at home.
The continuity between the two administrations can be seen in their

approaches to Taiwan, the most likely flash point between the United
States and China. Far from rescinding a policy introduced in the final
weeks of the Trump administration that removed restrictions on offi-
cial U.S. interactions with Taiwanese officials, the Biden administra-
tion has actively implemented it, publicizing high-level meetings
between U.S. officials and their Tai-
wanese counterparts. Just as the Americans want the
Trump administration worked to im-
prove U.S.-Taiwanese ties, the Biden benefits of international
administration has repeatedly stressed order without doing the
its “rock solid” support for Taiwan hard work.
and has inserted language emphasiz-
ing the importance of cross-strait sta-
bility into joint statements not just with Asian allies, such as Australia,
Japan, and South Korea, but also with global bodies, such as the G-7.
The continuity goes beyond Taiwan. The Biden administration
has kept in place Trump-era tariffs and export controls and is report-
edly looking into launching an investigation into China’s large-scale
industrial subsidies. It has doubled down on criticism of China’s re-
fusal to allow an independent investigation into the origins of
COVID-19 and given credence to the possibility that the new coronavirus
leaked from a laboratory in Wuhan, China. Like its predecessor, it
has called Beijing’s repression of the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang a
“genocide” and denounced its violation of the “one country, two sys-
tems” principle in Hong Kong. It has strengthened efforts to upgrade
the Quad, a dialogue meant to enhance cooperation among Australia,
India, Japan, and the United States, and launched a complementary
strategic initiative with Australia and the United Kingdom. It has
also continued to use the term “Indo-Pacific,” first brought into com-
mon official usage by the Trump administration.
To be sure, there are differences in the Biden administration’s ap-
proach in some important areas, including a focus on finding ways to
cooperate on climate change, the decision to refrain from echoing the
call by Trump’s secretary of state Mike Pompeo for regime change in
Beijing, and an effort to build a common stance with allies. Yet the
view that China is the United States’ chief competitor and even ad-
versary has become widespread and ingrained, and the similarities in
the two administrations’ approaches far outweigh any differences.
Richard Haass
Much the same can be said of the administrations’ policies toward

the United States’ other great-power competitor. Since Biden took
over, U.S. policy toward Russia has changed little in substance. Gone
is Trump’s inexplicable admiration for Russian President Vladimir
Putin. But whatever Trump’s personal regard for Putin, the Trump
administration’s posture toward Russia was in fact fairly tough. It in-
troduced new sanctions, closed Russian consulates in the United
States, and enhanced and expanded U.S. military support to Ukraine—
all of which has continued under Biden. The common view between
the two administrations seems to be that U.S. policy toward Russia
should mostly consist of damage limitation—preventing tensions,
whether in Europe or in cyberspace, from deteriorating into a crisis.
Even Biden’s willingness to extend U.S.-Russian arms control pacts
and start “strategic stability” talks is mostly about preventing addi-
tional erosion, not making further progress. The days of seeking a
“reset” with Moscow are long gone.
AMERICAN NATIONALISM
Accompanying this focus on great powers is a shared embrace of Amer-
ican nationalism. The Trump administration eagerly adopted the slo-
gan and idea of “America first,” despite the label’s origins in a strand of
isolationism tinged with sympathy for Nazi Germany. The Biden ad-
ministration is less overt in its nationalism, but its mantra of “a foreign
policy for the middle class” reflects some similar inclinations.
“America first” tendencies also characterized the Biden adminis-
tration’s initial response to covid-19. U.S. exports of vaccines were
limited and delayed even as domestic supply far exceeded demand,
and there has been only a modest effort to expand manufacturing ca-
pacity to allow for greater exports. This domestic focus was short-
sighted, as highly contagious variants were able to emerge in other
parts of the world before coming to do immense damage in the United
States. It also forfeited an opportunity to cultivate goodwill interna-
tionally by demonstrating the superiority of American technology
and generosity in the face of Chinese and Russian vaccine diplomacy.
U.S. trade policy has been shaped by similar forces, demonstrating
further continuity between Trump and Biden. The latter has avoided
the hyperbole of the former, who savaged all trade pacts except for the
ones his own administration had negotiated. (No matter that the
Trump administration’s agreements were mostly updated versions of
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Richard Haass
existing pacts: the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, for example,

largely followed the much-denounced North American Free Trade
Agreement and, in modernizing certain elements, made generous use
of the text of the equally denounced tpp.) But the Biden administra-
tion has shown little, if any, interest in strengthening the World Trade
Organization, negotiating new trade accords, or joining existing ones,
including the successor agreement to the tpp, the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or cptpp, de-
spite the overwhelming economic and strategic reasons for doing so.
Staying outside the agreement leaves the United States on the side-
lines of the Indo-Pacific economic order and also means missing op-
portunities in other areas, such as advancing global climate goals
through cross-border carbon taxes or using the deal to provide an
economic counterweight to China.
WITHDRAWAL AT ANY COST

Central to the new foreign policy is the desire to pull back from the
greater Middle East, the venue of the so-called forever wars that did so
much to fuel this paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy. Afghanistan is
the most striking example of this shared impetus. In February 2020,
the Trump administration signed an accord with the Taliban that set a
May 1, 2021, deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the coun-
try. The negotiations cut out and undercut the government of Afghan-
istan, and the agreement itself failed to call for the Taliban to lay down
their arms or even to commit to a cease-fire. It was not so much a peace
agreement as a pact to facilitate American military withdrawal.
By the time Biden assumed the presidency, the overreach that had
once characterized U.S. strategy in Afghanistan was a thing of the
past. U.S. troop levels, which had hit 100,000 during the Obama ad-
ministration, were down to under 3,000, with their role largely lim-
ited to training, advising, and supporting Afghan forces. U.S. combat
fatalities had plummeted with the end of combat operations in 2014
(years before the U.S.-Taliban accord). The modest U.S. presence
provided an anchor for some 7,000 troops from allied countries (and
an even larger number of contractors) and a psychological and mili-
tary backstop for the Afghan government—a sufficient presence, that
is, to avert Kabul’s collapse, but not enough to achieve victory or
peace. After 20 years, the United States seemed to have found a level
of commitment in Afghanistan commensurate with the stakes.
Yet the Biden administration rejected the options of renegotiating

or scrapping the accord. Instead, it honored Trump’s agreement in
every way but one: the deadline for a full U.S. military withdrawal
was extended by some 100 days, to September 11, 2021 (and then the
withdrawal was completed ahead of schedule). Biden rejected tying
the removal of U.S. troops to condi-
tions on the ground or to additional
Taliban actions. Like Trump before Greater disarray in the
him, he considered the war in Af- world will make it much
ghanistan a “forever war,” one he was
determined to get out of at any cost. more difficult to “build
And Biden didn’t just implement the back better.”
Trump policy he had inherited; his
administration did so in a Trumpian
way, consulting minimally with others and leaving NATO allies to
scramble. (Other decisions, including supplanting French sales of
submarines to Australia or being slow to lift COVID-related restric-
tions against European visitors to the United States, have likewise set
back transatlantic ties.) Multilateralism and an alliance-first foreign
policy in principle gave way to America-first unilateralism in practice.
In the rest of the greater Middle East, the Biden administration
has similarly continued the Trump approach of reducing the U.S.
footprint. It has resisted any temptation to get more involved in Syria,
much less Libya or Yemen; announced it will maintain only a small,
noncombat military presence in Iraq; embraced the Abraham Accords
while participating only reluctantly in diplomatic efforts to end the
fighting between Israel and Hamas; and eschewed launching any new
attempt to reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.
At first glance, Iran may seem like a glaring exception to the broader
similarity. Trump was a fierce critic of the 2015 nuclear agreement
with Iran (negotiated when Biden was vice president) and unilaterally
exited the accord in 2018; by contrast, the Biden administration
(which is staffed at the senior level by several officials who had a large
hand in negotiating the pact) has made clear its desire to return to the
agreement. But restoring the deal has proved easier said than done, as
the two governments have been unable to agree on either specific ob-
ligations or sequencing. In addition, a new hard-line Iranian govern-
ment has shown no interest in signing on to the sort of “longer and
stronger” pact the Biden administration seeks. As a result, the Biden
Richard Haass
administration may well face the same choices its predecessor did,
with Iran advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities and its influ-
ence throughout the region. Even if Iran once again accepts time-
limited constraints on its nuclear activities, the United States will still
have to decide how to respond to other Iranian provocations.
QUESTIONS OF VALUE
Even on those issues on which Biden’s rhetoric starkly differs from
Trump’s, the policy shifts have been more modest than might have been
expected. Consider the two presidents’ views on the role of values in
foreign policy. Trump was a transactional leader who often seemed to
consider democracy a hindrance and tried to establish close personal
relationships with many of the world’s dictators. He lavished praise on
Putin and exchanged “love letters” with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.
He spoke highly of China’s Xi Jinping, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdo-
gan, and Hungary’s Viktor Orban, while denigrating the leaders of
democratic allies, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French
President Emmanuel Macron, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau. He even levied tariffs on Canada and the European Union.
Biden, by contrast, has declared that the United States is in “a
contest with autocrats,” announced plans to hold his Summit for
Democracy, and pledged to prioritize relations with countries that
share American values. Yet such commitments, however sincere,
have hardly made human rights and democracy promotion a more
prominent part of U.S. foreign policy. Well-warranted expressions
of outrage have not led to significant changes in behavior by others;
the targets of such outrage are generally willing and able to absorb
U.S. criticism and increasingly even U.S. sanctions, thanks to the
growth of alternative sources of support. Myanmar in the wake of a
military coup is a textbook example: the United States sanctioned
members of the regime, but Chinese largess and diplomatic sup-
port have helped the military weather the sanctions. Washington
has offered only a minimal response to incidents such as the Cuban
government’s brutal reaction to protests last summer or the assas-
sination of Haiti’s president. Whatever concerns Washington may
have about Saudi human rights violations, it’s unlikely that those
concerns would prevent cooperation with Riyadh on Iran, Yemen,
or Israel if, for example, Saudi Arabia’s leaders showed an interest
in joining the Abraham Accords.
Of course, U.S. presidents have always allowed professed commit-

ments to human rights and democracy to be set aside when other in-
terests or priorities have come to the fore. The “free world” of the
Cold War was often anything but free. But the broader shift in U.S.
foreign policy today, with its stress on both great-power competition
and short-term domestic priorities, has made those tradeoffs more
frequent and acute. In China’s neighborhood, for example, the Biden
administration set aside concerns about human rights violations by
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in order to make it easier for
the U.S. military to operate in his country, and it has worked to bol-
ster ties with Vietnam, another autocracy ruled by a communist party.
With Russia, it signed an arms control accord while overlooking the
imprisonment of the opposition leader Alexei Navalny. It has largely
ignored the rise of Hindu nationalism in India in favor of stronger
ties with the country to balance China.
With its poorly executed withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the
abandonment of many Afghans most vulnerable to Taliban reprisals,
Washington further forfeited the high ground: the United States
walked away from a project that, for all its flaws and failings, had done
much to improve the lives of millions of Afghans, above all women
and girls. And of course, the sad reality of the fragile state of democ-
racy in the United States—particularly in the wake of the January 6
insurrection—has further undercut Washington’s ability to promote
democratic values abroad.
None of this is to say that there are not important areas of difference
between the Trump administration and the Biden administration on
foreign policy—consider climate change, for example: climate denial
has given way to new investments in green technology and infrastruc-
ture, the regulation of fossil fuel production and use, and participation
in the Paris process. But these areas of difference have rarely taken
priority when other issues, many of which reflect more continuity, are
at stake. Washington has been unwilling to use trade to advance climate
goals, sanction Brazil for its destruction of the Amazon, or make mean-
ingful contributions to help poorer countries shift to green energy.
THE PROBLEM WITH CONTINUITY

In theory, more continuity in U.S. foreign policy should be a good
thing. After all, a great power is unlikely to be effective if its foreign
policy lurches from administration to administration in a way that
Richard Haass
unnerves allies, provides openings to adversaries, confuses voters, and

makes impossible any long-term commitment to building global
norms and institutions. The problem with the emerging American
approach to the world is not an absence of domestic political consen-
sus; to the contrary, there is considerable bipartisanship when it comes
to foreign policy. The problem is that the consensus is woefully inad-
equate, above all in its failure to appreciate just how much develop-
ments thousands of miles away affect what happens at home.
It is also rife with self-defeating contradictions, especially when it
comes to China. Deterring China will require sustained increases in
military spending and a greater willingness to use force (since suc-
cessful deterrence always requires not just the ability but also the per-
ceived will to act). Many Republicans but few Democrats back the
former; few in either party seem ready to sign up for the latter. Both
parties favor symbolically upgrading U.S.-Taiwanese relations, even
though going too far in that direction has the potential to trigger a
costly conflict between the United States and China. As much as the
United States sees China as an adversary, Washington still needs Bei-
jing’s support if it is to tackle a host of regional and global challenges,
from North Korea and Afghanistan to global health. And while the
Biden administration has talked much about its support for alliances,
U.S. allies are in many cases unprepared to do what the administra-
tion believes is necessary to counter China. Indeed, when it comes to
both China and Russia, most U.S. allies resist U.S. calls to limit trade
and investment ties in sensitive sectors for geopolitical reasons. A
posture does not a policy make.
Competing with China is essential, but it cannot provide the organ
izing principle for American foreign policy in an era increasingly de-
fined by global challenges, including climate change, pandemic disease,
terrorism, proliferation, and online disruption, all of which carry enor-
mous human and economic costs. Imagine that the United States suc-
cessfully deters China from using aggression against its neighbors,
from Taiwan to India and Japan, and in the South China Sea. Better
yet, imagine that China even stops stealing U.S. intellectual property
and addresses U.S. concerns about its trade practices. Beijing could
still frustrate U.S. efforts to tackle global challenges by supporting Ira-
nian and North Korean nuclear ambitions, conducting aggressive cy-
berattacks, building more coal-fired power plants, and resisting reforms
to the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.
The contradictions go on. The war in Afghanistan revealed limits to

Americans’ support for nation building, but building up the capacity of
friends is essential in much of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle
East if the governments in those regions are to become better able to
meet local security challenges, a prerequisite for their becoming more
democratic and for the United States’ shouldering less of the burden.
Participation in trade blocs is desirable not just for economic reasons
but also to help rein in China’s unfair trade practices and mitigate cli-
mate change. Economic nationalism (especially “Buy America” provi-
sions) sets a precedent that, if others follow, will reduce global trade
and work against collaborative approaches to developing and fielding
new technologies that could make it easier to compete with China.
And in the Middle East, for all the focus on limiting U.S. involvement,
it is not clear how pulling back squares with U.S. commitments to
counter an Iran intent on developing its nuclear and missile capabili-
ties and on expanding its regional influence, both directly and through
proxies. Even a successful effort to revive the 2015 nuclear deal would
not change this reality, given what the agreement does not address and
given the sunset provisions for its nuclear restrictions.
AMERICA ALONE
Whatever the failings of this new paradigm, there is no going back;
history does not offer do-overs. Nor should Washington return to a
foreign policy that, for much of three decades, largely failed both in
what it did and in what it did not do.
The starting point for a new internationalism should be a clear
recognition that although foreign policy begins at home, it cannot end
there. The United States, regardless of its diminished influence and
deep domestic divisions, faces a world with both traditional geopo-
litical threats and new challenges tied to globalization. An American
president must seek to fix what ails the United States without neglect-
ing what happens abroad. Greater disarray in the world will make the
task to “build back better”—or whatever slogan is chosen for domestic
renewal—much more difficult, if not impossible. Biden has acknowl-
edged the “fundamental truth of the 21st century . . . that our own
success is bound up with others succeeding as well”; the question is
whether he can craft and carry out a foreign policy that reflects it.
The United States also cannot succeed alone. It must work with oth-
ers, through both formal and informal means, to set international
Richard Haass
norms and standards and marshal collective action. Such an approach

will require the involvement of traditional allies in Europe and Asia,
new partners, countries that may need U.S. or international help at
home, and nondemocracies. It will require the use of all the instru-
ments of power available to the United States—diplomacy, but also
trade, aid, intelligence, and the military. Nor can the United States risk
letting unpredictability give it a reputation as unreliable; other states
will determine their own actions, especially when it comes to balancing
or accommodating China, based in no small part on how dependable
and active they believe the United States will be as a partner.
In the absence of a new American internationalism, the likely out-
come will be a world that is less free, more violent, and less willing or
able to tackle common challenges. It is equal parts ironic and danger-
ous that at a time when the United States is more affected by global
developments than ever before, it is less willing to carry out a foreign
policy that attempts to shape them.∂
The Coming Democratic

Revival
America’s Opportunity to Lead the
Fight Against Authoritarianism
F
or two centuries, American leaders have quarreled about how
high to place support for democracy on the list of U.S. foreign
policy priorities. The Biden administration’s recent tragedy-
marred withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan reinforced the view
of skeptics from across the domestic political spectrum that actively
promoting democracy overseas is naive and less likely to advance the
country’s core interests than to embroil it in no-win quagmires. They
point as well to a steady decline in global freedom over the past 15
years as evidence that emphasizing democratic values is out of touch
with prevailing trends and therefore a losing strategy, one that actu-
ally detracts from the country’s international standing. With the
United States confronted by partisan divisions at home and fierce
adversaries abroad, these critics assert that U.S. leaders can no longer
afford to indulge in Lincolnesque fantasies about democracy as the
last best hope on earth. They must instead shift their focus inward
and accept the world as it is.
This thesis, although in keeping with the emotions of the hour, is
shortsighted and wrong. It would be a grave error for the United States
to waver in its commitment to democracy. Historically, the republic’s
claim on the global imagination has been inseparable from its identity—
however imperfectly embodied—as a champion of human freedom,
which remains a universal aspiration. The more disturbing events of the
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT is Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group. She served as U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations from 1993 to 1997 and as U.S. Secretary of State from
1997 to 2001.
twenty-first century, for all their complications, have dented, but not
destroyed, what remains a unique foreign policy asset. Nothing would
be more foolish than to toss away this comparative advantage or to flee
the global stage entirely due to past disappointments and self-doubt.
The United States still has immense resources it can deploy for
purposes that serve both its immediate needs and its enduring ideals.
Should the country conclude otherwise, however, and decide to absent
itself from the democratic struggle, it would disappoint its friends, aid
its enemies, magnify future risks to its citizens, impede human prog-
ress, and compromise its ability to lead on any issue. What is more,
American leaders would be sounding the call for retreat at precisely
the moment an opportunity has arisen to spark a democratic resur-
gence. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the momentum is not
with the enemies of democracy. It’s true that in recent years, some
authoritarians have grown stronger. But in many cases, they are now
failing to deliver, including in countries where people increasingly ex-
pect accountable leadership even in the absence of democratic rule.
This is a key point that few observers have yet grasped. Democracy is
not a dying cause; in fact, it is poised for a comeback.
DEMOCRACY STRIKES BACK

According to Freedom House, authoritarian leaders took advantage of
international indifference amid the covid-19 pandemic last year to
crush opponents and shrink the space available for democratic activism.
As a result, “countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those
with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative
trend began in 2006. The long democratic recession is deepening.”
There is, however, a silver lining in this cloud: it is easier to move
upward from a valley than from a peak. Measurements of democracy’s
slump typically start with the period following the breakup of the So-
viet Union, when newly free democratic governments emerged in al-
most every region. Many states whose democracies are now troubled
were under authoritarian rule until about 30 years ago. Today, the world
takes note when authorities in Tanzania arrest an opposition leader,
leaders in Sri Lanka consolidate their power, the president of Brazil
threatens to cancel elections, or the prime minister of Hungary rules by
decree. Yet there was a time in recent memory when those countries
were not democracies at all. Despite their current distress, the forces of
freedom have an enlarged platform from which to mount a revival.
Ballot power: at a polling station in Marikana, South Africa, May 2014

Observers should also note that democracy’s decline coincided with
the rise of international terrorism, the 2008 global financial meltdown,
the Syrian civil war, a global refugee crisis, and a worldwide public
health catastrophe. These events stoked a host of popular frustrations
and fears, with most blame settling on elected leaders. The next 20
years can hardly be less conducive to liberty’s growth than the last.
This is the case in part because the world’s two most prominent
authoritarian states, China and Russia, have squandered their best
chance to offer an appealing alternative to liberal democracy. With the
United States missing in action during President Donald Trump’s
four years in office, and Europe preoccupied with Brexit and other
intramural disputes, the governments in Beijing and Moscow had
J O Ã O S I LVA / T H E N E W Y O R K T I M E S
their opportunity to establish themselves as global models. They blew

it. According to a 2021 survey of people in 17 developed countries
conducted by the Pew Research Center, unflattering views of China
are at a historic high, and a median of 74 percent of those polled re-
ported that they had no confidence in Russian President Vladimir
Putin to do the right thing in world affairs. The results are easily ex-
plained. The Chinese government’s transactional approach, lack of
transparency, and tendency to bully have left it with more contracts

than friends. The regime in the Kremlin, meanwhile, is widely thought

to be corrupt, untrustworthy, and a one-man show rapidly approach-
ing its final curtain. Russia, a country that according to the World
Health Organization ranked 97th in average life expectancy in 2019,
does not have much to brag about.
Further, the outcome of the 2020 U.S. presidential election was a
blow to autocrats everywhere. Trump’s belly flop demolished the
myth he helped create that relentless egotism is a political winner.
Many of Trump’s most outspoken international admirers have also
suffered losses or are under siege. These include Benjamin Netan-
yahu in Israel, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in
Turkey, Viktor Orban in Hungary, and France’s Marine Le Pen. The
Philippines is one of the few countries where a charismatic strong-
man still has an appreciative audience. But the 76-year-old Rodrigo
Duterte’s term as president ends next May.
PUSHBACK
For all these reasons, a democratic comeback is possible. But should
one begin, it will meet resistance. Although some authoritarians are
self-obsessed amateurs, many are skilled at shaping public percep-
tions and checkmating potential opponents. Their ranks are split be-
tween those who insist that they are democrats—albeit “illiberal”
ones—and those who openly scoff at even the most basic democratic
norms. All of them assert that in a dangerous and amoral world, lead-
ers must be able to act decisively to impose order, repel threats, and
foster national greatness. In recent years, authoritarians have provided
cover for one another through their influence in multilateral bodies
and by insisting that governments not be criticized by outsiders for
doing whatever they wish within their countries’ borders. National
sovereignty, they assert, is a sufficient defense against any allegation.
Dictators also have the advantage of intimidation. Few are above us-
ing force to harass political rivals and disrupt protests. Their goal in so
doing is less to change minds than to convince women and men yearn-
ing for freedom to surrender that aspiration. Sometimes, this works.
But people should not abandon hope. There was a period late in the
Cold War when it was fashionable to conclude that Soviet-style govern-
ments would last forever because of their willingness to quash dissent
before it could take hold. That proposition was used to justify U.S.
support for anticommunist dictators on the grounds that if only des-
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pots could survive in countries lacking a democratic tradition, Wash-

ington should want them to be pro-Western despots. Then the Iron
Curtain lifted, and the theory of totalitarian permanence collapsed.
Could something similar happen again? That depends on what
metaphor one prefers. If history moves like a locomotive, in a single
direction, today’s trends will become tomorrow’s reality. But if the
human desire for change causes history’s course to swing back and
forth like a pendulum, a reversal can be expected.
Because people today are more connected and demanding than
ever before, governing is harder than it has ever been. Compared to
in the past, younger generations have easier access to education, more
awareness of one another, less respect for traditional hierarchies, and
an ingrained belief in their own autonomy. People of all ages observe
what others have—and want more. Technology has created in many a
thirst for speed and a dearth of patience. Citizens increasingly ques-
tion what leaders say and are drawn to voices that reject present con-
ditions and promise something better.
These factors have fueled the rise of demagogues, but they can also
undermine the staying power of authoritarian regimes old enough to
embody the status quo. There is a limit to how long an autocrat can
sustain popularity simply by comparing himself to a despised prede-
cessor. In Russia, Putin is rarely contrasted anymore with the hapless
Boris Yeltsin; in Venezuela, few remember the ineffectual civilians
who governed before Hugo Chávez; Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega can
hardly justify his broken promises by pointing to Anastasio Somoza,
who was deposed in 1979. Hungary’s Orban has ruled for more than a
decade, and Turkey’s Erdogan for nearly two, so neither can easily
escape responsibility for the beleaguered condition of his country.
Some of the more vulnerable heavy-handed governments are al-
ready facing intensifying pressure from below. In Belarus, a major
protest movement has emerged because a growing number of citi-
zens consider President Alexander Lukashenko to be a Russian pup-
pet and want him to leave. In Cuba, where for the first time since
1959 neither of the Castro brothers holds power, the street demon-
strations last July were the largest in decades. Although it is true
that repression may work for a time, that strategy has to fail only
once. Should a well-known authoritarian leader be forced out, there
is a good chance that others will be too, as happened during the last
democratic wave, when the triumph of Poland’s Solidarity move-
ment led rapidly to democratic transitions throughout central Eu-

rope and the ouster of a strongman in Manila was followed by
similar departures in Chile, South Africa, Zaire, and Indonesia. In a
world where most people are able to peer beyond national borders, a
trend of any kind can gather strength quickly.
It helps as well that the techniques the current generation of phony
democrats rely on may already be suffering from overuse. In their lexi-
con, “constitutional reform” is code for evading term limits, diminish-
ing the clout of parliaments, and seizing control of the courts. They
issue emergency decrees not to safeguard the public but to criminalize
opposition and silence the press. They employ patriotic appeals to
equate pro-democracy agitation with foreign subversion. They rig elec-
tions to hide the ugly visage of despotism beneath a veneer of respect-
ability. Although still harmful, these efforts no longer fool anyone—which
makes them easier to discredit and oppose.
Even more important, despite the battering that democracy has
endured, most people want to strengthen, not discard, their demo-
cratic systems. According to the German scholar Christian Welzel,
support for democracy has increased since the mid-1990s in more
countries than it has declined in, and it remains steady overall at
roughly 75 percent. Similarly, the research institution Afrobarometer
reports that those surveyed this year in 34 African countries still
overwhelmingly prefer democracy when compared to single-party or
one-man rule. This is true even for the minority of Africans who see
China as a better model for their countries than the United States.
Arab attitudes are less clear, but democracy has recently made mod-
est gains in some tough neighborhoods—Algeria, Iraq, and Sudan—
while somehow surviving almost nonstop chaos in Lebanon.
Today, more talented women and men are striving in more places
on behalf of democratic principles than ever before. The National
Democratic Institute, a nongovernmental U.S. organization that sup-
ports democratic institutions overseas, is working with around 28,000
local partners in more than 70 countries on five continents. Despite
democracy’s struggles, popular participation in shaping public agen-
das is up, not down. Strides toward gender equality have contributed
to this rising level of commitment, as has the fact that a record per-
centage of today’s young adults grew up in relative freedom. They
consider self-expression a right to be exercised regularly and regard-
less of obstacles. Far from giving up on democracy, they are generat-

ing a steady stream of proposals for its improvement, including more

rigorous term limits, reforms of campaign financing, equal access for
candidates to the media, ranked-choice voting, citizen assemblies, ref-
erendums, shorter campaigns, and steps to make it simpler or more
complicated to establish new political parties. Not all such ideas are
likely to prove both practical and beneficial, but the energy they at-
tract is evidence of a hunger that no dictator can satisfy.
AMERICA’S CHANCE
Another reason to be optimistic is that U.S. President Joe Biden is
better positioned than any American president in 20 years to argue on
behalf of democracy. George W. Bush saw himself as a champion of
freedom, but he wrapped that mission so thoroughly around his inva-
sion of Iraq that denigrators equated his stance with violent American
overreach. Wary of the association, Barack Obama was less outspoken
than he might have been in advocating democratic ideals. Trump, of
course, had the most antidemocratic instincts of any president. Hav-
ing replaced him, Biden faces an international pro-freedom constitu-
ency that has learned to be skeptical about the steadiness of U.S.
leadership but is also anxious for Washington to regain its voice on
matters of liberty and human rights.
In his inaugural address, Biden characterized his election as a vic-
tory not of a candidate or a cause but of democracy itself. He has since
stressed the benefits of political freedom; condemned specific acts of
repression in such places as Cuba, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, and Myan-
mar; and invited democratic leaders to an important and timely sum-
mit. The challenge he must address next is how to build on this start.
One good way to begin would be to draw a clear line separating past
U.S. military interventions from U.S. support for democracy. The dis-
tinction is important because many observers at home and abroad still
confuse the two. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan, launched toward the
end of 2001, was prompted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The invasion
of Iraq 16 months later was triggered by faulty intelligence concerning
that country’s weapons programs. Both were military operations. In
neither instance was the buttressing of democracy a primary motivat-
ing factor, and neither experience should discourage the United States
from pursuing future civilian initiatives on democracy’s behalf.
There are, after all, numerous examples of successful nonmilitary
American engagement in support of freedom. These include the Mar-
shall Plan, the Point Four Program, Radio Free Europe, the Alliance for
Progress, the Peace Corps, and overseas technical assistance on topics as
varied as public health and digital access. Projects such as these create,
at modest expense, a reservoir of respect that can serve the United
States well in times of crisis. Washington should invest far more in
them than it does, because that is how
democracy is best promoted—with an
outstretched hand, not a pointed gun. Democracy is not a dying
The Biden administration should cause; in fact, it is poised
also defend the American example for a comeback.
while acknowledging that U.S. de-
mocracy, although the world’s oldest,
remains a work in progress. Numerous commentators point to the
bitterness surrounding recent U.S. elections to suggest that the coun-
try’s democracy is unraveling and therefore no longer a suitable
model for others. Such claims are exaggerated. Despite widespread
fears and false allegations, the 2020 balloting was free of both sig-
nificant locally engineered fraud and disruptions traceable to foreign
disinformation campaigns. The high voter turnout was a sign of ro-
bust democratic health, as were the actions of courts and state offi-
cials to uphold the results. As for the storming of the U.S. Capitol on
January 6, less than one-fourth of Trump voters approved of the tac-
tics that the protesters employed, and a recent effort to organize a
follow-up demonstration fizzled. The debates currently underway
regarding election standards and early and mail-in voting mostly in-
volve issues that were not even under consideration a decade or two
ago. The important question now is not whether the country has
made progress toward more liberal electoral norms but whether those
gains can be preserved and enhanced. A positive answer—delivered
via legislative debate and, if necessary, the judicial branch—will only
strengthen the country’s democratic system. U.S. leaders should
speak about American democracy with humility, but dictators over-
seas who claim that the United States’ long experiment with freedom
is nearing its end will be proved wrong.
Even while working to set the record straight about U.S. democ-
racy, Biden should launch a multipart strategy aimed at sparking a
renewal of faith overseas in the power of collaboration among free
governments, workers, enlightened corporations, and civil society. His
core message, exemplified by his planned Summit for Democracy,

should be that democratic leaders must support one another and use
their combined influence to bolster civil discourse, due process, fair
elections, and the essential freedoms of speech, worship, and the press.
For this strategy to attract followers, the United States must show
the way by integrating its commitment to democracy into all aspects
of its foreign policy. In national se-
curity decision-making, when other
Biden is better positioned interests appear to conflict, the ben-
than any American efit of the doubt should be given
whenever possible to the backers of
president in 20 years to political openness and the rule of
argue on behalf of law. In bilateral diplomacy, consid-
democracy. erations of human rights should be
at the top of the agenda, instead of
an afterthought. The most coura-
geous democratic leaders, whether of countries large or small, should
be acknowledged, supported, and invited to the White House.
Through the UN and regional bodies, the United States should strive
to hold countries accountable to the principles proclaimed in multi-
lateral declarations and charters.
Biden and his team should also stress the economic advantages of
democracy. In the late 1990s, when I was serving as U.S. secretary of
state, I assured people everywhere that democracy would enable them
not only to vote without fear but also to better provide for their fam-
ilies. What I said was reinforced by what audiences saw. Aside from
the oil-rich Arab states, most prosperous nations were free. The rea-
son was plain: open societies were more likely to generate good jobs
by encouraging new ideas and innovative thinking. In the time since,
China’s domestic rise and subsequent increase in foreign commercial
engagement have, to some minds, undercut this thesis. Consider,
however, that even today, the per person income in the authoritarian
People’s Republic is around one-third of that in democratic Taiwan.
Since ancient times, authoritarian leaders have masqueraded as
modernizers, building great works that invariably double as advertise-
ments for themselves. Current examples of such leaders include
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman. Although there is obvious merit in looking
forward, there are flaws in the notion that a single all-powerful leader
is best for driving progress. In Egypt, Sisi has allowed the military to
sink its teeth into virtually every part of the economy, thereby inhibit-
ing opportunities for the private sector. Saudi Arabia remains overly
dependent on oil revenue and continues to spend vast sums on vanity
projects. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the “economic miracle” touted by Er-
dogan has given way to rising poverty, joblessness, currency devalua-
tion, and debt. The troubles intensified after 2016, when Erdogan
assumed emergency powers.
GETTING THE MESSAGE RIGHT

U.S. officials must also deal aggressively with problems that can
chip away at support for democracy. For instance, few factors do
more damage to the appeal of free institutions than the perception
that leaders who claim to be democratic are in fact ripping off their
countries. The message from Washington must be that open gov-
ernment is the remedy for, not the breeding ground of, crooked,
self-serving regimes. The point is harder to establish than it should
be because many demagogues confuse the issue by arguing that only
a single powerful leader can clean house—or “drain the swamp”—to
get rid of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Consider that one of
Putin’s favorite tactics is to accuse opponents of corruption, arrest
them in front of government cameras, and then prosecute them in
puppet courts. The most compelling answer to this brand of decep-
tion is the truth. Real democrats, such as Presidents Zuzana Ca-
putova of Slovakia and Maia Sandu of Moldova, are showing that
free institutions can be used to purge graft through honest investi-
gations, judicial reform, and incentives to reduce bribery at every
level. The international press has often done a good job of exposing
corrupt practices, and so democratic leaders should do all they can
to ensure that the rights of journalists are fortified and their free-
doms preserved. Meanwhile, the United States should mobilize a
global effort to seize the overseas assets of rulers who have been
pillaging their countries and return them to those countries. By
serving as agents of justice, democracy’s caretakers can thwart
greedy foes and win lasting friends.
The Biden administration must act, too, on its understanding that
democracy’s future is linked to how well societies handle the promise
and perils of cyber-capabilities and emerging technologies such as ar-
tificial intelligence. That, in turn, demands effective solutions to an
array of puzzles: how to establish a consensus on balancing freedom of

expression with protection of the public good; how to counter the

ability of authoritarian governments to spread lies, block communica-
tions, and criminalize even private indications of dissent; how to de-
rail the use of ransomware; how best to regulate Big Tech platforms to
ensure competition and honor individual privacy; and how to shield
democracies from the security threat posed by cyberwar.
The last time a new technology raised such profound questions
was at the dawn of the nuclear age. Back then, a small cadre of dip-
lomats, scientists, and military strategists devised ways to prevent
the worst outcomes; the solutions were necessarily top down. The
dilemma created by digital threats cannot be resolved so narrowly.
Any successful approach must incorporate not only better cyberde-
fenses but also more transparency for consumers, responsibility
from high-tech companies, scrutiny from legislatures, input from
academia, and research into the design of enforceable regulatory
regimes. Over time, the answers must take into account the inter-
ests of all stakeholders (not just governments), including the mil-
lions of entrepreneurs and billions of consumers who live in
nondemocratic states and who use, or would like to use, online tech-
nology to learn, shop, grow their businesses, and vent their opin-
ions. As the world develops new rules for the digital road, it is
essential that the United States join with allies to prevent authori-
tarian states from dictating those norms.
Biden can accomplish much by rallying friends of freedom from
across the globe, highlighting the tangible and moral benefits of
open government, and pushing for fairness in the regulation of new
technologies. Past efforts to do so, however, have stumbled when
democracy’s advocates have done a poor job of framing the issue. If
the alternatives presented are freedom or repression, freedom
clearly wins. The odds become less favorable, however, when the
choice advertised is between “the common people” and “arrogant
elites.” As has been shown in recent years, popular demagogues feed
eagerly on the condescension that many in academia, the arts, and
the press exhibit toward the less well educated and others they deem
culturally backward. The notion that despots care most about the
welfare of the average family is nonsense, and they should not be
allowed to create that impression. For democracy to prosper, its
champions must do a better job of defending and justifying their
beliefs in an inclusive manner.
THE TIME IS NOW

Progress in the democratic resurgence is less likely to be sudden than
gradual and more likely to be spotty than universal. A pendulum, af-
ter changing direction, takes a while to gain velocity. In his later years,
Vaclav Havel counseled freedom’s friends against impatience. If de-
mocracy can be compared to a flower, he said, gardeners may use
fertilizer and water to speed its growth but will only cause harm should
they become anxious and yank at the stem from above.
The importance of patience, however, is no excuse for idleness or
cynicism. Small-d democrats cannot compete successfully with the
likes of China and Russia by mimicking their methods, for that
would concede the match before it begins. Democracy has its faults,
but so, too, does every variety of despotism. Democracy’s assets are
superior, however, because they demand the best from everyone
and are grounded in respect for human rights, individual freedom, and
social responsibility. By contrast, dictators seek only obedience, and
there is nothing inspiring about that.
After too many years of handwringing, the time is right for demo-
cratic forces to regain the initiative. Democracy is fragile, but it is also
resilient. In every region, the generation coming of age is smart, out-
spoken, and fearless. Worldwide, people are demanding more, while
authoritarian leaders are tiring and running out of answers. The Biden
administration has before it an opportunity it must seize. Although
tattered and torn, freedom’s flag is ready to rise.∂

The Technopolar Moment

How Digital Powers Will Reshape the
Global Order
Ian Bremmer
A
fter rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, some of
the United States’ most powerful institutions sprang into ac-
tion to punish the leaders of the failed insurrection. But they
weren’t the ones you might expect. Facebook and Twitter suspended
the accounts of President Donald Trump for posts praising the riot-
ers. Amazon, Apple, and Google effectively banished Parler, an alter-
native to Twitter that Trump’s supporters had used to encourage and
coordinate the attack, by blocking its access to Web-hosting services
and app stores. Major financial service apps, such as PayPal and
Stripe, stopped processing payments for the Trump campaign and
for accounts that had funded travel expenses to Washington, D.C.,
for Trump’s supporters.
The speed of these technology companies’ reactions stands in stark
contrast to the feeble response from the United States’ governing in-
stitutions. Congress still has not censured Trump for his role in the
storming of the Capitol. Its efforts to establish a bipartisan, 9/11-style
commission failed amid Republican opposition. Law enforcement
agencies have been able to arrest some individual rioters—but in many
cases only by tracking clues they left on social media about their
participation in the fiasco.
States have been the primary actors in global affairs for nearly 400
years. That is starting to change, as a handful of large technology
companies rival them for geopolitical influence. The aftermath of the
January 6 riot serves as the latest proof that Amazon, Apple, Face-
book, Google, and Twitter are no longer merely large companies; they
have taken control of aspects of society, the economy, and national
IAN BREMMER is President of Eurasia Group.
security that were long the exclusive preserve of the state. The same
goes for Chinese technology companies, such as Alibaba, ByteDance,
and Tencent. Nonstate actors are increasingly shaping geopolitics,
with technology companies in the lead. And although Europe wants
to play, its companies do not have the size or geopolitical influence to
compete with their American and Chinese counterparts.
Most of the analysis of U.S.-Chinese technological competition,
however, is stuck in a statist paradigm. It depicts technology companies
as foot soldiers in a conflict between hostile countries. But technology
companies are not mere tools in the hands of governments. None of
their actions in the immediate aftermath of the Capitol insurrection,
for instance, came at the behest of the government or law enforcement.
These were private decisions made by for-profit companies exercising
power over code, servers, and regulations under their control. These
companies are increasingly shaping the global environment in which
governments operate. They have huge influence over the technologies
and services that will drive the next industrial revolution, determine
how countries project economic and military power, shape the future of
work, and redefine social contracts.
It is time to start thinking of the biggest technology companies as
similar to states. These companies exercise a form of sovereignty over
a rapidly expanding realm that extends beyond the reach of regula-
tors: digital space. They bring resources to geopolitical competition
but face constraints on their power to act. They maintain foreign rela-
tions and answer to constituencies, including shareholders, employ-
ees, users, and advertisers.
Political scientists rely on a wide array of terms to classify govern-
ments: there are “democracies,” “autocracies,” and “hybrid regimes,”
which combine elements of both. But they have no such tools for
understanding Big Tech. It’s time they started developing them, for
not all technology companies operate in the same way. Even though
technology companies, like countries, resist neat classifications, there
are three broad forces that are driving their geopolitical postures and
worldviews: globalism, nationalism, and techno-utopianism.
These categories illuminate the choices facing the biggest technol-
ogy firms as they work to shape global affairs. Will we live in a world
where the Internet is increasingly fragmented and technology compa-
nies serve the interests and goals of the states in which they reside, or
will Big Tech decisively wrest control of digital space from govern-

Ian Bremmer
ments, freeing itself from national boundaries and emerging as a truly

global force? Or could the era of state dominance finally come to an
end, supplanted by a techno-elite that assumes responsibility for of-
fering the public goods once provided by governments? Analysts,
policymakers, and the public would do well to understand the com-
peting outlooks that determine how these new geopolitical actors
wield their power, because the interplay among them will define the
economic, social, and political life of the twenty-first century.
BIG TECH IS WATCHING YOU

To understand how the struggle for geopolitical influence between
technology firms and governments will play out, it is important to grasp
the nature of these companies’ power. The tools at their disposal are
unique in global affairs, which is why governments are finding it so hard
to rein them in. Although this isn’t the first time that private corpora-
tions have played a major role in geopolitics—consider the East India
Company and Big Oil, for example—earlier giants could never match
the pervasive global presence of today’s technology firms. It is one thing
to wield power in the smoke-filled rooms of political power brokers; it
is another to directly affect the livelihoods, relationships, security, and
even thought patterns of billions of people across the globe.
Today’s biggest technology firms have two critical advantages that
have allowed them to carve out independent geopolitical influence.
First, they do not operate or wield power exclusively in physical
space. They have created a new dimension in geopolitics—digital
space—over which they exercise primary influence. People are in-
creasingly living out their lives in this vast territory, which govern-
ments do not and cannot fully control.
The implications of this fact bear on virtually all aspects of civic,
economic, and private life. In many democracies today, politicians’
ability to gain followers on Facebook and Twitter unlocks the money
and political support needed to win office. That is why the technol-
ogy companies’ actions to deplatform Trump after the Capitol Hill
riot were so powerful. For a new generation of entrepreneurs, Ama-
zon’s marketplace and Web-hosting services, Apple’s app store, Face-
book’s ad-targeting tools, and Google’s search engine have become
indispensable for launching a successful business. Big Tech is even
transforming human relationships. In their private lives, people in-
creasingly connect with one another through algorithms.
Monopoly man: Amazon’s Jeff Bezos in New York, September 2011

Technology companies are not just exercising a form of sover-
eignty over how citizens behave on digital platforms; they are also
shaping behaviors and interactions. The little red Facebook notifica-
tions deliver dopamine hits to your brain, Google’s artificial intelli-
gence (AI) algorithms complete sentences while you type, and
Amazon’s methods of selecting which products pop up at the top of
your search screen affect what you buy. In these ways, technology
firms are guiding how people spend their time, what professional and
social opportunities they pursue, and, ultimately, what they think.
This power will grow as social, economic, and political institutions
continue to shift from the physical world to digital space.
The second way these technology companies differ from their
formidable predecessors is that they are increasingly providing a full
S HA N NO N STAP L E T O N / R E U T E R S
spectrum of both the digital and the real-world products that are re-
quired to run a modern society. Although private companies have
long played a role in delivering basic needs, from medicine to energy,
today’s rapidly digitizing economy depends on a more complex array
of goods, services, and information flows. Currently, just four compa-
nies—Alibaba, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft—meet the bulk of
the world’s demand for cloud services, the essential computing infra-

Ian Bremmer
structure that has kept people working and children learning during
the covid-19 pandemic. The future competitiveness of traditional in-
dustries will depend on how effectively they seize new opportunities
created by 5G networks, ai, and massive Internet-of-Things deploy-
ments. Internet companies and financial service providers already de-
pend heavily on the infrastructure provided by these cloud leaders.
Soon, growing numbers of cars, assembly lines, and cities will, too.
Along with owning the world’s leading search engine and its most
popular smartphone operating system, Google’s parent company, Al-
phabet, dabbles in health care, drug development, and autonomous ve-
hicles. Amazon’s sprawling e-commerce and logistics network furnishes
millions of people with basic consumer goods. In China, Alibaba and
Tencent dominate payment systems, social media, video streaming,
e-commerce, and logistics. They also invest in projects important to the
Chinese government, such as the Digital Silk Road, which aims to bring
to emerging markets the undersea cables, telecommunications net-
works, cloud capabilities, and apps needed to run a digital society.
Private-sector technology firms are also providing national security,
a role that has traditionally been reserved for governments and the
defense contractors they hire. When Russian hackers breached U.S.
government agencies and private companies last year, it was Micro-
soft, not the National Security Agency or U.S. Cyber Command, that
first discovered and cut off the intruders. Of course, private companies
have long supported national security objectives. Before the biggest
banks became “too big to fail,” that phrase was applied to the U.S.
defense company Lockheed Corporation (now Lockheed Martin) dur-
ing the Cold War. But Lockheed just made the fighter jets and missiles
for the U.S. government. It didn’t operate the air force or police the
skies. The biggest technology companies are building the backbone of
the digital world and policing that world at the same time.
Big Tech’s eclipse of the nation-state is not inevitable. Governments
are taking steps to tame an unruly digital sphere: whether it is China’s
recent moves targeting Alibaba and Ant Group, which derailed what
would have been one of the world’s biggest-ever initial public offerings;
the eu’s attempts to regulate personal data, ai, and the large technology
companies that it defines as digital “gatekeepers”; the numerous anti-
trust bills introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; or India’s
ongoing pressure on foreign social media companies—the technology
industry is facing a political and regulatory backlash on multiple fronts.
Moreover, technology firms cannot decouple themselves from

physical space, where they remain at the mercy of states. The code for
the virtual worlds that these companies have created sits in data cen-
ters that are located on territory controlled by governments. Compa-
nies are subject to national laws. They can be fined or subjected to
other sanctions, their websites can
be blocked, and their executives can be
arrested if they break the rules. Technology companies are
But as technology grows more so- shaping the global
phisticated, states and regulators are environment in which
increasingly constrained by outdated
laws and limited capacity. Digital governments operate.
space is ever growing. Facebook now
counts nearly three billion monthly active users. Google reports that
over one billion hours of video are consumed on YouTube, its video-
streaming platform, each day. Over 64 billion terabytes of digital in-
formation was created and stored in 2020, enough to fill some 500
billion smartphones. In its next phase, this “datasphere” will see cars,
factories, and entire cities wired with Internet-connected sensors trad-
ing data. As this realm grows, the ability to control it will slip further
beyond the reach of states. And because technology companies pro-
vide important digital and real-world goods and services, states that
cannot provide those things risk shooting themselves in the foot if
their draconian measures lead companies to stop their operations.
Governments have long deployed sophisticated systems to monitor
digital space: China created the so-called Great Firewall to control the
information its citizens see, and the United States’ spy agencies estab-
lished the ECHELON surveillance system to monitor global communica-
tions. But such systems can’t keep tabs on everything. Fines for failing
to take down illegal content are a nuisance for businesses, not an existen-
tial threat. And governments realize that they could sabotage their own
legitimacy if they go too far. The potential for a popular backlash is one
reason why even Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to ever go
as far as Beijing has in restricting citizens’ access to the global Internet.
That is not to say that Big Tech is massively well liked. Even be-
fore the pandemic, public opinion polls in the United States showed
that what once was the most admired sector in the country was losing
popularity among Americans. A majority of Americans are in favor
of stricter regulations for big technology companies, according to a

Ian Bremmer
February 2021 Gallup survey. Global trust in those companies—

especially social media firms—has also been hit hard during the
pandemic, according to the annual Trust Barometer published by
Edelman, a public relations consultancy.
But even if getting tough on Big Tech is one of the few things on
which both Democrats and Republicans agree, the fact that there hasn’t
been a major crackdown yet is telling. In the United States, a combina-
tion of congressional dysfunction and Silicon Valley’s potent lobbying
power will likely continue to preclude expansive new regulations that
could pose a serious threat to the digital giants. It is different in Europe,
where the lack of homegrown cloud, search, and social media conglom-
erates makes passing ambitious legislation easier. And it is certainly dif-
ferent in China, where a recent round of regulatory crackdowns has sent
shares of the country’s own technology heavyweights reeling.
In both Brussels and Beijing, politicians are trying to channel the
power of the biggest technology companies in pursuit of national pri-
orities. But with the cloud, ai, and other emerging technologies set to
become even more important to people’s livelihoods—and to the abil-
ity of states to meet their people’s basic needs—it is far from certain
that the politicians will succeed.
THE STATE STRIKES BACK

The most important question in geopolitics today might be, Will
countries that break up or clamp down on their biggest technology
firms also be able to seize the opportunities of the digital revolution’s
next phase, or will their efforts backfire? The eu, alarmed that it has
not given rise to digital giants the way the United States and China
have, appears intent on finding out. It is at the forefront of democratic
societies pushing for greater sovereignty over digital space. In 2018,
the eu passed a sweeping data protection law that restricts transfers
of personal data outside the 27-member bloc and threatens steep fines
on companies that fail to protect eu citizens’ sensitive information.
A new regulatory package advancing in Brussels would give the
European Commission new powers to fine Internet platforms over
illegal content, control high-risk ai applications, and potentially
break up technology companies that eu bureaucrats deem too pow-
erful. The eu and influential member states, such as France, are also
calling for technology-focused industrial policies—including billions
of euros of government funding—to encourage new approaches to
pooling data and computing resources. The goal is to develop alter-

natives to the biggest cloud platforms that, unlike the current op-
tions, are grounded in “European values.”
This is a massive gamble. Europe, acting from a position of weak-
ness, is betting that it can corral the technology giants and unleash a
new wave of European innovation. If it turns out instead that only the
biggest technology platforms can
muster the capital, talent, and infra-
structure needed to develop and run Technology companies are
the digital systems that companies increasingly geopolitical
rely on, Europe will have only acceler- actors in and of themselves.
ated its geopolitical decline. The out-
come hinges on whether a handful of
large-scale cloud platforms, with all the attendant economic opportuni-
ties and challenges, can continue to drive innovation or whether a group
of companies operating under greater government supervision can still
produce cutting-edge digital infrastructure that is globally competitive.
It is expensive to create and maintain digital space on a massive
scale. Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft plowed a
combined $109 billion into research and development in 2019. That is
roughly equal to Germany’s total public and private R & D spending
in the same period and more than double the amount spent that year
by the United Kingdom’s government and private sector put together.
If European states want greater control of the technology sector,
they’re going to have to invest much more money. But even if govern-
ments were willing to finance these digital capabilities themselves,
money is only part of the picture. They would likely struggle to bring
together the engineering and other talent required to design, main-
tain, operate, and grow the complex cloud infrastructure, AI applica-
tions, and other systems that make these technologies work at scale.
Achieving and maintaining global leadership in fields such as cloud
computing or semiconductors requires huge and sustained invest-
ments of financial and human capital. It also requires close relation-
ships with customers and other partners across complex global supply
chains. Today’s modern semiconductor plants can cost in excess of $15
billion apiece and require legions of highly trained engineers to set
them up and run them. The world’s leading cloud service providers
can invest billions of dollars in R & D each year because they are con-
tinually refining their products in response to customers’ needs and

Ian Bremmer
funneling their profits back into research. Governments—and even

groups of small firms working together—would struggle to muster
the resources needed to deliver these technologies at the scale re-
quired to power the global economy. Even in China, where the gov-
ernment is not afraid to throw its weight around, the Chinese
Communist Party (ccp) is counting on the country’s biggest private-
sector technology companies to do the heavy lifting as it aims to build
a wealthy and digitally advanced society.
The next decade will test what happens as the politics of digital
space and physical space converge. Governments and technology
companies are poised to compete for influence over both worlds—
hence the need for a better framework for understanding what the
companies’ goals are and how their power interacts with that of gov-
ernments in both domains.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN BIG TECH

Technology companies’ orientations are no less diverse than the
states with which they compete. Strands of globalism, nationalism,
and techno-utopianism often coexist within the same company.
Which outlook predominates will have important consequences for
global politics and society.
First are the globalists—firms that built their empires by operat-
ing on a truly international scale. These companies, including Apple,
Facebook, and Google, create and populate digital space, allowing
their business presence and revenue streams to become untethered
from physical territory. Each grew powerful by hitting on an idea
that allowed it to dominate an economically valuable niche and then
taking its business worldwide.
The likes of Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent emerged at the top
of China’s massive domestic market before setting their sights on
global growth. But the idea was the same: set up shop in as many
countries as possible, respect local rules and regulations as necessary,
and compete fiercely. Sure, they have also benefited from policy and
financial support from Beijing, but it is still a cutthroat, profit-driven
approach to global expansion that is driving innovation at these firms.
Then there are the national champions, which are more willing to
align themselves explicitly with the priorities of their home govern-
ments. These firms are partnering with governments in various impor-
tant domains, including the cloud, ai, and cybersecurity. They secure
massive revenues by selling their products to governments, and they

use their expertise to help guide these same governments’ actions. The
companies hewing closest to the national-champion model are in
China, where firms have long faced pressure to further national goals.
Huawei and smic are China’s core national champions in 5G and semi-
conductors. And in 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping named Alibaba
and Tencent, along with the search engine Baidu and the voice recogni-
tion company iFlytek, to China’s “national ai team,” giving each of
them a leading role in building out parts of China’s ai-powered future.
More than perhaps any other country, China has enlisted its tech-
nology giants during the pandemic, leaning heavily on digital ser-
vices—including videoconferencing and telemedicine—and even
using them to enforce lockdowns and other travel restrictions as the
pandemic took hold. It has also tapped Chinese technology firms to
manage reopenings by providing digital health passports and to en-
gage in “mask diplomacy” by shipping badly needed medical supplies
to needy countries to enhance China’s soft power.
Today, even historically globalist U.S. companies are feeling the
pull of the national-champion model. Microsoft’s growing role in po-
licing digital space on behalf of the United States and allied democra-
cies and targeting misinformation spread by state actors (particularly
China and Russia) and international crime syndicates is leading it in
that direction. Amazon and Microsoft are also competing to provide
cloud-computing infrastructure to the U.S. government. Amazon’s
new ceo, Andy Jassy, who previously headed its cloud business, was
a member of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intel-
ligence, a blue-ribbon advisory panel that published a major report
earlier this year that is having a strong influence on the evolution of
the United States’ national ai strategy.
The forces of globalism and nationalism sometimes clash with a third
camp: the techno-utopians. Some of the world’s most powerful technol-
ogy firms are headed by charismatic visionaries who see technology not
just as a global business opportunity but also as a potentially revolution-
ary force in human affairs. In contrast to the other two groups, this camp
centers more on the personalities and ambitions of technology ceos
rather than the operations of the companies themselves. Whereas glo-
balists want the state to leave them alone and maintain favorable condi-
tions for global commerce, and national champions see an opportunity
to get rich off the state, techno-utopians look to a future in which the

Ian Bremmer
nation-state paradigm that has dominated geopolitics since the seven-

teenth century has been replaced by something different altogether.
Elon Musk, the ceo of Tesla and SpaceX, is the most recognizable
example, with his open ambition to reinvent transportation, link com-
puters to human brains, and make humanity a “multiplanetary species”
by colonizing Mars. Yes, he is also providing space lift capacity to the
U.S. government, but he is chiefly focused on dominating near-space
orbit and creating a future in which technology companies help socie
ties evolve beyond the concept of nation-states. Mark Zuckerberg, the
ceo of Facebook, has similar tendencies, even if he has become more
open to government regulation of online content. Diem, a Facebook-
backed digital currency, had to be scaled back dramatically after finan-
cial regulators almost universally raised concerns. Thanks to the
dominance of the U.S. dollar, governments retain a far stronger grip on
finance than on other domains in digital space.
That may not be true for long if Vitalik Buterin and the entrepre-
neurs building on top of his Ethereum ecosystem get their way. Ethe-
reum, the world’s second most popular blockchain after Bitcoin, is rapidly
emerging as the underlying infrastructure powering a new generation of
decentralized Internet applications. It may pose an even greater chal-
lenge to government power than Diem. Ethereum’s design includes
smart contracts, which enable the parties to a transaction to embed the
terms of doing business into hard-to-alter computer code. Entrepre-
neurs have seized on the technology and the surrounding hype to cook
up new businesses, including betting markets, financial derivatives, and
payment systems that are almost impossible to alter or abolish once they
have been launched. Although much of this innovation to date has been
in the financial realm, some proponents believe that blockchain technol-
ogy and decentralized apps will be the keys to unlocking the next big
leap forward for the Web: the metaverse, a place where augmented and
virtual reality, next-generation data networks, and decentralized financ-
ing and payment systems contribute to a more realistic and immersive
digital world where people can socialize, work, and trade digital goods.
China still has its globalists and national champions, albeit with a
more statist tilt than those in the United States. But it no longer has
its own techno-utopians. The ccp once exalted Jack Ma, a co-founder
of Alibaba and the country’s most prominent entrepreneur, who revo-
lutionized how people buy and sell goods and tried to create a new
version of the World Trade Organization to facilitate e-commerce and
promote direct global trade. But the party reined him in after he gave
a speech in October 2020 criticizing its financial regulators for stifling
innovation. Beijing now has Ma and Alibaba on a much tighter leash,
a cautionary tale for any would-be techno-utopians in China who
might consider challenging the state.
Even so, China depends on the digital infrastructure provided by
the likes of Ma to boost productivity and living standards—and thus
ensure the ccp’s long-term survival. China’s authoritarianism enables
it to be more forceful in its regulation of digital space and the compa-
nies that build and maintain it, but Beijing ultimately faces the same
tradeoffs as Washington and Brussels. If it tightens its grip too much,
it risks harming the country itself by smothering innovation.
OUR DIGITAL FUTURES

As technology companies and governments negotiate for control over
digital space, U.S. and Chinese technology giants will operate in one of
three geopolitical environments: one in which the state reigns supreme,
rewarding the national champions; one in which corporations wrest
control from the state over digital space, empowering the globalists; or
one in which the state fades away, elevating the techno-utopians.
In the first scenario, the national champions win, and the state re-
mains the dominant provider of security, regulation, and public goods.
Systemic shocks, such as the covid-19 pandemic, and long-term threats,
such as climate change, coupled with a public backlash against the power
of technology firms, entrench government authority as the only force
that can resolve global challenges. A bipartisan push for regulation in
the United States rewards “patriotic” companies that deploy their re-
sources in support of national goals. The government hopes that a new
generation of technology-enabled services for education, health care,
and other components of the social contract will boost its legitimacy in
the eyes of middle-class voters. Beijing and other authoritarian govern-
ments double down on cultivating their own national champions, push-
ing hard for self-sufficiency while competing for influence in important
global swing markets, such as Brazil, India, and Southeast Asia. China’s
private technology sector becomes less independent, and its technology
companies no longer go public on international stock exchanges.
U.S. allies and partners find it much harder to balance their ties with
Washington and Beijing. Europe is the big loser here, as it lacks technol-
ogy companies with the financial capacity or technological wherewithal

Ian Bremmer
to hold their own against those of the two major powers. As the EU’s push
for digital sovereignty sputters and the U.S.-Chinese cold war makes
national security in the technology space a dominant priority, Europe’s
technology sector has little choice but to follow Washington’s agenda.
As the United States and China decouple, companies that can re-
cast themselves as national champions are rewarded. Washington and
Beijing both funnel resources to technology firms to align them with
their national goals. The increasingly fragmented nature of the Inter-
net, meanwhile, makes operating on
a truly global scale increasingly diffi-
Governments and cult: when data, software, or ad-
technology companies are vanced semiconductor technology
poised to compete for can’t move across borders because of
legal and policy barriers or when
influence. computers or phones made by U.S.
and Chinese companies can’t talk to
one another, it raises costs and regulatory risks for companies.
Amazon and Microsoft might not find it hard to adapt to this new
order, as they are already responding to growing pressure to support
national security imperatives. Both companies already compete to
provide cloud services to the U.S. government and intelligence agen-
cies. But Apple and Google could find working with the U.S. govern-
ment more uncomfortable; the former has balked at government
requests to crack encrypted smartphones, and the latter pulled out of
a project with the Pentagon on image recognition. Facebook might
have the hardest time navigating a landscape that favored national
champions if it is seen as providing a platform for foreign disinforma-
tion without also offering useful assets for the government, such as
cloud computing or military AI applications.
This would be a more geopolitically volatile world, with a greater risk
of strategic and technological bifurcation. Taiwan would be a major con-
cern, as U.S. and Chinese companies continue to rely on the Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company as a major supplier of
cutting-edge chips. Washington is already moving to cut off leading
Chinese technology firms from Taiwan and TSMC, fueling impressions
in Beijing that Taiwan is being dragged further into the U.S. orbit. Al-
though it remains unlikely that China would choose to invade Taiwan
over semiconductors alone—the potential for a military conflict with
the United States that escalates beyond Taiwan would be too great, and
the damage to China’s international standing and business environment

would be too severe—it remains a potentially potent tail risk.
A world of national champions would also impede the interna-
tional cooperation needed to address global crises—whether a pan-
demic disease more lethal than covid-19 or a surge of global migration
induced by climate change. It would be ironic if technology national-
ism made it harder for governments to address these problems, given
the role of such crises in shoring up the state’s position as the pro-
vider of last resort in the first place.
In the second scenario, the state holds on but in a weakened condi-
tion—paving the way for the ascendancy of the globalists. Unable to
keep pace with technological innovation, regulators accept that gov-
ernments will share sovereignty over digital space with technology
companies. Big Tech beats back restrictions that could curtail its over-
seas operations, arguing that the loss of market opportunities will
harm innovation and, ultimately, governments’ ability to create jobs
and meet global challenges. Rather than accept a technological cold
war, companies pressure governments to agree on a set of common
rules that preserve a global market for hardware, software, and data.
Apple and Google would arguably have the most to gain from this
outcome. Instead of being forced to choose between a U.S.- and a
Chinese-dominated Internet, Apple could continue to offer its own
unique technology ecosystem catering to elites in both San Francisco
and Shanghai. Google’s advertising-heavy revenue model would thrive
as people in democracies and authoritarian countries alike consumed
products and services that commodified every piece of personal data.
The triumph of globalism would also help Alibaba, which hosts the
world’s largest e-commerce websites. ByteDance, whose video-sharing
app TikTok has helped it achieve a valuation north of $140 billion, would
be free to serve up viral videos to a global audience, supercharging its ai
algorithms and its global revenues. Tencent is also a globalist but cooper-
ates far more deeply with China’s internal security apparatus than Alib-
aba. It would find it easier to trend in the direction of a national champion
as ideological competition between Washington and Beijing intensified.
The globalists need stability to succeed over the coming decade.
Their worst fear is that the United States and China will continue to
decouple, forcing them to choose sides in an economic war that will
raise barriers to their attempts to globalize their businesses. Their
fortunes would improve if Washington and Beijing decided that over-

Ian Bremmer
regulation risks undercutting the innovation that drives their econo-

mies. In the case of Washington, that means pulling back from an
industrial policy designed to convince companies that they can thrive
as national champions; for Beijing, it means preserving the indepen-
dence and autonomy of the private sector.
A world in which the globalists reign supreme would give Europe
a chance to reassert itself as a savvy bureaucratic player capable of
designing the rules that allow technology companies and governments
to share sovereignty in digital space. Washington and Beijing would
still be the two dominant global powers, but the failure of the former’s
industrial policy push and the latter’s quest to elevate national cham-
pions would loosen the two powers’ grip on geopolitics, increase the
demand for global governance, and create more opportunities for
global rule setting. This is a world with somewhat weaker American
and Chinese governments but one that offers both countries their best
chance to cooperate on urgent global challenges.
In the final scenario, the oft-predicted erosion of the state finally
comes to pass. The techno-utopians capitalize on widespread disil-
lusionment with governments that have failed to create prosperity
and stability, drawing citizens into a digital economy that disinter-
mediates the state. Confidence in the dollar as a global reserve cur-
rency erodes—or collapses. Cryptocurrencies prove too much for
regulators to control, and they gain wide acceptance, undermining
governments’ sway over the financial world. The disintegration of
centralized authority renders the world substantially less capable of
addressing transnational challenges. For technological visionaries
with vaulting ambitions and commensurate resources, the question
of patriotism becomes moot. Musk plays an ever-greater role in de-
ciding how space is explored. Facebook substitutes for the public
square, civil society, and the social safety net, creating a blockchain-
based currency that gains widespread usage.
The implications of a world in which techno-utopians call the shots
are the hardest to tease out, in part because people are so accustomed to
thinking of the state as the principal problem-solving actor. Governments
would not go down without a fight. And the erosion of the U.S. govern-
ment’s authority would not give techno-utopians free rein; the Chinese
state would also need to suffer a collapse in domestic credibility. The less
that governments stand in their way, the more techno-utopians will be
able to shape the evolution of a new world order, for good and for ill.
A BRAVE NEW DIGITAL WORLD

A generation ago, the foundational premise of the Internet was that it
would accelerate the globalization that transformed economics and
politics in the 1990s. Many hoped that the digital age could foster the
unfettered flow of information, challenging the grip of authoritarian
holdouts who thought they could escape the so-called end of history.
The picture is different today: a concentration of power in the hands
of a few very large technology firms and the competing interventions
of U.S.-, Chinese-, and eu-centered power blocs have led to a much
more fragmented digital landscape.
The consequences for the future world order will be no less pro-
found. Right now, the world’s largest technology firms are assessing
how best to position themselves as Washington and Beijing steel
themselves for protracted competition. The United States believes
that its foremost geopolitical imperative is to prevent its displacement
by its techno-authoritarian rival. China’s top priority is to ensure that
it can stand on its own two feet economically and technologically be-
fore a coalition of advanced industrial democracies stifles its further
expansion. Big Tech will tread cautiously for now to make sure it does
not further compound government insecurity about losing authority.
But as U.S.-Chinese competition grows more entrenched, these
firms will wield their leverage more proactively. If they manage to
establish themselves as “the indispensable companies”—much like
the United States considers itself “the indispensable nation”—the na-
tional champions will push for greater government subsidies and
preferential treatment over their rivals. They will also press for
greater decoupling, arguing that their vital work needs maximum
protection from adversarial hacking.
The globalists will argue that governments will be unable to sustain
economic and technological competitiveness over the long haul if they
turn inward and adopt a bunker mentality. American globalists will
note that big Asian and European companies, far from exiting China,
are boosting their presence there—and that Washington will hurt only
itself by forcing American companies out of the world’s largest con-
sumer market. To preempt the government charge that they are put-
ting their bottom lines above national security, they will argue that
deeper levels of decoupling will inhibit U.S.-Chinese cooperation on
urgent transnational challenges, such as deadly pandemics and climate
change. The Chinese globalists will argue that the ccp’s ability to sus-

Ian Bremmer
tain robust growth—and therefore domestic legitimacy—will ride on

whether China can establish itself as a hub of global innovation.
And the techno-utopians? They will be happy to work quietly, bid-
ing their time. While the national champions and the globalists duke
it out over who will shape government policy, the techno-utopians
will use traditional companies and decentralized projects, such as
Ethereum, to explore new frontiers in digital space, such as the meta-
verse, or new approaches to providing essential services. They will
strike an understanding tone when the U.S. government hauls them
in before Congress every now and then, per usual, to denounce their
egos and power, taking minimal steps to appease policymakers but
deploying aggressive lobbying efforts to undermine any efforts by
Washington to bring them to heel.
This does not mean that societies are heading toward a future that
witnesses the demise of the nation-state, the end of governments, and
the dissolution of borders. There is no reason to think these predic-
tions are any more likely to come true today than they were in the
1990s. But it is simply no longer tenable to talk about big technology
companies as pawns their government masters can move around on a
geopolitical chessboard. They are increasingly geopolitical actors in
and of themselves. And as U.S.-Chinese competition plays an increas-
ingly dominant role in global affairs, they will hold growing leverage
to shape how Washington and Beijing behave. Only by updating our
understanding of their geopolitical power can we make better sense of
this brave new digital world.∂
America’s Crypto
Conundrum
Protecting Security Without
Crushing Innovation
Justin Muzinich
T
his is the year that digital currencies went mainstream. In the
span of just three months last spring, China tested its first-
ever digital currency in some of its largest cities, hackers
breached a major U.S. oil pipeline and successfully demanded a ran-
som of more than $4 million in Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies surged to a
record combined market capitalization of over $2 trillion, and Jerome
Powell, the chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve, warned that cryptocur-
rencies are “highly volatile” and “may carry potential risks to . . . users
and to the broader financial system.”
What for years many in Washington had dismissed as a pet project
of techies and West Coast libertarians suddenly became one of the
most important, if least understood, policy issues on the agenda of the
Biden administration. Digital currencies are driving tremendous in-
novation that has the potential to make whole economic sectors more
efficient. But they also pose various national security and financial
threats and could even diminish U.S. influence abroad.
One reason that digital currencies are so potentially transformative
is that their software design often reflects a particular policy view—
that government should have less control over money. Early adopters
routinely imbued their use of digital currencies with political and
philosophical meaning. And even if many people buying Bitcoin to-
day are just looking to make a profit, the values embedded in the code
still come with every purchase. Reduced government control of money
JUSTIN MUZINICH is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He
previously served as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury.

Justin Muzinich
has potential benefits, such as lowering the cost of payments. But it

can also undermine the ability of authorities to respond to economic
crises or fight cybercrime and financial crime, among other basic ser-
vices that citizens across the political spectrum expect.
The enormous potential for upside as well as downside has driven
the policy debate around digital currencies to extremes. On one side,
opponents of digital currencies see them mainly as tools for illicit fi-
nance and have called on the government to curb their spread, in some
cases going as far as advocating a ban on private-sector coins. On the
other side are evangelists who see digital currencies as revolutionary
and have pushed for the private market to determine their fate.
But what the United States needs is a public policy framework that
takes a balanced approach, preserving the market’s ability to innovate
without sacrificing the government’s capacity to perform essential
functions. In other words, policymakers need both the humility to
recognize that markets will be best at separating useful innovation
from hype and the confidence to adopt critical safeguards. To that
end, the Biden administration should establish guardrails in the areas
where these currencies pose the greatest collateral risk—namely, in
the government’s ability to set monetary policy, ensure financial sta-
bility, and fight illicit finance. At the same time, the United States
should lay the groundwork to launch a digital dollar or bless a private-
sector solution that ensures the dollar’s preeminent role in interna-
tional payments. This two-track approach would chart a shrewd path
between the fruitless extremes of banning digital currencies and al-
lowing the market to operate unhindered.
U.S. policymakers should act swiftly. Beijing recently cracked down
on the mining of Bitcoin, and China and other countries are forging
ahead with sovereign digital currencies. Uncertainty about what the
United States will do has added to the cloud of regulatory risk that hangs
over the industry. The sooner the United States takes common-sense
steps to provide policy clarity, the sooner innovation will be able to thrive.
CHEAPER, FASTER, RISKIER

Digital currencies come in public- and private-sector variants. Sover-
eign digital currencies, such as China’s digital yuan, are government
issued and give holders a direct claim on the central bank. Like trans-
actions with normal currencies, transactions with sovereign digital
currencies are validated by a central bank. In other words, these cur-
America’s Crypto Conundrum
Tales from the crypto: at a cryptocurrency mine in Gondo, Switzerland, May 2018
rencies are just digital extensions of regular currencies—except they
can make central banks look more like retail banks. Depending on
their design, sovereign digital currencies can even enable ordinary
depositors to have accounts directly with central banks and can poten-
tially increase, rather than decrease, government control of money.
Private-sector digital currencies, by contrast, generally rely on de-
centralized blockchain technology to settle accounts between users.
These currencies include cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ether,
which fluctuate in value relative to the U.S. dollar, and a subset of
cryptocurrencies called “stablecoins,” such as USD Coin, commonly
VA L E N T I N F L A U R A U D / K E Y S T O N E / R E U T E R S
known as USDC, and Facebook’s Diem, which are pegged to a fiat

currency and designed not to fluctuate in value. The blockchain
technology that undergirds these currencies comes in a number of
variations, but it generally allows a community of users to validate
transactions on a ledger instead of relying on a central authority
such as the U.S. Federal Reserve. For instance, a certain number of
coin holders might have to validate a transaction before coins can
move from one user to another, or coin holders might have to con-
firm a cryptographic key. Regardless of the exact process, network
users perform the formerly centralized job of a central bank.

Justin Muzinich
One consequence of moving transactions outside the banking sys-

tem is that transaction fees may be lower. Since 2018, sending Bitcoin
from one digital wallet to another has cost an average of about $4. For
transactions of a similar speed, the largest American banks charge con-
sumers far more: roughly $28 for a domestic wire transfer (slower op-
tions, such as using the Federal Reserve banks’ Automated Clearing
House, cost less) and about $40 for an international transfer. But de-
centralized systems are not inherently cheaper than centralized ones. A
centralized ledger can be run as efficiently as a decentralized one. One
reason that sending Bitcoin is cheaper than sending dollars is that Bit-
coin avoids much of the infrastruc-
ture—and associated fees—of the
Cryptocurrencies can legacy centralized banking system.
undermine essential Some of this infrastructure, such as
government functions. anti-money-laundering systems, serves
a vital function. To a certain degree,
therefore, the lower cost of trans-
ferring Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies reflects lower regulatory
and compliance costs that may not last. But other costs associated with
the legacy payments system stem from inefficiencies that could be
eliminated through competition. If the challenge posed by cryptocur-
rencies forces the legacy payments system to cut costs, that will clearly
be good for the United States as a whole.
In addition to offering lower fees, cryptocurrencies are giving rise
to a new generation of decentralized business models. For instance,
blockchain-enabled file-storage businesses allow anyone who joins a
network to rent spare hard-drive capacity directly to others on the
network, instead of relying on Dropbox or Amazon Web Services in
the middle. Other businesses allow the sharing and monetization of
social media content without Facebook or Instagram as an intermedi-
ary. And in what is known as “decentralized finance,” the blockchain
can facilitate lending without a bank. Lots of business models might
be reimagined with a community of users managing a network rather
than a central company. How successful emerging technologies will be
at replacing legacy systems is always difficult to predict, but the market
will do a much better job of determining this than the government.
Decentralization is not, however, just another example of a new
technology upending entrenched businesses, as some cryptocurrency
evangelists argue. True, companies threatened by blockchain technol-
ogy will have to adapt. But cryptocurrencies don’t just promise to dis-
place private-sector incumbents. They can undermine some essential
government functions valued on both sides of the aisle—and therein
lies the risk that a limited public policy framework should address.
WHO CONTROLS THE MONEY SUPPLY?

One of the biggest risks posed by cryptocurrencies is that they could
weaken the U.S. Federal Reserve’s ability to set monetary policy. Al-
though such a scenario is unlikely, a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin
could conceivably become a common enough medium of exchange
that it puts a meaningful portion of the money supply beyond the
Fed’s control. In addition, although cryptocurrencies usually have
predetermined formulas for coin growth or limits on the total number
of coins, most allow a certain group of decision-makers, such as a ma-
jority of coin holders, to alter these protocols. As a result, coin hold-
ers, rather than central bankers, could end up deciding to increase or
decrease the amount of digital currency in circulation.
So far, this is a theoretical concern. Despite being labeled “curren-
cies,” Bitcoin and its cryptocurrency brethren are mostly held as in-
vestment assets in the United States. Goods and services are not
priced in Bitcoin, so most holders are using it as a substitute for assets
such as gold or equities, sometimes as a hedge against inflation. One
reason Bitcoin has not become a medium of exchange is that the In-
ternal Revenue Service has said that any transaction involving digital
currency is a taxable “realization event”—meaning that users need to
pay tax on any gain in the value of Bitcoin between when they bought
it and when they used it to purchase something. In other words,
for tax purposes, Bitcoin is treated like stock, which makes it im-
practical to use as currency.
But even if the IRS were to change its view, Bitcoin and similar
cryptocurrencies would not be widely used as a medium of exchange
for a more fundamental reason: their price volatility relative to the
dollar. The price of Bitcoin has varied widely in just the last year—
from a low of less than $15,000 to a high of over $60,000 per coin. As
a result, anyone pricing goods and services in Bitcoin would either
have to accept this volatility risk or perpetually change their prices to
maintain purchasing power in dollars.
Not all digital currencies face the same obstacles to widespread use,
however. Unlike Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies, stablecoins,

Justin Muzinich
such as Diem, are for the most part neither volatile nor taxable at the
time of use. They are stable, as their name suggests, because they are
tied to the value of a fiat currency—for example, always being worth
$1. For this reason, there are no gains to be taxed when stablecoins are
used in transactions, nor is there a price risk for merchants who de-
nominate their goods and services in a stablecoin.
Over the last year, the total value of stablecoins has grown from
about $10 billion to over $100 billion. And the fact that large platforms
such as Facebook are behind these currencies makes them even more
likely to achieve widespread use as a medium of exchange. This would
not necessarily pose a risk to the Fed’s ability to set monetary policy, as
long as stablecoin platforms deposit a fixed dollar amount in a reserve
account for every stablecoin that is in circulation. But if a stablecoin
were to achieve widespread use and then change its reserve require-
ment from, say, $1 per coin to ten cents, the money supply could in-
crease meaningfully. Such a decision would be made not by the Fed but
by whatever group is permitted to alter the stablecoin’s protocol—a
private governing association or some proportion of coin holders, for
example. Not only would that take important monetary policy deci-
sions out of the hands of the government, but it could potentially allow
foreign powers to gain influence over the U.S. money supply, for in-
stance, by acquiring a majority of that particular stablecoin.
Such possibilities remain remote, but in a world where it is difficult
to predict how technology will develop, policymakers should take pro-
active measures to prevent private-sector digital currencies from erod-
ing the Fed’s control over monetary policy. In particular, they should
step up the enforcement of tax rules, including those requiring the
payment of capital gains tax on cryptocurrency transactions, so that
non-stablecoins remain more attractive as an asset than as a medium of
exchange. Congress’s effort to include properly tailored cryptocurrency
tax reporting language in recent legislation is a good step in this direc-
tion. Policymakers should also require that stablecoins always maintain
a fixed reserve ratio, so that they will not impede the Fed’s ability to set
monetary policy even if they achieve widespread use.
UNCLEAR RULES, UNCERTAIN AUTHORITIES

In addition to complicating monetary policy, cryptocurrencies could
create risks within the financial system, as Powell warned earlier this
year. They trade on secondary markets, both over the counter and
through exchanges that are broadly accessible to the public, but the
regulatory regime around them is unclear. One source of confusion is
whether cryptocurrencies are securities, which fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission (sec), or commodi-
ties, which are the purview of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC). Lawyers differ on this question, and there is
considerable uncertainty within the industry over which regulatory
regime, if any, applies to which currency. A $2 trillion market needs
more clarity than this.
Even if a cryptocurrency were to fall clearly in the CFTC’s juris-
diction, a second set of ambiguities would remain. The CFTC can
regulate futures markets for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, but it
has more limited powers—just the ability to punish fraud and ma-
nipulation—when it comes to cash markets. The same exchange
might facilitate trading in both futures and cash markets for Bit-
coin, for instance, but the CFTC would have regulatory authority
only over the former. Absent federal regulatory authority, cash mar-
kets could be subject to different regulations in all 50 states, which
would be both confusing to consumers and bad for American com-
petitiveness; entrepreneurs will do less business in the United
States if they have to comply with 50 different legal regimes there
but only a single regime in other countries.
Federal regulators may be able to find creative ways to assert juris-
diction, depending on the nuances of individual digital currencies.
But since cash markets for digital currencies can slide through a gap
in regulatory coverage between the SEC and the CFTC, Congress needs
to ensure that someone has clear regulatory authority. Congress need
not be heavy-handed; setting price controls to stop speculation is not
the government’s job. But Congress should act quickly.
Beyond jurisdictional questions, cryptocurrencies also raise finan-
cial stability concerns. For example, few rules govern reserve or li-
quidity management for stablecoins. As a result, coin holders may
have trouble exchanging their coins for dollars, and they may assume
more risk than they realize. The popular stablecoin Tether, for in-
stance, initially claimed that its coins were backed by dollars but later
disclosed that it had invested its reserves in a variety of risky assets,
to the surprise of many coin holders.
As long as these currencies are not widely held, such risks will be
borne solely by individual coin holders. But if the collateral underlying

Justin Muzinich
a systemically important stablecoin were to be impaired, a run on the

currency could occur and affect the stability of multiple markets—a
scenario that becomes more likely when the economy is already expe-
riencing difficulty. These are solvable problems that policymakers are
discussing, and existing regulatory frameworks, such as the one that
governs money markets, could be partially adopted for cryptocurren-
cies. But so far, Washington has taken few steps in this direction.
ILLICIT FINANCE
Perhaps the most immediate risk posed by cryptocurrencies stems
from the anonymity they allow. The United States does not permit
large numbers of dollars to move both anonymously and electroni-
cally. It requires that banks and money transfer businesses, such as
Western Union, collect identifying information and perform some
due diligence for high-risk transactions. Suspicious transfers and
those over $10,000 must be reported to the Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network, the bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treas-
ury devoted to fighting illicit finance. These regulations haven’t put
financial criminals out of business, but they have created many ob-
stacles for them. Suitcases of cash are cumbersome and risky, and
electronic payments are difficult to anonymize.
Unlike bank accounts, most digital currency ledgers do not require
any identifying information beyond a cryptographic key. This makes
illicit activity much easier, even though anonymous flows can be
tracked on a blockchain ledger that occasionally facilitates recovery
from criminals. The majority of digital currency transactions—
roughly between 60 and 99 percent, depending on how one meas-
ures—are for legal purposes, but the appeal of cryptocurrencies for
criminals is obvious: virtually all ransomware attacks, including the
one earlier this year on a U.S. oil pipeline, demand payment in digital
currency, and money launderers, terrorists, drug traffickers, and tax
evaders also make use of the technology.
U.S. banking laws allow the government to require identifying in-
formation for some digital currency accounts, but only at financial in-
stitutions, such as the currency exchange platform Coinbase, that are
already taking steps to be good corporate citizens. The government has
less clear authority to require the identification of users who hold their
currency directly—on a thumb drive, for instance, or in some other form
of “unhosted” digital wallet. Some private companies are developing
technology that would help identify the users of anonymous accounts,

but as long as banking laws permit anonymity, there is only so much
they can do. Tracing digital currency transactions across countries and
through previously unused, unhosted wallets is extremely difficult.
Congress needs to pass legislation to limit the harmful effects of ano-
nymity, in particular by barring large anonymous transfers of cryptocur-
rency that would be illegal within the banking system. Anonymity isn’t
all bad, however, and policymakers
could preserve it under certain cir-
cumstances. For instance, in authori- Perhaps the most
tarian countries, ID verification would immediate risk posed by
make it easier for governments to cryptocurrencies stems from
track their opponents and potentially
seize their assets. Policymakers must the anonymity they allow.
therefore balance the interest of pro-
moting freedom abroad against the need to ensure security at home.
One way to do this would be to forgo ID requirements for digital cur-
rency transactions under $10,000. Such an exception would allow most
families to meaningfully protect their assets—the median savings of a
U.S. family is under $10,000, and it is far less for families in most auto-
cratic countries—while making it much more difficult to buy expensive
weapons with digital currencies or demand six- and seven-figure ran-
soms. Such an exception could also allow anonymity for smaller day-to-
day transactions, consistent with the use of cash.
One obstacle to limiting anonymity is the lack of a centralized au-
thority to oversee ID verification. By their very nature, decentralized
digital currencies resist this type of oversight. But creative thinking
can likely overcome this challenge. For instance, digital currency ex-
changes or other private companies could maintain lists of wallets
whose users have been verified, and the programs running these cur-
rencies could automatically check users against such a list. Policymak-
ers should maintain a degree of humility, however, and not be too
prescriptive about how to regulate a fast-evolving industry. If policy-
makers require ID verification, the market will find solutions that are
compatible with decentralization and that minimize disruption.
Policymakers will also have to think creatively about enforce-
ment. Requiring ID verification could end up driving some digital
currency users to so-called anonymity-enhanced coins or to off-
shore exchanges and wallets beyond U.S. jurisdiction. Anonymity-

Justin Muzinich
enhanced coins, such as Monero, are more difficult to track, since in

addition to not requiring ID verification, they obscure other transac-
tion details, including amounts and wallet addresses. Because their
brands are so closely tied to anonymity, these coins might be less
likely to comply with ID verification rules and therefore more likely
to attract illicit users. Yet such an outcome would not necessarily be
all bad, because it would give authorities tracking illicit finance a
place to focus their efforts. The overwhelming majority of digital
currency users are not doing anything illegal, and many would prob-
ably accept ID requirements similar to those needed for cash depos-
its or stocks, as evidenced by the broad use of regulated platforms
such as Coinbase. Users who balk at these requirements and shift
their transactions to anonymity-enhanced coins will have signaled
something useful to law enforcement.
The spread of offshore digital currencies is a problem that the G-7
and the G-20 could tackle through the kind of coordination they al-
ready carry out on other financial issues. In fact, digital currencies are
already a topic of discussion when these multilateral groups meet, and
a number of countries have signaled a willingness to crack down on
the use of digital currencies for illicit activity. The United States
should actively engage in shaping these discussions and push other
countries to adopt regulations similar to those it adopts at home in
order to prevent criminals from forum shopping.
A DIGITAL DOLLAR
The final category of risks posed by digital currencies is geopolitical.
Spurred by the growth of private digital currencies and the problem
of slow and expensive payments, a majority of the world’s major cen-
tral banks are considering launching sovereign digital currencies, also
known as “central bank digital currencies.” Against this backdrop, the
United States must consider the risks to the international role of the
dollar if it does not launch its own digital dollar.
This danger is often framed too narrowly as a worry that China’s
digital yuan could threaten the dollar’s reserve status. Beijing has
made no secret about its desire to increase the share of international
payments in yuan at the expense of the dollar. Mu Changchun, the
digital currency chief at China’s central bank, has spoken publicly
about China’s desire to reduce “dollarization” in the international
economy. And the Chinese Communist Party certainly values the
data and surveillance capabilities the digital yuan will give the au-
thoritarian state. Considered alongside its vast infrastructure invest-
ment project, known as the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s ambition
to use the digital yuan to project economic power seems clear.
Yet the United States must weigh Beijing’s ambitions against its
capabilities. China faces a host of structural disadvantages, including
a managed exchange rate and a lack of economic transparency, that
will make it difficult for its sovereign digital currency to threaten the
dollar’s reserve status anytime soon. Some will embrace the digital
yuan, and others may be induced or forced to use it as a condition of
doing business with China—something for which Washington must
be prepared to hold Beijing to account. But wary of capital controls
and weaker property rights in China, most people will likely think
long and hard before ditching the dollar for the digital yuan at a scale
that would threaten the dollar’s reserve status. Put another way, the
real world factors that have historically constrained China’s fiat cur-
rency will also constrain its digital currency.
A more significant but largely overlooked risk of the digital yuan is
that it could help Beijing facilitate sanctions evasion. One way the
United States stops weapons sales to North Korea, for instance, is by
imposing secondary sanctions that prevent Americans from doing
business not just with the North Korean military but also with any
foreign entity that transacts with the North Korean military. Because
no bank can afford to lose access to the U.S. financial system, virtually
none will facilitate payments for Pyongyang’s military purchases. The
digital yuan could provide North Korea with a way around the bank-
ing system. If a foreign company that does no business in the United
States wants to sell to a North Korean military entity, both parties
could open accounts with the Chinese central bank, and money could
flow between them via the central bank without touching any com-
mercial banks, avoiding the bite of U.S. sanctions. Launching a digital
dollar would do little to address this threat.
Although the United States must be clear-eyed about the risks posed
by the digital yuan, in particular that it could undermine U.S. sanc-
tions, the threat to the dollar-based international system is much
broader than China. International payments are notoriously slow and
expensive. They flow through a patchwork of different national sys-
tems, touching multiple commercial banks in a process that adds cost
and time. A new system built with a global economy in mind could

Justin Muzinich
clearly improve efficiency, which is one reason so many countries are

considering adopting central bank digital currencies. If central banks
were to agree to provide foreigners direct account access, adopt com-
mon standards, or even share technology, international payments could
become more seamless and cost effective than the current dollar-depen-
dent system, thereby gradually eroding the dollar’s international role.
Yet as real as this danger is, the United States should not panic.
With the exception of China, most countries are in the early stages
of developing central bank digital currencies, and the United States
is engaged in international discussions aimed at setting standards for
the underlying technology—meaning that it will be able to shape
those standards. Moreover, the Federal Reserve is currently explor-
ing possibilities for the technology that would enable a digital dollar,
including by working with the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. Even if it does not adopt a digital dollar, the United States may
be able to bless a private-sector digital currency—or currencies—that
can facilitate low-cost international payments. A properly regulated
stablecoin, for instance, might meet the need for efficient dollar
transfers, depending on how the international landscape develops.
The United States must also consider the domestic policy implica-
tions of a digital dollar. Providing the public with direct access to ac-
counts at the Fed could make it easier to integrate the roughly five
percent of Americans who are currently unbanked into the country’s
financial system. But a digital dollar could also raise privacy concerns
if the government has insight into individual spending decisions, or it
could lead to government overreach if deposits are promised in ex-
change for conformity with a controversial social policy. In addition,
Fed accounts could cause banks to lose deposits, diminishing their
ability to make loans and hurting economic growth.
There are ways to mitigate these risks, such as using private-sector
intermediaries that do not share spending information with Wash-
ington, limiting what the government can do through Fed accounts,
or capping the size of Fed accounts. The United States, however, will
have to balance these domestic considerations with the need to en-
sure that international dollar transactions are powered by technology
that is efficient, resilient, and interoperable with technology being
developed by other central banks. This could be achieved through a
digital dollar or a properly regulated private-sector alternative, such
as a stablecoin. But to secure the global role of the dollar, which has
for decades provided stability for the United States and its allies,
Washington will need to adjust to—and shape—the global shift to-
ward central bank digital currencies.
A PATH FORWARD
If digital currencies continue to gain traction, the debate over how to
regulate them will only get louder. It will not be easy for Washington
to find a middle path. Because digital currencies touch so many policy
areas, they cut across the normal decision-making silos of the U.S.
government, creating more potential for bureaucratic sticking points
and risking an uncoordinated, patchwork approach. Within the execu-
tive branch, various agencies have a stake in the issue, including the
Treasury Department, the SEC, the CFTC, the Federal Reserve, the
Justice Department, and the State Department. In Congress, several
different committees have an interest in digital currencies, including
those on banking, finance, agriculture, and foreign relations.
To forge an interagency path forward, the Biden administration
should regularly convene a high-level group akin to the President’s Work-
ing Group on Financial Markets, which includes the treasury secretary,
the Fed chair, the SEC chair, and the CFTC chair, but add the attorney
general and the secretary of state or their deputies. Congress could also
set up a bipartisan task force to seek consensus across committees.
Most Americans want their government to be able to respond to
economic downturns, to prevent broad financial instability, and to fight
terrorism and other types of crime. But most also wish to benefit from
the innovative potential of new technologies such as digital currencies.
Both these things can be achieved only with common-sense guard-
rails—and, ultimately, through a digital dollar or a properly regulated
private-sector alternative. Decisions about the government’s control of
money must be shaped not just by software developers but by elected
representatives who are accountable to the American people.∂

The Myth of
Russian Decline
Why Moscow Will Be a Persistent Power
Michael Kofman and
Andrea Kendall-Taylor
T
he Biden administration came into office with a clear and
unambiguous foreign policy priority: countering a rising
China. The administration’s public statements, its early na-
tional security planning documents, and its initial diplomatic forays
have all suggested that pushing back against Beijing’s growing global
influence will be Washington’s national security focus, alongside
transnational threats such as climate change and the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The question of how to deal with Russia, by contrast, has taken
a back seat, returning to the fore only when Russian troops amassed
on Ukraine’s border in April. That crisis served as a reminder of the
danger of looking past Moscow—yet by July, President Joe Biden was
back to declaring that Russia was “sitting on top of an economy that
has nuclear weapons and oil wells and nothing else.”
Biden is not the first American leader to think along these lines.
Ever since the end of the Cold War, American politicians have peri-
odically suggested that Russia’s days as a true global power are num-
bered. In 2014, John McCain, a Republican senator from Arizona,
called Russia a “gas station masquerading as a country.” That same
year, U.S. President Barack Obama dismissed Russia as a mere “re-
gional power.” Not long thereafter, Russia successfully intervened in
the Syrian war, interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and
MICHAEL KOFMAN is Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA and a Senior Fellow
at the Center for a New American Security.
ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security

Program at the Center for a New American Security.
The Myth of Russian Decline
inserted itself into the political crisis in Venezuela and the civil war in
Libya. And yet, the perception of Russia as a paper tiger persists.
The problem is that the case for Russian decline is overstated.
Much of the evidence for it, such as Russia’s shrinking population
and its resource-dependent economy, is not as consequential for the
Kremlin as many in Washington assume. Nor should the United
States expect that Russia will automatically abandon its course of
confrontation once President Vladimir Putin leaves office. Putin’s
foreign policy enjoys widespread support among the country’s ruling
elite, and his legacy will include a thicket of unresolved disputes,
chief among them that over the annexation of Crimea. Any disagree-
ments with the United States are here to stay.
Put simply, Washington cannot afford to fixate on China while
hoping to simply wait Russia out. Rather than viewing Russia as a
declining power, U.S. leaders should see it as a persistent one—and
have a frank conversation about the country’s true capabilities and
vulnerabilities. Rethinking American assumptions about Russian
power would allow policymakers to address what will be a period of
prolonged confrontation with a capable adversary.
FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS
Expectations of Russian decline contain important truths. The coun-
try’s economy is stagnant, with few sources of value other than the
extraction and export of natural resources. The entire system is rife
with corruption and dominated by inefficient state-owned or state-
controlled enterprises, and international sanctions limit access to cap-
ital and technology. Russia struggles to develop, retain, and attract
talent; the state chronically underfunds scientific research; and bu-
reaucratic mismanagement hinders technological innovation. As a re-
sult, Russia lags considerably behind the United States and China in
most metrics of scientific and technological development. Military
spending has largely plateaued in the last four years, and the popula-
tion is forecast to decline by ten million people by 2050.
With such a dismal outlook, it is natural to assume that Russia’s
capacity for disruption and hostility on the international stage will
soon diminish, too—that the Kremlin will simply run out of resources
for its aggressive foreign policy. But those data points miss the broader
picture. They highlight Russia’s weaknesses and downplay its
strengths. Russia may be “a downshifter country,” as Herman Gref,

Show of force: at a military parade in Moscow, August 2021

the head of Russia’s largest bank, complained in 2016. But its eco-
nomic, demographic, and military potential will remain substantial,
rather than entering a precipitous decline.
Consider the country’s economy, which, stagnant as it may be, is
still larger and more resilient than many believe. Analysts like to point
out that Russia’s GDP of $1.5 trillion is comparable to that of Italy or
Texas. But that $1.5 trillion is calculated using market exchange rates.
Factor in purchasing power parity, and it balloons to $4.1 trillion,
which would make Russia the second-largest economy in Europe and
the sixth-largest in the world. Neither measure is wholly accurate—
one is likely an underestimate, the other an overestimate—but the
comparison shows that Russia’s economy is nowhere near as small as
the conventional wisdom holds. At any rate, raw GDP is often a poor
measure of geopolitical power: it no longer translates easily into mili-
tary potential or international influence.
To be sure, Russia’s economy has not been kind to its citizens. Real
MA XIM S H EM ET OV / REUT E RS
disposable incomes are ten percent lower today than they were in 2013,
wiping out nearly a decade of growth. But macroeconomic indicators
are stable enough to allow Moscow to project power well into the fu-
ture. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and occupation of eastern
Ukraine in 2014, international sanctions and falling oil prices caused its
economy to tumble. In the years since, however, the government has
reined in its spending and adapted to lower oil prices, creating budget
surpluses and a growing war chest. The latest estimates, as of August
2021, put the value of Russia’s National Wealth Fund at about $185 bil-
lion and its foreign currency reserves at $615 billion—hardly a picture
of destitution. A new policy of import substitution, devised in response
to international sanctions, has breathed new life into the agricultural
sector, whose exports now rake in more than $30 billion annually. The
Kremlin has also reoriented trade away from the West and toward
China, currently its number one trading partner. Trade with China is
expected to exceed $200 billion by 2024, twice what it was in 2013.
What of Russia’s dependence on extractive industries? Oil and gas
sales continue to account for about 30–40 percent of the government’s
budget, meaning that a future shift away from fossil fuels will sting. But
it is unclear how near that future really is. And Russia produces energy
at such a low price that other exporting countries are likely to get
squeezed well before it sees its budget crimped. In addition, Russia is
the main energy supplier to the European Union, whose dependency
has only grown over the past decade: the eu gets 41 percent of its natu-
ral gas, 27 percent of its oil, and 47 percent of its solid fossil fuels from
Russia. The problem Moscow faces is that its resources are not infinite.
Russia’s oil production will peak in the coming decade—some think it
may have done so already—meaning that the country’s capacity to ex-
port easily extractable (and thus cheap) oil will hit a ceiling.
Meanwhile, although Russia lags behind the United States in techno-
logical innovation, it still ranks among the top ten worldwide in research-
and-development spending. In the case of artificial intelligence, it may
not even matter whether the country is a leader or a follower: given the
many applications and the commercial utility of this technology, Mos-
cow will likely realize some second-mover advantages while letting the
United States and China take on the costs and risks of pioneering its
development. Moreover, Russia has a struggling but viable technology
sector and has developed its own analogs to Facebook, Google, and other
popular online platforms, all of which are fairly successful within Russia.
OF MILITARY AND MEN

Among the most common misconceptions about Russia is that the
country’s demographic outlook will dramatically constrain its future
capabilities. Such demographic determinism has historically failed to
predict Russia’s fortunes. According to un forecasts, Russia’s popula-

tion will shrink by about seven percent by 2050; more pessimistic

projections see a decline of up to 11 percent. Even in the latter case,
Russia would remain the most populous country in Europe and Eur-
asia by a wide margin. It may lag behind highly developed Western
countries in life expectancy and mortality rates, but it has substan-
tially narrowed those gaps since the 1990s. The country is certainly
not on the brink of demographic collapse.
More important, the relevance of demographics to state power
needs rethinking. Modern great powers are defined not by the size of
their populations but by their populations’ quality: people’s health,
educational levels, and labor productivity, among other indicators.
Were it otherwise, countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Ni-
geria would be among the world’s most powerful states. As the Amer-
ican scholar Hal Brands has written, “All things equal, countries with
healthy demographic profiles can create wealth more easily than their
competitors.” On this front, Russia has shown considerable improve-
ment since the 1990s, with reduced mortality, increased lifespans, and
an improved fertility rate. Until 2015, it steadily rose on indexes such
as the un’s Human Development Index and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s labor productivity meas
ures. An economic recession has since slowed down this trend, and
undone some of the progress, but Russia’s overall situation has con-
siderably improved from a demographic crisis in the 1990s and pre-
dictions of demographic doom in the early years of this century.
Brain drain remains a major problem, with many of Russia’s bright-
est leaving the country. Its economic impact, however, has been diffi-
cult to measure. And even as many middle-class Russians who are
essential to the knowledge economy leave, Russia benefits from sub-
stantial immigration by job seekers from the former Soviet republics.
Russia’s demographic profile is composed of mixed indicators that
show qualitative improvements alongside quantitative decline. Mean-
while, the demographic outlooks for many of the United States’ allies
and partners are equally problematic, if not more so.
MILITARY MIGHT
Above all, Russia will remain a military force to be reckoned with.
Military power has historically been a Russian strength, compensating
for the country’s relatively undiversified economy, technological back-
wardness, and lack of political dynamism. It is in part why Russia man-
aged to sustain prolonged competitions with economically much

stronger states in the past, whether it was the United States or the
British Empire. After its nadir in the early post-Soviet era, Russian
military power has been revived—and will only improve in the coming
decade, even as American policymak-
ers turn their attention to China.
Russia remains the United States’ Washington cannot afford
primary peer in nuclear weapons tech- to fixate on China while
nology. Aside from NATO, it also fields hoping to simply wait
the strongest conventional military in
Europe, reforged following a period of Russia out.
military reforms and investments since
2008. That transformation was largely overlooked prior to 2014, which
explains why Russia’s military moves in Ukraine and, later, in Syria took
many analysts by surprise. Today, the Russian military is at its highest
level of readiness, mobility, and technical capability in decades. NATO
remains superior on paper, but much is contingent in war, and NATO’s
apparent superiority does not guarantee victory or the ability to deter
Russia across the range of possible conflicts. Russia also fields a flexible
array of special forces, mercenaries, and military intelligence operatives.
This is before considering the country’s status as a leading power in
space or its extensive cyberwarfare capabilities, which were recently
demonstrated by the so-called SolarWinds breach, in which Russian
hackers penetrated and spied on several U.S. government agencies.
Adjusting for purchasing power parity and for the peculiarities of
autarkic defense sectors such as Russia’s, analysts have estimated that
Russia spends somewhere between $150 billion and $180 billion per
year on defense, considerably more than the market exchange rate
figure of $58 billion suggests. Half of Russia’s annual defense budget
is spent on procuring new weapons, modernizing old ones, and re-
searching military technology, which is a far greater share than is
spent in these areas by most Western militaries. Those, moreover, are
conservative estimates, since some Russian expenditures remain hid-
den, obscured, or classified. Using these generous budgets, the Rus-
sian military-industrial complex has developed many next-generation
weapons, from hypersonic missiles to directed-energy weapons (such
as lasers), electronic warfare systems, advanced submarines, and inte-
grated air defenses, along with antisatellite weapons of various types.
The Russian military is not without its problems and remains a

laggard in some areas. In practice, however, Russia is well positioned

to remain a dominant actor in the post-Soviet space and to challenge
U.S. interests in other regions, such as the Middle East. Russia re-
tains the airlift and sealift capabilities needed to deploy its troops at
some distance from its borders. Its defense spending looks stable at
current levels, despite the triple shock of an economic recession, low
oil prices, and international sanctions. The Russian military still sees
itself as a relative underdog, but it has grown more confident that it
can deter nato even without nuclear weapons, and the outcome of a
prolonged war between Russian and nato forces is difficult to pre-
dict. Under these circumstances, the United States and its allies
should stop dismissing Russia as a mere “disrupter” and recognize it
as a serious military adversary in both ability and intent.
IT’S NOT JUST A PUTIN PROBLEM

Tied up in the narrative of Russian decline is the notion that the United
States primarily has a Putin problem—that once the Russian president
leaves office, his country’s foreign policy will grow less assertive. Yet
that is unlikely to be the case. For one thing, Putin can legally remain
in office until 2036, thanks to a referendum that he pushed through last
year that allows him to serve two more six-year terms after his current
term expires in 2024. Research that one of us (Kendall-Taylor) con-
ducted with the political scientist Erica Frantz showed that such lon-
gevity is common for leaders like the Russian president. In the
post–Cold War era, autocrats who, like Putin, had made it to 20 years
in office, were at least 65 years of age, and had concentrated power in
their own hands ended up ruling for 36 years, on average.
Research on longtime authoritarian leaders also suggests that once
Putin does depart—even if earlier than expected—there will be little
prospect for substantial political improvement. Most often, the regimes
that such longtime leaders create persist, or a different dictatorship
emerges. The odds that democratization will follow a regime like Put
in’s—run by an older, personalist leader who has clung to power for 20
years or more—are less than one in ten. Extending term limits, as Putin
did after last year’s referendum, is also a bad sign. According to data
from the Comparative Constitutions Project, 13 leaders around the
world pursued term-limit extensions in the period from 1992 to 2009.
In all but one case, their regimes either are still in power or simply
transitioned to a new authoritarian regime after the leader’s departure.
This is not to suggest that Russia is doomed to authoritarianism or

that a change in the president would not matter. Nonetheless, the
empirical record shows that the actions longtime authoritarian leaders
typically take to ensure control—such as undermining civil society
and hollowing out institutions that could constrain their power—cre-
ate barriers to the emergence of democracy. Likewise, a mere change
in leadership would likely matter only at the margins. Unless Putin’s
departure ushers in a significant turnover in the ruling elite, key pil-
lars of Russian foreign policy, such as the notion that Russia maintains
the right to a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, will remain
incompatible with the values of the United States and its allies. Sim-
ply put, American policymakers must prepare for the possibility that
the contours of Russian foreign policy, and thus the Kremlin’s intent
to undermine U.S. interests, will endure long after Putin leaves office.
THE PERSISTENT POWER

The United States should think of Russia not as a declining power but
as a persistent one, willing and able to threaten U.S. national security
interests for at least the next ten to 20 years. Even if China proves to
be the more significant long-term threat, Russia will remain a long-
term challenger, too—a “good enough” power, as the political scientist
Kathryn Stoner has put it, with the ability to shape global affairs and
substantially affect U.S. interests. The former Soviet space remains a
tinderbox, still reckoning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
which should be thought of not as an event but as a process, as the
historian Serhii Plokhy has aptly put it. No matter how much Wash-
ington would like to focus on the Indo-Pacific, therefore, it must con-
sider the prospect of another Russian-Ukrainian war, a military
conflict resulting from political unrest in Belarus, or crises akin to the
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Compared with China, Russia also poses a more significant danger
to the U.S. homeland. For one thing, it remains the United States’
preeminent nuclear threat, despite China’s growing arsenal of strategic
nuclear weapons. The same goes for Russia’s ability to reach the conti-
nental United States with long-range conventional missiles. Russia also
has more troops stationed abroad than does China, with bases in the
Caucasus, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, putting its mili-
tary in regular proximity to U.S. and nato forces. When it comes to
indirect warfare, Moscow’s record of election interference and hacking

demonstrates that it can and will employ emerging technologies against

the United States and its allies. It is also worth underscoring that the
Kremlin can endanger U.S. interests on the cheap. Russia’s military
interventions in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya have been limited and inex-
pensive. So, too, are its cyberattacks and disinformation efforts.
It is perhaps in these domains—cyberwarfare and attacks on liberal
democracy—where Russia is likely to pose the most sustained threat.
Russia has refined a low-cost toolkit that allows it to bolster other
authoritarian regimes, amplify illiberal voices in established democra-
cies, poison information ecosystems, and subvert elections and other
democratic institutions. Since Moscow believes that weakening de-
mocracy can accelerate the decline of U.S. influence, it will persist in
its efforts on this front. Other states have taken note of Russia’s suc-
cess in this sphere and have begun to emulate it, as shown by China’s
adoption of Kremlin-style information warfare during the pandemic.
A final concern is that Moscow is increasingly finding common
cause with Beijing. In effect, the two governments have formed a stra-
tegic partnership, exchanging technical and material support to offset
Western pressure and focus their resources on competing with the
United States rather than with each other. Their defense and military
cooperation has grown, too. The impact of this alignment will be
greater than the sum of its parts, amplifying the challenge to U.S.
interests that each state poses individually. The challenge, therefore,
will be not just properly prioritizing China and Russia in U.S. strat-
egy but recognizing that the problems presented by the two countries
are not necessarily discrete and separable.
RIGHTSIZING RUSSIA
Washington must move past the myth that Russia is a beleaguered or
cornered state, lashing out in recognition of its own demise. In truth,
there is little evidence that Russia’s leaders see their country in this way—
on the contrary, they consider Russia to be the center of power in its own
region and an assertive player globally. Events such as the bungled U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan only reinforce Moscow’s perception that it
is rather the United States that is in decline. Ignoring that view will cre-
ate false expectations for Russia’s behavior, leaving the United States and
its allies poorly positioned to anticipate Russian actions.
The Biden administration has taken steps in the right direction.
Among them is its focus on fostering democratic resilience. By ele-
vating cybersecurity as a national security priority, strengthening

critical infrastructure, improving information ecosystems, and root-
ing out the corruption that Russia weaponizes to subvert democratic
institutions, Washington and its allies can cut off a major source of
Moscow’s influence abroad. Mean-
while, the administration’s efforts to
pursue arms control and strategic The United States should
stability with Russia, which should think of Russia not as a
extend to cyberspace and space, will declining power but as a
set up the necessary guardrails for a
prolonged confrontation. persistent one.
Moving forward, however, Wash-
ington must resist overly focusing on China to the point of neglecting
other important issues, such as Russia. The Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance, released in March as one of the Biden adminis-
tration’s earliest national security analyses, discussed China in consid-
erable depth while allocating barely a few sentences to Russia. Future
strategic documents, such as the upcoming National Security and Na-
tional Defense Strategies, should correct this imbalance.
The same approach should guide the administration’s defense bud-
geting. The Russian military threat has not decreased, yet the funding
allocated by Washington to deal with it has: successive budget requests
since 2020 have cut support for the European Deterrence Initiative (a
U.S. effort to bolster its military presence in Europe after Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea), most recently by 19 percent. Reallocating that
money to East Asia, as the Biden administration wants to do, is un-
likely to make a marked difference in the military balance vis-à-vis
China—the amount involved is too modest for that—but it will create
unnecessary risks in Europe. That is particularly true considering the
possibility of simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, in which
one of those states takes advantage of a crisis involving the other to
pursue its own aims. Washington must hedge against such a scenario
and ensure that Europe does not become the weak link in its strategy.
NATO will play a central role in that endeavor. The alliance has re-
cently begun updating its official guiding document, and Washington
must ensure that Russia, not China, remains the clear priority. The
United States should also continue to encourage its European allies
and partners to shoulder more of the burden for deterrence and de-
fense on the continent. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has

reenergized European calls to enhance its own capabilities. Now is the

time, through careful transatlantic coordination, for real steps toward
strengthening the European pillar within nato.
Finally, Washington must be bolder still in its efforts to defend de-
mocracy against outside subversion. The United States and its allies
and partners should step up their collective responses to Moscow’s cy-
berwarfare, election interference, and other actions that threaten the
health of their political and economic systems. They should, for ex-
ample, agree to take collective action against any foreign election inter-
ference that crosses agreed-on thresholds. Russia’s digital ambitions
may be overshadowed by China’s, yet Russia is developing its own
brand of digital dictatorship, designed in part to undermine democracy
worldwide. Addressing that threat also requires working with like-
minded democratic partners in international organizations such as the
International Telecommunication Union to ensure that it is not Beijing
and Moscow that write the digital rules and norms of the future.
The gravitational pull of the threat posed by a rising and revisionist
China is understandably strong, but the United States is capable of
dealing with two powers at once: China, a pacing threat, and Russia, a
persistent one. In talking about their approach to Russia, Biden admin-
istration officials are fond of saying that the United States “can walk
and chew gum at the same time.” Now they will have to prove it.∂
Order Before Peace

Kissinger’s Middle East Diplomacy
and Its Lessons for Today
Martin Indyk
T
he ignominious end to the U.S. war in Afghanistan dramati-
cally underscored the complexity and volatility of the broader
Middle East. Americans may try to console themselves that at
last they can turn their backs on this troubled region since the United
States is now energy self-sufficient and thus much less dependent on
Middle Eastern oil. Washington has learned the hard way not to at-
tempt to remake the region in the United States’ image. And if Amer-
ican leaders are tempted to make war there again, they are likely to find
little public support.
Nevertheless, pivoting away from the broader Middle East is easier
said than done. If Iran continues to advance its nuclear program to the
threshold of developing a weapon, it could trigger an arms race or a
preemptive Israeli strike that would drag the United States back into
another Middle Eastern war. The region remains important because of
its geostrategic centrality, located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.
Israel and Washington’s Arab allies depend on the United States for
their security. Failing states such as Syria and Yemen remain a poten-
tial breeding ground for terrorists who can strike the United States
and its allies. And although the United States no longer depends on
the free flow of oil from the Gulf, a prolonged interruption there could
send the global economy into a tailspin. Like it or not, the United
States needs to devise a post-Afghanistan strategy for promoting or-
der in the Middle East even as it shifts its focus to other priorities.
In crafting that strategy, there is a precedent that can serve as a use-
ful template. It comes from the experience of Washington’s preemi-
MARTIN INDYK is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the
author of Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy (Knopf,
2021), from which this essay is adapted.

Martin Indyk
The incrementalist: Kissinger in his office in Washington, D.C., August 1978

nent strategist, Henry Kissinger. Although he is little remembered for
it, during the four years he served as secretary of state to U.S. Presi-
dents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Kissinger presided over a suc-
cessful effort to build a stable Middle Eastern order, one that lasted for
30 years. Kissinger managed to achieve that while the United States
was withdrawing all its troops from Vietnam and pulling back from
Southeast Asia. It was a time, like today, when diplomacy had to sub-
stitute for the use of force. It coincided with the Watergate scandal,
which plunged the United States into a deep political crisis and forced
Nixon from office, creating a potential vacuum in U.S. leadership on
W. S T E C H E / B I L D A R C H I V V I S U M / R E D U X
the world stage. And yet during this period of American malaise, in
the midst of the Cold War, Kissinger’s diplomacy managed to sideline
the Soviet Union and lay the foundations for an American-led peace
process that effectively ended the conflict between the Arab states and
Israel, even though it failed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
One of the most important lessons from the Kissinger era is that an
equilibrium in the regional balance of power is insufficient for main-
taining a stable order. To legitimize that order, Washington needs to
find ways to encourage its allies and partners to address the region’s
Order Before Peace
grievances. Although policymakers should be circumspect in their

peacemaking efforts, prioritizing stability over end-of-conflict deals,
they should also avoid underreaching, because that can destabilize
the order, too. While there is little appetite in Washington to address the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Biden administration should resist the
temptation to neglect the issue. As Kissinger learned the hard way, con-
flicts that appear dormant can erupt into full-blown crises at unexpected
moments. Dealing with one of the central conflicts in the Middle East
by employing a Kissingerian strategy of incremental steps is the best
way to avoid yet another conflagration in this combustible region.
ORDER, NOT PEACE

It was order, not peace, that Kissinger pursued, because he believed that
peace was neither an achievable nor even a desirable objective in the
Middle East. In Kissinger’s view, preserving Middle Eastern order re-
quired the maintenance of a stable balance of power. In his doctoral
dissertation, which was subsequently published in 1957 as A World Re-
stored, Kissinger demonstrated how the Austrian diplomat Klemens von
Metternich and the Anglo-Irish statesman Lord Castlereagh produced
100 years of relative stability in Europe by artfully tending to the bal-
ance of power and skillfully manipulating those who tried to disrupt it.
Kissinger sought to replicate that approach in the Middle East when
he had the opportunity. But he understood that an equilibrium in the
balance of power was not enough. For the order to be sustainable, it
also had to be legitimate, meaning that all the major powers within the
system had to adhere to a commonly accepted set of rules. Those rules
would be respected only if they provided a sufficient sense of justice to
a sufficient number of states. It did not require the satisfaction of all
grievances, he wrote, “just an absence of the grievances that would
motivate an effort to overthrow the order.” A legitimate order, Kis
singer argued, did not eliminate conflict, but it did limit its scope.
This conclusion also came from what he observed during World
War II, when the Wilsonian idealism that sought a peace to end all
wars had instead led to appeasement and Hitler’s conquest of Europe.
As Kissinger noted in his memoirs, “For most people in most periods
of history, peace had been a precarious state and not the millennial
disappearance of all tension.” Consequently, in his diplomatic efforts
in the Middle East, Kissinger would consistently avoid the pursuit of
peace treaties, instead seeking agreements that would give all sides a

Martin Indyk
stake in preserving the existing order. As he told me decades later, “I

never thought there could be a moment of universal reconciliation.”
Kissinger’s skepticism first found expression in the subtitle he
chose for A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of
Peace. The fact that after years of deep research, he concluded that
peace was problematic would have a formative influence on his ap-
proach to diplomacy in the Middle East. On the first page of the in-
troduction to A World Restored, Kissinger explains why he came to this
conclusion. “The attainment of peace,” he writes, “is not as easy as the
desire for it.” Eras like the period he had studied turned out, para-
doxically, to be the most peaceful because the statesmen involved were
not preoccupied with brokering peace.
The eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant was
another influence on Kissinger’s Middle East policymaking. Kant be-
lieved that peace was inevitable. But what Kissinger took away from
the philosopher’s essay “Perpetual Peace” was that conflict between
states would lead over time to the exhaustion of their powers. Eventu-
ally, they would prefer peace to the misery of war. In other words,
peacemaking was a gradual process that could not be rushed. As Kis
singer noted, Kant understood that “the root dilemma of our time is
that if the quest for peace turns into the sole objective of policy, the
fear of war becomes a weapon in the hands of the most ruthless; it
produces moral disarmament.”
When Kissinger applied this prism to the Middle East, he assumed
that the Arabs were not ready to reconcile with the Jewish state and that
Israel was unable to make the territorial concessions they demanded
without jeopardizing its existence. So he developed a peace process that
provided for Israel to withdraw in small, incremental steps from the
Arab territory it had occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War. The legitimiz-
ing principle for this approach was enshrined in un Security Council
Resolution 242, which provided for an exchange of territory for peace.
Kissinger’s peace process, however, was designed to buy time rather
than peace: time for Israel to build its capabilities and reduce its isolation,
and time for the Arabs to tire of the conflict and recognize the advantages
of working with an increasingly powerful Israeli neighbor. In the mean-
time, he would pursue Middle East peace with caution, skepticism, and
gradualism, which is why he labeled it “step-by-step diplomacy.”
Equilibrium and legitimacy in the pursuit of order and incremen-
talism in the pursuit of peace were the basic concepts of Kissinger’s
Order Before Peace
strategic approach. He managed to negotiate three interim agree-

ments among Egypt, Syria, and Israel and laid the foundations for the
subsequent peace treaties that Israel forged with Egypt and Jordan.
His process began to unravel, however, when U.S. President Bill
Clinton ignored Kissinger’s emphasis on caution and tried and failed
to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And then President George W.
Bush launched his ill-fated invasion of Iraq, destabilizing Kissinger’s
order by making it possible for revolutionary Iran to challenge U.S.
dominance in the Sunni Arab world.
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR FRIENDS

Kissinger’s approach to the Middle East is particularly relevant in the
present moment. The United States is pulling back from the region in
an obvious parallel to the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia in
Kissinger’s time. Then, as now, the aftermath of a botched, long-
running war meant there was a strict limit on Washington’s ability to
deploy force in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Kissinger knew that a
stable equilibrium depended on the United States backing up its di-
plomacy with the credible threat of military action. He squared this
circle by relying on and working with capable regional partners.
For example, in September 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (plo) sought to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan. Three
Soviet-backed Syrian armored tank brigades supported the organiza-
tion’s attempt by occupying the northern Jordanian city of Irbid. Fearing
they would advance on Amman, Hussein called on Washington to
intervene. The United States, however, could not do so quickly and
risked getting stuck there if it did.
So Kissinger, on Hussein’s urging and with Nixon’s eventual sup-
port, turned to Israel to deter the Syrians. Prime Minister Golda Meir
ordered the Israel Defense Forces to mobilize on the Golan Heights
and on the Jordanian border adjacent to Irbid. Meanwhile, to deter the
Soviets, Kissinger deployed two U.S. carrier battle groups off the Leb-
anese coast and ordered a third into the Mediterranean. Emboldened
by Israeli and American backing, the Jordanian army inflicted heavy
losses on the Syrian tank brigades, and the Syrians withdrew. Within
days, the crisis was over, without one American boot on the ground.
Kissinger also harnessed the support of regional allies in dealing with
Egypt’s nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. When Kissinger en-
tered the White House as Nixon’s national security adviser, in 1969,

Martin Indyk
Nasser fit the mold of a revolutionary seeking to disrupt the existing

Middle Eastern order in much the way that Napoleon had challenged
the European order at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In deal-
ing with Nasser’s Soviet-backed gambit, Kissinger eschewed regime
change, a policy pursued by France and the United Kingdom during the
1956 Suez crisis with disastrous results. Instead, he sought to contain
Nasser by promoting a balance of power tipped in favor of the regional
defenders of the status quo: Israel in the heartland of the Middle East
and Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf. The détente that Nixon
and Kissinger developed with the Soviet Union bolstered that balance
because it involved, among other things, a joint commitment by the two
superpowers to maintain stability in the region.
Kissinger recognized that Washington had to address the Arab
states’ demand for justice in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, in
which they lost significant territory to Israel. Neglecting to do so
would threaten the legitimacy of the new Middle Eastern order.
Nevertheless, he assumed that as long as the superpowers main-
tained an equilibrium in the regional balance of power, justice could
be delayed. He badly miscalculated, as the outbreak of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War demonstrated.
In the lead-up to that conflict, Kissinger relied on Israeli and U.S.
intelligence assessments that Egypt would never risk war because a
militarily superior Israel, bolstered by sophisticated U.S. weapons
systems, would rapidly defeat it. That analysis led Kissinger to ig-
nore Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, when he warned repeatedly
that he would go to war if Egypt’s aspirations to regain the territory
it had lost were disregarded. Kissinger brushed aside Sadat’s pro-
nouncements even when they assumed an apocalyptic tone: in one
interview, for example, the Egyptian leader declared, “Everything in
this country is now being mobilized in earnest for the resumption of
the battle, which is now inevitable.”
Still, in 1973, when Egypt invaded the Sinai Peninsula and Syria
attempted to retake the Golan Heights on the holiest day on the Jew-
ish calendar, Kissinger sprang into action with the confidence that his
study of the nineteenth-century European order had provided. His
objective was to adjust the prewar arrangements in a way that the
Middle East’s major players would view as more just and equitable.
He also wanted to position the United States to play the role of the
predominant manipulator of the competing forces in the region.
Order Before Peace
To back his diplomacy with force, Kissinger encouraged Israeli

counteroffensives. When that military pressure helped persuade the
Egyptians and the Soviets to accept his cease-fire conditions, he de-
manded that Israel stop its assault. In particular, he prevented the Is-
rael Defense Forces from destroying the Egyptian Third Army, which
it had surrounded at the end of the war. That enabled Sadat to enter
peace negotiations with his regime—
and his dignity—intact.
Kissinger then seized on the plastic- Kissinger’s peace process
ity of the moment to launch his peace was designed to buy time
process with the aim of keeping Egypt— rather than peace.
the largest and militarily most powerful
Arab state—from joining any future
Arab war coalition. That would render another war between the Jewish
state and the Arab countries impossible. An unmistakable parallel exists
between Kissinger’s approach to Egypt and the way that Metternich and
Castlereagh handled France after Napoleon’s defeat, incorporating it into
the new order rather than punishing it—and thereby converting it from a
revolutionary, revisionist state into a status quo power.
Today, Kissinger would likely use a similar blueprint in dealing with
Iran, the country that most clearly threatens what is left of his U.S.-led
Middle Eastern order. He does not advocate the overthrow of the re-
gime. Rather, he would seek to persuade Iran to abandon its quest to
export its revolution and instead return to more state-like behavior. In
the meantime, Washington should pursue a new equilibrium in which
Iran’s revolutionary impulses are contained and balanced by an alliance
of Sunni states cooperating with Israel and the United States. Once Iran
decides to play by the rules, however, Kissinger believes the United
States needs to act as the balancer, positioning itself closer to all the
contending Middle Eastern powers than they are to one another. “Pur-
suing its own strategic objectives,” Kissinger says, “the United States can
be a crucial factor—perhaps the crucial factor—in determining whether
Iran pursues the path of revolutionary Islam or that of a great nation
legitimately and importantly lodged in the Westphalian system of states.”
BEWARE OF AIMING TOO HIGH

Because he was operating in an environment of retrenchment, Kissinger
was deeply aware of the dangers of overreach. But as he notes in A World
Restored, “It is not balance which inspires men but universality, not secu-

Martin Indyk
rity but immortality.” And as he detailed in his monumental book Diplo-

macy, published in 1994, American statesmen rarely understand or
respect the rules of the game that his conception of international order
requires. Their idealism is often driven by a sense of divine providence,
especially when it comes to the Middle East. They imagine that pursu-
ing peace and nation building are not only desirable but achievable and
that the only problem is coming up with the right formula. Herein lies
the dilemma at the heart of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. As
Kissinger understood, the maintenance of order requires a credible ef-
fort to resolve the region’s conflicts, but the scale of the statesman’s
ambition can end up destabilizing that order.
Consider how Nixon’s first instinct was to work with the Soviet
Union to impose peace on their recalcitrant Middle Eastern clients.
In the middle of the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger flew off to Moscow
to negotiate the terms of a cease-fire with the Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev. En route, he received explicit instructions from Nixon to
“go all out” to achieve a just settlement “now” and to work with
Brezhnev to “bring the necessary pressure on our respective friends.”
This threatened to upend Kissinger’s more modest strategy for a
cease-fire followed by direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Furious,
he ignored the president’s instructions. He was able to do so because
Nixon sent this message just as he was ordering the firing of Ar-
chibald Cox, the Watergate special prosecutor. The ensuing “Satur-
day Night Massacre”—in which two top officials from the Justice
Department resigned rather than carry out Nixon’s order—led con-
gressional leaders to initiate the impeachment of the president. With
all attention on U.S. domestic politics, Kissinger was able to pursue
his own priorities in the Middle East.
He managed a similar feat under Nixon’s successor, Ford. When
negotiations between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
broke down in February 1975, Ford wanted to convene a conference in
Geneva with the Soviet Union to impose a comprehensive peace set-
tlement on Israel and its Arab neighbors. Kissinger headed that initia-
tive off in favor of a return to his shuttle diplomacy, which brought
Egypt and Israel closer to their eventual peace deal.
U.S. presidents who came after Nixon and Ford also tended to
pursue their idealistic objectives for the Middle East with insufficient
concern for maintaining the regional order that Kissinger had estab-
lished. President Jimmy Carter resurrected the idea of working with
Order Before Peace
the Soviet Union in reconvening the Geneva Conference to impose a

comprehensive peace. This time it was Sadat who headed off the
American president, with his trip to Jerusalem in November 1977. At
Camp David a year later, a chastened Carter pursued a separate
Egyptian-Israeli peace deal rather than a comprehensive settlement
that would have included a resolution of the Palestinian problem.
More than two decades later, however, Clinton acceded to Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s insistence on an attempt to reach a
deal to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at Camp David in July
2000, abandoning the Kissingerian step-by-step process that Rabin
had introduced in the Oslo accords. The Palestinian leader Yasir
Arafat understood that Barak and Clinton intended to impose a fi-
nal resolution on the Palestinians, and he refused to go along. It was
a short step from there to the outbreak of the second Palestinian
intifada and the ensuing Israeli crackdown, a violent conflagration
that lasted for five years, led to the deaths of thousands, and de-
stroyed all trust between the two parties. Nevertheless, U.S. Presi-
dents Barack Obama and Donald Trump would later both try and
fail to produce conflict-ending agreements.
Bush resisted the siren song of comprehensive peacemaking but
succumbed to the urge for what Kissinger had long ago dubbed “im-
mortality.” After toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam
Hussein in Iraq, he announced a “freedom agenda” in the Middle
East, declaring that promoting democracy across the region “must be
a focus of American policy for decades to come.” The result was a dis
aster, serving mostly to pave the way for an Iranian bid for domi-
nance in Iraq and across the region. Bush also shifted the U.S. objective
in Afghanistan from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency and na-
tion building. That decision, too, produced failure and humiliation.
Twenty years later, it was left to the nonagenarian Kissinger to point
out that “the military objectives [had] been too absolute and unattain-
able and the political ones too abstract and elusive.”
THE DANGER OF AIMING TOO LOW

Unlike the American policymakers who came after him, Kissinger was
determined to avoid overreaching in the Middle East. But there were
several instances when his caution and skepticism led him to under-
reach. That is the danger that President Joe Biden also faces in the
Middle East now that he has ended the war in Afghanistan.

Martin Indyk
For Kissinger, the first instance of aiming too low came in July 1972,
when Sadat suddenly announced the expulsion of 20,000 Soviet military
advisers from Egypt. That was something Kissinger had called for two
years earlier. But when it happened, Kissinger felt no need to respond.
Sadat was disappointed. Five days before he announced the expul-
sion, he had sent a message to Kissinger expressing his desire to dis-
patch a special envoy to Washington. It would take seven months for
Kissinger to arrange a meeting with Hafez Ismail, Sadat’s national
security adviser. Ismail’s presentation captured Kissinger’s interest.
The Egyptian envoy explained that his country was ready to move
quickly, ahead of the other Arab states, and would even countenance
an Israeli security presence remaining in Sinai provided that Israel
recognized Egyptian sovereignty in the area.
Yet when Kissinger briefed Rabin, who was then Meir’s ambassa-
dor in Washington, the Israeli dismissed Ismail’s offer as “nothing
new.” Meir also rejected it, and Kissinger quietly dropped the idea.
Ismail met Kissinger again in May but came away from the meeting
believing that only a crisis would change Kissinger’s calculus. Four
months later, Sadat launched the Yom Kippur War.
Whether a more active response from Kissinger would have headed
off the war is unknowable. What is clear is that he underreached because
of his mistaken confidence in the stability of the equilibrium that he had
established. He had overlooked in practice something he had recognized
in theory: the stability of any international system depended “on the
degree to which its components feel secure and the extent to which they
agree on the ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ of existing arrangements.” That is
why, after the war, he resolved to address the justice deficit by launching
direct negotiations to produce Israeli withdrawals from Arab territory.
Justice for the Palestinians, however, was not on Kissinger’s agenda,
because they were represented by the plo, which was then an irreden-
tist nonstate actor deploying terrorist tactics in an effort to overthrow
the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan and replace the Jewish state. He
preferred to leave the Palestinian problem to Israel and Jordan. In this
case, his caution led him to miss an opportunity that arose in 1974 to
promote Jordan’s role in addressing Palestinian claims. That was the
last moment when the Palestinian problem might have been tackled
in a state-to-state negotiation between Israel and Jordan.
At the time, Jordan had a special relationship with the West Bank
Palestinians, who were its citizens. Thanks in part to the British, the
Order Before Peace
Hashemite Kingdom also had functioning government institutions,

including a reliable army and an effective intelligence organization.
Unlike the PLO, which entered the peace process in 1993 with no
government institutions, Jordan could have ensured the implementa-
tion of any agreement reached with Israel, as it has done with its own
peace treaty obligations. And from there, a confederation between a
Palestinian state on the West Bank
and the Hashemite Kingdom on the
East Bank could have evolved. Kissinger was determined
To achieve that, Kissinger would to avoid overreaching in
have had to pursue a disengagement the Middle East.
agreement between Israel and Jordan
after he concluded the agreements
between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria. King Hussein was
eager to regain a foothold in the West Bank, and the Israelis were will-
ing to engage and even show some flexibility. But Kissinger repeat-
edly avoided involvement in the effort. He encouraged Hussein to
deal directly with the Israelis, which the king did. Kissinger warned
the Israelis that if they didn’t respond, they would end up having to
deal with the PLO—a prescient prediction. But then, he repeatedly
insisted that there would be no pressure from him and “no reason for
[the United States] to be an intermediary.”
Without American engagement, the Israelis and the Jordanians were
unable to reach an agreement. And in October 1974, at its summit in
Rabat, Morocco, the Arab League declared the PLO “the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people,” thereby putting an end to the
chance of resolving the Palestinian problem in a Jordanian context. Sub-
sequently, Kissinger candidly admitted he had made “a big mistake.”
He had his reasons. Although he liked the king, he didn’t view Jor-
dan as a major player in the Middle East, and he thought that meant
he did not need to make diplomatic exertions on its behalf. Instead,
he devoted himself to a second Egyptian-Israeli agreement, because
removing Egypt from the conflict with Israel was his overriding stra-
tegic objective. Pursuing a Jordanian option would have interfered
with that endeavor, would have possibly provoked conflict between
Jordan and the PLO, and would have brought up the question of who
would control Jerusalem, an extremely contentious issue that he
sought to avoid at all costs. Kissinger’s belief in a hierarchy of power
helped him establish priorities, but it also meant that he paid too lit-

Martin Indyk
tle attention to the way less powerful states and even nonstate actors
could disrupt his hard-won order if the system he helped coax into
place could not provide them with at least a modicum of justice.
WARNING SIGNS AHEAD

Kissinger’s missteps and achievements can provide valuable lessons
for Biden as he deals with the Middle East in the aftermath of the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As Biden shifts his attention to
more pressing priorities elsewhere, the goal of his Middle East diplo-
macy should be to shape an American-supported regional order in
which the United States is no longer the dominant player, even as it
remains the most influential. At its core, that order will need a balance
of power maintained through U.S. support for its regional allies,
namely Israel and the Sunni Arab states.
But Biden will also need to work with actors willing to play con-
structive roles in stabilizing the Middle Eastern order. That will make
for some strange and uncomfortable bedfellows, as it will involve co-
operating with Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Gaza, with Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo-
gan in Syria, with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman in the Gulf, and with all of them to contain Iran’s hegemonic
ambitions and advancing nuclear program.
Few of these allies and partners will comport themselves according
to U.S. values. Nevertheless, as Kissinger’s experience in the Middle
East demonstrates, the United States will need to promote a sufficient
sense of justice and fairness to legitimize the emerging order. Across
the region, people are crying out for accountable governments. The
United States cannot hope to meet those demands. That would be to
overreach again. But it cannot ignore them, either.
Similarly, promoting a peace process that ameliorates the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict will be important in addressing the region’s griev-
ances. That is far down on Biden’s list of priorities. In 2014, as vice
president, he witnessed firsthand the unwillingness of Israeli and Pales-
tinian leaders alike to take reasonable risks for peace, and he does not
imagine that he will find immortality by trying to force them to do so.
He accepts Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s argument that
Israel’s left-right coalition government could not survive a peace process
requiring the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza. Like Kissinger in 1973, Biden assumes that the status quo is stable.
Order Before Peace
And like Kissinger in 1974, he sees the Palestinian problem as Israel’s to

deal with and will tend to brush aside any pressure to try to resolve it.
But the warning signs are there. The Palestinian Authority is near
collapse: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has lost all credibil-
ity among the Palestinian people, whereas Hamas—with its doctrine
of violent resistance—is gaining popularity. The Taliban victory in
Afghanistan will boost Hamas’s argument that its strategy is the only
way to liberate Palestinian territory. Moreover, Palestinian deaths
from confrontations with the Israeli army are rising at an alarming
rate, and for the first time, the Israeli government is permitting Jew-
ish prayer on what is known as the Temple Mount to Jews and Haram
al-Sharif to Muslims—a highly inflammatory move. The tinder is so
dry that even a simple jailbreak by six Palestinian prisoners in Sep-
tember risked sparking another uprising.
For years, American policymakers have warned that the Israeli-
Palestinian status quo is unsustainable—and yet it seems to sustain itself.
Experts cautioned against moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, but
when Trump did it, nothing happened. It feels just like the 1970s,
when, for years, Sadat threatened war, and nothing happened—until
one day it did. To minimize the potential for an explosion of violence,
Biden will need to encourage an incremental Israeli-Palestinian peace
process to rebuild trust and promote practical coexistence, just as
Kissinger did in his efforts to remove Egypt from the conflict with
Israel. Bennett has proposed economic changes, such as permitting
more Palestinians to work in Israel, as an initial step. Moves such as
that alone, however, will be insufficient to give credibility to a process
that has been so denigrated by past failures. The effort requires a po-
litical process, too, albeit a modest and realistic one that could include
a long-term cease-fire in Gaza and the transfer of some more territory
in stages to full Palestinian control in the West Bank.
In the aftermath of the pullout from Afghanistan, Biden is unlikely
to overreach in the Middle East. But as Kissinger could tell him, it
would also be a mistake for him to turn his back on it.∂

The International
Order Isn’t Ready for
the Climate Crisis
The Case for a New Planetary Politics
Stewart M. Patrick
T
he planet is in the throes of an environmental emergency.
Humanity’s continued addiction to fossil fuels and its vora-
cious appetite for natural resources have led to runaway cli-
mate change, degraded vital ecosystems, and ushered in the slow death
of the world’s oceans. Earth’s biosphere is breaking down. Our depre-
dation of the planet has jeopardized our own survival.
Given these risks, it is shocking that the multilateral system has
failed to respond more forcefully and has instead merely tinkered at
the margins. Although the United States and the European Union
have adopted measures to slow the pace of global warming—by set-
ting more aggressive greenhouse gas reduction targets, for example—
nothing guarantees that they will adhere to those pledges, and such
steps do little to encourage decarbonization in China, India, and other
major emitters. These efforts also fail to address other facets of the
looming catastrophe, not least collapsing biodiversity.
The natural world obeys no sovereign boundaries, and neither does
the worsening ecological crisis. It is time to take bold steps to over-
come the disconnect between an international system divided into 195
independent countries, each operating according to its own impera-
tives, and a global calamity that cannot be resolved in a piecemeal
fashion. It is time to govern the world as if the earth mattered. What
the world needs is a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy and inter-
national relations—a shift that is rooted in ecological realism and that
STEWART M. PATRICK is James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis
moves cooperation on shared environmental threats to center stage.

Call this new worldview “planetary politics.” All governments, start-
ing with Washington, must designate the survival of the biosphere as
a core national interest and a central objective of national and interna-
tional security—and organize and invest accordingly.
A shift to planetary politics will require a new, shared understand-
ing of the duties of sovereign states, serious commitments to sustain-
able development and investment, and innovative international
institutions. World leaders will need to adopt a new ethic of environ-
mental stewardship and expand their conceptions of sovereign obliga-
tions to include a responsibility to protect the global commons.
Governments, businesses, and communities will need to value and
account for the earth’s natural capital rather than taking it for granted
and exploiting it to depletion. Finally, national governments will need
to overhaul and strengthen the institutional and legal foundations for
international environmental cooperation. The United States is in a
position to lead this charge—indeed, any such effort will fall short
unless Washington is in the vanguard.
IN OUR BEST INTEREST

The devastating environmental impact of human activity is hardly a
secret. A parade of recent reports from groups such as the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change and the World Wide Fund for Nature
document the scope of our assault on the planet and portend a future of
searing heat, raging wildfires, acidifying oceans, violent storms, rising
seas, and mass migration. Meanwhile, human activity has imperiled
biodiversity as people despoil lands and waters, introduce invasive spe-
cies, and harvest natural resources unsustainably. The figures are sober-
ing: since 1970, wild vertebrate populations have declined by over 60
percent, and insect populations have declined by 45 percent. And the
damage is not confined to fauna alone. Extractive industries, such as
agriculture, ranching, logging, and mining, have scarred the surface of
the planet, in some places irreparably. Every year, the world loses an
area of tropical forest the size of Costa Rica. Today, some one million
plant and animal species face near-term extinction.
Our own species is suffering, too. Hundreds of millions of people
around the world face mounting food insecurity and a lack of reliable
water supplies. And as humans and domesticated animals increasingly
encroach on and disrupt biodiverse ecosystems and encounter once iso-

Stewart M. Patrick
lated species, we are exposed to dangerous new viruses: in recent dec

ades, scientists have documented more than 200 zoonotic pathogens
that have leaped from wild animals to people, including the Ebola vi-
rus, the virus that causes sars, and likely the virus that causes covid-19.
Things are poised to get worse. Despite a declining fertility rate,
the human population will not plateau until at least 2060, and the
rise of aspiring middle classes around the world will add to the eco-
logical strains. As we plunder the planet, we risk rendering it unin-
habitable—a crisis that cries out for global solidarity and collective
action. Yet most countries continue to treat ecological challenges as
second-tier foreign policy priorities distinct from presumably
weightier matters, such as geopolitical competition, arms control,
and international trade. The results are predictable: what passes for
global environmental governance is a patchwork of weak, sector-
specific agreements overseen by underpowered bodies that are unable
to enforce compliance. The fate of the planet largely depends on a
hodgepodge of uncoordinated national pledges driven by short-term
domestic political and economic considerations.
The global environmental crisis requires a new statecraft built around
the proposition that every other state concern—from national security
to economic growth—depends on a healthy, stable biosphere. This revi-
talized framework would not jettison the core concept of national inter-
est but broaden it to include environmental security and conservation.
Foreign policy traditionalists may recoil at such a reframing, worried
about distracting diplomats and defense officials from the threats that
have directly affected the survival of states throughout most of history.
But the ecological crisis has changed the nature of those threats.
U.S. President Joe Biden seems to grasp this truth. In a historic
executive order issued one week after his inauguration, Biden declared
climate change to be a top-tier threat to the United States and di-
rected U.S. federal agencies to lead an unprecedented, whole-of-
government response to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt
to global warming. Three months later, Avril Haines, the U.S. director
of national intelligence, told world leaders assembled at a virtual cli-
mate conference that climate change “must be at the center of a coun-
try’s national security and foreign policy.”
Rhetoric is easy, of course. The Biden administration must now
inculcate this new approach across the entire executive branch and
work with Congress to revise a gargantuan U.S. national security
We did start the fire: fighting the Caldor blaze, Grizzly Flats, California, August 2021
budget that is still overwhelmingly oriented toward countering tradi-
tional geopolitical and military threats. It must simultaneously col-
laborate with foreign partners on a multilateral response to slow and
reverse environmental collapse.
WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS

If the United States is serious about spearheading the global re-
sponse to the planet’s ecological emergency, it should start by work-
ing with other countries to remold traditional concepts of sovereignty.
Washington can begin this process by explicitly endorsing the idea
that countries have a responsibility to protect the earth, obliging
them to refrain from any activity that might fundamentally alter or
damage environmental systems.
No such consensus exists today, as demonstrated by the row that
F R E D G R E AV E S / R E U T E R S
erupted between Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and French Pres-

ident Emmanuel Macron in 2019, as tens of thousands of fires en-
gulfed the Amazon rainforest. Macron accused Bolsonaro of
“ecocide”: by allowing the world’s largest forest to be exploited by
rapacious loggers, ranchers, farmers, and miners, Macron argued,
Bolsonaro was committing a crime against the planet. The enraged

Stewart M. Patrick
Brazilian leader blasted his French counterpart and charged him with
treating Brazil as if it were “a colony or a no man’s land.”
Two rival conceptions of sovereignty underpinned this clash. Ac-
cording to Bolsonaro, Brazil has an absolute right to develop the Am-
azon as it sees fit. “Our sovereignty is nonnegotiable,” his spokesperson
declared. Macron retorted that all of humanity has a stake in the rain-
forest’s survival. The world is a stakeholder, not a bystander, and can-
not remain silent as Brazil despoils this indispensable carbon sink,
irreplaceable oxygen source, and precious repository of plant and ani-
mal life. The core debate, as Richard Haass, the president of the
Council on Foreign Relations, has pointed out, is whether Brazil
should be considered the rainforest’s “owner” or merely its “custo-
dian.” More leaders and societies must come to accept Macron’s view
and reject that of Bolsonaro. Territorial sovereignty should not constitute
a blank check to plunder collective resources.
WHAT IS THE EARTH WORTH?

Such a shift in thinking is entirely conceivable. Understandings of
sovereignty have never been fixed or absolute: they are continually
being contested, negotiated, and adapted, and the belief that sover-
eignty entails obligations as well as privileges is now widely accepted.
As all the member states of the United Nations agreed at the World
Summit in 2005, for instance, governments have a responsibility to
protect their inhabitants from mass atrocities. If they fail to do so,
they may forfeit the right to avoid foreign intervention.
The twin crises of climate change and collapsing biodiversity war-
rant a similar adjustment. Under an existing international principle
known as “the no-harm rule,” sovereign states already have a general
obligation not to damage the environment in areas beyond their ju-
risdiction. But this law has proved difficult to enforce: there is little
consensus on what exactly constitutes transnational environmental
damage, what state obligations should look like, or when they should
kick in. These questions are becoming trickier as potential sources
of damage become more complex. As the planet’s ecological emer-
gency deepens, countries must expand the definition of the global
commons—shared resources managed as part of humanity’s com-
mon heritage—to include all critical ecosystems and natural cycles.
They must agree to forswear all activities that threaten the integ-
rity of the biosphere, open themselves up to external scrutiny,
allow others to monitor and verify their compliance, and face sanc-
tions and other penalties should they violate this commitment.
Protecting this expanded commons will require putting a price on
nature. For too long, humans have readily invested in produced capital
(buildings, roads, machines, software) and human capital (education,
health care) while running down the natural capital that sustains life
and provides the foundation for all
prosperity. We have taken the natural
world for granted and assumed that The natural world obeys no
technological innovation and market sovereign boundaries, and
incentives would free us from the re-
source constraints of a finite planet. neither does the worsening
Such attitudes are no longer tenable. ecological crisis.
According to the UN Environment
Program, the planet’s total stock of
natural capital has declined by 40 percent on a per capita basis since
1992. Reversing this trend will require reworking the current under-
standing of wealth to include the value of the world’s natural assets
and the myriad benefits they provide. In January 2020, the World
Economic Forum estimated that over half of global output—$44 tril-
lion per year—is highly or moderately dependent on benefits from
nature that are increasingly in jeopardy. Another study, published in
2014, has placed the total annual value of the planet’s ecosystem ser-
vices—water filtration, nutrient cycling, pollination, carbon seques-
tration, and so on—at between $125 trillion and $145 trillion.
Most environmentalists, however, resist placing a monetary value on
nature, citing its intrinsic worth. But failing to do so encourages firms
and individuals to take ecosystem services for granted and to exploit
them to exhaustion. The result is market failure in the form of environ-
mental costs borne not by the participants in any specific exchange but
by society as a whole (what economists call “negative externalities”).
A related problem is the fact that GDP, the conventional measure of
wealth and progress, does not account for natural capital, making it a
poor indicator of well-being and long-term productive capacity. The
international community must work to develop metrics that can ac-
count for environmental assets. Approximately 89 countries, includ-
ing all the members of the EU, have released natural capital accounts
to keep track of such assets and to promote transparency regarding
their use. The United States should do the same.

Stewart M. Patrick
Governments must also adopt regulations and create incentives for

firms to assume the ecological costs of their market behavior, rather
than passing them along to society. The economist Partha Dasgupta
has estimated that the annual global cost of all environmentally dam-
aging subsidies (including for agriculture, fisheries, fuel, and water) is
somewhere between $4 trillion and $6 trillion. By contrast, govern-
ments devote only $68 billion annually to global conservation and
sustainability—about what their citizens spend every year on ice
cream. National authorities can also use taxes and fees to ensure that
the prices of goods and services accurately capture the social value of
the natural assets involved in their production, and they can employ
sector-specific market mechanisms to encourage environmental con-
servation. For example, measures such as catch share schemes, whereby
communities have a secure right to harvest a capped number of fish in
a specific area, can effectively combat overfishing.
A robust framework for natural capital accounting could also help
justify compensating developing countries that are rich in biodiversity,
such as Bolivia and Indonesia, to protect or restore local ecosystems
and their services. There are small-scale precedents for this kind of in-
vestment—when authorities pay landowners to preserve watersheds or
give tax breaks to farmers who plant carbon-sequestering cover crops.
But more significant international efforts are underway: the Biden ad-
ministration, for instance, is working to negotiate a multibillion-dollar
deal with Brazil to preserve a portion of the Amazon rainforest.
The global financial system must also play a bigger role in environ-
mental stewardship. Some national financial regulators, including the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are moving toward man-
dating corporate disclosures of exposure to climate risks so that inves-
tors are aware of the vulnerability of firms to the environmental shocks
of a warming planet. International financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank now encourage
partner governments to inventory their natural capital assets and
adopt policies and laws to protect them. A sea change is also under-
way in the private sector: BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, and other ma-
jor players have pledged to integrate sustainability into their
investment decisions. The practical challenge, of course, is to distin-
guish between credible corporate responses and greenwashing cam-
paigns, which are merely intended to burnish a company’s public
image. Environmental advocacy organizations, such as Greenpeace
and the Natural Resources Defense Council, can help hold companies
accountable by exposing hollow commitments and raising the specter
of consumer boycotts and other forms of civic activism to persuade
them that harming nature is a threat to their bottom lines.
THE PATH FORWARD

Planetary politics cannot succeed without multilateral institutions
and global governance that can foster the unprecedented international
cooperation demanded by the intertwined climate and biodiversity
crises. The most pressing near-term priority is to close the yawning
gap between the desultory negotiating process hosted by the un and
the stark reality outlined by the organization’s own Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, which envisions catastrophic warming un-
less the world takes immediate, dramatic steps to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. There is no conceivable way for the world to meet the
emission targets established by the un’s 2015 Paris climate accord,
however, without massive investments in terrestrial and marine eco-
systems capable of serving as carbon storehouses. Accordingly, gov-
ernments should make expanding such carbon sinks a centerpiece of
their contributions to the Paris goals.
Trade is another area in which global governance must adapt. One
path forward would be to reform global trade rules to allow countries
committed to decarbonization to discriminate against countries that
insist on conducting business as usual, without running afoul of the
World Trade Organization. The most effective solution would be for
wto members to adopt a blanket climate waiver that permits so-
called border adjustments for carbon in the form of taxes on imports
and rebates on exports. This would permit eu countries, for instance,
to penalize imports of carbon-intensive cement from Russia and Tur-
key and reward other trading partners that use greener production
methods. Such an arrangement would encourage the formation of
“climate clubs,” made up of countries committed to reducing emis-
sions and thus eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment.
Development models will also need to shift. Poor countries need
the backing of international partners to come up with policies and in-
centive structures that will encourage private actors and communities
to conserve nature. Extractive industries, such as timber and mining,
often damage the ecosystems of developing nations that rely on the
export of primary goods and have weak environmental regulations.

Stewart M. Patrick
The harm is usually suffered by the local inhabitants rather than by the
companies or consumers. The World Bank and other donors can pro-
vide technical assistance to give governments in developing countries
an accurate picture of the full costs of
such environmental degradation so
The global ecological that they can begin to hold corporate
emergency is the greatest perpetrators to account and force
them to shoulder the burden of these
collective-action challenge costs. Finally, the United States and
we have ever faced. other rich countries can encourage
nature-friendly development by de-
voting a greater share of bilateral and
multilateral aid to global conservation efforts and, more generally, con-
ditioning their assistance on sustainable environmental policies—
much as the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation makes access to
its financial resources contingent on good governance.
Simultaneously, countries should strengthen the international legal
framework for biodiversity conservation, particularly the Convention
on Biological Diversity. Although that treaty has failed to slow the loss
of ecosystems and species, some hope is on the horizon. In late 2020,
Costa Rica and France established an intergovernmental group known
as the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People, which seeks to
permanently protect 30 percent of the planet’s terrestrial and marine
surface by 2030. Scores of governments have since committed to the
so-called 30x30 target, which is slated for approval at the CBD’s confer-
ence in the spring of 2022. The Biden administration has already em-
braced 30x30 as a domestic goal; there is no reason why it should not
join the global campaign. It should also end the United States’ outlier
status as the only country in the world that has refused to ratify the
CBD by submitting it to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent.
The Biden administration should also work to engineer the success-
ful conclusion of a UN high seas biodiversity convention, which is cur-
rently in the final stages of negotiation. The agreement would establish
a framework to conserve and sustainably manage the living marine
resources and ecosystems lying beyond national jurisdictions—a vast
global commons that accounts for 43 percent of the planet’s surface.
The high seas are a remarkable source of biodiversity and protect hu-
manity from the worst effects of climate change by absorbing enor-
mous amounts of heat and carbon dioxide. But their health is declining
dramatically, as new technologies permit their unprecedented exploi-

tation and a patchwork of regulations fail to protect them. The pro-
longed negotiations and lingering disputes over the details of this
convention highlight the challenges of international collaboration. But
Washington is well placed to broker agreements on new rules to gov-
ern marine protected areas, environmental impact assessments, and
the sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources.
Finally, the United States should throw its support behind the
Global Pact for the Environment, which has been the subject of un
discussions since 2018 and would help bring coherence to the frag-
mented legal order of environmental protections. In contrast to the
global trading system, which grants the wto pride of place as a rule
setter and adjudicator, there is no overarching international legal
framework or organization governing global environmental matters.
Instead, hundreds of overlapping and conflicting multilateral treaties
promote cooperation on specific issues, such as endangered species and
hazardous waste, as if environmental concerns could be effectively
tackled one at a time. The Global Pact would codify a sovereign obliga-
tion to ensure that state and private actions do not harm other coun-
tries or the global commons and establish a fundamental human right
to a clean and healthy environment. The pact would elevate prevention
and provide a measure of restorative justice by endorsing the principle
that polluters should pay for environmental degradation. To hold gov-
ernments accountable, the convention would include provisions for
periodic reporting, establish rules for liability, and provide mechanisms
for the peaceful resolution of transboundary environmental disputes.
Despite overwhelming international support, multilateral negotia-
tions on the pact collapsed in the spring of 2019, thanks in part to
opposition from the Trump administration. The Biden administra-
tion should explicitly disavow its predecessor’s position and join on-
going efforts within the un Environment Assembly to negotiate a
nonbinding political declaration on the global environment as a prel
ude to an eventual global pact. The example of the 1948 un Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which inspired a dozen-odd treaties,
shows that even informal declarations can lay important groundwork
for more formal international conventions.
One should have no illusions, of course, about the enormous legisla-
tive obstacles standing in the way of U.S. ratification of the cbd, a high
seas convention, or the Global Pact. The United States has often opted

Stewart M. Patrick
out of treaties—even those it spearheaded and drafted—and today’s in-

tense partisan ideological divisions may encourage this tendency. Nev-
ertheless, the experience of the un Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which the United States championed and now mostly treats as custom-
ary international law (despite never having ratified it), suggests that the
Biden administration should seize this moment to help shape the evolv-
ing legal framework of international environmental cooperation.
BRIDGING THE GAP

The global ecological emergency is the greatest collective-action
challenge we have ever faced. Bringing humanity back into balance
with the biosphere will require a fundamental shift in how the poli-
tics and purposes of foreign policy are conceived. It will require re
imagining our place on the earth.
Consider the atlases we use to depict our planet. They usually open
with two distinct maps. The first map, a geophysical one, captures the
world in its natural state, revealing a startling array of biomes and
ecosystems—rainforests and savannas, steppes and taigas, mountains
and glaciers, river valleys and deserts, icecaps and tundras, remote
atolls and barrier reefs, continental shelves and deep-sea trenches—
shading into and overlapping with one another. The second map, a
geopolitical one, depicts the earth’s terrestrial surface carved into in-
dependent territorial units indicated by precise lines, each colored
distinctly from its neighbors.
The first map is an accurate representation of the planet. The sec-
ond map, with its artificially imposed borders, is akin to a work of
fiction—and yet people tend to treat it as more important. The crisis
of the biosphere has forced a collision of those two maps, exposing the
tension between an integrated natural world and a divided global pol-
ity and demanding that we reconcile the two.
National sovereignty is not going anywhere, but a new interna-
tional approach could help close the distance between the political
and the natural world. If a crisis of this magnitude cannot reshape
how countries formulate their national interests, definitions of inter-
national security, or approaches to the global economy, perhaps noth-
ing will. But this predicament does not call for resignation. It cries
out, instead, for a commitment to our role as stewards of the only
planet we have. It cries out for planetary politics.∂
REVIEWS & RESPONSES

The small-government,
low-tax economy that
Milton Friedman and
others imagined and
brought into being is
finally slipping
from power.
– Felicia Wong
Market Prophets The Imperial Presidency’s Enablers

LUCY NICHOLSON / REUTERS
Felicia Wong 178 Stephen I. Vladeck 195
How Apartheid Endures Recent Books 203

Sisonke Msimang 184
Letters to the Editor 230
Liars in High Places
Jameel Jaffer 190
Milton Friedman. Samuelson was a

Market Prophets Keynesian, best known for his work on
the so-called neoclassical synthesis,
which advocated a measure of govern-
The Path to a New Economics ment intervention in the economy.
Friedman, by contrast, was a one-time
Felicia Wong New Dealer who by the 1950s had
become perhaps the most pugilistic and
passionate libertarian of his day.
Samuelson Friedman: The Battle Over the Amid a global pandemic, there is
Free Market much to learn from the Samuelson-
BY NICHOLAS WAPSHOT T. Norton, Friedman saga. Today, as in the 1960s
2021, 384 pp. and 1970s, the assumptions of a previ-
ous era are falling away. The small-
A
fter taking office in the depths government, low-tax economy that
of the Great Depression, U.S. Friedman and others imagined and
President Franklin Roosevelt brought into being is finally slipping from
quickly upended the relationship power. Not only is the American public
between the government and the questioning old beliefs—that markets
economy. With the New Deal, Wash- are best when they are free and govern-
ington took the unprecedented step of ments are best when they are small—
creating new industries and millions of but experts from across the political
jobs. This spending rescued countless spectrum are also increasingly admit-
Americans from poverty and ultimately ting that these assumptions have proved
fueled the remarkable postwar eco- false. COVID-19 has put into sharp relief
nomic boom. By the 1980s, however, a something the economic data have long
new bipartisan consensus had taken suggested: a laissez-faire system pro-
hold, one that saw small government duces rising inequality rather than
and low taxes as the key to economic shared prosperity. With these deeply
prosperity. In 1941, Roosevelt declared held convictions under assault, leaders
that every American deserved “freedom have a crucial opportunity to design a
from want” and that it was the govern- more equitable economy.
ment’s responsibility to lead the way.
But by 1996, President Bill Clinton was GREAT MEN
promising that “the era of big govern- Wapshott begins his book in the mid-
ment is over.” What changed? 1960s, with the story of the Newsweek
Nicholas Wapshott’s new book, editor Osborn Elliott’s quest for new
Samuelson Friedman, tells that story— columnists who could outshine the
the victory of 1980s free-market liber- magazine’s stodgy rival, Henry Luce’s
tarianism over the midcentury welfare Time. Perhaps great economists com-
state—as a battle between two eco- menting on the news of the day would
nomic titans, Paul Samuelson and appeal to his younger audience.
FELICIA WONG is President and CEO of the Elliott felt lucky to secure Samuel-
Roosevelt Institute. son, the greatest theoretical economist
Market Prophets
of his time. He was also the author of a market system could regulate itself
what has become the best-selling without external intervention. Fried-
economics textbook of all time, first man believed that his unfettered
published in 1948 and titled simply version of capitalism, free from nearly
Economics. Samuelson, who had been all forms of government interference,
made a full professor at the Massachu- was synonymous with both economic
setts Institute of Technology at the age and political freedom. Samuelson, by
of 32, needed neither the headache nor contrast, maintained until the end of
the income that writing a magazine his life that “there can be no solution
column could bring, but he was seduced without government.”
by the idea of reaching Newsweek’s 14 Samuelson Friedman subscribes to the
million weekly readers. Elliott also tried great man theory (gender intentional)
to sign up Friedman, a conservative of intellectual history. In Wapshott’s
libertarian at the University of Chicago narrative, the two economists represent
who was an outsider to the Keynesian- almost the entirety of the debate
ism that dominated midcentury eco- between Keynesianism, a shorthand for
nomic thinking in the United States. active government management of the
Friedman initially refused Elliott, economy through fiscal policy, and
saying he was too busy. But Friedman’s libertarian-inflected monetarism, by
wife, Rose, pressed the case. “The task which central banks and the money
of explaining the relationship between supply take center stage. The intellec-
political freedom, for example, and a tual networks to which Samuelson and
free-market economy . . . has not been Friedman belonged get short shrift.
performed very well,” she wrote in a This is a fundamental omission. Fried-
1976 article for The Oriental Economist. man, for instance, was a founder, along
(Wapshott’s storytelling could have used with Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von
more from Rose Friedman. A distin- Mises, Karl Popper, and others, of the
guished economist in her own right and Mont Pelerin Society—an influential
a co-author of much of Milton Fried- group that originally developed and
man’s work, she was responsible for propagated the idea of neoliberalism.
turning a collection of speeches into her Such networks provide vital intellec-
husband’s most influential popular text, tual, social, and political support to
Capitalism and Freedom.) their members, helping their ideas gain
Samuelson and Friedman joined acceptance and legitimacy. Wapshott
Newsweek in 1966 and wrote for the pays a little more attention to the power
magazine until the early 1980s. of select academic institutions—such as
Throughout their tenure, both thinkers mit, the University of Chicago, and the
covered the central economic debates of University of Virginia—that educated
the time, including the appropriate generations of students, both Keynes-
level of taxation and the role of the ians and neoliberals. But these institu-
Federal Reserve. As Wapshott docu- tions still take a back seat to Samuelson
ments, however, the two fundamentally and Friedman themselves.
disagreed over central elements of The larger problem is that Wapshott
economic theory—specifically, whether fails to give readers a sense of the times.

Felicia Wong
The 1960s and 1970s were turbulent: version of economics proved to be the
the Vietnam War, the sexual revolution, most compelling. According to that
and the civil rights movement upended version, the right political, moral, and
the United States’ old social, racial, and economic answer was wherever supply
economic orders. Although these met demand. The theory’s moneta
changes were often liberating, the rism—the policy of using the money
accompanying chaos led many middle- supply to influence the whole economy
class white Americans, including instead of relying on complicated legisla-
suburban housewives in the Sunbelt tive decisions around taxing and spend-
and business leaders in the South, to ing—was similarly elegant and apolitical.
reject Samuelson’s vision of federal Friedman’s economic and political
government intervention in favor of arguments were one and the same.
Friedman’s simple and well-ordered Freedom meant limited government.
system of free enterprise. This was the triumph of neoliberalism.
Much of the anxiety stemming from
the changes crystallized in 1964, when STAGFLATION NATION
the Republican presidential candidate The duel between Samuelson and
Barry Goldwater ran on an anticommu- Friedman was perhaps most pointed
nist, economically conservative plat- and pivotal when it came to questions
form, opposing both the welfare state about inflation: what caused it and how
and the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Goldwa- governments could tame it. The infla-
ter cast federal civil rights laws as yet tion of the 1970s remains a cautionary
another instance of unjust state interfer- tale that still animates American poli-
ence in private affairs and, in so doing, tics. The conventional wisdom holds
directly linked Friedman’s small- that the inability of Keynesianism to
government ideas to white southern explain so-called stagflation, a period of
opposition to desegregation. By the end paradoxically low growth and high infla-
of the 1960s, the civil rights movement tion, was the major reason for Samuel-
itself had also begun to explicitly link son’s fall and Friedman’s rise. Stagfla-
race and economics, but in the opposite tion presented a puzzle to which
direction. Martin Luther King, Jr., Keynesians had no answer. Inflation,
proclaimed in 1967 that “the problems which averaged about seven percent
of racial injustice and economic injus- annually throughout the decade, was
tice cannot be solved without a radical not supposed to be possible if unem-
redistribution of political and economic ployment was high and growth sluggish.
power.” The economic fight had become Friedman’s characteristically simple
an explicitly racial one. answer to the problem was for the
The 1960s and 1970s thus pitted Federal Reserve to arrange “a 3 to 5
Samuelson’s New Deal–era vision of percent increase in the stock of money.”
government against Friedman’s business-, Otherwise, too much money would
profit-, and shareholder-focused world- chase after too few goods, causing
view during an era of intense social prices to rise even more.
upheaval. For many white Americans, Wapshott’s narrative is strongest
Friedman’s supposedly politics-free here, revealing just how complicated
and long running the inflation debates
of the 1970s were. Over many years,
Samuelson and Friedman argued about
whether stagflation was caused by
persistently high wages propped up by
union contracts, the costs of the ongo-
ing Vietnam War, or shocks to the
global supply of oil. Even today, the
causes of the inflation of the 1970s
remain the subject of fierce debate.
The solution that Samuelson eventu-
ally proposed was to raise taxes and
maintain high levels of public spending—
remarkable for contemporary economists
accustomed to thinking of increased
interest rates as the only inflation cure.
Friedman, for his part, continued to
advocate a combination of lower public
spending and careful control over the
money supply. By the early 1980s,
Samuelson’s argument for greater spend-
ing had lost. Sharply higher interest rates
and a focus on inflation rather than
employment became the order of the day. After the End of History
Ronald Reagan won the presidency, Conversations
onversations with
having built his political career on a Francis Fukuyama
Friedman-inspired promise to cut taxes Edited by Mathilde Fasting
and a false, racially coded campaign With Francis Fukuyama
against so-called welfare queens—a Intimate access to the mind of Francis Fukuyama
stereotype of Black single mothers raking and his reflections on world politics, his life and
in government checks. Once in office, he career, and the evolution of his thought
cut taxes on the wealthy (while raising “An engaging intellectual journey in which Fukuyama
them for working people) and fought reflects on the global crises and transformations that
against trade unions—famously firing have unfolded in the three decades since his famous
essay on ‘the end of history.’ ” —Foreign Affairs
striking air traffic controllers. The
postwar Keynesian welfare state was “Students of geopolitics and world history will
dead, at least in the United States. find Fukuyama’s thoughts both provocative and
Although the economy was in deep inspiring.”—Kirkus Reviews
recession, the paradigm had shifted. “...Fukuyama provides an interesting counterpoint

For Friedman, however, even this to the current pessimism about the future of
outcome was no victory. Wapshott’s democracy.”—MoneyWeek
description of Friedman’s anguish as

Paul Volcker, then chair of the Federal
Reserve, implemented sharp interest

Felicia Wong
rate hikes in the fall of 1979 contains Now, more than a decade after the
some of the book’s most powerful crisis, something very new is emerging
insights. Friedman, who called Volcker’s at the highest levels of government:
20 percent rate increase “monetarism Brian Deese, the director of the Biden
lite,” had long advocated steady and administration’s National Economic
algorithmically determined changes in Council, has made it clear that the
the money supply, with no discretion current government’s covid-19 eco-
left to the Federal Reserve chair or other nomic recovery plan is “quite different”
political actors. But simple theories, from previous ones. The American
where simplicity itself is the virtue and Rescue Plan, the stimulus package
the appeal, are rarely easy to implement. passed by Congress in March, priori-
Even the highest of economic priests tizes providing funds directly to
bitterly disagree, constrained by their unemployed Americans and struggling
own prior assumptions. states and cities. Austerity, that watch-
word of decades past, is finished.
FRIEDMAN’S LAST DAYS President Joe Biden himself has argued
Americans can learn much from the for a new economic paradigm. “We
1970s. Although it is easy to reduce to a can’t go back to the old, failed think-
simple clash of economic titans the ing,” he proclaimed in July.
rupture that broke Keynesianism and This new paradigm is notably more
brought Reaganomics to power, that complicated than Friedman’s monetarism.
change took more than a decade. The Most mainstream economists, in fact, now
transformation was rooted not in reject the latter for its relentless focus on
individual personalities but in how the amount of money in circulation.
economic theories filter through com- Instead, the emerging framework is about
plex political realities. encouraging the federal government to
Today’s economic paradigm shift has play various roles meant to promote the
also taken place over time, having health of the U.S. economy and society.
begun long before the emergence of Public institutions, its advocates argue,
covid-19, as Wapshott documents. should make and enforce strict rules to
Understanding the current upheaval prevent corporate monopolies, invest in
means examining the policy failures green energy, and spend much more on
that led to the 2008 financial crisis and such public goods as health care, child-
the subsequent recession. Americans’ care, and education. Government
veneration of private capital faltered should also deliberately seek to close
with the collapse of the financial giants racial gaps in wages, wealth, housing,
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Eve education, health, and other areas.
ryday people quickly came to believe Parts of this new vision are already
that these institutions no longer had coming to life. The $4 trillion allocated
their best interests at heart. According for the cares Act and the American
to Gallup polling, public confidence in Rescue Plan—both immediate re-
the banking system dropped from 53 sponses to the pandemic—includes an
percent in 2004 to 22 percent in 2009 unprecedented amount of government
and has never recovered. support for low-income and working-
Market Prophets
class Americans, parents with young international tax evasion or the lack of
children, and small and medium-sized pandemic preparedness, rather than
businesses. Although the relief is merely lower trade barriers for multina-
temporary, it kept the worst effects of tional corporations. More working-class
the recent economic downturn at bay in Americans might finally have access to
ways that were unthinkable only a few economic security rather than living
years ago. Federal rescue funds have paycheck to paycheck. Washington
also driven wage increases, and—absent could incentivize a transition to a
new covid-19-related shutdowns—the low-carbon economy in time to stave off
current recovery is on pace to be five the worst effects of climate change. And
times as fast as the recovery from the perhaps most important, the United
Great Recession: two years, not ten. States might become a country whose
But although the pandemic may be idea of freedom is not primarily based
the final nail in Friedmanomics’s coffin, a on market transactions but instead built
durable world of higher taxes and govern- on the promise of a more egalitarian
ment management of the economy—one and democratic future.∂
that Samuelson might have recognized
and even embraced—has yet to fully
emerge. Whether this new paradigm
takes root the way Keynesianism did in
the 1940s and Friedmanesque market
fundamentalism did in the 1980s will
depend on many factors. “The culture
wars”—a go-to euphemism for the
backlash against racial and gender equal-
ity—could pull the United States away
from acting on truly inclusive policies.
A small but powerful group of climate-
denying politicians might continue to
bury their heads in the sand about the
immediate need to cut carbon emis-
sions. The government’s talent pipeline
and institutional resilience might not be
sufficient to implement the ambitious
programs currently under consideration.
The government itself might be unable
to regain the trust of Americans who,
for a host of reasons, may be suspicious
and distrustful of federal action.
But if U.S. leaders persevere, this
model will open up vast new social and
political possibilities. International
economic cooperation might aspire to
solve genuine public problems, such as

made the rounds on social media. He

How Apartheid had been stopped by two women—both
strangers expressing motherly con-
Endures cern—as he walked out of a shop that
had just been looted. The women asked
the boy what he had taken, and he held
The Betrayal of South Africa up a small plastic bag for their inspec-
tion. Inside were a few pairs of under-
Sisonke Msimang wear, new shoes, and a few T-shirts. He
had been heartbreakingly frugal, taking
only what his conscience would allow.
Prisoners of the Past: South African Visibly moved, the women sent him on
Democracy and the Legacy of his way, his little frame disappearing
Minority Rule into the darkness.
BY STEVEN F RIEDMAN. Wits The scene spoke volumes about the
University Press, 2021, 232 pp. crisis gripping South Africa. Driven by
the sudden availability of items that are
I
n July, two of South Africa’s largest unaffordable for most people, the
cities—Johannesburg and Durban— turmoil reflected the stark inequality
descended into civil unrest and mass that has long divided the country, and it
looting. In the deadliest week of politi- laid bare the economic precariousness
cal turmoil since the end of apartheid in that characterizes most people’s lives.
1994, 337 people were killed, and mil- People took what they could as quickly
lions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure as they could, sometimes trampling
and property was destroyed. others in the process. But they did not
For almost five days, I worried about act out spontaneously: a faction of the
my family as I watched television and ruling African National Congress
social media footage of people breaking (ANC)—mainly supporters of the jailed
into shops and raiding them for food former president Jacob Zuma—appears
and other basic items. I live in Austra- to have instigated the unrest in a bid to
lia, but my relatives are split between destabilize the government. The attempt
the areas hardest hit by the unrest. at insurrection failed. Instead of a
Even in places that were unaffected by revolution, the week turned into a
the violence, panic buying caused food large-scale grab for goods. There were
shortages, and news of the looting set no marches or demands, no manifestoes,
off class anxieties. When you live in a and no calls for the president to step
society as unequal as South Africa, the down or the ruling party to vacate office.
sense that the country might explode at It was easy to see these events as a
any minute is always palpable. metaphor for the rampant corruption
In the midst of the chaos, a short that has come to define South African
video of a tiny boy, aged eight or nine, politics. The country’s democracy is not
rail thin, and wearing faded clothes, on the brink of failure, as some West-
SISONKE MSIMANG is the author of The ern commentators have opined. South
Resurrection of Winnie Mandela. Africa has regular free and fair elec-
How Apartheid Endures
tions, a noisy public sphere, an inde- THE OLD ORDER LIVES ON

pendent judiciary (indeed, too indepen- Soon after the antiapartheid activist
dent in the eyes of some in the ruling Nelson Mandela emerged from prison
party), and sophisticated media—all of in 1990, people began to refer to his
which remain intact. Yet the anc has brand of charm as “Madiba magic,” an
failed to meaningfully improve the lives affectionate nod to his clan name. As
of most South Africans, even as many South Africa hurtled toward the end of
within its ranks have grown rich. And apartheid, the phrase reflected a collec-
so decades after attaining political tive belief that Mandela could conjure
freedom, many South Africans have the nation’s freedom out of thin air.
been left to wonder when—or if—they National and global adulation helped
will ever get economic justice. shape the narrative of South Africa as a
This paradox is the subject of Steven place where something otherworldly
Friedman’s new book, Prisoners of the had happened: peace had settled on the
Past, which asks why South Africa’s land not because of compromises and
multiracial, left-wing government, negotiations but because of goodwill
which has been elected again and again and Madiba magic. Today, as people
with an overwhelming majority and a debate how much or how little has
strong mandate for change, has failed changed, it is easy to forget the im-
to transform the apartheid economy. A mense effort that anc leaders made to
well-known South African columnist present the transition to Black South
and academic, Friedman writes with Africans as a real break with the past
the nuance and insight of an insider. while reassuring white South Africans
His answer is that the post-apartheid that the changes would not affect their
order established in 1994 suffers from pocketbooks or their lifestyles.
many of the same problems as the old To a large extent, the anc has kept
order it sought to replace. its promises to white South Africans
The political theorist Antonio even as it has broken many of its
Gramsci once wrote of Italy during the pledges to the country’s Black people.
chaotic interwar period, “The crisis By protecting the rights of white
consists precisely in the fact that the property holders, the transition to
old is dying and the new cannot be democracy ushered in what the legal
born; in this interregnum a great scholar Mogobe Ramose has called the
variety of morbid symptoms appear.” “constitutionalisation of injustice”—that
The strength of Prisoners of the Past is is, a constitutional order that “reflects
its insistence that even though South the conqueror’s view that injustices
Africa is exhibiting many morbid which occurred a long time ago should
symptoms, the country’s real problem not be rectified.”
is that the old is not dying. Friedman This was partly by necessity. South
examines the resilience of apartheid Africa could have easily descended into
South Africa, showing how the old civil war, and it very nearly did in 1993,
order has repeatedly prevented the when Chris Hani, one of the anc’s most
new one from delivering on its prom- popular leaders, was assassinated in his
ises of racial justice. driveway in view of his 15-year-old

Sisonke Msimang
daughter. But Mandela calmed the to argue that economic policies in South
nation, urging restless Black youths not Africa were “created to serve the inter-
to retaliate against white people. After ests of those with the bargaining power
the tumult of the 1980s, when the to create new rules”—who, since the end
apartheid government kidnapped and of apartheid, have been a new and tiny
murdered activists and segregated Black multiracial elite. In other words, Fried-
communities exploded in violence, man shows that the country’s economic
neither the anc nor the white National institutions are primarily “the product of
Party, led by President F. W. de Klerk, who holds power; they may survive even
had an appetite for continued bloodshed. if they are inefficient, as long as they
The anc was focused on the transition: serve the interests of power holders.”
on writing a constitution, extending the
franchise to all citizens, and holding free ENDURING ECONOMIC ELITES
and fair elections. And so the political Friedman spends considerable time
settlement its leaders negotiated with examining how elites have guided
de Klerk’s government prioritized South Africa’s economic trajectory. In
moving on—which at the time seemed the 1990s, he recounts, the white
like a prerequisite for peace. political elite maintained its grip on the
But in Ramose’s view, the decision to economy even as it lost political power
wipe the slate clean conflicted with the by accommodating a small number of
tenets of African philosophy and, in new Black businesspeople. Predictably,
particular, with the notion of molato ga o these new Black economic elites were
bole, a Sotho proverb that holds that closely aligned with the anc. And when
debts do not expire with the passage of the anc passed new affirmative action
time and can be resolved only through laws mandating that all large financial
redress and restoration. Another leading transactions include partnerships with
South African academic, Joel Modiri, has Black-owned firms, its leaders stood
described South Africa’s post-apartheid ready to benefit, being the only Black
constitution as “a form of reiterative people with whom white elites had had
violence in the sense that the fundamen- previous professional interactions.
tal injustice of the old order was pre- Among the biggest beneficiaries was
served in the making of the new order.” Cyril Ramaphosa, who acted as the
Friedman rejects these views, which anc’s chief negotiator during the
root the current crisis in legal strictures, transition to democracy, led the team
arguing that the fault lies neither with that drafted the new constitution, and
the constitution nor with the negotia- now serves as South Africa’s president.
tions that produced it. Instead, he Ramaphosa worked closely with mem-
contends that the old order has lived on bers of the old white guard in the early
because of “path dependence”—a 1990s and was able to convert his
phenomenon famously described by the political networks into lucrative finan-
economic historian Douglass North as cial relationships within a few years of
“the powerful influence of the past on entering the private sector in 1996.
the present and future.” Throughout his Forbes has estimated that by 2015, his
book, Friedman draws on North’s ideas net worth had soared to $450 million.
Desperate times: fleeing tear gas at a protest in Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2021
Ramaphosa’s path to riches has been By the 1980s, Friedman explains,

well trodden by other members of the the apartheid regime had effectively
ANC, but it says as much about South elevated corruption to state policy. It
Africa’s past as it does about its present. came as little surprise then that when
As Friedman points out, although the the ANC took office, members of the
current president cannot be compared white economic elite sought to culti-
with the rapacious European settlers who vate personal bonds of criminality
arrived in the Cape of Good Hope in the with the new political leaders. In
mid-seventeenth century, his stratospheric mapping this lineage of elite corruption,
ascent was enabled by the same patronage Friedman charts the continuities
and corruption that elevated the previous between the old order and the new,
era’s elites. Jan van Riebeeck, the found- illustrating the powerful ways in
ing father of South Africa’s Afrikaner which path dependence has warped
community, was sent to the Cape by the the country’s economy.
Dutch East India Company in 1652 after At times, Friedman depicts path
Y E S H I E L / X I N H UA / R E D U X
being found guilty of abusing his position dependence as an inevitable and seem-
at the company to pursue private inter- ingly unwitting process, the outcome of
ests. More than two centuries later, the the march of history rather than of
mining magnate Cecil Rhodes was forced deliberate contestation. Yet there was
to resign as prime minister of the Cape nothing accidental about the economic
Colony over allegations that he gave a approach taken by the ANC. Beginning
government catering contract to a friend. with Mandela’s release in 1990, the

Sisonke Msimang
white-dominated business sector was a quarter of the Black population. And

vocal about its jitters. The anc had even this modest share may be in
many internal debates about how best jeopardy: a 2020 report by the Univer-
to manage these fears, but political and sity of Cape Town’s Liberty Institute of
market realities ultimately backed the Strategic Marketing showed that the
party into a corner: had it threatened to number of middle-class South Africans
redistribute land and seize bank ac- fell by more than half between 2017 and
counts in order to pay reparations, the 2020—from 6.1 million to 2.7 million.
economy would have crashed, and the As overall economic growth has
apartheid generals would never have stagnated and unemployment has
agreed to stand down. remained stubbornly high in recent
At other times, Friedman overstates years, the new middle class has grown
the nefarious intentions of Black elites. restless. Friedman calls the Black middle
For example, he claims that there was class “the angriest group in the society.”
an “unspoken consensus” between Black As he points out, “they enjoy qualifica-
and white elites “to leave things largely tions and opportunities which their
as they were, not because the new politi- parents and grandparents were denied
cal elite feared a backlash if it sought to but they experience many of the same
change them, but because it wanted to racial attitudes as previous generations
leave them intact.” Elites may have endured.” As a result, their anger is often
converged on a similar set of objectives directed at racial injustice, even when
over time, but the notion that the new they seem to be protesting other issues:
Black leaders simply weren’t interested whether the immediate concerns are
in changing the status quo is an over- about land, higher education, or anything
simplification. In order to escape else, racism is almost always the underly-
apartheid, Black South Africans had to ing concern of the Black middle class.
promise not to seek full compensation Poor South Africans, who constitute
and redress. White economic impunity a much greater share of the population,
was the price of Black political freedom. seldom articulate their demands in
purely racial terms. But middle-class
“THE ANGRIEST GROUP” narratives of racial injustice continue to
Once the anc assumed power, many of dominate because of South Africa’s
its leaders believed that in due course, history. As Friedman explains, “Racial
they would be able to work around the bias, even when it is subtle, is noticed
white elite. Their aim was to build a quickly by those at whom it is aimed
strong Black middle class that would because Black political actors (and some
drive economic growth. But partly whites sensitive to racism) are attuned
because of the path dependence Friedman to the many varieties of racial domina-
describes, this goal was never realized. tion.” By the same token, however,
Instead, the middle class grew “antennae which might detect threats to
painfully slowly—and eventually, it the poor may not work at all because
stopped growing altogether. Estimates their interests have always taken a back
of the size of the Black middle class seat to the central problem, racial
vary, but most studies put it at less than domination.” As a result, the vast
majority of South Africans often end up riches are shared more evenly among
as “spectators to bitter ideological battles its poorest citizens.
about them which never include them.” Under the present circumstances,
Poor South Africans fare even worse there is reason for skepticism about how
in the country’s economic battles. such an arrangement might be negoti-
Friedman shows how whereas the ated: the economic insiders have so
middle class and the elite have a stake much power, and the outsiders (most of
in the economy, the lower classes—and them poor and Black) have so little.
especially the unemployed—are ex- Still, cynicism has no place in South
cluded from the formal economy Africa’s future; its people simply cannot
altogether. Over the last few decades, afford it. Friedman’s call for a new
the share of people living below the economic pact might feel distant, but
$2-per-day poverty line has remained for the excluded majority, it is a tanta-
stubbornly high, and inequality has lizing possibility.∂
increased: South Africa is only slightly
more racially integrated than it was
before the end of apartheid, and it is
even more economically unequal.
In the early 1900s, W. E. B. Du Bois
argued that the problem of the twenti-
eth century would be the color line. He
was right, of course: in South Africa, as
in so many other parts of the world,
race was the predominant justification
for the oppression of Black people.
More than a century later, South
Africans have begun to understand that
while the color line still matters, the
poverty line has become more salient as
the country has been dominated by a new
multiracial group of economic insiders.
As the Trinidadian writer C. L. R. James,
whom Friedman aptly quotes near the
end of his book, put it in 1938, “To
neglect the racial factor as incidental is
an error only slightly less grave than to
make it fundamental.”
The way forward, in Friedman’s
view, is to look backward: South
Africans must once again sit across the
table from one another to negotiate a
new deal—not a political deal, as they
negotiated in the 1990s, but an eco-
nomic one, to ensure the country’s

tional commitment to popular govern-

Liars in ment, individual autonomy, and free
trade in ideas. But in an era in which
High Places misinformation is often described as a
scourge, this freedom takes on a darker
hue. What previously seemed like a
Who’s to Blame for feature of the country’s constitutional
Misinformation? system can begin to seem like a bug.
Is the First Amendment preventing
Jameel Jaffer the U.S. government from curtailing
harmful lies online? More broadly, is a
blind commitment to free speech
impeding public and private institu-
Liars: Falsehoods and Free Speech in tions from responding as they should to
an Age of Deception the problem of misinformation? These
BY CASS SUNSTEIN. Oxford are the questions that Cass Sunstein—a
University Press, 2021, 192 pp. Harvard professor, a former regulatory
czar in the Obama administration, and
A
mericans lie on their résumés, the most cited legal scholar in the
in their dating profiles, in country—takes up in Liars.
campaign ads, in their mem- The book is both succinct and
oirs, and, perhaps most of all, on social far-ranging. In a brisk nearly 200 pages,
media. Thanks to the First Amend- Sunstein looks at lies through the lenses
ment, they can mostly do so with of ethics, political theory, and constitu-
impunity—or, at any rate, without tional doctrine. In attributing the
fearing that the government will current informational crisis to a prolif-
punish them for it. In most contexts, eration of lies, however, the book largely
the First Amendment prohibits the overlooks the role that governments, the
government from restricting speech media, and technology companies are
because of its message. It makes it playing as agents and amplifiers of
difficult for public figures to win misinformation. Sunstein’s account lets
defamation suits. It precludes the the most powerful actors off the hook.
government from criminalizing false-
hoods that don’t cause serious harm. As REGULATING SPEECH
a result, Americans enjoy broad free- Sunstein argues that the United States
dom to say things that aren’t true. should regulate lies more aggressively
From one perspective, this freedom is than it does, even as he acknowledges
a wonderful thing, or at least a necessary that in most contexts, it is better to allow
byproduct of the United States’ founda- false speech to be corrected in the
JAMEEL JAFFER is Executive Director of the marketplace of ideas. It is usually better
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia to trust the marketplace, he says, because
University and former Director of the Center for even a government operating in good
Democracy at the American Civil Liberties
Union. He is a member of the Aspen Institute’s faith will not always be able to separate
Commission on Information Disorder. truth from fiction and because some
Liars in High Places
governments will use the authority to been doctored. The government should
police speech to suppress dissent instead. be able to respond to this kind of
(The “fake news” laws being adopted falsity—if not by prohibiting certain
around the world, including in Brazil, kinds of speech, then at least by label-
Hungary, and Russia, are a reminder that ing the lies as such or by requiring
this threat is real.) There is also a risk social media platforms to do so.
that falsehoods that are suppressed— First Amendment doctrine, Sunstein
rather than confronted head-on—will argues, too narrowly limits the govern-
fester and become more dangerous. ment’s ability to tackle harmful false-
But these arguments are not always hoods. One of the cases he takes aim at
convincing, Sunstein says. Some false- is New York Times v. Sullivan, from 1964,
hoods threaten serious harms that are in which the Supreme Court held that a
not likely to be corrected organically in public official who sues a critic for
public discourse. With respect to these defamation must demonstrate that the
falsehoods, policymakers must consider critic knew his or her statement was
regulatory responses. The U.S. Consti- false or acted with “reckless disregard of
tution is not always an obstacle to whether it was false or not.” Many
regulatory intervention, Sunstein reporters, editors, and media lawyers
observes. The First Amendment per- regard the decision in this case as
mits defamation suits, although it does synonymous with press freedom, but
place some limits on them. It allows the Sunstein is not so enthusiastic. In an age
government to ban false advertising. It in which anyone can disseminate misin-
doesn’t preclude the government from formation across the world with the click
prosecuting someone for committing of a button, he says, the case “looks
perjury or impersonating a government increasingly anachronistic.” It makes it
officer. In all these spheres, the First too difficult to hold people accountable
Amendment allows the government to for lies that do real damage, he argues.
punish people who lie. He also takes issue with the Su-
The First Amendment should be preme Court’s more recent decision in
understood to permit the regulation of United States v. Alvarez. That case, from
lies in other spheres, too, Sunstein says. 2012, invalidated the 2005 Stolen Valor
For example, the government should be Act, a federal statute that criminalized
able to regulate misinformation that lies about receiving military decora-
threatens public health. It should be tions or medals. (The defendant in the
able to regulate doctored videos, even if case was an inveterate liar who had
they aren’t defamatory. These kinds of falsely claimed to have been awarded
lies, Sunstein writes, cause serious the Congressional Medal of Honor.)
harms that cannot always be prevented The Court’s decision was based in large
or remedied by responsive speech. part on the concern that imposing
People may rely on false claims about penalties for false speech might chill
public health before the claims can be true speech, a concern Sunstein shares
exposed as false. A video may change to an extent. But he thinks that the
the public’s perception of a public Court’s decision in United States v.
figure even if it is later shown to have Alvarez was wrong, “even preposterous.”

Jameel Jaffer
Misinformation nation: at a Trump rally in Avoca, Pennsylvania, November 2020
He questions whether any socially useful government. Lies about other public
speech was really chilled by the Stolen figures—musicians, actors, and athletes,
Valor Act. In the name of defending the for example—can ruin people’s lives.
truth, he suggests, the Court merely “Many people are now being subjected
ceded more ground to falsehoods. to ‘cancellation’ on the basis of lies,”
Sunstein says, although he does not
AN AGE OF DECEPTION offer specific examples. His concern
Sunstein says Americans are living in extends beyond defamatory statements.
“an age of deception,” an era in which He argues that false statements falling
lies have become ubiquitous. He is short of libel are harming individuals
especially concerned about what he sees and society. He does not supply evi-
as the proliferation of defamatory lies dence that lying is more common today
about public officials, public institu- than it used to be. Still, he writes, “the
tions, and public figures. He mentions problem is serious and pervasive, and it
the “sustained attacks” on Hillary seems to be mounting.”
Clinton in the lead-up to the 2016 Sunstein is especially concerned
MARK PETE RSON / RE DUX
presidential election, unjustified attacks about all of this because social media
on the integrity of the media, and news allows liars to disseminate their lies
stories that carried “false statements more quickly and broadly. But he is
about Taylor Swift, Christian Bale, and principally worried about the liars, not
Julia Roberts.” Lies about public offi- the social media companies, and in fact
cials and institutions undermine faith in he casts the companies more as heroes
than as villains. “To their credit, some
of them are doing a great deal already”
to combat misinformation, he says, and
“their creativity offers a host of lessons
for public officials.” (Sunstein discloses
upfront that he has been a consultant to
Facebook, including on some of the
issues discussed in the book.) The
companies, in his view, are doing
“excellent work”—even if they should
Give the gift
do more, such as fact-check political
ads, strengthen their prohibitions
of the insight.
against misinformation relating to
public health, and suppress a broader
range of doctored videos.
Sunstein has a similarly rosy view of
the government’s relationship to lies.
He does briefly mention that U.S.
President Donald Trump pushed
misinformation about the 2020 presi-
dential election. But the lies of govern-
ment officials are mostly beyond the
scope of his inquiry. There’s no men-
tion here, for example, of the false
claims—all made by senior government
officials at one point or another—that
Iraq was hiding weapons of mass
destruction, that Muslims in New
Jersey cheered the 9/11 attacks, that the
CIA did not use torture, that drone
strikes have not resulted in civilian
casualties, or that wearing masks won’t
help against COVID-19. Sunstein says
he’s especially focused on falsehoods
that undermine the democratic process,
but it is difficult to understand why a
tabloid’s lies about a celebrity imperil foreignaffairs.com/gift
democracy, whereas the official lies that
misled the country into war do not.
Social media companies, too, bear a
great deal more responsibility for the
age of deception than Sunstein ac-
knowledges. Their ranking algorithms
can privilege sensational or extreme

Jameel Jaffer
speech and channel users into echo Sunstein criticizes, it is disturbingly easy
chambers where conspiracy theories for powerful people to use defamation
flourish. Their decisions about which lawsuits, or the threat of them, to
kinds of interactions to allow on their suppress important stories. Devin
platforms can have similar effects. And Nunes, a Republican member of Con-
their policies relating to ad targeting gress from California, has filed a slew of
can determine how broadly misinforma- lawsuits against journalists and ordinary
tion spreads and whether the misinfor- citizens who have criticized, mocked, or
mation can be corrected by others. reported on him, even suing the anony-
Social media companies—like govern- mous users behind two obviously satirical
ments—undoubtedly have important Twitter accounts, @DevinNunesMom
roles to play in addressing the problem and @DevinCow. And the Hollywood
of misinformation. But Sunstein is mogul Harvey Weinstein was able to use
wrong to conceive of them only as the threat of defamation litigation to
firefighters and not also as arsonists. stave off, for years, the news reports that
justifiably ended his career.
LIAR, LIAR, DEMOCRACY ON FIRE Sunstein isn’t oblivious to these
Still, Sunstein’s policy proposals are concerns. At one point, he suggests
worth considering. His prescriptions capping damage awards to mitigate the
concerning content moderation are chilling effect of defamation suits. But
modest but reasonable. His analysis of his analysis focuses on the costs of the
the Supreme Court’s case law relating to current doctrinal framework and mostly
false speech usefully pulls apart the skips over the benefits. It leaves the
various factors that courts should weigh impression that Sunstein has not fully
in deciding whether regulating misinfor- accounted for the possibility—the
mation in any given context would be certainty, some would say—that making
consistent with the First Amendment. it easier for public figures to sue critics
(The factors include the speaker’s intent, for false speech would make it easier for
the magnitude of the harm that could them to suppress true speech, as well.
result from the false speech, and how At its best, Sunstein’s book offers a
soon that harm would occur.) He is host of useful ideas about how First
plainly right that loosening current Amendment doctrine and content
doctrinal standards would create space for moderation policies might be adjusted to
regulation—including of false speech that encourage governments and technology
does not rise to the level of defamation. companies to address lies. But Sunstein
But he largely glosses over the ways gives the most powerful actors a free
in which new regulations could be pass. A more convincing account of the
abused. Even today, under a speech- age of deception, and a more compelling
protective doctrinal framework, state policy agenda, would place less emphasis
legislatures are fighting supposed on the mendaciousness of ordinary
misinformation by, for example, restrict- citizens and more on the governments
ing public schools’ ability to teach that spread falsehoods—and on the
students about systemic racism. And media organizations and technology
despite the Supreme Court cases that companies that amplify them.∂
enforce it—even, as in the case of

The Imperial Milligan, against President Abraham
Lincoln himself.
Presidency’s Yet the executive branch has fared
quite well in the courts in the years
Enablers since Davis made his dire warning about
unchecked presidential power—includ-
ing during Donald Trump’s presidency.
Why Executive Power Of Trump’s various abuses of authority,
Grows Unchecked few were exposed, confirmed, or pun-
ished by the courts, which did little to
Stephen I. Vladeck stymie his power grabs. True, the
Trump administration lost some high-
profile legal challenges to several of its
more controversial policies, including
Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The its clumsy effort to rescind the Deferred
Deep State and the Unitary Executive Action for Childhood Arrivals program
BY STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, JOHN A. (also known as DACA) and its even
DEARBORN, AND DESMOND KING. clumsier effort to add a question about
Oxford University Press, 2021, 304 pp. citizenship to the 2020 census. And
Trump himself effectively lost a pair of
I
n 1866, the U.S. Supreme Court major disputes over subpoenas from
handed down its landmark decision Congress and a Manhattan district
in Ex parte Milligan, which barred attorney for his financial records. But
the federal government from trying any objective accounting of the power of
civilians in ad hoc military tribunals the executive branch would have to
when civilian courts were available. concede that President Joe Biden had
Writing for the majority, Justice David more constitutional authority on his
Davis spent several pages explaining first day in office than President Barack
the dangers of an unchecked executive. Obama had on his last.
The United States, he said, “has no In their powerful and succinct
right to expect that it will always have monograph Phantoms of a Beleaguered
wise and humane rulers, sincerely Republic, the political scientists Stephen
attached to the principles of the Skowronek, John Dearborn, and Des-
Constitution.” Instead, “wicked men, mond King evaluate the long-standing
ambitious of power, with hatred of tension between two competing theo-
liberty and contempt of law, may fill ries of executive power—one that
the place once occupied by Washington locates power in the person of the
and Lincoln.” That is why the United president and another that finds it in
States has a written constitution, he the administrative state—and argue that
concluded, and independent judges to this tug of war has itself historically
served as a check on presidential
STEPHEN I. VLADECK is Charles Alan Wright
Chair in Federal Courts at the University of prerogatives. That vital tension, how-
Texas School of Law. ever, is disappearing quickly, and not

Stephen I. Vladeck
because of policies pursued or abuses vehicle safety to environmental protec-

committed by Trump, Obama, or any tion and government benefits. A bu-
other modern president. It is disappear- reaucracy was needed to administer
ing because of the Supreme Court. these functions, and successive presi-
The central thesis of Phantoms of a dents, as the heads of this bureaucracy,
Beleaguered Republic is that the modern were increasingly associated with these
federal government is characterized by sprawling federal programs. But despite
two irreconcilable ideas: on the one this symbiosis, the more powers and
hand, that presidents supervise gover- responsibilities the executive branch
nance and should therefore be able to had, the more the chief executive and
control it as they see fit and, on the the administrative state vied for author-
other hand, that an expertise-driven ity over those government functions.
bureaucracy should have authority over These two concepts of the executive
functions that are generally considered branch have been on a collision course
to be nonpartisan, everything from tax for a long time. But what is new is not
collection to national security planning. just a president more willing to push
Some degree of tension between these the envelope than any of his predeces-
two competing visions is inevitable. sors; it is also a Supreme Court dedi-
Absent a consensus on what is appropri- cated to putting its thumb on the scale.
ately partisan, an all-powerful White Unlike during most of the twentieth
House and an immovable federal bureauc century, when the Court simply helped
racy will view each other with suspicion. maintain an equilibrium between the
The authors devote most of the first half Oval Office and the administrative
of the book to documenting how and state, more recently, the Court has
when that antagonism began to fully intervened in support of the office of
manifest. They pay close attention to the the president, to the point that it can be
rise of personal presidential leadership blamed for enabling Trump’s war
during and after the Civil War and to the against his own bureaucracy.
two great expansions in the size and
function of the federal government: first HANGING IN THE BALANCE
around the time of the New Deal and Although much has already been written
then again in the 1960s and 1970s. “By on the dovetailing of the growth of
any historical reckoning,” they explain, presidential power and the expansion of
“the expansion of national administrative the federal government, one of the
capacities has been a boon for America’s delights of Phantoms of a Beleaguered
chief executive” and has “turned Ameri- Republic is the facility with which the
can government into a presidency- authors recount both relevant history and
centered government.” After all, the new leading scholarship. The first part of the
powers and responsibilities of the book is an engaging account of the
executive branch as a whole inserted the evolution of the federal government in
federal government into ordinary general, and in particular what the
Americans’ lives to a greater degree than Supreme Court justice Elena Kagan has
ever before, with state involvement in described as “presidential administration,”
everything from meat inspection and or a federal government that is regularly
The Imperial Presidency’s Enablers
Check and balance? Trump and Amy Coney Barrett in Washington, D.C., October 2020
and thoroughly supervised not only by authority, however, conservatives in the
individual agency heads but also by the 1970s and 1980s were embracing a rival
White House. But the larger the federal interpretation of the constitutional sepa-
bureaucracy grew and the more responsi- ration of powers known as the unitary
bilities it took on, the more complex and executive theory. This theory found
opaque its hierarchy turned, the more fertile ground up and down Pennsylva-
insulated from electoral accountability its nia Avenue, particularly as Republican
officials became, and the more indepen- presidents were in office for 20 of the 24
dence from the Oval Office it gained—in years between 1969 and 1993, and it had
some cases simply by circumstance and in powerful advocates in two executive-
others because Congress expressly pro- branch lawyers appointed to the Su-
vided for such independence. What might preme Court by Republican presidents
be called, meant nonpejoratively, “the during this time, William Rehnquist
deep state” reflects the desire of a grow- and Antonin Scalia. The Constitution
ing expert administrative apparatus—and, says that “the executive Power shall be
at various points, Congress—to shield vested in a President of the United
TOM BRENNER / REUTERS
more of the government’s decision- States,” and the theory’s central idea is
making authority from shifting partisan that, as Scalia once put it, “this does not
winds and from personal patronage and mean some of the executive power, but
the incompetence that accompanies it. all of the executive power.” In other
While the federal bureaucracy was words, executive power lies with the
accreting independent administrative president and the president alone.

Stephen I. Vladeck
According to this line of thinking, 1988, in a solo dissent to the Supreme

any independence within the executive- Court’s ruling in Morrison v. Olson.
branch bureaucracy is constitutionally That decision upheld the independent-
forbidden, regardless of its value. counsel provisions of the 1978 Ethics in
Presidents, therefore, exercise unim- Government Act, which empowered
peded control over the administrative the U.S. attorney general and a special
state and can dismiss whomever they division of the D.C. federal appeals
please, whenever they please. This court to appoint an independent
theory was trotted out to resist some counsel to investigate senior govern-
of Congress’s most aggressive post- ment officials, who, the reasoning went,
Watergate reforms, many of which the president’s handpicked attorney
were intended to strengthen the general might be unwilling or unable to
bureaucracy at the expense of presi- investigate himself. Crucially, the act
dential power—particularly in the protected the independent counsel
areas of war powers and foreign affairs, from being fired except for “good
where the arguments for executive cause.” In Scalia’s view, this last part
primacy are the strongest. was the true offense, for if the presi-
The relationship between these two dent could not fire a lawyer vested with
concepts—the deep state and the unitary the power to enforce the laws of the
executive—animates all of Phantoms of a United States, then he did not, in fact,
Beleaguered Republic. “Together the two have the executive power.
propositions construct a politics all their One of Morrison’s most important
own,” the authors write. “They draw each holdings was that Congress could
other out and tear at one another.” If protect “inferior” executive-branch
anything, the authors undersell the point: officers—in this case, the independent
the tension between these two proposi- counsel—from being dismissed by the
tions itself has significant value. James president without cause. “Principal”
Madison was referring to the relationship officers, including cabinet officials and
between the three branches of govern- ambassadors, have no such protection,
ment when he argued in The Federalist or independence: these officers are
Papers, no. 51, that “ambition must be appointed by the president and must be
made to counteract ambition,” but the subject to removal at will. Thus, in
same holds within the branches of govern- the contest between the deep state and
ment. So long as neither force dominates the unitary executive, Morrison tipped the
the other, they maintain a healthy equilib- scales in favor of the former.
rium whereby presidents exercise broad Morrison remains on the books today,
control over the bureaucracy of the but barely. Its wrongness has become an
executive branch but use relative restraint, article of faith among contemporary
lest they provoke pushback from within. conservatives, and as the Supreme Court
has turned further to the right, its efforts
TIPPING THE SCALES to gut it have accelerated. In 2010, for
Scalia wrote those pithy words about instance, Chief Justice John Roberts,
executive power at the end of his writing for a 5–4 majority, effectively
second term on the Supreme Court, in neutered the Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board, which was created
in the aftermath of the Enron and
WorldCom accounting scandals to
oversee the audits of public companies.
A provision that protected members of
the board from removal except for good
New Insight From
cause, the Court argued, interfered with the Council on
the president’s constitutional authority,
because, unlike in Morrison, these officers Foreign Relations
could be removed only by other execu-
tive officers whose removal also required
good cause, meaning that the president’s
capacity to dismiss them was further
limited. The Court explained this ruling
by arguing that one level of indepen-
dence is constitutional but two, as in the
case of the PCAOB, is not.
But the brakes have truly come off
with the confirmation of the Court’s two
newest justices. Brett Kavanaugh pro-
vided the fifth and decisive vote in the
June 2020 ruling in Seila Law v. Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, which
held that inferior officers otherwise
covered by Morrison are not protected
from removal without cause if they are
the singular head of an independent
agency, versus one of a number of
commissioners in charge of an agency. In
the abstract, the argument appeared
plausible: the president should be able to From Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy,
hire and fire agency heads at will. But if to the global reach of the #MeToo
the whole point of independent agencies movement, to adapting to climate
is their independence, the ruling took a change, the experts at the Council
on Foreign Relations examine how
healthy bite out of Congress’s power to
critical issues influence events
provide for such independence.
around the globe.
Earlier this year, Amy Coney Barrett
cast the decisive vote in United States v.
Arthrex, which handed proponents of
executive power an even more significant
victory by dramatically narrowing the
cfr.org/books
circumstances in which executive officers
are considered “inferior” and are thus
insulated from direct presidential con-

Stephen I. Vladeck
trol. At issue in Arthrex were the 200 or straints and of executive officers who
so patent judges within the U.S. Patent refused to do his bidding. What had
and Trademark Office who hear chal- been a primarily judicial and academic
lenges to the validity of patents granted movement, cloaked in dense legal jargon
by the federal government. With Clar- and technicalities, quickly became a
ence Thomas joining the three Demo- public spectacle, as Trump sought to
cratic appointees in dissent, the 5-4 bend the executive branch to his will.
majority held that even these minor Trump and his supporters, the authors
executive-branch adjudicators are in fact write, “pitted the chief executive against
“principal” officers under the Constitu- the executive branch, and they deployed
tion because their decisions are not the Constitution to dislodge anything
supervised by an executive-branch officer. within the president’s domain that
In one fell swoop, the Court significantly limited his authority or conditioned
winnowed the ranks of bureaucrats responsiveness to his directives.” The
protected from presidential removal by president portrayed the deep state as
Morrison and substantially increased the part of an antidemocratic conspiracy,
president’s direct control over adminis- and when the state pushed back—by
trative judges within the executive leaking damaging information to Con-
branch—a class of officials whose inde- gress and the press, publishing anony-
pendence is central to their job. mous op-eds excoriating the president,
And Arthrex is no outlier. The clear and filing whistleblower complaints, for
takeaway from a handful of recent instance—the result was, well, a spec-
decisions is that the Supreme Court is tacle. The authors drive the point home
now as committed to the idea of the in a particularly incisive passage:
unitary executive as it has been at any
The president’s insistence that he
point in its history. This development
alone held the executive power of the
would be significant at any point in time, American state drew out these forms
but it is especially glaring given that it of resistance. Tit for tat, he and the
transpired during Trump’s presidency. officers of the executive branch
Trump would have already loomed turned the Deep State conspiracy
large in this Court-sponsored expansion into something of a self-fulfilling
of presidential prerogative simply by prophecy. . . . [The resistance]
virtue of having appointed Kavanaugh turned on the value of depth, on the
and Barrett (and Neil Gorsuch, who has wisdom of stripping administration
also supported this drive). But what of its own integrity and operating the
Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic does executive branch as a strong arm of
so effectively is to demonstrate the presidential will. The clear-eyed
opportunity presented by Trump, who choice is not between the Deep State
and the unitary executive. It is
made no secret of his desire to amass
whether we value what depth has to
presidential power, for longtime propo- offer or not.
nents of the unitary executive. These
supporters of presidential authority The merits of the two sides of this
eagerly got onboard with Trump’s efforts debate aside, the authors’ point is that
to rid himself of administrative con- for those who supported Trump’s expan-
The Imperial Presidency’s Enablers
sion of the power of the chief executive, the president will have much more
the unitary executive theory “is, if power going forward. Trump may doubt
nothing else, an elaboration of newfound that the Court was on his side because it
skepticism of the value of depth.” Propo- didn’t hand him the 2020 election, but it
nents of the theory are unconvinced by was, and is, very much on the side of the
expertise, mistrustful of nonpartisanship, presidency as an institution.
and suspicious of everything that cannot As the authors note, the unitary
be directly controlled by the chief executive theory “is a license to presi-
executive. Fully applied, the theory dents to vent their instinctive hostility
therefore eliminates one of the critical to depth, and we should expect that
checks that exist to prevent presidents future presidents will use it as such.”
from pushing the envelope too far. With Indeed, Biden already has. Shortly after
the administrative state rendered an arm the Supreme Court’s decision in June in
of the Oval Office, and other checks on Collins v. Yellen, which reinforced the
presidential power, such as the courts 2020 ruling in Seila Law, Biden fired
and Congress, also not stepping up to the Trump-appointed commissioner of
the plate, the president ends up being the Social Security Administration
accountable to virtually no one. without cause—even though the person
in that position is protected from
BOTH SIDES NOW removal except in the event of neglect
Skowronek, Dearborn, and King don’t of duty or malfeasance in office. By way
ignore the Supreme Court’s role in of explanation, the Justice Department’s
adjudicating on executive and adminis- Office of Legal Counsel, which is
trative power, but they don’t feature it in headed by progressives who, before
the way that it merits, either. Trump is joining the Biden administration, had
hardly the first president to push been longtime academic critics of the
idiosyncratic theories of executive unitary executive, released a memo
power. President George W. Bush, for arguing that the protection from being
instance, embraced what some scholars removed without cause was no longer
dubbed “the commander-in-chief constitutional after Seila Law and
override”—the idea that any statutory Collins. Apparently, if the unitary
limits on the president’s national secu- executive truly is ascendant, even
rity powers were unconstitutional to the Democrats want to reap the benefits.
degree that they interfered with the That is the trap against which
president’s ill-defined authority as, in Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic
the Constitution’s words, “Commander- ultimately rails. Embracing the unitary
in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the executive at the expense of the remain-
United States.” The Supreme Court of ing checks within the executive branch
that era implicitly rejected this theory in “beckons us toward a strong state,
one especially high-profile dispute over hierarchically controlled by the presi-
the use of military commissions to try dent.” The authors explain that defend-
Guantánamo detainees. Today’s Su- ers of expansive presidential power reas-
preme Court, by contrast, has reconfig- sure the wary “that this is how it was
ured constitutional authority such that meant to be, that the framers envisioned

Stephen I. Vladeck
a plebiscitary democracy in which every officers from the Oval Office. As one of
incumbent cuts deep, each truly an the Court’s most influential justices,
administration unto himself.” But as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once said,
Davis warned 155 years ago in Ex parte the key is to accept that “certainty
Milligan, surveying a polarized political generally is illusion, and repose is not
landscape strewn with the wreckage of the destiny of man.” In other words, the
the Civil War, therein lies the problem. hard line of the unitary executive
The question then becomes how to theory, comforting as it may be to those
restore the balance that characterized who seek certainty in knowing where
both the executive branch and the federal power lies, does not make it the
separation of powers throughout the wiser choice: rather, the United States is
century after Davis’s ruling. It seems better off with tension between the
unlikely that Congress will reassert Oval Office and its bureaucracy.
itself, whether because one party is Trump laid bare the risks of the
reluctant to check the power of its own unitary executive, wielding expansive
president or because legislation that presidential power for personal gain
does try to bolster existing checks will with relative impunity. The Supreme
be vetoed by presidents who have no Court has so far reacted as if what
incentive to give away their own power. happened was because of who Trump
With the separation of parties taking was and is, not because of the powers of
the place of the separation of powers, the office that he held—powers that
interbranch checks on presidential exist and that he was able to benefit
power have increasingly fallen away— from thanks in part to the Court itself.
leaving only intrabranch checks. It is The United States may simply have to
also hard to be optimistic, given the hope that the Court will respond
polarized state of U.S. politics, that differently in the future, in defense of
voters will simply eliminate the problem checks on presidential authority, if the
by electing presidents who decline to country elects another Trump, because
expand their own authority. That is why, the alternative—a president unbounded
by the end of Phantoms of a Beleaguered by either external or internal checks—
Republic, the Court appears equal parts would be worse.∂
culpable for the current state of affairs
and the best hope for reform—not
changes of the like currently being
floated by progressives, who want to add
seats to the Supreme Court, take away
its power to decide certain cases, and so
on, but reform that maintains a healthy
balance between the chief executive and
the administrative state, such as treating
fewer officials as “principal” officers,
who must be subject to the president’s
absolute control, and expanding Con-
gress’s power to insulate “inferior”
tion” show the complex ways in which

Recent Books scholarly ideas have been weaponized
for political struggle. James argues that
successfully navigating today’s techno-
Political and Legal logical revolutions and upheavals in
global capitalism will require the
G. John Ikenberry invention of new concepts.
The Rule of Laws: A 4,000-Year Quest to

The War of Words: A Glossary of Order the World
Globalization BY F ERNANDA PIRIE. Basic Books,
BY HAROLD JAMES. Yale University 2021, 576 pp.
Press, 2021, 368 pp.
In this panoramic history, Pirie tells the
I
n this masterful exercise in “intel- story of the rise and fall of systems of
lectual decluttering,” James cuts law across the civilizations, empires, and
through the tangled terminological societies of the ancient and modern
and conceptual jungle of modern world. The kings of ancient Mesopota-
globalist discourse. All the major ideas mia wrapped their laws in grand state-
make an appearance: capitalism, social- ments of social justice and the dictates of
ism, democracy, populism, nationalism, the gods. Chinese emperors claimed that
technocracy, and so on. The book takes the laws on which their authority rested
the form of a glossary: each of those were manifestations of the order of the
concepts gets its own chapter, organized cosmos. The world religions promul-
around fascinating discussions of the gated laws that were guides for living
origins and meanings of the words used and a pathway to the afterlife, entangling
to describe them. Many of the terms church and state and setting the stage for
have gone through a sort of conceptual struggles in medieval Europe to build
life cycle: emerging and gaining cur- secular systems of law. The age of
rency in a particular historical moment, Western empire brought with it ambi-
often during a global crisis or a rapid tious efforts by European states to
transformation in the world economy; organize and legitimate their imperial
being deployed in discursive battles conquests in a system of international
between advocates and critics; and over law. Pirie shows that laws protect against
time slowly losing their precise mean- the abuse of power but also serve as
ing as more and more connotations and instruments of social control. Laws can
ideological usages undermine the be used as both swords and shields in the
original idea. The book can also be read struggle for power and order. Pirie
as a history of the modern global argues that if the history of law has a
system, in which the terms stand in as common theme, it is that laws are not
markers for upheavals, innovations, and simply rules: they have a more overarch-
transformations in markets and politics. ing function in providing societies with
Particularly revealing chapters on the shared identities and moral visions.
terms “neoliberalism” and “globaliza-

Recent Books
Making the World Safe for Dictatorship Women’s International Thought: Towards a
BY ALEXANDER DUKALSKIS. New Canon
Oxford University Press, 2021, 264 pp. EDITED BY PATRICIA OWENS,
KATHARINA RIETZLER, KIMBERLY
All states engage in public diplomacy to HUTCHINGS, AND SARAH C.
burnish their images abroad. But DUNSTAN . Cambridge University
today’s authoritarian states, operating in Press, 2021, 600 pp.
a global system that has elevated norms
of democracy and human rights, have In most histories of the academic field of
extra incentives to engage in image international relations, very few women
promotion. As Dukalskis shows in this make an appearance. The “greats” in the
intriguing book, authoritarian states scholarly canon are overwhelmingly
protect and enhance their legitimacy Anglo-American men. In this ground-
and standing with a range of practices, breaking book, a distinguished group of
from standard advertising campaigns to scholars engages in what the historian
high-risk extraterritorial operations to Glenda Sluga calls “recovery history,”
apprehend and silence critics. Regimes reconstructing the forgotten and margin-
such as Kazakhstan’s routinely employ alized ideas of 18 female thinkers, includ-
Western public relations firms in ing several African American women,
campaigns to promote the country’s who played formative roles in defining
achievements. Russia engages in more and launching the field beginning in the
systematic efforts to censor, obscure, late nineteenth century. The goal of the
and refute unfavorable information, book is not to simply add women to
using its infamous Internet “troll farms” the traditional story of international rela-
to distract and discredit critics. China tions scholarship but to expand and
has sought to persuade foreign elites to complicate the theories and debates
view the state favorably through junkets within the field, bringing questions such
for journalists and policymakers, and its as gender, race, and empire into the
state-owned media outlets offer positive mainstream. The editors note that the
accounts of the Chinese regime. North first use of the term “international
Korea, Russia, and Saudi Arabia have thought” can be traced to Florence
all reportedly assassinated dissidents Melian Stawell’s 1929 book, The Growth
living abroad. Dukalskis argues that the of International Thought, a work that has
best way to counter authoritarian received hardly any scholarly attention.
propaganda is to promote transparency, One chapter of the volume considers the
protect information flows, and stand up contributions of Eslanda Robeson, a
for democratic values. Black activist and intellectual whose
internationalist thought focused on the
struggles of women for participation in
world politics. There are also chapters on
the revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg and
the philosopher Simone Weil, who
concentrated on problems of class and
colonialism. Another chapter provides an
Recent Books
interesting portrait of Vera Micheles liberal democracy and its hallowed

Dean, who as director of research for the principles represented antiquarian relics
Foreign Policy Association in the mid- of an Enlightenment age that threatened
twentieth century formulated a brand of Western culture and identity. They may
liberal internationalism that emphasized seem obscure to many readers, but they
cosmopolitanism and democratic solidar- are well known and well regarded by the
ity. Together, the essays lay the founda- adherents of political movements that
tion for interdisciplinary debates and pose a serious threat to liberalism around
new histories of the field. the world today.
A World After Liberalism: Philosophers of

the Radical Right Economic, Social, and
BY MAT THEW ROSE. Yale University
Press, 2021, 208 pp.
Environmental
Across the Western world, right-wing Barry Eichengreen

activists and movements have grown
louder in recent years. As Rose argues in
this fascinating book, today’s various Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is,
nationalists, populists, religious tradi- and What It Should Be
tionalists, and racial supremacists form BY DIANA COYLE. Princeton
the vanguard of a “conservative revolu- University Press, 2021, 272 pp.
tion” with deep roots in the twentieth
A
century, and they are now charting a lthough the practice of econom-
path to a postliberal future. To illumi- ics is widely criticized, too many
nate the origins of this century’s post- critics oversimplify what econo-
liberal wave, Rose profiles major intellec- mists do or fail to appreciate how the
tual figures of the radical right discipline is changing. With her back-
prominent in the last century. The ground in government, consulting, and
German historian Oswald Spengler academia, Coyle offers a better-informed
developed an account of world history as critique. Economists, she shows, under-
a series of cultural struggles rooted in stand the limitations of their models; a
unbridgeable divides of blood, soil, growing amount of their research is
language, and tradition. Alain de Benoist devoted to analyzing big data as opposed
was a prophet of the French far right in to abstract theory; and they increasingly
his heyday, developing a theory of “folk interact with those in other disciplines.
democracy” in which all peoples had the Too often, however, economists forget
right to protect their customs, cultures, that they are part of the system they are
and ethnic identities from the effects of analyzing and that their work can affect
liberalism. Francis Parker Yockey was the its operation—as, for example, academic
preeminent American theorist of author- work on finance has affected the organi-
itarianism, envisioning an alliance zation of financial markets, and not
between a postliberal America and a always for the better. Economists also
post-Soviet Russia. To these thinkers, ignore the tendency for their findings to

Recent Books
be oversimplified when applied to policy, How We Give Now: A Philanthropic

sometimes with counterproductive Guide for the Rest of Us
consequences. They sometimes fail to BY LUCY BERNHOLZ. MIT Press,
ask whether their familiar statistical and 2021, 240 pp.
conceptual categories still apply in
today’s digital world. And they have a In this thought-provoking meditation
diversity problem: the profession lacks on philanthropy in the United States,
not just intellectual range but also the Bernholz argues that such giving is an
ethnic, racial, and gender balance that admirable American tradition but also a
would enrich the field. response to citizens’ deep and abiding
skepticism about the role of govern-
Making Social Spending Work ment and the consequent inadequacy of
BY PETER H. LINDERT. Cambridge public programs. The author highlights
University Press, 2021, 434 pp. new questions for philanthropy in the
digital age: For example, should indi-
Lindert has produced a worthy succes- viduals donate their genetic data in the
sor to his landmark book Growing name of medical research, despite
Public, which used historical evidence to privacy concerns, and should they favor
describe the rise of the welfare state. nonprofits over commercial gene-
Whereas that earlier book focused on sequencing companies? Economists will
the North Atlantic economies, this one search in vain for data on who provides
paints on a global canvas. Lindert again charitable donations and for what kinds
debunks the view that government of activities. But they will not search in
spending on social services tends to vain for novel ideas; the book does not
slow economic growth. He shows that lack for them.
social programs help equalize incomes,
even in countries such as the United Emerging Powers and the World Trading
States, where their scope is relatively System: The Past and Future of
limited. But he also points to worri- International Economic Law
some trends: too many countries invest BY GREGORY SHAF F ER. Cambridge
too little in high-return social programs, University Press, 2021, 250 pp.
such as education for the young, and
spend too much on pensions for the The post–World War II global trading
politically influential elderly. The system was largely designed by the
author concludes by exploring whether United States and was heavily criticized
immigration tensions will further fray by developing countries, including
social safety nets and whether increases Brazil, India, and (later) China, for
in life expectancy will threaten the placing unfair restraints on their eco-
solvency of public pensions or crowd nomic development policies. Yet now,
out other valuable forms of social paradoxically, the United States has
spending—and, if so, how social pro- become a leading critic of the World
grams might be redesigned to meet Trade Organization, and emerging pow-
these risks. ers have become its chief defenders. As
Shaffer explains, once emerging mar-
Recent Books
kets became major exporters, they turn of the twenty-first century, many
developed an interest in maintaining of the themes he sounds are strikingly
and even strengthening the rules-based contemporary: tension between Iran
system. For its part, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, dysfunction in
possessing a limited social safety net, Venezuela, and the need for oil-producing
resorted to import restrictions to and oil-consuming countries to think
protect workers and turned away from about the coming transition to a
the WTO when it ruled against Washing- global economy that no longer relies
ton. Importantly, emerging markets on fossil fuels.
developed the legal capacity—the
cadres of attorneys and negotiators with
trade law expertise—needed to use Military, Scientific, and
global trade rules and procedures to Technological
their advantage. Shaffer argues for
reinvigorating the WTO as a primary
interface between the United States and
Lawrence D. Freedman
China but also for revising WTO rules to
provide more space for Beijing to
pursue state capitalism and for Wash- Bitskrieg: The New Challenge of
ington to intervene to protect workers Cyberwarfare
from import shocks. BY JOHN ARQUILLA. Polity, 2021,
240 pp.
The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the
A
Twentieth Century rquilla was one of the first
BY GIULIANO GARAVINI. Oxford analysts to appreciate how
University Press, 2019, 448 pp. digital technologies were
transforming the nature of conflict, and
Garavini’s rich history starts with the he remains one of the most perceptive.
emergence of petroleum-producing His latest book pulls together the
countries in the 1920s and covers the strands of his three decades of studying
establishment of the Organization of this issue. A constant theme is frustra-
Petroleum Exporting Countries in the tion at the failure of policymakers to
1960s, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and adjust their thinking, despite his own
OPEC’s declining ability to control efforts to advise and inform them. It
prices in the 1980s and 1990s. Garavini, took too long for them to appreciate the
a diplomatic historian, focuses on the vulnerability of computer networks to
interaction of so-called petrostates with crooks and hostile political actors.
the U.S. government, with their oil Companies and governments placed too
companies, and with one another. He much emphasis on firewalls and antivi-
details OPEC’s internal machinations rus software when encryption and cloud
using the minutes of the organization’s computing offered better defenses. In
conferences, a primary source not addition, because military planners
available to previous investigators. were reluctant to abandon the legacy
Although Garavini’s account ends at the systems of industrial age warfare, such

Recent Books
as tanks, they failed to notice the cally brilliant in ways that human
potential of tactics involving numerous commanders could never match—but AI
small units, in constant communication will never be a true strategist.
with one another, overwhelming targets
in swarms—a form of warfare that Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China,
Arquilla dubs “bitskrieg.” One distinc- Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare
tive feature of his approach is his belief BY SETH JONES. Norton, 2021,
in arms control agreements to ensure 288 pp.
that civilians and critical infrastructure
are spared harmful attacks. Sadly, Jones takes an unusual and helpful
despite some occasional high-level approach to the security challenges facing
interest, there have been no serious the United States by exploring how three
negotiations on that issue among the men shaped the strategies of some of the
major powers. country’s most troublesome rivals. They
are General Valery Gerasimov, chief of
I, Warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Russia’s general staff; the late Iranian
Intelligent Conflict major general Qasem Soleimani, who was
BY KENNETH PAYNE. Oxford blown up on U.S. President Donald
University Press, 2021, 336 pp. Trump’s order in early 2020; and General
Zhang Youxia, vice chair of China’s
Payne has produced an engaging and Central Military Commission. Using
accessible guide to the development of Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin materials,
artificial intelligence (AI) as applied to Jones shows how they all turned to
war. He shows how an initial push irregular forms of warfare, including
stalled in the 1970s; what made the information campaigns on social media,
difference later was the remarkable as well as espionage and special opera-
increase in computing power, the tions, to weaken the United States. All
amount of data being generated on the three assumed a constant struggle with
Internet, and the way engineers came to the West. Whereas Soleimani had a
appreciate how machines can learn. certain swagger, Gerasimov and Zhang
Warbots are AI-enabled platforms that appear as somewhat two-dimensional
can make their own decisions: in prin- characters: competent, professional, and
ciple, they can identify targets, as well as loyal to their countries’ presidents. Jones
maneuver and fire, independently. From does not quite make clear whether or how
Payne’s analysis, three main conclusions these men created policy, as opposed to
emerge. First, profound ethical issues just articulating and implementing it.
arise once machines can decide which Still, he shows how menacing and
humans to kill, but the technology is disruptive their efforts can be and
now too varied and too far advanced to proposes ways to fight back. He is less
be banned. Second, AI favors the offense, convincing in arguing that these efforts
owing mainly to the ability of AI-enabled are more important than building up
weapons to swarm. Third, and perhaps conventional forces, at least for China
most important, if AI receives a lot of and Russia.
data and a narrow goal, it will be tacti-
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Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History work stoppages, sit-ins, hunger strikes,
and Future of American Intelligence and boycotts. Chenoweth believes that
BY AMY B. ZEGART. Princeton when it comes to inspiring social change,
University Press, 2022, 416 pp. such means are both more ethical and
more effective than violence. When
The inspiration for Zegart’s guide to the nonviolent activists topple a regime, for
U.S. intelligence community and the example, what follows is usually more
challenges it faces appears to have been stable and inclusive than the aftermath of
her discovery that Americans are poorly a violent insurrection. She uses an
informed about how the community impressive range of examples to address
works—and what they think they know some of the more obvious objections to
has been heavily influenced by civil resistance as a method: that
intelligence-themed pop culture nonviolence is equivalent to passivity, that
(“spytainment”). To correct the such movements can be easily suppressed
misperceptions this has produced, she with violence, that they often contain
uses a wealth of examples from the annals violent elements, and that they work only
of spycraft, from Washington’s failure to against democratic governments.
anticipate China’s entry into the Korean Chenoweth sees civil resistance as a form
War to its successful search for Osama of pressure building up from below
bin Laden. The digital revolution is against illegitimate and unjust practices
changing the practice of intelligence as and regimes. She identifies a close link
information becomes more plentiful and between the tactics of civil resistance and
accessible but also more manipulable. progressive political change, implying that
This raises for Zegart a number of those who use these methods are
interesting questions, such as whether invariably in the right. But as she
artificial intelligence can correct some of acknowledges, sectarian and regressive
the cognitive biases that lead to analytic movements can also employ civil
failures and how analysts can verify the resistance, and they frequently do.
authenticity of information when the
Internet makes fakery so easy. She also
discusses the importance of nonstate
actors, including technology giants such
as Google and even private individuals
tracking illicit nuclear activities.
Civil Resistance: What Everyone

Needs to Know
BY ERICA CHENOWETH . Oxford
University Press, 2021, 256 pp.
This is a work of advocacy as well as

analysis. Civil resistance is a form of
collective action in which unarmed people
coordinate a variety of measures, such as
Recent Books
The United States result in news feeds that lead users

down rabbit holes of misinformation—
these scandals and more follow an
Jessica T. Mathews infuriating pattern. First come efforts
to suppress the bad news internally.
When that fails, Facebook offers a weak
An Ugly Truth: Inside Facebook’s Battle for public apology, which is followed by an
Domination ineffectual response from Congress or
BY SHEERA F RANKEL AND the Federal Trade Commission and then
CECILIA KANG. Harper, 2021, 352 pp. a rise in the stock price. Even a record
$5 billion fine went unnoticed by the
W
ith an impeccably sourced, market. Facebook’s sheer size, its huge
highly readable volume cash reserves, its aggressive legal, public
based on interviews with relations, and lobbying teams, and
hundreds of current and former Face- regulators’ lack of understanding of
book employees, investors, and advisers, what happens “behind the platform”
as well as more than 100 lawmakers, have so far prevented effective action to
regulators, academics, and consumer rein in the company’s damaging impacts
advocates, and on access to previously on personal privacy and the integrity of
undisclosed documents from inside the democratic societies. The authors aren’t
company, two New York Times reporters hopeful this will come soon, but this
have produced an important addition to book could help.
the voluminous literature on Facebook
that should be read widely by policy- Power and Liberty: Constitutionalism
makers and the public alike. The title in the American Revolution
comes from a 2016 memo to Facebook BY GORDON S. WOOD. Oxford
employees in which an executive in the University Press, 2021, 240 pp.
CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s inner circle
explains: “The ugly truth is that we Many historians view Wood as the
believe in connecting people so deeply greatest living scholar of the American
that anything that allows us to connect Revolution. This book distills the core
more people more often is de facto insights of a long career into a single small
good.” If someone uses the platform for volume that grabs the reader’s interest
evil, the memo says, that’s unfortunate, from the first page and never lets go. He
but “still, we connect people.” What this explores the debates that shaped the
has meant in practice is that Facebook United States’ future governance, the
has prioritized revenue growth above all invention of the radical concept of
else. The company’s conversion of users popular sovereignty, and the forming of
into unwitting sales agents by tracking the country’s founding documents.
their shopping activity off the site, Lacking a common ancestry, Wood writes,
Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. “Americans have had to create their sense
presidential election partly through use of nationhood out of the[se] documents.”
of the site, Facebook’s development of The book covers power, liberty, concepts
algorithms that privilege fake news and of representation and rights, slavery, and

Recent Books
the emergence of a judicial branch with He achieved full diplomatic relations

arguably more power to shape lives than with China, concluded the SALT II arms
any other judiciary in the world. It is no control agreement, and, through his
discussion of abstract principles. Wood extraordinary personal engagement,
shows how the Revolution “released brought Israel and Egypt together in
pent-up social forces in the North that the Camp David accords, arguably the
turned northern society into a middle- most successful peace treaty since the
class world,” thereby pushing the nation end of World War II. His administra-
toward modernity. Tiny Rhode Island’s tion (in which I served) produced the
success in using paper money led to such nation’s first full-scale energy policy,
an explosion in its use that by the time pushed through significant legislation
the federal government began to regulate on the environment and government
the money supply, there were, incredibly, ethics, carried out the first civil service
“more than ten thousand different kinds reform in a century, created cabinet
of notes circulating in the United States.” departments of energy and education,
The relevance of the founding documents pursued sweeping economic deregula-
to today’s disputes is evident throughout. tion, and transformed the federal bench
by appointing more women (including
His Very Best: Jimmy Carter, a Life Ruth Bader Ginsburg) and Black jurists
BY JONATHAN ALTER. Simon & than all of his predecessors combined.
Schuster, 2020, 800 pp. His appointment of Paul Volcker to
chair the Federal Reserve broke the
The Outlier: The Unfinished Presidency of back of inflation—but with sky-high
Jimmy Carter interest rates, which played a major part
BY KAI BIRD . Crown, 2021, 784 pp. in Carter’s defeat at the polls. There
were failures: on health care and tax
Four decades after Jimmy Carter’s reform and especially in the administra-
presidency, two talented biographers tion’s bungled response to the Iranian
have reached identical conclusions in Revolution and Carter’s fateful decision
deeply researched biographies issued (made against his own inclination under
within a few months of each other. In intense pressure from his advisers) to
both foreign and domestic policy, they allow the deposed shah into the United
agree, the years of Carter’s single term States for medical treatment, which
were far more accomplished than they triggered the hostage crisis at the
seemed at the time or have seemed since. American embassy in Tehran.
The generally accepted view—that The books differ in two respects. Alter
Carter was a weak or failed president offers insightful judgments far more often
and a much better ex-president—is than Bird, who lets the story tell itself and
simply wrong. He avoided war in Latin treats far more extensively Carter’s life
America with the fiercely contested before his election in 1976, which pro-
Panama Canal treaties and initiated a foundly shaped his presidency, especially
human rights policy that played a role as regards race relations and civil rights.
in the later fall of the Soviet Union and Both volumes probe the contradictory
the dramatic global rise in democracies. aspects of Carter’s personality. Notwith-
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standing his patented grin and down- Richard Nixon. The latter two ate, drank,
home style, he was often cold and hard to and relaxed together, “rarely if ever talked
know. The intensely focused, hard- politics, . . . and often spent large chunks
working engineer and the deeply faithful of time in silence”—but Rebozo proved
born-again Christian coexisted, some- there was nothing he wouldn’t do for
times uneasily. Although devoted to doing Nixon. John F. Kennedy had already
right in the job of president, he lacked the shared a close friendship with the British
warmth and ease in communicating that diplomat David Ormsby-Gore for 25
would have made him a successful leader. years when he momentously called on
He was, writes Alter, an “all-business Ormsby-Gore to help figure out what to
president who seemed sometimes to do at the peak of the Cuban missile crisis.
prefer humanity to human beings.”
First Friends: The Powerful, Unsung (and Western Europe

Unelected) People Who Shaped Our
Presidents Andrew Moravcsik
BY GARY GINSBERG. Twelve, 2021,
304 pp.
It is hard to believe that there is any Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the
aspect of the American presidency that Making of Post–Cold War Stalemate
hasn’t been fully explored, from first BY M. E. SAROT TE. Yale University
ladies to first pets. Ginsberg noticed that Press, 2021, 568 pp.
there was one obvious, potentially
A
powerful set of actors who had largely distinguished historian of transat-
been ignored: presidents’ closest friends. lantic relations revisits Western
These are the men and women who can relations with Russia during the
relieve the loneliness a president lives 1990s. This critical decade set the tone for
with, help him think through what to do geopolitics in the post–Cold War period,
about a major problem, and say things to above all though the expansion of NATO.
him that no one else can. The resulting Sarotte weaves together the most engag-
book is an entertaining, sometimes ing and carefully documented account of
thought-provoking read. It opens with this period in East-West diplomacy
the well-known, highly political 50-year currently available. She deepens the
friendship between Thomas Jefferson and conventional wisdom among most
James Madison, during which they historians, namely that in the late 1980s
exchanged around 1,250 letters. There is and early 1990s, many Western leaders
Abraham Lincoln’s friendship with gave informal assurances that NATO would
Joshua Speed, who may have saved not expand—not just to the territory of
Lincoln’s life from severe depression and the former East Germany but also across
probably did save his career. At another central and eastern Europe. Since Mos-
extreme are those friends whose main cow failed to secure any formal guarantee,
role was to listen: Daisy Suckley to however, Western leaders later went
Franklin Roosevelt and Bebe Rebozo to ahead anyway, downplaying or denying

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any contradiction. She argues more specu- things done, diplomats must often
latively that this perceived betrayal was a mislead or mistreat the public and, often,
major factor in the subsequent collapse of their political masters; many will surely
democracy in Russia and the further find it troubling that he hails Talleyrand
deterioration of relations between the and Kissinger as models. At the same
West and Russia under President Vladi- time, Cooper portrays most foreign-pol-
mir Putin. But most of the book’s evi- icy making as little more than a desperate,
dence actually leans in the opposite often futile effort to navigate in the face
direction and suggests that U.S. Presi- of deep uncertainty, “black swan” events,
dents George H. W. Bush and Bill and unintended consequences. And he
Clinton and their top diplomats slowed traces a centuries-long spread of liberal
NATO expansion to try to stabilize the values, democratic institutions, multilat-
government of Russian President Boris eral cooperation, and the use of diplomacy
Yeltsin in the short term and held off as instead of military force—preconditions
long as he still looked viable. It was only for the peaceful and prosperous world one
when Yeltsin’s fall became imminent, and finds within the EU. These three conclu-
a hardening of East-West relations started sions remain in considerable, and perhaps
to seem inevitable, that the United States irreconcilable, tension with one another.
moved to expand the alliance.
European Language Matters: English in Its
The Ambassadors: Thinking About European Context
Diplomacy From Machiavelli to BY PETER TRUDGILL. Cambridge
Modern Times University Press, 2021, 275 pp.
BY ROBERT COOPER. Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 2021, 563 pp. Because of the global reach of first the
United Kingdom and later the United
For many years, Cooper, a British diplo- States, the world language today is
mat, was the European Union’s unofficial imperfect English, spoken by well over a
foreign policy guru, and from 2002 to billion people. The majority learn it as a
2010, he served as the union’s director second language—and according to some
general for external and politico-military (generally British) native speakers, other
affairs. EU insiders see him as a tough and (generally American) native speakers do
thoughtful analyst. This sweeping reflec- not speak it properly. Meanwhile, English
tion on 500 years of transatlantic state- has become the de facto European
craft focuses on a small number of language, although among the EU mem-
individuals who, in his view, combined ber states, only two embrace it as one of
sophisticated thinking with effective their official languages: Ireland and
diplomatic action: Machiavelli, Talley- Malta. One could not wish for a more
rand, Konrad Adenauer, Jean Monnet, qualified guide to the resulting chaos than
Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and Trudgill, a linguist who writes a popular
Henry Kissinger. Cooper draws three column for The New European. He revels
main conclusions. The first is that diplo- in English’s massive and diverse vocabu-
matic success requires extreme inconsis- lary, with its finely shaded differentiations
tency and immorality. To get important among near synonyms, a result of histori-
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cal interactions with other languages and because their system has always worked,
dialects. He delights in each tidbit of or does their system work because they
knowledge: the word “metaphor,” for are more trusting? If the latter, why? In
example, has a figurative meaning in the end, it is unclear what foreigners can
English but is found on delivery trucks in learn from Norway’s success.
Athens that “transfer things from place to
place.” Trudgill rues the way that many The Greeks: A Global History
English words lose their power and BY RODERICK BEATON. Basic Books,
precision when employed indiscrimi- 2021, 608 pp.
nately, as with the superlative “awe-
some.” For anyone, native speaker or not, When people think of Greece, they
this book offers a pleasurable and hu- generally think of the present-day nation-
morous voyage of discovery. state, which they imagine as roughly
conterminous with a narrowly bounded
The Norwegian Exception? Norway’s ancient society that had Athens and a few
Liberal Democracy Since 1814 neighboring cities at its center. In this
BY MATHILDE FASTING AND magisterial yet readable introduction to
OYSTEIN SORENSEN. Hurst, 2021, Greek history—one of the best of its
280 pp. kind, whether for academic or popular
audiences—Beaton reveals the far more
Norwegians enjoy a well-functioning complicated reality. Greece has always
liberal democracy, a productive free- been a broadly settled civilization: Greeks
market economy, stable social relations, have long lived in parts of present-day
and—even more so than other Scandina- Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Russia, Turkey,
vian countries—a generous and popular and countries of the Middle East. In 1830,
social welfare state. In global rankings of modern Greece gained its independence
equality, gender balance, happiness, life not via a popular ethnic revolution: most
expectancy, and the rule of law, Norway of its inhabitants spoke Albanian, and
invariably appears near the top. In this three times as many Greeks lived outside
book, two historians seek to explain why the country’s borders as did inside.
the country is so successful. They enthu- Instead, Greek independence resulted
siastically recount the country’s history, from the work of warlords, outside
yet they fail to answer the question. powers, and generic Orthodox Christian
Much of Norway’s edge seems to reflect opposition to Ottoman rule. The new
dumb luck: the country benefits from state had to impose a sanitized version of
abundant energy resources, peaceful the Greek language and a sense of na-
neighbors, and a strong sense of national tional identity within its territory. Many
identity. Elsewhere, however, these of contemporary Greece’s problems with
things have led to conflict and collapse. its neighbors are rooted in past wars
The magic ingredient, the authors argue, waged by the Greeks to assert that
is trust: Norwegians trust one another identity; others spring from its status as a
and trust their government, which can small country subject to many indignities,
thus effectively promote the common only one of which is its financial tutelage
good. Yet are they trusting simply under the European Union.

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Powers and Thrones: A New History of the 370,00 indigenous people (compared with
Middle Ages an estimated five million prior to Euro-
BY DAN JONES. Viking, 2021, 656 pp. pean conquest in the sixteenth century)
belonging to nearly 200 tribes, Salgado,
Jones is best known for writing popular accompanied by anthropologists and
histories and producing television series such linguists, spent weeks on end with each of
as Secrets of Great British Castles and Britain’s a dozen remote communities. The
Bloodiest Dynasty; perhaps unsurprisingly, his hospitable tribes, scattered in tiny com-
history of Europe between the fall of Rome munities, subsist in bucolic harmony with
and the Protestant Reformation is neither an abundant, generous natural world yet
deep nor authoritative. But it certainly is are dwarfed by the natural immensity of
entertaining. In an old-school manner, Jones the rainforest. The voluminous book’s
weaves together brief biographical sketches brief texts add informative context, but
of colorful people, from Attila the Hun to Salgado mainly allows the captivating
Martin Luther, with engaging yarns about black-and-white photos to speak for
the critical events in which they took part. themselves. The rainforest’s startling
He nods to historiographic fashion just long beauty and majesty are overwhelming;
enough to inquire about the impact of amazing aerial photography captures
climate change and to ask why European breathtaking cloud formations that offer
countries rose to global preeminence in this an ever-changing visual spectacle. But the
period. But in the end, his question-begging greatest contribution of Amazônia is its
answer is simply that they had grown intimate, sensitive portraits of everyday
stronger and richer, and he tells that tale life among the indigenous tribes: their
without much criticism of its more brutal warm family ties, their hunting and
aspects. Still, the resulting account of the fishing skills, their dazzling facial and
Middle Ages is as engaging a read as any. body paintings, and their ritual dances.
Salgado neither patronizes nor sensa-
tionalizes. He honors his subjects by
Western Hemisphere capturing both their communal and their
individual selves: avoiding a flaw found
Richard Feinberg in some documentary work depicting
indigenous people, he accompanies every
photograph of a person with the subject’s
full name.
Amazônia
BY SEBASTIÃO SALGADO . Taschen, Civilizations: A Novel
2021, 528 pp. BY LAURENT BINET. TRANSLATED
BY SAM TAYLOR. Farrar, Straus and
S
algado, a famed Paris-based Brazil- Giroux, 2021, 320 pp.
ian documentary photographer,
takes his camera deep into the Binet playfully imagines a counterfactual
Amazon rainforest. To tackle this vast history in which the Aztecs and the
territory, larger than the European Union Incas conquer western Europe. His
and inhabited, Salgado estimates, by some entertaining style blends biting satire of
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late medieval European follies with COVID-19’s disruption of tourism, the

postmodern irony. Seen through the eyes book describes a Cuba already suffering
of the pragmatic Incan emperor Ata- from poverty and postrevolutionary
huallpa, sixteenth-century Christendom inequalities; readers visit the sumptuous
is plagued by perpetual dynastic and private restaurants and homes of the
religious wars, ridiculous superstitions, elites (new and old), as well as peripheral
and shocking social injustice. Just as the shantytowns populated by darker-skinned
Spanish conquistadors did in reality, migrants (popularly labeled
Binet’s fictional Incas form alliances with “Palestinians”) from the eastern
conquered, restive populations. But provinces. In a parallel narrative located
unlike the Europeans, the Incas impose a during the murderous, chaotic medieval
progressive social order. Meanwhile, the Crusades, Padura ponders whether
brilliant Cuban princess Higuénamota ideologies and religions merely disguise
intimidates European courts with her the human drive for power and wealth;
brown-skinned nakedness; Michelangelo he also asks whether revolutionaries
is commissioned to make a sculpture of elevate or immiserate their populations—
her. In passing, Binet lampoons Christo- questions echoed by Cuba’s contemporary
pher Columbus, Martin Luther, and fate. Surrounded by his country’s
Thomas More and has great fun trans- material and moral decay, the mature
porting the Spanish novelist Miguel de Conde finds solace in an enduring love
Cervantes and the artist El Greco to an relationship and in his steadfast circle of
idyllic island in the Caribbean. As a lifelong drinking buddies.
redemptive fantasy rescuing history from
the horrific tragedy of the European Two Spies in Caracas: A Novel
destruction of the precolonial Americas, BY MOISÉS NAÍM. TRANSLATED BY
Civilizations is a most satisfying read. DANIEL HAHN. Amazon Crossing,
2021, 348 pp.
The Transparency of Time: A Novel
BY LEONARDO PADURA. Naím, who left his native Venezuela
TRANSLATED BY ANNA KUSHNER. many years ago, turns to historical
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021, 416 pp. fiction to pen this sharp, effective
indictment of Hugo Chávez and the
In this erudite crime thriller, Padura, late tyrant’s brand of authoritarian
Cuba’s leading man of letters, pilots his populism. Readers of political
melancholic, irreverent detective, Mario thrillers may intuit early on the
Conde, toward his 60th birthday. The resolution of the deadly duel between
plot, revolving around a stolen wooden two opposing spies—a gorgeous
statue of the Black Virgin, of medieval female CIA operative and an
origin, is a vehicle for the author’s irresistibly charming male officer in
trenchant commentaries on contemporary Cuba’s Intelligence Directorate.
Cuba and his existential ruminations on Operating in worlds populated by
the human condition. Situated in 2014, corruption and deception, they are
before U.S. President Donald Trump’s among the few characters with any
intensified economic sanctions and moral fiber; the fast-paced plot turns on

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the alliance between a money- awful to recite. Based on his meticulous

laundering American evangelist research, Lomnitz speculates that his
preacher and a Venezuelan criminal great-grandfather, a successful
who masterminds his illicit syndicates businessman in Mannheim, Germany,
from prison with impunity. This nasty was assassinated in his office by young
world is not so unlike those Naím has Nazis—envious neighbors of his—as
uncovered in his award-winning early as 1922. In more hopeful passages,
nonfiction, in which legitimate leaders he recounts how his relatives brushed
and private business executives, shoulders with such luminaries as the
interlaced with violent Mafias, engage Peruvian Marxist José Carlos
in intricate power struggles and some Mariátegui and the Chilean folk
civil society leaders can be as composer Violeta Parra. Hanging over
hypocritical as the politicians they this poignant history is a disturbing
decry. In his acknowledgments, Naím question: Might today’s resurgence of
reasserts his faith that his “wonderful identity politics and conspiracy
country” will recover. But from the theories, similarly rooted in historical
deep abyss depicted in his novel, it is revanchism and social envy, lead to yet
difficult to perceive the green shoots another round of violent nightmares?
of a reborn Venezuela.
Nuestra América: My Family in the Vertigo Eastern Europe and Former

of Translation Soviet Republics
BY CLAUDIO LOMNITZ. Other Press,
2021, 464 pp.
Maria Lipman
Lomnitz, a cultural historian, adds to
the burgeoning literature on
immigration, ethnic identity, and racial Russian Energy Chains: The Remaking of
hatred with this introspective memoir Technopolitics From Siberia to Ukraine to
tracing the odyssey of his Ashkenazi the European Union
Jewish ancestors from Nazi-infested BY MARGARITA M. BALMACEDA.
Europe to South America, Israel, Columbia University Press, 2021,
California, and Mexico City. Although 440 pp.
mid-twentieth-century Latin America
B
offered a safe haven from European almaceda criticizes the conven-
barbarisms, the conservative Roman tional understanding of Rus-
Catholic societies of the region were sian energy power that reduces
hardly free from anti-Semitism. Still, it to a mere state-held weapon used
Lomnitz’s well-networked, intelligent, by Moscow against the former Soviet
and hard-working family survived and states. Her own analysis is focused on
even prospered. Yet they remained value chains—the separate paths
haunted by the unspeakable traumas of taken by Russian natural gas, oil, and
the Holocaust, even as parents sought coal from their production in Siberia,
to shield their children from truths too through Ukraine, and to consumers in
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the European Union. In the countries his brother on the result of his super-
through which they pass, these value secret mission to the Soviet ambassador,
chains deeply permeate politics and Anatoly Dobrynin; and peek into the
business. For some important players, room next door, where the president’s
their country’s energy dependence on young lover is sleeping. Plohky also
Russia may turn out to be an opportu- shares Soviet soldiers’ recollections of
nity rather than a constraint. unbearable heat, poisonous plants,
Ukraine’s major energy oligarchs are a and worm-infested food during their
striking example. Dmytro Firtash, time in Cuba and relates the anxiety
Ihor Kolomoisky, and Rinat Akhmetov of the Soviet envoy Anastas Mikoyan
were able to build tremendous for- as he failed to placate the Cuban
tunes by extracting rents in the leader Fidel Castro, who was furious
natural gas, oil, and coal sectors, at what he saw as Khruschev’s be-
respectively, and turn their wealth trayal. Plokhy focuses on the many
into political power. Meanwhile, mistakes made by both major and
Ukraine’s industrial capacity contin- minor participants during the crisis.
ued to decline, and its role as a transit In his answer to the perennial ques-
country weakened. All three oligarchs tion of who blinked first, he empha-
remain powerful today, even as Russia sizes that both sides were operating in
has moved to drastically reduce “a dark room of deception and mutual
Ukraine’s transit role by launching the suspicion,” so “when one side blinked,
Nord Stream project, which will it took the other side more than a day
bypass Ukraine and bring Russian gas to realize what had happened.”
directly to Germany through a pipe-
line under the Baltic Sea. A Full-Value Ruble: The Promise of
Prosperity in the Postwar Soviet Union
Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban BY KRISTY IRONSIDE. Harvard
Missile Crisis University Press, 2021, 320 pp.
BY SERHII PLOKHY. Norton, 2021,
464 pp. In her study of Soviet economic policies
from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s,
Plokhy discovered a few previously Ironside contests the view that money
unknown documents relating to the had limited value in the Soviet system.
Cuban missile crisis, and although his She demonstrates that Soviet postwar
research does not essentially change governments were very concerned with
the story, his outstanding talent for increasing the ruble’s purchasing power
weaving a narrative from myriad as a means to economic growth and
sources makes his new book hard to eventual abundance. This goal, however,
put down. Readers witness tense remained unfulfilled. By examining
debates in the White House as Presi- political leaders’ beliefs, economic
dent John F. Kennedy’s aides reject experts’ debates, and citizens’ com-
his idea of a compromise with the plaints to the authorities, Ironside
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev; shows how a variety of economic
listen in as Robert Kennedy reports to policies introduced in the decades after

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World War II repeatedly led to the is playing out in the post-Soviet world,
accumulation of unspendable money in however, remains largely unexplored.
the hands of the people. The Soviet Radnitz applies political science
leader Joseph Stalin slashed consumer methods to an extensive comparative
prices, but amid an acute food shortage, study of the political use of conspiracy
there was little for people to buy. His theories in post-Soviet states (excluding
successor, Nikita Khrushchev, opted the Baltics). He points out that the
instead to raise pensions and the wages resort to “conspiracism” cannot be fully
of low-paid workers and to eliminate explained by either historical patterns or
certain taxes, but that led to wage the character of the political regime.
overspending—and without a rise in Incumbent politicians’ propensity for
productivity, the demand for goods still making conspiracy claims changes over
exceeded the supply. The resulting time and may rise in response to political
surplus of cash further undermined the developments. Drawing on a database of
ruble. The government tried various conspiracy claims originating in post-
means, such as compulsory mass- Soviet countries from 1995 to 2014,
subscription bonds, lotteries, and savings Radnitz identifies the immediate circum-
deposits, to absorb the excess cash, but stances—domestic political competition
these instruments steadily increased the or destabilizing events such as terrorist
government’s debt to its own citizens— attacks, protests, riots, or assassina-
which remained unpaid through the end tions—that tend to motivate leaders to
of the Soviet Union in 1991. rely on the rhetoric of conspiracism. Of
the countries examined, the increasingly
Revealing Schemes: The Politics of authoritarian Russia stands out for its
Conspiracy in Russia and the Post-Soviet volume of conspiracy claims, mostly
Region involving American or Western interven-
BY SCOT T RADNITZ . Oxford tions, many of them centered on the
University Press, 2021, 264 pp. disruptive events in Ukraine during the
2004–5 Orange Revolution and the
Russia Today and Conspiracy Theories: 2013–14 Euromaidan protests. Ukraine
People, Power, and Politics on RT itself, with its competitive and turbulent
BY ILYA YABLOKOV AND PRECIOUS politics, is second to Russia in the overall
N. CHAT TERJE-DOODY. Routledge, volume of conspiracy claims. Using
2021, 116 pp. surveys and focus groups, Radnitz
concludes that even among people who
In democracies and autocracies alike, are generally receptive to conspiracy
declining trust in politics and politicians theories, the essential cynicism of those
has allowed conspiracy theories to move theories tends to deepen public suspicion
from the margins of society to the center of the very officials who endorse them.
of politics. The study of this phenomenon Yablokov and Chatterje-Doody limit
is a growing field, but so far, it focuses their study to one purveyor of conspiracy
mostly on Western countries—the United theories: the English-language service of
States, in particular, provides a striking the Russian state-owned television
example of what is happening. The way it network RT. They trace its transformation
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from a source for stories about Russia to describes the regime’s attempts, across
an aggressive “ministry of information the reigns of several kings, to both
defense” waging war on Western main- collect and suppress documentation
stream media, with conspiracy theories as about the country’s past. But the book
its primary weapon. The authors describe is about more than archives. Ever since
RT’s methods based on an episode-by- the Saudi royal family faced damaging
episode examination of several RT shows, criticism for its cooperation with
including one hosted by Jesse Ventura, a non-Muslim powers in the 1990–91
retired wrestler and former governor of Gulf War, the monarchy has systemati-
Minnesota with a long track record as a cally pivoted away from reliance on the
conspiracy theorist. RT generally refrains Wahhabi religious establishment, which
from producing its own outlandish allega- had been its staunchest ally, and has
tions and opts instead for planting doubts constructed a secular nationalist narra-
about mainstream reports and interpreta- tive placing itself at the center of the
tions, whether by unashamedly taking one story. Doing so, Bsheer reveals, has
side or by participating in the “booming involved a variety of revisionist steps,
conspiracy culture in the United States.” from trying to obliterate evidence of
The authors acknowledge, however, that the lively and varied political debates of
when it comes to RT’s attempts to counter the late Ottoman era to seizing prop-
grave allegations of Russia’s wrongdoings, erty and destroying old neighborhoods
such as the government’s involvement in in order to transform Mecca and
the poisoning of the Russian opposition Medina from pilgrimage sites into
leader Alexei Navalny, the channel’s tourist destinations. Much of the work
tactics are not necessarily effective with of this “historic preservation”—consoli-
foreign audiences. dating national archives, creating
national museums, developing the
historic birthplace of the Saud family,
Middle East north of Riyadh, as a heritage site—was
overseen by the current king, Salman,
Lisa Anderson during his decades as the governor of
Riyadh, and it has been embraced and
accelerated under the current crown
prince, Mohammed bin Salman.
Archive Wars: The Politics of History in
Saudi Arabia You Can Crush the Flowers: A Visual
BY ROSIE BSHEER. Stanford Memoir of the Egyptian Revolution
University Press, 2020, 416 pp. BY BAHIA SHEHAB . Gingko Library,
2021, 144 pp.
T
his book is an intelligent,
subtle, and learned treatment of By her own account, Shehab, one of the
the efforts by the Saudi Arabian Arab world’s most inventive graphic
monarchy to construct and disseminate artists, was not a political rebel until the
a historical narrative that will legitimize Egyptian uprising of 2011. A Lebanese
its rule. Bsheer precisely and elegantly Egyptian, she’d spent most of her life in

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Lebanon, moving to Egypt only in 2004. Turkish Kaleidoscope: Fractured Lives in a

When the revolution broke out, she was Time of Violence
teaching at the American University in BY JENNY WHITE AND ERGUN
Cairo and was the mother of young GUNDUZ. Princeton University Press,
children and an artist with a budding 2021, 115 pp.
international career. (At the time, I was
serving as president of the university.) A graphic novel based on the civil unrest
Already well regarded for her work on that seized Turkey in the 1970s and led to
Arabic calligraphy, she had started a the military coup of 1980, this book
project called “A Thousand Times NO,” endeavors to capture the excitement,
in which she explored the various ways confusion, and, it appears, ultimate
the word “no” has been written in Arabic futility of the political activism of that
over the centuries. As the upheaval era. White, an American anthropologist
unfolded, she was inspired, as were many who was a student in Turkey at the time,
previously politically inactive Egyptians. and Gunduz, a Turkish artist and illustra-
She took to the streets, contributing to a tor, collaborated to follow the political
remarkable flowering of public art as a careers of four fictional student activ-
graffiti artist, stenciling variations of ists—two rightists and two leftists—as
works from “A Thousand Times NO” they clash over issues and causes they
across Cairo. It was a period of extraor- seem to understand poorly. As their
dinary artistic creativity, and Shehab’s battles spiral into factionalism and
memoir recounts the emotional intensity violence, they sacrifice family harmony,
and artistic inspiration of the period— long-standing friendships, and promising
and, better yet, illuminates it on page professional careers. White correctly
after page with her vivid photographs of argues that the format of the graphic
both her own work and that of other novel avoids the flattened abstractions of
graffiti artists working in Cairo at the conventional academic analysis, but the
time. The book’s title comes from a line book begs for an epilogue that would
of the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda’s that draw more universal conclusions and go
was scrawled across the walls of Cairo: beyond the wistful reminiscences decades
“You can crush the flowers, but you can’t later of now middle-aged protagonists.
stop the spring.” The memoir is evoca- After all, the groups to which these
tive and moving; the illustrations an young people pledged allegiance, what-
important piece of the historical record. ever their putative ideologies, are all
portrayed as being led by intolerant
autocrats. In a different format, White
and Gunduz might have shared their own
speculation about what may or may not
have changed in Turkey in the interven-
ing decades.
Recent Books
The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab
Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty Spring
BY RAY TAKEYH. Yale University EDITED BY RITA STEPHAN AND
Press, 2021, 336 pp. MOUNIRA M. CHARRAD. New York
With this addition to an already
crowded field of books on the question Women in the Middle East and North
“Who lost Iran?” Takeyh sets out to Africa are typically portrayed as victims—
provide a sober, fair-minded assess- of patriarchy and poverty, war and vio-
ment, enabled by perspectives afforded lence, Orientalism and imperialism. This
by both the passage of time and increas- book suggests, very convincingly, that they
ingly accessible archives. There is little are victimized just as much by the anti-
surprising in his version of this still quated platitudes, stereotypes, and
sorry story: the shah was an indecisive distortions with which they are portrayed.
autocrat; his American enablers were In a collection of 40 short pieces by
often distracted and ill informed; most scholars and activists, the editors showcase
of the monarchy’s officials were politi- a stunning variety of domains in which
cally naive, and many were simply women are operating on their own behalf
corrupt sycophants. Takeyh has a soft and in the service of others. Graffiti
spot for the old aristocracy, arguing artists, journalists, filmmakers, teachers,
that, however elitist it may have been, it bloggers, government ministers, commu-
had a far more sensitive finger on the nity organizers, and political activists are
pulse of the countryside than the debating constitutional reform in Tunisia,
clueless technocrats who implemented advocating feminism in Islam in Syria,
the shah’s U.S.-sponsored programs of supporting independence in southern
land reform and educational develop- Yemen, developing gender studies in
ment. Whether the landed nobility Morocco, calling for restorative justice in
would have been able to understand and Libya, demanding an end to sexual
respond to frustrations among peasants harassment in Egypt, advancing gay rights
and students—complaints that the in Lebanon. Although the seeds of this
revolutionary Islamists exploited activism were planted as early as the 1920s,
effectively—remains an open question. Stephan and Charrad argue compellingly
What is striking, however, is the num- that the Arab uprisings of 2010–11 em-
ber of senior figures in the regime who, boldened a generation of women who are
rather than stand their ground, simply now more active, more visible, and more
decamped to Europe or the United influential in the politics and social life of
States as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomei- the region than ever before. Despite all
ni’s revolution gathered steam, aban- appearances, the editors suggest, there has
doning not just the shah but also the been a subtle democratization of politics,
country they had enabled him to rule. as bottom-up pressure is forcing greater
accountability on often reluctant regimes.
The Arab Spring left important traces,
visible today in the growing prominence
and authority of women.

Recent Books
Asia and Pacific without fully understanding the political

risks. In places such as Libya, Sudan, and
Yemen, Beijing eventually had to provide
Andrew J. Nathan protection when insurgents threatened
Chinese personnel and assets. But so far,
China has limited itself to “military
China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the operations other than war,” such as
New Geopolitics of Eurasia participation in UN peacekeeping missions
BY DANIEL S. MARKEY . Oxford and multilateral antipiracy patrols, the
University Press, 2020, 336 pp. deployment of private security contrac-
tors, and crisis-driven evacuations. The
Protecting China’s Interests Overseas: policy debate at home suggests that
Securitization and Foreign Policy Beijing remains committed to the prin-
BY ANDREA GHISELLI . Oxford ciple of intervening only under UN
University Press, 2021, 304 pp. mandates and with the permission of local
governments. Instead of pushing for
T
hese deeply informed books permanent bases in many places abroad,
challenge the view that China’s the Chinese military prioritizes challenges
growing economic influence closer to home, such as Taiwan. If China
around the world will inevitably lead to were nonetheless to try to expand its
Chinese political and military domina- military footprint globally as its interests
tion. Markey demonstrates that in Iran, and capabilities increase, these books
Kazakhstan, and Pakistan, China seeks show that the process would not be easy.
energy resources, more secure transport
routes, and deference to its repression Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a
of the Uyghurs. But Beijing shows little Twenty-First-Century Conflict
interest in intervening in other coun- BY SUMANTRA BOSE. Yale University
tries’ domestic problems or in solving Press, 2021, 352 pp.
its partner states’ conflicts with their
neighbors. To be sure, the Chinese Over three-quarters of a century, the
presence reduces U.S. influence and contested territory of Kashmir has been the
buttresses authoritarian regimes with locus of four wars between India and
diplomatic support and new surveil- Pakistan, frequent firing and shelling
lance technology. But the partner incidents across the so-called Line of
governments themselves—and neigh- Control, Pakistani-sponsored terrorist
boring regional powers, such as India, incursions into the Indian-occupied sector
Russia, and Saudi Arabia—are keen to called Jammu and Kashmir, conflict
set limits on Chinese influence. So between the Muslim majority and the
China’s rising presence in continental Hindu minority, a protracted insurgency in
Eurasia is unlikely to lead to anything Jammu and Kashmir and an abusive Indian
resembling hegemony. counterinsurgency, and, to the east, clashes
Ghiselli focuses on the Middle East between Chinese and Indian forces over the
and North Africa, where Chinese state- Chinese-occupied sector called Aksai Chin.
owned enterprises have invested heavily More recently, Pakistani security agencies
have disrupted peace talks by dispatching
terrorist proxies to attack Indian interests,
and Jammu and Kashmir has been swept by
renewed waves of resistance; and in 2019,
the Hindu nationalist government of Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi imposed
direct central government control over the
sector in what is bound to be a futile
attempt to crush all opposition. Meanwhile,
China increased its military pressure in
Aksai Chin. Bose traces these events in
intimate detail. His analysis suggests that
peace is more remote than ever.
The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese Get Foreign Affairs

POWS in the Korean War
BY DAVID CHENG CHANG. Stanford
delivered straight
University Press, 2020, 496 pp. to your inbox.
After U.S.-led UN forces battled
Chinese and North Korean forces to a
stalemate on the Korean Peninsula in
July 1951, the two sides began to
negotiate an armistice. The negotiations
dragged on for two years because the
United States insisted on the “voluntary
repatriation” of Chinese prisoners of
war. This ostensibly humanitarian
concept was unacceptable to the Chinese
side (although Beijing eventually
yielded), violated the newly signed
Geneva Convention on the treatment of
POWs, and, as the war continued, cost
tragically large losses of life among
soldiers and POWs on both sides and
among North Korean civilians. Chang
shows that the true reason for the U.S.
policy was the desire for a propaganda
victory over China. Most of the 14,000
Chinese POWs who ultimately decided to foreignaffairs.com/newsletter
go to Taiwan did so as a result of an
American “reindoctrination/exploitation”
program in the camps that was violently
reinforced by a core group of

Recent Books
anticommunist prisoners and Chinese the state made war”—in this case,
Nationalist agents. Chang’s exceptionally however, with the help of organizational
vivid prisoner’s-eye account, based on techniques, weapons, and training from
camp archives and interviews with a powerful neighbor.
ex-POWs, leads him to condemn the key
U.S. policymakers, including President The Political Economy of the Abe
Harry Truman and Secretary of State Government and Abenomics Reforms
Dean Acheson, for their “arrogance, EDITED BY TAKEO HOSHI AND
ignorance, and negligence.” PHILLIP Y. LIPSCY. Cambridge
The Road to Dien Bien Phu: A History of
the First War for Vietnam The 25 expert contributors to this
BY CHRISTOPHER GOSCHA. book analyze how Shinzo Abe
Princeton University Press, 2022, managed not only to stay in office for
568 pp. eight years, from 2012 to 2020—the
longest term of any Japanese prime
Goscha’s zestfully granular history of the minister—but to carry out a series of
Vietminh war against the French, which major institutional reforms and
lasted from 1946 to 1954, challenges the stimulate the economy. Having learned
myth that Ho Chi Minh’s forces bested the lessons of his failed first term as
the professional French army simply prime minister (2006–7), Abe actively
because they were fighting for national managed public opinion, used
liberation. He focuses on a less under- strategically timed elections to
stood and more practical factor: Ho’s discipline factions in his ruling party,
creation of a party-controlled governing and increased staffing in the Cabinet
apparatus with the capacity to recruit, Secretariat and the prime minister’s
finance, arm, coordinate, and deploy office to control the bureaucracy. His
armed forces. Even from its early days economic policies, known as
as what Goscha calls an “archipelago “Abenomics,” accelerated existing
state,” Ho’s regime administered a programs to promote innovation,
network of territories, drafted soldiers, upgrade working conditions, boost
kept records, conducted police work, female workforce participation, and
issued currency, taxed commerce, and reduce the power of the national
carried on international trade. With association of agricultural cooperatives
Chinese support, Ho then expanded his over farmers’ business decisions,
organizational machine into a Leninist- among other gains. But several
style “wartime state,” able to field the chapters puzzle over why monetary
well-equipped conventional army that easing and fiscal stimulus under Abe
besieged and overran the French garri- drove smaller-than-desired increases in
son at Dien Bien Phu. The Vietminh inflation and economic growth. Many
was a modern Asian example of the late chapters are technical, but the book’s
sociologist Charles Tilly’s insight, drawn core leader-centered analysis gains
from the history of early modern credibility from the fact that Abe’s
Europe, that “war made the state, and successor, Yoshihide Suga, had the
Recent Books
same tools as Abe but was less Africa

successful. Abe would doubtless pick
up his agenda again if he were to
return to office for a third term.
Nicolas van de Walle
China and the International Human Rights

Regime, 1982–2017 Blood and Diamonds: Germany’s Imperial
BY RANA SIU INBODEN . Cambridge Ambitions in Africa
University Press, 2021, 320 pp. BY STEVEN PRESS. Harvard
China in the post-Mao period has not
P
tried to deny or destroy the international ress has written an excellent
human rights regime, but it has worked history of Germany’s colony
to shape the regime in its favor, usually in German South West Africa, a
ways that weaken it. Inboden’s revealing place that eventually gained indepen-
behind-the-scenes case studies show how dence as the country of Namibia in 1990.
China’s human rights diplomacy has The book looks at the story through the
become increasingly sophisticated. When prism of diamonds, the colony’s main
the UN Convention Against Torture was source of revenue and exports. This is a
drafted, in the early 1980s, China was smart choice, as it allows Press to range
relatively passive. But during negotia- widely, from the day-to-day activities in
tions over the convention’s optional the diamond fields, to business intrigue
protocol, in the 1990s, it worked (along in Berlin, to the shady politics of the
with the United States and others) to international diamond trade in Antwerp,
weaken the ability of an independent Johannesburg, and London. German
anti-torture subcommittee to inspect South West Africa was founded in the
places of detention in signatory states. In 1880s to further the imperial ambitions
the following decade, when the UN’s new of German Chancellor Otto von Bis-
Human Rights Council was writing its marck, and Press’s account shows that
rules of operation, China worked with the colony well deserved its reputation
others to block proposals that would have for brutal violence. His careful economic
made the council more effective, such as a history makes clear the importance of
human rights good-behavior requirement diamonds to the survival of the colony
for states to join the council. The book’s and to Germany’s economic reach at the
third case study tracks China’s use of the time, as South West African diamonds
compliance-monitoring committee of the came to dominate the huge retail market
International Labor Organization as a for gems in the United States. As in
venue to trade favors with like-minded almost every colony, this natural resource
regimes that want to avoid scrutiny. With wealth mostly benefited the imperial
well-staffed missions in Geneva and New rulers back home, especially a small
York, China is a player wherever human number of German banks and business-
rights norms are shaped and applied. men. The colony’s infrastructure re-
mained rudimentary, most of the small
German settler population lived in

Recent Books
poverty, and the indigenous African The War That Doesn’t Say Its Name: The
labor force toiled to mine alluvial dia- Unending Conflict in the Congo
monds under horrendous conditions. BY JASON K. STEARNS. Princeton
Insurgency and War in Nigeria:
Regional Fracture and the Fight In 2003, an internationally brokered
Against Boko Haram peace deal formally ended the murder-
BY AKALI OMENI. I.B. Tauris, 2020, ous Second Congo War and created a
288 pp. transitional national government in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. But
Most academic studies of Boko Haram the fighting never stopped. Stearns’s
have focused on the Islamist militant book seeks to explain why, despite major
group’s sociological roots and religious UN peacekeeping missions and substan-
antecedents. Aside from two short tial foreign aid, the last two decades
chapters on the organization’s formative have been marked by regular outbreaks
years and its turn to violence, Omeni’s of violence in the eastern and northeast-
highly original study focuses instead on ern regions of the country. Stearns
trying to explain the group’s success details the emergence of warlords with
over the last few decades as a fighting ambiguous motivations, the repeated
force. He analyzes its ability to benefit interventions by Rwanda and Uganda,
from the rugged environment in which and the role of the incompetent and
it operates, in northeastern Nigeria, on rapacious national army. An old Congo
the borders with Cameroon, Chad, and hand who appears to have interviewed
Niger. He then turns to its military all the key players, Stearns does not
tactics. Many analyses of the group offer a linear history of the conflict,
emphasize its use of seemingly indis- instead moving back and forth across
criminate violence against civilians, the two decades to develop his argu-
including kidnappings and suicide ments. But he makes a convincing case
bombings. Omeni argues, however, that that the violence has been sustained by a
Boko Haram has sometimes operated as “military bourgeoisie” that benefits from
a more traditional insurgency and has instability by plundering natural re-
exhibited both organizational resilience sources and foreign aid. The govern-
and a good deal of strategic savvy in its ment has made things worse by shelling
choice of targets and its ability to out “fighting bonuses” to military
surprise the Nigerian army with chang- personnel that dwarf their peacetime
ing tactics. The book also includes a salaries. The violence has created a small
useful discussion of the group’s relation- but influential ruling class that has little
ship with the Islamic State (also known motivation to end the bloodshed.
as ISIS), which ultimately led Boko
Haram to fragment into two rival
factions in 2016. Unfortunately, the
book does not discuss the implications
of the recent death of Abubakar Shekau,
who had led the organization since 2009.
Recent Books
Empire of Rubber: Firestone’s Scramble for The Wealth of Refugees: How Displaced
Land and Power in Liberia People Can Build Economies
BY GREGG MITMAN. New Press, BY ALEXANDER BET TS. Oxford
2021, 336 pp. University Press, 2021, 448 pp.
In 1926, the fledgling Firestone Tire and Today, there are more than 25 million
Rubber Company was looking for a way people who have left their countries of
to reduce its dependence on British origin because of some combination of
suppliers from Southeast Asia, as it tried economic, environmental, and political
to keep up with an explosion in the crises. Such refugees often feature in
American appetite for car tires. That is Western media as a burden on the rich
how the company came to invest in a countries of the developed world. In
rubber plantation in Liberia. Over time, fact, the overwhelming majority remain
and with help from accommodating in the region of their homeland, as
governments in the United States and Betts makes clear in this informative
Liberia, the company came to dominate account of contemporary refugee policy.
the country’s economy and policymaking The three East African countries that
to a remarkable extent. Mitman peppers provide the main case studies for the
this history with a wealth of fascinating book—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda—
details and interesting characters. Most alone account for some three million
readers will be surprised to learn, for refugees today. Betts’s central argument
instance, that one of the early boosters of is that even in low-income hosting
the venture was the American civil rights countries, the right mix of policies can
leader W. E. B. Du Bois, who would ensure that refugees not merely survive
soon regret having believed that Fire- in misery but can instead thrive and
stone could hasten the emergence of an generate wealth for themselves, their
independent African bourgeoisie. communities, and the host country. In
Instead, as Mitman demonstrates, particular, his analysis suggests that
Firestone and its supporters in the U.S. providing refugees with civil and
government brought to relations with economic rights, allowing them to work,
Liberia the attitudes and practices of Jim and integrating them more completely
Crow—even long after World War II. A in the receiving communities can lead
long succession of Liberian heads of to much better outcomes.∂
state were willing to play along not least
because, with the help of Firestone, they
invested in very profitable rubber
plantations of their own.
Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), November/December 2021, Volume 100, Number 6. Published six times annually (January, March,
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stoke polarization, but the tinder has to

Letters to be in place for the fire to start. It is
precisely such polarization that contrib-
the Editor utes to the government dysfunction that
Norris claims we ignore. Yet in our book,
we made our storyline clear: polarization
operates through stalemated institutions,
growing public disaffection with demo-
POWER TO THE PEOPLE? cratic procedures, and voters’ support for
To the Editor: autocrats who offer supposed solutions
We appreciated Pippa Norris’s that cut through procedural niceties.
generous review of our book Backsliding Norris also chastises us for our
(“Voters Against Democracy,” May/ narrow and highly heterogeneous
June 2021). Unfortunately, however, it sample of 16 cases, but our selection was
misses not only important aspects of self-conscious. Backsliding is an incre-
our argument but also key dimensions mental deterioration of democratic
of the very concept of backsliding. institutions and norms in countries that
Norris argues that we focus primarily have attained a modicum of democracy
on elites and thus miss larger changes in to begin with. Not all forms of demo-
electorates and the failure of democratic cratic regression fit this definition.
institutions to deliver the goods. As she What is striking is precisely that the
puts it, “Haggard and Kaufman treat diverse countries in our sample show
demand-side factors, the forces that common patterns: histories of polariza-
allow illiberal leaders to rise, as second- tion, a crucial role for legislative acqui-
ary. They assume a limited role for the escence—a key component of our
public: voters provide a market for argument that Norris ignores—and
illiberal political appeals, sending illib- strategies of stealth and incremental-
eral leaders into office, but then are seen ism. There is much more to be said on
as passively accepting the consequences.” backsliding, including about its invidi-
She even goes so far as to claim that we ous foreign policy consequences. But
have a “‘great man’ theory of history.” Norris’s objections cover ground that is
Nothing could be further from the fully addressed in Backsliding.
truth. We do define backsliding as STEPHAN HAGGARD
purposeful institutional change led by Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of
would-be autocrats, but precisely in Korea-Pacific Studies, University of
contexts in which they have gained office California, San Diego
in free and fair elections. The electorate ROBERT R. KAUFMAN
is baked into the very concept of back- Distinguished Professor of Political
sliding. As Norris notes, it is ultimately Science, Rutgers University
voters who acquiesce to majoritarian and
even authoritarian appeals. Norris replies:
Moreover, the starting point in our As my review noted, Stephan Hag-
causal story is polarization, and among gard and Robert Kaufman’s book makes
publics as well as elites. Autocrats may an invaluable contribution to the debate
Letters to the Editor
over the deterioration of democratic Backlash, it is structural and cultural

institutions, norms, and practices. But as changes in mass society that are the
their letter suggests, Backsliding empha- primary long-term drivers of backsliding—
sizes top-down explanations focused on resulting in consequences for institutions
the role of autocrats (or would-be and opportunities for strategic elites.
autocrats), who are seen to stoke polar- There is clearly room for supply-side,
ization, and on the importance of demand-side, and institutional accounts
“stalemated institutions.” They write, in the literature on democratic regres-
“We do define backsliding as purposeful sion. Analysts do not and should not
institutional change led by would-be have to artificially pick one or another in
autocrats.” Right. In this view, the any comprehensive understanding. But
electorate is a facilitator of executive there are profound differences in those
power but not a primary driver of it; accounts in theoretical emphasis and
voters “acquiesce,” but they are not the empirical evidence.∂
reason democracy is eroding. The public
is treated as the Greek chorus in the FOR THE RECORD
wings—not the principal lead. This is a A review of Policing Iraq (September/
common view in the media. October 2021) incorrectly described the
That was the key point of my review. city of Sulaymaniyah as the capital of
As the political scientist Ronald Inglehart the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq.
and I demonstrate in our book Cultural The region’s capital is Erbil.
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November/December2021 231
Too Hostile to China?
Foreign Affairs Brain Trust
We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that U.S. foreign policy
has become too hostile to China. The results are below.
20
10
0
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 8 STRONGLY AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 10
Oriana Skylar Mastro J. Stapleton Roy

Center Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for Former U.S. Ambassador to China,
International Studies at Stanford University, Indonesia, and Singapore and former
and Senior Nonresident Fellow, American Assistant Secretary of State for
Enterprise Institute Intelligence and Research
“While it’s true that the United States has decided “By overreacting to China, the United States is
to push back against some nefarious Chinese misplaying a strong hand and lessening
activities, the U.S. approach is still relatively Asian countries’ confidence that Washington can
measured. For better or for worse, Washington has manage its relationship with China in a
at its disposal far more ‘hostile’ options that it has manner consistent with their interests.
yet to exercise.” We can do much better.”
232 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/USChina

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THE END OF THE AGE OF INTERVENTION

The CSS Point, Pakistan’s The Best

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THE DIVIDED WORLD

Containment Beyond the Cold War 22

The Kremlin’s Strange Victory 36

The Inevitable Rivalry 48

The Last Days of Intervention 60

Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy 74

The Age of America First 85

The Coming Democratic Revival 99

The Technopolar Moment 112

Americaí s Crypto Conundrum 129

The Myth of Russian Decline 142

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REVIEWS & RESPONSES

How Apartheid Endures 184

Liars in High Places 190

The Imperial Presidency’s Enablers 195

Recent Books 203

Letters to the Editor 230

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SUBSCRIP TION SERVICES: Foreign Affairs

The son of a British intelligence officer, RORY STEWART

TSAI ING-WEN is the president of Taiwan. Born and raised in

From 1997 to 2001, MADELEINE ALBRIGHT served as the first

THE DIVIDED WORLD

The New Cold War The Kremlin’s Strange Victory

Containment Beyond the Cold War The Inevitable Rivalry

It’s no longer debatable that the

during the last half of the last Cold War,

10 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S PACKAGE ILLUSTRATIONS BY BENEDET TO CRISTOFANI

chiefly a land power, beset by an ancient forms of hybrid hegemony. President

infallibility on which legitimacy in an recovered quickly enough to join the

ity: history is full of instances in which STRATEGY AND UNCERTAINTY

Discover our degrees in

November 19, 1991, he had asked one of

if Ukraine’s breaking away would prompt

mode of enlargement would have rizes nato enlargement as either good

consign Eastern Europe indefinitely to Hence, if Gorbachev had asked the

scher’s thinking, not Bush’s: What if NO SECOND-TIER GUARANTEES

As U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine The all-or-nothing expansion strat-

cil. Like everyone else who worked in

learned a great deal about Trump’s

still agonizing to watch. I was sitting in plenty of evidence of an extensive and

vulnerability to subversion. Putin Referendums, plebiscites, and executive

Whether you want to work in business, government, or the

Move into roles that support multi-national cooperation related

States as an extension of his other his most formidable opponents, Joe

Union posed an existential threat to the Washington is hell-bent on invasion

same political direction for some of the decades as an intelligence operative

erodes Americans’ sense of a shared strife and populist proclivities among

inevitable triumph and the obsolescence

cratic and Republican administrations

tions. Applied to China, this logic permanent most-favored-nation status,

increasingly aggressive foreign policy. mittee and in the Obama administra-

embraces capitalism. Americans should Berlin, for example, making Washington’s

least consider employing nuclear would require Washington to maintain