[G.R. No. L-13134. February 13, 1960.

MARIA C. ROA, plaintiff and appellant, v. SEGUNDA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., defendants

and appellees. 

Felimon Cajator for Appellant. 

Valeriano Silva and Abel de Ocera for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WHEN CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME MAY BE

DETERMINED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. — The civil liability arising from crime may be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it
adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. 

2. ID.; WHEN OFFENDED PARTY MAY INTERVENE IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE

CRIMINAL CASE. — An offended party in a criminal case may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense, only if he has not waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right of institute it, subject, always, to the direction and control of
the prosecuting fiscal. 

3. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION. — The right of intervention reserved to the

offended party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act
and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 

4. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF OFFENDER FOR DAMAGES; FAILURE TO ALLEGE DAMAGES IN

THE INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT, EFFECT OF. — Even if the complaint or information
is silent as to damages or the intention to prove and claim them, the offender is still liable
for them, and the offended has the right to prove and claim for them in the criminal case,
unless a waiver or the reserving of the civil action is made. 

5. ID.; RES JUDICATA; WHEN JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTION BARS CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES. — Where, as in the present case, the offended party elected to claim damages
arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her appearance or
intervention as private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to
the subsequent civil action for damages based upon the same cause. 

6. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT CONCLUSIVE AS TO FUTURE PROCEEDINGS. — Under the principle

of res judicata, that judgment is conclusive as to future proceedings at law not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain the claim or demand, but as to any
admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for damages upon defendants’ motion on the ground that it
was barred by prior judgment. 

The facts are not disputed. In Criminal Case No. 1225 of the court below, Segunda de la
Cruz, one of herein defendants, was charged with serious oral defamation. The offended
party, herein plaintiff Maria C. Roa, did not waive the civil action or reserve her
right to institute it, but intervened through counsel in the prosecution of the
offense. After trial, the court on April 30, 1957 rendered a decision finding the defendant
Segunda de la Cruz guilty a slight slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00. It,
likewise, ordered her to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs, but
made no award as to damages. 

About a month later, or on May 28, 1957, the offended party Maria C. Roa filed the present
action in the same court below against Segunda de la Cruz and her husband Juan Aguas to
recover moral and exemplary damages. The cause of action was based on the
defamatory remarks which were the subject matter of the criminal action against
Segunda de la Cruz. The aggregate amount sought to be recovered, including attorney’s
fees, was P28.000.00. 

Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that it was barred by prior judgment and that it did not state a cause of action.
Sustaining the motion on the first ground, the court below dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff
in due time filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this
appeal. 

Article 33 of the new Civil Code provides:

"Art. 33. In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence."

Under the above provisions, independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit
for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. It is
apparent, however, from the use of the words "may be", that the institution of such
suit is optional. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R. C. Puno, Vol. I,
p. 54.) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it
adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. 1 (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz. [25] 4633.) 

In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa — upon whose initiative the
criminal action for defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed — did not
reserve her right to institute an independent civil action. Instead, she chose to intervene in
the criminal proceedings as private prosecutor through counsel employed by her. Such
intervention, as observed by the court below, could only be for the purpose of
claiming damages or indemnity, and not to secure the conviction and punishment of
the accused therein as plaintiff now pretends. This must be so because an offended party
in a criminal case may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the
offense, only if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute
it, subject, always, to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in
connection with section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil.,
197). The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the
prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action
is that by such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its
prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, Et Al., v.
Gatmaitan, Et Al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [5] 2526.) The rule, therefore, is that the
right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing
the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
(People v. Orais, 65 Phil. 744; People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People v. Flores Et. Al., G. R.
No. L-7528, December 18, 1957; see also U. S. v. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U. S. v. Heery, 25
Phil. 600.) 

Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the
criminal case through her appearance or intervention as private prosecutor, we hold
that the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present
civil action for damages based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard
Vacuum Oil Co., Et Al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.) 

". . . A judgment upon the merit bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, brought in a
different form of action, and a party, therefore, cannot by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case escape the operation of the principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." (Francisco v. Blas, Et Al., 93
Phil., 1.) 

The fact that there is no claim or allegation of damages in the complaint or information is of
no legal consequence. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art.
100, Revised Penal Code.) It has, therefore, been held that even if the complaint or
information is silent as to damages or the intention to prove and claim them, the offender is
still liable for them, and the offended case, unless a waiver or the reservation of the civil
action is made, (People v. Oraza, 83 Phil., 633; 46 Off. Gaz. Supp. No. 11, p. 86.) As
already stated, herein plaintiff not only did not waive or reserve her right to file a
separate civil action but actually intervened in the criminal action. 

The criminal court, it is true, did not enter a judgment for indemnity when it was duty
bound to do so because of the intervention of the offended party. See People v. Ursua, 60
Phil., 253.) It would appear, however, that plaintiff failed to submit evidence of her
damages. For such failure, she has only herself or her counsel to blame. Of course, she
could have still filed a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to rectify the error. But his
she failed to do, thus allowing the decision to become final and executory. Under the
principle of res judicata, that judgment is conclusive as to future proceedings at law not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain the claim or demand, but
as to any other admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose. (Miranda
v. Tiangco, Et Al., 96 Phil., 526; 51 Off. Gaz., [3] 1366; NAMARCO v. Judge Macadaeg, 98
Phil., 185; 52 Off. Gaz. 182.) 

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs. 

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L.,

Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.