PROPERTY

Llantino vs. Co Liong Chong

FACTS:
• The Llantinos aver that they are the owners of a commercial-residential land situated in the
municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, which sometime in 1954 they leased to Juan Molina who
was then a Chinese national and went by the name of Co Liong Chong for a period of thirteen
(13) years for the sum of P6,150.00 for the whole period.
• Co Liong Chong was placed in possession of the property but knowing that the period of
the least would end with the year 1967.
• Llantino requested Co Liong Chong for a conference but the latter did not honor the request
and instead he informed the Llantinos that he had already constructed a commercial building
on the land worth P50,000.00; that the lease contract was for a period of sixty (60) years,
counted from 1954; and that he is already a Filipino citizen.
• The claim of Chong came as a surprise to the Llantinos because they did not remember
having agreed to a sixty-year lease agreement as that would virtually make Chong the owner
of the realty which, as a Chinese national, he had no right to own and neither could he have
acquired such ownership after naturalization subsequent to 1954.
• On December 16, 1967, in order to avoid a court litigation the Llantinos once more invited
Chong to a conference about the matter but again Chong ignored the invitation.
• Hence, on January 10, 1968, the Llantinos filed their complaint to quiet title with damages
before the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes
• At the pre-trial, both parties agreed upon the identity of the land as described in the
complaint. It was mutually admitted that the defendants original name was Co Liong Chong
who was then a Chinese national in 1954, when he approached the Llantinos and offered to
lease the land in question. It was also admitted by the counsel for the defendant that prior
to the filing of the case, the plaintiffs have in fact invited the defendant to a conference about
the matter • Chong's counsel produced the carbon original of the contract of lease entered
into between Chong and the Llantinos and the existence of the contract of lease as a public
instrument was admitted
• It was also admitted that Chong had in fact constructed a building of strong materials on
the land worth P40,000 and that Chong has become a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1961 and
that his name is no longer Co Liong Chong but Juan Molina
• Trial Court rendered a Decision declaring the contract of lease entered into by the parties
valid
• From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of law

ISSUE: WON the lease contract is invalid because at the time of its execution, he was a
Chinese. NO.

HELD:
• The contract was VALID.
• The lower court correctly ruled that Chong had at the time of the execution of the contract,
the right to hold by lease the property involved in the case although at the time of the
execution of the contract, he was still a Chinese national
• In the present case, it has been established that there is only one contract and there is no
option to buy the leased property in favor of Chong. There is nothing in the record, either in
the lease contract or in the complaint itself, to indicate any scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition.
• Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject contract is prohibited, the same can no longer
be questioned presently upon the acquisition by the private respondent of Filipino citizenship.
It was held that sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino citizen is valid
• Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option
giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine
citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use of lands for
residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted
temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should
they desire to remain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship
is not impossible to acquire
• The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid is, if there are
circumstances attendant to its execution, which are used as a scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition. If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a
piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual
transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights, the sum of
which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the
use, the next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership
is made up are consolidated in an alien.

FALLO: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against the plaintiffs-appellants.
Laurel vs. Garcia

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives
and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at 306 Roppongi; 5-chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. The
subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May
1956. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino
people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the
Philippine government.
2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and
jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for
public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement
and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government
and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is
outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil
335). It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted
by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Petition is granted.
Noveras vs. Noveras

FACTS:
David A. Noveras and Leticia T. Noveras were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually
acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras, who
was born on 4 November 1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. Upon learning that
David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, USA.

The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on
29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well
as all the couple’s properties in the USA. On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.

The RTC rendered judgment which stated among others that the absolute community of
property of the parties is declared as dissolved. The net assets of the absolute community of
property of the parties in the Philippines were awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only,
with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of
petitioner Leticia Noveras. One half of each of these properties were awarded to their children.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment
was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues
that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment
in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the
California court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute community of property of the spouses should be
liquidated by virtue of the divorce decree granted to the petitioner – NO but petition for
judicial separation of property was granted based on another article in the FC
RULING AND DOCTRINE:
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond
of marriage between the parties. The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were
not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not
tackled in the trial court’s decision because the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties. The records of this case are replete with
evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it
is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to
go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends
that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Moreover, the Court also affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Philippine
courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties. It likewise affirmed the
modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes.