City Academy Law College (Affiliated To Lucknow University) Lucknow
City Academy Law College (Affiliated To Lucknow University) Lucknow
City Academy Law College (Affiliated To Lucknow University) Lucknow
Session-2021-2022
REFORMS
paper, for her patience and understanding, responsibility and motivation. Her
the instructor of the Senior Dissertations Class. His enthusiasm, great sense of
humor, encouragement and faith in all the ICP seniors has been extremely
helpful. I also would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude to all of the
Department faculty members for their help and support. My sincere thanks also
go to Shivani for sharing his knowledge with me. Despite of being very busy, he
I thank my friends Shreya for their endless support and help. I thank my family and
parents for their love and care
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CONTENTS
Preface
Abstract
Introduction
CHAPTER 1
Structure of Electoral System in India
The system of Election in India
The Problems
The Suggested Reform Options
CHAPTER 2
Electoral Rolls and Voter ID
Electronic Voting Machines
Booth Capturing and Rigging
President’s Rule During Elections
Communal and Caste Hatred
Use of Muscle Power
Criminalization of the electoral process
Election Expenditure – The Money Power
CHAPTER 3
Disqualification on Ground of Corrupt Practices
Compulsory Voting
Negative Voting
Defections and the Tenth Schedule
Delimitation of Constituencies
Problems of Instability
CONCLUSION
Issues of Political Morality
Miscellaneous Suggestions
SUMMARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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PREFACE
There has been increased realization in the world that a democratic form of government,
drawbacks notwithstanding, is the best form of government and elections are the means
through which such form of government is obtained. Elections are particularly
conspicuous and revealing aspects of most contemporary political systems. They
highlight and dramatize a political system, bringing its nature into sharp relief, and
providing insights into other aspects of the system and the basic nature and a‹:tual
functioning of the system as a whole.
Elections are complex events involving individual and collective decisions which
directly affect, and are affected by, the total socio-political and legal process. They
open up channels between the polity and the society, between the elites and the
masses, between the individual and his government.
Election obviously have different meanings and play different roles in different
political systems. But in every political system, elections are the cornerstone of
democracy. They lie at heart of democratic and provide opportunities for expressions
of popular will. The credibility of the electoral process has an important bearing on the
healthy functioning of a political system. Holding of free and fair election is, therefore,
the sine qua non of democracy.
When India became independent in 1947, and opted for parliamentary democracy, it
chose for its electoral system the one with which it had become familiar during the
preceding decades — the Anglo-American majority system The statute drawn up to
govern Indian Elections derived not only its content but even its name from its British
counterpart — Representation of the People Act. There has been some tinkering with
the laws, some amendments here and there, some revision of rules, but the basic
structure has been the same.
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Since the Indian Republic began its march in its historic career in 1950, basic features of the
electoral system have been held al(›ft. It goes to the credit of the Indian masses that they have,
by and large, shown capacity for political judgement to give marching orders to the errant
rulers from time to time. The vibrancy of the democratic system depends in the fairness of
elections. If elections are vitiated by violence, intimidation, booth capturing and other unfair
practices, the choice of people is not properly reflective and democracy becomes a farce. So, it
is essential for the survival of democracy to ensure that elections are free and fair. Owing to
their significance in a democratic political system, the elections are governed by a set of laws.
Since the Indian electoral experience has been so vast, it seems particularly important to bear
in mind the larger aspects and significance of the electoral process in India. This perspective
can be best achieved by stressing systemic and developmental analysis.
The present study therefore has been chosen by the researcher to throw some light on the
present scenario of electoral system in India. The primary objective of this research work is to
make an evaluation of the overall election laws in India, identifying areas of practice that seem
to call for improvement from the perspective of laws relating to the Indian electoral system.
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ABSTRACT AND PROLOGUE
A general election in India is a gigantic exercise. It is equal to holding polls in Europe, the
United States, Canada and Australia all put together. General elections to Lok Sabha and State
Legislative Assemblies in India are held under the supervision, direction and control of a
constitutional body - the Election Commission of India. Elections to local bodies – Panchayats
and Nagarpalikas – are the responsibility of State Election Commissioners.
Nearly fifty years of experience has brought to fore many distortions, some very serious, that
have crept into the conduct of India’s elections generating a deep concern in most quarters.
There are constant references to 3 MPs, viz. money power, muscle power and mafia power and
to 4Cs, viz. criminalisation, corruption, communalism, and casteism. Also, majority of our
representatives are elected by a minority of votes cast thereby making their representative
credentials doubtful. The result is that the legitimacy of our political process gets seriously
compromised.
After a review of various reports, research papers by activist organisations and concerned
citizens, newspaper reports and analyses, and other literature available on the subject of
elections, this paper attempts to create a discussion and consultation agenda.
The paper emphasizes that the basics of an electoral system i.e., the preparation and
maintenance of electoral rolls and a foolproof voter ID needs the highest and resolute attention
which by itself has the potential to help take care of some of the serious problems such as
impersonation and rigging. Also, it addresses the divisive nature of our electoral campaigns and
criminalisation of the process and attempts to find ways that would help contain these.
The paper raises the fundamental question of the high cost of elections and legitimate sources of
funding political activity and election campaigns. In this connection the need for drastically
bringing down the costs and the Gandhian model of decentralization and a bottom-up instead of
the present top down approach are also mentioned.
It is felt that it would be necessary to impart effective political education in democracy and for
democracy and in citizenship responsibilities so that the right kind of representatives are elected
and kept fully accountable to the people. For, in the ultimate analysis, the objective of all
electoral laws and processes is to provide to the nation truly representative legislators of good
quality who in turn can give us a good and development oriented governance and a citizen
friendly administration.
The paper reflects on some of the more important electoral reform options and treats them in a
way that should help the readers form their own informed views. The purpose basically is to
generate a national debate and elicit reactions and not to advocate any particular course of
action or reform agenda.
CHAPTER- 1
INTRODUCTION
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Introduction
The history of electoral laws in India date back to the Act of 1919 but it has its origin in the
Act of 1861 itself. As a result of the First Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, non-official representation
on the Governor’s and Governor General’s Council was provided, and as a result of this
decision the Act of 1861 was formed. The Act provided that there should be appointment of
other members which are not less than six and not more than 12. The time for this should be
two years. Amongst this half of the members are needed to be non-official . The people on
this council were not be included on the basis of the Principle of Democracy, rather were the
Rulers of the Princely States or their Dewans who were just faithful to the Britishers.
After this came the Indian Councils Act of 1894, which like the Act before this failed to
impress the people especially the rising, Indian National Congress which was in its early
stages. As for the Supreme Council, this act increased the number to not less than 10 and not
higher than 16 and "prescribed the manner in which such regulations should be carried into
effect"1. ML Schwann, a Member of Parliament from Manchester, was unsure whether the
electoral system would be effectively put in place in practice because even the word election
was not stated in the Act. He then submitted an amendment specifying that, “no reform of the
Indian councils which does not embody the elective principle will prove satisfactory to the
Indian people or compatible with good Government”2. Lord Curzon stated, "In reply I should
like to point out that our Bill does not exclude some such principles, be it the method of
election, or selection or delegation"3.
The 1909 Indian Councils Act, which was better known as the Morley Minto Reforms of
1909 enhanced the legislative councils of both the governor general and the provincial
councils4. They introduced for the first time, the system of voting, although indirect, for
the process of forming a portion of non-official representatives. Every Legislative Council
consisted of three groups of members: the elected, the official and the appointed non-
commissioned members. However, the theory has been limited by so many constraints,
stoppage and distortions. The franchise was highly narrow based such that the elective
theory lost its true meaning and purpose.
• Electoral class including the electoral districts of Land holders and the
Muslim electorate ;
This model was extremely puzzling which was often "confusing" for the class and the special
electorate. In general, the beginning of caste based electoral system is considered to be very
mischievous and notorious which an out-of-the-box example of notorious British Colonialism
in India. Though these reforms were a betterment over the Act of 1892, they did not fulfil the
need of the people. The Councils have not been true representatives of the people as a whole.
Close franchise and the process of election which was indirect have been able to give the
members a feeling of responsibility towards the people. Mr. Montagu then came to India in
1917-18 and then published a report called as the Montagu Chelmsford report which was on
the need for constitutional reforms in India. In the meantime, another Franchise Committee
was appointed which was to study the issues of franchise and election. The recommendations
of that were made by the Franchise Committee was the basis for the elections under the 1919
Act. The new central legislature was made up of two chambers: the Council of States and the
Central Legislative Assembly. Under the rules made by the Government of India, the Council
5
Government of India, Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms, Calcutta, 1918, p. 54.
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of States was to have 60 members, among which 34 were elected-20 by the general
electorate, 3 by the European Chambers of Commerce and 11 by the communal electorate (10
by the Muslims and 1 by the Sikhs). The Assembly consisted of 143 members, of whom 103
were elected – 51 by general electoral districts, 32 by municipal districts (30 by Muslims and
2 by Sikhs) and 20 by special electoral districts (7 by landholders, 9 by Europeans and 4 by
Indian Commerce). The Franchise Committee had suggested such a system for the Indian
Legislative Assembly because according to it, the election which were direct although much
better were practically not possible at the moment. The constitutions, it stated, based on the
provinces divided into different franchise would be too large and unwieldy, and a narrower
franchise would not have any logic and would also not have any political desirability. India
therefore selected the method of direct elections to all houses that were in the the Central
Legislature. Similarly, the majority of the members of the Legislative Councils, taken
together, made up 77.8% of the total number6. But we cannot call any of the Central
Legislatures to democratic in nature or that they represent the people in any manner.
Although it was direct, it remained very low and narrow. Until 1919, there had been no
system of direct election except for the Muslim and people who were Land Holder in the
Central Legislature. Representatives have always come through the method of election which
was indirect in nature. However, in the 1919 Act, the system which was of indirect elections
was changed to direct elections. A full chapter on franchises and elections was introduced in
the Act of 1919. Section 64(i) of the Government of India Act of 1919 says about the conduct
of the election. It says that the , "subject to the provisions of this Act may be made by Rules
under this Act as to "7.
• The qualifications of the electors, the constitution of the electoral divisions, the
method of election of the Council of States and the Legislative Assembly (including
the number of members to be elected by the municipal and other electorates) and any
incidental or ancillary issues there;
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However, Section 15 of the Electoral Rules of 1920 authorized the provincial governments to
issue regulations on the actual conduct of elections under the Act. The conduct of the
elections was therefore the responsibility of the provincial government, which not only issued
an election regulation, but also obtained an election with the help of its officials. Elections
were held in 1920, 1923, 1926 and 1929 under the Act of 1919. The second Franchise
Committee was appointed by the British Cabinet in 1928 to examine the current franchise
and election system and to make recommendations to be incorporated into the Government of
India Act of 1935. The Franchise Committee then made some serious recommendations on
the reform of the electoral system and the machinery. The recommendations were duly
accepted by the Government of India and the Government of the Great Britain and
incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1935.
Another milestone in the history of elections in India is the Government of India Act of 1935,
which was only partially implemented-because only the provincial part of the Act came into
force. During the evolution of this Act, the question of the franchise attracted the attention of
several bodies. The Indian statutory commission, popularly known as the Simon
Commission, recommended in 1928, was in favor of enfranchising at least 10 % of the total
population, or 20% of the adult population, and greatly increased the proportion of female
voters8. The Indian Franchise Sub-Committee at the Round Table Conference argued for a
recommendation similar to that of the Simon Commission. In 1931, the chairmanship of Lord
Lothian considered the question of adult suffrage. The Committee did not, however, show
itself in favor of its adoption. In view of the fact that adult franchise was considered
administratively impossible and, generally speaking, the line of the Round Table Conference
Sub-Committee was in favor of extending the franchise to ten to twenty per cent of the total
population9. The Act of 1935 did not envisage any change in the principles of the allocation
of seats in the Legislative Assembly and the Councils. Separate, communal electorates and
'weighting' have been retained. The franchise was primarily based on property, education and
income qualifications.
The electoral machinery remained practically the same as that of 1919. Elections were held
for the first time in 1937 under the Government of India Act of 1935. The elections brought
to light the different trends of Indian political opinion that existed in the country at the time.
In fact, they have revealed the ill results of numerous communal, special and separate
8Report of the indian Statutory Commission, Vof_Jl; Cal, 1930, p.92, para 106
9Report of the Indian Franchise Committee, 1932, p. 10.
CHAPTER -2
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
IN INDIA
Structure Of the Electoral System in India
Some actions in relation to the elections are said to be as offences under the Indian
penal Code 1860 (IPC). They are :
All these offences have been the part of the Indian Penal Code from before independence
with an exception of Section 153A and Section 153B which have been added in 1969 and
1972 respectively.
The Constitution of India:
• Articles 52-71, which set down the process for the election in the case of the President
of India and the Vice-President of India, are the most relevant provisions of the
Constitution concerning election.
• Articles 83 and 80 have laid down the structure, terms of the Rajya Sabha and the
Lok Sabha and their term for which they remain in the house.
• Article 84 sets down the minimum requirements for Member of Parliament. (a) has to
be a citizen of India and (b) have a minimum age of twenty-five years in case of Lok
Sabha and a minimum age of thirty-five years in case of Rajya Sabha. Other
requirements can also be made necessary from time to time.
• Article 101 says that person cannot be member of both the houses at the same time.
• Article 102 provides for disqualification of Members of Parliament, i.e. (a) holding a
business office under the jurisdiction of the Government; (b) being insolvent; (c)
having been found unsound by the court which is competent; and (d) having willingly
obtained the citizenship of another country. Many disqualifications are given by
statute.
• Art. 324 deals with the powers and composition of the Election Commission and
has gained significance and garnered attention at the present time. It specifies that
the Section 171G- Making False Statement;
President may nominate the Election Commissioner and Other members present in the
Commission
• Art. 326 provides that elections to both the house shall be held on the basis of
universal adult franchise. The minimum age to be considered and to be an adult has
been changed from 21 years to 18 years in 1988.
Article 329 (i) forbids the courts from challenging the legitimacy of any law relating
to the delimitation of electoral districts or the allocation of seats; and (ii) provides that
the election to Parliament or the State legislature can be challenged only by means of
an election petition submitted to the authority provided for by statute. The Election
Commission was the authority until 1966. In 1966, the jurisdiction was transferred to
the High Courts.10
This is the most critical piece of legislation that sets out the nut-and-bolt elements of the
process for election.
• This sets out specific rules on qualifications and disqualification for candidates in
the timetable for elections.
• It gives detailed the information of the administrative body for the conduct
of elections.
• It gives power to the government to requisition premises, cars, etc. for elections.
• The process to count the votes or polling and the announcement of polls;
• The seats in the lower house are divided according to state. The electoral district
of Lower House cannot be split between states.
• The constituencies in Lok Sabha are single member constituencies.
• The President determines the constituencies of the Legislative Council.
• A person who is not below the age of 18 years on the qualifying and ordinarily a
resident of the constituency and not in any way disqualified by law is entitled to vote.
The electoral rolls are required to be updated timely by the Electoral Registration
Officers. It can be done either on the application by a person or suo-motto.
10
Section 80A to the R.P. Act 1950
The System of Election in India:
There are wide number of voting systems in the world, but they can be primarily
divided under three heads:
In India, we have been following the Majoritarian System which has been better
known as “First past the Post Systems” (FPTPs) in this the territories in the nation
are divided into single member constituencies. In this every voter has one vote and the
person having the most number of votes irrespective of the proportions of the vote
wins.
• A candidate who receives not more than fifty percent vote from an electorate (at
times as few as 25 to 30 per cent) is selected. His ability to be face of the
electoral district is doubtful.
• This scheme is not fair to minor parties that obtain much less representation than
the share of their votes (at times no share at all).
• On the other side, a party that enjoys even underwhelming general support has
far more representation than the proportion of its votes.
• When there are two or three equally strong parties, such as the Conservative and
Labor Parties in the United Kingdom or the Republicans and Democrats in the
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United States, both parties that alternately take advantage of this structure, unfair
as it may be, and form stable governments; but where the political stage is
controlled by a single party, as in pre-1989 India, the system leads to a virtual one-
party rule.
• This avoids the rapid increase in number of political parties, as in Israel, where
a few small groups dictate to the two main parties.
Why did India implement this method while a vast majority of established democracies
use
• At first we can see that the origins of our political system lie in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition.
Second, the drafters of our Constitution predicted that, like the United Kingdom and the
United States, we will also possibly establish a stable two-party system. This hope did
not materialize partly because of the lack of democratic values (not to mention our
nostalgic and sentimental reverence for our ancient gram panchayats, which
Dr.Ambedkar rightly called 'pathetic'), the servile mindset of turning to those in authority,
which was further underpinned by dire poverty. The ruling party has used the framework to
reinforce and maintain its grip by all means. The opposition parties have also called for a reform
in the electoral structure.
Two other majoritarian systems are in operation: the Double Ballot system in France
and the Preferential Voting System in Australia. They both offer much fairer results but
are not suited to Indian conditions. The French double-vote system would almost
double the expenditure on money as well as on labour, which, while ideal for a small
rich country like France, would be inexpensive for a continent-large countries like
India. In a country like India with barely 74% literacy (as low as 63% Bihar),
the Australian system focused on preferential voting, which allows voters to show their
preference for candidates on the ballot by writing a number against each candidate, is
inconceivable. One does not know how much the census figure of 74%11 of literacy
corresponds to reality. Moreover, a large proportion of Indian population lives in villages where
illiteracy is much more prevalent. While Australia has a high literacy rate of 99% , the
preferential voting system is successful there but the same voting system would be a malarkey in
India with a literacy rate of 74%.
Nor is a full-fledged proportional representation (PR) method an unmixed blessing. The key
drawbacks are as follows:
• It is a complicated method for the estimation of seats.
• A system of election which does not have any face in which an elector elects for a party
and not an candidate from a district that he knows.
• A full stranglehold of the party on candidates who are unacceptable in a fully democratic
environment.
Opposition parties and intellectuals were also calling for a system close to that was
used in elections to the lower chamber of the German Parliament (called the
Bundestag), which is a variation of the PR systems and FPTP Systems. The number of
electoral districts is equal to half the total number of seats and thus each electoral
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district has two seats. One seat is filled by the method of FPTP, the other by the
method of PR. Accordingly, the ballot paper has two sections, one showing the names
of the individual candidates and the other showing the names of the parties.
The voter needs to give two votes, one for the candidate and the other for the party.
He would not need to vote for the candidate's party for which he voted in the first
portion of the ballot paper. The votes for the parties shall be pooled together and the
quota of seats won by each party by the PR shall be filled from the list of party
candidates submitted by the party prior to the election.
There are two slight challenges to the method. First, the electoral districts are becoming
very large-twice the size of the entire FPTP scheme. This leads to increased spending
on candidates with very negative implications. In the elections to the Lok Sabha, each
electoral district would have the size of two districts. Second, half of the members
chosen on the basis of the PR are faceless people on the party lists.
The Tarkunde Commission, formed in 1977, then proposed an adjustment to the German
system. The Committee suggested that there should be a single electoral district as at
present and that the elections should be held in the same way as at present (by the
FPTP method). For electoral districts where a candidate wins more than 50% of the
votes cast, he will be declared elected. Where no candidate receives more than 50% of
the votes, the votes of these constituencies should be pooled together in a party-wise
manner and the PR system should be filled. As in the German system, no party should
be qualified for a seat under the PR system unless the party has received at least 5 %
of the total votes.
The alternative method has three benefits over the German system:
• The representation would be much less skewed than under our current structure
Both candidates chosen under the FPTP approach must have the approval of at
least 50% of the voters and will thus be more representative of the electorate
than under the current system.
• There is, however, a risk of a system degenerating into a cent per cent PR
system if no particular candidate receives more than 50 per cent of the votes in
his or her electoral district; or a cent per cent FPTP system if a candidate in
each electoral district receives more than 50 per cent of the votes in his or her
second ballot. As in the French method.
CHAPTER- 3
THE PROBLEM
&
ELECTORAL REFORM
4. The Problems
In all of the above reports and literature, the main problems that have been generally
recognized and debated are as follows:
• Increasingly money hungry elections leading to unethical, illegal and even mafia
provided electoral funding. The terribly high cost of elections in turn, has led to increased
corruption, criminalisation and black money generation in various forms.
• With the constituents/electors being the same for all directly elected representatives from
the lowest Panchayat level to the Lok Sabha level, there are competing role expectations
and conflict of perception e.g. the constituents expect even members of the Union
Parliament to attend to their purely local problems.
• With the electorate having no role in the selection of candidates and with majority of
candidates being elected by minority of votes under the first-past-the-post system, the
representative character of the representatives itself becomes doubtful or so to say their
representational legitimacy is seriously eroded. In many cases, more votes are cast
against the winning candidates than for them. One of the significant probable causes may
be the mismatch between the majoritarian or first-past-the-post system and the
multiplicity of parties and large number of independents.
2. Flagrant use of raw muscle power in the form of intimidating voters either to
vote against their will or not to vote at all, thus taking away the right of free
voting from large sections of society and distorting the result thereby.
3. Involvement of officials and local administration in subverting the electoral
process
• Divisive and disruptive tendencies including the misuse of religion and caste in the
process of political mobilization of group identities on non-ideological lines.
• An ineffective and slow process of dealing with election petitions, rendering the whole
process meaningless.
• Fake and non-serious candidates who create major practical difficulties and are also used
to indirectly subvert the electoral process.
• Incongruities in delimitation of constituencies resulting in poor representation.
• Problems of instability, hung legislative houses and their relation to the electoral laws
and processes.
• Last but not the least, loss of systemic legitimacy due to decay in the standards of
political morality and decline in the spirit of service and sacrifice in public life.
Elections in parts of the country have become synonymous with intimidation of voters specially
poorer sections, rigging, booth capturing, violence against and even killing of candidates and
political workers, connivance of officials at the polling stations and at times a complete hijacking
of the polling process by unruly and criminal elements. Unfortunately, over a period of time local
police forces have also allegedly become involved in the above by becoming partisan and by being
guided by local loyalties, caste considerations, as well as by being easily bribed for connivance.
What is disturbing are the sporadic allegations of even the central forces acting in a partisan way
in some places. Reports of above irregularities in the conduct of elections have become so
commonplace that these are not news anymore. Many suggestions
have been made to address these issues and most relate to implementing our existing rules and
laws effectively. But experience has shown that laws in a low accountability society like India
are known more for violation than for any degree of compliance.
The suggestions for reform can generally be placed into three broad categories. The first
category attempts to tackle the problems within the boundaries of the current electoral system.
The second category goes a bit further and takes a stand that the present electoral system itself
needs to be modified. (The emphasis is on modification or reform and not on altering the basic
framework of the system). Both of these categories have to be dealt with together because there is
considerable overlapping between the two and we have to view reform suggestions as an
integrated package and not piecemeal.
There is a third approach which seeks to strike at the root of the problem which is that of the
terrible high costs of elections and the question of finding legitimate funds for the purpose. The
suggestion is to cut down the costs drastically by following the Gandhian principles of
decentralization of power down to the grassroots levels and building multitiers of Government
from below in a bottom-up instead of the present topdown approach. It is stated by those
advocating this approach that the only way to conduct a meaningful electoral exercise in this
country is to have direct elections only at local levels with the upper tiers filled by
representatives indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of the representatives
manning the lower tiers.
A true democracy as advocated by Gandhi ensures that local, state and national representatives
are accountable to the people for local, State and national matters respectively through
effective transparency. Such one-to- one accountability may promote responsible politics and
attract patriotic and competent professionals and social workers to politics. Our present system
based on diffused accountability breeds corruption and attracts self-seekers to politics. For this
breed, interests of national development, welfare of the people and needs of god governance
take lower priorities, if any.
The elected representative is too far removed from the people as there are an average of one
million voters for each Lok-Sabha constituency spread over a large geographical area. To
influence the choice of such a large and geographically dispersed number of voters, social action
on the part of the candidate is totally inadequate. And, this creates space and scope for using both
money and muscle power. It is no surprise therefore that the candidates have to spend huge
amounts of money at the time of campaigning to “purchase” the votes of these distant voters.
And this is done mostly through a host of intermediary brokers who become the link in this
transaction. These huge election expenses breed huge corruption. This also means that the
electors are in no position to hold the candidate accountable nor does the candidate consider
himself accountable to these people.
Based on the Indian ethos, Gandhi had advocated a low-expense election system linked with
watchdog councils and separate elected chief executives at each local level. He proposed a
highly democratic and, what is more important, a highly accountable system. More thought out
and more in keeping with the evolution of political culture in our country, many scholars have in
recent years adapted these thoughts in their work and advocated a system of direct elections only
at the grassroots of the Indian democracy. They propose that without in anyway interfering with
the basic structure or features of the Constitution and while fully continuing the parliamentary
system, some reforms be brought in the electoral system. Direct elections should be held on the
basis of adult franchise at the level of Panchayats and other local bodies. Panchayats and other
local bodies could elect the zila parishads and they could together elect the State legislature.
These three could elect the Parliament and in the last analysis the four of these could elect the
President. The Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers could be elected by the Parliament and
the State Legislatures concerned. The President, the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers in
order to be elected should each necessarily secure no less that 50%+1 of the votes cast. Once
elected, the Prime Minister or a Chief Minister should be removable only by a constructive vote
of no-confidence.
The fact that the directly elected representatives are all at the grassroots level where they are in
contact with their electors on a daily basis, would mean that their accountability to the people
will always be high. Corruption will not get the kind of boost and inducement that it gets
presently because of an unaccountable remote representative doing what he pleases.
The representatives elected at the grassroots level will also have to win on a 50%+1 vote
principle so that their appeal is more universal than parochial. They would then be truly
legitimate representatives of their people. In the alternative, at the lowest tier double-member or
multiple member constituencies could be considered. Local elections do not entail heavy costs.
The cost to political parties of indirect State and national elections will be low. Since the national
and State governments will handle only higher-level infrastructure and coordination, indirect
elections backed by party primaries will facilitate emergence of the best leadership. The ills in
the present “first-past-the-post” system will be eliminated because local governments will handle
all social issues and State and national governments shall be accountable to local governments as
advocated by Gandhi who will have elected them. This will nurture culture, education and values
and gradually eliminate social discords. Also, this election process, it is claimed, has the greatest
potential to bring public service spirited and sacrifice oriented people to the fore.
There are strong arguments in favour of this Gandhian model and it would be worthwhile
that this option is studied deeply and debated widely. Part II, however, discusses some reform
options that may be possible and found necessary within the four walls of the existing system of
elections.
• Those oppose to this approach, however feel that it may become easier to purchase/terrorise
electors if their number is small and that it would be debatable if the cost of elections would
increase or decrease on adoption of the proposed model of elections. They would like it to be
examined if increased importance of local elections and small number of electors in the proposed
system would lead to high cost of local elections; increased incidents of violence in local
elections; and increased incidents of bribery, coercion, intimidation, winning the votes on
sectorial considerations of caste, religion, etc. Thus, much can be argued on either side.
CHAPTER- 4
ELECTORAL ROLLS &
VOTER ID
30 | P a g e
6. Electoral Rolls and Voter ID
The beginning of the electoral system is the preparation of electoral rolls. It is, by now, a well-
established reality that electoral rolls in India have large-scale errors in them. The Goswami
Committee on Electoral Reforms also formally acknowledged it and stated rather tactfully that
there were acts of “omissions and commissions” on the part of officials in addition to the
flaws in the system itself. An indirect way of stating that the system was being subverted.
The Dinesh Goswami Committee recommended a more stringent punishment for breach of
official duty in connection with preparation of electoral rolls (see para 1.3, chapter 4, ‘Electoral
Rolls’ of the Report of the Dinesh Goswami Committee). The said recommendation made by
Dinesh Goswami Committee has since been implemented with the enactment of Representation
of People’s (Amendment) Act, 1996.
Activist organizations like for example the Hyderabad based Lok Satta have conducted sample
household surveys and found an incredible 40% to 50% errors in urban electoral rolls. According
to them, even a casual glance at electoral rolls in urban areas shows the obvious discrepancies
and inaccuracies. Taking advantage of these defects, political parties and influential persons
manage large-scale registration of bogus voters, or large-scale deletion of names of “unfriendly”
voters. It is quite possible that in the rural areas there may be fewer errors, but informal estimates
by most observers put these errors at 15% to 20%. These are all educated guesses and the real
position is not known. What is known, however, is that there are serious irregularities and a large
number of electorate is disenfranchised partly by default and partly by impersonation that is
made easy by the current flawed electoral rolls. Given that large swings in seats that are won are
caused by small swings in voting percentages, and again given that the margins of victory are
generally narrow, the need to have accurate electoral rolls becomes all the more critical. This
apart, electoral rolls are very close to people and the irregularities in them are exposed very
quickly at the grassroots level. There have been cases of entire sections of villages
disenfranchised leading to immense cynicism. Therefore, the legitimacy of the whole electoral
process is compromised because of faulty electoral rolls.
31 | P a g e
It is easy to see that any serious attempt at electoral reform in India must tackle the question
of faulty electoral rolls at the very outset. If this is set right, at least some of the other problems
will thin out. Why are the electoral rolls everywhere full of inaccuracies? Some of it may be the
result of inefficiency and a flawed system but certainly, as pointed out by the Goswami
Committee, some of it is also the result of purposeful tampering which may happen due to
partisan attitude of the local officials who may have their own local affinities and/or may be
bought over by vested interests. The many rules and laws to punish erring officials in this
respect have been totally ineffective. Recognising this, the Goswami Committee had
recommended that more stringent punishment should be provided for breach of official
duty in this regard. While commending the 1996 Amendment to RPA we need to
recognize that punishment is not a substitute for systemic corrections.
Basically we should have a reasonably fool proof method of preparing the electoral roll right at
the lowest constituency of a voter and we should supplement this further by creating a foolproof
voter ID. And both should be related to each other. The benefits of this exercise at the bottom
level of our democracy would be immediate in the sense that it would serve the objective of
contributing to cleaning up the electoral process and curbing impersonation and rigging. In the
long run, it would create widespread belief in the fairness of our electoral process thereby
providing it a high degree of institutional legitimacy. We would do well to remember that
significant political change happens at the lower levels first and only then spreads to higher
levels.
The Goswami Committee had suggested that Post offices should be made the focal point of
preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls as well as keeping of electoral rolls up to date and
the upkeep of records. This may or may not be the solution particularly because in this case the
responsibility is diffused over different organisations, which usually makes it nobody’s
responsibility. If there is non-compliance, there is no way of pinning it on any one organisation
because there will always be insurmountable problems of coordination and there will be no way
of taking any stringent action against anyone. The work will automatically stabilize at a low level
of efficiency. Also, post offices today do not enjoy the credibility that they did earlier. Their
efficiency stands seriously eroded.
In today’s technological age we should not be talking about a generally antiquated post office
structure of the country, where government servants work to their own notions of efficiency.
Given the technology today, it is not a difficult task to create a good scheme of things,
systemically sound, for the preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls and voter ID cards. The
Election Commission says it is alive to these problems and in May 2000 it has issued instructions
for a new voter ID card numbering system with a unique code for each of the 4072 assembly
constituencies of the country. Some of what is suggested below may be already at least partially
in the action pipeline by the Election Commission. To take the scheme of things a few logical
steps forward, it is felt that the effort should not limit itself to Assembly constituencies and
through them to Parliament constituencies only.
In this scheme of things, it is most essential that there is a coordinated effort at preparing
accurate electoral rolls beginning at the lowest constituency that a voter belongs to. If this is
done well, everything else will fall into place. At the moment the EC is responsible for
preparing the electoral rolls for assembly and parliamentary constituencies. The State Election
Commissioners are responsible for electoral rolls for local body elections. In some States, the
EC and State Election Commissioners have agreed to coordinate the preparation of electoral
rolls. This is as it should be. There should be no duplication of effort and a single exercise
should be enough for preparing electoral rolls covering the lowest to the highest constituency
that a voter belongs to. This makes perfect administrative sense. The task could be handled by
the E.C. or by the SECs or by the two in coordination. This means that at the level of gram
panchayat (or the relevant local level), a voter must have his/her name properly placed on the
electoral roll. This would automatically identify the voter to be a part of the electoral roll of the
assembly constituency, which contains this particular panchayat. Likewise, the voter would be
automatically identified on the electoral roll of a particular Lok Sabha constituency, in which
both his assembly constituency and panchayat are included. In addition the identity of the voter
could easily be linked to his polling station.
The electoral rolls should be updated constantly and not just at election time. Every 1st of April,
the electoral roll as of previous 31st December should be made available. This information should
be posted on the web site of the Election Commission and CD ROMs should be available to all
political parties or anyone interested, at a reasonable price. In any case, the cost of this will
only be a fraction of a printed list. (It is understood that this has been already initiated by the
EC). Prior to elections these rolls should be printed and publicly displayed at the post offices in
each constituency, as well as at the panchayats or relevant constituency HQs. This would
improve public access to this information which today, even though theoretically available, is
very hard to get in practice. As corrections take place, the rolls would be updated through
addendums on the web and therefore be available straightaway to interested parties. At the time
of elections it is these latest rolls that will be made available at polling stations. We may use the
help of post offices covering various polling stations in preparation of these rolls as well as to
display and make available to general public these rolls at election time, but the responsibility for
accurate execution will remain with the EC/SEC.
Electoral rolls are intrinsically linked to the question of Voter ID. Election Commission is
said to have taken action to help in issuing of proper voter ID cards in various States and these
are reportedly at varying stages of completion in most States at the moment. The pity is that
these have been issued to an old design that does not create a unique ID number for each voter.
The new cards to be issued now will incorporate the constituency code as designed by the EC
but as mentioned earlier this is an assembly constituency upward exercise only. It appears from
the records at the EC that about 2/3 rd of the voters in the entire country have already been issued
the old voter ID cards. Haryana with a reported 88% and Bihar with a reported 37% are at the
head and the tail of the table of performance of all States in this regard. The exercise for
identification of voters is said to have worked well in the last elections in Haryana where some
identification document was made mandatory for voting. Most, though not all, voters brought
their voter ID cards.
The Goswami Committee had recommended a scheme of a multi purpose photo identity
card in coordination with other ministries and government departments so that the possession of
this card would become compulsory for all adult citizens. In their view, this citizenship card
could be used as an ID for many benefits that are provided by government agencies. For
example the issuance of a ration card, a passport, driving licence, any agricultural inputs that are
distributed either free or at a subsidized rate, telephones for individuals, applications for a
government or even private sector jobs, admission of wards to schools or colleges, for opening
bank accounts, for transfer of one’s property and many such things. In other words, the
possession of this identity card would be in the citizen’s own interest and therefore he/she
would make sure that this was applied for in the proper format. Because the present voter ID
card, in various stages of preparation in different States, is not a multipurpose card, whatever
number of cards have been issued, further issue of the same should be put on a hold until these
are redesigned in the fashion outlined below. After all the remaining cards are issued, the older
ones should also be replaced over a period of time.
This ID card apart from all necessary personal details should list one visible identification
mark. This is necessary as with age the photo can look very different after a while. If it is an old
photograph then sometimes the likeness is missing. Also a visible identification mark is difficult
to reproduce even if the photograph is fraudulently changed on the card. For an electorate of
about 600 million on an all-India basis, an automated and well-designed online system, broken
down to district level, can be created without much hassle. As already stated, the basic work in
this direction has been done by the EC, so the
learning curve is already favourable. It just needs to be extended to the lowest level
constituency. PRIs and local post offices should be involved to help with the creation and
distribution of these IDs, but only to help not to control. When the ID is right at the Panchayat
level, it will be by design, right for each higher constituency.
But, of course, if the card is multipurpose and required compulsorily, the implemen-tation of
this suggestion would also make it obligatory for the government to create an agency that would
do this job in a citizen friendly way. The idea here is not to create one more agency, which can
extort money from the hapless citizen just to issue him/her the ID card. This is a real possibility if
we have to go by our experience of the last few decades, which indicates that even for a ration
card a citizen, particularly from lower economic classes, must pay money. It is better to
recognize it at the outset and work our way around it.
This job may be carried out by a professional agency/ies appointed by the Election Commission.
There should be a pre-qualified consultancy company appointed to draw up specifications in
consultation with the EC. This pre-qualified consultant would also oversee that the contracted
companies do their job efficiently. When private agencies are doing this job and persons
responsible can be held accountable for not doing it accurately, the results will contain only a
tiny percent of acceptable human errors. The database containing these electoral rolls would be
centrally computerized by the EC (this is already being done) and each Voter would have a
unique bar-coded ID number. The card would also have a number/code that would indicate the
holder’s base constituency e.g., the panchayat level or the relevant local constituency, leading to
the next higher level of constituencies till the parliamentary constituency. Any change of address
would automatically change everything else except his unique ID Number. This ID number
would be for life and in the long run the best bet against any impersonation. The consultancy
organization and through it the EC would maintain a database of all polling stations with their
respective association to the relevant constituency i.e., Panchayat, Nagar-Palika, Municipal
Corporation, Assembly or Parliament. With technology available today this can be easily done.
There is enough expertise available within the Election Commission, if we go by their web site,
to guide this exercise. In any case India is in the forefront of information technology and this is
an easy job. The first time exercise may be a large one but subsequently it will fall into a routine.
Like in the USA, the penalty for false declaration for this purpose, or any tampering with
the card or impersonation based on a stolen or fraudulently prepared card should be heavy with a
prompt mandatory prison sentence and a heavy fine. The law should take this into account. If it
is a multipurpose card, it may even be feasible to charge a small amount for its issuance, say Rs.
10 in urban areas and Rs. 5 in rural areas. This would make it partly self-financing and would
add personal value leading to voters taking more care of it rather than keep applying for
duplicates.
The impact of proper electoral rolls and voter ID together with Electronic Voting Machines
(EVMs) will be first felt at the local level and will help create a level playing ground for State
and national elections. It will send a message through the system that the country takes all
electoral exercises seriously, which are by definition designed to give people voice.
7. Electronic Voting Machines
On the questions of booth capturing, rigging and intimidation of the voters, the proposals of
the Goswami Committee to the effect that EC should be empowered to take more stringent
action should be accepted and implemented in full. Vide Representation of People
(Amendment) Act, 1996, in addition to returning officers, observers appointed by the Election
Commission of India have also been empowered to send report to the Election Commission in
respect of booth capturing, etc., and the Election Commission authorized to issue appropriate
directions for countermanding the elections or order repelling in certain polling stations where
booth capturing has taken place, on the basis of such reports (see Section 20B of R.P. Act,
1951).
Other proposals of the Committee included the following:
Under section 58A of the Act, the Election Commission should not only be
empowered to countermand the election and order a fresh election as now provided
under the law, but also should be empowered to declare the earlier poll to be void and
order only a re-poll in the entire constituency, instead of a re-election there, depending
on the nature and seriousness of each case.
Campaigns which are crafted to create or exacerbate tensions between communities and/or to
incite feelings of hatred on the basis of caste , community, religion, race, or language attract
disqualification at present but effective implementation of laws is lacking. This deserves the
highest degree of attention and in addition these offences should be punishable with mandatory
imprisonment for three years instead of discretionary as currently provided under section 125 of
Representation of the People Act, 1951. This should be within the powers of special courts for
election petitions proposed later in this paper. However, if the suggestion to only have winning
candidates on the basis of 50%+1 vote also made elsewhere in this paper is accepted, candidates
and political parties would have to broaden their appeal and in their own self-interest their
agenda and rhetoric will change.
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11. Criminalisation of the electoral process
12..1 “A candidate contesting in Bihar has 174 criminal cases against him and he is on the most
wanted list not only in Bihar but in Delhi, Mumbai and Uttar Pradesh. Yet flouting all rules and
regulations he is openly campaigning” …… “a sitting MLA is now contesting as an independent
while he is stillserving a life term in jail. He was convicted in a kidnapping case but an appeal
has been entered in the high court.” (Times of India, 11.2.2000).
The above is just one of the many “no longer shocking” quotations from a newspaper with
regard to well-known criminals contesting elections with impunity. Due to reasons that need not
be listed here, politics and therefore elections in India have progressively attracted criminal
elements. During the election period, particularly in the states of Bihar and U.P., newspapers are
usually full of information about the number of criminals in the field sponsored by every party. It
is a disgrace for the country that several hardened criminals who may have many cases of
murder, rape and dacoity against them are actually occupying the seats in the highest
representative forums of this country namely the State assemblies and the Lok Sabha.
Vohra Committee appointed by the Government had stated in strong terms that the nexus
between crime syndicates and political personalities was very deep. According to the CBI report
to the Vohra Committee: “all over India, crime syndicates have become a law unto themselves.”
..... “Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men have become the order of the day.
Hired assassins have become part of these organizations. The nexus between the criminal gangs,
police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the country. The
existing criminal justice system, which was essentially designed to deal with the individual
offences/crimes, is unable to deal with the activities of the Mafia; the provisions of law in regard
to economic offences are weak; there are insurmountable legal difficulties in
attaching/confiscation of the property acquired through Mafia activities”. The committee quoted
other agencies to state that the Mafia network is “virtually running a parallel government,
pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance.” The report also says “in certain States like Bihar,
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, these gangs enjoy the patronage of local politicians cutting across
party lines and the protection of the functionaries. Some political leaders become the leaders of
these gangs/armed senas and over the years get themselves elected to local bodies, State
assemblies and national parliament. Resultantly, such elements have acquired considerable
political clout seriously jeopardizing the smooth functioning of the administration and the safety
of life and property of the common man causing a sense of despair and alienation among
people.”
The visible presence of many criminals is in fact a very large factor in the loss of legitimacy for
politicians as a whole. This is also extremely dangerous for the country because apart from
distorting the political culture of the country, criminal elements progressively get to influence
leadership and governance. The spectacular success of some criminals in politics invites
emulation. The signal to the society by such a process is that it is acceptable to muscle your way
through everything because in the last analysis the system rewards you. A petty dada soon
becomes a respectable and feared representative of the people. And many become ministers with
power to distribute spoils and parade themselves as rulers. It is a surefire recipe for long-term
disaster.
Although the exact numbers of criminals in political positions are not known, the EC at one
time was reported to have stated that the number of candidates with criminal records who
contested Lok Sabha 1998 elections was around 1500 out of a total of 13952. They were under
prosecution for crimes like murder, dacoity, rape, theft and extortion. As many as 820 of these
1500, came from Bihar and U.P. If the objective of this public statement was to even moderately
influence political parties to stay away from criminals, the EC failed because parties simply
shrugged off this information and continued to induct criminals. Of course, the raison d´être
being that it was these criminals who the parties thought could win the election for them.
From the side of the administration there has been a half-hearted attempt to stop these
criminals because of the fact that all political parties use these criminals in their attempt to
ensure themselves a certain number of seats in the State Legislative Assemblies as well as in the
Lok Sabha. But this issue really needs to be tackled head-on. The Law Commission suggests
unambiguously that if charges relating to certain crimes have been framed by a competent court
against a person then this particular person should not be permitted to contest elections. This
suggestion may pose problems of misuse but it needs to be considered, may be with some
modifications.
There is a school of thought that fears that such a regulation might be used against innocent
candidates who are perceived to be a threat to those in power. Also, fears are expressed that
such regulations might be used against dalits and members of other socially backward and poor
communities or against political workers participating in movements and agitations. Given
India’s record of corruption, it is conceivable that false framing of charges may happen.
Therefore, a suggestion of having special electoral courts set up by the Election Commission for
pronouncing summary decisions in regard to eligibility may be considered. If there is a candidate
against whom charges have been framed by the police and he wishes to contest an election, he
may take the matter to this special electoral court. The decision need have no bearing on the
actual case, which as we know might go on for years. This may help to keep habitual and
hardened criminals away. But, the suggestion merits further discussion from a judicial point of
view.
In 1997, The EC issued an order that candidates for election to State Assemblies and
Parliament need to submit an affidavit about their convictions in cases covered by Section 8 of
the Representation of the People Act 1951. The EC held that even if the trial court had
convicted the candidate, this was enough to attract disqualification. But there are other issues.
The Election Commission wrote a letter to the Prime Minister in September 1997 that there
were grave incongruities in the existing provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of the said
Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, illustrating the case of a rapist,
convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, being disqualified only for six years under
sub-section (1) and being free to contest elections, even while in prison serving the last four
years of his sentence. The Commission had suggested that the law may be simplified by
amending said Section 8 to provide that whoever is convicted of any offence by a Court of law
and sentenced to imprisonment for six months or more should be debarred from contesting
elections, for a period totalling the sentence imposed plus an additional six years. This
suggestion has been supported by several other organisations and concerned citizens and
therefore merits full consideration.
Currently, if a member of any House is convicted, there is no action for three months and if the
case goes for an appeal within this time, then no action is taken till the appeal is disposed off.
This may not be very justified. If an elected representative gets convicted on charges related to
specific crimes, he should be required to withdraw until he is cleared. It is also worth considering
that when political parties are seen to abet criminalization by fielding criminals, there should
be some provisions to enable action against them including their derecognition.
This is one of the most critical problems facing the Indian electoral system. As against the
limits prescribed by our electoral laws, the campaign expenditure by candidates is in the range of
about twenty to thirty times the said limits. As a result contesting elections is becoming a very
costly affair, which keeps many good candidates out and it also creates a high degree of
compulsion for corruption in the political arena. This has progressively polluted our entire
system. Corruption, because it erodes performance, becomes one of the leading reasons for non-
performance and compromised governance in the country.
The sources of some of the election funds are believed to be unaccounted criminal money
in return for protection, unaccounted funds from business groups who expect a high return on
this investment, kickbacks or commissions on contracts etc. No matter how we look at it,
citizens are directly affected by it because apart from compromised governance, the huge
money spent on elections pushes up the cost of everything in the country. It also leads to
unbridled corruption and the consequences of wide spread corruption are even more serious
than many imagine. When people find progressively that they are trapped in a corrupt
environment of no hope, this will provide a possible burning ground that can ignite given a
spark. Electoral compulsions for funds are really the foundation of this whole super structure of
corruption.
In the ultimate analysis, the reality seems to be that political parties and serious contenders
have a single point agenda “to win” and then to remain in power. Everything else, whether
issues of good governance or even long term national interest, come second. Once we accept
this, we realize that political parties as well as candidates will take all those actions that
contribute to this objective. Both political parties and political candidates, in order to win, will
do all they can and all that the system will permit them to do. Political parties and candidates
have found that by spending money on intermediaries to buy votes, by distributing liquor and
other goodies, by directly bribing officials, and by patronizing, through the spending of money,
most rowdies and “goondas” of the locality, their chances to win become better. This is what has
become the norm therefore. They do this, however, because the system, directly or indirectly,
permits them to collect a far greater sum of money if they win the election. Therefore, the
money spent on elections is like a mandatory investment. In the eventual analysis, costs can only
be controlled if we control the way in which politicians can generate money through corrupt
means once they are in power. If this is not entirely possible within the current scenario, then
whatever rules and regulations we bring about can only have a limited influence toward
achievement of this objective.
13..4 The question is how do we go about reducing the role that money can play? The answer to
this one is not easy. The fact is that political parties need tons of funds for political activity,
which includes campaigning for elections. Political parties should have legitimate sources of
these funds. If they don't have these funds legitimately and then if (and this is the critical part)
the system permits them to do so, they will find illegitimate funds. This is what has been
happening in India and with illegitimate funding the spending has also been comparatively
limitless. One party started it but others soon caught on. However, it is also true that if the
system did not permit the kind of spending that is happening, the various candidates would have
found their equilibrium at a much lower level.
Various attempts have been made in the past to regulate this expense; as well as various
suggestions keep coming through in this regard. The primary suggestions are two-fold: first set
relates to fixing “more reasonable limits” for campaign expenditure. The argument is that
election campaigning costs money. It is best for us to recognize this and estimate what would be
reasonable costs taking everything into account – the need for public meetings, handouts,
election workers, agents, posters, vehicles, staff movement, loudspeakers and microphones and
communications etc. If, the argument goes, we fix “reasonable” limits for all of this, then the
candidates would not have to spend more than these amounts that are permitted. There would be
no need for illegal spending. This suggestion has been made by all - the Goswami Committee,
the Indrajit Gupta Committee, the Law Commission as well as a number of other organisations.
In fact, the limits have been raised to Rs.15,00,000 for most Lok Sabha (compared to
Rs.4,50,000 before) and Rs.6,00,000 (compared to 1,50,000 before) for most assembly
constituencies. These limits also may need to be continuously under review by the Election
Commission and perhaps be linked to the cost of living index. But, the basic question will
always arise that if a Lok Sabha election costs upwards of a crore then how does fixing the limit
at 15 lakhs help? And in any case where is even this 15 lakhs going to come from? That means
there must be an active plan to reduce the cost of election to this magical figure of 15 lakhs. But
clearly an approach such as this has to be also backed up by a strong deterrent against
overstepping the limits sanctioned. On this there is not much action.
The other problem is that the present rules have a significant loophole in the shape of
explanation 1 to section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1951, under which the
amounts spent by persons other than the candidate and his agent themselves, are not counted in
his election expenses. This means that all extra expenditure, even when known and proven, can
be shown to have been incurred by the party or by any friends and it remains outside of the
enforceable limits. Even the Supreme Court has commented that this needed to be changed.
However, this remains as it was. This anomaly should be immediately removed. For, in any case
the returns of election expenses filed now are almost invariably false and there is hardly any way
the prescribed limits can be really enforced even though the Supreme Court has laid on the
candidate the onus to prove that the extra expenditure was not from his funds.
The second set of suggestions is that political parties as well as individual candidates should be
subject to a proper audit of the amounts they receive and spend. At the end of the election each
candidate should submit an audited statement of receipts and expenses, head-wise. Any violation
or misreporting should be dealt with strongly. These two suggestions have also received
agreement from most activists and non-governmental organisations. Most persons recommend
that these be implemented.
The Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections portrays a third set of
suggestions. According to them, there should be at least a partial though non-cash state funding
of elections. Theoretically, at least, it means that the candidates and parties have to spend less
for campaigning with the state taking care of some aspects. Whatever levels of permissible
expenditure we may fix, unless we have a) a reasonably foolproof method of enforcing these
and b) to take action when these are violated, these exercises may turn out to be meaningless. At
the current moment we do not seem to have any foolproof mechanism. Also for obvious
reasons, the political will to enforce this appears to be missing. Regarding partial state funding,
till such time that there is an effective systemic acceptance of full audit of party funds including
a full audit of campaign funds, deletion of explanation 1 to section 77(1) of the Representation
of People Act 1951, a foolproof mechanism to deter expenditure violations, and until the
government is convinced that these improvements have been institutionalised and are no longer
being breached, the question of state funding should not even arise. The Law Commission in
their report have voiced similar sentiments. To quote them, “We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the proposals relating to state funding contained in the Indrajit Gupta Committee Report
should be implemented only after or simultaneously with the implementation of the provisions
contained in this report relating to political parties viz., deletion of Explanation 1 to Section 77,
maintenance of accounts and their submission etc., and the provisions governing the functioning
of political parties contained in chapters I and II of Part IV and chapter I of Part III. The funding
even if partial, should never be resorted to unless the other provisions mentioned aforesaid are
implemented lest the very idea may prove counter-productive and may defeat the very object
underlying the idea of state funding of elections.” If any state funding is permitted without the
above it simply means an additional burden on the state exchequer and the taxpayers. And, for
no particular public or systemic benefit whatsoever. Political parties and candidates will happily
accept this additional bounty and still continue to spend whatever else they perceive is required
by the competitive ground realities in order to win elections. If they get elected, they find ways
to repay it many times over.
Another view on state funding is that a national election fund should be created out of the
consolidated fund of India in order to specifically subsidize election expenses and more
generally to support legitimate political activity. The suggestion is to pay at the rate of Rs. 5 or
10 for each vote polled by a political party in any constituency provided they have polled at least
2 % of the votes cast. It should be compulsory to get audited for the use of this fund and to
spend at least half of this amount on election campaign. Parties which do not hold internal
elections to its highest decision making body should be ineligible for this fund. The legitimacy
of any such suggestion may be extremely doubtful. In any case the necessary control
mechanisms simply do not exist.
Sensibly enough, an indirect way of state funding has in fact already been put into practice in
the form of giving recognized political parties far greater time, free of any charge, on equitable
basis on State owned television to use for their election campaigning at the time of general
elections. But this does not seem to have helped in reducing any campaign expenditure.
The situation can be helped only by bringing transparency in this whole exercise.
Transparency fights corruption and deviant behaviour. We strongly feel that we need to create
more and more transparency in the receipt and spending of election expenses. It is a bit odd
that while we do talk about the expenditure statement from the candidate, we do not ask for the
source of this money.
The Goswami Committee, for reasons that appear more political that economic,
recommended that there should be a ban on any corporate or company donations to political
parties or political candidates. The only purpose a recommendation or rule of this kind serves is
that it drives contributions underground. Political parties need money and this money is going to
be generated one way or another. If through our misguided rules and regulations we block legal
and more transparent sources of funding, we can be totally sure that illegal and non-transparent
channels will immediately open up and substitute for the legal ones. There may be no
justification to ban corporate contributions including contributions from trade unions and
professional associations. In fact, these should be permitted within the limits that already exist.
The effort should be to make them transparent. Thus, all donations and contributions should be
allowed legally, subject to over all limits, as was the case prior to 1985. In fact corporate
donations should be encouraged by making them tax exempt within certain limits so that
maximum funds become visible. For example, tax exemptions should be limited to say 25,000
for individuals and 10,00,000 for companies provided that the contributions are made to party
funds and not to individuals. In the case of corporate contributions, the Board of Directors may
approve up to say 1,00,000 and anything over this amount may be approved by the shareholders.
Political funding should be separate head in the accounts and annual report of the company. This
will ensure transparency. The tax loss to the state should be treated as partial state funding of the
electoral process. The more we push contributions above ground into public eye, the better
control we will have in the end. There may be a clear rule that all political party accounts, much
like the accounts of a public company, should be published yearly with complete disclosure
under pre-determined account heads. Failure to do so should invite action including de-
recognition. Also it may be made obligatory for campaign expense accounts – both receipts and
expenses - of all candidates being made public in their constituencies. In addition, a full audit
should not only be mandatory but it should be enforced by Election Commission by appointing a
council of at least two auditors say for 10 constituencies each. The funding issue is quite
universal and almost everywhere including U.K. and U.S.A. the debate on this has focused on a
high level of transparency as the only long term effective instrument. It is felt that only
transparency can create a strong public opinion or a possibility of public censure and as a result
have a moderating influence on excessive or devious political sources or application of funds.
Transparency means that both, the means of finance as well as where these have been spent
are listed out in an audited statement. If we can make the politicians list the sources of their
revenue, this can be a damper because each contribution that they show can be checked back by
the income tax authorities. In the first instance there will be much resistance to this idea both
from the politicians and also from the business. What if they have contributed to the wrong
party? The opponent who wins might make their life miserable. But over a period of time, this
may settle down and the long-term effect may be beneficial. Also instead of looking at creating
more rules and regulations for monitoring electoral expenses, there should be a serious attempt at
reducing election expenses and this can be done by perhaps changing the ground rules for
electoral campaigns – partly by encouraging the use of electronic and digital technology to
campaign at state cost and simultaneously by totally and effectively banning other overt and
wasteful tamashaas of campaigning including the use of auto-traffic to ferry people to election
rallies of any kind. The maximum money is spent by parties to ensure attendance for their so-
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called popular rallies. It should be possible to stop this by common agreement between the
political parties/candidates or by law. This apart, the Law Commission and many others have
suggested that some reasonable restrictions should be placed on the following:
1. Wall writings
2. Display of cut-outs, hoardings and banners
3. Hoisting of flags (except at party officers, public meetings and other specified
places)
4. Use of more than a specified number of vehicles for election campaign and for
processions
5. Announcements or publicity by more than a specified number of moving vehicles
6. Holding of public meetings beyond the specified hours
7. Display of posters at places, other than those specified by the district/electoral
authorities.
It is said that strong penalities are already provided for violations of expenditure ceilings under
the RPA, 1951 and that most of the above points are generally covered by the model code of
conduct and instructions of E.C. and can be implemented as the EC deems fit. As long these are
the same for all candidates, the ground realities will adjust to them. But, the costs of elections can
only come down if the people so elected are unable to make money out of their positions.
This would require reform in other and more critical areas.
All the suggestions relating to rules and regulations for controlling political funding may come
to naught unless we have an effective mechanism for imposing these rules and an effective ability
to hand over deterrent punishment even leading to complete disqualification in case of
transgression. Regrettably, our experience of fifty years has taught us that rules and regulations
are known more for violation than for compliance. Finally, suggestions for reducing the cost of
elections, for state funding etc. cannot be considered without first considering reforms in the
system and structure of political parties, reduction in the number of parties, role of independents
etc.
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13. Disqualification on ground of corrupt practices – election petitions
The Representation of the People’s Act 1951, Section 8A, provides for disqualification on
ground of corrupt practices. The current practice is that once the High Court hands out the
judgement on an election petition holding the candidate guilty of corrupt practices, the case
goes to the Secretary of the concerned State Legislature or the Secretary General Lok Sabha
or Rajya Sabha, as the case may be. It is then forwarded to the President who in turn
forwards it to the EC. Only then does the EC get jurisdiction to tender its opinion to the
President based on which the disqualification order is issued. The EC has suggested that the
President should determine the period of disqualification on the direct opinion of the EC and
avoid the delay currently experienced. This can be done by resorting to the position before
the 1975 amendment to RPA, 1951.
14..2 The High Court is expected to give the judgement on all election petitions within 6
months, which in itself is quite a long time. In actual practice, there is quite some delay from
the High Court in delivering of these judgements. Out of a total of 81 election petitions
pertaining to the 1998 State Assemblies elections, 61 (75%) are still pending. In the opinion
of many activists and eminent persons, all election related petitions should be heard by a
separate judicial set up as suggested in the previous section, and these petitions should be
decided within a time bound period by dedicated benches of those special electoral courts. If
so, much of the present in-built delays will be taken care of. At the moment election petitions
can remain pending for years together. There are many cases where the petition is not
decided within the term of the house after which it has lost most of its significance apart from
having subverted the rules and law in this regard. For example, there were 49 petitions
relating to 1996 Lok Sabha. Of these 13 (27%) are still pending four years later. Of the 52
petitions relating to Lok Sabha 1998, 13 (25%) are pending as on date. For the Lok Sabha
1999, out of 64 petitions, 62 (97%) are still pending and 100% of all State Assembly petitions
of 1999 are pending, indicating that in about one year hardly anything has moved.
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CHAPTER- 6
COMPULSORY & NEGATIVE
VOTING
14. Compulsory voting
Some scholars and concerned citizens have suggested that voting should be made a
citizenship obligation. Voting is compulsory in countries like Australia, Argentina, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Gutemala,
Guinea, Honduras, North Korea, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Singapore, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and others.
Interestingly, in Egypt, voting is compulsory for men only. There may be some very strong
arguments in favour of making voting compulsory in India for all men and women. But, in
our situation, there may be several management and legal enforceability problems and
difficult questions of penalty for not voting, Perhaps, we could think along the lines of
providing some incentives to help increase the electoral turnout, particularly of sections that
are now not voting. For example, we could consider a tax deductible expense of say Rs.
2500. Or this could be linked to the schemes of tax rebate on total amount of tax payable by
the person subject to some pre-determined limits. Or for non tax-payers other small
incentives or token benefits in the matter of rations, speed of granting certain licenses,
passports, etc. could be considered. The revenue lost as a result could be treated as partial
state funding of the electoral process. Such policies might help push electoral turnout up. An
additional counterfoil in the voting paper could be given to the voter as his certificate of
voting. It is felt these suggestions for increasing popular participation in the democratic
exercise of elections are certainly worth debating.
Arguably, the above would help to bring more voters out to the polling booths. The
process of voting would meanwhile be simplified by the introduction of EVMs and in the
long run it would be possible to have, particularly for sensitive constituencies, mobile polling
stations with EVMs that can reach the voter rather than the voter reaching them.
(1) The proposal is negative in character. (2) Maximum effort and money of every candidate
has to be devoted to getting the voters to the polling booth to vote for him. Thus, as it is,
those who come only to vote for someone. It may be unrealistic to expect a reasonable
percentage of voters to come simply to say that they do not wish to vote for any of the
candidates. (3) It may require a massive and costly movement to motivate people to stand in
queues to cast negative votes. Also, if such a movement can be mounted, those doing it can
as well do the more positive thing of putting up a candidate they consider desirable. (4)
Where some candidates win with 20, 15 or even less percentage of votes cast, it would not be
easy to decide what percentage in the negative vote category should suffice to invalidate the
election.
(5) It would hardly be easy for the largely illiterate Indian electorate to understand the
concept of negative vote.
CHAPTER- 7
DEFECTION AND DELIMITATION
OF CONSTITUENCIES
INCLUDING OTHER ISSUES.
16. Defections and The Tenth Schedule
The question of defections has now haunted the Indian polity for over three decades.
Between the fourth and the fifth general elections in 1967 and 1972, from among the 4000
odd members of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies in the States and the Union
Territories, there were nearly 2000 cases of defection and counter-defection. By the end of
March, 1971 approximately 50% of the legislators had changed their party affiliations and
several of them did it more than once – some of them as many as five times. One MLA was
found to have defected five times to be a minister for only five days. Defections were always
rewarded thereby establishing the fact that these “floor crossings” were engineered and
bought. This was sought to be eliminated by the Tenth Schedule but all that has happened
that while individual defections have become rare, en bloc defections are permitted, promoted
and are amply rewarded. Therefore, despite Tenth Schedule, or because of it, countless
defections have taken place without incurring any disqualification. In fact, on an average
more defections per year took place after the Anti-defection Law (10 th Schedule) came into
force than ever earlier.
What has been even more disconcerting is that some of the Speakers have tended to act in
a partisan manner and without a proper appreciation – deliberate or otherwise – of the
provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Almost everyone dealing with this subject agrees that
defections flout people’s mandate and cannot and should not be permitted, neither singly nor
in a group. The fact is that most candidates get elected on the basis of the party that has
given them a ticket. Defections allow these candidates to theoretically go to the polar
opposite of this party, which is not the basis on which people elected them. Simply because
there is no accountability vis-à-vis the people, such a practice continues unabated.
Defections encourage corruption of the highest level. Defectors usually are gifted with
political positions and other such perquisites so openly that it really makes a mockery of our
democracy.
The rule should be clear and unambiguous. If a candidate has an insurmountable problem
with his party he should resign and go back to the people for a fresh mandate. He cannot be
permitted to use the old mandate to “live-in” with new partners on whose ticket he might
even have forfeited his deposit.
This is a negative power, used only for pelf and our legislators and parliamentarians can and
should do without it. There should be no debate and no discretion for the Speaker or anyone
else to interpret it. The disqualification for a defector should be automatic and immediate and
his vote should be annulled. If votes are not annulled, the defectors may succeed in toppling
or forming governments before they are disqualified.
In the same vein, just to ensure that the party machinery does not misuse this power either,
what constitutes defection should be re-defined. At the moment any disagreement with the
party organisation and a vote against party directive on any issue can subject a legislator to
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. This is not what should happen. The whip should
only be applicable for any matter where the life of the government is in danger and not to all
voting as at present under the Tenth Schedule. In other words except on voting concerning a
finance bill, or confidence motion or no-confidence motion, whip should not apply from the
point of view of anti-defection law. The question of defection will then only arise when a
legislator actually changes allegiance or defies party directives on critical issues of affecting
its life.
Some activists and scholars still accept the idea of a split. The argument is that in view of
the lack of internal democracy in political parties splits should not be barred. This school of
thought wants to introduce what in their view might be better regulations to monitor splits.
But even here there is unanimity that defecting members should not be permitted any spoils
of office. It is suggested that the members.
who split from their parent party shall not be eligible for any ministerial or other position at
least for a period of one or two years or until they get reelected. However, conceptually
splits are wrong. Party members can always split if ideologically there is a big
disagreement, or really for any other reason, but they must go back to the people for a fresh
mandate if they are members of any legislature at that time. Permitting the concept of splits
will ensure that some indiscreet politicians will find a way to work around the regulations.
The Law Commission had also felt that when a person becomes a member of a political
party, accepts its ticket and contests and succeeds on that ticket, he renders himself subject
to the discipline of this party. Therefore, the concept of “splits” as provided in the Tenth
Schedule should be done away with. Alternatively, there may be every case for our
debating the repeal of the anti-defection law which has fulfilled no objective and served no
purpose except to legalise and institutionalize group defections.
17. Delimitation of Constituencies
Since 1971, the number of seats in the Lok-Sabha allocated to different States was frozen
upto the year 2000. No fresh delimitation commission has been formed. The Law
Commission deliberated on this issue but was persuaded that a fresh delimitation exercise for
Lok Sabha would place those States, particularly the Southern States, which had carried out
a successful family planning programme and had curbed the rate of growth of population, at
a considerable disadvantage compared to the others. Indeed it would appear to reward the
States with poor population control by granting them a bigger representation in the
parliament.
Of course, freezing the delimitation exercise goes against the grain of one-man one vote
because the value of the vote becomes unequal. For example the average Lok Sabha
constituency in Rajasthan in 1991 consisted of 1,060,540 voters compared to 769,046 of Goa
and only 31,665 at the bottom of the table for Lakshwadweep. Within States the oft quoted
example is that Outer Delhi Lok Sabha constituency has a number of over 29,00,000 voters
whereas Chandni Chowk parliamentary constituency has only about 3,68,000 – about 13% of
the former. Clearly the value of an individual vote in Outer Delhi is only about 1/8 th of
Chandni Chowk. There are many similar cases all over the country.
There is no general agreement on this issue. The opinion is divided so far as inter-State
delimitation is concerned. Some have agreed that fresh delimitation between States should
be frozen; others argue that this goes against the grain of our Constitution. In any case this
exercise has already been frozen for another 10 or 25 years according to newspaper reports.
The last few decades have seen a great deal of political instability in India. During the last
ten years there have been seven governments at the Union level. Being minority
governments, these have been unable to provide stable administration and stable policies.
The reasons are not far to find. We adopted the Westminster model of FPTP system of
elections but forgot that it works mainly in communion with a two par;ty system or a limited
number of parties. Even today there are only two major political parties in the UK. In our
case, politicization at ground level coupled with a highly fragmented society, has given rise
to a large number of political parties, each one existing not on a different ideology or
economic programme, but on the basis of having nursed a narrow parochial, mostly caste or
religion based, identity for itself and its band of followers. Even this support is usually
earned not by doing some positive work for the concerned group but negatively by bad-
mouthing and demeaning others and all the time pitting one group against the other. The
political system and the politicization of caste and communal identities have proved to be
very divisive of society and disruptive of the national ethos. It has become increasingly
difficult to get a workable majority to form a government and make a success of coalition
arrangements.
19..2 This has had very negative repercussions on the quality of governance because to
cobble up a workable majority to form government, compromises had to be made and
ideology or notions of quality of governance may sometimes have taken a back seat. The
consequences are pretty severe. Law and order suffers because control mechanisms break
down or become very loose. It becomes difficult to take strong measures to curb corruption
and provide clean and quality governance. In the end, it is the citizen who is the victim of all
the misgovernance.
There is a bi-polar spread on this issue and there have been many strong views on both
sides. One insists that for a parliamentary democracy to work there must be a limit on
political parties as well as on the number of independents that are allowed to contest
elections. The other view challenges this on the pretext that a democracy like India, which
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has a huge cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, needs to articulate its differences
through a share for most participants in the power structure. Therefore there should be no
curtailment whatsoever. There are many other moderating views that work between the two
extremes.
The Law Commission dealt with this issue in some detail and suggested rather radically
that ideally the effort should be to have only one election every five years for Lok Sabha and
all the legislative assemblies. Although the Commission clarified that it was not their
intention to suggest a fixed five-year term for the government, the implication of their
suggestion was clearly in that direction. The Law Commission also stated that in if a political
party received less than 5% of the valid votes cast in the parliamentary or legislative
assembly election, they should not be entitled to any seat and Independents should be barred
from contesting elections. This would, the Commission thought, consolidate the presently
fragmented vote and provide for possible stability.
Many activist organisations and eminent persons have disagreed with this suggestion but
many have not only agreed but also gone a step further to suggest even other methods to
reduce the number of parties or political alliances participating in the electoral process. One
of the other suggestions is for actively pursuing the ideal of building a healthy two party
system essential for the success of the parliamentary system. Former President, Shri R.
Venkataraman and others have suggested that political parties that secure less than 10% of
votes cast should be de-recognised by the EC. After the first such election the party that
secures lowest number of votes in each subsequent general election should be de-recognised
until the number of parties left is only two. The de-recognised parties would lose the right to
get a common symbol for their candidates.
The argument about independent candidates to be discouraged if not altogether barred from
elections is based on the fact that out of 1900 independent candidates who contested the
general election in 1998, only 6 (0.65%) succeeded. 885 (47%) lost their deposits. Likewise
out of the 10635 candidates, who contested the 1996 Lok-Sabha elections, only 9 (0.08%)
won and 10,603 (99.7%) lost their deposits. It is also known that most of these so-called
independent candidates are in fact dummy candidates or defectors from their parties on being
denied party tickets. These candidates only vitiate the sanctity of the electoral process. This
was carried to ridiculous limits when a Lok Sabha constituency in Andhra Pradesh (Nagonda
1996) had 480 contestants. The first three received 82% of votes and the balance 477 got
18% of votes. Similarly there have been assembly constituencies reaching over 1000
candidates. What a waste of resources and effort!
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The more moderate suggestions on the question of independents contesting elections are
that such candidates should be proposed by a certain minimum number of Panchayat
Sarpanches or municipal councilors from their constituency. This would ensure that only
persons who have some political standing in their constituency contest the election. In the
alternative, some have proposed that only such independent candidates should be
permitted to contest who have already a track record of having held some other elective
political office, e.g., panchayat or zilla parishad or municipality or a cooperative etc. The
suggestions need further debate and consideration.
One other set of suggestions centers around permitting only recognized “national parties”
or qualifying pre-poll alliances to contest national elections to Lok Sabha. In their view this
would, by prompting pre-poll alliances, automatically consolidate the vote and help in
evolving some sort of federal parties or alliances providing more stable governments.
Candidates who thus come to occupy seats in the national parliament will have a more
national perspective on things as opposed to those who come on a purely local or regional
platform.
Some suggestions are centered around reducing the number of recognized national parties
or pre-poll alliances by changing the present criteria for their recognition. For example, at the
moment a political party in order to be recognised as a national party needs to secure at least
6% votes in 4 States or have one MP elected for every 25 MPs from four States. It is
proposed by some scholars and elder statesman like the former President Shri R.
Venkataraman that this percentage should be increased to 10% of votes polled. It is also
proposed by some that the number of States should be increased to half of the total States and
Union territories. This would certainly trim down the list of national parties/alliances. A de-
recognition would mean the loss of many benefits including a common symbol nationwide.
Coupled with the suggestion that non-national parties should not be permitted to contest
national elections, this would force many pre-poll alliances or growth of federal parties.
It has also been suggested that in a situation of so called ‘hung’ house, the best course
would be to have the house elect its leader as it elects the Speaker. The leader so elected may
be appointed the Prime or Chief Minister and his government should be removable only on a
constructive vote of no-confidence. This really means that at the time of introducing the vote
of no-confidence, a simultaneous vote of confidence has to be passed in favour of an
alternative leadership, which will be sworn in if the vote goes through. In other words, there
may be a change of leadership, or even a change of government but the country would not go
back to polls, nor would there be time for horse-trading after the fall of a government to
cobble up artificial majorities. The period of office for Lok Sabha and Assemblies should be
reduced to 4 years. If India can have only one election every four years this would be a huge
national saving apart from creating stability that at least gives a chance for better and
development oriented governance. Some have suggested that if a vote of no confidence is
proposed and is defeated in the House, a fresh vote of no-confidence should not be permitted
for a period of time say a year or two. Most of these suggestions do not call for any
amendment in the provisions of the Constitution and all that may be needed may be a simple
legislative amendment or a modified rule of procedure.
Also, all the suggestions are permutations and combinations of the same set of proposals to
achieve the objective of more stability in the system of governance as contradistinguished
from the suggestions of some to provide fixed terms to the government or to the legislators.
The latter cannot be considered legitimate. If a leadership is performing poorly and/or
making grievous errors, deliberate or compulsive, in running of the nation, or even when it
fails to provide the basics of governance, it cannot be allowed to continue for any fixed term.
Many of the above issues in the long run will be addressed if the proposal of winning on
a majority 50%+1 vote is accepted. Many non-serious candidates and even fringe parties
will go out of the electoral fray, as it will be impossible for them to contemplate a win. It
will certainly push many of them into better formed and longer lasting political alliances in
order to win.
The decay in political morality is an issue that occupies centre-stage in India’s political
discourse but there are really no remedies and we appear to be on a downhill course with
getting rich-quick anyhow and competitive consumerism having become the highest virtues.
If the question is asked how can we reverse this trend, the answer would have to be that there
are no magical formulas or laws and regulations for moral regeneration that can help in
creating a better sense of higher values and a general political conscience. It can only be
done by building and nursing strong conventions that politically and even more importantly,
socially ostracize deviant behaviour.
One of the ways in which this may be attempted is by educating India’s masses about their
fundamental rights and duties, by driving home the message that political position holders are
not “rulers” in the sense of the “mai-baap” of the colonial era or “maharajas of the feudal
vintage”. They are elected to positions of authority to serve the society’s needs. Strong public
opinion has to be created against political corruption making sure that no one gets to enjoy
the fruits of corrupt actions. Above all, we may need a renaissance of the old values of
sacrifice and service in public life and politics based on some moral principles. This would
need politicians who are not for power for its own sake or for promoting their own narrow
self interests but who enter public life motivated by a mission and a desire to serve the people
or ones fellow citizens. For this the government would have to keep on a constant
communication with the populace at large. For whatever it is worth, immediate appointment
of one or more ombudsmen or Lokpal may be suggested once again. To keep a tab on issues
of public morality and ensure that transgressions are widely debated and the culprits brought
to book, a beginning should be made to include some secular constitutional values and
citizenship obligations in the curriculum of schools and colleges so that the next generations
will grow up with this information and perhaps wisdom to form a formidable social force
against the kind of decaying political morality of today.
CHAPTER- 8
MISCELLANEOUS
SUGGESTIONS
20. Miscellaneous Suggestions:
Some other suggestions need mention. These may need to be considered. The feedback
and views received may help in framing arguments and reaching some conclusions in regard
to the following:
2. There must be a bar on ministries that are larger than 10% of the house. No other
position with executive or financial powers to be considered for legislators. Also, the
power to create Minister level or Cabinet rank posts should be strictly regulated.
3. There must be a limit of two terms for any political position. So one may be a
member of the panchayat for two terms, of State assembly only for two terms even if
non- contiguous and MP for two terms. This may reduce the number of life-time
professional politicians who have no other sources of livelihood except political
office.
4. The EC should be appointed by a neutral body consisting of the Prime Minister, the
Vice President, the Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of
India. This would make his position totally impartial in the eyes of all political parties
and factions. The EC should not be appointed to any other office after retirement.
7. There seems to be a general agreement on the need to have more women members.
The question is whether political parties should be asked to put up women candidates
for at least one-third of the seats they contest both for State and Parliament elections
or one-third seats should be reserved for them by rotation. Another suggestion being
made is that there may be a 30% increase in the number of seats in each house and
these additional seats be filled by women party candidates on the basis of a list
system.
8. The minimum number of valid votes polled should be increased to 25% in order not
to forfeit the deposit. Also, the amount of deposit should be again increased
substantially. These two steps would further reduce non-serious candidates.
9. All candidates should be required to clear all government dues e.g. huge I.T. arrears
before their candidature is accepted. This pertains also to holding on the
accommodation, telephones, and government facilities used while in power.
10. EC should have full disciplinary authority over the officials who are involved in
election duty. It is said that at present there are too many complaints of compromised
or partisan officials but EC is unable to take any stringent action. The question
however is whether the Election Commission could have the same disciplinary
powers over all the officers and staff engaged on election duty as that of the
appointing authority.
12. Hold State level and parliamentary level elections at the same time. This would
reduce expenditure.
13. Every candidate to an elective office at the time of filing nomination and every holder
of a political position annually must declare his assets and liabilities as also the assets
and liabilities of his close family members.
14. For Legislative Councils, eliminate the Teachers’ and Graduates’ constituencies,
which provide extra votes to some electors and have politicized educational
institutions.
15.Subsequent to the 73rd and 74th amendments, ensure that criminalization does not
engulf our PRIs and there must be a serious debate on the issue with a view to
substantive reform.
16.For constesting elections to the Rajya Sabha, the requirement of a candidate being
‘ordinarily resident’ in the State should be interpreted to mean that he or she should
be actually residing in that State.
Voter-Turnout Trends:
The turnout of voters have fluctuated over the past sixteen years. The lowest ever turnout was
recorded was of 45.67% which was in the year 1951 which was the first ever General
Elections held in India. From thereon the turnouts has been as, 47.74% in 1957; 55.42% in
1962, 61.33% in 1967; 55.29% in 1971; 60.49% in 1977; 56.92% in 1980; 64.01% in 1984-
85; 61.95% in 1989; 55.88% in 1991-1992; 57.94% in 1996; 61.97% in 1998; 59.99% in
1999; 57.98% in 2004; 58.19% in 2009; 66.44% in 2014 and 67.11 in 2019.
As is evident from the above data the general voter turnout can be considered as low. The
lowest turnout was in the year 1951 which can be due to the fact that it was the first ever
general election and the general awareness about the election was less and mostly people
were unaware about the concepts of democracy and the benefits of election. But even after
the first election the picture has not been very bright. There has been a general deviation of
+- 5% in the voter turnout from the elections since the year 1962 with the only sudden surge
being in the year 1984-1985, this could be attributed to the fact that it was the year in which
the first and only women Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi was assassinated. She
was immensely popular among the masses and her assassination led the people to sympathise
with the congress and elect Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to be her heir. Under Mr Gandhi, India had
many reforms, one of which was the Introduction of Universal Adult Franchise which led to
the lowering of the voting age to 18years. After that the general voting trend has been
generally similar. The highest voting turnout was in recent election of 2019 with a voting
turnout of 67.11%. This voting turnout was mainly attributed to the immense popularity of
the current Narendra Modi government and general increased awareness of the youth due to
the Social Media. Moreover, even before this election strides were being made by the BJP
Government in the area of quashing of the triple talaq amongst the Muslim community. This
led to an increased sense of freedom amidst the women. The view of current government on
the Kashmir Issue was also one of the major factor to instil the feeling amongst masses to go
out and vote and a result of which strides were made by the BJP government in Kashmir after
the re-election with the removal of the Special Status granted to Kashmir under Article 370.
Though the voting turnout was at an all time high yet it is considerably low and it is very
shameful that the “largest democracy in the world” has not been able to garner even 70%
voter turnout even after 70 years of being a “Democratic” Country. This can be attributed to
the following reasons –
• The people have a feeling that one vote does not counts. The people
should be made aware that every vote counts and if all the people
start to think the same way then no one will turn out to vote and
election would just be a farce.
• Many areas in India are still such that the Women are not
allowed to go out.
• There are many cases of election booths being bombed and death
of civilians. This causes the rise of a sense of fear among the
people.
CHAPTER -9
CONCLUSION &
BIBLIOGRAPHY
70 | P a g e
Conclusion
Democracy can have its true meaning only when the large mass of people turn out to vote
th
because as the 16 President of United States of America has stated that , “ Government of the
people, by the people and for the people” ( this was said by him in his Gettysburg Address) .
This clearly means that people are the true essence of democracy. Therefore, to make India
democracy in true sense the voting turnout needs to be increased. In my view following steps can
be taken to increase the voter turnout-
• The voters belonging to the urban working middle class can be given the incentive that
who ever votes can get an extra day of paid leave this could further be added in the
corporate bodies Corporate Social Responsibility.
• The voters need to be educated that every vote matters. The students can be educated
how a single vote can make difference.
• For the people living in rural areas the literacy needs to be increased and government
should organise drives to educate the people.
• The National Commission of Women can take steps to ensure the safety of women and carry
out gender sensitization drives to generate awareness about voting among women.
• The government should deploy more security and ensure safety of the boots in every way
possible.
In my view, the process of election can also be reformed and both the elections to the Lok Sabha
and the State Legislatures could be made to take place at the same time. This will decrease the
expenditure needed in conducting the election and it can cause to form a stable government in
every state and ensure that there is no fall of government in the next five years, as is in the case
of most Coalition Government.
71 | P a g e
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