2004 - Merara

African Association of Political Science
The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Democratisation in Ethiopia

Author(s): Merera Gudina
Source: African Journal of Political Science / Revue Africaine de Science Politique, Vol. 9,
No. 1 (June 2004), pp. 27-50
Published by: African Association of Political Science
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Afr. j. polit, sci. (2004), Vol 9 No. 1
The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and

Démocratisation in Ethiopia
Merera Gudina
Abstract
Following the change of regime in 1991, Ethiopia has been undergoing a major politi
cal metamorphosis, the key elements of which are political pluralism and a decentra
sation of power based on ethnic-linguistic criterion. As such, the twin objective of th
Ethiopian transition is to effect a dual transition, i.e. a transition from an ethnic
dominated empire state ofunequals to an ethnically egalitarian nation-state of equals
and from authoritarian rule to democracy'.
The central problem in Ethiopias démocratisation is the contradictory policy of th
TPLF/EPRDF regime, which has been démocratisation on paper and authoritarian
ism in practice. Motivated by the propensity to dominate and the imperatives of re
reating the Ethiopian state and society according to its own image, the ruling party
has been advocating the policy of political pluralism, a liberal national constitution
decentralisation of the state structure to promote self-rule, etc., while in theory co
centrating power in the hands of the ruling party. To this end, a strategy of creatin
the PDOs as instruments of central control has been followed, which have obstructe
the various démocratisation initiatives. As argued in this paper, the exclusive elec
tions held in June 1992 and 1994, May 1995 and 2000, were all aimed at the insti
tutionalisation of a de facto one-party state and have contributed little, if any, to th
démocratisation of the Ethiopian state and society.
This paper further argues that despite some measures related to political liberalisa
tion, ending of a command economy, etc., the Ethiopian state has generally remaine
authoritarian and repressive, and in the same way the 'nation-building' project of
the imperial regime for much of the 20th century and the 'garrison socialism' of th
military regime in 1970s and 1980s failed to produce the desired result, the present
attempt to democratise the Ethiopian State and society appears to be foundering, as
result of the continued adherence of the TPLF leadership to what they call 'revolutio
ary democracy', which is essentially based on Mao's dictum: 'power comes from th
barrel of the gun' and the principles of democratic centralism, both of which seem t
have a debilitating effect on the démocratisation enterprise.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International relations, Addis Ababa
University, Ethiopia.
1027-0353 © 2004 African Association of Political Science
28 M erra Gudina
Introduction
Since the 1960s the multi-ethnic empire state of Ethiopia has been experien
a crisis of major proportions that have provoked two major upheavals in 1974 a
1991. The first revolutionary upheaval ended in the institutionalisation of "bar
socialism", which opened the way for a bloody military interlude that turned t
country to a big prison house for 17 years.
The second upheaval, which came in 1991, has led to yet another major politi
metamorphosis. Following the regime change, institutions of the old order suc
as the omnipotent party, the parliament, the military and the civilian bureaucra
the supportive mass organisations such as the peasant, women, youth as we
the workers associations were all dismantled to give way to the emerging insti
tions of the new regime. In other words, the Ethiopian state and the institutions
government thereof have been fully reordered in the image of the victorious e
And in the remaking of the Ethiopian state ethnicity as well as multi-party de
racy have become central. Here, in what appears to be a response to the centur
old ethnic domination, an ethnic-based federal formula has been introduced wh
political pluralism is expected to end centuries of autocratic rule and a bloody m
tary interlude from 1974 to 1991.
This paper argues that notwithstanding the positive attempts to end ethnic ine
ity and democratise state and society, as a result of the hegemonic aspiration of
now dominant elite as well as the competing ethnic nationalisms that have obstru
the creation of a broad national consensus, the hoped-for democratic transition se
to be frozen while the federal formula that has been intended to democratise inter
ethnic relations by empowering the hitherto marginalised groups appears to be
creating more problems than the ones it seeks to solve. Consequently, Ethiopia has
continued to be rocked by ethnically precipitated crisis in much of the country.
Theoretical Discussion
The Elite and Competing Ethnic Nationalisms

There is an emerging academic consensus that political mobilisation is an
part of competing ethnic nationalisms and that the role of the elites is cen
mobilisation. Put differently, the role of the elite is critical in synthesisin
ogy of nationalism, setting the agenda, organising the nationalist movem
providing the necessary leadership to achieve the set goals. In fact, mos
this field underline the centrality of the elite in such projects. For instanc
'ethnic entrepreneurs' for Esman (1994) and Eriksen (1993), 'inventors of
for Gellner (quoted in Hann, 1996:106) and 'political gladiators' for Milaz
Furthermore, it is generally known that for any nationalist movemen
lising elite is needed to articulate, appeal as well as inspire the masse
name the struggle is to be waged - what Nairn calls 'to invite the m
The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Démocratisation 29
history' (quoted in Smith, 1986:137). However, a word of caution is in order here:

for the masses to be mobilised and be ready to make the necessary sacrifices for
a given cause, there should be separate material or other interests of their own in
the cause to be promoted. This implies the possibility of both convergence and
divergence of the interests of the elite and the masses in any nationalist enterprise.
Moreover, ethnicity and nationalism will arouse stronger popular sentiment and
turn into a formidable material force if the interests of the leaders and that of the
masses have found a meeting ground. In this regard, another important point to
note is that ethnic nationalism, as ideology of political mobilisation, can be used
to maintain a given status quo in the name of 'state-building' and/or 'nation-build
ing' political ventures in order to defend the political, economic and socio-cultural
interests of the dominant elite. It can also be equally used to change the existing
status quo in favour of the subaltern ethnic groups. In other words, in multi-ethnic
societies, an ethnic-based dominant political class can use political mobilisation to
ensure the continuity of the structure of dominance and its privileges in the name
of such national mottoes as 'nation-building' and 'national unity'. In the same way,
marginalised groups can use it to end historical injustice, current exploitative rela
tions and repression as part of popular struggles for the creation of democratic
governance. This means that the role of nationalism can be 'state-making', 'state
breaking' (Ayoob, 1996), or serving political interests in the grey area between.
Competing Conceptions of Democracy

In its simplest form, democracy is generally understood to be, "government of
the people, by the people, for the people". But such undertanding of democracy
has been fraught with difficulties that arise from competing conceptions that run
from liberal democracy, which is premised on the primacy of individual rights and
free enterprise to socialist democracy, which calls for social justice and economic
empowerment of the subaltern classes. For instance, Lipset defines democracy as
'a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing
the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible
part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders
for political office' (quoted in Vanhanen, 1997: 28). Similarly, for Pennock, democ
racy is a political system in which 'public policies are determined either directly
by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably fre
quent intervals and by a process in which each voter who chooses to vote counts
equally... and in which a plurality is determinative' (quoted in ibid.).
On his part, Vanhanen has conceptualised democracy as 'a political system in
which different groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which insti
tutional powerholders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people'
(ibid:. 31). In this connection, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), who attempt to link
it up with the problematic of transition write:
30 Mena Gudina
democracy is...a form of political regime in which citizens choose, in competiti

elections, the occupants of the top political offices of the state. According to this
definition, a transition to democracy occurs with the installation of a governmen
chosen on the basis of one competitive election as long as that election is freely
and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, and that all the contestant
accept the validity of election results (1997: 12f).
These conceptions of democracy are limited to 'formal' or 'procedural' definiti

of democracy, and apply primarily to liberal democracies. In a sharp contrast
such definitions, Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997) make a clear di
tion between 'formal democracy' and 'social democracy'. According to them, 'f
mal democracy' is 'a political system that combines four features: regular free
fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the state's administrative or
to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for freedom of expres
and association as well as protection against arbitrary state action' (1997:
To them, such a system does not provide 'equal distribution of political po
and does not 'reduce social and economic inequality' (ibid. : 324). They fur
hold that a political system that meets the criteria of 'formal democracy' ame
with 'equal distribution of political power' is a 'participatory democracy',
a political system that goes further still and includes the goal of reducing soc
and economic inequality would qualify as 'social democracy' (ibid.). Altho
less inclusive, Joseph also argues for a need to go beyond a minimalist definit
of democracy and suggests that the 'dominant way of characterizing democrac
according to a set of electionist, institutionalist, and proceduralist criteria mu
expanded into a broader conceptualization' (Joseph, 1997: 365). Held (1996:2
poses what he calls 'democratic autonomy' (or 'liberal socialism'), which pro
citizens both from the 'economic power' of accumulated capital as well as from
dangers of centralized political power' of the left.
These competing conceptions of democracy appear to be limited to and g
ally drawn from Western experiences of democracy. The key question in light
our study is - how much of such experiences can be related to the situatio
multi-ethnic polities of the Third World such as Ethiopia? Or to what extent
the models of democracy developed in the context of the Western World
the chronic problem of governance in the conflict-ridden, multi-ethnic societ
the Third World, which so far have had frustrating experiences with democra
These are some of the questions that need to be addressed in any intelle
enterprise aimed at solving the riddles of democratising Third-World multi-et
societies.
Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Democracy: A Tenuous Relationship?

Yet another difficult part in the study of ethnic nationalism in contemporary politics
is to establish its relationship with democracy. In this regard, work on Nationalism,
Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy edited by Diamond and Plattner (1994) contains
interesting debates that cover the whole range of possibilities, from 'marriage'
between nationalism and democracy to the presentation of nationalism as a force
'allergic' to democracy. For instance, Nodia (1994: 4), who makes a distinction
between 'home-grown' and 'imported' liberal democracies, forcefully argues that
'the idea of nationalism is impossible - indeed unthinkable - without the idea of
democracy, and that democracy never exists without nationalism' and sharply
disagrees with Fukuyama's view of the incompatibility of nationalism and liberal
democracy {ibid.). Fukuyama (1994: 23-28) on his part, although recognizing the
role nationalism played in the retirement of socialism, underlines what he calls
the 'illiberal' and 'anti-democratic' aspects of nationalism. He further argues that
nationalism is inherently anti-democratic. In the same work, Pesie (1994:132-135)
even goes further to show what he describes as 'the cruel face of nationalism'.
Mann, on his part, stresses that 'exclusionary nationalism' is a result of the 'fail
ure to institutionalize democracy' and that the attempt to suppress it by authoritar
ian methods 'may result in aggressive nationalist movements'. To him, the solution
is 'to achieve democracy, especially 'federal inter-regional democracy' (Periwal's
summary, 1995: 233). Some intellectuals like Nnoli (1995) have attempted to show
the complexity of ethnic nationalism and have underlined the need to differentiate
between the legitimate demands of dominated ethnic groups and the chauvinistic
tendencies of the hegemonic groups with the aspiration to dominate others.
McGarry and O'Leary (1993) illustrate, among other things, the wisdom of rep
resentation based on 'federation' and 'consociation or power-sharing' in regulating
and mediating ethnic conflicts in divided societies. In the more specific African con
text, Nnoli (1995) addresses the two major currents in post-colonial Africa in terms
of their history and their contemporary manifestations. He attempts to establish
'the conjuncture of ethnic conflicts and démocratisation in Africa' by considering
the mutual impacts of the two upon each other. He also suggests the need to medi
ate their contradictory aspects by institutionalising 'a democracy that guarantees
both individual and group rights, balances them and provides an institutional
framework for greater participation in decision making' (1995: 24). In a nutshell,
the attempt to link ethnic nationalism to democracy and démocratisation positively
or negatively is not conclusively settled in either way. But experiences of Africa
and most of the multi-ethnic societies across the Third World show that the model
of democracy based on the primacy of individual rights seems not to work well.
The same experiences also show us, as Joseph (1997: 366) observed, 'pluralist and
competitive democracy in Africa has tended to take the form of competition among
communities rather than individuals, parties, and administrative sub-units.' No less
importantly, despite rallying cries in the name of 'nation-building' by every African
leader - civilian or military - demands of ethnic groups not only persisted but even
led to devastating civil wars and the collapse of some states. Furthermore, most
32 Merra Gudina
people across the Third World never totally abandoned their communal values an
continued to act collectively despite the penetration of Western values. Hence, in
spite of serious reservation shown by some academics to the introduction of gro
rights in situations like South Africa (Milazi, 1996; Szeftel, 1994) where demands
for group rights are associated with people who had been beneficiaries und
apartheid, a democratic model, which accommodates both individual and gro
rights seems to be more applicable in situations such as Ethiopia.
To sum up our discussion of the theoretical part, the following generalisation ca
be made regarding ethnicity and its impact on state transformation and the dém
ratisation enterprise thereof. First, ethnicity and nationalism are generally bett
conceived as ideology of mobilisation of collectivities for political ends informed
by the struggle for power and resources that may be resolved within or outside
given state. Secondly, the élites, who usually have their own vested interests but
may also (claim to) represent the interests of the masses, play crucial roles in th
mobilisation of collectivities. And as a result, ethnicity and nationalism tend to lea
to competing, often contradictory demands on the state. Thirdly, as corollary to
this, ethnicity and nationalism pit one ethnic group against another by creating t
'us' and 'they' divide, where issues of identity matter more than socio-econom
questions. As in such cases staying in power depends on the ethnic balance to
forged. It generally tempts the ruling élite to devise a divide-and-rule policy, usua
by manipulating ethnicity. Fourthly, under conditions of politicised ethnicity and/
competing nationalisms, the struggle for power involves convoluted alignments
the few and the many, and saddles ruling minorities with a sense of insecurity. Th
in turn causes distrust among the competing élites and so undermines the politic
consensus needed for démocratisation to succeed. Fifthly, ethnicity and national
generally tend to fragment and weaken civil society organisations - the very pillar
of democracy - by obstructing their unity across ethnic divides. Finally, althoug
the conventional assumption that democracy is the better way to mediate confli
that may arise from ethnic differences is acknowledged, plurality of ideas is see
as challenging the dominant status quo because ethnicity and nationalism tend to
be exclusivist. Cumulatively these conditions are likely to have serious impact on
the démocratisation of multi-ethnic states such as Ethiopia, where politicisation
ethnicity and/or competing ethnic nationalisms already have a debilitating effect
the attempt to democratise state and society.
Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the New Attempts at State

Transformation
Ethnic Nationalism and the Rise of the TPLF

The rising expectations that followed the 1974 revolutionary upheaval in Ethio
had led to the rise of many liberation and social movements, one of which wa
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The original agenda of the movem
The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and, Démocratisation 33
was to liberate Tigray from a century of Amhara domination (Aregawi, 1993;

Young, 1997; Merera, 2002). To be sure, since its creation in 1975, it has pursued
such a goal very flexibly and pragmatically as dictated by the political expediency
of the day. Using the Marxist-Leninist principle of 'the right to self-determination
of nations and nationalities, including secession', a principle that had been popu
lar among the Ethiopian youth of the day, it effectively used both Marxism and
Tigrayan nationalism to mobilise the Tigrayan peasantry.
Marxism was 'officially' discarded and replaced by 'liberal democracy' after
the capture of state power by the group in 1991 while Tigrayan nationalism has
continued to serve as a moving sprit in the post-1991 remaking of the Ethiopian
state. And, as we shall see below, both ethnic nationalism and the official multi
party democracy ideology, have been fashioned to serve the hegemonic interest
of the Tigrayan élite.1 Here, the official discarding of the Marxist-Leninist ideol
ogy appears to be necessitated by the imperatives of the new World Order' whose
twin criteria for legitimacy are based on political pluralism and the sanctity of free
enterprise. The TPLF, whose ethnic support base is one of the country's minorities
in the North constituting about 6 per cent of the country's population had to devise
a strategy that could help it to outflank the major contending forces from the other
ethnic groups. Consequently, the dual strategy of the TPLF leadership is to preach
liberal democracy on the one hand to attract the support of the donors and continue
to adhere to its Marxist past of 'revolutionary democracy' on the other. Arguably,
its ultimate goal has been to ensure the centrality of Tigrayan nationalism in the
reordering of the Ethiopian State and society (Leenco, 1999; Merera, 1994c). And,
in the new scheme of things, 'the right to self-determination and secession' and the
ethnic-based federal arrangement have been carefully designed in a manner they
could serve the dominance of the new Tigrayan elite in power.
Thus, in the post-1991 period ethnicity has become the cornerstone of the
major policy initiatives (see Charter, 1991; Constitution, 1994), i.e. political issues,
economic matters or educational, linguistic and cultural domains. Put differently,
the critical issues at the July Conference of 1991, the fundamentals of the Transitional
Charter, the organisational basis of the Transitional Government and the decentrali
sation of the administrative structure as well as the constitutional engineering were
all informed by the imperatives of competing ethnic nationalisms. Consequently, the
Tigrayan People's Liberation Front/Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic
Front (TPLF/EPRDF), which achieved an impressive military victory in coordination
with the Eritreans was able to extend the basic tenets in its own political programme
to the basic tenets in the Charter of the July Conference, later the Constitution of
1994, where the basic principles such as 'the right to self-determination' has been
canonised in line with the political philosophy of 'revolutionary democracy'.2 In a
nutshell, the central problem associated with the EPRDF-sponsored experiment at
multiparty democracy is that it was born and matured as a guerrilla force under the
guidance of 'revolutionary democracy', to which it covertly continues to adhere and
34 Merra Gudina
its overt shift to liberal democracy after assumption of state power. The sole purp
of such behaviour appears to be the promotion of the hegemony of the Tigrayan é
in the face of strong resistance from other competing ethnic nationalisms. Ethn
nationalism, which, thus, has become the new base for the restructuring of the
Ethiopian State, ends up serving the hegemonic interest of the victorious Tigray
élite rather than the hoped-for decentralisation of power and multiparty democrac
which, in theory, should promote stability and meaningful economic development
The July Conference and the Remaking of Ethiopia

The TPLF/EPRDF marched to power in May 1991 with the motto of 'natio
struggle first' as opposed to class struggle, despite its background of revolut
ary Marxism-Leninism. After capturing state-power, it moved fast with the wind
the day to embrace the philosophy of multiparty democracy more by the post-Co
War imperatives than by faith in the ballot box. And, contrary to popular expec
tion, it has remained loyal to its old principle of 'national struggle first', which h
become the main base for state transformation. In the chain of events, the July
Conference of 1991 became the first major act in the remaking of Ethiopian sta
and society by the new regime.
The objective of the July Conference as officially stated was to establish a 'leg
mate and broad-based' transitional government that can prepare the country for
a smooth democratic transformation as agreed at the American-brokered London
Peace Conference (Cohen, 1991). But the EPRDF leaders, whose priority seem
to be consolidation of their hard-won victory had selectively invited weaker pol
cal organisations most of which were instantly created and excluded the act
or potential real power contenders from the process.3 Consequently, the m
than two dozen political groups invited to attend the conference had neither th
political muscle nor an agenda of their own, except the Oromo Liberation Fr
(OLF), which negotiated a junior partnership as well as the right to independent
mobilise its own political support base (Africa Confidential, 1991; Merera, 1992).
such the major outcomes were two: the Transitional Charter and the Transitiona
Government. The former, which was approved with little or no resistance,
designed to serve as the supreme law of the land for the transitional period. Based
the Charter, 87-seat Council of Representatives (COR) was created mainly out of t
representatives of the participating political groups based on a pre-determined qu
set by the EPRDF itself. Of the 87 seats, the EPRDF took a lion's share (32 seats) an
distributed the remainder as handouts to the more than two dozen political grou
The Council was empowered to make laws for the whole transitional period a
except the OLF, which was able to secure 12 seats, other parties mostly rece
one or two seats and had little, if any, political influence. The TGE was proclaim
by the COR while the executive branch of the TGE was also created out of the sam
COR. And according to many critics, with high level of political manoeuvres that
supported by military muscle and tacit support of the Western donors, especially the
Americans, who were delighted with the demise of Mengistu's regime, the EPRDF
easily achieved two of its main political objectives: the approval of the Charter and
the establishment of a transitional government that was comfortably controlled by
itself (Merera, 1992; 1994a; b; Leenco, 1999)
To be sure, the EPRDF-authored Charter, which provided a legal basis for the
new regime contained both positive elements that have opened the way for visible
political liberalisation measures as well as provisions, which have had detrimental
impacts on the country's quest for democracy. On the positive side it stipulated
the new regime's commitment to respect the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the United Nations, especially the "freedom of conscience, expression,
association, ... peaceable assembly, ... right to engage in unrestricted political
activity and to organise political parties". It also contained the provisions that
promised to address the historical grievances of the hitherto marginalised ethnic
groups. Above all else, the Charter promised the creation of a federal democratic
republic that ends ethnic domination and ensures good governance. To translate
the promises made on paper, a régionalisation policy was proclaimed and carried
out while the country's command economy has been replaced by a more liberal
economic policy.
As noted earlier, despite the more promising beginning, the hegemonic aspi
ration of the new elite on the one hand and the imperatives of transforming the
Ethiopian state and society along democratic lines on the other have very quickly
led to new types of contradictions that have had a negative impact on the transition.
And, as it will be clearer further down, the rising expectations, which are inherent
in competing ethnic nationalisms have further compounded the task of the démoc
ratisation enterprise.
PDOs and the Régionalisation Policy

Following the spirit of the Charter, a régionalisation policy was proclaimed at
the beginning of 1992 on the basis of which the country was restructured into
14 regions.4 This policy was basically aimed at addressing the demands for self
rule by the hitherto marginalised ethnic groups. Consequently, the framers of
the régionalisation policy have hoped to implement it through the creation of the
Peoples' Democratic Organisations (PDOs).5 Put differently, it is the strategy
of manufacturing a political support base by creating controlled ethnic-based
organisations for the various ethnic groups of the country, which has helped the
real ruling party to speak through the other ethnic groups, win elections and rule
the country in the name of all the peoples of Ethiopia. The classical use of the
PDOs system is a decentralisation of power on paper and centralisation in practice
through the PDOs (Leenco, 1999; Aalen, 2000a).
36 Merra Gudina
Contrary to the spirit of democracy as well as genuine federation, the functions

and the loyalty of the PDOs as instrument of central control are ensured both
through the formal structure of the party and government and the parallel informal
structures where cadres are planted in the PDOs and the regional structures at vari
ous levels. The formal party structure is that of the EPRDF, which has been fully
controlled by the TPLF until the split of the TPLF itself in 2001. The TPLF as the
creator of the PDOs that constitute the EPRDF has been at the top of the pyramidal
informal power structure. And, according to inside-house information as well as
testimonies of key defectors from the regime, decisions are generally made by the
TPLF polibureau and/or central committee and taken to the EPRDF for rubber
stamping. The PDOs, which are controlled both through the formal application of
the party rules based on democratic centralism and the TPLF assigned hard-core
cadres implement the decisions made by the TPLF/EPRDF leading bodies without
any serious questions that can be asked by real autonomous local leaders.
True to the modus operandi of a de facto one-party state, the government
structure is controlled by and subordinate to a party structure. Hence, in the
5-tier government structure, i.e. federal, regional, Zonal, Woreda and Kebele
levels, the TPLF practically controls the central government by occupying the
key posts of the Prime Ministership, the Foreign Ministry as well as the key
posts in the army, the police and security structure. In other words, the TPLF,
which controls the PDOs through the EPRDF, in turn controls the regional and
other tiers of local governments through the PDOs. Here, it is important to
note that the regional governments are staffed and operated by the PDO offi
cials, who are either appointed or assumed office through mock elections. As
Young has observed, the activities of the PDO cadres are supervised and their
decisions are cleared at the top while they "have little political or military expe
riences, generally have low levels of education, frequently appear to be moti
vated by opportunism, and not surprisingly, have little legitimacy among their
constituents" (1997: 212)
The end result is as Aalen argues:
The centralized party structure of the EPRDF is clearly contradictory to the provi
sions of the federal and regional constitutions, which give these levels the right to
self-determination. It promotes upward accountability to the party organs above
rather than downward accountability to the people of the region, Woreda and
Kebele. The constitutional rights for the regions to formulate and implement plans
and policies are severely diminished by the fact that the regional governments,
which are all under the EPRDF's hegemony, follow the centrally designed policies
and five-year plans... in the Ethiopian case, the party structures are centralized,
and when the state and party are the same this leads inevitably to a centralized
division of state power (2002:80).
Aalen further points out that there is the existence of "dual administration" where
"politics outside of the legal framework" (ibid.) dominates the modus operandi of the
EPRDF federation. Here, it is important to note that according to the officially stated
objectives of its authors, the régionalisation policy was designed to serve the larger
goal of démocratisation of the Ethiopian State by promoting the decentralisation of
power where the hitherto marginalised ethnic communities are empowered to gov
ern themselves and conduct their own affairs, develop their own economies, culture
and language without interference (TGE Charter, 1991; Constitution, 1994). But the
régionalisation initiative through the PDOs has quickly led to a new type of domina
tion (Ottaway, 1995; Harbeson, 1998). Hence, the régionalisation policy, which was
a positive initiative rather than satisfying the demands of the hitherto subaltern
groups for self-rule appears to have served the divide-and-rule policy of the now
dominant Tigrayan élite (see Hovde, 1994; Paul, 2000; Vestal, 1994a). Furthermore,
it has led to the rise of many unanswered questions such as what type of federation
- ethnically or territorially-based? Which rights are to have priority - collective or
individual? What model of party organisation - ethnic or multi-ethnic? What type of
electoral laws? What should be the national education and language policies of the
country? etc.
The June Elections of 1992

Following its régionalisation policy, the new regime had undertaken the regional
elections of 1992, which became the first acid test for the new regime's decen
tralisation of power as well as the démocratisation initiatives. The legal framework
for this election was laid down by proclamation No. 7/1992, which was enacted
to serve as a basis for the restructuring of the country's regional administration
along linguistic and/or ethnic lines. The twin objectives of these elections were
to legitimise the EPRDF's rule and ensure local autonomy. The former objective
hoped to be met by making the process 'free and fair' in the eyes of the Ethiopian
public and the international community while the latter objective was to be met by
establishing a popularly elected local government. Moreover, the largest interna
tional observer groups ever were invited to judge the fairness of the process and to
legitimise it in the eyes of the international community.
Not surprisingly, as the stakes in the June 1992 elections were high for both the
incumbent government and the major opposition groups, the already existing atmos
phere of distrust and suspicion easily turned to that of confrontation. The OLF, the
then major contending group, was forced to withdraw from the election process at
the eleventh hour. With the boycott of legally registered parties like Islamic Front
for Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), All Amhara People's Organisation (AAPO), the
Southern Ethiopian groups and the exclusion of older parties like the Ethiopian
Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (popu
larly known as MEISON), the June 1992 election turned out to be an affair of the
ruling party. As a result, according to the National Democratic Institute/African
American Institute (NDI/AAI) Report of 1992 (NDI/AAI, 1992: 7):
38 Mena Gudina
The June 21 elections did not contribute directly to Ethiopia's development as

democratic state. At best, the elections were premature, especially for the sout
ern half of Ethiopia. Less kindly judged, the elections were ill conceived, dubio
and counter-productive in their contribution to the democratization of Ethiopia. Th
elections, moreover, exacerbated existing tensions, reinforced the hegemony of
the EPRDF while marginalizing other fledging parties and were a central factor
the withdrawal of the OLF from the TGE and the return to war in the Oromo regio
Finally, the elections created new 'political facts'...the EPRDF dominated regiona
and district assemblies...that will remain controversial in regions where the ele
tions are mired in doubt and suspicion.
Following elections, the EPRDF quickly moved to set up local governments, wh

in the eyes of the opponents were neither democratic nor autonomous. Thu
what seemed to be a new style of authoritarianism, the TPLF ensured its domina
over Tigray while the rest of the EPRDF's constituent parts, the Oromo Pe
Democratic Organisation (OPDO), Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movemen
(EPDM) later Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the pro-E
Southern Ethiopian group established a monopoly of power over the Oromo, Am
and Southern Ethiopian regions respectively (Pausewang, 1992; Hovde, 1994; Ve
1994a). Consequently, the elections that were hoped to lead to power sharing an
empowerment of local communities have led to yet another confrontation, whic
obstructed the meaningful opening up of the political space.
Closing the Transitional Period Through Constitutional Engineerin

As agreed upon during the writing of the Charter, the constitution-making pr
ess was central to both the consolidation of power and legitimacy for the
ruling élite. To this end, in the period between June 1992 and December
the EPRDF worked out the technical aspects of the constitution-making pr
while the consolidation of power has continued more aggressively. The EP
controlled Council of Representatives (COR) appointed a Constitutional Dra
Commission in 1993 pursuant to Article 10 for the transition period (Cha
1991). To ensure the loyalty of the Commission to the incumbent regime, mem
of the Commission were mostly selected from members of the EPRDF-domina
Council of Representatives itself while the few Commission members who
appointed outside of the Council were subject to the approval of the same
(Merera, 1994a; b; Vestal, 1996; Paul, 2000).
Despite opposition to it from the various sectors of Ethiopian society, especi
from the organised groups and lack of national consensus, the TPLF/EPRD
the Draft Constitution to the vote of a Constituent Assembly controlled by it
in December 1994 (Pausewang, 1994b; Paul, 2000). No less importantly, m
controversial articles such as 'the right to self-determination, including secess
the ethnic-based federal structure of government, continued government own
ship of land, were all approved without a serious debate and no dissent voi
such, in the eyes of many observers the new national constitution of Ethiopia is a
replica of the EPRDF programme in both letter and spirit (Cf. EPRDF Programme,
1991; EHRCO, 1995; Vestal, 1996). And, contrary to the claim of the framers of the
Constitution for its being both liberal as well as one that can pass the test of time,
as one foreign critic has argued even before its official approval;
the draft constitution embodies essentially what the EPRDF/TGE wishes the world
outside and its own people to believe about the political order. It does not express
political reality but instead is a façade behind which the true actuality of the Marxist
Leninist political order is hidden. The constitution does not restrain government
because it is not an expression of a firm belief in the importance of doing so.
Exercise of power in such a system is not subject to review by someone other than
the holder of the power-the antithesis of constitutionalism (Vestal, 1996: 35f)
To both Ethiopian and foreign observers, the making of the national Constitution
appears to be the attempt by the TPLF leaders to ensure the permanency of the
remaking of Ethiopia and their hegemonic position in the reordered state. At any
rate, like the Charter, the Constitution contains important provisions that guaran
tee, albeit on paper, a pluralistic political system as well as rights of citizens.
The May 1995 elections, which followed the approval of the Constitution
that opened the way for the country's Second Republic, were neither free nor
fair. Put differently, they were held to bestow the much-needed legitimacy on the
emerging de facto one party state. And, needless to add, the 2000 elections and the
other measures taken by the new regime in the post-1995 period were all aimed
at further consolidation of power in the face of stubborn resistance by the oppo
sition as well as the public at large.6 As indicated earlier, the central problem in
the TPLF/EPRDF-sponsored hoped for democratic transformation is basically the
contradictory aspirations of the leading Tigyaran elite, i.e. the aspiration to ensure
its hegemonic position by any means necessary on the one hand while aspiring to
create an open democratic society through free and fair elections on the other. What
make such contradictory aspirations more difficult are that, ethnically speaking, the
political support base of the TPLF is a minority from the North, which constitute
about 6% of the country's population, compared to the Oromos and Amharas who
share between them about two-thirds of the country's population.
A closer look at the problématique of the Ethiopian transition clearly shows that
while some of the major bottle-necks to the Ethiopian démocratisation have to do
with the hegemonic aspiration of the TPLF leaders, some are more fundamental,
emanate from and informed by competing ethnic nationalisms. As indicated in
our discussion of the theoretical part, ethnic nationalism is mobilisation of eth
nic groups for collective action in the struggle for greater share of power or the
creation of separate statehood by the hitherto marginalised groups. It can also
be for the maintenance of the existing status quo by privileged groups. Central to
the moving spirit of ethnic nationalism is the collective aspirations and demands
40 Merra Gudina
advanced in the name of the collectivity where the role of elite is critical both in
the articulation of the nationalist agendas and mobilisation of multitudes for the
implementation of the agendas. In this regard, an important point to note is that
collective rights, which are central in ethnic nationalism, do often contradict the
idea of individual rights, the very foundation of liberal democracy (Fukuyama
1994; Poluha, 1996). What has come out with the ethnicisation of politics since the
change of the Ethiopian regime in 1991 has been the double pressure on the state
very often to fulfill the contradictory demands of collectivities on the one hand
and individual rights of citizens on the other. This has further raised the problém
tique of creating a political structure that is able to accommodate and harmonise
the demands of competing ethnic nationalisms on the one hand and collectiv
demands alongside with individual rights on the other.
In the Ethiopian context, there are several crucial issues related to the creation
of such a political structure. First, the TPLF/EPRDF has recognised the right
to self-determination both in the Charter of 1991 as well as the Constitution of
1994. This has led to a fear on the part of some Ethiopians that recognising such
a right could lead to the disintegration of the country. Furthermore, the practical
implementation of such a right has not been easy in light of the claims and counter
claims of the various ethnic nationalist groups.
Secondly, the right to self-rule provisions enacted in the country's Constitution
appears to be implemented through the PDOs. But, as indicated above, the PDOs,
which were created for political expediency could not evolve as an embodiment of gen
uine autonomy and self-rule. The end result is a three-dimensional conflict, where the
ruling élite together with its PDOs is pitted against the independently initiated political
organisations of the various ethnic groups and the contradictions between the various
independent groups themselves. The best examples of the latter are the Oromo and
Amhara-based political organisations, which are against each other as much as, if not
more, against the ruling élite.
Thirdly, competing ethnic nationalisms tend to create the problem of majorities
and minorities with respect to basic rights in the ethnically reconstituted regions.
An important matter to be noted here is that Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic state of
not less than eighty ethnic groups of varying sizes, which have been mingling for
centuries across the country's plateau where ethnic boundaries are very porous,
especially in gerrymandered areas and major cities. Moreover, the descendants
of the empire builders and other people who moved from the relatively exhausted
North to the relatively richer South constitute several millions whose rights are
difficult to ignore. Taken together, this raises the problem of guaranteeing the
rights of minorities under a condition of acute competing ethnic nationalisms
where minorities are generally pitted against majorities.
Fourthly, the TPLF/EPRDF, which has sponsored the Ethiopian démocrati
sation enterprise has continued to adhere to the modus operandi of democratic
centralism, which has been part of its old socialist ideology now officially discarded
to give way to the principles of liberal democracy. This has further complicated the
task of democratising the Ethiopian state as the application of the principle has the
tendency of obstructing power sharing and self-rule, both of which are central in the
project of creating a federal democratic republic such as Ethiopia.
In summary, the TPLF/EPRDF upon assumption of state power in May 1991
has promised the three greatest needs of Ethiopia: stability, democratic govern
ance and quick economic development by creating an egalitarian nation-state of
equals in which all the country's diverse communities are empowered. And, if we
have to draw the balance sheet of the regime's achievements thirteen years later
against its failures, the latter clearly outweighs the former with visible discrepan
cies between the promises made on paper and the reality on the ground. In other
words, despite four major elections as well as various policy initiatives, the modus
operandi of the Ethiopian state has remained authoritarian. Hegemonic aspirations
on the part of the dominant elite as well as the contradictory perspectives and
claims of the other competing nationalist elites on the other has led to the derail
ment of the much-publicised 'democratic transition'. In fact, the big 'democratic'
promise of the Charter on which the whole transitional process hinged, the trans
fer of power to a democratically elected party was pushed aside and a de facto one
party state was further institutionalised. Consequently, the massive violations of
human and democratic rights, repression of political parties as well as civil society
organisations and the harassment of the nascent independent press have contin
ued unabated all of which have a debilitating effect on the hoped for democratic
transformation (See EHRCO, 1995; 2000).
As ethnicity tends to lead to extremist positions such as who is an authentic
nationalist and who is not, the Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1998 had brought to the
fore the tensions within the TPLF leadership that appear to have been building
over the years regarding the Eritrean independence. Arguably, although the main
cause of the split within the TPLF/EPRDF hard-core cadres seems to be power
struggle, the leaders of both wings of this organisation have admitted making
serious errors in the whole process of state transformation. The victorious wing,
which is led by the Prime Minister, claimed to have launched a rectification move
ment code-named 'renewal' in which it has promised to hasten up the démocratisa
tion drive. But, despite much talk about the "renewal", the TPLF revolution has
continued as originally modelled along 'revolutionary democracy' and seems to be
the Ethiopian version of Mao's 'New Democracy', (see EPRDF, 2001). Competing
ethnic nationalisms, which tend to lead to a divergent conception of democracy,
which in turn obstruct the creation of a broad national consensus are also addi
tional burden on Ethiopia's démocratisation. And with the third national elections
less than a year away and little movement towards broad consensus among the
contending nationalist elites, the démocratisation process appears to be as frozen
as ever.
42 Merra Gudina
Conclusion
Upon the assumption of state power in 1991, the new regime has made a tr
promise in its project of state transformation: stability, démocratisation and qu
economic development by ending both ethnic domination and the comma
economy. To this end, in what appears to be a thorough surgical operation
the country's body politic, the EPRDF sponsored the July conference of 19
authored the transitional Charter of 1991 as well as the national constitution
1994 and conducted major elections in June 1992 and 1994, May 1995 and 20
However, according to many critics, most of the initiatives along the opening u
of a democratic space have remained a paper value (Vestal, 1994a; 1994b; Jose
1998).
As we have attempted to show above, the most serious problématique in the
Ethiopian transition are the hegemonic aspiration of the ruling elite on the one
hand and the pervasive impact of competing ethnic nationalisms on the other.
Here it is important to note that both have given rise to multiple competing
interests and contradictory visions, especially among the contending elites. Put
differently, as has been indicated in our preceding discussion, the hegemonic
aspiration as well as the contradictory perspectives have impacted on the démoc
ratisation drive at several levels. First, they have negatively affected the political
will of the competing élites to reach a national consensus on the fundamental
rules of the game of democratic transition as well as on the future fate of the
country as a whole.
Secondly, they have fragmented the opposition, undermined their unity of pur
pose and action while giving advantage to the ruling party to continue to divide,
harass, intimidate and weaken the opposition. Thirdly, the contradictory perspec
tives not only pitted one ethnic group against another, but have also affected the
working of civil society movements and the independent press, which, as a result of
this, are as fragmented as the political society. The central issue in these schemes
of things is the competing demands on the state, which give rise to practical politi
cal questions such as what type of party formation - (ethnic or multi-ethnic), what
type of federal model to be adopted - (ethnic-based or territory-based), and who
is the authentic representative of a given group? The attempt to answer such perti
nent questions would easily lead to competing conceptions of democracy. In other
words, competing ethnic nationalisms tend to give rise to inter-élite and inter-eth
nic rivalries and competition driven by competing interests, demands, perspectives
and hegemonic aspirations of the various elites all of which undermine the broader
agenda of democratising state and society on the basis of equality. Therefore, what
needs to be suggested in conclusion as the possible way out of the present political
quagmire is the creation of an accommodative political structure by the consent of
the citizens where both power and resources are equitably shared and the impera
tive of development is commonly pursed.
Endnotes
1. To many observers, Tigrayan nationalism has been more ot resurgence nation
alism - to regain the centrality of Tigray in the Ethiopian State which th
Tigrayan élite lost to the Amhara élite in the second half of the 19th century.
2. The TPLF/EPRDF leadership formulated revolutionary democracy based o
Mao's New Democracy. The anomaly came when revolutionary democracy for
mulated for a socialist revolution was made to serve the cause of liberal demo
racy and free enterprise. The most serious pitfall in the Ethiopian démocratis
tion enterprise is, therefore, the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of revolutionar
democracy being made to guide a liberal democratic transformation.
3. For further discussion of what happened at the July Conference and afterward
see among others, 'Ethiopia: Majorities and Minorities' in Africa Confident
Vol. 32, No. 14 (12 July 1991); EHRCO, (1995) Merera Gudina (1994)
4. Both before and after capturing state power, the TPLF has been creatin
one ethnic organisation almost for each ethnic group in the country und
similar name 'peoples democratic organisation' to ensure its own dominati
in the reordered Ethiopian State. That is why all are referred to as PDOs. The
PDOs are neither autonomous nor have any real existence of their own. A
such they don't enjoy respect both by the TPLF leaders who created them or
the larger Ethiopian public.
5. Initially fourteen regions were carved out. Twelve of them comprised seve
dozen 'nations, nationalities and peoples' and Addis Ababa and Harar cit
were given regional status. Regions One, Two, Three, Four and Five we
mainly designated for the Tigrayans, Afars, Amharas, Oromos and Somal
respectively, while the rest of the regions are cohabited by a number of eth
nic groups of different population sizes. Later on, Dire Dawa evolved as
special region for reason of its being a bone of contention between Orom
and Somalis. Regions 7 to 11 have been lumped together to form a larg
southern region, for reasons of political considerations and administrati
expediency.
6. Most opposition parties, AAPO, Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and
Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE), Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) and
Oromo National Congress (ONC), demanded a serious negotiation with a rul
ing party over the rules of the game for the conduct of 'free and fair' elections
during May 2000. The ruling party, fully conscious of the implications, has
remained adamant to the end.
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African Association of Political Science

The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Democratisation in Ethiopia

African Association of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and

1027-0353 © 2004 African Association of Political Science

The Elite and Competing Ethnic Nationalisms

history' (quoted in Smith, 1986:137). However, a word of caution is in order here:

Competing Conceptions of Democracy

democracy is...a form of political regime in which citizens choose, in competiti

These conceptions of democracy are limited to 'formal' or 'procedural' definiti

Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Democracy: A Tenuous Relationship?

Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the New Attempts at State

Ethnic Nationalism and the Rise of the TPLF

was to liberate Tigray from a century of Amhara domination (Aregawi, 1993;

The July Conference and the Remaking of Ethiopia

PDOs and the Régionalisation Policy

Contrary to the spirit of democracy as well as genuine federation, the functions

The June Elections of 1992

The June 21 elections did not contribute directly to Ethiopia's development as

Following elections, the EPRDF quickly moved to set up local governments, wh

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