Texas Law On Piercing Corporate Veil
Texas Law On Piercing Corporate Veil
Texas Law On Piercing Corporate Veil
The Texas corporation, like the corporation in every other state, is a creature of
statute and is legally separate and distinct from its officers, directors and shareholders.
The general rule of corporate law is that the corporation is a completely separate, legal
entity, and, as such, the corporation, and not its shareholders, is liable for its own
contracts, debts and torts. In other words, shareholders, directors, officers and employees
of a corporation benefit from the doctrine of limited liability, in which none of them are
liable for actions taken on behalf of the corporation. This protection from personal
liability has traditionally been one of the attractions of the corporate form of organization
to its shareholders, officers and directors.
Piercing the corporate veil, also known as the doctrine of corporate disregard, is a
method used by plaintiffs and courts to impose liability on officers, directors, and
shareholders of a corporation. Additionally, plaintiffs will often attempt to pierce the
corporate veil in order to impose liability upon a parent corporation for the obligations of
a subsidiary. “For the purposes of legal proceedings, subsidiary corporations and parent
corporations are separate and distinct “persons” as a matter of law and the separate entity
of corporations will be observed by the courts even where one company may dominate or
control, or even treat another company as a mere department, instrumentality, or agency.”
Texas courts are generally willing to disregard the corporate form in this situation only
when corporations are not “operated as separate entities, but rather integrate their
resources to achieve a common business purpose.” Plaintiffs, therefore, often attempt to
pierce the corporate veil in order to treat the two corporations as one entity.
The alter ego theory permits a court to impose liability upon an individual
shareholder, officer, director, or affiliate for the acts of a corporation. This theory may
also be used to impose liability upon a parent corporation for the acts of a subsidiary
corporation when the subsidiary is “organized or operated as a mere tool or business
conduit.” A court will look at many factors to determine whether an alter ego
relationship exists. When dealing with an individual and a corporation, the court will
look at the total dealings of the corporation and the individual, including evidence of the
degree to which corporate and individual property have been kept separate; the amount of
financial interest, ownership, and control the individual has maintained over the
corporation; whether the corporation has been used for personal purposes; and whether
the corporation is undercapitalized in light of the nature and risk of its business.
In Castleberry, the Texas Supreme Court held that Texas courts should take
a flexible, fact-specific approach since the purpose of the corporate veil doctrine “is to
prevent use of the corporate entity as a cloak for fraud or illegality or to work an
injustice, and that purpose should not be thwarted.” The Castleberry court held that
plaintiffs did not need to show fraud or intent to defraud as a prerequisite to piercing a
corporate veil, so long as recognizing the separate corporate existence would bring about
an “inequitable result.” Therefore, under Castleberry, “tort claimants and contract
creditors must show only constructive fraud” to pierce the corporate veil.
Additionally, since amended in 1993, Article 2.21 has provided that, with
certain exceptions, Section A of Article 2.21 is the sole method for piercing the corporate
veil and imposing liability upon an individual for the obligations of a corporation or upon
one corporation for the obligations of another corporation. The current version of Section
B of Article 2.21 states:
(i) such shares other than the obligation, if any, of such person to
pay to the corporation the full amount of the consideration, fixed in
compliance with Article 2.15 of this Act, for which such shares were
or are to be issued;
Even if a showing of actual fraud is not required in a tort case, the courts are
reluctant to pierce the corporate veil under an alter ego theory and hold one entity liable
for the torts of another or hold the individual shareholders liable. Generally, in a tort case
the financial strength or weakness of the corporate tortfeasor is the primary consideration.
Lucas, 696 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.1984). If the corporation responsible for the plaintiff's
injury is capable of paying a judgment upon proof of liability, then no reason would exist
to attempt to pierce the corporate veil and have shareholders pay for the injury. Id. If,
however, the corporation sued is not reasonably capitalized in light of the nature and risk
of its business, the need might arise to attempt to pierce the corporate veil and hold the
parent corporation liable. Id. The Court in Lucas chose not to pierce the corporate veil
and stated that the fact that the two entities may have had some or all of the same
directors or officers, filed consolidated tax returns, shared the same corporate logo, and
conducted inter-corporate business was not enough to pierce the corporate veil. Id. at
376. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the blending of activities or interlocking
directorship will not give a Court a basis for disregarding the separate identities of
corporations, unless such relationship is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrongs, protect fraud, or defend crime. Id.
The Texas courts have enunciated several factors that are to be considered
when determining whether a single business enterprise exists. It appears that a plaintiff
need not prove every factor, so a corporation may be held liable even if all of the factors
listed below are not present. Unfortunately, the courts have not given any guidance or
instruction as to whether any of the listed factors is to be given more weight than the
other factors. Factors that have been considered by the Texas courts include:
In recent years, Texas courts have increasingly begun utilizing the single
business enterprise theory to pierce the corporate veil. The case law is unclear as to
whether the single business enterprise theory is an “other similar theory” under Article
2.21 or whether the theory is completely separate from alter ego. In the case of Southern
Union Company v. City of Edinburg, the parties urged the Texas Supreme Court to
clarify the law in Texas regarding the “validity and parameters of the single business
enterprise theory.” The court declined to speak to the issue, however, stating :
[w]e need not decide today whether a theory of “single business enterprise”
is a necessary addition to Texas law regarding the theory of alter ego for
disregarding corporate structure and the theories of joint venture, joint
enterprise, or partnership for imposing joint and several liability. That is
because whatever label might be given to the [plaintiff’s] attempt to treat
the [defendant] entities as a single entity, article 2.21 of the Texas Business
Corporation Act controls. . .
Based upon these comments by the Texas Supreme Court, it would appear
that the single business enterprise theory of veil piercing should be treated as an “other
similar theory” under Article 2.21 and that a plaintiff should have to prove actual fraud
when attempting to pierce the corporate veil by utilizing either the alter ego theory or the
single business enterprise theory.
Based upon legislative intent and the comments of the Texas Supreme
Court in the Southern Union decision set forth above, however, Texas courts should be
reluctant to treat alter ego and single business enterprise as separate and distinct theories
for piercing the corporate veil. Both theories have the exact same purpose and effect: to
disregard the corporate entity. The single business enterprise theory is obviously an
“other similar theory,” and any attempt to pierce the corporate veil utilizing this theory
should be governed by Article 2.21. The legislature enacted and amended Article 2.21 to
“curb the creativity of the bench and the bar as they continued to pierce the corporate veil
and disregard the corporate entity.” Simply by looking at the original version of Article
2.21 and the subsequent amendments, it is apparent that the legislature intended to
preserve the corporate entity and protect shareholders, as well as any other affiliate, from
veil-piercing claims in all but the most extraordinary situations. In light of the legislative
history behind Article 2.21 and the Texas Supreme Court’s comments in Southern Union,
Texas courts should not use the single business enterprise theory as a back door to
disregard the corporate form and bypass the actual fraud requirement of Article 2.21.
The Texas Limited Liability Company Act (the “Act”) governs the liability of
owners of limited liability companies, or LLCs. “The allure of the [LLC] is its unique
ability to bring together in a single business organization the best features of all other
business forms – properly structured, its owners obtain both a corporate-styled liability
shield and the pass-through tax benefits of a partnership.”
The Act provides that, except as provided for in the LLC regulations, a member or
manager is not liable to third parties for the debts, obligations or liabilities of an LLC.
Additionally, members may participate in the management of the LLC without losing this
shield. Since the Act deals expressly with the liability of members and managers for the
obligations of an LLC, corporate veil piercing principles should not apply to LLCs in
Texas.
One Texas court, however, has suggested that corporate veil piercing concepts are
applicable to LLCs. In Pinebrook Properties, Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners
Association, the Texarkana Court of Appeals assumed that corporate veil piercing rules
must apply to LLCs because the LLC is a limited liability entity. The only authority cited
by the court, however, was Castleberry, which was decided five years before the Act was
passed. Additionally, Castleberry made no reference to the LLC or any entity other than
the business corporation. The Pinebrook court then proceeded to analyze the facts before
it under Castleberry, which as noted above has been repudiated by the legislature in
amendments to Article 2.21, and under Article 2.21, which applies only to corporations
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and not to LLCs. Ultimately, the court held that veil piercing was not appropriate in the
Pinebrook case, which makes the court’s opinion in the case neither well reasoned nor of
precedential value.