[G.R. No.

103590 January 29, 1993]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF

CAVITE and VICTOR G. VALENCIA, respondents.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

Petitioner Government Service Insurance System signed a

building project agreement with Queen's Row Subdivision, Inc., after
which the latter signed a construction contract with private respondent
Victor G. Valencia, who then filed a complaint in Civil Case No.
Despite Valencia's repeated demands, QRSI has failed to pay its half
of the contract. The Court subsequently ordered QRSI and GSIS to
pay Valencia the appropriate sums, and petitioner partially paid
Valencia in the amount of $154,714 with the following Court orders
prompting petitioner to submit two consecutive petitions for
reconsideration, all of which were refused. GSIS filed a certiorari
petition with a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as well as additional reasons for the events that followed.
 2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

Respondent Victor G. Valencia filed a move for stay of

execution pending appeal and a Motion for Examination of Judgement
Debtor Debtors, followed by a petition to hold petitioner in contempt
of court for failing to comply with the writ of execution. Respondent
Valencia requested for the issuing of an alias writ of execution in the
sum of five million seven hundred fifty-nine thousand six hundred
seventy seven pesos after the petitioners motion for reconsideration
was refused, citing res judicata or bar by earlier judgment.

3. Decisions of the lower courts

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants on February 2, 1982, further demanding them to pay costs
and damages to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari onthe

grounds that the trial court's Decision of March 2, 1982 "has long
since become final," because neither QRSI nor the petitioner had filed
for reconsideration or appealed it within the reglementary time.

Issue/s

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals made reversible

mistake by overturning its own Decision of June 28, 1991, based on
res judicata and estoppel.
HELD

4. Disposition of the case

As a result, the instant petition is approved. The decision on

January 15, 1992, of the respondent Court in CA-G.R. No. SP No.
24021 is reinstated and affirmed, and its decision of June 28 1991, is
set aside.

5. Dictum
An order of execution of a final decision, in general, is not
appealable. It is acknowledged, however, that this norm is susceptible
to two exceptions: (1) where the order of execution changes or tries to
change the tenor of the decision, and (2) when the contents of the
judgment are not clear enough that the trial court can interpret them.
In such cases, the aggrieved party may file an appeal from the order of
execution issued or pursue any other available remedy under the Rules
of Court, such as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
[G.R. No. 148599. March 14, 2005]
Professional Academic Plans, Inc., Francisco Colayco and Benjamin
Dino, petitioners,
vs.
Dinnah L. Crisostomo, respondents.

FACT:
1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)
The petitioners contend that the respondent is not entitled to a
franchise commission since she did not participate in originating,
formulating, or negotiating the first moa with the afpslai, except when it was
signed. The petitioners also contend that the only reason why te franchise
commission was awarded to the respondents was because rueda and
macariola, the ones entitled to it, were disqualified to be franchise holders.
The petitioners also pointed out that since the respondent had no
participation in the negotiation or execution of the new moa, said respondent
had no right to the franchise commission on the afpslai account under the
new moa.

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)

The respondent was not paid her commission when the afpslai
resumed its remittances of the installment payments of its members in June
1, 1992 to petitioner PAPI, and during this time, her franchise commission
on sales transacted with the afpslai was terminated. Nonetheless, she still
insisted on the release of her 2% franchise commission, in which she
approached her supervisor, but with no avail. Crisostomo then stated that
when she went to petitioner Dino, she was threatened with her termination if
she insisted with her demand.

3. Decision of the lower courts

Regional Trial Court – The Regional Trial Court, dated November 20,
1997, rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The court
ordered the defendants to release to the plaintiff the sum of P183,867.25
which constitutes her commission from afpslai and the sum equivalent to 2%
of all future remittances by afpslai to defendant PAPI. The court also
ordered the defendant to pay P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as
exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

Court of Appeals – The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration due to the lack of merit. The court found that the
award of moral damages, exemplaty damages, attorney’s fees and the costs
of the suit was fully supported and was justified.

ISSUE:
Issue/s (one sentence)
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the franchise fee or
commission under the new memorandum of agreement
HELD:
4. Disposition (one sentence)
The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with
modifications which deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees, with no pronouncement as to costs.

5. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue relevant
to the topic under discussion)
Once a contract is entered into, no party can renounce it unilaterally or
without the consent of the other. This is the essence of the principle of
mutuality of contracts entombed in Article 1308 of the Civil Code. Contract
termination always requires mutual consent. The mere fact that one made a
terrible deal may not be grounds for canceling the agreement. The parties
simply made major changes to the first MOA and agreed that only those
provisions that conflicted with the second were rescinded, modified, and/or
superseded, according to the second MOA.
[G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000]

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER

OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

On March 1988, Petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease

with option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome whereby petitioner
was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land
for six years which is renewable for another six years, in which the
option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from
the signing of the contract. The petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00
a month as consideration for the reservation of its option. The
petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the
contract to Encarnacion until her demise in January 1990.

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the

properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly,
respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate Title B-
37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the
name of Victor Bartolome. Petitioner was eager to pay its part of the
contract yet Victor keep on refusing the payments from the contract.
 3. Decisions of the lower courts

After trial on the merits, The Regional Court of Valenzuela,

Branch 172 rendered its decision on January 4, 1993, dismissing the
complaint and ordering the petitioner to pay Victor P30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.

Issue/s

Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to buy entered into
by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated
upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her
demise.

HELD

4. Disposition of the case

The Court of Appeals held that the said contract was terminated
upon the death of Encarnacion Bartolome and did not bind Victor
because he was not a party thereto.

5. Dictum
Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows, Contracts take
effect only between the parties. Their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received
from the decedent. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by
contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when
the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by
(1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
[G.R. No. L-27696 September 30, 1977]

MIGUEL FLORENTINO, ROSARIO ENCARNACION de

FLORENTINO, MANUEL ARCE, JOSE FLORENTINO,
VICTORINO FLORENTINO, ANTONIO FLORENTINO,
REMEDION ENCARNACION and SEVERINA ENCARNACION,
petitioners-appellants,

vs.

SALVADOR ENCARNACION, SR., SALVADOR ENCARNACION,

JR., and ANGEL ENCARNACION, oppositors to encumbrance-
petitioners-appelles.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

The petitioner-appellants applied with the Court of First

Instance of Ilocos Sur to register a plot of agricultural land in Barrio
Lubong Dacquel Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, under Act 496. The petitioners-
appellants filed a Reply to the Opposition, reiterating their previous
arguments and attacking the registration court's jurisdiction to decide
on the validity or invalidity of the agreement Exhibit O-1, claiming
that such jurisdiction is only appropriate in a civil action and not in a
land registration proceeding.
 2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

Petitioners-appellee filed a manifestation seeking to withdraw

their application on their respective shares of the land sought to be
registered.

3. Decisions of the lower courts

The court denied the petitioners-appellees' move to withdraw

due to a lack of merit. "Taking the self-imposed arrangement in favor
of the Church as a pure and simple donation, the same is void for the
fact that the donee here has riot accepted the donation (Art. 745, Civil
Code) and for the further that, in the case of Salvador Encarnacion, Jr.
and Angel Encarnacion, they had made no oral or written grant at all
(Art. 748) as they are even opposed to encumbrance," the court
concluded.

Issue/s

Whether or not the lower court as a registration court could pass

upon the merits of the encumbrance as the same involves an
adjudication of rights

HELD

4. Disposition of the case

Yes, to allow the annotation of Exhibit O-1 as an encumbrance

on the title to be granted in the final favor of all petitioners.
5. Dictum
The religious expenses stipulation in Exhibit O-1 is not
reversible at the co-owners' discretion, nor is it limited to the
petitioners-appellants. The trial court made an error when it held that
the stipulation, arrangement, or grant (Exhibit O-1) is revocable at the
co-owners’ discretion. While a stipulation in favor of a third party has
no legal effect unless the favored party accepts it, the law does not
specify when the third party must accept. In most cases, such a third
party has no time once the time limit has expired unless the stipulation
is revoked.
[G.R. No. 120554. September 21, 1999]

SO PING BUN, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP. and

MANUEL C. TIONG respondents.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

Petitioner refuse to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner

requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor
Trendsetter Marketing. So The petitioner is refusing to go.
Petitioner requested formal lease contracts with DCCSI in favor of
Trendsetter Marketing on March 4, 1992. So Ping Bun said that after
his grandfather, So Pek Giok, died, he continued to use the premises
for his textile business and paid the rent on time. The petitioner's
request was granted by DCCSI. The leasing contracts in Trendsetter's
favor were completed.

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to

petitioner asking Mr. So Ping Bun to vacate the premise because he
used a warehouse. The respondents claim that due to the close
associate of the petitioner’s grandfather and respondent, he allowed
temporarily So Ping Bun to use the warehouse. However, the
 respondent would go back to the textile business and thus be needing
a place for his stocks.

3. Decisions of the lower courts

Trial Court – The judgement rendered by annulling the four

contacts of leas, ordering So Ping Bun to pay the amount of P500,000
to the aggrieved party and ordering So Ping Bun to pay cost of this
lawsuit.

Court of Appeals - On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of

Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court modified the decision by reducing the award of
attorney's fees from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to
two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos.

Issue/s

Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s

decision finding So Ping Bun guilty of tortuous interference of contract?

HELD

4. Disposition of the case

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby affirmed, with modification that
the award of attorney's fees is reduced from two hundred thousand
(P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No
pronouncement as to costs.
5. Dictum
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid
contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal
justification or excuse. A duty which the law of torts is concerned
with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex
delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one
person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may
pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on
or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the instant case, it is
clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the
warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation.
Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
[G.R. No. 119107 March 18, 2005]

JOSE V. LAGON, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ,

respondents.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased two parcels

of land in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, from the estate of Bai Tonina
Sepi through an intestate court. Beginning in 1964, he claimed to have
entered into a leasing agreement with the late Bai Tonina Sepi
Mengelen Guiabar for three plots of land in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao.

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

The rents to be paid by those tenants would cover the rent that
the private respondent was required to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the
land lease. Private respondent began paying his rent to the court-
appointed administrator of Bai Tonina Sepi's estate after she died. He
then discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner
of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants
compelling him to file a complaint against the latter, accusing
petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property
to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.
 3. Decisions of the lower courts

The appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of

petitioner's counterclaim for actual and moral damages because there
was no basis for awarding the amount of damages requested by
petitioner. In light of the foregoing, the petition is granted. The Court
of Appeals' decision in question is hereby reversed and put aside.

Issue/s

Whether or not the purchase of the subject property by petitioner

during the ostensible existence of private respondent's leasing contract
with the late Bai Tonina Sepi constituted tortious interference for
which petitioner should be held accountable for damages.

HELD

4. Disposition of the case

Petitioner was unable to establish that he suffered a loss or

injury, and thus his claim for actual damages must be dismissed.
Petitioner's request for moral damages was also unwarranted, as moral
damages should result from a person's wrongful act, and the worries
and anxieties experienced by a party involved in court litigation are
not compensable.

5. Dictum
This case highlights Article 1314 wherein third parties that
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to
the other contracting party. In this case, the third party is the petitioner
who represented himself as the new owner of the property and began
collecting the rentals himself. However, as the court ruled, the
petitioner cannot be held liable for any damages since there were no
evidence of suffering, damage, and loss as a result of the petitioner’s
actions was presented.
[G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961]

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

The plaintiff-appellant, Emeterio Cui, was a law student at

Arellano University from 1948 to 1949, up to and including the first
semester of his fourth year, and was granted by the defendant
university for a total of P1,033.87 in tuition fees. Cui left Arellano
University and enrolled at Abad Santos University in his last
semester. Cui applied to take the bar exam after graduation and
needed his transcript of records from Arellano University, which he
couldn't get until he paid back the P1,033.87. This is the amount that
plaintiff is seeking from defendant in this case.

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

Arellano University, the defendant-appellee, claims that before

awarding to plaintiff the scholarship grants, Cui was made to sign the
following contract covenant and agreement: "In consideration of the
scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right
to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash. (Sgd.) Emeterio
Cui". On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
 Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship,"
addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities”,
which the defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau
of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with
plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above-
referred to is null and void.

3. Decisions of the lower courts

The lower court resolved this upon the ground that the
aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not
a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in
nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical,
yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the
defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to
follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in
its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of
Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority
to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the
corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.

Issue/s

Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff

and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to
another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
HELD

4. Disposition of the case

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one

shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from
September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the
costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.

5. Dictum
As stated in Article 1306, “The contracting parties may
establish such stipulation, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to the law, morals
good customs, public order and public policy”. This is in accordance
with the Doctrine of Freedom of Contract, which allows the
contracting parties to determine the terms of the contract themselves,
but only if those clauses do not infringe the mandatory legal rules of
the contractual regime, morality and public order. Memorandum No.
38 merely codifies a reasonable public policy principle. The defendant
exploits the scholarship as part of a commercial operation to boost an
educational institution's profit potential, which is not only
incompatible with sound policy, but also with good morals.
[G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990]

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION,

petitioner,
vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON.
VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister;
ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG,
respondents.

FACTS

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s

Farrales and Mamasig were habitual absentees, according to

PIA, who also claimed that both were in the habit of bringing in large
quantities of "personal effects" from abroad, and that PIA personnel at
the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by
customs officials to advise private respondents to stop doing so.

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s

Farrales and Mamasig filed a joint complaint for illegal termination

and non payment of company benefits before the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE).
 3. Decisions of the lower courts

Private respondents were ordered to be reinstated with full back

wages or, in the alternative, to be paid amounts equivalent to their
salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their
employment contracts after they had attained the status of regular
employees by the Regional Director of MOLE.

On appeal, the Deputy Minister of MOLE upheld the Regional

Director's findings of fact and conclusions, except for the portion of
the award that gave PIA the option of "paying each of the
complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] " instead of
reinstatement. . .”

Issue/s

Whether or not the provisions of the contract superseded the general

provisions of the Labor Code

HELD

4. Disposition of the case

No. The principle of freedom to contract is not absolute.

5. Dictum
Stipulations by the parties are permitted under Art. 1306 as long as they are
not in violation of the law, morality, good customs, public order, or policy.
As a result, the idea of contracting parties' liberty must be weighed against
the general norm that relevant law's requirements are presumed inscribed
into the contract.

In this scenario, labor and employment law is an area where the parties are
not free to simply contract with one other to shield themselves and their
connection.