Appellee Appellant: Third Division
Appellee Appellant: Third Division
Appellee Appellant: Third Division
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
The same incident took place in August 2000. This time, appellant
forced AAA to lie down on the bed, went on top of her, removed her short
pants and panty, then rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice. AAA
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resisted by crossing her legs but appellant lifted her right leg and partially
inserted his penis into her vagina. As she struggled, appellant stood up then
ejaculated. AAA felt numbness on her buttocks after the bestial act
committed against her. 16
Appellant repeated his dastardly act against AAA on separate
occasions in September and November 2000. During these times, appellant
satisfied himself by rubbing his penis against AAA's vagina without trying to
penetrate it. After reaching the top of his lust, he used AAA's short pants to
wipe his mess. Instead of keeping her harrowing experience to herself, AAA
narrated it to her best friend. 17
On November 24, 2000, appellant approached AAA and told her that he
wanted to have sex with her. When she refused, appellant forcibly removed
her pants and boxed her right buttock. AAA still refused, which angered
appellant. He then went to the kitchen and returned with a bolo which he
used in threatening her. Luckily, AAA's grandmother arrived, prompting
appellant to desist from his beastly desires. 18
On December 20, 2000, AAA and her best friend were doing their
school work in front of the former's house. When appellant arrived, he
embraced AAA. He, thereafter, pulled her inside the house and kissed her on
the lips. 19
The last incident occurred inside the comfort room of their house on
May 27, 2001. When AAA entered, appellant pulled down her short pants and
panty, unzipped his trousers, brought out his penis, then repeatedly rubbed
it on her vagina while they were in a standing position. 20
AAA decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother who
forthwith brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation where she was
examined by the medico-legal officer. It was found during the examination
that there were no extragenital physical injuries on AAA's body but there
were old, healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations. 21
Appellant denied all the accusations against him. He claimed that in
August and September 1999, he was at the house of his mistress in Antipolo
City. He also explained that in August 2000, he stayed in Baguio City and
worked there as a karate instructor. He added that he only went home in
September 2000 but left again in October for Quirino, Ilocos Sur where he
stayed for three weeks. When he went back home, his wife informed him
that AAA had not been coming home. Thereafter, appellant went to Baguio
City to buy medicine for his wife, then returned home again on the third
week of December 2000. While there, he was confronted by his wife about
his womanizing. His wife got mad and refused to forgive him despite his
repeated pleas. Consequently, he became furious and almost choked his
wife to death when she ignored and refused to talk to him. This prompted
him to leave and go back to Baguio. 22 DAaIEc
SO ORDERED. 30
In her direct testimony, AAA stated that appellant removed her short pants
and panty, went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her vaginal
orifice. She resisted by crossing her legs but her effort was not enough to
prevent appellant from pulling her leg and eventually inserting his penis into
her vagina. Clearly, there was penetration.
It is noteworthy that appellant pulled AAA's leg, so that he could insert
his penis into her vagina. This adequately shows that appellant employed
force in order to accomplish his purpose. Moreover, in rape committed by a
father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and
influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and
intimidation. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to
cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires, and no further proof
need be shown to prove lack of the victim's consent to her own defilement.
40 AHacIS
In view of the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) 9346, appellant was correctly
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
As to damages, appellant should pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances that
warrant the imposition of the death penalty. 43 In light of prevailing
jurisprudence, 44 we increase the award of moral damages from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00. Further, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 45 is authorized due to the presence of the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. 46
In Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654, although appellant was charged
with qualified rape allegedly committed on the second week of November
2000 and May 27, 2001, he should be convicted with Acts of Lasciviousness
committed against a child under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610, 47
which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: CASaEc
AAA testified that in November 2000, while she and appellant were
inside the bedroom, he went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her
vaginal orifice until he ejaculated. 49 She likewise stated in open court that
on May 27, 2001, while inside their comfort room, appellant rubbed his penis
against her vagina while they were in a standing position. 50 In both
instances, there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert his penis
into her vagina.
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the definitions of
"sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct" under Section 2 (g) and (h) of the
Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. 7610:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a
person.
As the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the
alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated. In crimes
against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, relationship is always
aggravating. 51
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since there is an aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in
its maximum period — reclusion perpetua for each count. 52
Consistent with previous rulings 53 of the Court, appellant must also
indemnify AAA in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a
fine in the same amount in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
Criminal Case Nos. 1644 and 1645 for Acts of Lasciviousness
Appellant is likewise guilty of two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Section 5 (b), Article III, R.A. 7610 committed against AAA on the
second week of August 1999 and on the first week of September 1999. AAA
testified that in August, appellant, with lewd design, inserted his hands
inside her shirt then fondled her breasts; and in September, he forced her to
hold his penis until he ejaculated.
The trial and the appellate courts were correct in giving credence to
the victim's testimony, in dismissing appellant's defense of denial and alibi,
and in disbelieving that AAA initiated the criminal cases only upon the
prodding of the latter's grandmother. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the
mere denial of one's involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over
the positive testimony of the offended party. 54
We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant was specifically
charged in an Information for Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized
by Article 336 of the RPC. However, the failure to designate the offense by
statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an
erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if
the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. 55
The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information. 56
In the present case, the body of the information contains an averment
of the acts alleged to have been committed by appellant which unmistakably
refers to acts punishable under Section 5 (b), Article III, R.A. 7610.
Appellant should, therefore, be meted the same penalties and be made
to answer for damages as in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654. CDcHSa
The attempt that the RPC punishes is that which has a logical
connection to a particular, concrete offense; and that which is the beginning
of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. 59 In the instant case, the
primary question that comes to the fore is whether or not appellant's act of
removing AAA's pants constituted an overt act of Rape.
We answer in the negative.
Overt o r external act has been defined as some physical activity or
deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. 60 TAHCEc
The evidence on record does not show that the above elements are
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present. The detailed acts of execution showing an attempt to rape are
simply lacking. It would be too strained to construe appellant's act of
removing AAA's pants as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen
into rape. Hence, appellant must be acquitted of Attempted Rape.
Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light Threats for
threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for undressing her without
her consent, causing disturbance, torment, distress, and vexation; nor for
Maltreatment for boxing the right side of AAA's buttocks. Although all of the
above acts were alleged in the Information for Attempted Rape in the Order
dated September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653
involving the above crimes were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
based on the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.
The order granting appellant's demurrer to evidence was a resolution
of the case on the merits, and it amounted to an acquittal. Any further
prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the proscription
on double jeopardy. 61 Accordingly, appellant's conviction of any of the
above crimes, even under Criminal Case No. 1651, would trench in his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Criminal Case No. 1655 for Unjust Vexation
Appellant was charged with Unjust Vexation, defined and penalized by
Article 287 of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 287. Light coercions. — Any person who, by means of
violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty
o f arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the
value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be punished by
arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
The second paragraph of this provision is broad enough to include any
human conduct that, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. The paramount
question to be considered is whether the offender's act caused annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it was directed. 62
Appellant's acts of embracing, dragging and kissing AAA in front of her
friend annoyed AAA. The filing of the case against appellant proved that AAA
was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article
287 of the RPC is arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or
both. Accordingly, appellant is sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to
pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the January 31, 2008 Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 30045 with MODIFICATIONS. The Court
finds appellant Salvino Sumingwa: SaICcT
Footnotes
11. The acts complained of were committed when the victim was 15 and 16
years old.
26. In Criminal Cases No. 1644, 1645, 1646, 1649, and 1654.
34. People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675, 687-
688.
35. People v. Deauna, 435 Phil. 141, 163 (2002).
36. People v. Miñon, G.R. Nos. 148397-400, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 671, 685-
686.
37. People v. Deauna, supra note 35, at 164.
38. People v. Miñon, supra note 36, at 685-686.
39. Rollo, pp. 17-18.
40. Campos v. People, G.R. No. 175275, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 334,
347-348; People v. Balonzo, G.R. No. 176153, September 21, 2007, 533
SCRA 760, 771.
43. People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 180920, March 27, 2008, 549 SCRA 569, 574.
44. People v. Bejic, G.R. No. 174060, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 488; People v.
Ibañez, G.R. No. 174656, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 136.
45. People of the Philippines v. Lilio U. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009;
People of the Philippines v. Adelado Anguac y Ragadao, G.R. No. 176744,
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June 5, 2009; The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., G.R. No.
182191, May 8, 2009.
46. People v. Bejic, supra note 44; People v. Ibañez, supra note 44, at 145.
47. "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act".
48. Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 656;
Navarrete v. People, G.R. No. 147913, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 509, 521;
Olivares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465,
473.
49. TSN, December 10, 2003, p. 22.