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    Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., vs. Joy C. Cabiles Facts

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    Paulyn Marie
    The Supreme Court ruled against allowing the registration of a property purchased by Mario Malabanan. While the property had been designated as alienable and disposable, possession and occupation of the property did not meet the requisite character and period (open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945) to be considered converted to private property. As the state had not deemed it appropriate to release the property for alienation, the presumption was that the government was still reserving the right to use the property. Therefore, the land remained ineligible for registration under the Property Registration Decree.

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    Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., vs. Joy C. Cabiles Facts

    Uploaded by

    Paulyn Marie
    33 views4 pages
    The Supreme Court ruled against allowing the registration of a property purchased by Mario Malabanan. While the property had been designated as alienable and disposable, possession and occupation of the property did not meet the requisite character and period (open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945) to be considered converted to private property. As the state had not deemed it appropriate to release the property for alienation, the presumption was that the government was still reserving the right to use the property. Therefore, the land remained ineligible for registration under the Property Registration Decree.

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    StatCon - Bathan

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    The Supreme Court ruled against allowing the registration of a property purchased by Mario Malabanan. While the property had been designated as alienable and disposable, possession and occupation of the property did not meet the requisite character and period (open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945) to be considered converted to private property. As the state had not deemed it appropriate to release the property for alienation, the presumption was that the government was still reserving the right to use the property. Therefore, the land remained ineligible for registration under the Property Registration Decree.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    33 views4 pages

    Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., vs. Joy C. Cabiles Facts

    Uploaded by

    Paulyn Marie
    The Supreme Court ruled against allowing the registration of a property purchased by Mario Malabanan. While the property had been designated as alienable and disposable, possession and occupation of the property did not meet the requisite character and period (open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945) to be considered converted to private property. As the state had not deemed it appropriate to release the property for alienation, the presumption was that the government was still reserving the right to use the property. Therefore, the land remained ineligible for registration under the Property Registration Decree.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 4

    Bathan, Paulyn Marie R.

    SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., vs. JOY C. CABILES

    FACTS:

    Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., the petitioner, is a recruiting and


    placement firm. Joy Cabiles, the respondent, was employed and signed a one-year
    contract for a monthly pay of NT$15,360.00. Joy has been assigned to Taiwan
    Wacoal, Co. On June 26, 1997, Ltd. (Wacoal) was founded. She said that she
    agreed to serve as quality control for a year under her job contract. She was
    requested to work as a cutter in Taiwan.

    Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
    informed Joy that she had been fired without warning and that she should
    "immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport," as well as
    "prepare for immediate repatriation." Joy claims that she was told that she only
    earned NT$9,000.15 from June 26 to July 14, 1997, and that Wacoal deducted
    NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

    Joy filed a case with the NLRC on October 15, 1997, alleging that petitioner
    and Wacoal had wrongfully dismissed her. The complaint against LA was
    dismissed. The judgement of the LA was overturned by the NLRC. The California
    Court of Appeal upheld the National Labor Relations Commission's decision that
    respondent was wrongfully fired and awarded her three months' pay, compensation
    for her repatriation expenses, and attorney's costs.

    ISSUE:
    Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary
    due to illegal dismissal.

    RULING:
    Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' judgment, ruling that
    the respondent was illegally dismissed.

    Joy was fired for no good reason, according to Sameer Overseas Placement
    Agency. Wacoal, her employer, also violated her right to due process. Employers
    do, in fact, have the authority to set productivity and quality requirements in the
    workplace. They can also establish reasonable regulations to ensure that staff
    follow these guidelines. Their firing might be justified if they don't follow the
    rules. Employers cannot be forced to keep an employee who is committing conduct
    against the employer's best interests. While the law acknowledges the plight and
    vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression or self-destruction of
    the employer.” Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our
    jurisprudence.

    This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the


    employee’s right to security of tenure.” Workers are entitled to substantive and
    procedural due process before termination. They may not be removed from
    employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without going
    through the proper procedure.

    Our Constitution guarantees the security of tenure for workers. When


    employees relocate to work in a new jurisdiction, they do not lose their security of
    tenure. We follow the idea of lex loci contractus in regards to the rights of overseas
    Filipino employees. The rule that this jurisdiction is governed by lex locus
    contractus has been established. The employment contract in this case was
    unquestionably finalized in the Philippines. As a result, in this scenario, the Labor
    Code, its implementing rules and regulations, as well as other labor laws, apply.

    Furthermore, it is well established that the forum's courts will not enforce
    any foreign claim that is contrary to the forum's public policy. Employment
    agreements in the Philippines are more than contractual in nature.

    A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid
    procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the charged employee at
    least two written notices before termination. One of the written notices must inform
    the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other
    notice must “[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision.” Aside from the
    notice requirement, the employee must also be given “an opportunity to be heard.”

    Sameer failed to comply with the requirements for both notice and hearing.
    On June 26, 1997, respondent began working. She was informed that she had been
    fired on July 14, 1997, effective the same day as her first day on the job. She was
    likewise deported the same day she received her termination notice. The abruptness
    of the termination ruled out any claim that she was adequately told and given a
    chance to be heard. Her right to a fair trial was infringed upon under the law.
    HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
    PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

    FACTS:

    Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title on


    February 20, 1998, for a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite, which he purchased from
    Eduardo Velazco and for which he and his predecessors in interest had been in
    open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession for more than 30 years.

    The vendor, Velazco, claims that his great-grandfather originally held the
    land, which he handed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons had become
    the administrator of the properties, while the latter's son had replaced his parents as
    the administrator. The Velazco's property was one of the ones sold there.

    They also provided proof about the DENR's designation of land as alienable
    and disposable. The RTC sided with them, but the CA overturned it, citing
    Republic v Hebierto as a precedent.

    ISSUE:
    Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed.

    RULING:
    NO. The Court needed to settle down the correct interpretation of Sec 14 (1)
    and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141. It should be noted that CA 141, particularly
    Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisite,
    while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other. The
    use of descriptive phrase “alienable and disposable” further limits the coverage of
    Section 48 (b) to only agricultural lands of the public domain under the
    Constitution. The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires
    a mix of interpretation of Article 1113, Article 1137, and Articles 420-422 of the
    New Civil Code.

    Only objects within the trade of men and the patrimonial property of the
    State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
    according to Article 1113. It is also evident that, under Articles 420-422, public
    dominion property that is no longer in use is turned into patrimonial property if and
    only if a positive act of the executive or legislature proclaiming lands to be such
    exists. Combining the two judgements, it is evident that the land sought to be
    registered may only be obtained by prescription if there is a positive act, regardless
    of whether the land was designated as alienable and disposable.

    When the land is already categorized as alienable and disposable at the time
    of the application, the Court decided that the criteria of bona fide ownership since
    June 12, 1945 is met. Because the State has not yet deemed it appropriate to release
    the property for alienation or disposition at the time the application is filed, the
    presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to use the property;
    thus, the need to preserve the property's ownership in the State, regardless of the
    length of adverse possession, even if in good faith.
    The petitioners therefore failed to submit adequate evidence to show that
    they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since
    June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession –
    possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
    June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
    private property even upon the subsequent declaration of its alienable and
    disposable.

    The land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14 (1) of the
    Property Registration Decree since prescription never began to run against the
    State. Similarly, the land will remain ineligible for land registration under Section
    14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress passes legislation or the
    President issues a proclamation proclaiming the land no longer intended for public
    service in the creation of national wealth.

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