Coso and Acl 302

Adapting your audit philosophy to COSO utilizing CAATS
By Kate Head
Audit and Investigations Manager, University of South Florida
©2002
As auditors we are often advisors to management in relation to the

implementation of new automated financial systems. During these efforts, we
seem to be constantly reminding management not to implement a new system
based on the “old way” of doing business. We ask them to re-think their
business processes to enhance effectiveness, reduce redundancy, and fully
utilize the new functions provided by the newer tools.
Yet, when we as auditors internally implement an automated audit tool, such as

ACL, we often forget to practice what we preach. We too, try to incorporate ACL
functionality into the existing audit process rather than re-thinking the audit
process and the affect this tool will have on audit department operations.
In 1992, COSO told us that we needed to reassess our audit processes to

incorporate soft controls--not just hard controls. COSO also told us that one of
the least important components of the internal control environment was actually
those control processes we had spent 70-80% of our time evaluating.
Traditional auditing was based on the principal that we should identify key
controls and then select a representative sample of transactions to verify their
existence. If our sample indicates that these key controls are functioning, we can
make certain representations regarding the financial function being reviewed.
There was little testing or evaluation of soft controls. In 1995, COCO even
further refined the concept presented in COSO and provided us a series of
twenty objectives of an effective internal control system.
COSO (and COCO) told us the most important component of internal control was
the control environment. But auditors continue to struggle on how to evaluate
"tone from the top." Soft controls such as management integrity, philosophy, and
ethics have been hard to quantify. Yet we know that employee compliance with
controls is integrally tied to these factors.
The other three components of internal control (risk assessment, information and
communication, and monitoring) can be rated as equally important. Testing of
these principals also did not seem to fit with our traditional model of spending
minimal time on risk assessment and the majority of audit time on testing
controls. Often only 10 percent of our audit time was spent in risk assessment
(see exhibit A).
Risk assessment was often limited to performing a few simple analytical review
procedures and documenting control processes through narratives and
flowcharts. Risk assessment tools were limited to deciding what functions to test.
©2002 USF OIG

In order to adopt the principals of COSO (and COCO) you need to be able to
shift the audit time to include a significant evaluation of the control environment,
including an assessment of risk, a review of the information available to users
about the system and control processes, and an assessment of the adequacy of
monitoring of operations. (See exhibit B)
The use of automated CAATS easily permits a shift to COSO (exhibit C). Using
CAATS has forced auditors to learn more about the financial system to be
reviewed. The auditor naturally obtains a more detailed overview of the
information and communication processes in place. Often the same information
used to train users is used to train auditors. Meetings with managers and users
on operational risks not only allows management to share their knowledge of the
operational risks but allows the auditor to get a glimpse of the control
environment through these interactions. In addition, monitoring systems are
carefully reviewed by auditors who are gaining information about available data
sources. Often these monitoring reports are useful in CAAT testing; therefore,
they are more carefully analyzed. As a result significantly more time is spent in
understanding the control environment, information and communication systems,
and monitoring activities.
The preliminary review of control processes is then limited to those areas in

which control risk is significant. This minimizes time spent in evaluating low risk
operational areas and places the appropriate amount of emphasis on these
control activities. While system strengths and weaknesses are still identified, this
information is used in determining what a normal transaction looks like and
where risks of errors might occur.
Even before true CAAT testing has begun, the auditor is well on the way to
evaluating four attributes of control: control environment, information and
communication processes, monitoring systems, and control activities.
The last criteria for the establishment of an adequate internal control system is
the assessment of risk. Often these risk are not purely financial and may be
operational in nature. The assessment of risk is one area in which CAAT tools
really shine. The data mining activities used in CAATS allow for a more
comprehensive assessment of risk. Data mining is based on the ability to review
large data files and drill down into the data to obtain more and more detailed
information.
Functions such as analyze, classify, and stratify allow the auditor to assess the
data quickly and to determine the degree of risk associated with various
categories of transactions. Once these high-risk areas are identified, an
anomaly-based testing approach can be utilized.
©2002 USF OIG

An assumption is made that if the internal control structure is working effectively,
transactions will fall within expected limits. Anomaly-based testing allows you to
“ignore” those transactions that appear reasonable and allow you to concentrate
your efforts on those transactions that have a higher probability of errors and
irregularities.
Transactions that do not meet the normally expected range can either be natural
anomalies in the environment, unintentional errors not identified by the control
activities, or fraudulent transactions.
In all of these situations, there is a good potential that the control activities failed.
As a result, you are testing the control environment without having to evaluate all
of the key controls. You are also meeting the audit standards for looking for “red
flags” of fraud and are not placing undue emphasis on the hard controls. Once
you have located unidentified errors or irregularities, a review of the processes
surrounding these transactions will help identify the hard and soft controls that
were missing or were not being implemented properly.
In addition, the same audit procedures you develop to identify anomalies can
later be used as continuous monitoring tools by management. This will allow
management to perform an on-going evaluation of the control environment and
provide a value-added audit service.
An example of this approach is a recent audit of telecommunications we

performed. After performing a risk assessment process, we felt our highest risk
area was long distance calls. We used ACL not only to report unusual activity
(excessive long distance, frequent calls to the same number, excessive lengths,
costs, etc), but we were able to test for known anomalies such as calls made by
terminated employees (indicating phone codes had not been cancelled), and
faculty codes used in dormitories (indicating misuse of faculty codes). We were
able to easily identify these calls and provide an excellent continuous monitoring
tool for managers. We also were able to recalculate the phone bills and ensure
management that the system was rating and billing calls properly.
Since ACL can be used to test 100% of transactions, the audit report also can be
a more balanced report of risks and mitigating controls. In the example above
we were able to report that 100% of the calls were properly rated.
The implementation of CAAT tools will allow you to shift your efforts to be more in
line with the COSO pyramid, provide more information and tools for managers,
and will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit department’s
operations.
The audit process goes from a checklist or program driven process to an

interactive analysis of the high-risk transaction in an operations. Management
becomes an integral part of the process from risk assessment to resolving issues
©2002 USF OIG

identified by the audit. Emphasis is placed on those risks that are unmitigated
rather than verifying control to determine their existence. (See Exhibit D)
©2002 USF OIG

Exhibit A
Old Audit Model

Prelim/Risk 10%
Assessment
70-80%
Testing
Reporting 10-20%
Exhibit B
COSO Auditing
Comprehensive
Risk Assessment, 40-50%
Including IT Risks
Testing
40-50%
Reporting 10%
Exhibit C
©2002 USF OIG

Paradigm Shift
Old Model New Model
Focus of Audit Transaction Driven Process Driven
Emphasis Internal Controls Risk Assessment

Tests to Determine Compliance with Key Presence of Un-
Controls mitigated Risks
Report Emphasis Historical Based Instance Overall Assessment of
of Non-Compliance Risk
Findings Control Weaknesses Ways to Reduce Risk
or Increase Efficiency
Exhibit D
Effect on Process
Old Model New Model
Preliminary Checklist Driven Process Driven
Testing
Audit Planning Based on Past Audit, Interactive Assessment
Standard Plans Process
Scope Set at Beginning: Established after Risk
Establishment Inflexible Assessed: Flexible
Basis of Scope Auditor Judgment Auditor/Manager
Assessment of Risk
Report Timing At End of Testing Continuous
Findings Control Flaws, Noted Ways to Reduce Risk
Inefficiencies Risk/Incr. Efficiency
©2002 USF OIG

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Adapting your audit philosophy to COSO utilizing CAATS

As auditors we are often advisors to management in relation to the

Yet, when we as auditors internally implement an automated audit tool, such as

In 1992, COSO told us that we needed to reassess our audit processes to

©2002 USF OIG

The preliminary review of control processes is then limited to those areas in

©2002 USF OIG

An example of this approach is a recent audit of telecommunications we

The audit process goes from a checklist or program driven process to an

©2002 USF OIG

©2002 USF OIG

Old Audit Model

©2002 USF OIG

Emphasis Internal Controls Risk Assessment

©2002 USF OIG

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