Innovation in Candrakīrti'SPrasanna-padā

J Indian Philos (2010) 38:379–417
DOI 10.1007/s10781-010-9087-7
The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster:

Innovation in Candrakı̄rti’s Prasanna-padā
Eviatar Shulman
Published online: 9 June 2010

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract This paper challenges the notion that there is a complete continuity
between the thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakı̄rti. It is shown that
there is strong reason to doubt Candrakı̄rti’s gloss of Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā
(MMK) 2.1, and that Candrakı̄rti’s peculiar reading of this verse causes him to alter
the context of the discussion in the four cases in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1
later in the text—MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7. The innovation produced by
Candrakı̄rti is next contrasted to Nāgārjuna’s style of argument, and it is shown that
these two author’s notions of emptiness, as well as their particular implementation
of Madhyamaka logic, significantly diverge from each other. Finally, Candrakı̄rti’s
reading of these verses is compared with his commentary on MMK 15 so as to
suggest a possible subtle metaphysical position that is at the base of his thinking.
Keywords Candrakı̄rti Æ Nāgārjuna Æ Madhyamaka Æ Prasannapadā Æ
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Æ Middle-way
Abbereviations
D Der-ge Tenjur
dJ de Jong (1980a, b)
JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy
LVP de La Valée Poussin (1903–1913)
MMK Mūla-madhayamaka-kārikā
PEW Philosophy East & West
PP Prasanna-padā
VV Vigraha-vyāvartanı̄
E. Shulman (&)
Department of Comparative Religion, Faculty of the Humanities, The Hebrew University,
Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
123
380 E. Shulman
Candrakı̄rti (circa 650 A.D) is considered by many to be Nāgārjuna’s most authori-

tative and reliable commentator. The Prāsangika _ school of Madhyamaka (‘‘The
Middle-Way Consequence school’’), whose self-understanding was shaped by the
first chapter of Candrakı̄rti’s Prasanna-padā (PP, ‘‘Clear Words,’’ his commentary to
Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-Madhyamaka-kārikā [MMK]), is more often than not understood
to express the one true and coherent Middle-way position. Although Candrakı̄rti may
have been only marginally significant for Indian Madhyamaka,1 its Tibetan coun-
terpart accepted him as the authentic Mādhyamika par excellence.2 The Tibetan
philosophical tradition, enhanced by the charismatic exposition of Madhyamaka
thought developed by Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419 A.D), views Candrakı̄rti’s major
texts as the finest tools for deciphering the enigmatic words of Nāgārjuna. Following
Tsong-kha-pa and his Tibetan students, modern scholars have grown to view
Candrakı̄rti and Nāgārjuna as sharing a similar, if not an identical view of reality.
A lucid example of the tendency to fuse the voices of Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti
is the ‘‘debate’’ between Huntington (2007) and Garfield (2008) that took place in
recent editions of this journal. This debate has its roots in earlier discussions of
Madhyamaka thought by these same authors, as well as by a number of other
leading scholars, which focus on the question of whether the Mādhyamika adheres
to a philosophical position.3 The current version of the disagreement concerns the
place of rational inquiry in Madhyamaka method, as well as the nature of the
experience, or the knowledge, generated by the school’s dialectic. For Huntington,
rationality is epiphenomenal to Nāgārjuna. He believes the gravest misunder-
standing of this school’s teachings is to view them as a rational enterprise that aims
to achieve any sense of certainty regarding emptiness. Rather, the inquiry that
discovers the truth of emptiness relieves the person who conducts it properly of any
need for certainty. Surrendering the demand for a ‘‘true, rationally binding con-
clusion,’’ the Mādhyamika reaches a ‘‘state of non-abiding, a metaphorical place
which is neither on nor off the Map.’’4 According to Huntington, authors such as
Robinson (1957), Hayes (1994), Tillemans (1999), and Garfield (2002) violate the
spirit of Nāgārjuna’s MMK in an attempt to present the text as a rational set of
arguments. In their search for rational, objective certainty, they elude the true
purport of the text.
Garfield stood up to the challenge and supplied not only a forceful rebuttal of
Huntington’s claim, but an advance against the position that denies the role of logic
and reasoning in Madhyamaka inquiry as well. For Garfield, Huntington is stub-
bornly attempting to shun the obvious. Not only do Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti
engage in an overtly rational investigation, employing complex rational arguments
the whole way through, but they even admit to doing so in their texts. Moreover, we,
1
Vose (2009, ch. 1).
2
I Follow Saito (2008) in referring to Madhyamaka as the name of the school to which Mādhyamikas
adhere.
3
See (a) Huntington (1989), and the responses in Williams (1991) and Cabezon (1990); (b) Betty (1983),
Loy’s (1984) response, and Betty’s (1984) response to Loy; (c) Oetke (1991), Ruegg’s (2000, Section II,
esp. n. 164) discussion of Oetke’s ideas on the subject, and Oetke’s (2003) response to Ruegg; (d)
Garfield (1995, pp. 353–354), who relates to traditional Tibetan deliberations on the questions at hand.
4
P. 123, emphasis in the original.
123
The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster 381
as interpreters of the Buddhist tradition, are inevitably committed to the employ-

ment of reason.5 Most importantly, Garfield argues that the uniqueness of
Nāgārjuna’s intellectual dexterity lies precisely in the fact that ‘‘he presents such
profound arguments for the inconsistency of reality’’ and that ‘‘he demonstrates that
it is rational to regard phenomena as empty.’’6 For Garfield, the defining feature of
Madhyamaka thought is its unique ability to combine rational understanding with
the view of anti-foundationalism.
The questions regarding the role of reason in the Madhyamaka analysis and
experience will be of greater concern for us later. For now, what is more important to
note is that both Huntington and Garfield understand Nāgārjuna’s and Candrakı̄rti’s
thought to be virtually one and the same. Although their interpretations of Madhy-
amaka are in diametrical opposition, both believe that their presentation is on par
with the thought of Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti. For both Huntington and Garfield, a
correct interpretation of Madhyamaka includes understanding how these two men
viewed reality. Huntington’s take on Nāgārjuna is clearly informed by his previous
work on Candrakı̄rti, where he has advanced a reading of his work that is strikingly
similar to the one he attributes to Nāgārjuna in the paper referred to.7 As for Garfield,
the fact that in the abstract of his paper he refers to the position of ‘‘Nāgārjuna and
Candrakı̄rti’’ no less then three times speaks for itself.8
The major aim of the current paper is to address an identifiable gap between the
thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakı̄rti. The difference between the
Madhyamaka systems espoused by these two philosophers rests on each author’s
particular implementation of Madhyamaka logic. Although both agree that all things
are empty, what they mean by ‘empty’ is different, and the logical procedures by
which they articulate their understanding are distinct.9 This gap appears most viv-
idly in Candrakı̄rti’s well known commentary on MMK 2.1, a verse that aside from
opening an important chapter of the MMK, is referred to directly by Nāgārjuna four
times later in the text. Thus, we will be analyzing a group of arguments which are
misconstrued in Candrakı̄rti’s commentary. A close look at these four verses (MMK
3.3, 7.14, 10.13, 16.7) will show that Candrakı̄rti’s commentary alters the context of
the discussion and forces upon them an understanding unnatural to the text. A
careful reading of MMK 2 will then also demonstrate that Candrakı̄rti’s reading is
questionable. Once Candrakı̄rti’s idiosyncratic presentation of Nāgārjuna’s argu-
ment is viewed clearly, I will proceed to comment on the nature of his innovations
and their implications, which have much to do with the questions that interest
Huntington and Garfield.
5
‘‘In sum, a commitment to reason is a transcendental condition of interpretability,’’ p. 515.
6
P. 523.
7
See Huntington (1983, 1989, 2003).
8
In fairness, it must be pointed out that Garfield’s (1995, 124–125) translation and presentation of MMK
2.1, a critical verse to the discussion conducted below, does not adopt the readings suggested by
Candrakı̄rti.
9
Casey (1967) has discussed differences between Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti of a different nature than
the ones I will elaborate on here. Although there are many aspects of Casey’s reading of Nāgārjuna I
disagree with, he points out very clearly that Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti wrote in different historical and
philosophical milieus.
123
382 E. Shulman
Candrakı̄rti on MMK 2.1
In order to facilitate the forthcoming discussion, let us first recall Candrakı̄rti’s

reading of MMK 2.1. Candrakı̄rti’s gloss of the verse has received much attention in
modern scholarship,10 and hence I will provide but a short summary of it. The verse,
as Candrakı̄rti understands it, could be translated as follows:
The walked-over (in the past) is not being walked-over, and the not-walked-
over is certainly not being walked-over. Apart from the walked-over and the
not-walked-over, the being-walked-over is not known.11
gatam: na gamyate tāvad agatam : naiva gamyate / 12
gatāgata-vinirmuktam : gamyamānam: na gamyate //
Many questions arise regarding the translation of this enigmatic verse, and many
different translations could be provided for it.13 What distinguishes Candrakı̄rti’s
reading of the verse is that he understands gata, agata, and gamyamāna as referring
to what is/is not being moved over or walked on. Thus the verse receives a Zeno-like
quality: the path being traversed is divided into no more than two parts, one which
has been walked over and the other which has yet to be walked over.14 Apart from
these two parts of the path, presumably, there is no third part which can be walked
over in the present. Candrakı̄rti emphasizes the complete dichotomy between the
walked-over and the not-walked-over, speaking of different parts of the foot (the
heel, the toes, etc.) that are supposed to perform the action of walking. Once the foot
has been conceptually dissected into what has stepped and not-stepped on the path,
the path is also divided into the part which has been stepped on by the rear end of
the foot, and the part which has not yet been stepped on by the front end of the foot.
Candrakı̄rti is convinced that the infinite capacity to keep dissecting the foot into the
parts that have already stepped or that have not yet stepped exhausts all possibilities
10
For works on MMK 2 that directly engage Candrakı̄rti’s commentary, see Siderits and O’brien (1976),
Bhattacharya (1980, 1985), Mabbett (1984), Galloway (1987), Loy (1999) and Westerhoff (2008, 2009,
ch. 6).
11
Mabbett (1984, pp. 407–408) has questioned Candrakı̄rti’s understanding of the last na gamyate as ‘‘is
not known,’’ and has argued convincingly for its implausibility. Galloway (1987, p. 1) believes there is a
‘‘clever pun here, intending both ‘is not logically possible’ (na prajñāyate) and ‘is not gone over.’’’
12
In quoting the Sanskrit text of the MMK, I rely on the edition of de Jong (1978), together with the
emendations suggested by MacDonald (2007) and Ye Shaoyong (2007a).
13
See the discussion in ‘‘MMK 2.1 in context’’ section below.
14
Bhattacharya (1980, p. 85) states he believes Hermann Jacobi was the first to make the connection
between Nāgārjuna and Zeno (see Jacobi 1911, n. 2). Basing himself on the work of Prof. Ingalls,
Bhattacharya proceeds to define a fundamental difference between the two thinkers: Zeno’s philosophy,
as part of the Greek scientific enterprise, was based on Mathematics, while the Indian Nāgārjuna’s was
based on the study of grammar. The same author made similar statements in Bhattacharya (1985). Siderits
and O’Brien (1976) have discussed the relation between Nāgārjuna and Zeno as well. They conclude that
the Mādhyamika’s argument, understood through the prism of Candrakı̄rti’s reading, is fundamentally
distinct from Zeno’s. Mabett (1984) has also reached similar conclusions. Galloway (1987, pp. 82–85)
believes the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Zeno to be related.
123
that an action of stepping can take place. Candrakı̄rti reaches a firm conclusion:
there is no part of the path that can be walked over.15
Candrakı̄rti’s logic is compelling, but not all will agree that it is convincing. The
utter impossibility that there is an infinitesimal part of the path in-between the
already-walked-over and the not-yet-walked-over is too much of an assumption, or a
pre-determined truth, too little of an empirical or a logical must. After-all, we just
can’t imagine such minute details, and the analytic dissection of the path remains a
position one must hold is true in order to accept the argument. No less important for
our concerns, there are serious doubts whether such a reading of MMK 2.1 does
justice to Nāgārjuna’s thinking in chapter 2; Taking the argument as referring to the
possibility that the path can be walked on will prove to be highly suspect. We will
examine these questions below, but only after we have appreciated the contexts in
which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text.
It is important to note that Candrakı̄rti’s commentary is not the first we know of
that reads MMK 2.1 as discussing the question of whether there can be something
that can be walked on. It is actually Bhāvaviveka who first referred to gata and
agata as relating to the path (lam, mārga). In the beginning of his gloss of the
opponent’s claim in 2.2, Bhāvaviveka also speaks of the ‘‘lifting up and setting
down of the foot.’’16 Quite strikingly, there is no term relating directly to ‘‘the path’’
in Buddhapālita’s commentary on MMK 2.1,2,17 and neither is there one in the
Akutobhayā’s.18 Candrakı̄rti thus elaborates on his supposed Svātantrika rival’s take
on the verse as referring to the relation between the foot and the path. Nevertheless,
it is Candrakı̄rti who first offered the full-fledged analysis of the different parts of
the foot and the path as an aid to understanding MMK 2.1.
15
For a good discussion of Candrakı̄rti’s exposition of this verse see Siderits and O’Brien (1976) and
Mabbett (1984).
16
Prajñā-pradı̄pa 64.2: de la phyogs la gang na rkang pa ‘debs pa dang / ‘jog pa’i mtshan nyid kyi g.yo
ba snang ba de na ‘gro ba yod de /, translated by Ames (1995, p. 304) as ‘‘As to that, going exists in that
place where a movement of the limbs appears which has as [its] defining characteristic lifting up and
setting down the foot.’’
17
Buddhapālita’s reading of MMK 2.1,2 (D 168.2.3–169.1.2) is ambiguous, since his short commentary
can be read in different ways. Although it is possible to read Candrakı̄rti’s understanding into Budd-
hapālita’s words (see in Tachikawa 1974, p. 5 and Saito 1984, p. 31), the verse could support other
readings as well. What is clear about Buddhapālita’s commentary on 2.1 is that the center of the argument
for him is that the gamyamāna cannot be perceived (gzung med), or known (shes par mi ‘gyur) apart from
gata and agata:
‘‘‘Because (the gamyamāna) is not perceived, it is unreasonable,’ that is the meaning. Thus, since it is
not perceived apart from the gone and the ungone, it is unreasonable. Therefore it does not exist, and there
is no movement.’’
gzung du med pas te mi ‘thad do zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go / / de ltar gang gi phyir song ba dang ma
song ba ma gtogs par bsgom gzung du med pa kho na ste mi ‘thad pa de’i phyir med pa kho na yin pas
‘gro ba med do /.
18
The problems regarding the dating of the Akutobhayā are well known (see Komito 1987, pp. 189–191
for a good summary of the discussion), but nevertheless it is recognized that Buddhapālita based large
parts of his commentary on it (Lindtner 1981, p. 188, Ames 1985, p. 314). With the risk of discovering
that some passages are later emendations, the text still represents, in its main bulk, an early stratum of the
Madhyamaka commentarial enterprise. See Huntington (1995) for a fuller treatment of the text and its
status.
123
384 E. Shulman
Candrakı̄rti is obviously right in taking gata as a past passive particle, agata as its
negative, and gamyamāna as a passive present particle. The question is whether the
understanding of these passive particles as what is or is not being walked on is
justified. Taking these terms as referring to the path, rather than to what contains
movement or is being moved, i.e. to the mover, forces MMK 2.1 to speak of the
relation between movement and its locus, or more generally between an action and
its object. In MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13, and 16.7, where Nāgārjuna quotes 2.1, reading
the argument as referring to the locus or the object of the action is unnatural. Rather,
the context of the discussion in which these quotes are embedded involves an
analysis of the nature of subjective action and of the relation between action and the
subject to whom it belongs. We will thus proceed by examining the contexts in
which MMK 2.1 is quoted later in the text.
Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK 3.2 and 3.3
We begin our analysis by viewing Candrakı̄rti’s treatment of MMK 3.2:

MMK 3.2 Seeing does not see itself.
What does not see itself–
How will it see another?
svam ātmānam: darśanam: hi tat tam eva na paśyati /
na paśyati yad ātmānam
: katham : draks: yati tat parān //
This is perhaps one of the more aesthetically pleasing verses of the MMK, making a
statement that feels more like a poem than like an argument. But the poetic quality
should not obscure the profound philosophical argument made by the verse. First,
Nāgārjuna says that seeing, or sight,19 does not see itself. This, of course, makes
intuitive sense: we do in fact believe that sight sees its object, i.e. the other. The
second sentence makes the main point: ‘‘What does not see itself—how will it see
another?’’
The problem, as I understand the argument, is that in order for sight to function, it
must see in and of itself. If sight does not see independently of the object, it has no
true nature that will define it as an action or faculty and allow it to connect to its
object. Sight must see prior to contacting its object in order to be ‘‘sight.’’ Thus, if
sight is already seeing, the object becomes superfluous.
Another way to state this principle is that sight must be dualistic in order to be
itself. The need for sight to see in and of itself demands that the object be subsumed
within sight, which makes the act of seeing it meaningless. This means that sight
must both see and be seen, since if it is not both it cannot see. Thus, sight is no
longer purely subjective, and the object becomes part of sight’s very nature. This is
the meaning of the first line of the verse—‘‘seeing does not see itself’’—elegantly
19
Darśana could be translated as either ‘‘sight’’ or ‘‘seeing,’’ the second being preferable since darśana
is an action noun. Darśana can refer also to the eye, but since it appears in MMK 3.1 as part of the
standard list of the six indriyas, darśana should relate to the faculty of sight or to the action of seeing.
123
and succinctly explained by Candrakı̄rti as ‘‘because it would have contradictory

action with regard to itself’’ (svātmani kriyā-virodhāt).20
The understanding of vision just outlined is deeply problematic for two main
reasons. First, seeing loses its subjective character, since it is also the object. Next,
more importantly, seeing can no longer see the object, since the object is now part of
itself, and since sight must see without making contact with its object. We are led to
accept two wholly contradictory positions: (a) sight needs to be defined in and of
itself, and (b) sight must contain the object it sees in order to be itself. We must accept
both points, which inevitably cancel each other out. We appear to be facing an
insurmountable problem in defining the action of seeing. These ideas are at play in the
second line of the verse—‘‘That which does not see itself—how will it see another?’’
The key point to take note of is that for Nāgārjuna there is a casual or conditional
relation between the fact that seeing does not see itself and the fact that it does not
see another. Because, or so long as21 seeing does not see itself, i.e. so long as it does
not appear within its own selfhood, it cannot see another either. The fact that seeing
does not see another is the result of its inability to see itself. Sight’s lack of self-
reference means that it has no true nature that can relate to another, and
hence—‘‘What does not see itself—how will it see another?’’ Nāgārjuna makes this
same point twice in the Śūnyatā-saptati as well,22 and later in the MMK he will
refer a number of times to the inability of a thing that lacks self-reference to relate to
another.23 This is, also, Buddhapālita’s main emphasis in explaining the verse:
Here, as for the nature of things, if one observes it in (the thing) itself, he will
also perceive it in another (thing), because (the other thing) possesses it. For
example, when one observes wetness in water, he will also perceive it in earth,
because (earth) possesses it; and when one observes heat in fire, he will also
perceive it in water, because (water) possesses it; and when one observes a
sweet smell in the blossom of the nutmeg flower, he will also perceive it in a
cloth, because (the cloth) possesses it. In the same manner, how will a certain
20
LVP 114.1. References to the Sanskrit text of the PP are to the edition of de La Valée Poussin (1903–
1913). I have checked the rendering of the text in the relevant sections against the emendations suggested
by de Jong (1978a,b). Although I am aware of the complex situation regarding the Sanskrit text of the
Prasana-padā, as discussed by MacDonald (2008), I believe that for the purpose of the present discussion
the edition of de La Valée Poussin will serve our needs well enough.
21
yad ātmānam: in the second line of the verse could also be read either as yadā-ātmanam : —‘‘So long as
(it does not see) itself.’’ In a sense, the yadā, ‘‘so long as,’’ is implied also when the verse is translated as
yad-ātmānam :.
22
48ab. gal te blo des gzugs ¢dzin na/ rang gi rang bzhin la ¢dzin ¢gyur/ (‘‘If the mind perceives a form, it
perceives its very own nature).
52ab. gal te mig bdag mi mthong na/ des gzugs mthong bar ji ltar ‘gyur/ (‘‘if the eye does not see itself,
how will it see another’’)
The references to the Śūnyatā-saptati are to Lindtner’s (1982, 1986) edition of the text.
23
I quote but two examples that both relate to the nature of causality:
12.7ab Since there is no establishment of what has been done of itself—whence will there be suffering
done by another? (svayam : kr: tasyāprasiddher duh: kham
: para-kr: tam
: kutah: )
20.23 This assemblage of a cause and conditions does not give birth to itself of itself. How will it give
birth to the result?
na ca pratyaya-hetūnām iyam ātmānam ātmanā / yā sāmagrı̄ janayate sā katham
: janayet (Ye 2008,
p. 150: janayate) phalam//.
123
386 E. Shulman
thing that does not appear in itself be perceived in another (thing)? Thus, if
one does not view the bad smell of a nutmeg blossom, he will not perceive it in
a cloth either.
Therefore, if seeing performs the action of seeing itself, the statement ‘‘sight
performs the action of seeing a form, and is therefore ‘sight’’’ will be tenable.
This being so, sight does not perform the action of seeing itself. That which
does not perform the action of seeing itself, how will it perform the action of
seeing another? Therefore the statement ‘‘sight performs the action of seeing a
form and is therefore ‘sight’’’ is untenable.24
The main feature of the argument I have outlined regarding MMK 3.2 has been
identified long before me by Buddhapālita: there is a causal relation between sight
not seeing itself and its not seeing another. Because sight does not operate in and of
itself, it cannot see forms. Sight must appear in its own nature in order for it to relate
to another thing. This is not the case and therefore sight cannot be said to see its
object. According to Buddhapālita, Āryadeva shared this same understanding of the
problematics of vision as well.25
When Buddhapālita’s commentary follows Nāgārjuna’s argument, it is surprising
that Candrakı̄rti pays minimal attention to the relation between ‘‘not seeing itself’’
and ‘‘not seeing another.’’ Candrakı̄rti comments on MMK 3.2 very briefly, pro-
viding no explanation for the enigmatic argument in Nāgārjuna’s verse.26 He then
immediately moves on to discuss why sight cannot see another. Preparing himself
for the next verse, Candrakı̄rti introduces an interlocutor who believes that sight is
24
D 175.1.1–175.1.5: ‘di la dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ni rang gi bdag nyid la mthong na de dang
ldan pas gzhan gyi bdag nyid la yang dmigs par ‘gyur te / dper na chu la rlan mthong na de dang ldan pas
/ sa la yang dmigs pa dang / me la tsha ba mthong na de dang ldan pas chu la yang dmigs pa dang / sna
ma’i me tog la dri zhim pa nyid mthong na de dang ldan pas gos la yang dmigs pa lta bu yin na dngos po
gang rang gi bdag nyid la mi snang ba de gzhan gyi bdag nyid la ji ltar dmigs par ‘gyur te / ‘di ltar sna
ma’i me tog la ‘dri nga ba nyid ma mthong na gos la yang dmigs par mi ‘gyur na lta bu’o / /
de’i phyir gal te lta ba rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar byed na ni des na gzugs la lta bar byed pas lta ba’o
zhes bya ba de ‘thad par ‘gyur ba zhig na lta ba ni rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed do / de gang rang
gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa de gzhan dag la ji ltar lta bar byed de / des na gzugs la lta bar byed pas
lta ba’o / zhes bya ba de mi ‘thad do /
The quotes from Buddhapālita’s text are from the critical edition in Saito (1984).
25
As part of his commentary, Buddhapālita quotes the following verse from the Catuh: śataka (316):
‘‘The self-nature of all things, if it appears to itself from the beginning—How will the eye not perceive
that very eye (i.e itself)? (dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin ni / thog mar bdag la snang gyur na / mig nyid la
yang mig gis ni / ci yi phyir na ‘dzin mi ‘gyur //)
Although this verse can be read as making a slightly different point than Buddhapālita’s—that there
cannot be self-nature since that would imply that the eye sees itself—the fact that Buddhapālita believed
himself to share the understanding of Āryadeva is itself significant.
The Tibetan version of Āryadeva’s Catuh: śataka (bstan bcos bzhi rgya) preserves a slightly different
version of the verse than the one which appears in Buddhapālita’s vr: tti:
dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin ni / dang por bdag la snang ‘gyur na / mig ni mig nyid kyis ‘dzin par / ci
yi phyir na ‘gyur ma yin //.
26
‘‘Here this very sight does not see itself, because it would have contradictory action with regard to
itself. Hence, because of not seeing itself, it is like the ear and the other (faculties) and does not see blue
and the like. Therefore there is no sight.’’
LVP 114. 1-2: tatra tad eva darśanam : svātmānam : na paśyati svātmani kriyāvirodhāt / tataś ca svāt-
mādarśanāc chrotrādivan nı̄lādikam
: na paśyati / tasmān nāsti darśanam: //.
123
like fire, which burns another.27 Candrakı̄rti will use 3.3 as an answer to his
opponent, where Nāgārjuna says that:
The example of fire is unsuitable for establishing seeing. This was explained,
together with seeing, by (the analysis) of gamyamāna, gata and agata.28
na paryāpto ‘gni-dr: s: :tānto darśanasya prasiddhaye /
sa-darśanah: sa pratyukto gamyamāna-gatāgataih: //
This is the first among four instances in which Nāgārjuna refers his reader to the
examination of gamyamāna-gata-agata. Obviously, Nāgārjuna is referring to the
analysis of motion in chapter 2, and specifically to the opening verse of the chapter,
quoted above. The question here is what position the example of fire intends to
support, there being at least two possibilities: either fire burns another without
burning itself, or fire burns itself and another. In both cases, the opponent argues,
sight sees its object in the same way that fire burns.
The first of these options—that fire burns another without burning itself—appears
attractive at first, since it affords a simple and straightforward answer to Nāgārju-
na’s claim: Sight sees another even though it does not see itself, just like fire burns
another without burning itself. This is indeed the reading adopted by Candrakı̄rti,
who naturally explains the verse according to his take of MMK 2.1: As the foot
cannot tread the path, since there is nowhere on the path where motion can take
place, so too ‘‘the other’’ cannot be burned by fire or seen by sight. Candrakı̄rti next
composes a verse modeled on MMK 2.1:
The seen (in the past) is not being seen, and the un-seen is certainly not being
seen. The thing-being-seen, apart from the seen and the un-seen, is not being
seen.
na dr: s: :tam : dr: s: yate tāvad adr: s: :tam
: naiva dr: s: yate /
29
dr: s: :tādr: s: :ta-vinirmuktum : dr: s: yamānam: na dr: s: yate //
A number of considerations raise doubt about Candrakı̄rti’s understanding of the
example of fire in 3.3. First, note that Candrakı̄rti does not discuss fire itself, i.e. the
subject that executes the action, but rather relates to the locus or the object of
the action. When the question involves the ability of sight to see, we would expect
the example to speak of fire’s ability to burn. More importantly, Candrakı̄rti’s gloss
of the example of fire ignores the subtle implication that is so central to the argu-
ment in MMK 3.2. This verse, which introduces the main argument in chapter 3,
states that sight does not see another because it does not see itself; sight does not see
another since it does not exist in and of itself. The example of fire should therefore
engage the possibility of sight’s seeing another even though it does not see itself.
Understanding the argument of fire as not being concerned only with relation to
another, but also with relation to selfhood, also makes better sense with regard to the
next verses introduced by Nāgārjuna in chapter 3. In 3.4 and 3.5ab Nāgārjuna denies
27
See note 32 below for the text and its translation.
28
I leave gamyamāna-gata-agata untranslated, since our discussion revolves around the question of how
they should be translated.
29
LVP 114.14-15.
123
388 E. Shulman
the statement that ‘‘sight sees.’’ This leads him to reject the veracity of the seer in
3.5cd and 3.6ab. In these verses Nāgārjuna is still searching for a coherent definition
of subjective action, apart from its object. Only once he has become fully convinced
that no definition of the subjective action of seeing is possible, will he conclude, in
3.6cd, that so long as there is no seer there can be no object of sight either:
MMK 3.4 When there is no sight that is not (presently engaged in) seeing,
what sense does it make to say that ‘sight sees’?
MMK 3.5 Surely, sight does not see. Surely, non-sight does not see either.
The seer, too, should be understood in the same way that sight has been
explained.
MMK 3.6 There is no seer with or without sight. When there is no seer, how
will there be sight and an object of sight?
nāpaśyamānam : bhavati yadā kim : cana darśanam /
darśanam : paśyatı̄ti evam
: katham etat tu yujyate //
paśyati, darśanam : naiva naiva paśayty adarśanam /
vyākhyāto darśanenaiva dras: tā cāpy avagamyatām //
dras: :tā nāsty atiraskr: tya tiraskr: tya ca darśanam /
dras: :tavyam : darśanam caiva dras: :tary asati te kutah: //
These verses support a reading of chapter 3 as concerned with the nature of
subjective action, of sight, and with the claim that the non-existence of the object of
sight is inferred from the conclusion that there is no subjective action. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that with the example of fire Nāgārjuna is making a point
along those same lines. Such an understanding of the example of fire in 3.3 also
makes good sense with regard to the way Nāgārjuna discusses fire in chapter 10.
There too, as we will see in the section ‘‘Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK
10.13’’ below, the problem lies in the relation between agent and action, rather than
between action and its object. Moreover, in the next instance in which Nāgārjuna
quotes MMK 2.1, in chapter 7, the quote follows the analysis of the famous question
of whether a lamp can light itself and another.
These last considerations suggest that the example of fire in MMK 3.3 is meant to
push home the point that seeing does not see itself and therefore does not see
another. This reading is once again in agreement with Buddhapālita’s commentary
on the verse, who argues mainly against the possibility that fire burns itself and
another. Like Candrakı̄rti, Buddhapālita understands 3.3 as a response to an inter-
locutor who suggests that vision functions like fire, which burns another. But for
him the emphasis is still on the possibility of fire’s burning itself.30 There is first a
subtle difference in the way the two commentators introduce the opponent’s posi-
tion. While Candrakı̄rti’s interlocutor speaks of fire burning another, and at the same
time not burning itself, Buddhapālita’s opponent speaks of fire burning another
30
Buddhapālita’s commentary (D 175.1.6–176.1.3) raises too many problems to be treated fairly in this
context, and thus I offer only a short summary of the points most relevant to the current discussion. For a
translation see Saito (1984, pp. 50–54).
123
although (literally ‘‘but,’’ achieved through use of the participle gyi) it does not burn
itself.31 The difference between the commentarial approaches to the passage
becomes more explicit when they deal with the example of fire itself. The major
bulk of Candrakı̄rti’s commentary to MMK 3.2-3 discusses the second line of 3.3
that refers to MMK 2.1. For him this line explains why fire cannot burn another, and
the problem lies in the capacity of the object to burned, seen or walked on.
Buddhapālita will reach the second line of 3.3 only after a long and complex
passage which continues to discuss the possibility of fire burning another while it
cannot burn itself. For him the core of the problem relates to the definition of
subjective action. The allusion to MMK 2.1 is taken as no more than a technical
argument that shows that fire does not burn and that the action of seeing does not
see, since movement does not take place on/in the gata, agata or the gamyamāna:
Interestingly, in his commentary on these verses, Budddhapālita defines the
Madhyamaka position regarding fire as one for whom indhana (bud shing) is
‘‘kindling/burning’’ (sreg par byed pa), while fire is ‘‘what is to be kindled’’ (bsreg
par bya ba, probably idhyamāna).32 This definition will prove helpful in under-
standing the structure of the argument in MMK 10, which discusses the relation
between fire and ignition, or kindling (indhana), discussed below. In the present
context, these definitions suggest that for Buddhapālita, indhana refers to an action,
and that when he speaks of what is to be kindled, moved on/in, or seen, he is
actually referring to what we would normally understand as the subject of the
action, in this case ‘‘fire.’’ The subject must be made to possess the action by which
he is characterized—fire must by made to burn, seeing must be made to see, and the
mover must be made to move. The subject is, in this sense, the object of the action,
since it must be brought into a position in which the action can take place in or
through it. Once again, Buddhapālita identifies antecedents for his understanding of
the example of fire in Āryadeva.33
31
Candrakı̄rti (LVP 114.3-5): And if sight does not see itself, then it sees another, like fire. Just as fire
burns another and does not burn itself, sight sees only another, and not itself.
yady api svātmānam
: darśanam : na paśyati tathāpy agni-vat parān draks: yati tathā hy agnih: parā-
tmānam eva dahati na svātmānam evam : darśanam: parān eva draks: yati na svātmānam iti //
Buddhapālita (D 175.1.5-7): For example, although fire performs the action of burning, it performs the
action of burning another but it does not perform the action of burning itself. In the same manner,
although sight performs the action of seeing as well, it performs the action of seeing as well, another but it
does not perform the action of seeing itself.
dper na me ni sreg par byed pa yin yang gzhan dag sreg par byed pa yin gyi rang go bdag nyid sreg
par byed pa ni ma yin no / de bzhin du lta ba yang lta bar byed pa yin yang gzhan dag la lta bar byed pa
nyid yin gyi rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar byed pa ni ma yin no //.
32
D 175.2.1: kho bos kyang bud shing ni sreg par byed pa’o / / me ni bsreg par bya ba’o //.
33
Buddhapālita quotes (or possibly misquotes, see below) verse 341 from the Catuh: śataka:
‘‘Fire, i.e heat, is to be kindled, but it is in heat, so how will it be kindled? Therefore, there is no
‘kindling.’ Without it there is no fire either.’’
mes ni tsha ba nyid bsreg ste / tsha ba la yin ji ltar bsreg / des na bus zhing shes bya med / de ma gtogs
par me yang med //
This verse is quoted differently in the Tibetan edition of the Catuh: śataka, which could be translated thus:
‘‘Heat is fire. How will what is not-heat be burned? Therefore there is no ‘burning.’ Without it there is
no fire either’’ (For an alternative translation see Sonam and Geshe Sonam Rinchen 2008, p. 271).
tsha ba me nyid du ‘gyur te / tsha ba min pa ji ltar bsreg / des na bud shing zhes bya ba / yod min de
med me yod min //.
123
390 E. Shulman
In sum, Nāgārjuna’s argument is that what lacks self-reference cannot relate to

another, in this case sight cannot see its object and fire cannot burn. This under-
standing is accepted by Buddhapālita, but nearly ignored by Candrakı̄rti. For
Candrakı̄rti, the main point made by MMK 3.2-3 is that the object of sight cannot be
seen; the problem is not in the nature of the subject, but in the nature of the object. It
appears that Candrakı̄rti is influenced by his reading of MMK 2.1, which, as he
understands it, states that the path cannot be walked on. This leads him to view the
quote from MMK 2.1 in MMK 3.3 as referring to the object’s inability to be burned
or seen.
We will next examine the other verses in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 and
see that they also deal with the problem of self-reference or self-validation of a
subject or his action. We will see as well that Candrakı̄rti reads these verses as
pointing to a problem in the nature of the object. Once the different points made by
these two Madhyamaka philosophers will be appreciated, we will return to MMK 2
and re-examine the argument developed by Nāgārjuna in this chapter.
Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK 7.14
The fundamental question asked by MMK 7, especially in the first half of the
chapter, is ‘‘how does arising arise?’’ This question stems from the analysis of the
category of the ‘conditioned’ (sam : skr: ta), defined as things being characterized by
arising (utpāda), abiding (sthiti) and ceasing (bhanga). _ The major bulk of the
chapter is devoted to the concept of arising, since once arising is refuted the other
characteristics are naturally refuted as well.
Nāgārjuna begins by asking whether arising itself is characterized by the three
characteristics of the conditioned. This demands an explanation for the arising of
arising, since an infinite regress is implied.34 Here an interlocutor proposes that
arising and the arising of arising are one and the same thing: It is the basic (maula)
arising that produces the arising of arising.35 Nāgārjuna responds that this is
untenable, since something must cause arising to arise, or, more precisely, that the
basic arising cannot give rise to the arising of arising, since it itself is un-arisen
yet.36 Here the opponent supplies the well-known example of light, which sup-
posedly lights itself and another, in the same way, he suggests, that arising causes
itself and another to arise.37 This example is probably meant to be analogous to the
34
MMK 7.3 If there is another characteristic of being conditioned for arising, abiding and ceasing,
there will be an infinite regress. If not, they are not conditioned.
_
utpāda-sthiti-bhangānām anyat sam : skr: ta-laks: an: am
: / asti ced anavasthaivam
: nāsti cet te na sam
: skr: tāh: //.
35
MMK 7.4 The arising of arising is only the arising of the basic arising. The basic arising creates the
arising of arising.
utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya kevalam / utpādotpādam utpādo maulo janayate punah: //.
36
MMK 7.5 If, as you say, the arising of arising is the arising of the basic arising, how will it, yet
uncreated by the basic (arising), create it?
utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya te yadi / maulenājanitas tam
: te sa katham
: janayis: yati //
Implications of this statement are treated in verses 6 and 7.
37
MMK 7.8 Just as light illumines itself and another, arising gives rise to both itself and another.
pradı̄pah: sva-parātmānau sam
: prakāśayate yathā / utpādah: sva-parātmānav ubhav utpādayet tathā //.
123
case of fire in MMK 3.3, discussed in the previous section.38 Nāgārjuna undermines
the example with a dazzling set of arguments: (1) Light can’t meet darkness since
darkness is already destroyed where light is present.39 (2) If light is still being
created it will not destroy darkness.40 (3a) If light destroys darkness without
meeting it, there would be no darkness anywhere.41 (3b) If light destroys darkness
without meeting it, then just as light would cover everything, so would darkness.42
The strength of the arguments is of lesser concern for our discussion. What is
primary is what the analogy is meant to convey—does it focus on the ability of
arising to arise or on its capacity to give rise to another? In Nāgārjuna’s text, the
context of the discussion both before and after the example makes no explicit
mention of arising giving rise ‘‘to another.’’ The sole concern is to understand how
arising arises.43 Thus, the example of light’s lighting itself and another seems out of
place unless it relates to this question. Indeed, the issue at stake is of intrinsic
validation for arising. If arising can arise in and of itself—and this is more or less
the same question as if there is an acceptable definition for the arising of aris-
ing—the self-validated arising could then give rise to something else as well.
That the example of light is concerned with the possibility of intrinsic validation
becomes clear when we recall Nāgārjuna’s use of an analogous example in Vigraha-
vyāvartanı̄ (VV) 34–39.44 As has been shown convincingly by Burton (1999, ch.
10), the question addressed by the VV when it discusses this same example is if the
pramān: as are intrinsically validated. In the context of the VV, the example is
offered by an opponent as an analogy to the functioning of the pramān: as, again in
the attempt to avert the consequences of an infinite regress. An infinite regress can
be stopped by the positing of intrinsic validation, and light or fire are meant to serve
as examples of intrinsically validated phenomena. Naturally, Nāgārjuna denies the
applicability of the examples. In both cases—the discussion of pramān: as in the VV
38
Interestingly, in the Akutobhayā’s short discussion of MMK 2.1, the text concludes by saying that the
fact that there is no gamyamāna (and gata or agata) is ‘‘like the appearance of a lamp’’ (mar me dang
snang ba bzhin no).
39
MMK 7.9 Where light is found, there is no darkness. What will light illumine? For light is the
destroyer of darkness.
pradı̄pe nāndhakāro ‘sti yatra cāsau pratis: :thitah: / kim
: prakāśayate dı̄pah: prakāśo hi tamovadhah: //.
40
MMK 7.10 How is darkness destroyed by a light which is still arising, when a rising light does not
reach darkness?
katham utpadyamānena prdı̄pena tamo hatam / notpadyamāno hi tamah: pradı̄pah: prāpnute yadā //.
41
MMK 7.11 If darkness is destroyed by a light which has not reached it, this (light) here will destroy
the darkness in all worlds.
aprāpyaiva pradı̄pena yadi vā nihatam
: tamah: / iha-sthah: sarva-loka-stham
: sa tamo nihanis: yati //.
42
MMK 7.12 If light would illumine itself and another, then darkness would doubtlessly cover itself
and another as well //
pradı̄pah: sva-parātmānau sam : prakāśayate yadi / tamo ‘pi sva-parātmānau chādayis: yaty asam
: śayam //.
43
The verses that precede the example of the light have already been referred to. Among the verses that
follow the example, see 7.13-14, discussed below, and 7.25:
The abiding-state of abiding is unreasonable by itself or by another abiding, just as arising is
unreasonable by itself or by another.
sthityānyayā sthiteh: sthānam
: tayaiva ca na yujyate / utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā //.
44
In the VV the question is whether fire (agni) can illumine (prakāśayati) itself and another.
123
392 E. Shulman
and of arising in MMK 7—he claims that the example does not exemplify a case of
intrinsic validation since light does not illumine darkness.
As with the discussion of chapter 3 in the previous section, we see that Nāgārjuna
is interested in the nature of an action—seeing or arising, and in the examples ahead
of us in chapters 10 and 16, kindling (or burning, indhana) and binding (bandhana),
respectively. In all these cases, Nāgārjuna inquires into the relation between the
action and the subject to whom the action is supposed to belong—the seer, the
conditioned thing, fire and the person bound to sam : sāra. The heart of the matter is if
there is some subjective element that can be considered self-validated or self-
referential and could then relate to other phenomena through action.
Immediately following his analysis of the example of the light, Nāgārjuna returns
to focus on the nature of arising:
MMK 7.13 This un-arisen arising—how will it give birth to itself? But if the
arisen gives birth, being born (already), what will be born?
anutpanno ‘yam : utpādah: svātmānam
: janayet katham /
athotpanno janayate jāte kim: janyate punah: //
This verse again emphasizes that we are concerned with the question of intrinsic
validation; can arising can rise in and of itself? Nāgārjuna states that such arising
can take place neither if the arising is un-arisen nor if it is has already arisen. In the
next verse he will quote the analysis of movement in chapter 2:
MMK 7.14 Neither the being-made to arise, nor the arisen, nor the un-arisen,
arises45 in any way. This has been explained by (the analysis of) gamyamāna,
gata, and agata.
notpadyamānam : notpannam : nānutpannam
: katham: cana /
46
utpadyate tad ākhyātam
: gamyamāna-gatāgataih: //
Nāgārjuna, in his search for an arising that arises in and of itself, is concerned with the
question of whether there is something that can arise. This brings him to state that
neither the arisen, nor the un-arisen, nor what is being made to arise can arise. It is
obvious that in 7.14 utpadyamānam, utpannam, and anutpannam are neuter nouns in
nominative singular. They are not the objects of the action of arising, but the subjects,
the ‘‘thing’’ that is supposed to be characterized by the action of arising. Although in
some respects, these terms can be considered as the object of the action of aris-
ing—since the arising thing must somehow be made to arise—they more simply denote
the conditioned thing that is characterized by arising. Nāgārjuna states that none of
them can arise, thus pushing home his point that arising cannot rise in and of itself.
Candrakı̄rti’s gloss of these verses makes a subtle but significant shift of
emphasis: He views the statement in MMK 7.14 as being concerned with the ability
of arising to give rise to another. After explaining the previous verse (7.13) as
denying the possibility of arising giving rise to itself, he now reads 7.14 as
45
More technically, utpadyate could be translated here as ‘‘is made to arise.’’ I believe that the standard
meaning of ‘‘to arise’’ (see, for instance, ut-pad in Monier-Williams Sanskrit dictionary: ‘‘to arise, rise,
originate, be born or produced’’) is better suited to this verse. For other occurrences in the MMK where
utpadyate means simply ‘‘to arise’’ see MMK 7.17, 17.21.
46
Ye Shaoyong (2007a, p. 150): vyākhyātam
:.
123
supplying the complementary argument that arising cannot give rise to another.
Introducing the verse he states that ‘‘at the same time, (arising) cannot give rise to
another, as (Nāgārjuna) makes the argument that. . .’’47 Following the verse,
Candrakı̄rti states that:
If something were to arise, then arising would make it arise. But nothing arises
in all three times, because arising does not come to be. This has been
explained earlier by (the analysis of) gamyamāna, gata, and agata.48
For Candrakı̄rti, utpadyamānam : , utpannam : and anutpannam : refer to the ‘‘some-
thing’’ (kim: cit, tat) to which ‘‘arising’’ (utpādo) is supposed to give rise (utpādayet).
They cannot arise since arising cannot take place in any of them, just as movement
cannot take place on the gata, agata or gamyamāna. Indeed, the allusion to 2.1
consists most of Candrakı̄rit’s gloss of the verse. But this supposedly innocuous
presentation of the verse produces an effect similar to Candrakı̄rti’s reading of
3.3, since the verse now speaks of ‘‘otherness’’; utpadyamānam : , utpannam : and
anutpannam : no longer refer to the conditioned thing whose arising is analyzed in the
chapter, but are now the objects of the action of arising. They are the ‘‘other’’ to
which arising is supposed to give rise. Thus Candrakı̄rti concludes by stating that
‘‘therefore, arising giving rise to another is unreasonable’’ (tasmād utpādah: param
utpādayatı̄ti na yuktam : ).
We must note that Candrakı̄rti’s emphasis on ‘‘otherness’’ is not unfounded; the
difference between Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti, in this case, is subtle. The question
of whether arising gives rise to another is obviously part of what is under discussion,
as is made clear by the example of light lighting itself and another, which itself is
similar to the previous examples of sight seeing itself and another and fire burning
itself and another. Viewing 7.13 as a refutation of arising giving rise to itself, and
7.14 as a refutation of its giving rise to another, also makes good enough sense. In
reading 7.14 as complementing 7.13 by showing that arising can not give rise to
another, Candrakı̄rti is also no more than reapplying the position of some of his
earlier Madhyamaka predecessors.49
Nevertheless, it seems that Candrakı̄rti, influenced by his understanding of MMK
2.1, employs a stronger notion of ‘‘otherness’’ than the one suggested by the text.
For Nāgārjuna, the term ‘‘other’’ does not even appear in verses 13 and 14, and the
focus of his discussion is on the possibility of intrinsic validation for arising. For
him, 7.14 states that there is nothing that can arise, since there is no coherent
definition for the relation between an arising thing and its own arising. Again, the
focus is on the subject. The recall of the path from MMK 2.1 gives Candrakı̄rti’s
commentary on 7.14 a light but noteworthy twist: the verse now speaks of the
‘‘other’’ that cannot be made to arise by arising. In any case, regarding our interest
in MMK 2.1, we can note that again the context in which the verse is quoted refers
47
LVP 157.12: idānı̄m : param api yathā notpādayati tathā pratipādayann āha /.
48
LVP 158: 1-2: yadi hi kim : cid utpadyeta tad utpāda utpādayet / na tu kim
: cid utpadyate ‘dhva-traye
‘py utpādāsam
: bhavāt / etac ca gamyamāna-gatāgataih: prāg evoktam : //.
49
See in Buddhapālita’s commentary leading up to the verse in D 190.2.4 (skyes bas gzhan skyed par
byed do), which is nearly identical in this section to the Akutobhayā (D 46.1.3). Interestingly, Bhava-
viveka does not incorporate this understanding into his commentary on the verse (D 106.1.7ff.).
123
394 E. Shulman
to the relation between a subject and its action, and that the notion at stake is that of
self-validation.
The third time Nāgārjuna quotes the analysis of gamyamāna-gata-agata is in chapter

10 of the MMK, where he discusses the relation between fire and indhana, the action of
kindling or burning (indhana). The translation of the action noun indhana is crucial to
understanding the chapter. Indhana can refer both to the action of kindling or burning,
or to what is being burned and provides fire’s sustenance—the fuel, the wood or the
grass. The Tibetan translation of indhana as bud shing has emphasized the second of
these meanings, and has clearly inspired translators to understand indhana as referring
to the wood or the fuel being burned.51 The understanding of indhana as ‘‘what is being
burned,’’ rather than as ‘‘the action of kindling/burning,’’ leads the chapter into
philosophical concerns that are similar to the ones which interest Candrakı̄rti in his
commentary of MMK 2.1. Candrakı̄rti understands 2.1 as discussing the relation
between the foot and the path, and here we are lead to a discussion of the relation
between fire and its sphere of operation.
The opening verse of the chapter makes it evident that MMK 10 is dealing with
the relation between fire and the action of burning, and not with the relation between
fire and the thing being burned:
MMK 10.1ab If the action of burning is fire itself, (that would imply)
identity of agent and action.
yad indhanam : sa ced agnir ekatvam
: kartr: -karaman: oh: /
Naturally, here, fire (agni) represents the agent (kartr: ), while indhana represents the
action (karman).52 Hence, the main thrust of the argument in this chapter must
50
I thank Gary Tubb and Alex Cherniack for their assistance in analyzing the grammatical questions that
are crucial for understanding the argument in this section, especially instrumental with regard to the
question discussed in note 52.
51
See, for inastance, Inada (1993) who translates ‘‘wood’’ and Garfield (1995) who translates ‘‘fuel.’’
And see Tsongkhapa’s commentary to the MMK, who in MMK 10.1 (see below) understands ‘‘fuel’’ to
be the ‘‘object’’ of fire (see translation in Garfield and Samten 2006, p. 251).
52
This reading is supported by the Tibetan translation: bud shing gang de me yin na / byed pa po dang
las gcig gyur. Nevertheless, the question is more complex, since kartr: -karamn: oh: , could refer not only to
the agent and the action, but also to the agent and the object (see, for instance, in the entry for ‘‘karman’’
in Monier-Williams’ Dictionary). What this means is that the Tibetan translation may not have been
sensitive enough to the grammatical context, and that this verse, which initially appears to be a
straightforward expression of the reading of Nāgārjuna I am suggesting, may actually support Cand-
rakı̄rti’s point that goes back to the foot not being able to step on the path. A close reading of the
discussion in chapter 10, especially of verses 4 and 13, leads to the conclusion that the Tibetan translators
were indeed correct in translating karma as las, ‘‘action.’’ See the discussion of these verses below.
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involve the relation between fire and the action of burning or of igniting the fire.53
MMK 10’s basic claim is that fire and indhana cannot be conceived of as being the
same or as being different.54 The two are so inconceivable apart that they cannot
even be understood as existing in dependence on each other.55 MMK 10.1 demands
us to accept that Nāgārjuna is making an argument about the relation between agent
and action, exemplified here through fire and the action of burning. Thus, although
the same logic may apply to the relation between fire and what it burns, the burned
thing is not directly being addressed.
Verse 13 is also important for our concerns, for two main reasons. First,
Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 for the third time. Second, this verse clarifies the
meaning of indhana. Following the denial of fire and indhana existing in depen-
dence or without dependence on each other in 10.12, Nāgārjuna states:
MMK 10.13 Fire does not come from anywhere else. Fire is not in kindling
(indhana). the rest regarding the action of burning has been explained by (the
analysis of) gamyamāna, gata and agata.
āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane ‘gnir na vidyate /
atrendhane śes: am uktam
: gamyamānagatāgataih: //
Nāgārjuna is wondering where fire comes from, saying that it cannot be in the action
of kindling itself. The question, in effect, is how fire begins, since if it is already in
kindling, then again—how did it begin?56 What the reference to MMK 2.1 adds to
this statement is yet unclear, but surely the notion of the path being or not being
walked on seems out of place. The question, as in MMK 3.3 and 7.14, is how the
subject has come to possess his action or function.
That indhana refers to the action of kindling is made clear also in verse 4 of the
chapter:
53
Metaphorically, Nāgārjuna is speaking in this chapter about the relation between the Self and the
aggregates. This idea is nicely expressed by Candrakı̄rti (LVP 204.1-3), as well as by Nāgārjuna himself
in the penultimate verse of the chapter. Nāgārjuna is building on the familiar Buddhist connotation of the
well-known āditta-pariyāya-sutta (Sam: yutta-Nikāya iii,19). Indhana, or the plural indhanāni referred to
in verse 14 of the chapter, are, again, not the things burned by the fire, but rather the aggregates, in the
sense of the ‘‘masses of burning’’ which cause experience to be painful.
54
MMK 10.1-4,14.
55
The heart of the argument in chapter 10 is that fire and the action of burning cannot exist in depen-
dence on each other, since one is needed to exist independently of the other in order that the other can rely
on it:
10.8 If fire depends on burning, and burning depends on fire, which one of them is arisen before (the
other) so that fire or burning depends on it?
yadı̄ndhanam apeks: yāgnir apeks: yāgnim : yadı̄ndhanam : / katarat pūrva-nis: pannam : yad apeks: yāgnir
indhanam //
10.10 The thing that is established in dependence—regarding that very thing that it is established in
dependence on, if that which is to be depended on must be established—what depends on what?
yo ‘peks: ya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpeks: ya sidhyati / yadi yo ‘peks: itavya sa sidhyatām
: kam apeksya kah: //
For a broader discussion of Nāgārjuna’s arguments against relational or dependent existence, see Shul-
man (2007 [2009], section 3).
56
This understanding of the discussion of fire and indhana as based on the question ‘‘how is fire
kindled?’’ explains Buddhapālita’s apparently odd definition of fire and indhana as ‘‘what is to be
kindled’’, and ‘‘kindling’’ respectively (see p. 14 above).
123
396 E. Shulman
MMK 10.4 Here, if it were true that what is being kindled (idhyamāna) is
kindling (indhana) (itself)—by what would kindling be kindled if it was only
that?
tatraitat syād idhyamānam indhanam : bhavatı̄ti cet /
kenedhyatām indhanam : tat tāvan-mātram idam: yadā //
In verses 1–3 Nāgārjuna was at pain to enumerate the consequences of fire and
indhana being the same or different. The problem of identity was referred to above,
in 10.1ab. 10.1cd-10.3 treat the question of relation in difference, the main problems
being the fact that fire would ‘‘burn forever’’ (nitya-pradı̄pta eva syād), would ‘‘be
kindled without a cause’’ (apradı̄pana-hetukah: ), its ‘‘renewed beginning would be
pointless’’ (punar-ārambha-vaiyarthyam : ), and its being ‘‘lacking an executor’’
(akarmaka). These definitions themselves attest that Nāgārjuna is concerned with
the question of the lighting of fire.
The question of whether indhana is the idhyamāna (‘‘what is being kindled’’),
introduced in verse 4, makes it obvious that indhana does not refer to what is being
kindled or burned, and can only refer to the action of kindling itself. If indhana
referred to the object of the action of kindling, the question if it is the idhyamāna
would be meaningless. MMK 10.4 demands the translation of indhana as ‘‘the
action of kindling’’ also since if indhanam is ‘‘what is being kindled,’’ we are left
with no ‘‘kindling’’ to light the fire. What MMK 10.1-4 are asking is whether fire or
the action of kindling are ‘‘what is being kindled,’’ a question very near to the one
asked by chapter 7 regarding the arising of arising.
While for Nāgārjuna chapter 10 speaks of the relation between agent and action,
the allusion to MMK 2.1 again causes Candrakı̄rti to alter the context of the verse
that quotes it (10.13). He thus defines indhana as the object of fire, the dahyamāna,
‘‘what is being burned.’’57 This gloss seems to be in conflict with Nāgārjuna’s
refutation of indhana as being the idhyamāna in 10.4. Candrakı̄rti then again
composes a verse modeled on MMK 2.1:
The burned (in the past) is not being burned, and the un-burned is certainly not
being burned. The thing-being- burned, apart from the burned and the
un-burned, is not being burned.
dagdham: na dahyate tāvad adagdham : naiva dahyate /
58
dagdhādagdha-vinirmuktam : dahyamānam : na dahyate //
Although Candrakı̄rti says little about MMK 10.14, it is clear that he reads the verse
along the lines of his understanding of MMK 2.1. The reference to the object of the
action obscures Nāgārjuna’s statement regarding the relation between a subject and
his action. Although the modeling of the verses on MMK 2.1 is elegant, it is, once
again, misleading, referring to the object instead ot to the subject of the action.
57
LVP 211.8: agninendhanam : dahyamānam upalabhata ity atrendhana-prastāve śes: am : dūs: an: am
:
gamyamāna-gatāgata-dūs: an: ena samam: veditavyam
: . ‘‘’It is perceived that indhana is what is being
burned by fire.’ Here, regarding the topic of indhana, all faults should be understood in accord with the
faults relating to gamyamāna-gatāgata.’’
58
LVP 211.10-11.
123
The final instance in which Nāgārjuna relates to his discussion of gamyamāna, gata
and agata appears in chapter 16 of the MMK that argues for the impossibility of
liberation. The central problem Nāgārjuna addresses is that there is no-one who can
be ‘‘bound’’ to, or transmigrate in sam : sāra. In the opening verses of the chapter
Nāgarjuna examines the options of a being (sattva), a person (pudgala), or karmic
inclinations (sam
: skārā) transmigrating, denying them all. In verse 6 he raises and
refutes the option that the act of binding is upādāna, ‘‘attachment’’ or ‘‘appropri-
ation’’ (bandhanam : ced upādānam : ), referring by this term mainly to the five
aggregates.59 Nāgārjuna refutes this possibility by stating that what has upādāna
does not become bound (sopādāna na badhyate), and that what does not have
upādāna doesn’t become bound either (badhyate nānupādānah: ). ‘‘Then having
what state does one become bound?’’ (kim avastho ‘tha badhyate), he asks.
In verse 7 Nāgārjuna states:
MMK 16.7 If, as you wish, the action of binding could bind, it would exist
prior to what would be bound. And this isn’t so. The rest has been explained
by (the analysis of) gamyamāna, gata and agata.
badhnı̄yād bandhanam : kāmam: bandhyāt pūrvam
: bhaved yadi /
na cāsti tat ches: am uktam: gamyamāna-gatāgataih: //
We have one more argument in full agreement with the one made in the three
previous quotations of MMK 2.1. Once again, the question is whether the action of
binding can exist in and of itself. Only such a binding could really bind the person to
be bound (badhya). In the present case, Nāgārjuna asserts that this would mean that
the action would have to exist prior to, i.e. apart from, the person being bound. This,
of course, ‘‘isn’t so’’ (na cāsti tat): Binding lacks self-reference and thus cannot
bind the person to be bound. Although the person to be bound can be considered the
object of the action of binding, the central concern once more is that of the relation
between the subject and his action or properties. The question is if there is some way
by which a subject’s definition of being bound to sam : sāra can be achieved.
Commenting on the verse, Candrakı̄rti again composes a verse inspired by MMK
2.1:
The bound (in the past) is not being bound, and the un-bound is certainly not
being bound. The thing-being-bound, apart from the bound and the un- bound,
is not being bound.
baddho na badhyate tāvad abaddho naiva badhyate /
baddhābaddha-vinirmukto badhyamāno na badhyate //60
Candrakı̄rti adds nothing to this statement that makes any reference to the path to be
traversed. Indeed, it would be odd, since it is clear that baddha, abaddha and
badhyamāna all relate to the subject who may be characterized as being bound.
There is actually nothing in this formulation that leaves any scent of ‘‘otherness’’ in
59
Candrakı̄rti glosses sopādāna as bhāva, commonly defined as ‘‘the five aggregates’’.
60
LVP 292.3-4.
123
398 E. Shulman
the sense implied by the path. It is clear that the discussion concerns the relation
between a subject and the action that defines him or her as a subject.
An Interim Summary
The preceding discussion has made one central claim—that Candrakı̄rti grants the
verses in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 a meaning unbefitting their context.
The focus of these verses is on the question of self-validation for subjective
action—is it possible for the subject or his action to exist in and of himself? The
understanding Nāgārjuna wishes to develop is that there is no self-referential sub-
jective element, and therefore that the action cannot relate to the object of the action
as well. But for Candrakı̄rti, these verses are not about the subject but concern the
object of the action, which cannot be affected by the action because of problems that
involve its own self-definition. It is because there is no object to be worked upon
that an action cannot take place, since the action cannot affect an object that has
already been affected in the past or one that has not yet been affected. For Cand-
rakı̄rti, the fundamental reasoning of these arguments rests on the notion that there is
no object to be affected by the present action, since no object exists aside from the
one affected in the past and the one yet to be affected.
Candrakı̄rti’s is a strict logic with a strong Zeno-like scent: There exist only two
diametrically opposed options that both clearly do not work. Candrakı̄rti bases his
understanding on his reading of MMK 2.1: The field of inquiry—the path—is
divided into two mutually exclusive parts that are supposed to fully exhaust all
possibilities regarding the locus of the action, in this case movement. The path is
separated into what-has-already-been-moved-upon (gata) and what-has-not-yet-
been-moved-upon (agata). This leaves, he believes, no place (and no time as well)
in which movement can take place. Without the strict dichotomy between the parts
of the path to have already been moved on and yet to have been moved on, the
argument collapses. Indeed it is the strict logical assumption that there can be no
part of the path other than gata and agata that is the heart of the argument.
Candrakı̄rti then proceeds to project this logic into the contexts in which Nāgārjuna
relates to MMK 2.1 later in the text, stating that there is nothing that can be seen
(ch. 3), made to arise (ch. 7), burned (ch. 10) or bound (ch. 16).
That Candrakı̄rti’s is a forceful articulation of Madhyamaka vision is granted.
Whether this was Nāgārjuna’s argument appears less certain. We shall next proceed
to examine the verse that is the core of our discussion, MMK 2.1, and to ask if
Candrakı̄rti’s reading of it is reliable.
MMK 2.1 in Context
Chapter 2 of the MMK has already received ample scholarly attention. In a recent
edition of this journal, Westerhoff (2008) summed up much of the discussion and
123
defined the basic arguments developed by Nāgārjuna in the chapter.61 Earlier, Loy
(1999) supplied a lucid expositon of the central concerns of the chapter. For both
these authors, the main issue addressed in MMK 2 is the relation between properties
and the individuals instantiating them (Westerhoff), or between substance and
attribute or subject and predicate (Loy). Following our analysis of the verses in
which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1, this conclusion seems quite natural. Never-
theless, both Loy and Westerhoff, as well as many other scholars,62 accept Cand-
rakı̄rti’s reading of the first verse of the chapter, a reading that does not express, or
at least expresses very coarsely, the central problems they both identify as being
treated by the text.
The opening verse of chapter 2 is complex, and it is for good reason that so much
scholarly effort has been invested in the attempt to decipher its meaning. The main
problem is that the verse can be interpreted in many different ways. For simplicity’s
sake, I will disregard the translations that run into too much trouble.63 The Sanskrit
reads as follows:
gatam : na gamyate tāvad agatam : naiva gamyate /
gatāgata-vinirmuktam : gamyamānam : na gamyate //
The verse speaks of three ‘‘non-movements’’: those of gata, agata and gamyamāna.
These three are all said to na gamyate—which can mean either ‘‘to be moved,’’ or
‘‘to be moved upon’’.64 It is evident that gata, agata and gamyamāna are all passive
participles, and that they form a continuum representing past, present and future
movement. Most simply, gata must be ‘‘what has moved in the past,’’ or, more
precisely, ‘‘what has been made to move in the past,’’ or it may be ‘‘what has been
moved upon.’’ Agata must be ‘‘what has not yet been made to move’’ or ‘‘what has
not been moved upon.’’ Gamyamāna will be the correlate of gata and agata in the
present tense—‘‘what is being moved / moved upon.’’65
61
See also in Westerhoff (2009, ch. 6).
62
All the works mentioned in note 10 above translate 2.1 according to Candrakı̄rti’s reading of the verse.
63
Gary Tubb has pointed out to me (private communication) that this verse could also be seen as a bhāve
prayoga (in this case, when a verb of motion has no direct object in the accusative, it can speak of the
action itself). Although reading the verse in this way makes good sense regarding 2.1 itself, I believe it is
mistaken in relation to the way the chapter develops. The problem concerns the important expression
gamyamānasya gamanam : that implies a dual movement (see the discussion of verses 3–6 below). If we
accept the bhāve prayoga reading, this expression would refer to ‘‘the present movement of the action of
movement.’’ To state that two movements are involved in such a case seems like stretching the argument
beyond reason.
Garfield’s (1995) translation of the verse, although philosophically coherent and similar in some
respects to the reading of the verse I will suggest, is not attested by the Sanskrit, as he translates the
corresponding Tibetan term of gamyamāna (bgom) as ‘‘movement.’’
64
I read na gamyate as a passive present tense verb in third person singular. Another possible
option—although highly unlikely—is as an irregular usage of the root gam in the 4th conjungtion, and
thus as an active verb ‘‘to move.’’ The third and last na gamyate is understood by the Madhyamaka
commentarial tradition as corresponding to avagamyate, ‘‘is not known.’’ I accept Mabbett’s (1984,
pp. 407–408) questioning of this reading, and agree that it makes better sense to understand this last na
gamyate as identical in meaning to the two that precede it in the verse.
65
The temporal aspect is unessential to the meaning of gata, agata and gamyamāne and is here intro-
duced only for the sake of clarity. Gata, agata and gamyamāna can just as well be ‘‘what has been /has
not been / is being made to move (or moved upon),’’ respectively.
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400 E. Shulman
Candrakı̄rti’s commentary opts for the second reading suggested: For him, gata,
agata and gamyamāna are ‘‘what has been / has not been / is being moved upon,’’
respectively. For Candrakı̄rti, MMK 2.1 states that movement cannot take place
because of the inability of the path to receive motion. The problem lies in the
locus of action, not in the action itself. Although this reading of the verse is
grammatically plausible, such an interpretation is at odds with the way the chapter
develops. Two observations are of primary importance for this understanding:
First, verses 3–6 make it clear that gamyamāna does not relate to ‘‘what is being
moved upon,’’ but relates rather to the subject of motion. Therefore, also gata and
agata should not be understood as relating to what has been or has not yet been
moved upon.66 Next, verses 12–17 use the terms gamyamāna and gantr: , ‘‘the
mover,’’ interchangeably, and therefore gamyamāna must refer to the agent, rather
than to the locus of motion.
The second verse introduces an objection raised by an opponent who realizes that
Nāgārjuna has just attempted a complete refutation of motion:
MMK 2.2 Where there is action, there is movement, and it is in the
gamyamāna, rather than in the gata or the agata. Therefore movement is in the
gamyamāna.
ces: :tā yatra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sā yatah: /
na gate nāgate ces: :tā gamyamāne gatis tatah: //
This verse could fit well with Candrakı̄rti’s commentary, since gamyamāne is in the
locative, which could imply that movement (gati) is on the gamyamāna. But this
reading seems unlikely in light of Nāgārjuna’s response:
MMK 2.3 How will it be reasonable for there to be movement of the
gamyamāna, when there can certainly be no gamyamāna devoid of movement?
gamyamānasya gamanam : katham: nāmopapatsyate /
gamyamānam: vigamanam : yadā naivopapadyate //
This verse clarifies the meaning of gamyamāna in the chapter: The gamyamāna is
something that must be able to possess movement, since the question is if there is
movement of the gamyamāna. Nāgārjuna is troubled by one main concern: does it
make any sense to say gamyamānasya gamanam, that is to attribute movement to
the gamyamāna. Thus, it is preferable to read gamyamāna as ‘‘the mover’’ (or ‘‘the
moving thing’’67) rather than ‘‘what is being moved upon.’’68
Evidently, the idea that the gamyamāna would lack movement (would be viga-
manam : ) is meant to be absurd. As talented as the Mādhyamika conceptual trapeze
66
See also the introduction of Candrakı̄rti’s reading in ‘‘Candrakı̄rti on MMK 2.1’’ section above.
67
Although there is a distinction between ‘‘the mover’’ and ‘‘the moving thing’’ that may be relevant to
certain aspects of MMK 2, I will refer to the gamyamāna here as ‘‘the mover,’’ using the term to refer
more generally to the subject of motion.
68
Here it is worth recalling a popular methodological principle in the study of Madhyamaka thought,
employed by authors such as Arnold (2005: introduction, esp. 7–8) and Westerhoff (2009, p. 8). This is
the principle of charity that we are to effect the best rational reconstruction of the argument that the text
allows.
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artist may be, he will never manage to convince us that paths can move, or that they
possess movement. While there is no real problem of attributing non-movement to
the path, the attribution of non-movement to the mover is indeed curious. This
reading is in complete accord with Loy’s and Westerhoff’s understanding of the
central concern of the chapter, since both these authors speak of the relation
between a subject and his properties, specifically his action. This understanding is
also in full agreement with the instances in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1,
discussed above. Finally, we clearly do not wish to claim that gamyamāna has
different meanings in verses 1 and 3 of the same chapter.69
Nāgārjuna continues to address the problem of gamyamānasya gamanam, ‘‘the
movement of the mover,’’ in the next verse:
MMK 2.4 For whom there is movement of the gamyamāna, there will follow
a gamyamāna without movement.70 The gamyamāna, though, is the one being
moved (/upon).
gamyamānasya gamanam : yasya tasya prasajyate /
r: te gater gamyamānam
: gamyamānam : hi gamyate //
This verse emphasizes the point made in verse 3, that for there to be any meaning to
the fact that there is movement of the gamyamāna, there must be a possibility of
there being a gamyamāna without movement. Otherwise, what does it mean to say
that the mover moves, or that the mover possesses movement? Again, this argument
is best understood as referring to the mover, rather than to the path—if it is a mover
in any real sense of the word (certainly in a svabhāvic sense), the movement must
already be part of the mover.
Furthermore, for Nāgārjuna, if there is a meaningful distinction between the
mover and his movement, between the subject and his action, this means that there
must be two movements involved:
MMK 2.5 When there is movement of the gamyamāna, two movements
must be involved: the one by which he is a gamyamāna, and the one which is
(his) movement.
gamyamānasya gamane prasaktam : gamana-dvayam : /
yena tad gamyamānam : ca yac cātra gamanam : punah: //
69
Some scholars are indeed consistent in regarding the gamyamāna of verses 3–5 as referring to the path
that is being traversed. See Bhattacharya (1985), Loy (1999, p. 247) and Mabbett (1984, pp. 10–11).
Westerhoff (2008, pp. 458–465, 2009, ch. 6) is a peculiar case, as he is quite consistent in translating
gamyamāna as ‘‘the presently traversed space’’ in the verses of MMK 2 he quotes, but in commenting on
them renders the same term as ‘‘the presently moving object.’’ In fact, Westerhoff’s perplexity can be
seen as a lucid expression of the two facts that (a) reading the gamyamāna as referring to the moving
subject makes much better sense, while (b) Candrakı̄rti’s commentary exerts immense influence on the
minds of Madhyamaka scholars.
70
Gamanam and gati are interchangeable for Nāgārjuna in this chapter, as evidenced by verse 20.
123
402 E. Shulman
This argument again emphasizes that we are speaking of the relation between the
mover and movement, and not between the movement and the path. The path does
not move, and no problem of a dual movement seriously needs to be contemplated
with respect to it. Once more, the idea relates to the mover: if a mover is a mover, he
must possess movement by his very definition. At the same time, we still want to say
that a mover moves, that he possesses movement. This is necessary in order for
there to be a beginning or a stopping of motion, and in order to avoid the problem of
a perpetual motion, problems Nāgārjuna will address later on in the chapter. This
then means that mover and motion must have meaning on their very own. The
outcome is that we are speaking of two movements, one of the mover, the other of
movement itself. Therefore we are now in need of two movers as well:
MMK 2.6 When there follow two movements, two movers must follow.
Movement without a mover obviously doesn’t make sense.
dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamana-dvaye /
gantāram
: hi tiraskr: tya gamanam
: nopapadyate //
At this point, the term gamyamāna is replaced by the term gantr: , literally the subject
or the agent of movement. This change points to the fact that our concern is with the
relation between the agent and the action, or between the subject of movement and
his movement.71 This also allows Nāgārjuna, in verses 8–11, to phrase his question
using an active form of the verb—can the mover move? (gantā gacchati).72
It is true that the argument can be made that much of the context of the discussion
is grammatical,73 and that the overall question can be defined as whether there can
71
The relation between the mover and movement is a direct concern of verse 7 as well:
If a movement without a mover is unreasonable, there being no movement—how will there be a mover?
gantāram: cet tiraskr: tya gamanam
: nopapadyate / gamane ‘sati gantātha kuta eva bhavis: yati //.
72
I quote 2.11 as an example:
Two movements are implied if the mover moves: the one by which he manifests as a mover, and being a
mover, the one by which he moves.
gamane dve prasajyete gantā yady uta gacchati / ganteti cājyate yena gantā san yac ca gacchati //.
73
Bhattacharya (1980, esp. 89–90) has convincingly pointed to a possible grammatical context for the
analysis of the dual movement in MMK 2.5,6, i.e. Patañjali’s discussion of Pān: ini II,3,1 (anabhihite, for a
fuller exposition see Cardona 1974, pp. 275–278). Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the discussion
of anabhihite, although similar in some respects to the questions that interest Nāgārjuna, does indeed
frame the discussion in MMK 2. Of interest for our discussion is the notion that in the sentence āsana āste
the implicit subject of the locative verbal noun āsane is the act of sitting itself. Nonetheless, Nāgārjuna’s
gamyamāna is clearly of a different category, as Bhattacharya himself states. In fact, what may be more
significant for the present analysis is the notion referred in passing by Bhattacharya, that the action
conveyed by the verbal root gam is defined as being situated in the agent (p. 89). See also Bhattacharya
(1985, esp. 10–12).
123
be such ‘‘things’’ that correspond to the grammatical terms used in a sentence.74 In

this sense, it could also be reasoned that there is no difference between the
understanding of gamyamāna as referring to the mover or to the path being tra-
versed, since in any case the term instantiates the verbal root gam. We must reply,
though, that the argument is not only grammatical, and that Nāgārjuna is discussing
the nature of words mainly as representations, or possibly better, as ‘‘presentations’’
of ‘‘reality.’’ Under any consideration, the argument formulates in verses 3-6 of
chapter 2 are much more convincing if they relate to the relation between the mover
and his movement than if they relate to the relation between the movement and the
path.
Verses 12–19 strengthen the identification between gamyamāna and the gantr: or
the moving thing. In verses 12–14, gamyamāna again appears as part of the triad
gata-agata-gamyamāna. Here Nāgārjuna addresses the problem of the beginning of
motion. It is said that movement cannot begin in any of the three, the gata, the
agata, or the gamyamāna.75 It is true that this statement could easily be read in the
‘‘Candrakı̄ritian’’ way, as denying the possibility of movement starting in the three
parts of the path. But following the questions regarding the movement of the gantr:
in verse 8–11, it is more natural to assume that Nāgarjuna is saying that movement
does not commence in what has moved, what has not moved, or what is moving;
There is no-one who can begin to move. This idea is enforced by verses 15 and 16,
74
Oetke (2004, pp. 84–89) has challenged Bronkhhorst’s (1997) understanding of the dual-movement
discussed in MMK 2 as part of a larger scaled discussion of the nature of Nāgārjuna’s argument. For
Oetke, Bronkhorst misconstrues Nāgārjuna’s argument, stating that it is based on a ‘‘correspondence
principle’’ that demands a full correlation between word and reality. For Oetke, the problem lies rather in
there being a ‘‘verb-related’’ and a ‘‘noun-related’’ movement at one and the same time.
I believe that Bronkhorst is actually making a relevant point, and that the debate between the two
scholars may be semantic. If I understand Bronkhorst correctly, his ‘‘correspondence principle’’ is a way
to say that if a word has meaning, there must be something in reality that corresponds to it. This means
that when there is a ‘‘goer’’ and a ‘‘going’’ at the same time, as when it is said that ‘‘the goer goes,’’ there
must be two movements involved. Bronkhorst’s statement should be understood together with his
remarkably clear definition of Nāgārjuna’s interest in language: ‘‘. . .Nāgārjuna’s arguments concern the
phenomenal world, not language. Since, however, he believed that the phenomenal world is determined
by language, his arguments are based on certain linguistic features’’ (p. 32). Thus the term ‘‘corre-
spondence’’ is somewhat misleading, since there is no objective reality to which language conforms.
Words are reality itself, and hence the problem of the dual movement.
To my mind, Oekes’s definition of the problem amounts to not much more than a spelling out of
Bronkhorst’s statement, stressing the fact that the problem lies in the connection between nouns and
verbs, which must both be characterized by the same movement. It is worth noting as well that
Bronkhorst’s articulation of the argument seems very well suited for explaining MMK 7.17, which Oetke
is sure it does not (p. 89–91). Indeed, what Nāgārjuna seems to be stating rather humorously in this verse,
is precisely the point defined by Bronkhorst—there must be something anutpanna that could arise,
otherwise it is already arisen. Better said, there must be such a ‘‘thing’’ that would correspond to the word
anutpanna in order that something could arise.
75
2.12 Moving does not begin in what has been moved, unmoved, or in what is being moved. Where
does moving begin?
gate nārabhyate gantum: gantum: nārabhyate ‘gate / nārabhyate gamyamāne gantum ārabhyate kuha //
2.13 Before moving begins, there is no moved or being made-to-move where movement could
begin—is there movement in what has not-yet-moved?
prāg asti gamanārambhād gamyamānam : na vā gatam / yatrārabhyeta gamanam agate gamanam : kutah: //
2.14 When the commencement of movement is not seen at all—what moved thing, what unmoved
thing, what thing-being-moved is imagined?
gatam: kim : gamyamānam: kim agatam: kim: vikalpyate / adr: śyamāna ārambhe gamanasya sarvathā //.
123
404 E. Shulman
where Nāgārjuna supplies the parallel argument regarding the cessation of motion.
In this pair of verses he states that it is neither the mover (gantā) nor the non-mover
(agantā), nor any third possibility (anyo kas tr: tı̄yo) which may stand or stop to move
(tis: :thati).76 The fact that Nāgārjuna addresses the commencement of movement
with the triad gata-agata-gamyamāna, and the parallel case of the stopping of
motion with the triad gantr: -agantr: -anya, strengthens the identification between
gamyamāna and gantr: , which both must be translated as ‘‘the mover.’’ Note also the
precise phrasing of 2.15, which is an obvious parallel to 2.1: gantā na tis: :thati tāvad
agantā naiva tis: :thati / anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tr: tı̄yo ‘tha tis: :thati. The first line
of this verse is an exact replica of the first line of 2.1, exchanging gantā for gata,
agantā for agata, and tis: :thati for gamyate. The second line of 2.15, phrased as a
question, is in full conceptual correspondence to the second line of 2.1.
Then, once again, in verse 17, Nāgārjuna returns to use the terms gata-agata-
gamyamāna:
MMK 2.17 Movement, apart from the mover, apart from what has moved,
and apart from what has not moved, does not stop. Commencement and
cessation of motion are the same.
na tis: :thate gamyamānān na gatān nāgatād api /
gamanam : sam
: pravr: ttiś ca nivr: ttiś ca gateh: samā //
Nāgārjuna moves back and forth between the terms gata-agata-gamyamāna and
gantr: -agantr: -anya, demanding us to accept that these terms are interchangeable.
Nāgārjuna then supports our reading by explicitly stating in 2.17 that ‘‘com-
mencement and cessation of motion are the same,’’ underscoring the identification
between the terms he uses to refer to the subjects who begin or cease to move. The
fact that the question under discussion is whether the mover and the movement are
the same or different is made clear by the next verse:
MMK 2.18 It is unreasonable that movement and the mover are one and the
same. That movement and the mover are different is unreasonable as well.
yad eva gamanam: gantā sa eveti na yujyate /
anya eva punar gantā gater iti na yujyate //
Notice that Nāgārjuna has returned once more to the term gantr: . That we are
speaking of the relation between agent and action, and not between the action and
the locus of the action, is again emphasized in the following verse:
MMK 2.19 If movement and the mover were one and the same, it would
follow that agent and action are one and the same thing.
yad eva gamanam : gantā sa eva hi bhaved yadi /
ekı̄bhāvah: prasajyeta kartuh: karman: a eva ca //
76
2.15 A mover does not stop, a non-mover does not stop / who is the third apart from the mover and
non-mover who will stop?
gantā na tis: :thate tāvad agantā naiva tis: :thati / anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tr: tı̄yo ‘tha tis: :thati //
2.16 How will it be reasonable that ‘the mover’ stops, so long as a mover without movement is
unreasonable?
gantā tāvat tis: :thatı̄ti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate //.
123
It is vividly clear that the major question addressed by the chapter involves the
relation between agent and action. Read in this way, the chapter achieves a far more
coherent and unified form, and it articulates a stronger argument. In verses 24–25,
Nāgārjuna sums up his argument:
MMK 2.24-25ab A real mover does not move any of the three-modal
movements.77 Neither does an unreal (mover), nor a real and unreal one move
any of the three-modal movements.
sad-bhūto gamanam : gantā tri-prakāram : na gacchati /
nāsad-bhūto ‘pi gamanam: tri-prakāram: sa gacchati //
gamanam : sad-asad-bhūtah: tri-prakāram: na gacchati /
Simply put, the discussion is summarized by saying that the mover is not moving a
movement. If anything, the movement, rather than the path, is the object unrealized
by the mover. The problem is between movement and itself, or between movement
and the mover. This means, however, also that there are no paths, or nothing to be
moved on:
MMK 2.25cd Therefore there is no movement, no mover, nothing to be
moved on.
tasmād gatiś ca gantā ca gantavyam
: ca na vidyate //
Like in chapter 3, Nāgārjuna concludes that once there is no self-referential vali-
dation for subjective action, there can be no object of the action as well.78 Because
there is no coherent definition for the relation between the mover and his movement,
there can also be no path on which movement can take place either.
We have found two good reasons for understanding gamyamāna as referring to
the agent of motion, i.e to that which is made to move: First, the discussion of the
problems involved in the phrase ‘‘the movement of the gamyamāna’’ in verses 3–6.
Second, the parallel use of the terms gamyamāna and gantr: in verses 12–19. There
is one more argument to add to these last two—in the four verses that Nāgārjuna
quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text (3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7), discussed at length in
the previous sections of this paper, the context of the discussion involves the
relation between an action and the subject that is qualified by it. This subject is a
parallel of MMK 2’s gamyamāna, who is a subject that is in one important respect
the object or function of his action: the subject must be made to possess his action,
and thus we speak of a passive agent, the gamyamāna or ‘‘he who is being made to
move.’’
We can now return to MMK 2.1, with good enough reason to translate gam-
yamāna as ‘‘the mover,’’ the subject who is supposed to contain movement. We may
assume, also, that in the first verse of the chapter, in which Nāgārjuna anticipates his
argument, he will speak of the problems he intends to discuss regarding the status of
the mover and his movement. Nāgārjuna is now saying that:
77
This ‘‘three-modal movement’’ (tri-prakāram: gamanam : ) could refer to movement conducted in the
past, present or future, but more probably refers to real (sad-bhūta), unreal and real-and-unreal move-
ments.
78
See especially verse 3.6 on p. 12 above.
123
406 E. Shulman
MMK 2.1 Now, what-has-been-made-to-move is not being made to move.

What-has-not-yet-been-made-to-move is surely not being made to move.
Apart from what-has-been-made-to-move and what-has-not-(yet)-been-made-
to-move, what-is-being-made-to-move is not being made to move.
A less technical, more communicative translation would read:
MMK 2.1 Now, what-has-moved does not move. What-has-not-yet-moved
surely does not move. The-moving-thing does not move apart from what-has-
moved and what-has-not-yet-moved.
Gamyamāna is now ‘‘the moving thing,’’ more specifically ‘‘what is being made to
move.’’ Accordingly, gata and agata are what has moved and what has not yet
moved. With this new rendering of the terms, let us proceed to appreciate the
argument.
In MMK 2.1, Nāgārjuna is not stating that there is no gamyamāna whatsoever,
but rather that there is no gamyamāna that is not connected to gata and agata. The
idea is that there is a gamyamāna only if it relates to, or contains, gata and agata,
that both express non-movement.79 A gamyamāna cannot be detached from gata
and agata (gata-agata-vinirmutkam : ). Being a gamyamāna means previously and
subsequently being agata and gata, which are both devoid of movement. Thus, in
order for there to be a gamyamāna, it must be self-contradictory, since it must rely
on both movement and non-movement; Movement’s very definition contains
aspects of non-movement. This statement anticipates not only the problem of
attributing non-movement to the mover, but also the ones of the commencement and
cessation of motion. Movement must, in fact, be a process which begins in non-
movement (agata), turns to movement (gamyamāna), and then returns to non-
movement (gata). Movement demands non-movement in order to make sense, and
the mover must transform himself into and out of states of motion and non-
motion.80
Aside from the fact that the idea expressed by Nāgārjuna is different from the one
made by Candrakı̄rti, it is probably more convincing as well. Candrakı̄rti’s point
demands the acceptance of the position that there is no place or time in which the
present movement can occur. This notion is well expressed be Garfield (1995,
79
There is obviously a difference in saying that gamyamāna ‘‘relates to’’ gata and agata, or that it
‘‘contains’’ them. Nonetheless, the fact that things are related means, for Nāgārjuna, that they in some
sense contain each other. See the arguments regarding ‘‘otherness’’ in MMK 14.5-6, and the arguments
regarding time in MMK 19.1-3.
80
Although questions of Nāgārjuna’s literary technique are beyond the scope of this paper, the similarity
between the function of MMK 2.1, as it has been presented here, and the function of MMK 1.1, is
striking. Both verses (1) offer a powerfully counter-intuitive statement, (2) Do not support this statement
with philosophical argument, and (3) anticipate the major arguments made in the chapters they open,
while the chapters are then devoted to fleshing out these statements.
It is also worth noting that when MMK 2.1 is understood in this way, Buddhapālita’s main statement
regarding the verse need not necessarily be read along the lines of Candrakı̄rti’s commentary. In fact,
Buddhapālita may be saying something quite similar to the point made here, that gamyamāna is unin-
telligible apart from gata and agata, and therefore that it cannot be a true concept: ‘‘[S]ince (the
gamyamāna) is not perceived apart from gata and agata, it is unreasonable. Therefore it does not exist,
and there is no movement.’’ For the Tibetan text and further assessment of Buddhapālita’s short com-
mentary on this verse, see note 17 above.
123
p. 354): ‘‘The present has no duration.’’81 Rather than relying on such a weighty
metaphysical assumption, Nāgārjuna’s point appears to be more palatable: Move-
ment must relate to non-movement, and thus non-movement becomes a property of
the mover. The statement in the second line of the verse should in fact be read as it
is stated—‘‘The moving thing does not move apart from what has moved and what
has not yet moved.’’ The mover cannot be detached from his own non-movement.
What kind of mover is he then?
Differences of Strategy Between Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti
The difference between Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti is similar to that between the
trickster and the theologian. One poses an enigma, echoing comic and perplexing
overtones; the other explains the enigma away with dry reasoning.82 Candrakı̄rti
supplies a strictly logical statement, which could be summarized as follows:
a. There is no movement on x or on non-x.
b. (Presumably, everything is either x nor non-x). Therefore,
c. There is no movement.
Nāgārjuna’s procedure is quite different:

a. Movement must relate to, or contains, non-movement by its very definition.
Therefore,
b. Movement is paradoxical and self-contradictory, and hence
c. There is no movement in any real sense.
Although the conclusions are very similar, possibly even identical, the arguments
are very different. Candrakı̄rti’s argument relies heavily on the assumption that
every part of the path must be gata or agata and on the idea that movement can take
place in neither one of them. It is a black and white, yes or no argument, aimed at
inducing a strong sense of logical certainty. The conclusion is firm—there is no
movement.
Nāgārjuna’s argument proceeds along a different sequence. First, his sole
assumption is that we say ‘‘gamyamāna’’ or perceive movement. Then, more
interestingly, rather than utilizing a negative logic of exclusion, he employs a
positive logic of inclusion, which will then lead to a necessary exclusion of both
possibilities. We are lead to accept, at the same time, both movement and non-
movement, and thus to conclude that something in our perception is misfiring. We
saw a similar example in MMK 3.2, where we were lead to accept contradictory
notions regarding the action of seeing—that it must be defined apart of its object
81
See also Galloway (1987, p. 82): ‘‘nothing is left over except a point of zero length.’’
82
There are a number of instances in the PP in which Candrakı̄rti drains Nāgārjuna’s humorous or poetic
statements of their impact. See, for instance Candrakı̄rti’s gloss of MMK 1.12 and 14.5, both verses which
clearly possess humorous aspects. See also verses such as 5.8, 25.24 and 19.6, all statements with a strong
aesthetic appeal. It seems that a commentator such as Candrakı̄rti has not much choice but to explain the
aesthetic effect away.
123
408 E. Shulman
and that it must contain its object.83 Rather than achieving a firm logical stance, we
are left with a strange, tickly sense of peculiarity.
The difference between the two thinkers may be summed up in mathematical
form:
Candrakırti: ð1Þ ð1Þ ¼ 0

Nāgārjuna: ð1Þ þ ð1Þ ¼ 0
The arguments are different, and the fact that they lead to the same conclusion
doesn’t blur the significance of the distinction. Possibly more important than the
different logic of the arguments is the cognitive space they generate. I admit that I
am treading an unmarked and somewhat risky path here, but it is nevertheless best
admitted that Nāgārjuna’s and Candrakı̄rti’s arguments possess a very dissimilar
‘‘feel.’’84 The aesthetic difference between the arguments gains substance when we
recall that Madhyamaka thought is not only a philosophical system but a part of the
Buddhist transformative enterprise. Madhyamaka thought, at least by its own self-
understanding, is participating in the Buddhist attempt to relieve human suffering.85
This, again, becomes even more significant when we recall Nāgarjuna’s famous
86
denial of the difference between sam : sāra and nirvān: a. When there is no final
87
nirvān: a, the world of understanding created by the religious philosophy becomes
reality itself. In the empty world of Madhyamaka, the nature of the argument
generates a unique quality of realization. Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti seem to create
distinct Buddhist worlds.
For Candrakı̄rti, contrary to what Huntington leads us to believe,88 the experience
brought about by the Madhyamaka dialectic at work in the verses under discussion
involves a strong sense of logical certainty. Candrakı̄rti’s realization has a clear-cut
logical structure. Supposedly, internalizing the dialectic reduces doubt about its
truth. In the context of our discussion, Nāgārjuna’s application of logic is more
complex. Rather than certainty, the dialectic leads to a sense of impossibility, to a
sort of vertigo created by the necessity to accept contradictory understandings. No
less analytic than Candrakı̄rti, Nāgārjuna uses logic in order to generate an expe-
rience that blends certainty with impossible possibilities. Indeed, as Garfield has
suggested, this is the rationality of non-foundationalism.89 But with no foundation,
with what kind of logical world are we left?
83
See p. 8 above.
84
The concept of speech acts, as developed by Austin (1962), offers a first step in the direction of the
discussion I am suggesting, viewing words as something one ‘‘does’’ rather than merely ‘‘says.’’ Austin
does not proceed, though, to offer a concept similar to the ‘‘cognitive space’’ I employ here. For an
interesting comparative study of the epistemological thinking of Austin and Candrakı̄rti, see Arnold
(2001).
85
See, for instance, in Streng (1967, 1971) and Napper (1989, ch. 1).
86
See MMK 25.19-20 and Yukti-s: as: :tikā-kārikā 5 and 6.
87
Clearly, other scholars may interpret the statement on the lack of distinction between sam : sāra and
nirvān: a differently, viewing it as a statement made from the absolute viewpoint. For initial responses to
such a position, see Shulman (2007 [2009], p. 146, esp. n. 21).
88
See the reference to Huntington’s work in pp. 1–3 above.
89
Garfield (2008, p. 524).
123
Candrakı̄rti’s Metaphysics in Light of Prasanna-padā 15
The preceding discussion has exposed a significant gap between the style of argu-
ments employed by Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti. This gap suggests that we need not
blindly accept Candrakı̄rti’s Madhyamaka as an utterly faithful exposition of
Nāgārjuna’s thought. Furthermore, the approach employed by Candrakı̄rti in com-
menting on MMK 2.1 and the group of verses which rely on it bears on his
90
_
definition as a Prāsangika. In his commentary on these verses, Candrakı̄rti subjects
Nāgārjuna’s arguments to a well-structured logical procedure: In Svātantrika-like
style he applies his clearly structured logical grid, his black and white Zeno-like
argument, even though this move is uncalled for by the text. His method is obvi-
ously not that of svātantra anumāna, but nevertheless, Candrakı̄rti has a peculiar
logical vision to which he feels it is his job as a commentator to make Nāgārjuna’s
verses conform.
According to Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka synthesis, the so-called Svātantrika
possesses two characteristic features. The first is his position regarding Madhya-
maka methodology: he believes in the necessity of formulating the Madhyamaka
position in the form of a syllogism that he believes is intrinsically validated. The
second feature is the ontological position that is the natural outcome of this
methodology: the Svātantrika’s reliance on a particular logical method betrays an
essentialist belief in the reality of both the logical method itself and its object of
investigation. Yoshimitsu (2003) has shown that for Candrakı̄rti, the methodological
component of the argument was the important one, and it is in this respect that I
have said that Candrakı̄rti implements working methods befitting a Svātantrika. But
there may still be more at stake, and it may be true that Candrakı̄rti’s preferences in
the realms of method reflect ontological or metaphysical inclinations as well.
The prevalent conceptualization of Candrakı̄rti’s thought in modern scholarship,
advanced by such scholars as Arnold (2005), Huntington (1989, 2003), Loizzo
(2001), Siderits (1980, 1989) and Tillemans (1990, 2003), centers on Candrakı̄rti’s
upholding of the truth of conventions in a strictly non-foundational reality. Cand-
rakı̄rti’s voice, presented in this way, is thus markedly pertinent in a modern
philosophical world that has grown suspicious of any form of absolutism, since it
affords a genuine middle-way stance that allows human reason and experience to
retain a substantial degree of relevance and significance. But although Candrakı̄rti’s
use of the concept of conventional truth may converse with modern epistemological
inquisitions, there are other aspects of his work that suggest that his view of con-
ventions was not as positive as it appears through the presentations of these authors.
90
_
In relating to Candrakı̄rti as a Prāsangika _
I am referring mainly to the way the Prāsangika system of
philosophy has been presented and distinguished from Svātantrika-Madhyamaka by Tsongkhapa and his
dge-lug-pa followers. For a discussion of this familiar position see, for instance, in Hopkins (1996 [1983],
part 5) and Lopez (1987). The widely read collection of essays in Dreyfus and McClintock (2005)
_
convincingly argued that both Prāsangika and Svātantrika are terms that had little, if any, meaning for
Indian Madhyamaka. Vose’s (2009) recent work, anticipated by Tauscher (2003) and discussed below,
_
has demonstrated that the term Prāsangikā has gone through a number of developmental stages.
123
410 E. Shulman
Specifically, Candrakı̄rti’s views of Buddhahood suggest that he believed that the

world of conventions is completely annihilated when one gains a confident vision of
truth.91
Dunne (1996) and MacDonald (2009) have both discussed Candrakı̄rti’s views on
the nature of the Buddhist soteriological experience. The passages quoted by both
these scholars show that for Candrakı̄rti, once liberation is reached, nothing is left of
human knowledge and experience.92 Lately, Vose (2009) has convinvcingly shown
that this indeed was the understanding of Candrakı̄rti prominent in Tibet at the
beginning of the second millennium, a Madhyamaka position adhered to by such
influential figures as Śantideva, Prajñakramati, Jāyananda, Atiśa and Patshab-
Nyimadrag.93 According to this early version of Prāsangika, _ a Buddhic mind
operates in spheres totally beyond the ones familiar to human consciousness, if it
operates at all.94
A comprehensive appraisal of Candrakı̄rti’s ontology and metaphysics in the PP
is surely not possible here. Nonetheless, I would like to comment on the way chapter
15 of the Prasanna-padā engages with the metaphysics implied by Candrakı̄rti’s
Buddhology and advances a view of reality that resonates with the more technical
questions that comprised the heart of this paper. A short presentation of a number of
passages from PP 15 will show that it is possible that Candrakı̄rti’s fondness for neat
logical clarity may be part of a wider philosophical position.
Chapter 15 of the MMK is overtly complex, raising a number of important issues,
among them the meaning of the term svabhāva for Nāgārjuna. Some of the
anomalies and complexities of the chapter, as well as of Candrakı̄rti’s reading of it,
have been treated by Ames (1982), Hayes (1994, pp. 316–322) and Westerhoff
(2009, ch. 2).95 For our concerns, what is most significant is the differentiation
Candrakı̄rti makes between what can be defined straightforwardly as true svabhāva
and false svabhāva, the first being the sphere where a Buddha’s vision resides, the
second characterizing the objects perceived by the normal human mind conditioned
by ignorance.
91
See MacDonald (2009, pp. 160–162) for a similar asseement of the positions of Huntington (1989) and
Arnold (2005).
92
Dunne bases most of his reading on passages from the Madhyamakāvatāra and the Madhya-
makāvatāra-bhās: ya. MacDonald relies on a wider range of sources, such as Candrakı̄rti’s commentaries
on Śūnyatā-saptati 2 and Yukri-s: as: :tikā-kārikā 8. An important passage from the PP in this context is the
commentary on MMK 18.7.
93
According to Vose’s work, it is the Svātantrikas of this period, best represented by the views of Phya-
pa-chos-gyi-seng-ge, that attempted to salvage conventional truth and the validity of human under-
standing (pramān: as) and who created the initial synthesis between Candrakı̄rti’s and Dharmakı̄rti’s views
that became the hallmark of Tibetan, and primarily dge-lug-pa Madhyamaka.
94
There is good reason to believe that there are striking differences between the Buddhology of Can-
drakı̄rti and the Buddhology of Nāgārjuna. In fact, Nāgārjuna devotes great efforts in texts such as
Ratnāvalı̄, Yuktis: as: tikā-kārikā and Śūnyatā-saptati to refuting the notion of Buddhahood as cessation, as
it is advanced by Candrakı̄rti.
95
It must be noted that there are many aspects of Candrakı̄rti’s reading MMK 15 that can be questioned,
most importantly his positive definition of svabhāva, discussed below, which bears strong absolutistic
overtones. There is good reason to doubt the compatibility of this positive take of svabhāva with
Nāgārjuna’s philosophical vision as discussed in MMK 15.
123
Commenting on the important MMK 15.2, Cadrakı̄rti’s basic concern is to

demarcate a clear-cut boundary between svabhāva and anything which is made
(kr: trima). These two are defined as ‘‘having a meaning that is irreconcilable due to
contradicting one another’’ (kr: takaś ca svabhāvaś ceti paraspara-viruddhatvād
asam : gatārtham eva tat , LVP 260: 4). What is made and is characterized by change,
by coming into being and by arising through causes and conditions, cannot be
defined as svabhāva. Thus, for Candrakı̄rti, not only is heat not the nature of water,
it is not the nature of fire either. Anything that changes and is produced cannot be a
real nature. Nevertheless, the people of the world see ‘‘all forms of existence’’
(bhāva-jāta96), which wholly lack svabhāva, as possessing svabhāva. To Cand-
rakı̄rti these people are fools, or similar to a person suffering from an eye disease
who believes that the mistaken perception of hairs he sees in front of him is real.97
In complete opposition to this false svabhāva perceived by cowherds and such
simpletons, Candrakı̄rti now defines a svabhāva seen by the āryas, which he defines
as ‘‘the own true nature’’ (ātmı̄yam rūpam : ), ‘‘unmade’’ (akr: timam : ), ‘‘a dependable
base’’ (āyattam : ), ‘‘unchanging’’ (avyabhicārin) ‘‘innate’’ (nijam : ), and ‘‘what does
not exist in dependence on causes and conditions’’ (yac ca hetu-pratyaya-sāpeks: am :
na bhavati). Although he says this svabhāva neither does or does not exist essen-
tially (na tad asti na cāpi nāsti svarūpatah: ), and that he speaks of this ‘‘inex-
pressible truth’’ (anaks: arasya dharmasya98) only in the form of superimposition
(samāropya),99 Candrakı̄rti proceeds to define this svabhāva as ‘‘the true being of
dharmas’’ (dharmān: ām dharmatā), ‘‘dharmas’ self-nature’’ (dharmān: ām svabhāva)
or ‘‘nature’’ (prakr: ti), which is ‘‘emptiness’’ (śūnyatā), ‘‘the lack of self nature’’
96
More literally: ‘‘what is included in the class of existence’’.
97
_
LVP 260.14-261.9: nanu ca gopālānganājana _
[dJ: cāgopālānganājana]-prasiddham etad agner
aus: n: yam: svabhāva iti / kim : khalv asmābhir uktam : na prasiddham : iti / etat tu vayam : brūmo nāyam
svabhāvo bhavitum arhati svabhāva-laks: an: a-viyuktatvād / avidyā-viparyāsānugamāt tu loko nih: svab-
hāvam eva bhāva-jātam : sasvabhāvatatvena pratipannah: / yathā hi taimirikās timira-pratyayād asantam
eva keśādi-svabhāvam sasvabhāvatvenābhinivis: :tāh: / evam avidyā-timiropahata-mati-nayanatayā bālā
nih: svabhāvam : bhāva-jātam : sasvabhāvatvenābhinivis: :tā yathābhiniveśam : laks: an: am ācaksate / agner
aus: n: yam: svalaks: an: am
: / tato anyatrānupalambhād asādhāran: atvena svam eva laks: an: am iti kr: tvā /
bālajana-prasiddhyaiva ca bhagavatā tad evais: ām : sām : vr: tam: svarūpam abhidharme vyavasthāpitam : /
sādhāran: am: tv anityatvādikam samānya-lakas: an: am it coktam : / yadā tu vigatāvidyātimirāvadāta-prajñā-
caks: us: ām
: darśanam apeks: yate / tadā vitimirais taimirikopalabdha-keśādarśana-vad-bālajana-mati-
parikalpitānupalabdha-svabhāvair aryaih pura [dJ: spas: :tataram] ucyate parahitavyāparair nāyam :
svabhāvo bhāvānām iti // See a translation in Sprung (1979, pp. 153–154).
98
Candrakı̄rti offers this phrase in a quote from a sūtra in LVP 264.6.
99
LVP 262.12-264.4: iha svo bhāvah: svabhāva iti yasya padārthasya yad ātmı̄yam : rūpam
: tat tasya
svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate / kim : ca kasyātmı̄yam: yad yasyākr: trimam : / yat tu kr: trimam : na tat tasya
ātmı̄yam
: tad yathāpām aus: n: yam
: / yac ca yasyāyattam : tad api tad-ātmı̄yam : tad yathā sve bhr: tyāh: svāni
dhanāni / yat tu yasya parāyattam : na tat tasyātmı̄yam: tad yathā tāvat kālikā-yācitakam asvatantram : /
yataś caivam
: kr: trimasya para-sāpeks: asya ca svabhāvatvam : nes: :tam: / ata evaus: n: yam agner hetu-pratyaya-
pratibaddhatvād pūrvam abhūtvā paścād utpādena kr: takatvāc ca na svabhāva iti yujyate / yataś caitad
evam ato yad evāgneh: kālatraye ‘py avyabhicāri nijam : rūpam: akr: timam : / pūrvam abhūtvā paścād yan na
bhavati/ yac ca hetu-pratyaya-sāpeks: am : na bhavati/ kim : khalu [agneh: ] tad-ittham : svarūpam asti // na tad
asti na cāpi nāsti svarūpatah: / yady apy evam : tathāpi śrotr: n: ām-uttrāsa-parivarjanārtham : sam : vr: tyā
samāropya ta astı̄ti brūmah: / For a full running translation, see Sprung (1979, pp. 154–155).
123
412 E. Shulman
(naih: svabhāvyam
: ) and ‘‘suchness’’ (tathatā). It is ‘‘existence always as such,
100
standing firm and never changing’’ (tathā-bhāvo ‘vikaritvam : sadaiva sthāyitā).
This positive description of the svabhāva that is the sphere of the āryas is now
established as a negative state that annuls the more common forms of experience:
All forms of existence (bhāva-jāta) are perceived by the power of the eye-
disease of ignorance. Through being connected to not-seeing through that
nature, one enters into the sphere of the āryas, who have done away of the eye-
disease of ignorance. That is their (things’) true nature, and it is established as
svabhāva. This is its defining characteristic: ‘‘self-nature is unmade and not-
dependent on another,’’ as the great teachers established it and thus it should
be known.
And this very self-nature, the nature of the unarising of things, because it is
only non-existence in which there is nothing whatsoever, becomes, indeed,
‘‘no-self-nature.’’ It should be known that there is no self-nature of things.101
The passage betrays both nihilistic (‘‘because it is only non-existence in which there
is nothing whatsoever’’) and absolutistic (‘‘That is their [things’] true nature, and it
is established as svabhāva’’) inclinations. What Candrakı̄rti appears to be saying,
although other readings could be offered, is that once one stops perceiving through
infected ignorance, he or she enters into the sphere of the noble ones, where there is
nothing left. This reading resonates with Candrakı̄rti’s Buddhology as discussed by
Dunne, Macdonald and Vose.102
It is noteworthy that Candrakı̄rti specifically identifies MMK 15.2ab as the
defining characteristic (laks: an: a) of svabhāva that is the sphere of the āryas. He has
also stated, in his reply to the cowherd’s suggestion that heat is the svabhāva of fire,
that ‘‘this svabhāva, we say, can’t be so, because of the defining characteristic of
svabhāva being illogical.’’103 It is this concern with logic and reason that becomes
the focus of the differentiation between mistaken and true cognition. Commenting
on MMK 15.6,104 Candrakı̄rti says:
Those who due to mistaken conception in regard to the unmistaken teachings
which are the word of the Tathāgata, consider firmness the self-nature of earth,
100
LVP 264.11-165.1. For a full running translation, see Sprung (1979, pp. 155–156).
101
LVP 265.3-8: avidyā-timira-prabhāvopalabdham : bhāva-jātam: yenātmanā vigatāvidyā-timirān: ām
āryān: ām adarśana-yogena vis: ayatvam upayāti tad eva svarūpam es: ām : svabhāva iti vyavasthāpyate /
tasya cedam : laks: an: am
: akr: trimah: svabhāvo hi nirapeks: ah: paratra ca iti vyavasthāpayām babhūvur
ācāryā iti vijñeyam : // sa cais: a bhāvānām anutpādātmakah: svabhāvo akim : cittvenābhāva-mātratvād
asvabhāva eveti kr: tvā nāsti bhāva-svabhāva iti vijñeyam: //.
102
The quote form a sūtra that follows the passage just referred to further emphasizes the connection
between entering the sphere of the āryas achieving a pacified signless samādhi (LVP 265, pp. 10–14):
‘‘He who knows things and non-things, does not hold to any thing. He who does not hold to anything,
touches the signless samādhi.’’
bhāvān abhāvān iti yah: prajānati / sa sarva-bhāves: u na jātu sajjate/ [yah: sarva-bhāves: u na sajjate] sa
ānimittam : (read animittam : ) spr: śate samādhim
: //.
103
LVP 260: 15: etat tu vayam
: brūmo nāyam
: svabhāvo bhavitum arhati svabhāva-laks: an: a-viyuktatvād.
104
MMK 15.6 Those who see self-nature, other-nature, existence and non-existence, do not see the
truth with regard to the Buddha’s teaching.
svabhāvam: parabhāvam: ca bhāvam
: cābhāvam eva ca / ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvam
: buddha-śāsane //.
123
experience of objects the self-nature of sensations, perception of objects the

self-nature of consciousness, and thus describe a self-nature of things. . . They
do not get at the truth in regard to the deep and exalted dependent-origination,
since the existence of self-nature, other-nature, and so forth, is contrary to
reason, as explained above. At the same time, the Tathāgatas do not speak of
self-nature of entities which is contrary to reason, thanks to their awakening,
by their own power, to the unmistaken truth with regard to all things.105
The prominent feature of Buddhahood, according to this passage, is that it tran-
scends logical contradiction; the Buddha does not speak of what is contrary to
reason (upapatti-viruddha), and this includes all states of existence. His teaching,
the heart of which is the principle of dependent-origination, possesses a special
power, an ability to cure human perception of contradiction.106 Moreover, it is
precisely this quality of complete logical coherence which makes it an effective
vehicle for obtaining nirvān: a:
Now the wise describe the word of the Lord Buddhas as "valid cognition"
(pramān: a), because it is without contradiction (avisam : vādatvāt), through
being in accord with reason (sopapattikatvena). And because it comes from
realized ones who have let go of all faults, it ‘‘makes one arrive’’, as it leads to
the truth in all its aspects. Since it comes from those who directly see, basing
oneself on it, the man of the world goes to nirvān: a. Thus, the word of the
perfect Buddha is established as ‘‘Authority’’ (āgama, or ‘‘having the power to
bring one to the truth’’).107
The Buddha’s teaching has now become a pramān: a (of āgama!), precisely because
of the ontological nature of a Buddha’s mind: since the defining feature of this mind
is the lack of logical contradiction, all that it expresses can be relied on in spiritual
practice. The Buddha’s words are no longer only pragmatically true, but now
ontologically and metaphysically true. Candrakı̄rti forms, once again, a strict
dichotomy, this time between truth and falsehood, both defined in terms of their
relation to reason: The illusory, the conditioned, reality and its representation in
mistaken consciousness, are forms of incoherence; The true, the ultimate, the real
and the Buddha are what is reasonable and free of contradiction. The commonly
perceived reality is logically inconsistent and its truth is wholly negated, while the
105
LVP 267.10-16: ye hi tathāgata-pravacanāviparı̄ta-vyākhyānābhimanitayā/ pr: thivyāh: kāt:hin: yam :
svabhāva/ vedānāyā vis: ayānubhāva/ vijñānasya vis: aya-prativijñāpti svabhāva ity evam : svabhāvam :
bhāvānām
: varn: ayanti/…na te parama-gambhı̄rasya pratı̄tya-samutpādasya tattvam : varn: ayanti/ yasmād
yathoditopapatti-viruddham : svabhāva-parabhāvādı̄nām astitvam : / na copapatti-viruddham : padārtha-
svabhāvam anuvarn: ayanti tathāgatāh svayam aviparı̄tāśes: a-padārtha-tattva-sam: bodhāt/.
106
It must be emphasized that in this context, the meaning of dependent origination appears to exceed
the popular scholarly understanding that it is a realistic principle describing the dependent nature of all
things. Rather, dependent origination carries the connotation of the 12 links, which are understood as an
articulation of the arising of suffering, and that are supposed to be annihilated through the reverse process
of dependent cessation.
107
LVP 268.1–269.2: ata eva buddhānām bhagavatām vacanam : pramān: am ity upavarn: ayanti
vicaks: an: āh: sopapattikatvenāvisam
: vādatvāt/ ata eva ca āptebhyah: prahı̄n: āśes: ados: ebhya āgatatvāt/
āgamayatı̄ti samantāt tattvam : gamayatı̄ti vābhimukhyād āgamād vā tad-āśrayen: a lokasya nirvān: ag-
amanāt sam : buddha-vacanasyaivāgamatvam : vyavasthāpyate/.
123
414 E. Shulman
absolute truth of Buddha fully transcends this inconsistency and is alone logically
consistent. It appears that this vision of truth indeed demands an understanding of
Buddhahood as a radical form of cessation, once again in line with the discussion of
Candrakı̄rti’s Buddhology by Dunne, MacDonald and Vose. Any form of existence,
as well as any form of perception, will raise the naturally contradictory notions of
svabhāva, existence and non-existence. The Buddha’s logical coherence, as defined
by Candrakı̄rti, does not allow for such conceptual or ontological categories.
It appears that in these passages Candrakı̄rti reveals his inner drive as a
commentator. The world of ignorance, i.e. the world of passion and pain, is
characterized by a basic state of logical contradiction. We people of the world
see self-nature, other-nature, existence and non-existence, where in fact there are
no such qualities. In deep opposition to our logical depravity stands the Buddha,
who has reached perfection and achieved full rational coherence. The commen-
tator thus clears the cognitively reliable (pramāna) words of the Buddha of the
misconceptions that are attached to it by ignorant human minds, an effort that
can pave the way to other levels of existence, where no logical imperfection
remains.
Conclusion: The Trickster’s Commitment
We can now return to comment on the debate between Huntington and Garfield,
referred to at the outset of the discussion, and to assess Candrakı̄rti’s role as a
Madhyamaka ‘‘trickster.’’ The reading of Candrakı̄rti advanced above emphasizes
the importance of logical argument for Candrakı̄rti’s commentarial enterprise. This
aspect of the discussion enforces the position articulated by Garfield. Indeed,
Garfield does not go far enough: Rather than being in line with Garfield’s coupling
of logical reasoning with the view of anti-foundationalism, a view that may indeed
apply to Nāgārjuna’s MMK, Candrakı̄rti’s view of logic appears to be foundational
in itself. For Candrakı̄rti, logic relates to the very structure of reality, marking the
Buddha’s radical transcendence beyond, or cessation of, the logically inconsistent
structure that is reality. Thus, his efforts as a religious scholar are aimed at relieving
human cognition not of the need for logical certainty, but of any element of rational
incoherence. To be noble means to be devoid of logical contradiction.
The bulk of this paper was devoted to an analysis of Candrakı̄rti’s commentary
on MMK 2.1 and on four verses that quote this verse later in the text. This analysis
revealed that the prominent tendency in modern scholarship to fuse the voices of
Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti may be counter-productive. Candrakı̄rti’s idiosyncratic
reading of these verses is based on his commitment to a specific type of logic that
imbues the Madhyamaka argument with a Zeno-like quality.
Chapter 15 of the Prasanna-padā suggests that there may be more than meth-
odological questions involved in Candrakı̄rti’s implementation of Madhyamaka
logic. The chapter raises the possibility that behind Candrakı̄rti’s logical approach to
Nāgārjuna’s text is hidden a subtle and profound metaphysical and ontological
position. Candrakı̄rti views the MMK according to his grasp of the Buddha’s mind,
which he believes is fully coherent and eludes any logical contradiction. The strict
123
dichotomy Candrakı̄rti establishes between gata and agata, for example, is a way to
advance toward the logical certainty possessed by the Buddha. Human reality and
Buddhahood mark two sharply differentiated options, the one mistaken and logi-
cally incoherent, the other empty and truthful. The trickster Candrakı̄rti emerges as
a split figure demanding a confident choice: you must pick black or white, coherent
emptiness or unreasonable reality. The Mādhyamika must fully understand on
which non-path he is treading.
Acknowledgements I wish to thank Yael Bentor, Oren Hanner, Anne MacDonald, Akira Saito, David
Shulman, Gary Tubb, Alex Cherniack and Roy Tzohar for their comments on and contributions to
different aspects of this paper.
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J Indian Philos (2010) 38:379–417

The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster:

Published online: 9 June 2010

Candrakı̄rti (circa 650 A.D) is considered by many to be Nāgārjuna’s most authori-

as interpreters of the Buddhist tradition, are inevitably committed to the employ-

Candrakı̄rti on MMK 2.1

In order to facilitate the forthcoming discussion, let us first recall Candrakı̄rti’s

Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK 3.2 and 3.3

We begin our analysis by viewing Candrakı̄rti’s treatment of MMK 3.2:

and succinctly explained by Candrakı̄rti as ‘‘because it would have contradictory

In sum, Nāgārjuna’s argument is that what lacks self-reference cannot relate to

Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK 7.14

Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK 10.1350

The third time Nāgārjuna quotes the analysis of gamyamāna-gata-agata is in chapter

Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti on MMK 16.7

MMK 2.1 in Context

be such ‘‘things’’ that correspond to the grammatical terms used in a sentence.74 In

MMK 2.1 Now, what-has-been-made-to-move is not being made to move.

Differences of Strategy Between Nāgārjuna and Candrakı̄rti

Nāgārjuna’s procedure is quite different:

Candrakırti: ð1Þ ð1Þ ¼ 0

Candrakı̄rti’s Metaphysics in Light of Prasanna-padā 15

Specifically, Candrakı̄rti’s views of Buddhahood suggest that he believed that the

Commenting on the important MMK 15.2, Cadrakı̄rti’s basic concern is to

experience of objects the self-nature of sensations, perception of objects the

Conclusion: The Trickster’s Commitment

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