TECHNICAL REPORT

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)

- Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Evaluation Techniques Part 4:
Determining the SIL of a SIF
via Markov Analysis

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substantial civil and criminal penalties.

Approved 17 June 2002

TM

ISA–The Instrumentation,
Systems, and
Automation Society
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 4
Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)  Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) Evaluation Techniques Part 4:
Determining the SIL of a SIF via Markov Analysis

ISBN: 1-55617-805-0

Copyright © 2002 by The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society. All rights reserved. Not for
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 −3− ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Preface

This preface, as well as all footnotes and annexes, is included for information purposes and is not part of
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 4.

This document has been prepared as part of the service of ISAthe Instrumentation, Systems, and
Automation Societytoward a goal of uniformity in the field of instrumentation. To be of real value, this
document should not be static but should be subject to periodic review. Toward this end, the Society
welcomes all comments and criticisms and asks that they be addressed to the Secretary, Standards and
Practices Board; ISA; 67 Alexander Drive; P. O. Box 12277; Research Triangle Park, NC 27709;
Telephone (919) 549-8411; Fax (919) 549-8288; E-mail: [email protected].

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HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. THE USER OF THIS STANDARD MUST EXERCISE SOUND
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 −4−

PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT CONCERNING ITS USE AND APPLICABILITY UNDER THE USER’S
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE USER MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE APPLICABILITY OF
ANY GOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY LIMITATIONS AND ESTABLISHED SAFETY AND HEALTH
PRACTICES BEFORE IMPLEMENTING THIS STANDARD.

THE USER OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE IMPACTED
BY ELECTRONIC SECURITY ISSUES. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT YET ADDRESSED THE
POTENTIAL ISSUES IN THIS VERSION.

The following people served as members of ISA Committee SP84:

NAME COMPANY

V. Maggioli, Chair Feltronics Corporation

R. Webb, Managing Director POWER Engineers
C. Ackerman Air Products & Chemicals Inc.
R. Adamski Invensys
C. Adler Moore Industries International Inc.
R. Bailliet Syscon International Inc.
N. Battikha Bergo Tech Inc.
L. Beckman HIMA Americas Inc.
S. Bender S K Bender & Associates
K. Bond Shell Global Solutions
A. Brombacher Eindhoven University of Technology
S. Brown* DuPont Company
J. Carew Consultant
K. Dejmek Baker Engineering & Lisk Consulting
A. Dowell* Rohm & Haas Company
R. Dunn* DuPont Engineering
P. Early ABB Industrial Systems Inc.
T. Fisher Deceased
J. Flynt Consultant
A. Frederickson Triconex Corporation
R. Freeman ABS Consulting
D. Fritsch Fritsch Consulting Service
K. Gandhi Kellogg Brown & Root
R. Gardner* Dupont
J. Gilman Consultant
W. Goble exida.com LLC
D. Green* Rohm & Haas Company
P. Gruhn Siemens
C. Hardin CDH Consulting Inc.
J. Harris UOP LLC
D. Haysley Albert Garaody & Associates
M. Houtermans TUV Product Service Inc.
J. Jamison Bantrel Inc.
W. Johnson* E I du Pont
D. Karydas* Factory Mutual Research Corporation
L. Laskowski Solutia Inc.
T. Layer Emerson Process Management
D. Leonard D J Leonard Consultants
E. Lewis Consultant
E. Marszal Exida.com
N. McLeod Atofina
W. Mostia WLM Engineering Company
D. Ogwude Creative Systems International
 −5− ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

G. Ramachandran Cytec Industries Inc.

K. Schilowsky Marathon Ashland Petroleum Company LLC
D. Sniezek Lockheed Martin Federal Services
C. Sossman WG-W Safety Management Solutions
R. Spiker Yokogawa Industrial Safety Systems BV
P. Stavrianidis* Factory Mutual Research Corporation
H. Storey Equilon Enterprises LLC
A. Summers SIS-TECH Solutions LLC
L. Suttinger Westinghouse Savannah River Company
R. Szanyi ExxonMobil Research Engineering
R. Taubert BASF Corporation
H. Tausch Honeywell Inc.
T. Walczak GE FANUC Automation
M. Weber System Safety Inc.
D. Zetterberg Chevron Texaco ERTC
______
* One vote per company.

This standard was approved for publication by the ISA Standards and Practices Board on 17 June 2002.

NAME COMPANY

M. Zielinski Emerson Process Management

D. Bishop David N Bishop, Consultant
D. Bouchard Paprican
M. Cohen Consultant
M. Coppler Ametek, Inc.
B. Dumortier Schneider Electric
W. Holland Southern Company
E. Icayan ACES Inc
A. Iverson Ivy Optiks
R. Jones Dow Chemical Company
V. Maggioli Feltronics Corporation
T. McAvinew ForeRunner Corporation
A. McCauley, Jr. Chagrin Valley Controls, Inc.
G. McFarland Westinghouse Process Control Inc.
R. Reimer Rockwell Automation
J. Rennie Factory Mutual Research Corporation
H. Sasajima Yamatake Corporation
I. Verhappen Syncrude Canada Ltd.
R. Webb POWER Engineers
W. Weidman Parsons Energy & Chemicals Group
J. Weiss KEMA Consulting
M. Widmeyer Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
C. Williams Eastman Kodak Company
G. Wood Graeme Wood Consulting
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 −7− ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Contents

Foreword ....................................................................................................................................................... 9

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 11

1 Scope................................................................................................................................................... 17

2 References .......................................................................................................................................... 17

3 Definitions ............................................................................................................................................ 18

4 Introduction to Markov ......................................................................................................................... 18

5 Modeling and calculation procedures .................................................................................................. 19

5.1 Modeling and calculation procedures........................................................................................... 19

6 Assumptions for Markov calculations for an SIF ................................................................................. 20

7 Overview examples ............................................................................................................................. 21

8 Example 1............................................................................................................................................ 22

9 Quantifying a Markov model ................................................................................................................ 27

10 Results Example 1 ........................................................................................................................... 29

11 Example 2 ........................................................................................................................................ 32

12 Results Example 2 ........................................................................................................................... 35

13 Example 3 ........................................................................................................................................ 38

14 Base example calculation for an SIF using Markov models ............................................................ 39

15 Results base example...................................................................................................................... 48

16 Index................................................................................................................................................. 50
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 −9− ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)

 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Evaluation Techniques

Part 4: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Markov Analysis

Foreword

The information contained in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 is provided for information only and is not part of the
(1)
ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 Standard requirements.
(2)
The purpose of ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 is to provide the process industry with a description of various
methodologies that can be used to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of Safety Instrumented
Functions (SIF).

ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 provides the minimum requirements for implementing a SIS given that a set of
functional requirements have been defined and a SIL requirement has been established for each safety
instrumented function. Additional information of an informative nature is provided in the annexes to
ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 to assist the designer in applying the concepts necessary to achieve an acceptable
design. However, Standards Project 84 (SP84) determined that it was appropriate to provide
supplemental information that would assist the user in evaluating the capability of any given SIF design to
achieve its required SIL. A secondary purpose of this document is to reinforce the concept of the
performance based evaluation of SIF. The performance parameters that satisfactorily service the process
industry are derived from the SIL and reliability evaluation of SIF, namely the probability of the SIF to fail
to respond to a demand and the probability that the SIF creates a nuisance trip. Such evaluation
addresses the design elements (hardware, software, redundancy, etc.) and the operational attributes
(inspection/maintenance policy, frequency and quality of testing, etc.) of the SIF. The basis for the
performance evaluation of the SIF is safety targets determined through hazard analysis and risk
(6)
assessment of the process. This document demonstrates methodologies for the SIL and reliability
evaluation of SIF.

The document focuses on methodologies that can be used without promoting a single methodology. It
provides information on the benefits of various methodologies as well as some of the drawbacks they may
have.

THE METHODOLOGIES ARE DEMONSTRATED THROUGH EXAMPLES (SIS

ARCHITECTURES) THAT REPRESENT POSSIBLE SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIS. THE
USER IS CAUTIONED TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA
ASSOCIATED WITH THE METHODOLOGIES IN THIS DOCUMENT BEFORE
ATTEMPTING TO UTILIZE THE METHODS PRESENTED HEREIN.

The users of ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 include:

• Process Hazards Analysis teams that wish to develop understanding of different methodologies in
determining SIL

• SIS designers who want a better understanding of how redundancy, diagnostic coverage, diversity,
etc., fit into the development of a proper SIS architecture

• Logic solver and field device suppliers

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 10 −

• National and International standard bodies providing guidance in the use of reliability techniques for
SIS architectures

• Reliability engineers (or any engineer performing this function) can use this information to develop
better methods for determining SIL in the rapidly changing SIS field

• Parties who do not have a large installed base of operating equipment sufficient to establish
spurious
appropriate statistical analysis for PFDavg and MTTF for SIS components

• Operations and maintenance personnel

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 consists of the following parts, under the general title “Safety Instrumented
Functions (SIF)  Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Evaluation Techniques.”

Part 1: Introduction

Part 2: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Simplified Equations

Part 3: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Fault Tree Analysis

Part 4: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Markov Analysis

Part 5: Determining the PFD of Logic Solvers via Markov Analysis

 − 11 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Introduction

ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 describes a safety lifecycle model for the implementation of risk reduction
measures for the process industry (Clause 4). The standard then proceeds to provide specific guidance in
the application of SIS, which may be one of the risk reduction methods used. The standard defines three
levels of safety integrity (Safety Integrity Levels, SIL) that may be used to specify the capability that a
safety instrumented function must achieve to accomplish the required risk reduction. ISA-TR84.00.02-
2002 provides methodologies for evaluating SIF to determine if they achieve the specific SIL. This may be
referred to as a probability of failure on demand (PFD) evaluation of the SIF.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 only addresses SIF operating in demand mode.

The evaluation approaches outlined in this document are performance-based approaches and do not
provide specific results that can be used to select a specific architectural configuration for a given SIL.

THE READER IS CAUTIONED TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE ASSUMPTIONS ASSOCIATED

WITH THE METHODOLOGY AND EXAMPLES IN THIS DOCUMENT BEFORE DERIVING ANY
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE EVALUATION OF ANY SPECIFIC SIF.

The evaluation processes described in this document take place before the SIS detailed design phase of
the life cycle (see Figure I.1, Safety Lifecycle Model).

This document assumes that a SIS is required. It does not provide guidance in the determination of the
need for a SIS. The user is referred to ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 Annex A for methodologies that might be
used in making this determination.

This document involves the evaluation of the whole SIF from the sensors through the logic solver
to the final elements. Process industry experience shows that sensors and final elements are
major contributors to loss of SIS integrity (high PFD). When evaluating the performance of
sensors and final elements, issues such as component technology, installation, and maintenance
should be considered.

Frequently multiple safety instrumented functions are included in a single logic solver. The logic solver
should be carefully evaluated since a problem in the logic solver may adversely impact the performance
of all of the safety instrumented functions (i.e., the logic solver could be the common cause failure that
disables all of the SIFs.).

This principle (i.e., common cause) applies to any

• element of a SIS that is common to more than one safety instrumented function; and

• redundant element with one or more safety instrumented function.

Each element should be evaluated with respect to all the safety instrumented functions with which it is
associated

• to ensure that it meets the integrity level required for each safety instrumented function;

• to understand the interactions of all the safety instrumented functions; and

• to understand the impact of failure of each component.

This document does not provide guidance in the determination of the specific SIL required (e.g., SIL I, 2,
and 3) for the SIS. The user is again referred to ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 or to other references.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 12 −

The primary focus of this document is on evaluation methodologies for assessing the capability of the
SIS. The SIS lifecycle model is defined in ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996. Figure I.2 shows the boundaries of the
SIS and how it relates to other systems.

Start

Establish
Develop * Operation &
Safety Maintenance
Conceptual Requirements Procedures
Process Specification
Design

Perform SIS * Pre-Startup

Conceptual Safety Review
Perform
Design, & verify (Assessment)
Process Hazard
Analysis & Risk it meets the SRS
Assessment
SIS startup,
operation,
Apply non-SIS Perform SIS
maintenance,
protection layers Detail Design
periodic
to prevent
functional testing
identified hazards
or reduce risk
SIS Installation, Modify
No Commissioning Modify or
and Pre-Startup Decommission
SIS required? Acceptence Test SIS?

Yes Decommision
Define Target
SIS
SIL for each
Decommissioning
Safety
Instrumented
Function

Legend:
Safety Life Cycle *
Safety Life Cycle Safety Life Cycle steps where
steps covered steps not covered TR84.00.02
by 84.01 by 84.01 is applicable

Figure I.1  Safety life cycle model

 − 13 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

SIS User Basic Process

Interface Control System

Logic Final
Sensors Solver Elements

Logic

SIS Boundary

Figure I.2  Definition of Saf ety Instrumented System (SIS)

The safety requirements specification addresses the design elements (hardware, software, redundancy,
etc.) and the operational attributes (inspection/maintenance policy, frequency and quality of testing, etc.)
of the SIS. These elements affect the PFD of each safety instrumented function.

The PFD of these systems can be determined using historical system performance data (e.g., statistical
analysis). Where systems, subsystems, components, etc. have not been in use for a sufficiently long time
and in large enough numbers to have a statistically significant population available for the evaluation of
their performance solely based on actuarial data, a systematic evaluation of the performance of a system
may be obtained through the use of PFD analysis techniques.

PFD analysis techniques employ systematic methodologies that decompose a complex system to its
basic components. The performance and interactions of these basic components are merged into
reliability models (such as simplified equations, fault trees, Markov models) to determine the overall
system safety availability.

This document provides users with a number of PFD evaluation techniques that allow a user to determine
if a SIF meets the required safety integrity level.

Safety integrity is defined as “The probability of a Safety Instrumented Function satisfactorily performing
the required safety functions under all stated conditions within a stated period of time.” Safety integrity
consists of two elements: 1) hardware safety integrity and 2) systematic safety integrity. Hardware safety
integrity which is based upon random hardware failures can normally be estimated to a reasonable level
of accuracy. ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 addresses the hardware safety integrity by specifying target failure
measures for each SIL. For SIF operating in the demand mode the target failure measure is PFDavg
(average probability of failure to perform its design function on demand). PFDavg is also commonly
referred to as the average probability of failure on demand. Systematic integrity is difficult to quantify due
to the diversity of causes of failures; systematic failures may be introduced during the specification,
design, implementation, operational and modification phase and may affect hardware as well as software.
ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 addresses systematic safety integrity by specifying procedures, techniques,
measures, etc. that reduce systematic failures.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 14 −

An acceptable safe failure rate is also normally specified for a SIF. The safe failure rate is commonly
referred to as the false trip, nuisance trip, or spurious trip rate. The spurious trip rate is included in the
evaluation of a SIF, since process start up and shutdown are frequently periods where chances of a
hazardous event are high. Hence in many cases, the reduction of spurious trips will increase the safety of
the process. The acceptable safe failure rate is typically expressed as the mean time to a spurious trip
spurious
(MTTF ).

NOTE In addition to the safety issue(s) associated with spurious trips the user of the SIS may also want the acceptable
MTTFspurious to be increased to reduce the effect of spurious trips on the productivity of the process under control. This increase in
the acceptable MTTFspurious can usually be justified because of the high cost associated with a spurious trip.

The objective of this technical report is to provide users with techniques for the evaluation of the hardware
spurious
safety integrity of SIF (PFDavg) and the determination of MTTF . Methods of modeling systematic
failures are also presented so a quantitative analysis can be performed if the systematic failure rates are
known.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 shows how to model complete SIF, which includes the sensors, the logic solver
and final elements. To the extent possible the system analysis techniques allow these elements to be
independently analyzed. This allows the safety system designer to select the proper system configuration
to achieve the required safety integrity level.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 1 provides

• a detailed listing of the definition of all terms used in this document. These are consistent with the
ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996, IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards.

• the background information on how to model all the elements or components of a SIF. It focuses on
the hardware components, provides some component failure rate data that are used in the examples
calculations and discusses other important parameters such as common cause failures and functional
failures.

• a brief introduction to the methodologies that will be used in the examples shown in this document.
(3) (4) (5)
They are Simplified equations , Fault Tree Analysis , and Markov Analysis .

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 2 provides simplified equations for calculating the SIL values for Demand
Mode Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) installed in accordance with ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996,
“Applications of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries”. Part 2 should not be
interpreted as the only evaluation technique that might be used. It does, however, provide the
engineer(s) performing design for a SIS with an overall technique for assessing the capability of the
designed SIF.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 3 provides fault tree analysis techniques for calculating the SIL for Demand
Mode Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) installed in accordance with ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996,
“Applications of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries”. Part 3 should not be
interpreted as the only evaluation technique that might be used. It does, however, provide the
engineer(s) performing design for a SIS with an overall technique for assessing the capability of the
designed SIF.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 provides Markov analysis techniques for calculating the SIL values for
Demand Mode Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) installed in accordance with ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996,
“Applications of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries”. Part 4 should not be
interpreted as the only evaluation technique that might be used. It does, however, provide the
engineer(s) performing design for a SIS with an overall technique for assessing the capability of the
designed SIF.
 − 15 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 5 addresses the logic solver only, using Markov Models for calculating the
PFD of E/E/PE logic solvers because it allows the modeling of maintenance and repairs as a function of
time, treats time as a model parameter, explicitly allows the treatment of diagnostic coverage, and models
the systematic failures (i.e., operator failures, software failures, etc.) and common cause failures.

Figure I.3 illustrates the relationship of each part to all other parts.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 16 −

Part 1

Development of the overall terms, symbols, explanation of

SIS element failures, comparison of system analysis
techniques, and uncertainty analysis examples.

Part 2 Part 5

Development of SIL for SIF using

Simplified Equation Methodology.

Guidance in
determining
Part 3 the PFD of
Development of SIL for SIF using E/E/PE logic
Fault Tree Analysis Methodology. solver(s) via
Markov
Analysis.

Part 4

Development of SIL for SIF using

Markov Analysis Methodology.

Figure I.3  ISA-TR84.00.02-2 002 overall framework

 − 17 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

1 Scope
1.1 ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 is informative and does not contain any mandatory requirements.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 is intended to be used only after a thorough understanding of ISA-
TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1. This technical report is intended to provide

a) technical guidance in Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Analysis;

b) ways to implement Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) to achieve a specified SIL;

c) failure rates and failure modes of SIF components;

d) diagnostics, diagnostic coverage, covert faults, test intervals, redundancy of SIF components; and

e) tool(s) for SIL verification of SIF.

1.2 ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 provides one possible technique for calculating PFDavg values for
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) installed in accordance with ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996, "Application of
Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries.”

1.3 Persons using ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 require knowledge of the Markov modeling technique.
The reader who is interested in learning more about Markov modeling is referred to:
(5)
• Evaluating Control Systems Reliability , Chapter 5;
(12)
• Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems , Chapter 8 and 9;
(13)
• Introduction to Reliability Engineering , Chapter 9;

• ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 5.

1.4 ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 introduces the reader to three examples, which explain the Markov
theory and capabilities. These three examples make it possible to better understand the Base Example,
which is also presented in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 2 and ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 3.

2 References
1. ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 “Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries,”
Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society," ISA, Research Triangle Park, NC, 27709,
February 1996.

2. ISA-TR84.00.02-2002, "Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) – Safety Integrity Level Evaluation

Techniques, Part 1: Introduction; Part 2: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Simplified Equations; Part 3:
Determining the SIL of a SIF via Fault Tree Analysis; Part 4: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Markov
Analysis; Part 5: Determining the PFD of SIS Logic Solvers via Markov Analysis," Instrumentation,
Systems and Automation Society, Technical Report, Research Triangle Park, NC, 27709, 2002.
th
3. “Reliability, Maintainability and Risk (Practical Methods for Engineers),” 4 Edition, D.J. Smith,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993. ISBN 0-7506-0854-4.

4. “Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes,” Center for Chemical Process Safety,
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY 10017, 1993.

5. “Evaluating Control Systems Reliability,” W. M. Goble, Instrument Society of America, Research

Triangle Park, NC, 27709, 1990.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 18 −

6. Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Henley, Ernest J. and Kumamoto, Hiromitsu, IEEE Press, New York,
New York, 1992.

7. CARE III, COSMIC, University of Georgia, 382 Broad East Street, Athens, GA 30602, USA.

8. CARMS, DAINA Corp., 4111 Central Ave. NE, Suite 212, Columbia Heights, MN 55421-2953, USA.

9. MARKOV1, Decision Systems Associates, 746 Crompton Rd., Redwood City, CA 94061, USA.

10. PC Availability, Management Sciences, 6022 Constitution Ave. NE, Albuquerque, NM 87110, USA.

11. MKV, Item Software Inc., 6545 Sunrise Blvd. Suite 201, Citrus Heights, California 95610-5105, USA.

12. “Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems,” R. Billinton, R.N. Allan, Pitman Advanced Publishing
Program, Marshfield, MA 02050, 1983.

13. “Introduction to Reliability Engineering,” E.E. Lewis, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY 10158, 1987.

3 Definitions
Definitions and terminology used in this part are defined in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1.

4 Introduction to Markov
4.1 The Markov approach or Markov modeling technique originated from the Russian mathematician
A.A. Markov (1856 - 1922). Markov was engaged in research on mathematically describing random
processes. With the years, that work has been extensively developed and the Markov technique has
received more attention and increased use.

The basic principle of Markov analysis is that a system can exist in different states. Each state is defined
by an internal failure in the system. Usually these internal failures are combined to the level of what are
called system states. These states are often driven by the availability of data, for example, data can be
available on board level but can also be available on transistor level. Independent of the level of detail
the system can be a:

• Fully operational system;

• Partially failed system (degraded), but still fulfilling its function; or

• Totally failed system.

4.2 A Markov model consists of Markov states and the transitions between these states, see
Figure 4.1. The driving force to transition from one state to another is the failure or repair probability of
components. There are two reasons why a transition from one state to another can occur:

• First, a component in an operating state can fail.

• Second, a component in a failed state can be repaired.

 − 19 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Failure

State 1 State 2

Repair

Figure 4.1  Simple Markov model

5 Modeling and calculation procedures

Markov analysis offers certain advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of Markov modeling
is its modeling flexibility. Markov analysis can model all the aspects that are important for SIFs. In one
Markov model, it is, for example, possible to model different failure modes of different components,
different repair or test strategies (i.e., on-line, off-line, periodic), imperfect testing and repair, diagnostics
capabilities, time dependent sequences of failures and common cause or systematic failures. Once the
Markov model is constructed all the information is available to calculate the probability of a failure on
demand or spurious trip.

The main disadvantage is its computational and modeling complexity. A number of computer programs
(7) (8)
are available on the market to perform the actual calculations, for example CARE III , CARMS ,
(9) (10) (11)
MARKOV1 , PC Availability , MKV . The construction of the Markov model is seen by users and
practitioners of the technique as the largest disadvantage. Today’s current practice is that these models
are constructed by hand. ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 4, Clause 5 explains a straight forward FMEA type
of approach to construct the Markov model. This method is easy in use although constructing the Markov
model is more time consuming and tedious as the SIS grows in complexity.

5.1 Modeling and calculation procedures

(1)
1. Assign each safety function to its SIS as defined in the safety requirements specification .

2. List the components that have a safety impact on each safety function. This will include logic
solver(s), sensor(s) and final control element(s).

3. List the possible failure modes for each component.

4. Determine the degraded (intermediate) and failure system states by introducing in a systematic way
the different failure modes of each component and its effect on the safety function. Determine how
the SIS can be repaired from the degraded (intermediate) and failure system states and construct the
Markov model (Clause 7).

5. Solve the Markov model to determine the probability of being in any state as a function of time.

6. Calculate the PFDavg and the probability of a spurious trip of the SIS (Clause 8).

7. Determine if the PFDavg of the SIS generated by the Markov Model Technique meets the SIL
(1)
requirements of the safety requirements specification .

8. If required, modify the configuration (hardware configuration, functional test interval, hardware
selection, etc.) and repeat from step 3.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 20 −

9. If the calculated probability of a spurious trip is unacceptable, modify the configuration (incorporate
redundancy, use components with better reliability, etc.) and repeat from step 3.

10. When the SIS SIL and the probability of a spurious trip meet the specified requirements the
calculation procedure is done.

6 Assumptions for Markov calculations for an SIF

The following assumptions were used in this Part for Markov analysis:

6.1 The SIF being evaluated will be designed, installed, and maintained in accordance with ANSI/ISA-
84.01-1996.

6.2 Component failure and repair rates are assumed to be constant over the life of the SIF.

6.3 Redundant components have the same failure rates.

6.4 The sensor failure rate includes everything from the sensor to the input module of the Logic solver
including the process effects (e.g., plugged impulse line to transmitter).

6.5 The logic solver failure rate includes the input modules, logic solver, output modules and power
supplies. These failure rates typically are supplied by the logic solver vendor.

NOTE ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 5 illustrates a suggested method to use in developing failure rate data for the logic solver.

For the examples shown in this Part, the logic solver failure rate was estimated by taking the PFDavg for
the logic solver, as supplied by the vendor, and converting it using Equation 6.1 into a rate. The
derivation of this equation is shown in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 3 Annex B.

λTI
(Eq. 6.1) PFDavg =
2

6.6 The final element failure rate includes everything from the output module to the final element
including the process effects.

6.7 The Test Interval (TI) is assumed to be much shorter than the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF).

6.8 Testing and repair of components in the system are assumed to be perfect.

6.9 All SIF components have been properly specified based on the process application. For example,
final elements (valves) have been selected to fail in the safe direction depending on their specific
application.

6.10 Once a component has failed in one of the possible failure modes it cannot fail again in one of the
remaining failure modes. It can only fail again after it has first been repaired. This assumption has been
made to simplify the modeling effort.

NOTE In real life it is, for example, possible that a component first fails dangerous and after some time fails safe.

6.11 It is assumed that when a dangerous detected failure occurs, the SIS will take the process to a safe
state or plant personnel will take necessary action to ensure the process is safe (operator response is
 − 21 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

assumed to be before a demand occurs, i.e., instantaneous, and PFD of operator response is assumed to
be 0).

NOTE If the action depends on plant personnel to provide safety, the user is cautioned to account for the probability of failure of
personnel to perform the required function in a timely manner.

6.12 The fail-safe and fail-dangerous state are treated as absorbing states. This means that, once a
component failure leads to either state, they will not be repaired. This assumption has been made to
simplify the modeling effort. In real life, these states are not absorbing states. Specifically, the fail-safe
state will be repaired relatively quickly because entering the fail-safe state will result in a spurious trip of
the process. This assumption also brings about that it is not possible to fail again once entered into either
states. For example, a failure of component causes a transition from the fail-dangerous state to the fail-
safe state is not modeled.
spurious
6.13 The target PFDavg and MTTF is defined for each SIF implemented in the SIS.

6.14 For the first two examples the power supplies are not taken into account. The examples used in
this part assume a de-energized to trip system, which means that power supply failures only contribute to
the fail-safe state.

6.15 The Beta model is used to treat possible common cause failures.

NOTE A detailed explanation of the Beta model is given in Annex A of ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 1.

7 Overview examples
Four examples are presented in this document. More detail on the architectures and the performed
calculations can be found in the following clauses. The first three examples are specific examples for
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 4. Example 1 is a safety instrumented function (SIF) with two sets of
sensors where each individual sensor can shut down the process. Example 2 is the analysis of the same
SIF, taking into account diagnostic capabilities for the sensors and valves. Example 3 highlights
additional features that show the modeling capabilities of the Markov technique. The fourth example is
the base example that is also presented in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 2 and ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 –
Part 3. Table 7.1 gives an overview of the results of the performed calculations. Column 2 gives the
spurious
PFDavg after 1 year. Column 3 gives the MTTF after 1 year.

Table 7.1  Overview result s examples

Example: PFDavg MTTFspurious

(years)

1 1.2 x E-2 3.3

2 5.3 x E-3 3.3

3 does not apply does not apply

Base 8.3 x E-3 1.7

NOTE The four examples shown are NOT equivalent systems.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 22 −

8 Example 1
The following example is used to explain the Markov approach (Clause 5, procedures 3 through 7).

Figure 8.1 presents a Safety Instrumented Function where each individual sensor can shut down the
process. The system consists of two sets of sensors using 1oo2 shutdown logic connected to two valves
piped in series. The first set consists of two identical flow sensors and the second set consists of two
identical temperature sensors. Each sensor gives a signal to the logic solver. The signals from the
sensors are used by the logic solver to close the valves in case of an unacceptable situation. The Hazard
and Risk Analysis mandated a SIL 1. An analysis is performed to determine if the architecture shown in
Figure 8.1 is adequate. Diagnostic capabilities for sensors and valves are not taken into account. This
means that failure rates are only split into safe and dangerous rates. As a result, on-line repair is not
taken into account.

Flow

1oo2

Flow
Valve 1a

Logic 1oo2

Temperature Valve 1b

1oo2
Temperature

Figure 8.1  Example 1 (dem and mode process)

Table 8.1 shows a FMEA that lists the components, their failure modes and the effect on system level
after a single failure. Only one failure at the time is introduced. It is assumed that components can fail
due to a Safe (S), Dangerous (D), Safe Common Cause (SCC) or Dangerous Common Cause (DCC)
failure. The effect of a failure on the SIF can result in a fail-safe (FS) (or spurious trip state), a fail-
dangerous (FD) (or fail to function state) or in an intermediate state (IS).

Some component failures will lead to an intermediate state and, in that case, it is still possible for other
components to fail. For example, the SIF will enter an intermediate state if the Flow Sensor 1 fails in a
dangerous mode. Since this sensor has failed already it cannot fail in any other way. On the other hand,
the remaining components can still fail in the failure modes as presented in Table 8.1. All the information
to present the full Markov model is gathered, once there are no intermediate states left or there are no
components left that can fail. Table 8.1 only presents the information after a single component failure.
 − 23 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Table 8.1  Resulting state after single failure - Example 1

Starting from OK state

Component Failure Mode Resulting System State after a single
failure

Flow Sensor 1a (S1) S FS

D IS
SCC FS
DCC FD

Flow Sensor 1b (S1) S FS

D IS
SCC FS

DCC FD

Temperature Sensor 2a (S2) S FS

D IS
SCC FS
DCC FD

Temperature Sensor 2b (S2) S FS

D IS
SCC FS

DCC FD

Logic Solver (L)* S FS

D FD

Valve 1a (A) S FS
D IS

SCC FS
DCC FD

Valve 1b (A) S FS

D IS
SCC FS

DCC FD

S = Safe, D = Dangerous, SCC = Safe Common Cause, DCC = Dangerous Common Cause
FS = Fail-safe, FD = Fail-dangerous, IS = Intermediate State

*The data for the logic solver comes from the vendor (or the methodology used in Part 5). The data for the logic solver also
includes elements like common cause, systematic failures, etc.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 24 −

Figure 8.2 presents, without going into detail, the full Markov model for this example.

13

2
FS 7

4
18

8
11
14

1
6
OK

15
12

9
5

17

3 10
FD

16

Figure 8.2  Fully developed Markov model - Example 1

 − 25 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Table 8.2 gives a complete overview of the different states and associated meaning. Please note that
Table 8.2 does not show any transitions between the different states and does not provide information on
the specific failure that resulted in the current state. Each state gives the SIF status.

Table 8.2  Description of t he different states of the SIS - Example 1

State Description of the state

1, OK No failures, SIS operates without any component failed.

2, FS A component failure caused a spurious trip of the SIS.

3, FD A component failure caused a fail to function on demand of the SIS.

4 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

7 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Temperature Sensor failed
dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

13 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Temperature Sensor failed
dangerous (but not both) AND one Valve failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs
its function.

8 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Valve failed dangerous (but not
both), the SIS still performs its function.

14 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Valve failed dangerous (but not both)
AND one Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

5 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

9 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Flow Sensor Failed
Dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

15 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Flow Sensor Failed
Dangerous (but not both) AND one Valve failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs
its function.

10 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Valve failed dangerous (but
not both), the SIS still performs its function.

16 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Valve failed dangerous (but
not both) AND one Flow Sensor Failed Dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its
function.

6 One Valve failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

11 One Valve failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Flow Sensor Failed Dangerous (but not
both), the SIS still performs its function.

18 One Valve failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Flow Sensor Failed Dangerous (but not
both) AND one Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its
function.

12 One Valve failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but
not both), the SIS still performs its function.

17 One Valve failed dangerous (but not both) AND one Temperature Sensor failed dangerous (but
not both) AND one Flow Sensor Failed Dangerous (but not both), the SIS still performs its
function.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 26 −

The transition from the operating state 1 to the fail-safe state 2 can be represented as follows:

λ1, 2 = 2λSS1 + 2λSS 2 + λSL + 2λSA + β [λSS1 + λSS 2 + λSA ]

where λ represents the failure rate and β represents the beta model for common cause failures. This
expression means that any safe failure of one of the flow sensors, one of the temperature sensors, the
logic or one of the valves will lead to the fail-safe state. A safe common cause failure of the flow sensors,
the temperature sensor or the valves will also lead to the fail-safe state.

Similar transitions can be derived for the other states. State 3 is the fail-dangerous state and the states 4
through 18 represent intermediate states. The intermediate states 4, 5 and 6 are caused by a dangerous
failure of any of the flow sensors, a dangerous failure of any of the temperature sensors or a dangerous
failure of any of the valves, respectively. From the Markov model, it can be concluded that there are
single failures that directly lead to the fail-safe or fail-dangerous states, but also combinations of failures
(2, 3 or 4) that can lead to the fail-safe or fail-dangerous state. For example, a dangerous failure of one
of the flow sensors will lead to state 4. If this failure is followed by dangerous failure of one of the
temperature sensors, the system will transition to state 7. A dangerous failure of one the valves will lead
to state 13. The system is still functioning because there is still a working flow sensor, a working
temperature sensor and a working valve left. Any other failure from this state will lead to the fail-safe or to
the fail-dangerous state.

Aspects like voting, redundancy or diversity bring about a full Markov model of a SIF usually consisting of
many intermediate states. The quantitative results will mostly depend on the direct transitions to the fail-
safe and fail-dangerous states. As a result, in most cases, it is not necessary to present a fully developed
Markov model.

Each transition is an independent event. The transition from state 1 to state 2 is characterized by a
probability. The transition from state 1 to state 2 via state 4 is characterized by the probability to transition
from state 1 to state 4 AND the probability to transition from state 4 to state 2. In statistical terms, this
means that these probabilities need to be multiplied. The probabilities used in the safety industry are so
small that the contribution to a state by a transition of more than two steps can be neglected. Therefore,
the following simplified Markov model is presented:

2
FS

1
6
OK

3
FD

Figure 8.3  Simplified Mark ov model - Example 1

The meaning of each state corresponds with the description in Table 8.2. A maximum sequence of two
failures is presented. From the intermediate states 4, 5 and 6 only the transitions are shown that lead to
 − 27 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

the fail-safe and fail-dangerous states directly. The possible intermediates states resulting from 4, 5 and
6 are neglected. The formulas belonging to this Markov model are presented next.

[
λ 1,2 = 2λSS1 + 2λSS2 + λSL + 2λSA + β λSS1 + λSS2 + λSA ]
[
λ 1,3 = λDL + β λDS1 + λDS2 + λDA ]
λ 1,4 = 2λDS1

λ 1,5 = 2λDS 2

λ 1,6 = 2λDA

[
λ 4 ,2 = λSS1 + 2λSS2 + λSL + 2 λSA + β λSS2 + λSA ]
[
λ 4 ,3 = λDS1 + λDL + β λDS2 + λDA ]
[
λ 5,2 = 2 λSS1 + λSS2 + λSL + 2λSA + β λSS1 + λSA ]
[
λ 5,3 = λDS2 + λDL + β λDS 2 + λDA ]
[
λ 6,2 = 2λSS1 + 2 λSS 2 + λSL + λSA + β λSS1 + λSS1 ]
[
λ 6,3 = λDL + λDA + β λDS1 + λDS2 ]
9 Quantifying a Markov model
Once the Markov model has been developed it can be quantified. Two methods are available to quantify
a Markov model. These methods are

• the Differential Equations Method; and

• the Matrix Multiplication Method.

9.1 The Differential Equations Method is practical if the number of Markov states is limited ( ≤ 6). For
(3)

small systems this is an acceptable method. When the systems are larger, the Markov models become
more complex and the Differential Equation Method is very time consuming and cumbersome. This
technique is discussed in Annex A.4.1 of ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 5.

9.2 The Matrix Multiplication Method is a straightforward method and is relatively easy to translate into
computer code. The method is based on a Stochastical Transition Matrix whose elements represent the
probability of making a transition from one state to another in a certain time interval. If Λ represents this
transition matrix then the element λ1,2 of the matrix is defined as the Probability of making a transition to
state 2 after a time interval t + ∆t, given that the system was in state 1 at time t.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 28 −

ToState→
 λ1,1 λ1,2 
T = FromState ↓  .
λ 2,1 λ 2, 2 

The term ∆t is introduced to transfer from failure rate to probabilities. This is done by multiplying the
failure rate by ∆t, because P ( Failure) ≅ λ∆t (for more details see ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 5). ∆t
must be chosen so small that the probability of having two or more failures in this time interval can be
neglected. To simplify calculations ∆t is often chosen to be 1 hour. For the Markov model in Figure 8.3
the transition matrix Τ looks like:

 6

 ∑ λ1,i ⋅ ∆t λ1, 2 ⋅ ∆t λ1,3 ⋅ ∆t
1 − λ1, 4 ⋅ ∆t λ1,5 ⋅ ∆t λ1,6 ⋅ ∆t 
 i ≠1 
 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 6 
T= 0 λ 4, 2 ⋅ ∆t λ 4,3 ⋅ ∆t 1 − ∑ λ 4,i ⋅ ∆t 0 0 .
 i≠4 
 6

 0 λ 5, 2 ⋅ ∆t λ 5,3 ⋅ ∆t 0 1 − ∑ λ 5,i ⋅ ∆t 0 
i≠5
 6 
 0 λ 6, 2 ⋅ ∆t λ 6,3 ⋅ ∆t 0 0 1 − ∑ λ 6,i ⋅ ∆t 
 i≠6 

Once the matrix has been defined the probability of making a transition from one state to another after q
time intervals can be determined using the following formula

T(q ) = T q

which means multiplying the matrix q times with itself or taking the matrix to the q-th power. The variable
q should be in-line with ∆t. Therefore, if ∆t equals 1 hour and the system should be evaluated for two
years then q equals to

2 ⋅ 365 ⋅ 24
q= = 17520 ,
1

assuming 24 hours a day and 365 days a year. Τ(q) is a new transition matrix after q time intervals.
Eventually the system can be evaluated with the following expression

P(t ) = P(0 ) ⋅ T q ,

where the vector P(t) represents the probability of being in a state at time t, P(0) represents the initial
state vector and t = q∆t. The initial vector for the example used in this paragraph equals
 − 29 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

P(0 ) = [1 0 0 0 0 0] .

This vector states that, at time zero, the probability of being in state one (OK state) is 1 and the probability
of being in any other state is 0. P(t) represents the vector of being in any of the states at time t,

P(t ) = [P1 (t ) P2 (t ) P3 (t ) P4 (t ) P5 (t ) P6 (t )] .

The states 2 and 3 represent the Spurious Trip state and the Fail to Function state, respectively. The
probability of a system to be in a spurious trip state at time t equals

PSpurious Trip ( t ) = P2 (t )

and the probability of a system to fail to function on demand at time t equals

PFail to Function ( t ) = P3 ( t )

The PFDavg can be calculated by using the following formula:

∫P Fail to Function ( t )dt

PFDavg( t ) = 0
.
t

10 Results Example 1
To actually perform the calculations, the data from Table 4.1 in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1 has been
used. For the logic solver, the assumption is made that it has a PFDavg of 0.005. For more detail on how
to evaluate the performance of the logic solver, see ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 5, which takes into
account the important aspects of a logic solver like redundancy, voting, diagnostics capabilities, etc. In
this example, the logic solver is modeled as one block. The probability of failure on demand and the
probability of spurious trip are shown in Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2, respectively. The theory behind the
uncertainty and sensitivity plots is explained in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1, Clause 5.9.

Figure 10.1 shows the instantaneous PFD for the SIF as a function of the testing interval, TI. The PFDavg
can be calculated from Figure 10.1, by averaging the instantaneous values over 1 year. The PFDavg is
1.2 x E-2, which means that this SIF has SIL 1 performance. The STR for example 1 can be calculated
spurious
from Figure 10.2 and equals 0.303 per year. This is equivalent to a MTTF of 3.3 years.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 30 −

0
10

-1
10

-2
10
Probability [-]

-3
10

-4
10

-5
10

-6
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFD, Example 1, No Diagnostics

FD Flow sensor

FD Temp sensor

Common cause

FS Temp sensor

FD Valve

FS Valve

FD Logic

FS Flow sensor

FS Logic

0 Low 0.5 Medium 1 High 1.5 Dominant

Statistical sensitivity

Statistical Sensitivity Parameters for the PFD, Example 1, No Diagnostics

Figure 10.1  PFD and sensi tivity plot - Example 1
 − 31 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

0
10

-1
10

-2
10
Probability [-]

-3
10

-4
10

-5
10

-6
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFS, Example 1, No Diagnostics

FS Flow sensor

FS Temp sensor

FS Valve

Common cause

FD Flow sensor

FD Temp sensor

FS Logic

FD Valve

FD Logic

0 Low 0.5 Medium 1 High 1.5 Dominant

Statistical sensitivity

Statistical Sensitivity Parameters of the PFS, Example 1, No Diagnostics

Figure 10.2  Probability of s purious trip and sensitivity plot - Example 1
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 32 −

11 Example 2
Example 2 is the same SIF as in Example 1. In this case, sensors and valve diagnostic capability is taken
into account. This is intended to illustrate what impact the addition of diagnostic coverage to the
architecture in Example 1 has on the attainable SIL. The use of the diagnostics coverage factor divides
each of the safe and dangerous failures rates into a detected part and an undetected part. This means
that a sensor or valve can now fail in four different ways, i.e., safe detected (SD), safe undetected (SU),
dangerous detected (DD) and dangerous undetected (DU). Using these failure modes for the example in
Figure 8.1, Table 11.1 can be created for the resulting states after a single failure. Failures that lead to
an intermediate state and are detected can be repaired on-line.

Table 11.1  Resulting state after single failure with diagnostic capabilities -
Examples 2
Starting from Ok state

Component Failure Mode Resulting State after single failure Repair action

Flow Sensor 1a (S1) SD FS

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS
SCC FS
DCC FD

Flow Sensor 1b (S1) SD FS

SU FS

DD IS on-line
DU IS
SCC FS

DCC FD

Temperature Sensor 2a SD FS
(S2)
SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS
SCC FS
DCC FD

Temperature Sensor 2b SD FS
(S2)
SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS
SCC FS
DCC FD
 − 33 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Logic Solver (L)* S FS

D FD

Valve 1a (A) SD FS
SU FS

DD IS on-line
DU IS
SCC FS

DCC FD

Valve 1b (A) SD FS
SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

SCC FS
DCC FD

S = Safe, SD = Safe Detected, SU = Safe Undetected, SCC = Safe Common Cause, D = Dangerous,
DD = Dangerous Detected, DU = Dangerous Undetected, DCC = Dangerous Common Cause
FS = Fail-safe, FD = Fail-dangerous, IS = Intermediate State

* The data for the logic solver comes from the vendor (or the methodology used in Part 5).

2
FS

1
OK
7

3
FD

Figure 11.1  Simplified Mar kov model with diagnostics - Example 2

Figure 11.1 shows the associated simplified Markov model taking into account sequences of only two
failures that will lead to the fail-safe and fail-dangerous state.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 34 −

Table 11.2 gives an overview of the states of Figure 11.1. Please note that Table 11.2 does not show
any transitions between the different states and does not provide information on the specific failure that
resulted in the current state. Each state gives the SIF status.

Table 11.2  Description of the different states of the SIS - Example 2

State Description of the state

1, OK No failures, SIS operates without any component failed.

2, FS A component failure caused a spurious trip of the SIS.

3, FD A component failure caused a fail to function on demand of the SIS.

4 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

5 One Flow Sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

6 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

7 One Temperature Sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

8 One Valve failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

9 One Valve failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

The formulas belonging to this Markov model are presented next:

[
λ 1,2 = 2λSS1 + 2λSS2 + λSL + 2λSA + β λSS2 + λSS2 + λSA ]
[
λ 1,3 = λDL + β λDS1 + λDS 2 + λDA ]
λ1, 4 = 2λSDD
1 λ 4,1 = µ OT

λ1,5 = 2λDU
S1

λ1, 6 = 2λSDD2 λ 6,1 = µ OT

λ1, 7 = 2λDU
S2

λ 1,8 = 2λDD
A λ8,1 = µ OT

λ 1,9 = 2λDU
A

λ 4 ,2 = λSS1 + λDD S S S S
[
S1 + 2 λ S 2 + λ L + 2 λ A + β λ S 2 + λ A
S
]
λ 4 ,3 = λDU [
S1 + λ L + β λ S 2 + λ A
D D D
]
λ 5,2 = λSS1 + λDD S S S S
[
S1 + 2 λ S 2 + λ L + 2 λ A + β λ S 2 + λ A
S
]
 − 35 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

λ 5,3 = λDU [
S1 + λ L + β λ S 2 + λ A
D D D
]
λ 6,2 = 2λSS1 + λSS2 + λDD S S
[
S 2 + λ L + 2 λ A + β λ S1 + λ A
S S
]
λ 6,3 = λDU [
S1 + λ L + β λ S1 + λ A
D D D
]
λ 7 ,2 = 2λSS1 + λSS2 + λDD S S
[
S 2 + λ L + 2 λ A + β λ S1 + λ A
S S
]
λ 7 ,3 = λDU [
S 2 + λ L + β λ S1 + λ A
D D D
]
λ 8,2 = 2λSS1 + 2λSS 2 + λSL + λSA + λDD [
A + β λ S1 + λ S 2
S S
]
λ 8,3 = λDL + λDU [
A + β λ S1 + λ S 2
D D
]
λ 9 ,2 = 2λSS1 + 2 λSS2 + λSL + λSA + λDD [
A + β λ S1 + λ S1
S S
]
λ 9 ,3 = λDL + λDU [
A + β λ S1 + λ S 2
D D
]
12 Results Example 2
To actually perform the calculations, the data from Table 4.1 in TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 1 has been used.
For the logic solver, the assumption is made that it has a PFDavg of 0.005. For more detail on how to
evaluate the performance of the logic solver, see ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 5, which takes into account
the important aspects of a logic solver like redundancy, voting, diagnostics capabilities, etc. In this
example the logic solver is modeled as one block. The probability of failure on demand and the
probability of spurious trip are shown respectively in Figure 12.1 and Figure 12.2. The theory behind the
uncertainty and sensitivity plots is explained in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1, Clause 5.9.

Figure 12.1 shows the instantaneous PFD for the SIF as a function of the testing interval, TI. The PFDavg
can be calculated from Figure 12.1, by averaging the instantaneous values over 1 year. The PFDavg is
5.3 x E-3, which means that this SIF has SIL 2 performance. The STR for example 2 can be calculated
spurious
from Figure 12.2 and equals 0.303 per year. This is equivalent to a MTTF of 3.3 years.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 36 −

0
10

-1
10

-2
10
Probability [-]

-3
10

-4
10

-5
10

-6
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFD, Example 2, With Diagnostics

FDU Flow sensor

FDU Temp sensor
FDU Valve
Online repair
FDD Flow sensor
FDD Temp sensor
FDD Valve
Common cause
FS Logic
FSU Flow sensor
FSD Flow sensor
FD Logic
FSD Temp sensor
FSU Temp sensor
FSD Valve
FSU Valve
0 Low 0.5 Medium 1 High 1.5 Dominant
Statistical sensitivity

Statistical Sensitivity PFD, Example 2, With Diagnostics

Figure 12.1  Probability of fail on demand and sensitivity plot with diagnostics -
Example 2
 − 37 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

0
10

-1
10

-2
10
Probability [-]

-3
10

-4
10

-5
10

-6
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFS, Example 2, With Diagnostics

FSD Flow sensor

FSD Temp sensor
FSU Flow sensor
FSU Temp sensor
FSU Valve
FDD Flow sensor
Online repair
FSD Valve
Common cause
FDU Temp sensor
FS Logic
FDU Valve
FDU Flow sensor
FDD Temp sensor
FDD Valve
FD Logic
0 Low 0.5 Medium 1 High 1.5 Dominant
Statistical sensitivity

Statistical Sensitivity PFS, Example 2, With Diagnostics

Figure 12.2  PFS and sensi tivity plot with diagnostics - Example 2
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 38 −

13 Example 3
Example 1 and 2 clearly show that more detailed modeling of the SIF application can make a large
difference in the results. Example 1, which did not include diagnostics capabilities of the sensors and
valves, resulted in a lower SIL level than Example 2, which included the diagnostic capability of the
redundant components. The Markov approach can account for the diagnostic coverage without
introducing additional complexity concerning the model or the analysis of the model.

The following example includes two modeling features that can easily be included in a Markov model.
The modeling features highlighted are periodic testing and imperfect testing. It is assumed that an
existing SIF application has a PFD as presented in the left graph of Figure 13.1. The required SIL of the
SIF application is SIL 2. With the current functional test interval of one (1) year, it is clear that most of the
time the PFD does not reach a SIL 2. It is decided that the SIF application will be subject to four
Functional Tests, one every three months. These tests are very simple and will not find every failure in
the SIF application, which means that they are imperfect. The results of the quarterly functional imperfect
testing are shown in the right graph of Figure 13.1. By testing the SIS on an increased basis, it can be
seen that it is possible to keep the SIS application in the SIL 2 range. The second functional test, carried
out after 6 months, is a better test then the two tests carried out after 3 and 9 months and results in a
larger drop in PFD. From this example, it can be seen that it is possible to model different functional tests
where each test can have a different coverage.

Probability [-] Probability [-]

0 0
10 10

-1 -1
10 10

-2 -2
10 10

-3 -3
10 10

-4 -4
10 10

-5 -5
10 10

-6 -6
10 10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [Hours] Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFD, Functional Test Interval 1 year PFD, Functional Testing 4 per year,
tests are imperfect

Figure 13.1  PFD before an d after periodic and imperfect testing

For a SIF application, it is possible to include important design, installation, and testing aspects and
model it in one Markov model. For example, one Markov model can include all the information necessary
to calculate the PFD and PFS of the SIS application, including different failures modes for different
components, diverse components, sequences of failures in time, systematic failures and common cause
failures, different repair strategies for different components, functional testing, imperfect testing (repair)
and all of this as a function of time.
 − 39 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

14 Base example calculation for an SIF using Markov models

The following example, see Figure 14.1, is the base example that can also be found in ISA-TR84.00.02-
2002 – Part 2 and ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 3. In this example, a tank is equipped with four
safeguards to reduce the risk associated with the involved hazards. The SIF used to protect the process
is presented in Figure 14.2.
spurious
This SIF is evaluated to demonstrate the procedure for calculating a SIF PFDavg and MTTF . The
PFDavg and spurious trip rate calculation provided in this clause is for illustrative purposes only
and should not be used without review for the appropriateness for the specific installation. The
following assumptions are made relative to the SIS components:

1. All inputs and outputs in the example are assumed to be part of the same SIF. Therefore a single
spurious
PFDavg and a single MTTF are calculated for the entire SIF.

2. In a process hazards analysis, it was determined that the SIF should have a SIL 2.

3. The SIF is designed as de-energize to trip and will go to a safe state on loss of power. The
spurious
MTTF of the power supply is assumed to be 20 years.

4. Redundant AC power supplies (2) are provided external to the system.

5. All redundant devices are assumed to have the same failure rate.

6. The logic solver is a PES with output redundancy to prevent unsafe failure of an output and has an
spurious
external watchdog circuit. The PFDL and MTTF for the logic solver are assumed values. The
spurious
PFDavg is 0.005 and the MTTF is 10 years.

CAUTION  THE USER SHOULD OBTAIN PFDL FROM THE LOGIC SOLVER VENDOR FOR
THE ACTUAL FUNCTIONAL TEST INTERVAL.

7. It is generally assumed that when a dangerous detected failure occurs, the SIF will take the process
to a safe state or plant personnel will take necessary action to ensure the process is safe (operator
response is assumed to be before a demand occurs and PFD of operator response is assumed to be
0).

NOTE If the action depends on plant personnel to provide safety, the user is cautioned to account for the probability of failure
of personnel to perform the required function in a timely manner.

8. A one (1) year functional test interval is assumed for the SIF components. Testing is assumed to be
perfect.

9. The mean time to repair is assumed to be 8 hours, and the repair is assumed to be perfect.

10. The effects of common cause and systematic errors are assumed to be negligible in the calculations.

11. For simplicity, other possible contributions to PFD and STR such as loss of instrument air are not
DU spurious
included in the example calculations. They are incorporated into the MTTF and MTTF for the
individual components.
D spurious
12. The MTTF and MTTF values used in the example are representative values taken from the
Table 5.1 of ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1.

13. The data used to perform the calculations is taken from Clause 6 in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 2.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 40 −

14. The use of diagnostics outside the normal design of the device is not modeled in this example. It is
assumed that spurious failures are detected on-line.

15. The MTTF number used in the example in Clause 14 are for illustrative purposes only and
should not be used for actual evaluation of a SIF.
 − 41 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

I
I
1oo2
2oo3
SOL1 SOL2

I I
FT1 FT2 FT3 s s
1oo2 1oo2
DE DE

BV1 BV2

PT1 PT2 TS1 TS2

LS1 LS2 I

1oo2

Figure 14.1  SIS process di agram - Base example

Flow Element
2oo3

PressureXmitter
1oo2

Logic Solver
PE
Temp. Switch
1oo2

Level Switch 1oo2

1oo2

Figure 14.2  SIS configurat ion - Base example

Table 14.1 shows the resulting state after a single failure.

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 42 −

Table 14.1  Resulting state after single failure - Base example

Starting from OK state

Component Failure Mode Resulting State after single failure Repair action

Flow Sensor 1a (S1) SD IS on-line

SU IS
DD IS online
DU IS

Flow Sensor 1b (S1) SD IS on-line

SU IS
DD IS online

DU IS

Flow Sensor 1c (S1) SD IS on-line

SU IS
DD IS online
DU IS

Pressure Sensor 2a (S2) SD FS

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

Pressure Sensor 2b (S2) SD FS

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

Temperature Sensor 3a SD FS
(S3)

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

Temperature Sensor 3b SD FS
(S3)

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

Level Sensor 4a (S4) SD FS

SU FS

DD IS on-line
DU IS
 − 43 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Level Sensor 4b (S4) SD FS

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

Logic Solver (L)* S FS

D FD

Solenoid Valve 1a (A1) SD FS

SU FS
DD IS on-line
DU IS

Solenoid Valve 1b (A1) SD FS

SU FS
DD ID on-line
DU ID

Valve 1a (A2) SD FS
SU FS

DD IS on-line
DU IS

Valve 1b (A2) SD FS

SU FS
DD IS on-line

DU IS

Power supply 1a (PS) SD IS on-line

SU IS
Power supply 1b (PS) SD IS on-line
SU IS

S = Safe, D = Dangerous, SD = Safe Detected, SU = Safe Undetected, DD = Dangerous Detected DU =

Dangerous Undetected, FS = Fail-safe, FD = Fail-dangerous, IS = Intermediate State

* The data for the logic solver comes from the vendor (or the methodology used in Part 5).

Figure 14.3 shows the associated Markov model taking into account only sequences of two failures that
will lead to the fail-safe and fail-dangerous state.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 44 −

2
12 4

13
5

14
6

15 7

16 8

17 9

18 10

19 11
3

Figure 14.3  Simplified Mar kov model - Base example

 − 45 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Table 14.2 gives an overview of the states of Figure 14.3. Please note that Table 14.2 does not say
anything about the transitions between the different states. Each state gives the current status of the SIS.
How the SIS got into this state is not described in this table.

Table 14.2  Description of the different states of the SIS - Base example

State Description of the states

1, No failures, SIS operates without any component failed.

OK

2, A component failure caused a spurious trip of the SIS.

FS

3, A component failure caused a fail to function on demand of the SIS.

FD

4 One Flow sensor failed safe detected (but not all three of them), the SIS still performs its function.

5 One Flow sensor failed safe undetected (but not all three of them), the SIS still performs its function.

6 One Flow sensor failed dangerous detected (but not all three of them), the SIS still performs its function.

7 One Flow sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not all three of them), the SIS still performs its function.

8 One Pressure sensor failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

9 One Pressure sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

10 One Temperature sensor failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

11 One Temperature sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

12 One Level sensor failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

13 One Level sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

14 One Solenoid Valve failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

15 One Solenoid Valve failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

16 One Valve sensor failed dangerous detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

17 One Valve sensor failed dangerous undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

18 One Power supply failed safe detected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

19 One Power supply failed safe undetected (but not both), the SIS still performs its function.

The formulas belonging to this Markov model are presented next:

λ 1,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS 4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ1,3 = λDL

λ1, 4 = 3λSD
S1 λ 4,1 = µ OT

λ 4 ,2 = 2λSS1 + 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ 4,3 = λDL
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 46 −

λ1,5 = 3λSU
S1

λ 5,2 = 2λSS1 + 2λSS2 + 2λSS 3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ5,3 = λDL

λ1,6 = 3λDD
S1 λ 6,1 = µ OT

λ 6,2 = 2λDD
S1 + 2 λ S 2 + 2 λ S 3 + 2 λ S 4 + λ L + 2 λ A 1 + 2 λ A 2
S S S S S S

λ 6,3 = λDL

λ1, 7 = 3λDU
S1

λ 7 ,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ 7,3 = 2λDU
S1 + 2λ S1 + λ L
DD D

λ1,8 = 2λDD
S2 λ8,1 = µ OT

λ 8,2 = λSS 2 + λDD

S 2 + 2λ S 3 + 2λ S 4 + λ L + 2λ A1 + 2λ A 2
S S S S S

λ8,3 = λDU
S2 + λ L
D

λ1,9 = 2λDU
S2

λ 9 ,2 = λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ9,3 = λDD
S2 + λS2 + λ L
DU D

λ1,10 = 2λDD
S3 λ10,1 = µ OT

λ 10,2 = 2λSS 2 + λSS3 + λDD

S 3 + 2 λ S 4 + λ L + 2 λ A1 + 2 λ A 2
S S S S

λ10,3 = λDU
S3 + λ L
D

λ1,11 = 2λDU
S3

λ 11,2 = 2λSS2 + λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

 − 47 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

λ11,3 = λDD
S3 + λ S3 + λ L
DU D

λ1,12 = 2λDD
S4 λ12,1 = µ OT

λ 12 ,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + λSS4 + λDD

S 4 + λ L + 2λ A 1 + 2λ A 2
S S S

λ12,3 = λDU
S4 + λ L
D

λ1,13 = 2λDU
S4

λ 13,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ 13,3 = λDD
S 4 + λS 4 + λL
DU D

λ 1,14 = 2λDD
A1 λ14,1 = µ OT

λ 14 ,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + λSA1 + λDD

A 1 + 2λ A 2 + λ A 2
S DD

λ 14 ,3 = λDU
A1 + λ A 2 + λ L
DU D

λ 1,15 = 2λDU
A1

λ 15,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS 4 + λSL + λSA1 + 2λSA 2

λ 15,3 = λDD
A1 + λ A1 + λ A 2 + λ A 2 + λ L
DU DD DU D

λ 1,16 = 2λDD
A2 λ16,1 = µ OT

λ 16,2 = 2λSS 2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + λDD

A1 + λ A 2 + λ A 2
S DD

λ 16,3 = λDU
A1 + λ A 2 + λ L
DU D

λ 1,17 = 2λDU
A2

λ 17 ,2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + λSA 2

λ 17 ,3 = λDD
A1 + λ A 1 + λ A 2 + λ A 2 + λ L
DU DD DU D

λ 1,18 = 2λSD
PS λ18,1 = µOT
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 48 −

λ 18,2 = 2λSS 2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2 + λSPS

λ18,3 = λDL

λ1,19 = 2λSU
PS

λ19, 2 = 2λSS2 + 2λSS3 + 2λSS4 + λSL + 2λSA1 + 2λSA 2 + λSPS

λ19,3 = λDL

15 Results base example

Using the data from ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 – Part 1 and the assumptions from ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 –
Part 2, the results shown in Figure 15.1 and Figure 15.2 are obtained. The logic solver is assumed to
spurious
have a PFDavg of 0.005 and MTTF of 10 years.

0
10

-1
10

-2
10
Probability [-]

-3
10

-4
10

-5
10

-6
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFD, Base Example

Figure 15.1  Probability of f ailure on demand - Base example

Figure 15.1 shows the instantaneous PFD for the SIF as a function of the testing interval, TI. The PFDavg
for the Base Example can be calculated from Figure 15.1, by averaging the instantaneous values over 1
year. The PFDavg equals 8.3 x E-3, which means that this SIF meets a SIL 2 performance. Next, the
calculated PFDavg should be compared to the target SIL specified in the Safety Requirements
 − 49 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

Specification (See ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996, Clause 5 and Clause 6.2.2) for each SIF. Since the target SIL
is SIL 2, the SIF does meet the specification.

0
10

-1
10

-2
10
Probability [-]

-3
10

-4
10

-5
10

-6
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Functional Test Interval [hours]

PFS, Base Example

Figure 15.2  Probability of s purious trip - Base example

The STR for the base case example can be calculated from Figure 15.2 and equals 0.59 per year. This is
spurious
equivalent to a MTTF of 1.7 years.
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 50 −

16 Index
accuracy 13

architecture(s) 9, 10, 21, 22, 32

assessment 9

availability 11, 13, 18

boundary(ies) 12

calculation(s) 14, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29, 35, 39

code(s) 27

common cause 11, 14, 15, 19, 21, 26, 38, 39

common cause failure(s) 14, 15, 21, 26, 38

complex 13, 27

computational 19

configuration(s) 9, 11, 14, 15, 19, 20

cost 14

coverage 9, 15, 17, 32, 38

coverage factor 32

covert 17

covert fault(s) 17

current 19, 25, 34, 38, 45

dangerous detected failure(s) 20, 39

de-energize(d) to trip 21, 39

de-energized 21

definitions 14

demand 9, 11, 13, 19, 21, 25, 29, 34, 35, 39, 45

demand mode 11, 13

designer 9, 14

diagnostic coverage 9, 15, 17, 32

 − 51 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

diagnostic(s) 9, 15, 17, 19, 21, 29, 32, 35, 38, 40

diagram 13

diverse 38

diversity 9, 13, 26

document(s) 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 39

documents 11, 12, 13, 14

errors 39

fail-safe 21, 26, 27, 33, 43

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 19, 22

failure mode(s) 17, 19, 20, 22, 32

failure rate data 14

failure rate(s) 14, 17, 20, 22, 26, 28, 39

false 14

fault tree(s) 13

field device(s) 9

final control element(s) [See field device(s)] 19, 20

final element(s) [See field device(s)] 11, 14, 20

flow 22, 26

frequency 9, 13

function 11, 13, 15

function(s) 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 29, 34, 38, 39, 45, 49

functional test interval 19, 38, 39

functional test(s) 19, 38, 39

functional testing 38

hardware 9, 13, 14, 19

hardware configuration 19

hazard(s) 9, 39

hazardous 14
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 52 −

hazardous event(s) 14

identical 22, 32

IEC 14

industry 9, 11, 26

input module(s) 20

inspection(s) 9, 13

inspections 13

installation 11

internal 18

life cycle 11

logic solver(s) 11, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 29, 33, 35, 39, 43, 48

maintenance 9, 10, 11, 13, 15

Markov analysis 9, 10, 14

Markov modeling 17, 18, 19

measure(s) 11, 13

mode(s) 11, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 32, 38

modeling 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 38

modification(s) 13
MTTFspurious
10, 39, 48

nuisance trip 9, 14

objective(s) 14

off-line 19

on-line 19, 22, 32, 33, 42, 43

operator response 20, 39

operator(s) 15, 20, 39

output(s) [See input/output devices and input/output modules] 20, 39

panel(s) 9

parameter(s) 9, 14, 15
 − 53 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

period(s) 13, 14

PFDavg 10, 17, 19, 21, 29, 35, 39, 48

plant 20, 21, 39

power 21, 28, 39

power supply(ies) 21, 39

process industry(ies) 9, 11

program(s) 19

Programmable Electronic System(s) (PES) 9, 10, 14, 39

purpose(s) 9, 40

quality 9, 13

quantified 27

quantitative 14, 26

redundancy 9, 13, 17, 20, 26, 29, 35, 39

redundant 11, 39

reference(s) 11

reliability 9, 10, 13, 20

repair(s) 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 38, 39

response(s) 21, 39

risk assessment 9

risk reduction 11

risk(s) 9, 11, 39

safe 14, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 32, 33, 39, 43, 45

safe state(s) 20, 21, 26, 39

safety availability 11, 13

safety function(s) 9, 11, 13, 19, 21, 39, 49

Safety Instrumented System(s) (SIS)9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41,
45

safety integrity 11, 13, 14

ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4 − 54 −

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 9, 10, 11, 17

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Evaluation Techniques 9, 10, 17

sensor(s) [See field device(s)] 11, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 32, 38, 45

sequence(s) of failure(s) 19, 38

sequencer(s) of failure(s) 19, 38

shutdown 14, 22

SIL 1 11, 22, 29

SIL 2 35, 38, 39, 48

simple 38

SIS application(s) 38

SIS architecture 9, 10

SIS components 10, 39

software 9, 13, 15

spurious trip(s) 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 34, 35, 45

supplier(s) 9

system analysis techniques 14

systematic error(s) 39

systematic failure(s) 13, 14, 15, 19, 38

team 9

temperature 22, 26

terminology 18

Test Interval (TI) 17, 19, 20, 38, 39

test(s) 17, 19, 20, 38, 39

testing 9, 13, 19, 38, 39

time(s) 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 38

TR84.00.02 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 35, 39, 48

transistor(s) 18

trip(s) 9, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 34, 35, 39, 45
 − 55 − ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 4

validation 17

valve(s) 20, 21, 22, 26, 32, 38

variable(s) 28

vendor(s) 20, 33, 39, 43

voting 26, 29, 35

watchdog 39

watchdog circuit 39
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