United Nations

Security Council
Resolution 47

The United Nations Security Council

Resolution 47, adopted on 21 April 1948,
concerns the resolution of the Kashmir
conflict. After hearing arguments from
both India and Pakistan, the Council
increased the size of the Commission
established by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 39 to five members
(with representatives of Argentina,
Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia and
the United States[1]), instructed the
Commission to go to the subcontinent and
help the governments of India and
Pakistan restore peace and order to the
region and prepare for a plebiscite to
decide the fate of Kashmir.
 UN Security Council 47

Date 21 April 1948

Meeting no. 286

Code S/726 (Document (htt

ps://undocs.org/S/RE
S/47(1948)) )

Subject The India–Pakistan

Question

Result Adopted

Secondly, the Resolution recommended a

three-step process for the resolution of the
dispute. In the first step, Pakistan was
asked to withdraw all its nationals that
entered Kashmir for the sake of fighting. In
the second step, India was asked to
progressively reduce its forces to the
minimum level required for law and order.
In the third step, India was asked to
appoint a plebiscite administrator
nominated by the United Nations who
would conduct a free and impartial
plebiscite.

The resolution was adopted paragraph by

paragraph; no vote on the resolution as a
whole was taken.

Both India and Pakistan raised objections

to the Resolution. However, they
welcomed mediation by the UN
Commission. Through its mediation, the
Commission amplified and amended the
Security Council Resolution, adopting two
resolutions of its own, which were
accepted by both India and Pakistan.
Subsequently, a cease-fire was achieved
by the Commission at the beginning of
1949. However, a truce was not achieved
due to disagreements over the process of
demilitarisation. After considerable
efforts, the Commission declared its
failure in December 1949.

Background
Map of the former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir

Prior to 1947, Jammu and Kashmir

(Kashmir) was a princely state under
British Paramountcy, ruled by a Hindu
maharaja. With the impending
independence of India and Pakistan, the
British announced that the British
Paramountcy would lapse and the rulers of
princely states were given the option of
joining one of the two new countries
(termed "accession") or staying
independent. The Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir chose to stay independent, given
the mixed ethnic and religious
composition of the state's population.[a]

Following an uprising in the western

districts of the state and an armed
invasion by Pashtun tribes from Pakistan,
the Maharaja acceded to India on 26
October 1947. India immediately air lifted
troops into Kashmir the next day.
Considerable evidence cited by scholars
since then has pointed to Pakistan's
complicity in instigating and supporting
the invasion. A limited war ensued
between the Indian troops and the
Pakistani raiders within the confines of the
princely state.

On 1 January 1948, India took the matter

to the United Nations Security Council
under Article 35 of the UN Charter, which
allows the member nations to bring to the
attention of the UN matters endangering
international peace. It claimed that
Pakistani nationals and tribesmen had
attacked Jammu and Kashmir, which was
Indian territory. It requested the Security
Council to prevent Pakistan from
continuing its actions. India also stated
that, despite holding the state's legal
accession, it was prepared to conduct a
plebiscite to confirm the people's wishes
and abide by its results. In response,
Pakistan denied involvement in the conflict
and made counter-accusations claiming
that India had acquired the state's
accession by "fraud and violence" and that
it was conducting a "genocide" against
Muslims.[3]

On 20 January 1948, the Security Council

passed Resolution 39 establishing a three-
member Commission to investigate the
complaints. However such a Commission
did not come into fruition until May 1948.
Meanwhile, the Security Council continued
its deliberations and the war too
continued.

Resolution 47
On 18 March, the Republic of China tabled
a new draft resolution in three parts. The
first part dealt with the restoration of
peace, asking Pakistan to withdraw its
nationals. The second part dealt with the
conduct of plebiscite for the people of
Kashmir to choose between India and
Pakistan. India was asked to create a
"Plebiscite Administration" whose
directors would be nominated by the UN
Secretary General but would function as
the officials of the state. The third part
dealt with creating an interim
administration for the state which would
represent all major political groups in the
state.[4]

During the subsequent discussion, the

draft was modified considerably, with
several concessions made to Pakistan at
the instigation of the British delegation.
India expressed discomfort at the
modifications.[5]

The resolution …
The final resolution adopted had two
parts. The first part increased the
Commission's strength to five members
and asked it to proceed to the Indian
subcontinent at once to mediate between
India and Pakistan. The second part dealt
with the Security council's
recommendations for restoring peace and
conducting a plebiscite. This involved
three steps.[5][6]

In the first step, Pakistan was asked to

use its "best endeavours" to secure the
withdrawal of all tribesmen and
Pakistani nationals, putting an end to
the fighting in the state.
In the second step, India was asked to
"progressively reduce" its forces to the
minimum level required for keeping law
and order. It laid down principles that
India should follow in administering law
and order in consultation with the
Commission, using local personnel as
far as possible.
In the third step, India was asked to
ensure that all the major political parties
were invited to participate in the state
government at the ministerial level,
essentially forming a coalition cabinet.
India should then appoint a Plebiscite
Administrator nominated by the United
Nations, who would have a range of
 powers including powers to deal with
the two countries and ensure a free and
impartial plebiscite. Measures were to
be taken to ensure the return of
refugees, the release of all political
prisoners, and for political freedom.

The resolution was approved by nine votes

against none. The Soviet Union and
Ukrainian SSR abstained.[7]

Commentary …

The resolution was passed under the

Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter
(which is devoted to "peaceful settlement
of disputes"). It did not consist of
directives to the parties, but rather
"recommendations". Former UN diplomat
Josef Korbel states that this bound the
parties only "morally" but not "juridicially".
The final resolution of the conflict rested
with the governments of India and
Pakistan and depended on their
goodwill.[8]

The Security Council refrained from taking

sides in the dispute. It did not condemn
Pakistan as the aggressor, as India had
requested. Neither did it touch upon the
legalities of the accession of Jammu and
Kashmir. Korbel states that the Security
Council could have requested the
International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on the legal issues. Had
that been done, the Security Council would
have been in a stronger position to declare
one of the parties to be in the wrong, and
the handling of the dispute would have
been easier.[8]

In the event, the approach of the Security

Council was "timid" in Korbel's view. Its
evaluation of the Kashmir dispute was not
realistic as discovered soon with
prolonged debates, endless wrangling, and
adjournment of the deliberations. With the
passing of time, the tensions and political
cleavages in Kashmir grew and the
plebiscite solution became increasingly
difficult.[9]

The American ambassador to the UN

Warren R. Austin also shared the view. He
thought the resolution, as well as others
that followed, were unrealistic and
ineffective. They depended on the goodwill
of India and Pakistan cooperating with the
Security Council and failed to give it the
authority to impose sanctions. The US
embassies in India and Pakistan were
equally frustrated.[10]

It is apparent that the Security Council

viewed the problem as primarily a political
dispute rather than looking at its legal
underpinnings, in particular whether
Kashmir's accession to India was valid.[11]
It implicitly assumed that accession was
valid but incomplete, contingent upon the
ratification by the people of the state. Thus
it asked for the Pakistani nationals to
withdraw in the first instance but held that
plebiscite was the ultimate solution.[12]
Legal specialist Sumathi Subbiah
contends that the way of dealing with the
situation as a political dispute rather than
legal obligations proved too weak to
compel India and Pakistan to reach a final
resolution.[13]
Reception …

Both India and Pakistan raised objections

to the Resolution 47.[b]

India objected first of all that the

resolution placed India and Pakistan on an
equal footing, ignoring the complaint of
Pakistani aggression and Kashmir's legal
accession to India. Secondly, it objected to
the absence of allowance for it to retain
troops in the state for its defence. It also
felt the requirement of a coalition
government would put Sheikh Abdullah,
then Prime Minister of Kashmir, in an
impossible position. It said that the
powers conferred on the Plebiscite
Administrator were far too wide and
undermined the state's sovereignty. It felt
that provision for the return of all refugees
was unrealistic. Finally, India wanted
Pakistan to be excluded from the conduct
of the plebiscite.[14]

Pakistan objected to the retention of the

Indian forces in Kashmir, even at the
minimum level allowed by the resolution. It
wanted an equal representation in the
government of the state for the Muslim
Conference, the dominant party of the
Pakistani-held Kashmir.[14] The Pakistani
government circles felt that the Security
Council deliberations had been favourable
to Pakistan but the final proposals were
modified by the United States and Britain
to "mollify" India. Britain came in for
particular criticism.[15]

Both the sides however welcomed the UN

Commission and agreed to work with it.[14]

UN Commission
The five member United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP) consisted of the representatives
from Czechoslovakia (Josef Korbel),
Argentina (Ricardo Siri), Belgium (Egbert
Graeffe), Colombia (Alfredo Lozano) and
the United States (Jerome Klahr Huddle).
It secretariat was headed by Erik Colban,
the Norwegian ambassador to the UK, with
the British Quaker Richard Symonds acting
as Colban's secretary.[16]

Sources state that the political

atmosphere in both India and Pakistan
was hostile to the Commission upon its
arrival in the subcontinent in July 1948.[17]

Ceasefire (1948) …

Upon arriving in Karachi, the Commission

was informed by Pakistan that three
brigades of its regular troops had been
fighting in Kashmir since May, which was
described as a "bombshell" by Josef
Korbel.[18] In New Delhi, India asserted that
it attached the highest importance to a
declaration of Pakistan's guilt.[19] The
fighting in Kashmir went on unabated and
the Commission recognized that the
Sheikh Abdullah government in Jammu
and Kashmir and the Azad Kashmir
government in Muzaffarabad were
engaged in an irreconcilable struggle.[20]

On 13 August 1948, after discussions with

both the governments, the Commission
unanimously adopted a three-part
resolution, amending and amplifying the
UN Resolution 47.[21]

Part I dealt with ceasefire, calling for a

complete cessation of hostilities.
Part II dealt with a truce agreement. It
asked for a complete withdrawal of
Pakistan's fighting forces, including the
army, tribes and other Pakistani
nationals, and stated that the evacuated
territory would be administered by local
authorities under the surveillance of the
Commission. Following the Pakistani
withdrawal, India was expected to
withdraw the "bulk of its forces"
 reducing them to the minimum level
required for maintaining law and order.
Part III stated that, after the acceptance
of the truce agreement, the two
countries would enter into consultation
with the Commission for settling the
future of the state in accordance with
the will of the people.[22]

The structure of the resolution was of

significance to India. The three-part
structure implicitly recognized Pakistan's
"aggression" by making the truce
agreement precede the consultation for
the future of the state. Moreover, plebiscite
was not mentioned, which allowed for
other possible avenues for determining the
will of the people, such as electing a
constituent assembly. India feared that a
plebiscite would incite religious passions
and unleash "disruptive forces".[23]

While India accepted the Commission's

resolution, Pakistan attached so many
reservations and qualifications that the
Commission believed it was "tantamount
to rejection".[22] The Commission surmised
that Pakistan's main preoccupation was
the guarantee of a free and impartial
plebiscite after the fighting stopped.[19] It
then developed a supplement to its August
resolution outlining proposals for the
administration of the plebiscite. It defined
the functions of the Plebiscite
Administrator who would, among others,
decide the final disposal of the Indian and
Azad Kashmir forces.[24] India objected
that it was being asked to make further
concessions even though Pakistan had
not accepted the truce agreement. It
sought and obtained several assurances,
including an agreement that it would not
be bound by plebiscite if Pakistan did not
implement the first two parts of the
August resolution;[25] and assurance that
the Azad Kashmir forces would be
disbanded before the plebiscite.[26][27]
Despite reservations, questions and
dissents, the two governments finally
accepted the proposals, leading to a
ceasefire in Kashmir on 1 January
1949.[28] The Commission incorporated
the supplement into a new resolution
approved on 5 January 1949.[1]

Elusive truce (1949) …

The Commission returned to the

subcontinent in February 1949 to
implement the terms of the ceasefire, set
up a truce agreement and prepare for a
plebiscite. Korbel states that the
Commission faced "enormous
difficulties".[29][c]

India insisted on the disbandment of the

'Azad forces' as an "essential condition"
before the plebiscite, which, according to
Korbel, came as "jolt" to the
Commission.[30] This was indeed agreed in
the previous round.[26] However India
appeared to have advanced the
timetable.[31] The so-called 'Azad forces'
were made up of the demobilised soldiers
of the British Indian Army belonging to the
Poonch and Mirpur districts. They rose in
revolt against the Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir prior to the tribal invasion.
Following the invasion, Pakistan organised
the soldiers into 32 battalions of a serious
military force and used them to fight the
Indian forces. During the truce
discussions, Pakistan insisted on a
balance between the Azad forces and the
State forces, and demanded that Pakistan
be allowed to train the Azad forces to take
the positions that the Pakistani forces
would vacate. This led the Indians to
conclude that Pakistan was planning to
resume hostilities as soon as the Indian
withdrawal began. Thus they demanded
that the disbandment of Azad forces
should occur during the truce stage itself.
Pakistan rejected the demand for
disbandment and insisted on parity
between the Azad and State forces.
Pakistan also wished to see the detailed
plans of the Indian withdrawal and insisted
that it should be "synchronized" with the
Pakistani withdrawal.[31][32]

After multiple rounds of proposals for

demilitarisation, which were rejected by
both India and Pakistan, the Commission
proposed arbitration. Pakistan accepted
the proposal for arbitration, but India
rejected it, saying that it was not a matter
for arbitration but for "affirmative and
immediate decision". India's position was
that no distinction could be made between
the Pakistan Army and the Azad forces.
The Commission conceded that the Azad
forces now had a strength that changed
the military situation and made the Indian
withdrawal as envisaged in the original
resolution difficult.[31][32]

Another difficulty arose with regard to the

"Northern Areas" (present day Gilgit-
Baltistan). India demanded that, upon
Pakistani withdrawal, these areas should
be restored to the government of Jammu
and Kashmir and India should be allowed
to defend its borders. The Commission
conceded the legal basis of the Indian
demand but feared that it would cause
renewed fighting between the Indian
forces and the local forces. It proposed
that the areas should be governed by
"local authorities" under the supervision of
the Commission and Indian forces would
be sent only if the UN observers notified it
of their necessity. This compromise was
rejected by both India and Pakistan.[33]

The Commission declared its failure and

submitted its final report to the Security
Council on 9 December 1949. It
recommended that the Commission be
replaced by a single mediator; that the
problem of demilitarisation be viewed as a
whole without the required sequentiality of
the August resolution; that the UN
representatives should have the authority
to settle issues by arbitration. The Czech
delegate submitted a minority report
contending that the Commission's
declaration of failure was premature, that
the problem of Azad forces had been
underrated, and that the Northern Areas
did not receive adequate attention.[34]

Aftermath
The Security Council asked its Canadian
delegate, General A. G. L. McNaughton, to
informally consult India and Pakistan
towards a demilitarisation plan. In the
course of his discussion, on 22 December
1949, McNaughton proposed that both
Pakistani and Indian forces should be
reduced to a minimum level, followed by
the disbandment of both the Azad forces
and the State forces. India proposed two
far-reaching amendments, in effect
rejecting the McNaughton proposals. The
McNaughton proposals represented an
important departure from those of the
UNCIP resolutions in that they treated
India and Pakistan on an equal footing.
India was averse to such an
equation.[35][36]
Despite India's apparent objection, the
Security Council adopted the McNaughton
proposals in Resolution 80 and appointed
a mediator. The mediation also ended in
failure.

In 1972, following the Indo-Pakistani War

of 1971, India and Pakistan signed the
Simla Agreement, agreeing to resolve all
their differences through bilateral
negotiations. The United States, United
Kingdom and most Western governments
have since supported this
approach.[37][38][39][40][41]
In 2001, the then Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Kofi Annan during his visit
to India and Pakistan, clarified that
Kashmir resolutions are only advisory
recommendations and they should not be
compared to those on East Timor and
Iraq.[42]

In 2003, the then Pakistan President

Pervez Musharraf announced that
Pakistan was willing to "leave aside" the
demand for UN resolutions and explore
alternative bilateral options for resolving
the dispute.[43]
In 2020, the UN general secretary António
Guterres called for the implementation of
UN Security Council resolutions on
Kashmir, including the holding of a
plebiscite among Kashmir's residents on
whether they wanted join India or
Pakistan.[44]

See also
Kashmir conflict
Timeline of the Kashmir conflict
Indo-Pakistani relations
List of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1 to 100 (1946–1953)
Notes
a. According to the 1941 census, the state's
population was 77 percent Muslim, 20
percent Hindu and 3 percent others (Sikhs
and Buddhists).[2] The Jammu province in
the south was Hindu majority, related to the
East Punjab in India, Ladakh in the east was
Buddhist majority, the Kashmir Valley in the
centre was predominantly Muslim and
Kashmiri-speaking, the western districts
were Sunni Muslim, related to the West
Punjab in Pakistan, and the northern areas
were predominantly Muslim of Shia and
Ismaili sects.
b. The reaction finds various descriptions in
the sources:
Raghavan (2010, p. 132): "Both India
and Pakistan rejected the resolution."
Korbel (1949, p. 279): "Both India and
Pakistan raised voices against the
April 1948 resolution."
Korbel (1966, pp. 112–113): "The
Government of India sent a letter of
protest to the United Nations and
refused cooperation in any
implementation of the resolution...One
month later, however, the Indian
representative was somehow more
conciliatory... The Pakistani delegate
was not wholly satisfied with the
proposal but his criticism did not imply
outright rejection."
 c. Josef Korbel left Czechoslovakia after the
communist coup. He was replaced by
another Czech delegate who, according
Korbel, "embarked upon the Soviet-
Communist tactic of disrupting the
structure of peace".[29]

References
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55) . ThoughtCo. Retrieved 3 February
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2. Bose 2003, pp. 27–28.
3. Raghavan 2010, pp. 124–125.
4. Raghavan 2010, pp. 130–131.
 5. Raghavan 2010, p. 131.
. Korbel 1966, pp. 113–114.
7. Korbel 1966, p. 112.
. Korbel 1966, p. 114.
9. Korbel 1966, p. 117.
10. Schaffer 2009, p. 18.
11. Subbiah 2004, p. 180.
12. Subbiah 2004, p. 181.
13. Subbiah 2004, p. 182.
14. Raghavan 2010, p. 132.
15. Korbel 1966, p. 113.
1 . Ankit 2014, p. 69.
17. Blinkenberg 1998, p. 106 (https://books.go
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1 . Korbel 1966, p. 121.
19. Korbel 1966, p. 124.
20. Korbel 1953, pp. 501–502.
21. UNCIP 1948.
22. Korbel 1953, p. 502.
23. Raghavan 2010, pp. 137, 144.
24. Korbel 1966, pp. 151–153.
25. UNCIP 1949a, p. 23.
2 . UNCIP 1949a, p. 25.
27. Raghavan 2010, p. 145.
2 . Korbel 1966, p. 153.
29. Korbel 1966, p. 154.
30. Korbel 1966, p. 155.
31. Raghavan 2010, p. 146.
32. Das Gupta 2012, pp. 147–148.
33. Das Gupta 2012, pp. 150–151.
34. Das Gupta 2012, pp. 151–152.
35. Das Gupta 2012, pp. 153–154.
3 . Raghavan 2010, p. 147.
37. Schaffer 2009, pp. 122–123.
3 . Roberts & Welsh 2010, p. 340 (https://book
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39. Cheema 2009, p. 47 (https://books.google.
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42. Ramananda Sengupta (26 June 2004).
"Low expectations from Indo-Pak talks" (htt
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43. B. Muralidhar Reddy (18 December 2003).
"We have 'left aside' U.N. resolutions on
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ndu.com/todays-paper/we-have-left-aside-u
n-resolutions-on-kashmir-musharraf/article
27816543.ece) . The Hindu. Archived from
the original (https://www.thehindu.com/tod
ays-paper/we-have-left-aside-un-resolutions
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44. " 'Deeply concerned': UN chief offers
mediation on Kashmir dispute" (https://ww
w.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/17/deeply-c
oncerned-un-chief-offers-mediation-on-kash
mir-dispute) . Al Jazeera. 17 February
2020.

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External links
Records of the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP) (1948-1950) (https://search.arc
hives.un.org/united-nations-commission
-for-india-and-pakistan-uncip-1948-195
0) at the United Nations Archives
Works related to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 47 at
Wikisource
Text of Resolution at undocs.org (http
s://undocs.org/S/RES/47(1948))
S/995: UNCIP Resolution of 13 August
1948 (https://digitallibrary.un.org/recor
d/471051/files/S_995-EN.pdf) , United
Nations Digital Library, retrieved 10
August 2019.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy
of India, 26 March 1949 (https://history.
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus194
9v06/d1171) , Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1949, The Near East, South
Asia, and Africa, Volume VI, US
Department of State.
 Pakistani perspective on the UN
resolution (http://www.pakun.org/kash
mir/history.php) , Pakistan Mission to
the United Nations.

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