Kurds in Iran
Kurds in Iran
Kurds in Iran
Kerim Yildiz
and
Tanyel B. Taysi
Pluto P Press
LONDON • ANN ARBOR, MI
in association with
www.plutobooks.com
The right of Kerim Yildiz to be identified as the author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright Designs and
Patents Act 1988
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Acknowledgements ix
2 A History 11
Post-First World War 11
The Mahabad Republic 13
Mossadegh 19
The Revolution 21
The Iran–Iraq War 27
Notes 119
Index 129
This book was written by Kerim Yildiz, who would like to thank
Rachel Bernu for her invaluable editing assistance and also Anna
Irvin.
There are a small number of experts on the Iranian Kurds,
and this book owes much in particular to the work of Nader
Entessar, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, A.R. Ghassemlou, James Ciment
and Nazila Ghanea-Hercock.
ix
INTRODUCTION
The regional power vacuum created by the end of the First World
War presented a valuable opportunity for the Kurds to attempt
to break out from under the hegemony of the ruling territorial
powers. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of
Sèvres, various revolts in both Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan, and
the general weakness of the powers in Tehran were all factors
influencing the Iranian Kurds to revolt.
At this point in time, the Kurds as a whole were tribally
oriented, and several tribal revolts broke out in greater Kurdistan.
Iranian Kurdistan was no different, as Ismail Agha Simko, chief
of the Shakak tribe, overcame neighbouring tribes to extend an
unstable hold over a large portion of Iranian Kurdistan in the
early 1920s until bitter fighting between Kurds and Azeris (who
11
their own destiny, as the allied armies entered Iran and forced
the Shah into exile.
The combination of regional and internal Iranian political
forces ultimately allowed the Kurds the opening needed to form
the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, the most serious challenge to
the authority of the Iranian state, as well as the only independent
Kurdish republic to date. Unlike Simko’s uprising, which was not
based on concrete visions of Kurdish identity and was thus not a
nationalist movement formed on a wider sense of Kurdish identity,
the creation of the Mahabad Republic, in which the questions
of nationalism and identity were very present in the hearts and
minds of the leaders, is widely seen as a nationalist movement.3
MOSSADEGH
Kurds of Iran, who for the most part agreed with his democratic
ideals. The KDP-I, which had been outlawed by the Shah after
the fall of Mahabad, stepped up their political activity, albeit in
a clandestine manner. In early 1952 the KDP-I participated in
provincial elections and won an impressive percentage of the
votes. However, the election was invalidated by the Shah, whose
army rolled through Mahabad, leaving their own pro-royalist rep-
resentatives for Mahabad. Mossadegh, who had been appointed
the premiership in 1951, opposed the Shah’s actions yet was
powerless in this matter, as under the constitution, the Shah, as
Commander in Chief, controlled the armed forces. The Kurdish
support for Mossadegh angered the Shah, and when Mossadegh’s
government was overthrown in a CIA-led coup in August 1953,
the Kurds found themselves once again on the wrong side of
the government.
Sporadic rebellions took place in Kurdistan, but, as they
were unable to meet the vast forces of the Iranian army, they
were unsuccessful. The return of the Shah ushered in a period
of grumbling quiescence in Kurdistan, where no major revolts
occurred again until 1978. Throughout this period the KDP-I, who
had moved their headquarters to Iraq, were influenced by the
Kurdish movement in Iraq. Furthermore, changes were occurring
in the internal structure of the KDP-I. In 1964 a contingent of
critical KDP-I intellectuals called for armed struggle against the
regime, in order to establish a federal government. As a result, a
three-year KDP-I organised peasant uprising occurred in Urmiyeh,
in which over 50 members of the KDP-I, hailing from a broad cross-
section of society including tribesmen, merchants, intellectuals,
peasants and mullahs, lost their lives.24
By this time, despite having to operate clandestinely, it appears
that the KDP-I had become a mass party that enjoyed the active
support of most of the Kurdish nation, the vanguard of a politically
mature nationalist movement.25 During this period, the KDP-I
changed its direction away from guerrilla action towards building a
base among Iranian Kurds living and studying in western nations.
THE REVOLUTION
IRAN–IRAQ WAR
31
rights activists already under extreme pressure from the state seek
to distance themselves from the Kurds, an issue that they know
will inflame the authorities.4
The Iranian ruling powers, in whatever form they may take, have
historically demonstrated a less than accommodating stance
towards the Kurds that live within their borders. As far back as
the early sixteenth century one can see evidence of suppression
of Kurdish tribal uprisings, as the Safavids, the Shi‘ite Persian
Empire that had, since the early 1500s, emerged as a regional
power, embarked on a strong state centralisation programme that
ran counter to the historical freedom of the Kurds.5 The Kurds
were targeted specifically by Safavid policies, as they were deemed
problematic to the powers that be. This led to the formulation of
treaties, such as one signed between the Ottomans and Safavids
in 1639, which designated the previously semi-sovereign Kurdish
principalities to the Ottoman and Persian Empires, in an effort to
control the Kurds. It was at this time that the beginnings of the
now familiar strategy employed by state powers of pitting Kurdish
tribes against each other occurred, as the Safavid administration
engaged in a selective system of punishment and rewards that
took advantage of tribal hostilities.6
These methods continued throughout the next centuries, as a
series of empires rose and fell, and the Kurds continued much in
the way they had for centuries. In the mid-1800s, Amir Kabir, chief
minister to Naser ad-Din, Shah of the Qajar dynasty, attempted to
strengthen the centre through a process of modernisation from
above. This fell foul of the tribes, Kurdish and otherwise, who found
their powers limited. Kabir, for his troubles, ultimately displeased
the Shah and was dismissed in 1851, only to be assassinated the
following year.7 Following the failed efforts of Kabir to modernise,
the tribes were again left to their own devices through the rest of
the Qajar period (approximately 1795–1925), which was a time
police and often more serious charges are brought against them
than their Persian counterparts accused of the same crime, In
response to the government crackdowns and revitalisation of anti-
Kurd and anti-minority policies, violent protests have broken out
in areas inhabited by largely non-Persian Iranian nationals.
It is not only the Kurds who suffer political and human rights
violations at the hands of the Iranian state: as serious violations
occur across multiple areas of society, the vast majority of the
population is negatively affected by the repressive rule of Islamic
theocracy. Torture and ill-treatment in detention; unfair trials;
arbitrary detention, including indefinite solitary confinement; the
ill-treatment and harassment of women and ethnic minorities;
the harassment, imprisonment and torture of human rights
defenders, civil society activists and students; the silencing of
journalists and writers and the regular closure of newspapers are
all par for the course in the daily workings of the Islamic Republic
of Iran.
At the centre of a number of rights violations sit the judiciary and
the Guardian Council, both accountable to the Supreme Leader, as
well as ‘parallel institutions’ which consist of paramilitary groups,
plain-clothes intelligence operatives, and the secret illegal prisons
and interrogation centres run by intelligence services that hold
much of the unofficial power in Iran.36
In order to understand the context of the human and political
rights situation in which the Kurds of Iran operate, it is important
to have insight into the complex power structure of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The Iranian political system is a decentralised
power structure made up of loose coalitions influenced by
patronage networks. It is fundamentally convoluted, consisting
of a vast number of marginally connected yet severely competitive
power centres, both formal and informal. The formal power
structures are grounded in the constitution and in government
46
as well as other laws, and the fact that girls can be married at the
age of nine, all contribute to the serious violation of the human
rights of all women in Iran.50 Women in Iran face challenges
on two fronts, both in discriminatory laws as well as through
patriarchal attitudes in society, which manifest themselves largely
in widespread violence against women.51
Iran’s discriminatory laws are designed to strip women of any
real power, relegating them to the private sphere, making entering
the workforce difficult. This type of oppression necessarily
renders women dependent on men by the state structure as well
as community pressure. Women are denied the opportunity to
be present in the public sphere, and thus find it difficult to find
employment and provide an income for their families, despite
having the necessary qualifications. There is a significant lack
of access to senior management and professional positions in
government. Although female candidates are allowed to run
for parliament, the vetting process engaged in by the Guardian
Council often disqualifies parliamentary candidates on grounds
such as non-belief in the constitution or Islam, and it is not
obligated to explain its reasons for disqualification. In January
2004, after the Guardian Council’s disqualification of 49 per
cent of the parliamentary candidates, nine women managed to
be elected. Of these, eight are conservative. During the January
elections, women protested the lack of reformist candidates, and
many did not vote, as the conservative female legislators who
emphasised the traditional role of women in the private sphere did
not appeal to those attempting to challenge the status quo.52
Despite women’s activities to combat the situation, pathways
to empowerment remain closed, and women are forced into a
situation in which they are dependent on men in a patriarchal
society that views the private (home) sphere as women’s only
rightful space. Iranian women are exposed to high levels of
violence, by both domestic and state forces, yet as with so many
other areas of Iranian life, there are no statistics available that
document the degree of persecution.
became the law. The chadored woman that had become the public
symbol of the Islamic Revolution was too powerful a symbol
to be lost. The concept of choice was gone, and the promised
dignity and respect turned into massive human rights violations,
including public rapes, beatings and executions for women who
did not obey the new laws.
In addition to the mandatory veiling, all female judges were
fired, and draconian laws known as the Qassas, that negated
women’s rights to justice, were implemented.55 Reprisals for trans-
gressions were harsh, including beatings, imprisonment, or having
acid thrown in their faces by bands of roving gangs who were
authorised by law to monitor public morality. Needless to say,
the women who had embraced the revolution were dismayed by
this turn of events, and were the first to stage large-scale protests.
Despite threat of serious bodily harm, women took to the streets
throughout 1979 to protest the mandatory veiling and Qassas
laws, but to no avail.
The election of Mohammed Khatami ushered in some changes
for women. However, they were slow to happen, and often blocked
by hard-liners. As is the case in situations in which the only
source of legitimacy derives from Islam, it is next to impossible
to support or attempt to implement any changes that are seen
by the status quo powers as being illegitimate, thus any demands
for change must be made within a religious, culturally authentic
framework. This fact makes any sort of change extremely difficult,
as it can be rejected as unauthentic. In a country such as Iran in
which the President has to answer to the clerics, even he has to
tread carefully, so as not to appear a tool of the West.
KURDISH WOMEN
A COMPLEX SITUATION
61
extent of the support Baghdad offered the KDP-I during the war is
a point of contention, and there is disagreement in the literature
concerning how much assistance the KDP-I actually received from
Baghdad, with opinion ranging from modest to major.18 At the
very least it is evident that Baghdad assisted the Iranian Kurds
through the establishment of supply routes to the peshmerga.
What is clear is that both sides made a concerted effort to involve
the Kurds in the war effort, utilising the war to deal with their
own Kurdish problems.19
Furthermore, over the years there have been divisions in the
various organisations themselves. The KDP-I was divided into
warring mutually suspicious factions,20 as was the Komala. All
was not completely bleak, as in this point in the Iran–Iraq War
the plethora of uprisings and armed struggles that occurred
within Iran, Iraq and Turkey led to a rejuvenation of notions of
a wider unity and cause, despite the Kurds’ many differences.
However, the Iran–Iraq War proved disastrous to the Kurds of
both states. For their part, the Iranian military waged a major
offensive against them that severely weakened the KDP-I and
turned Iranian Kurdistan into a war-zone. The Iranian Kurds were
isolated not only from the outside world, but from the Iraqi Kurds
as well as the other opposition forces in Iran, a period of time
that added to the Iranian Kurds’ sense of aloneness, as their major
ally was Saddam Hussein who, in the fashion of the leaders of
the nations in which the Kurds live, was using the Iranian Kurds
to his own advantage.
In the past, particularly in the Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and
Sadeq Sharafkandi time periods (1973–1992), there was a definite
distance between the KDP-I and other regional Kurdish political
organisations, as they attempted to distance the Iranian Kurds
from the attempted hegemony of the Iraqi Kurds and attempted
to work with rather than against, the Iranian government.21
However, the KDP-I changed it’s stance under the leadership
of Mustafa Hejri, who moved the KDP-I closer to the Iraqi
Kurds, setting up multiple Iranian Kurdish bases in the Kurdish
69
among the states of the region, particularly Iran and Turkey, has
existed since the end of the First World War. This cooperation has
been manifested mainly through the formulation of treaties, one
of the primary ways in which sovereign nation states voluntarily
enter into relationships that potentially compromise their
independence.6 As early as the 1920s, Tehran was so concerned
with the uprisings that were occurring within its own borders as
well as in neighbouring nations that it forwarded the idea of a
joint Turko-Iranian cooperation against the Kurds. This mutual
agreement was short-lived: an incident in which Turkish soldiers,
who entered Iran in pursuit of Kurds who had fought in the
Sheikh Said rebellion, were captured by the Kurds, led to the
withdrawal of the Turkish ambassador to Tehran.
The Kurds, for their part, passed freely between Turkey and
Iran throughout the 1920s, causing much consternation to the
states in question, who were constantly engaged in low-level
bickering fuelled by Turkish accusations of alleged support of
the Turkish Kurds by the Iranians. In 1927 the tense situation
led to the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador from Turkey.7
The Turks believed the Iranians were tactically trying to play the
‘Kurdish card’, supporting Turkish Kurds in order to destabilise
Turkey, keeping the government busy with internal problems,
thus gaining leverage in the territorial disputes the two states
were engaged in.
It was at this point, specifically surrounding this issue, known
as the Ararat rebellion, that Turkish-Iranian relations reached a
watershed, as the Turko-Iran Frontier Treaty was signed in 1932,
an agreement, that, with minor adjustments made in 1937, still
stands. The major purpose of this treaty was to place the eastern
slopes of Mt Ararat under Turkish control, as Kurdish rebels were
using this area as a haven against the state in their uprising. In
return, Iran was ceded a parcel of land. Two other treaties quickly
followed between the two states.
In July of 1937 another major treaty was to follow, as Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan entered into a treaty of non-aggression
Iran–Iraq War, and (3) to take advantage of the war for economic
gain.10 Furthermore, there was a tactic understanding that Turkey
wanted to revisit the two states’ policies on the Kurds.
Iran, on the other hand, deeply mired in war, was interested
primarily in the maintenance of relations, be it (1) maintaining
Turkey’s war-time aid and ensuring Ankara did not tilt favour to
Iraq in the war, or (2) maintaining good relations with Turkey
to balance its political isolation in the international community
as well as to lessen Turkish interest in fanning Azeri nationalist
aspirations.11
The Kurdish issue influenced relations between the two states
in this period, primarily through the issue of Turkey’s desire to
control the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The 1980 coup in
Turkey had had a profound impact on Kurdish rights activism,
and had consolidated the fractured resistance movement of
the 1970s, bringing about the rise in influence of the PKK who
dominated the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1980s.
The PKK initiated a phase of overt guerrilla warfare against the
repressive Turkish state in 1984, which led to harsh reprisals from
the Turkish military, ultimately lasting over a decade and claiming
the lives of tens of thousands, mainly civilians. Thus, at this
period in time, the Turkish government was extremely concerned
with the threat of outside support for the PKK, and their foreign
policy concerns with Iran reflected this. Multiple issues were at
play, with Turkey desperately needing Iran to cease support of the
PKK, be it the provision of weapons, territory for bases, or aid in
negotiations either with the PUK, the KDP or state actors in the
area, such as Syria.12 Iran, while dealing with less of an internal
Kurdish problem than the Turks at this time, was still concerned
with keeping its own Kurdish population in check, as evidenced
by the brutal crackdown on the Kurds living in Iran during the
early years of the war.
After the Iran–Iraq War, areas of mutual concern for Turkey
and Iran included: (1) the desire for the sharing in oil and gas
revenues (primarily through pipelines); (2) the need to temper
AN IRAN–IRAQ RAPPROCHEMENT?
87
Korea and help with nuclear capabilities from Russia. Finally, Iran
deeply resents the general US intervention in an area that it sees
as rightly an Iranian sphere of influence.10 Many Iranians feel that
current American policy in the region is an attempt to encircle
and isolate Iran, particularly the build-up of US military in central
Asia and the invasion of Iraq.11
It is understandable that the presence of US forces in the region
is cause for concern for Tehran. It is believed that this may have
bolstered support for conservative elements, and may have
played a part in the election of Ahmadinejad. Furthermore, it
may also have been a factor in Iran’s desire to develop its nuclear
capabilities. Ahmadinejad has forwarded the notion that he has
subjects to discuss with Britain, Germany and France and has
drawn closer to Russia, North Korea and Venezuela. However, he
has snubbed the US, stating that relations with Washington are
not the key to the people’s problems.12
The unexpected difficulties endured in Iraq since the fall of
Saddam Hussein in April 2003 have directly led to Tehran taking
US pressure with a grain of salt, secure in the knowledge that
the US presence in Iraq has been, at times, self-defeating. This
situation has boosted Iranian confidence, which has been added
to by the government’s intractable position with regard to Iran’s
right to pursue nuclear capabilities. Further adding to Iran’s
strength is the history of relatively friendly relations between
the EU and Iran and the recent wave of EU investments in Iran
that help it to circumvent many of the extraterritorial sanctions
and laws imposed by the United States.13 However, in light of
the recent troubles surrounding Ahmadinejad’s treatment of the
nuclear issue, Iran’s relations with the EU are quickly souring.
Despite claims to the contrary, Iran clearly is not an ‘innocent’
who has been grossly mistreated by an evil superpower and has
experienced mixed results in its foreign policy. This does not
stop Iran from maintaining a long list of grievances against the
United States, with meddling in its sovereignty high on the list.
Situations as far back as the coup against Mossadegh in 1953
imports from Iran consist of oil products, the exports to Iran are
more diversified, with power generation plants, large machinery
and electrical and mechanical appliances making up about 45
per cent of the total exports.
EU and especially British relations with Iran, despite recent
setbacks, are comparatively strong and, some feel, one-sided.
While there are those that believe the EU policy of linking human
rights with economic relations is working, others simply accuse
the EU (Britain in particular) of kowtowing to Iran. According
to a July 2004 interview with Jack Straw, the British Foreign
Secretary, the ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach of engagement with
Tehran has proved fruitful over the years, despite the lack of
approval for this approach from the US. Although admitting
that the relationship is often difficult, particularly regarding the
nuclear issue, he maintained that ‘it can be frustrating and it
certainly is frustrating. Two steps forward and its sometimes two
back as well but bit by bit I believe we are making progress.’29 In
2002 the EU and Iran entered into a ‘human rights dialogue’ that,
although cleverly hyped, offered little lasting benefits. Despite
the continuation of these talks once a year, little improvement
has been seen, and human rights defenders in Iran, as well as in
the west, routinely criticize the process for its lack of efficacy and
transparency. For the most part, there has been
107
ground in the cities and towns, and must assist in reviving a sense
of Kurdish identity. Despite their recent lack of efficacy, the parties
have years of experience and as they seek to be an evolutionary
rather than revolutionary force, the political parties have the
potential to use their legacy in a positive, engaged manner.
In early 2006, the Kurdish United Front, a movement that is not
an official party or a non-governmental organisation, was formed
in Iranian Kurdistan by Bahaeddin Adab, a former Kurdish Member
of parliament, who was banned along with thousands of reform-
minded candidates from running in the 2004 parliamentary
elections. The Front plans to help Kurdish representatives gain
seats in city councils and in the national parliament, as well
as to raise Kurds’ awareness of their rights, and to demand the
implementation of the equal rights and democracy promised
to them by law in Iranian Kurdistan. While Adab believes the
Front will be able to achieve results working within the current
framework of the regime, some Kurdish activists in Iran express
doubt, claiming that it is impossible to achieve such results as
long as the current regime remains in power, as it is the regime
that is the major problem.
The majority of the groups and organisations operating in
Iranian Kurdistan maintain a broader agenda than those that
focus only on the Kurds, and often couch Kurdish demands in the
context of general democratic rights for all Iranians. Several human
rights organisations, and periodicals such as Sirwan Weekly, the
Kurdish-language magazine with the largest circulation in Iran, all
have appeal that reaches beyond the Kurdish regions, and attempt
to develop linkages with the wider rights movement, promoting
dialogue rather than divisiveness. Unfortunately, in the growing
climate of repression, the Iranian authorities closed down Sirwan,
along with other periodicals, in the spring of 2006.
In this period of greater oppression, the various ethnic minority
opposition forces are realising that it is in their best interest to
try to overcome their geographic isolation and work together
in their often common purposes, as the state would have a far
Kurds, and would not turn on the Kurds of other nations under
any circumstances.
Prospects and possibilities aside, it is clear that due to the
current geopolitical changes in the region, the Kurdish issue will
grow in each state, with Iran no exception. However, it must
be remembered that the realities of the Kurdish situation are
different in each state and thus the solutions will be different
as well. Although the dream of a united Kurdistan is not dead,
it is clear that the realities of the Iranian Kurds are different
from those of the Iraqi, Turkish and Syrian Kurds, and this must
be respected and understood. Increasingly, the call for status as
citizens of a federal and democratic Iran appears to be rising from
Iranian Kurdistan.
CONCLUSIONS
The Kurds have learned the painful lessons of the past and are
therefore not as open to the interventions and assistance of
outside forces, as these have always ended badly. At this point
in time, the best assistance the Kurds can hope for is not the cloak
and dagger clandestine assistance that leaves them open to risk,
but the aforementioned ‘open door’ policy of clearly tying in the
minorities issue to any negotiations between the international
community and Iran. This way, everyone is aware of the agenda
and a clear dialogue can be presented.
Unfortunately, there are many challenges to this route, as the
trend not only among Kurds (which as discussed is changing),
but also within Iran itself, and between Iran and the international
community, is of divisiveness rather than discussion. In Iran, we
are still dealing with a situation in which the ruling powers are
not open to negotiations with the Kurds or the international
community unless it is on their terms. The Kurds themselves
recognise this and, as discussed earlier, are engaged in presenting
a united front, both among the Kurds themselves as well as across
minority groups within Iran, in an attempt to strengthen their
1. K. Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future (London:
Pluto Press, 2004), p. 8.
2. For more information on this subject see The Kurds in Iraq, The
Kurds in Turkey (London: Pluto Press, 2005), and The Kurds in Syria
(London: Pluto Press, 2005), by K. Yildiz.
3. This book will complete the series of books mentioned in note 2.
4. J. Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran (New
York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996), p. 63.
5. Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq, p. 4.
6. N. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1992),
p. 23.
7. F. Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 26–7.
8. Ibid. p. 32.
9. Ibid. p. 33.
10. A.R. Ghassemlou, ‘Kurdistan in Iran’, in G. Chaliand (ed.) A People
Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Books,
1993), pp. 103–4.
11. Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran, p. 33.
12. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, ‘The Development of Nationalism in Iranian
Kurdistan’, in P.G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl (eds) The Kurds: A
Contemporary Overview (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 179.
13. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism, p. 160.
14. Ibid. p. 48.
15. Ciment, The Kurds, p. 1.
16. H.J. Wiarda (ed.) New Directions in Comparative Politics. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), p. 1X.
17. T. Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research’, in P.B. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer and T. Skocpol
(eds) Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), pp. 3–37; p. 9.
18. J. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988), p. xiv.
119
2 A HISTORY
1. K. Yildiz and G. Fryer, The Kurds: Culture and Language Rights (London:
KHRP, 2004), p. 78.
2. Ibid. p. 80.
3. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, B. Samii, ‘Iran: Kurdish Grievances
Remain a Thorny Issue’, 18 August 2005.
4. S. Nabi, ‘Sanandaj Showdown – A Slippery Slope?’ in KHRP Legal
Review no. 7, 2005, p. 121.
5. N. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1992),
p. 11.
6. Ibid.
7. N. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2003), p. 50.
8. G. Chaliand The Kurdish Tragedy (London: Zed Books, 1994),
p. 80.
9. Although exact figures are impossible to come by, it is evident that
non-Persian ethnicities make up a majority of the population of
Iran.
10. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism, p. 13.
11. Ibid. p. 14.
12. Not to be confused with the former Soviet Azeri Republic, a separate
geopolitical entity.
13. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism, p. 23.
14. Ibid.
15. Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 124.
16. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism, p. 26.
17. A.R. Ghassemlou, ‘Kurdistan in Iran’, in G. Chaliand (ed.) A People
Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Books,
1993), p. 99.
18. G. Chaliand, ‘Iranian Kurds Under Ayatollah Khomeini’, in
Chaliand, A People Without a Country, p. 211; Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-
Nationalism, p. 32.
19. M. van Bruinessen, ‘The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq’, in M. van
Bruinessen (ed.) Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism Versus Nation-Building
States (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000), p. 208.
20. J. Bulloch and H. Morris, No Friends but the Mountains (New York:
Penguin Books, 1993), p. 205.
21. F. Koohi-Kamali, ‘The Development of Nationalism in Iranian
Kurdistan’, in P.G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl (eds) The Kurds:
A Contemporary Overview (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 184.
22. Ibid. p. 185.
23. Entessar, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism, p. 38.
24. ‘Sept Ans d’Aide Medicale au Kurdistan d’Iran 1981–1987’,
unpublished document housed in library of the Kurdish Institute,
Paris, GEN. 1158, p. 28.
25. Ibid. p. 37.
26. Ibid. pp. 37–49.
27. Ibid. p. 33.
28. Khateri, Victims of Chemical Weapons in Iran, p. 11.
29. J. Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran (New
York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996), p. 200; R. Olson, Turkey’s Relations
with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991–2000 (Costa Mesa: Mazda
Publishers, 2001), p. 15.
21. J. Bulloch and H. Morris, No Friends but the Mountains (New York:
Penguin Books, 1993), p. 208.
22. K. Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future (London:
Pluto Press, 2004), p. 25.
23. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), ‘Iran/Iraq: Tehran Airs
its Grievances Against Saddam Hussein’, 12 December 2005.
24. Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, p. 37.
25. M. Ware, ‘Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq’, TIME Magazine, 22
August 2005.
26. Ibid.
27. P. Galbraith, ‘Creating an Iran–Iraq Axis’, edition 30, 11 August
2005, Bitter Lemons international.org Middle East roundtable.
28. RFE/RL, ‘Iran Report’, 26 July 2004.
29. ‘Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq’ TIME Magazine, 22 August 2005.
30. Ibid; Galbraith, ‘Creating an Iran–Iraq Axis’.
31. R. Wright, ‘U.S. Wary as Iran Works to Increase Influence in Iraq’,
Washington Post, 12 June, 2004.
32. T. Robberson ‘Iranian Influence Raises Anxiety in Southern Iraq’,
Dallas Morning News, August 3, 2005.
33. Wright, ‘U.S. Wary as Iran Works to Increase Influence in Iraq’; TIME
‘Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq’.
34. RFE/RL, ‘Iran Report’, 26 July 2004.
35. Galbraith, ‘Creating an Iran-Iraq Axis’.
36. Ibid.
37. Taremi, ‘A Shi‘ite Alliance is Taking Shape’.
38. RFE/RL, ‘Iran Report’, 27 September 2005.
39. RFE/RL, ‘Iran Report’, 20 December 2004.
40. RFE/RL, ‘Iran Report’, 27 September 2005.
41. Taremi, ‘A Shi‘ite Alliance is Taking Shape’.
42. Ibid.
43. M. Somer, ‘Security and Secular Democracy’, Edition 30 Volume
3, 11 August 2005, Bitter Lemons international.org Middle east
roundtable.
44. Ibid.
45. R. Olson, Turkey–Iran Relations, 1979–2004: Revolution, Ideology,
War, Coups and Geopolitics (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2004)
p. xxxi.
46. For further discussion, see ibid.
47. Ibid. pp. 165–66.
48. Ibid. p. 162.
49. RFE/RL, ‘Iran Report’, 9 August 2004.
50. Author telephone interview with Dr Robert Olson, London, 19
October 2005; Olson, Turkey–Iran Relations, 1979–2004: Revolution,
Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics p. 256.
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