Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical chessboard

As power shifts, the region becomes more important

By Muhammad Asif Baloch

Undoubtedly, history proves that the changing shadow of global politics and
power transition from one state or region to another state or region leads to
geopolitical clashes of interests between emerging and existing powers. It
is said that the 19th century was marked as the British century because of
its trade and naval power domination. The same is the case of the
20th century which was known as the American because of its economic
and military superiority. But now there is a turning point of the power
spectrum and geopolitics which is transforming from America to Asia.
However, in recent global geopolitical debate the term ‘Asian Century’ is
frequently being used because of the growing Asian countries such as
China, India, and Japan, due to their robust economies and strong military
build-ups.

The Indo-Pacific consists of the Indian Ocean Region and the Western
Pacific. Beginning from eastern Africa and passing through East and South
Asia all the way to South China Sea and defined by connectivity and
conflicts between regional and global powers, today, the region
encapsulates the world’s economic centre of gravity and maritime strategy
involving it is shaping geopolitical outcomes in the 21 st century. The US
historian and naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that, “Whoever
controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the
seven seas in the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided in
these waters.” Due to the rising importance of the Indo-Pacific region in the
political, economic and security spheres, the region has become the
epicentre of geopolitics. In addition, Asian countries are with their economic
developments and trade partnerships playing a prominent role in the
world’s geopolitical and economic landscape. Recently, China is the world’s
fastest-growing economy and its One Belt, One Road initiative is a mega
project in the contemporary world consisting of six major economic
corridors which connect more than 65 countries from different continents.
The USA has been one of the leading players in the competition. Due to the expanding
geopolitical and geo-economic influence of china, the USA is trying to reshape its Indo-Pacific
policies to contain and counter China’s manoeuvring in the region. The USA is responding to
China by strengthening its own internal power as well as building regional security and military
alliances to contain China. These geostrategic and geopolitical developments in the region will
leads contending parties in a greater geopolitical rivalry which may be caused direct
confrontations

Probably, the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical chessboard comprises of

numerous regional and global powers, having various conflicting and
contradictory interests and ambitions in the region. Whereas, the growing
influence of China in the region economically and militarily might be the
source of contest between involved parties. China’s rise presents a power
transition which is a major threat to USA, India and Japan. However, rising
China is unacceptable for these parties. These parties perceived China’s
BRI project as a major regional as well as global threat, and distinguish it
as an encirclement policy known as the String of Pearls towards the region.
But Chinese officials never directly claimed that the purpose of the project
is other than economic development and regional connectivity. Probably,
geostrategic competition exists in the region either economically or
militarily. Undoubtedly, China’s building of commercial ports and military
bases in the region is not just based on economic purposes but rather
shows strategic ambitions. Whereas, Sri-Lanka and Djibouti are the prime
examples of Chinese debt trap diplomacy, called neo-colonialism. Owing
more than $1 billion in debt to China, Sri Lanka surrendered Hambantota
port to Chinese companies owned by its government on a 99-year lease.
The same is the case with Djibouti located in the Horn of Africa, where
China built its first overseas military base. On the other hand, Gwadar port
in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, are
where China is also willing to use these commercial ports in the near future
for military and strategic purposes to check India and the USA in the
region. These dilemmas in the Indo-Pacific further intensify the regional
strategic competition between contending parties.

In addition, India believes that she is the sole south Asian power and owns
the Indian Ocean as a natural part of India and massive Chinese in India’s
neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka
further enhance India’s sense of fear and of a threat to its national security
and interests. China has the strategic ambition of encircling India. There is
a chain of fear among South Asian countries from each other India fears
China, Pakistan feels threatened by its arch-rival India, and China
perceived a threat from India and its ally the USA. China may or may not
have any long-lasting goal in the Indian Ocean Region, but she is
interested in maintaining the power balance there because of its economic,
political, strategic and diplomatic significance. China’s growing military
presence in the Indian Ocean should not come as a surprise. China is
following in the traditional path of other rising powers by expanding its
military operations to match its interests abroad.
Therefore, the emerging of Chinese influence alarmed India into the
strategy of thwarting Chinese intentions, with India perceiving it as an
expansionist and imperialist encircling strategic policy. Now, Indian
policymakers are advancing their naval power under the Indian Maritime
Doctrine and modernising into a Bluewater Navy to reach other ports and
bases. The Wallet reported, India’s ‘Look East’ policy is a countermove to
establish economic and defence ties with Chinese neighbours and south-
east Asian nations such as Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and South Korea to counter China. Similarly, in the Arabian Sea
and Indian Ocean, it is also building the Chabahar port of Iran and Duqm
port of Oman for economic and military purposes. Now India is going to
respond to China’s encirclement policy through its containment policy.
Furthermore, The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), which is a
security and strategic dialogue between India, Australia, Japan, and the
USA was formally originated in 2007, by the leaders of these countries.
Strategic, military, security and the diplomatic arrangements were at the
centre of the discussion and viewed as a response to growing Chinese
power in the region. The strengthening Chinese economic and military
power is a major cause of regional alignment in the Indo-Pacific region.
Chinese aggressive assertiveness in the South China Sea and Indian
Ocean region is perceived by Quad members as a threat to the regional
international system.
The USA has been one of the leading players in the competition. Due to
the expanding geopolitical and geo-economic influence of china, the USA is
trying to reshape its Indo-Pacific policies to contain and counter China’s
manoeuvring in the region. The USA is responding to China by
strengthening its own internal power as well as building regional security
and military alliances to contain China. These geostrategic and geopolitical
developments in the region will leads contending parties in a greater
geopolitical rivalry which may be caused direct confrontations.
CASE OF TWO RIVALRIES
December 11, 2019 by  Udayan Das

The concept of the Indo-Pacific has emerged from an evolving mental map of the
increasingly contiguous Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as the growing
economic interdependence of states within the region. However, the Indo-Pacific is
also a political entity best understood as a case of two rivalries on either end of the
region. In the Western Pacific, the rivalry is between the United States and China,
and in the Indian Ocean, Sino-Indian competition shapes strategic calculations.
These distinct rivalries—and the emerging interactions between them—are likely
to decide the geopolitics of the region.

Sino-U.S. Rivalry in the Western Pacific

In the Western Pacific, the rivalry is between the United

States and China, and in the Indian Ocean, Sino-Indian
competition shapes strategic calculations. These distinct
rivalries—and the emerging interactions between them—are
likely to decide the geopolitics of the region.

The Sino-U.S. rivalry in the Western Pacific is a case of the inherent tensions
arising from an emerging superpower (China) challenging a reigning one (the
United States). By flexing its muscles in the Western Pacific, especially in the
South China Sea, China poses a threat to U.S. dominance in two ways. First,
China’s territorial claims have been a direct negation of U.S. presence in the
region. Through the missiles and naval forces Beijing has acquired and/or
developed in recent years, its anti-access/area-denial capabilities could
circumvent and push back on U.S. influence in the region. Beijing’s approach is
also a major challenge for the United States’ bid to uphold the principle of freedom
of navigation in the waters of the South China Sea.
Second, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could alter the foundations of U.S.
dominance in the modern international order through a geoeconomic offensive.
China’s BRI is a concerted plan to influence regional actors through both
economic incentives as well as coercive measures. Therefore, BRI presents
smaller states in the Indo-Pacific with a unique dilemma: although China is
economically coercive, BRI provides these states with opportunities for better
connectivity and modernization. In such a regional landscape, where small states
cannot remain isolated and cannot challenge Beijing on their own, they are
struggling to find an alternative to China. The United States and its partners do not
yet have a comprehensive alternative to BRI. Although Washington is gradually
putting more emphasis on the economic dimension of its Indo-Pacific policy
through efforts such as the BUILD Act and the Asia EDGE initiative, these
efforts lack the financial merit to meaningfully counter China-led plans or fulfill
U.S. objectives. The crux of the issue in the region is this: China is emerging as a
politically indispensable force and a financial powerhouse while the United States,
the erstwhile leader, is simultaneously fading.

Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

One of the trends of the last decade in Asian geopolitics has been the rising
footprint of China in the Indian Ocean, where India is a resident power. China’s
primary objective in the Indian Ocean is to ensure that all of its energy trade and
shipping traffic passes securely through its sea lanes. But Beijing also has
aspirations to project power in the region, and it has developed a two-pronged
strategy to do so. First, China has been developing relationships and partnerships
with the Indian Ocean littoral states, many of which include India’s neighbors, in
order to further its position in the region through the establishment of military
bases. Second, China has been deploying assets in the IOR—for both incremental
control in the region as well as to gauge the operational environment in an effort to
be ready in case of an emerging conflict.

Concerned about China encircling its coastline and wooing its neighbors with
offers of connectivity and economic development, India is aiming to
counterbalance Chinese efforts by: (1) deepening relations with Indian Ocean
littoral states and putting its “neighborhood first” (2) engaging with favorable
extra-regional actors such as the United States, France, and Japan; and (3) arguing
for an inclusive and multipolar region to undercut any tendencies of hierarchical
power equations.

In contrast to Sino-U.S. dynamics in the Western Pacific, the Sino-Indian rivalry in

the Indian Ocean takes the form of a security dilemma. In this particular situation,
rivals cannot clearly distinguish between defensive and offensive actions. As
offensive measures have an inherent advantage, skepticism begets an arms race.
For instance, China claims that the ports it is establishing in littoral nations are not
strategic, but rather for civilian/commercial purposes. However, China’s continued
incursions in the South China Sea and the history of Sino-Indian mistrust due to
their border dispute leads to uncertainties in New Delhi. In turn, India has
developed a proactive approach to emerge as a net security provider in the region,
which might be perceived as an offensive measure by China. Against this
backdrop, China in turn may try to overcompensate for its lack of geographical
proximity to the IOR by flexing its economic and military muscles in the region.
These actions once again make India concerned about encirclement or losing
influence in its own region. The downward spiral is evident and in the midst of this
security dilemma, the Indian Ocean has become a flashpoint where India and
China are competing for regional influence.

Trends for the Future

With the United States identifying China as its main strategic
competitor in its National Defense Strategy last year, and
India’s increased diplomatic, economic, and defense
engagement with South East Asia and IOR littorals,
alongside efforts by powers like Australia and Japan to
balance China, the region may be heading towards steeper
competition.

What do these rivalries mean for the region and how might they interact with each
other? Looking at the region through the United States-China and India-China
regional contestations underlines a crucial point: in the future, the Indo-Pacific
region is likely to be characterized more by competition than cooperation. Since
China’s concerns in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean are tied to
sovereignty and securing its economic interests, its advances in these waters are
likely to grow with time. On the other hand, Washington interests’ in the Western
Pacific and the Indian Ocean are about preserving the rules of the order it has led
through the years. Thus, its support for like-minded partners such as India, which
has been a proponent of the same principles of freedom of navigation and a free
and open Indo-Pacific, is likely to grow and would take the form of an enhanced
maritime partnership with New Delhi, to balance against Beijing. Even
independent of the United States, India has recognized the long-term Chinese
threat to its interests in its own backyard.

However, the United States-India partnership to counter China faces some hurdles.
Firstly, though both recognize the challenges China poses in the Indo-Pacific,
Washington and New Delhi’s interests in the region and how it is defined do not
fully converge. This has restricted the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to the
Western Pacific, largely leaving out the Indian Ocean, while India’s presence
beyond the Straits of Malacca has been nominal and symbolic. Secondly, even
though the Indian Ocean is its primary area of interest, India has to play according
to its capabilities. While it is aware of what’s at stake in the IOR, it cannot
overplay its hand and risk instigating China, with which it has a power differential
and a lingering border dispute.

With regard to how these two rivalries might impact the region, they are likely to
provide multiple options to regional actors, especially small states, to hedge against
China.  In the Western Pacific, smaller nations favor U.S. military presence to
balance Chinese might, but find it difficult to stay away from the economic
opportunities created by China. In the Indian Ocean, the littoral states, scrambling
for connectivity and development, have been using China as a bargaining chip to
balance India. However, with the United States identifying China as its
main strategic competitor in its National Defense Strategy last year, and India’s
increased diplomatic, economic, and defense engagement with South East Asia and
IOR littorals, alongside efforts by powers like Australia and Japan to balance
China, the region may be heading towards steeper competition. Already the United
States is gradually looking for opportunities to advance into the Bay of
Bengal while India is projecting influence beyond its immediate arc. If these
trends hold, the United States-China and China-India rivalries may pose challenges
to Beijing’s advances in the region.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Since 2011, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is being used increasingly in geopolitical discourse. [4]
[5]
 The concept is not new to the geopolitical discourse. The German geopolitician Karl
Haushofer first used it in the 1920s in his academic work called "Indopazifischen
Raum". [6] Since then, intermittently, many analysts sought to describe the 'geo-
economic' connect between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, in the
contemporary context, beginning the 2000s, analysts began to observe the 'security'
linkage between the two Oceans. In this context, the term was first used in an article
authored by Gurpreet Khurana, which was carried in the January 2007 issue of
the Strategic Analysis journal (Routledge/ IDSA) titled "Security of Sea Lines: Prospects
for India-Japan Cooperation". In the article, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ refers to the maritime
space stretching from the littorals of East Africa and West Asia, across the Indian
Ocean and western Pacific Ocean, to the littorals of East Asia. [7] The spirit of the term
was picked up by Japan's Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, as reflected in his speech to
the Indian Parliament in August 2007 that talked about the "Confluence of the Indian
and Pacific Oceans" as "the dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity" in
the "broader Asia".[8][9] From 2010 onwards, the term Indo-Pacific acquired salience
within the Indian government and has since been used often by India's apex political
leadership.[10] From about 2011 onwards, the term has been used frequently by strategic
analysts and high-level government/military leadership in Australia, Japan and the US to
denote said region. However, a formal/ official documented articulation of the term first
appeared in Australia's Defence White Paper, 2013. [11]
In 2019, the U.S. State Department published a document formalizing the concept of a
"Free and Open Indo-Pacific", to be sustained among members of "the Quad", a
partnership of four Indo-Pacific democracies led by the United-States, in concert with
Australia, India, and Japan.[12] 'Indo-Pacific' has also featured prominently in top-level
U.S. strategic documents such as the 2017 National Security Strategy, [13] the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review,[14] and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. [15]
It has been argued that the concept of the Indo-Pacific may lead to a change in popular
"mental maps" of how the world is understood in strategic terms. [16] In 2013, US officials
have begun using the term "Indo-Asia Pacific". [17] This enabled America to maintain its
geographic inclusiveness in the new coinage of 'Indo-Pacific'.
The term's profile was raised when it found mention in the joint statement issued by the
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and United States President Donald Trump after
the former's state visit to the White House on 26 June 2017. "As responsible stewards
in the Indo-Pacific region, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi agreed that a close
partnership between the United States and India is central to peace and stability in the
region. In marking 70 years of diplomatic relations between India and the United States,
the leaders resolved to expand and deepen the strategic partnership between the
countries and advance common objectives. Above all, these objectives include
combatting terrorist threats, promoting stability across the Indo-Pacific region,
increasing free and fair trade, and strengthening energy linkages". [18]