HDR 2018 Nigeria Finalfinalx3

National Human
Development Report 2018

Achieving Human Development in North East Nigeria
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA a
National Human
Development Report 2018
Achieving Human Development in North East Nigeria
Towards an Understanding of the Humanitarian-Development – Peace Nexus
This special regional edition of the National Human Development Report has
been prepared to provide a more in-depth understanding of both the causal root
factors as well as the tragic consequences to Human life, following the decade-long
‘Boko Haram’ instigated conflict and violence. The Report also aims at proposing
an alternate, if not novel and integrated framework model for unpacking and
understanding the consequential ‘Humanitarian-Developmental-Peace Nexus’.
© Published by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2018,

Plot 617/618 Diplomatic Drive, Central Area District, Diplomatic Zone,
Garki, Abuja FCT, Nigeria.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form of by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
prior permission.
The analysis and policy recommendation of the report do not necessarily

reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its
Executive Board Members or the United Nations Member States.
The cover illustration used on this 2018 Report attempts a depiction of the diversity
of the Nigerian Federation. The different groups of people from all corners of the
Federation bring their uniqueness that contribute to the whole. Instructively, these
groups, as part of the whole have a role to play jointly and individually towards
efforts required in addressing the challenge posed by insurgency, violence, conflict
and the resultant devastation of the economic and political infrastructure of
Nigeria’s North-East region.
Table of Contents
List of Tables iv
List of Figures iv
Foreword vi
Preface viii
Acknowledgments ix
Acronyms and Abbreviations xi
Report Summary, Conclusions and Key Messages xii
Chapter 1
Background Context to the Humanitarian, Developmental and Security Challenges in
Nigeria’s North East 1
1.1 Introduction 2
1.2 Geographic Location and Basic Demographic Dynamics 2
1.2.1 National and State Level Demographic Structure 2
1.2.2 North East Geography and Demographics 4
1.3 The Historical and Political Background of the North East 5
1.4 Some Background to Each of the North-East States 6
1.4.1 Adamawa State 7
1.4.2 Bauchi State 8
1.4.3 Borno State 9
1.4.4 Gombe State 10
1.4.5 Taraba State 11
1.4.6 Yobe State 12
1.5 Land Degradation and Loss of Livelihoods 13
1.6 Religious Contests and Anti-Western Influence in the North East 14
1.6.1 The Abiding Influence of the 19 Century ‘Jihad’
th
14
1.6.2 The Quest for a Puritanical Brand of Islam in the Post-colonial Era 15
1.6.3 Rebellion Against Western Education and Influence 15
1.6.4 The Failed Promise of Western Education 16
1.6.5 The Colonial Principle of Indirect Rule and Religious Contest 16
1.6.6 The Effects of Latter-day Calls for a Universal Jihad 16
1.7 Proliferation of Arms and Ammunition 17
1.8 The Emergence of Boko Haram 17
1.9 Conclusion 18
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA i
Chapter 2
An Assessment of the Root Causal Factors of the Crisis 19
2.1 Introduction 20
2.2 Poverty, Deprivation and Low Human Development 20
2.2.1 Rising Poverty and Income Inequality 20
2.2.2 High Levels of Multiple Deprivation 21
2.2.3 Low Human Development 24
2.3 Unemployment and Underemployment 26
2.4 Perceived Systematic Exclusion and Structural Inequality 29
2.5 Use of Religion as a Tool for Economic and Political Mobilisation 30
2.6 Conclusion 32
Chapter 3
The Making of a Complex and Multidimensional Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria’s
North East Region 33
3.1 Introduction 34
3.2 Violence, Loss of Lives and Destruction of Property 34
3.2.1 Maiduguri as a Case Study 36
3.3 A Spectre of Internal Displacement within Host Communities 39
3.4 Food Insecurity, Malnutrition Crisis and Loss of Livelihoods 40
3.4.1 The Emergence of Food Insecurity 41
3.4.2 A Malnutrition Crisis 43
3.4.3 Insecurity, Bureaucratic Bottlenecks and Logistical Challenges 43
3.5 Crisis in the Health Sector 44
3.6 The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Crisis 46
3.6.1 Water 46
3.6.2 Sanitation and Hygiene 47
3.7 The Educational Crisis 48
3.7.1 Educational Crisis in Maiduguri, Borno is Apical 49
3.7.2 Severe and Diverse Impacts on Education Across the North East 50
3.7.3 Education in Favour of Male Children 51
3.7.4 Some Promising Initiatives for Education in the North East 51
3.8 The Crisis of Shelter and Accommodation 51
3.8.1 The Sad Tale of ‘Secondary’ Displacement 52
3.9 Conclusion: A Proper Multi-Dimensional Crisis 54
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Chapter 4
Journeying Towards a ‘New Way of Working’: A Framework Model for Achieving
Rehabilitation, Re-Integration and Sustainable Development 55
4.1 In Search of Models that Deliver 56
4.1.1 The UNs ‘New Way of Working’ 56
4.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Proposed Nexus Response Framework 56
4.2.1 Conceptualising the Analytical Framework 56
4.2.2 Understanding Why People Engage Violence 57
4.3 Fitting the Violence Motivation Theories into the Boko Haram Insurgency 58
4.3.1 Resistance to Foreign Western Education 58
4.3.2 Resistance Against Cultural Domination 59
4.3.3 The Defence and Promotion of Sacred Islamic Values 59
4.3.4 Movement Against Blocked Opportunities 60
4.3.5 Movement Against Perceived Historical Marginalization 60
4.3.6 Protest against Governance Deficit and Perceived State Failure 61
4.4 Support Systems and Identity Framework of Perpetrators and Enablers 62
4.4.1 The Internal Support System and Enablers of Boko Haram 62
4.4.2 The External Enabling Environment and Support System for Boko
Haram 63
4.4.3 Availability and Easy Access to Foreign Arms and Munitions as
Enablers 64
4.5 A Proposed Conceptual, Analytical and Response Framework 64
4.5.1 Unpacking the Humanitarian-Development - Peace Nexus 65
4.5.2 Humanitarian Assistance Pillar 65
4.5.3 Development Pillar 66
4.5.4 Peace and Security Pillar 66
4.6 The ‘Plus 5’ Guiding Principles 67
4.6.1 Good Governance as the Irreducible Nexus Core 67
4.6.2 Partnerships and Capacity Building 68
4.6.3 Ensuring Predictable Funding and Sustainable Financing 68
4.6.4 Environmental Sustainability 69
4.6.4 Deeper and Granular Analytics 69
4.7 Proposed Models for Addressing Violence Motivation Factors and
Unpacking the Nexus 70
4.7.1 The Insurgency Quantum Factor (IQF) 70
4.7.2 Integrated Framework for Unpacking and Operationalising the Nexus 72
4.8 Conclusions 72
Technical Notes and Data Sources 74
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA iii
Statistical Annexes 83
Annex 1: Human Development Index and it’s Components 83
Annex 2: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) 84
Annex 3: Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and its Components 85
Annex 4: Gender Inequality Index and its Components 86
List of Refences 87
List of Tables
Table 1.1: Population and Ethnic Diversity of the Six States in North-Eastern
Nigeria 5
Table 1.2: Percent land use in Northern Nigeria using the SALU 13
Table 2.1: Household Size of Respondents 25
Table 2.2: People Perceptions of the political implications of Boko Haram
Insurgency in Maiduguri 30
Table 3.1: Direct Human Casualties from the Boko Haram Insurgency in
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States 34
Table 3.2: A Chronology of Reported Boko Haram Insurgency attacks in
North Eastern States, 2009 to August, 2017 35
Table 3.3: The implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Maiduguri 36
Table 3.4: The Human and Economic implications of Boko Haram
insurgency in Maiduguri 37
Table 3.5: Implications of the insurgency on Educational and Commercial
Institutions 38
List of figures
Fig.1.1 Nigeria Population Structure, 2016 2
Fig.1.2 Nigeria Demography – by State and Sex. 3
Fig.1.3 Map of Nigeria Showing the Location of the North-East Region 4
Fig.1.4 North East Nigeria showing the six states 6
Fig.1.5 Adamawa State showing the 21 LGAs 7
Fig.1.6 Bauchi State showing the 20 LGAs 8
Fig.1.7 Borno State showing the 27 LGAs 9
Fig.1.8 Gombe State showing the 11 LGAs 10
Fig.1.9 Taraba State showing the 16 LGAs 11
Fig.1.10 Yobe State showing the 17 LGAs 12
Fig.1.11 Receding Waters of the Lake Chad 1972 (left) and 2007 (right) 14
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Fig.1.12 Cumulative Deaths by Boko Haram 2011-2018 18
Fig.2.1 Changes in Poverty Headcount ratio by region - 2004-2013 20
Fig.2.2 Changes in percent middle income 2004-2013 21
Fig.2.3 Gini Coefficient Changes 2004-2013 21
Fig.2.4 Multidimensional Poverty Index – OPHDI 2017 22
Fig.2.5 State level Multidimensional Poverty Index – UNDP 2018 23
Fig.2.6 Intensity of Poverty by region 23
Fig.2.7 State level Human Development Index – UNDP 2018 24
Fig.2.8 Perceptions about average Life Expectancy in the families in the North-Eastern
States (%) 25
Fig.2.9 Unemployment Trends (20-1016) 26
Fig.2.10 Under - and Unemployment by Age Group – Q3-2017 26
Fig.2.11 Under - and Unemployment by Gender – Q3-2017 27
Fig.2.12 Under - and Unemployment by Place of Residence- Q3-2017: 27
Fig.2.13 Under - and Unemployment by Educational Attainment – Q3-2017 27
Fig.2.14 Perceptions of Relationship Between Youth Unemployment and Insurgency (%) 28
Fig. 3.1 Number of people who lost their lives in a family in the last ten years (%) 36
Fig. 3.2 Internally Displaced Persons in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States 39
Fig. 3.3 Easy accessibility of health care services by communities in the North Eastern
States (%) 45
Fig. 3.4 Level of Health Care Facilities in the communities in the North Eastern
States (%) 46
Fig. 3.5 Supply of Pipe born water to communities in the North Eastern States (%) 47
Fig. 3.6 Environmental Sanitation in the communities in the North Eastern States (%) 48
Fig. 3.7 Number of children enrolled in school (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary
institutions) by Sex (%) 51
Fig. 4.1 Schematic Graphic Presentation of Causes, Motivations and Justifications for
the Boko Haram Insurgency 61
Fig. 4.2 Modular Anatomy of Boko Haram Support System and Identity Framework of
Perpetrators and Enablers 63
Fig. 4.3 Schematic Illustration* of Multivariable Indicators and Restorative Intervention
Measures in Respect to the Boko Haram Insurgency 71
Fig. 4.4 An Integrated Framework for Unpacking and Operationalising the Nexus in
N.E Nigeria 72
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA v
Foreword
I am honoured to write a foreword to this Human Development Report themed around
Achieving Human Development for Nigeria’s North East. I am happy to note that just like
in 2016, when the national HDR focused on ‘Human Security and Human Development
in Nigeria’ and underlined the imperative of Human Security across the board, the focus
of this Report on Nigeria’s North East is equally timely. It has been distressing that the
North East is now almost synonymous with the uncanny phenomenon of insurgency that
has been mounted under the banner of Boko Haram. The term Boko Haram has, indeed,
become the imprimatur and currency of unbridled conflict, terror and violence that has
taken its toll on North East Nigeria for slightly more than a decade. It is therefore gratifying
that for the second time, the UNDP is standing with Nigeria in this noble attempt to
understand and propose lasting remedial measures to a crisis that has probably blighted
Nigeria’s standing among the comity of nations more than any other in contemporary
times.
In terms of its substance, I am happy to note that the 2018 report is neither frivolous nor
simplistic in its assessment. It has, in fact, duly appreciated that the problem associated
with the North East is a rather complex and multi-faceted one. The Report has carefully
chronicled both the possible internal as well as the external enablers that fuel the violence
and conflict leading to the monumental humanitarian challenge the region is now
grappling with. The one terrible impact and evidence of it all, has been the deaths of tens
of thousands and displacement of close to two million Nigerians spread right across the
six states of the North East. These deaths and displacements occurred in the relatively
short period of just between 2009 and 2016.
But the region in its entirety has also faced other forms of human destruction that are
more disturbing and disconcerting. These include, in the words of the Report, the “…
abduction and trafficking of persons - mostly boy children used as foot soldiers, and girl
children used as sex slaves; displacement of persons from their homes and livelihoods, and
radicalization of populations through religiously articulated ideological indoctrination
and extremist political propaganda…” These, to say nothing of the severe destruction
of the economic and social as well as the agricultural basis of livelihoods in the region.
Life in many parts of the North East has been severely imperilled, including the stigma
associated with homelessness, but more fundamentally, the long-term psycho-social
impacts of terror and destruction. Education and Health facilities, not to mention
the environment have all been destroyed. Moreover, the loss or migration by a large
segment of critical human capacities will take many generations to rebuild. For the long
term, this type of scenario presents a major developmental challenge for the people
of Nigeria in their collective. Without a shadow of doubt, the task of reconstruction
will certainly therefore be one of the most important and urgent agendas in the policy
and programmatic vision of the Federal Government of Nigeria under H.E. President
Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR.
vi HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
On the upside of things, I am penning this foreword at a time when there are some extremely
positive vibes, and the report does make some robust and useful recommendations on just
how to tackle this morass; especially on the basis of a fully holistic and well-integrated
model that leaves no one behind. Moreover, the Lake Chad Basin Governors Forum has just
been inaugurated as part of the international call to rally together in tackling a debilitating
crisis. It is my earnest hope, and indeed that of the entire Federal Government, that the
Forum will play its part in healing the deep wounds while also helping in finding lasting
solutions to the humanitarian and developmental challenge facing the region currently.
With this, as well as many other initiatives currently underway and the assured support
of the international community, I remain optimistic that the North East and Nigeria as a
whole will walk tall again.
Zainab S. Ahmed
Honourable Minister of Finance
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA vii
Preface
For close to three decades, UNDPs Human Development Reports (HDRs) have curved their
niche as one of the most highly prized signature knowledge products of the United Nations
System. Since the fi rst appearance back in 1990, the vision to provide a scientific measurement
of the totality of Human Development that goes beyond the primordial focus on income and
wellbeing indicators has been alive. Th is edition of Nigeria’s HDR has remained faithful to that
original vision.
The report has picked for its focus, the human plight presently associated with the North
East of the nation for close to one decade now. And beyond merely giving a chronicle of the
extent of human devastation and waste, the report’s main intent is to signal to the highly
complex and multi-faceted and multi-dimensional syndrome sometimes referred in emerging
UN parlance as the Humanitarian-Development and Peace Nexus of which the North East
defi nitively presents a classic case study. As it were, the fi rst and second chapters of the report
are thus devoted to presenting the critical historical background issues; including reference
to the main causal factors that unleashed the Boko Haram insurgency. As is now fairly well
known, that spate of insurgency, characterised by what are in their essence, senseless killings
and violence, displacements and destruction of property is now widely accepted to bear the
full hallmarks of terrorism. Chapter two of the report goes into more in-depth assessment of
the historical and causal factors but also incorporates the widely used Human Development
Indicators: poverty and deprivation; low human development, unemployment and other indices
that have been summarised to constitute basic structural inequalities, including the governance
deficit. In presenting this scenario in terms of facts, figures and perceptions based on a UNDP
commissioned study, the important factor associated with the use of religion for political
indoctrination also emerges as critically important.
The real novelty of this report is probably in its chapter four where a framework model for
‘unpacking the nexus” is presented. The model presents what has been aptly referred as the
Insurgency Quantum Factor, itself the equivalent of the amount of radicalisation, recruitment
and resultant terrorism that is subtracted from the purposive response in terms of resilience
building, rehabilitation and other forms of sustainable socio-economic support. In the usual
tradition, the report is also rich in terms of vital statistical annexes and technical notes aimed
at providing the data as of the time of the report, all very useful in objectively and scientifically
presenting the situation in the North East.
It must be stressed conclusively, that the views canvassed in this report are not in any way the
views held by UNDP as an organization. Rather the letter and spirit of this report is to present
yet another opportunity for the sober reflection and intellectual discoursing on Nigeria’s North
East and thereby, not only advancing knowledge and understanding of ‘the Nexus,’ but also,
triggering fundamental policy shifts that can inform long-term remedial measures in all global
situations faced with these types of unbridled flare-ups.
Edward Kallon
Resident Representative
viii HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
Acknowledgements
The preparation and final production of this Report has seen to the efforts and collaboration
between many individuals and various institutions.
First and foremost, the UNDP Nigeria Country Office set up a National Steering Committee
(NSC) co-chaired by the Minister of State for Budget and National Planning, Hon (Madam)
Zainab S. Ahmed, and Mr Edward Kallon, the UNDP Resident Representative. The NSC
provided the overall policy direction and guidance while a Technical Committee co-chaired
by the Statistician General of the Federation and the UNDP Economic Advisor for Nigeria and
ECOWAS oversaw the computation of the various indices of Human Development: the HDI,
the I-HDI, the GII and the MPI. The actual computation of these indices was undertaken by a
core team at the National Bureau of Statistics comprising Dr Yemi Kale, the Statistician General
of the Federation; Dr Isiaka Olarewaju, Mr S.B Harry, Mrs Patricia Eweama, Mr Adeyemi, Mr
Ajebiyi Fafunmi, Mr Baba Madu and Sam Adakole. We would like to most sincerely thank the
Technical Committee members for their dedication in computing the indices and preparing
the extremely important Technical Notes and Statistical Annexes included in the report and
without which any Human Development Report would be incomplete.
We specifically acknowledge the untiring dedication of the UNDP Country Office team led
by Ojijo Odhiambo (UNDP Economic Advisor for Nigeria and ECOWAS), along with Robert
Asogwa and Grace Arinze-Ononwu all working under the leadership of the Country Director,
who conceptualised the thematic focus area for the report and oversaw its preparatory process
right up to the end. Chapter four that specifically proposes a model and an analytical framework
for “unpacking the Humanitarian-Development - Peace - Nexus, benefited immensely from the
contributions by Ojijo Odhiambo. Substantial contribution from Lucky Musonda, Head of our
Communication Unit not only ensured consistency with corporate publication guidelines but
also improved the report’s design and visual appeal.
We would also like to acknowledge the team of highly dedicated peer-reviewers: Angela Lusigi
(UNDP–New York); Amarakoon Bandara (UNDP–Zimbabwe); James Wakiaga (UNDP–
Ethiopia); Rogers Dhliwayo (UNDP–Kenya) and Joerg Kuhnel (UNDP–Nigeria) all who provided
invaluable comments on the initial draft of this report.
The report has obviously drawn from various sources and publications prepared by other UN
Agencies and non-UN Agencies, including a lot of international NGOs. We therefore record
our appreciation for their continued focus and dedication that has helped in putting the unique
challenges of Nigeria’s North East under international focus and scrutiny.
Last but not least, we express profound appreciation to the Federal Government of Nigeria, and
specifically, the support and good-working relationship between the UNDP and the Federal
Ministry of Budget and National Planning and the National Bureau of Statistics.
To one and all, I say a big thank you.
Samuel Bwalya
Country Director, UNDP
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA ix
x HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
Acronyms and Abbreviations
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FCT Federal Capital Tertiary
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HCD Human Capital Development
HDR Human Development Report
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IEDs improvised explosive devices
INEC Independent National Electoral Commission
IPOB Indigenous People of Biafra
LGAs Local Government Areas
MASSOB Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NDPVF Niger Delta People Volunteer Force
NPE National Policy on Education
NYSC National Youth Service Corps
OPC Oduwa People’s Congress
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organisation
WIR World Investment Report
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA xi
Report Summary, Conclusions and Key Messages
1. The Report Objectives 2. The NHDR’s Specific Focus on the

The main objective in commissioning a study of North East
Nigeria’s North East and the subsequent preparation This 2018 Human Development Report focuses
of a Human Development Report (HDR) has been to on the North East region of Nigeria, comprising
provide an independent and fairly objective analysis the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
of the root causes of conflict and violence, and, Taraba and Yobe. Nigeria’s North East region has
consequently, the humanitarian and development in recent years acquired some sort of worldwide
crisis that has raged therein and peaking in the last fame and notoriety, for the conflict and widespread
decade. A key objective has also been to propose an violence that has generally been associated with the
analytical and conceptual framework for unpacking militant insurgency of the Islamic fundamentalist
and operationalising the Humanitarian- Development- group better known as Boko Haram. To date, the
Peace Nexus, in the context of the North East Nigeria, signature exploit of this extremist group whose
specifically, and more generally, the entire Lake Chad tendencies mirror those of other world-renowned
Basin and elsewhere. terrorist groupings that emerged in diverse locations
of the world in recent years, is forever represented
Specifically, the study and report was conceptualised
in the widely reported abduction and capture of the
and aimed at:
two hundred and seventy-six (276) ‘Chibok Girls.’
(i) Identifying the root historical, socio-cultural This report has therefore timeously sought to call
as well as the socio-economic causes of conflict attention to the often outrageous and terrifying
and violence in the North East; humanitarian and developmental crisis that has
evolved in the last decade as to make Nigeria’s North
(ii) Assesing the specific contribution of the main East region one of the world’s most lesson-bearing
social and economic factors and especially the and critical flashpoints.
place of perceived ‘exclusion’ and ‘marginalisa-
tion’ in exacerbating conflicts, violence and in-
surgency in the North East; 3. The Report Preparation Process
This report is primarily based on data and infor-
(iii) Identifying and analysing the manifestations mation gleaned from various authoritative national
of violence and insurgency on the region, with sources under the guidance and direction of a Na-
special focus on the human, developmental as tional Steering Committee. In computing the various
well as humanitarian consequences; indices or measures of Human Development, the
(iv) Enumerating and presenting a range of new, report also relied on data sourced from secondary
innovative and bold policy options for address- sources at the National Bureau of Statistics, MICS
ing or resolving the conflict and violence in the 5-2016 and a survey conducted by the National Bu-
region; and, reau of Statistics, in close collaboration with UNDP
purposively for collecting data on the various indices
(v) Reflecting on and proposing a new analyt- in 2017, referred to as the HDI 2017 Survey. The sur-
ical and conceptual framework for under- vey covered households in both urban and rural areas
standing and addressing the raging crisis and in all the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal
similar types of crises with a view to advancing Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. These data were used
and expanding the forntiers of knowledge in to compile the Human Development Index; Inequal-
conflict resolution, rehabilitation and re-inte- ity-adjusted Human Development Index; Gender
gration. This, in specific terms, is also especially Inequality Index and the Multidimensional Poverty
intended as the novelty in this particular HDR. Index.
xii HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
Additionally, the report benefitted from empirical cio-cultural nexus identifies, inter alia, the polyga-
reviews and studies undertaken by two independent mous orientation of the local population which it has
consultants commissioned by the UNDP Nigeria been argued, accounts for the phenomenal increase
Country Office and whose basic mix of methodology in population, especially of the young people, the so
included an in-depth desk review of the relevant lit- called ‘youth bulge’ that could not be properly ca-
erature on socio-economic and socio-cultural caus- tered for. The resultant huge population of idle and
al factors, some of which date back the pre-colonial unemployed youth encourage what is known locally
period. This was followed by another field work in as the Almajeri phenomenon – an entrenched cul-
the North East region to capture the peoples’ per- tural practice, it has meant that children are sent to
ceptions. Using the information from these diverse distant places, away from their biological parents in
sources, a draft report was prepared and subjected to order to acquire Qur’anic education. In general, this
peer review at various stages. is a fodder that has partly fuelled the crisis, especial-
ly given that the Almajeris (street children or child
4. The Report in Summary beggars) live in extremely appalling conditions and
This Report commences with two background chap- hence spend their time begging for alms or else are
ters that have outlined to some detail, the better known readily available for recruitment into extremist orga-
geographic, historical, socio-cultural, socio-economic, nizations such as the Boko Haram.
political as well as the religious and ideological factors
that have helped fuel one of the most pronounced, 4.2 Politics, Religious Ideology and the
multi-faceted and complex humanitarian and devel- Governance Deficit
opment crisis known to the international community In terms of the political and governance systems, the
today. In presenting the relevant background factors, report is unequivocal that the Boko Haram insurgen-
the report has touched on and tried to assess the root, cy is in a significant sense, a response to the conse-
as well as the proximate causal factors that fuelled quences of progressive failure of governance; partic-
the crisis; including in particular, what has been ad- ularly in so far as Nigeria’s North East is concerned.
judged as the deficits in state promise, or if one likes: A key failure cited is the persistence of governance
the shortcomings of governance in some respects. The deficits that appear to torpedo or frustrate the free-
expanding influence of a puritanical Islamic ideology dom of political choice. But the report has also made
that saw to flare-ups in the wider Maghreb and argu- reference to the ideological underpinning of Boko
ably, spilling into the wider Lake Chad Basin where Haram in particular; the spirited effort to render it
the bulk of Nigeria’s North East is located has been as a potent counter-argument and rebellion against
touched upon. The virtual rejection, among certain pervasive governance deficit and resultant low levels
groups in the region, of Western Education and from of development. When the perception of bad gover-
which, incidentally, the Boko Haram derives its name, nance is coupled with widespread poverty, the youth
along with the contested history of colonialism have have become highly skeptical about a democratic
been touched upon. In sum, the report has touched system that has brought them little benefit and only
on the internal enabling factors, the enabling exter- serve the interests of a small political elite. Hopeless-
nal support systems, as well as their various manifes- ness and frustrations as a result of unemployment
tations, that catapulted into a complex nexus of hu- and widespread poverty have therefore lured the
manitarian and developmental crisis in all its possible largely youthful population to embrace resistance.
manifestations. The strong ideological orientation and notion in
some quarters that Western Education is the cause
4.1 The Historical and Socio-Cultural of corruption, inequality and injustice bedevilling
Factors the society and hence must be forbidden makes Boko
In terms of the historical background, the abiding Haram particularly appealing. The religious factor
influence of the earlier jihad associated with Sheikh has been strongly canvassed in this report as a major
Usman Dan Fodio is apical and remains a major fac- factor in the emergence of Boko Haram and violence
tor accounting for the rise of Boko Haram. The so- in the region. What is critical is the fact that reli-
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA xiii
gion per se may not have been the problem, but the 4.4 An Integrated Conceptual and
fact that it is easily manipulated for various selfish Resolution Model
reasons. Accordingly, it must be noted that although
In view of the foregoing summary, this Report has
the Boko Haram is readily linked to the Islamic faith
presented and proposed some kind of novel frame-
and religion, track must not be lost of the fact that
work model that can be considered, not just for in-
both Christians and Muslims have been easy targets
tervention and mitigation, but for the guarantee of
of violence depending on how the manipulation is
reintegration, development, and ultimately, sustain-
actually done or operationalised.
ability. The core essence of the model is its three
4.3 The Complex Nature of the plus five (3+5) Integrated Framework; i.e. three re-
Humanitarian, Peace and Development sponse pillars underpinned by five guiding princi-
Nexus ples defining the schematic configuration within a
clearly stressed and vulnerable nexus. The propos-
This report has established-without equivocation, al includes the basic pillars for peace and security;
that the humanitarian crisis in the North East region humanitarian intervention as well as the develop-
is far from over. More importantly, it is a humanitar- mental response, most ideally working in tandem or
ian crisis that is complex, multi-faceted and indeed moving together in an inter-connected, non-linear
monumental. Not only has more than two million and non-sequential manner. But these basic pillars
people been displaced and tens of thousands killed must, of necessity, be underpinned by the five prin-
in the last decade alone, but the sheer destruction ciples of good governance; effective partnerships;
of the basic economic and social infrastructure will human capacities; assured funding and financing,
take a long time to rebuild. The impact of the insur- as well as, investments in deep and reliable data.
gency on all the basic Human Development indices The peace and security pillar envisages specific com-
is colossal. As detailed out in chapter three of the ponents such as an increased use of local security
report, the experience of people, especially those in systems in the form of community policing and local
IDP camps and the measures of well-being, as cap- vigilante groups. It also includes concerted multi-di-
tured in the various reports and community surveys; mensional response as well as attention to deliber-
education, health, the environment, gender, water, ate peace building initiatives; including in teaching
hygiene and sanitation – among others, have all and education generally. As is fairly customary, the
worsened. The complexity of dealing with the cate- humanitarian response pillar remains the first line of
gory that may be called, ‘undocumented IDPs’ since action, particularly in the provision of life-saving in-
they live in rather unclear circumstances within the terventions in the form of food and non-food items.
‘host communities’ and quietly bearing the full brunt Critically though, the report has noted the need to
of economic deprivation, cultural discrimination as build synergies and co-operation among the human-
well as the noted lack of access to basic health ser- itarian agencies rather than the more familiar sense
vices, including sanitation, is simply huge. Closely of competition. The developmental pillar envisages
related and as critical is the fact that unless all-round attention to the rebuilding and reconstruction of
efforts are put in place to comprehensively deal with destroyed infrastructure; skills and capacity devel-
and reverse the trend, there would be legitimate fear opment in entrepreneurship, private sector partic-
that the insurgency will and can only mutate to actu- ipation and actions that in general, guarantee local
ally cause more devastation not only across Nigeria, economic growth. Similarly, the component of good
but right into the entire Lake Chad Basin and other governance goes beyond popular public participa-
neighbouring areas in the region and globally. Con- tion, to include questions of financing and funding as
clusively, it can be said that although there have been well as environmental sustainability targeting in par-
commendable governmental engagement and inter- ticular the imminent consequences associated with
ventions, it is clear that the prevailing situation re- land degradation and climate change.
quires a lot more in terms of the capacity of security
forces to provide security for everyone, let alone the In summation, the framework model presented pro-
guarantee of shelter and accommodation. vides for both the theoretical and conceptual analy-
xiv HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
ses as well the necessary evaluation and examination 5. Main Conclusions
into the root causal factors that various actors can
In general, the study and report has confirmed the
draw from. The fundamental premise of the integrat-
dominant view that the Boko Haram insurgency and
ed framework model is that Boko Haram’s several
terrorism is deeply rooted in the socio-economic,
acts of insurgency are perpetrated by different role socio-cultural and political conditions that are then
players whose combined actions result in four core manipulated by religious extremists. In more specific
end-effects; including the violent destruction of hu- terms, the study and report has also confirmed at least
man life and property; abduction and trafficking of four important facts:
persons- mostly boy children used as foot soldiers,
and girl children used as sex slaves; displacement of (i) That, there is a significant relationship between
persons from their homes and livelihoods; and rad- perceptions of exclusion, inequality, widespread
icalization of populations through religiously articu- unemployment, poverty, religious bigotry,
lated ideological indoctrination and extremist politi- Western Education and the consequence of rag-
cal propaganda. The envisaged intervention measures ing conflicts with its associated forms of terror
and violence in North East Nigeria;
would include concerted steps to suppress the insur-
gency; coordinated measures for reconstruction, and (ii) That, there is a significant convergence of the
resilience building to restore affected communities. consequences of these conflicts and violence
Accomplishing these would therefore have to focus on infrastructure; loss of property; unemploy-
on a multiple number of intervention areas. The key ment, loss of lives, psychological trauma and
indicator variables are thus, on the one hand; what the resultant loss of livelihoods;
the report presents as ‘the quantum factor’ of the (iii) That, perceptions of exclusion that extend to
Boko Haram insurgency, made up of levels of its re- health, education, agriculture, developmental
cruitment, perpetration and radicalization which all infrastructure and other livelihoood amen-
are reflected in the negative impacts; and on the oth- tites, all have a significant nexus with the con-
er hand, positively impacting variables such as the flicts and violence in North Eastern Nigeria;
levels and intensity of counter-insurgency measures; and,
rehabilitation and reintegration efforts; rebuilding
(iv) That, it is possible to [re]-conceptualise the
community resilience, depending on degrees of deg-
way in which the Humanitarian-Develop-
radation of original resilience levels; and the amount
ment-Peace Nexus operates with a view to
of reconstruction of physical and socio-economic in-
integrating crisis response operations by ac-
frastructures in affected regions.
tors in a bid to ensure restoration, rebuilding
The integrated/nexus framework model therefore of institutions as well as reaching sustainable
captures selected possible mitigation intervention resolutions.
measures against a backdrop of negative and positive
dimensions of the insurgency. In a modular sense, 6. Key Messages
the positive impacts would, ceteris paribus, net-off In view of the main findings and what the report has
the negative direct impacts of the insurgency and established as its conclusions, the following emerge
corresponding ripple effects, to arrive at what the as key messages of the report:
report qualifies as the Insurgency Quantum Factor
(IQF). Addressing the insurgency within the context 6.1 Prevention is the Penultimate Weapon
of the IQF, ultimately, sets the stage for an integrated and Key
framework and sustainable approach that leverages This report recommends prevention as the penulti-
on the support and working together by all stake- mate weapon and anti-dote against conflict, violence
holders in order to rebuild, develop and place the and subsequently, humanitarian and development
region onto the path to lasting peace and stability; crisis. The most effective way to deal with any po-
human development for all; and environmental sus- tential humanitarian and development crises is to
tainability. prevent them from occurring in the first place and/
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA xv
or spreading to nearby and even distant geograph- detail, the reasons why some people become
ic locations. There are, indeed many possible ways radicalised and engage violence. It is a fact
through which prevention can be implanted; includ- that many youths in the region have been
ing the following: overly-radicalised and could be ready to take
up arms in the defence of causes which the
a) Addressing conclusively, rather than glossing
report finds to be essentially, political rather
over, the root causes of the crisis that have been
than religious and, in fact, most intrinsically
candidly identified in various sections of the
linked to their economic deprivation.
report. This would include paying attention
to the menace of poverty and deprivation and e) Strengthening the Rule of Law: there is need
dealing with the governance deficit that the for judicial reforms that are necessary in
report has highlighted. speeding up the processes of litigation and
meting out penalties in cases of criminal
b) Early detection of potential crisis triggers, as
culpability. Much of the appeal of the Sharia
well as determining the sign posts and tack-
Courts hinges on the belief that its judicial
ling the root causes of these triggers. The
process is more efficient than its civil equiv-
theoretical premise of putting in place an
alent and hence making the Islamic ideology
early warning system complete with period-
more attractive to the youth who feel power-
ic evaluation mechanisms has been shown to
less in the hands of the various political and
be effective in reducing losses and casualties
legal arms of government. But it has been
from conflict and violence. In the northern
noted that this is also a factor fuelling the
part of Nigeria, especially the North Central
preponderance of ‘jungle justice’ because of
region, the incessant and frequent farm-
the lack of faith in the civil judicial system.
ers-herders conflict, and associated violence
and loss of lives, is one such potential trigger f) Promoting Peace Building and Peace Educa-
that should be conclusively addressed to halt tion Initiatives: As matter of policy, intensive
any possible slide into a crisis situation or Peace Building and Peace Education should
serve as a fertile ground for the spread of the be vigorously pursued in the area at both
crisis from its current epicentre- the North formal and informal levels. At the formal
East region. level and particularly in schools and colleges
c) Delinking State from Religion, is a policy and other higher learning institutions, peace
worth pursuing, given what the report has education can be incorporated into social
shown to be its negative consequences, studies, religious studies, civic education as
noting in particular, the historical origins well as existing peace and conflict studies.
to the binary schism between the two Similarly, traditional institutions can be en-
dominant religions. In its place, the Federal couraged to play a role in promoting peace
and State governments may want to pursue building and education through the estab-
and encourage social justice on the basis lishment of peace centres at ward levels.
of human equality rather than religious
inclination or faith. There is clearly an element
6.2 Tackling the Co-joined Problems of
of unconstitutionality in the coupling of Youth Unemployment and Poverty
State and Religion which, at times, tends to There is need for deliberate programmes of investment
play right into the hands of the Boko Haram that would increase job creation and employment
ideology that disparages Western Education opportunities for youth who the Report has profiled
and blames it for all and any governmental as being clearly the main sources and tools used in
shortcomings. fanning conflict and violence. The Government
d) Strengthening and decentralising the de- should in fact engage a deliberate policy on poverty
radicalization policy, arising from the fact alleviation in the region to reduce the effect of
that the report has examined, in some the insurgency over the last few years. The ready
xvi HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
mechanisms for these include soft loans extended to and the conduct of economic development activi-
the people for their agricultural production as well as ties. Reconstruction of public infrastructures such as
provision of land and security in order to safeguard dwellings, schools, hospitals, roads and water points
lives and property. Moreover, government should will play an important role in rehabilitation and
embrace more and more, the policy of public – private re-integration of affected communities. In so doing,
partnership in order to contribute to job creation, it is important not only to ‘re-build better’, but also
poverty alleviation as well as in the provision of basic to ‘rebuild sustainably’ and through a process that
services and security in the region. involves and empowers local communities through
skills acquisition and their active participation in the
6.3 Investing in Human Capital and rebuilding and reconstruction process.
Empowerment of Women and Girls
6.5 Innovative Funding and Financing
There is need to re-design the education system in
Mechanisms
the region with a view ensuring equal access while
also increasing accessibility of both basic and higher Although funding is almost always never sufficient,
education. This aspect is critical in laying the foun- it remains a critical component in achieving lasting
dation for much-needed human capital in the region. restoration of communities affected by the insurgency.
At the same time specific attention should be given In this respect, mechanisms for establishing predictable
to policies on primary and secondary healthcare de- long-term funding covering the entirety of the
livery with a view to reviving those affected areas humanitarian – development continuum and tied to
and especially the IDP camps across the region and results but with a degree of fungibility is necessary.
other parts of the country. A strategy that specifi- Even more important is the need to ensure that within
cally aims at equipping the youth, women and girls the framework of the nexus there is planned movement
with the knowledge and skills needed for effective from reliance on [donor] funding, to local financing,
participation in the development and decision-mak- leveraging, as appropriate, from private sector resources.
ing processes of their communities is vital in the long There is, certainly, a compelling business case for greater
run. Notwithstanding the widespread traditional at- private sector financing of humanitarian, development
titudes towards girls and women which discriminate and peace initiatives. Only in this way will the response
against their participation in and access to educa- and rebuilding be sustained in the long-run.
tion, there is room for promoting their rights to edu-
cation and health and especially reproductive health. 6.6 Integrating the Principles of
The report considers that according women and the Environmental Sustainability
girls the necessary education and skills, as well as The crisis response provides a perfect opportunity to
space and voice guarantees economic and political begin integrating and mainstreaming environmen-
empowerment and that this is a key investment in tal sustainability agenda in the region. Addressing
seeking to address the complexes associated with the waste management, pollution, land degradation and
nexus. In particular, there is a need to stem the tide climate change through, for instance climate smart
of early marriage into polygamous unions especial- agriculture, clean energy, energy conservation, affor-
ly within poor families which are often sponsored estation; as well as re-charging the waters of the vi-
through wedding Fatiha, leading, subsequently, to tally important Lake Chad are all important aspects
large unplanned families often perpetuating a cycle of the crisis response framework.
of poverty.
6.7 Paving Way for Humanitarian Response
6.4 Re-build better; Re-build Sustainably and Developmental Initiatives
The insurgency and violence led to massive destruc- The conclusive restoration of peace, security and live-
tion of basic infrastructure and as such, priority lihoods while upholding the human rights of all and
should be given to infrastructure development in the institutional capacity strengthening are paramount in
region in order to enhance socio-economic condi- ushering a new era. There are two important consider-
tions and improve living standards. Infrastructure ations in paving way for a successful humanitarian and
development is critical for effective service delivery development response in the region:
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA xvii
a) Guaranteeing Safety and Security: security 6.8 Deeper Analysis and Granularity for
agencies and humanitarian and development Better Outcomes
actors should uphold the ‘human rights first’
Deeper and granular analysis of comprehensive,
principle at all times. Appropriate deploy-
reliable, relevant and up-to-date data and infor-
ment of the international, national and local
mation is desirable both for proper identification
community security apparatus is important
of the needy and improving the outcomes of the
not just in terms of dealing with the insur-
gents but also serving as a deterrent measure response. In uncovering the humanitarian – devel-
for any potential radicalised elements. The opment-peace nexus there is a need for finer-anal-
local security apparatus (Vigilante Groups), ysis of data and information in order to determine
in particular, should be rendered, by way of and target the most vulnerable and deprived. In this
national law, part of local level policing as it regard, working in close collaboration with, and
has proved to be effective in safeguarding lo- building capacities of local level institutions in data
cal areas. It has been noted that in instances, and information collection, as well as involving the
insurgency groups appeared to have access to affected populations themselves are key. Upholding
more modern and advanced equipment than the international principle of subsidiarity in uncov-
the formal security agents. This makes it nec- ering the humanitarian- development-peace nexus
essary to renew the thinking of investments means and implies the taking of action at the lowest
in modern security equipment, including possible levels with strong community involvement
assured strategies for staying ahead. More- on the basis of objectivity, sound evidence and facts.
over, better synergy and harmonization of
all security operations will be necessary giv- 6.9 Transforming and Turning Adversity
en the finding that, in some instances, con-
into Opportunity
flicts among and between respective security
agencies was one of the challenges that stood The last decade or so of such a phenomenal cri-
against a united front against the insurgency. sis presents the North East and Nigeria as a whole,
with an opportunity for a new beginning; for a life
b) Institutional Capacity Strengthening: This full of hope and prosperity in line with the Agenda
is a pre-requisite for crisis prevention and 2030 aspirations. The Agenda 2030 should provide
response. The specific establishment of the the overarching framework for, as well as the prin-
North East Development Commission as a
ciples guiding the humanitarian response and re-in-
dedicated and empowered organ of govern-
tegration and reconstruction efforts. The rebuilding,
ment saddled with the singular responsibility
reconstruction and reintegration efforts should not
of developing the region and with a view that
just restore affected populations and communities
all Federal government interventions such as
to their original conditions or status, or indeed build
the Presidential Committee on North East Ini-
tiatives (PCNI), Safe School Initiatives (SSI), and restore better; but rather should aim at propel-
Victim’s Support Fund (VSF) and other sup- ling the individuals, households and communities to
port from partners will be collapsed into the higher levels of prosperity; including the assurance of
Commission is welcome. It is hoped the ini- a much more dignified living and fulfilment. It is the
tiative will help in putting in place measures considered view of this report that the adversity so far
that would, among other factors, prevent the experienced in the North East presents an excellent
escalation and spread of the crisis to other opportunity for the region to begin a journey onto
geographic areas. a different path; a path defined by hope and shared
prosperity, a path towards sustainable development.
xviii HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
Chapter 1
Background Context to the
Humanitarian, Developmental
and Security Challenges in
Nigeria’s North East
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA 1
1.1 Introduction
The aim in this chapter is to provide a contextual and broad overview of the background context to
the humanitarian, developmental and security challenges that have bedevilled Nigeria’s North-East
region in the last decade or so; but whose roots certainly go back much further into the more distant
history. In presenting the context, it then becomes possible to appreciate the present-day challenges
within their broader historical, socio-cultural, ecological, political, developmental and even
geographic contexts. The chapter also delves into some of the prevailing governance systems that are
implicated in the overall development paradigm and trajectory that the North East has experienced
in the recent past. Owing to the prevailing significance of the Boko Haram insurgency, the chapter
pays particular attention to those socio-cultural, as well as the specific socio-economic factors that
appear to have fuelled conflict and violence, and consequently exacerbating the developmental and
humanitarian crisis that is discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of the report. The
evolution of the causal factors is traced for their persistence over time, along with a determination
of their full range and significance alongside what has been billed as the ‘ideological’ as well as the
‘religious persuasion’ that has helped foment the crisis. Reference is also made to the role of political
power relations and decision-making processes, as well as the societal and institutional structures
that are more entrenched in the region and their possible contribution to the conflict and violence
and hence, the raging crisis.
1.2 GeographicLocationandBasicDemographicDynamics
1.2.1 National and State Level Demographic Structure
Nigeria has an estimated population of 191 million (51 percent male, 49 percent female) with an
estimated growth rate of 2.43 percent per annum and a high dependency ratio of 88 percent (NBS,
2016). The most populous states are Kano (13 million) and Lagos (12.5 million) while the least
populous state is Bayelsa with just over 2 million people (NBS, 2016). The population is generally
young with an estimated 42 percent of the population being within the 0 -14 years age cohort.
Fig.1.1 Nigeria Population Structure, 2016
POPULATION (2016)
85+
75-79
65-69
55-59
45-49
35-39
25-29
15-19
5-9
—Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016
2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2018 ACHIEVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
Fig.1.2 Nigeria Demography – by State and Sex
POPULATION, NIGERIA (2016)
MEN WOMEN
FCT ABUJA  FCT ABUJA
ZAMFARA  ZAMFARA
YOBE  YOBE
TARABA  TARABA
SOKOTO  SOKOTO
RIVERS  RIVERS
PLATEAU  PLATEAU
OYO  OYO
OSUN  OSUN
ONDO  ONDO
OGUN  OGUN
NIGER  NIGER
NASARAWA  NASARAWA
LAGOS  LAGOS
KWARA  KWARA
KOGI  KOGI
KEBBI  KEBBI
KATSINA  KATSINA
KANO  KANO
KADUNA  KADUNA
JIGAWA  JIGAWA
IMO  IMO
GOMBE  GOMBE
ENUGU  ENUGU
EKITI  EKITI
EDO  EDO
EBONYI  EBONYI
DELTA  DELTA
CROSSRIVER  CROSS RIVER
BORNO  BORNO
BENUE  BENUE
BAYELSA  BAYELSA
BAUCHI  BAUCHI
ANAMBRA  ANAMBRA
AKWA/IBOM  AKWA/IBOM
ADAMAWA  ADAMAWA
ABIA  ABIA
—Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016
1.2.2 North East Geography and Demographics
Nigeria’s North-East region is one of the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. It comprises the six
states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe with a total estimated population
of just over 26 million people (NBS 2016). It is a territory that extends from Lake Chad in the
North to the Mambilla Plateau in the South and is bordered by the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary
to the East. It shares state boundary with the other Nigerian states of Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna,
Plateau and Benue as seen in figure 1.3 here below. The total area covered by the six states
in the North-East zone is about 284,646 square kilometres which constitutes about 30.8 per
cent of the total land mass in Nigeria (Dlakwa, 2004). The region has a total of 112 statutorily
recognized Local Government Areas (LGAs) which is about 14.47 per cent of the 774 LGAs in
Nigeria.
Fig.1.3 Map of Nigeria Showing the Location of the North-East Region
The table 1.1 here below summarises the population breakdown as well as the ethnic diversity
of the North-Eastern region. As is readily evident, Bauchi is the most populous state in the
region, closely followed by Borno State while Taraba has the least population of just over 3
million people. In general, the North-East states cover the six states which hitherto, were within
what was previously called the North-East State between 1967 and 1976. Adamawa and Taraba
states which hitherto formed Gongola State until 1991, have within themselves several ethnic
groups that are estimated to be more than 100. The region is inhabited by diverse ethnic groups
each with its own distinct language, but Hausa is a common language in all the six states while
Fulfulde (the language of the Fulani) is also widely spoken.
Table 1.1: Population and Ethnic Diversity of the Six States in North-Eastern Nigeria
STATE POPULATION (2016 estimates) MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS
Male Female Total
Bacharna,Chamba,Lunguda,Bulachi,Bare,Kono,Kanakuru,
Adamawa 2166702 2081733 4248435
Hunawa, Kilba, Hausa-Fulani, Ganda, Marghi. Higghi etc.
Bauchi 3334030 3203283 6537313 Hausa-Fulani, Karai-karai. Sayawa jarawa, Warji etc.
Kanuri,Shuwa,Babur-Bura,Marghi,Gwoza,Higghi,Kanakuru,
Borno 2988693 2871489 5860182
Kibabku, Hausa-Fulani
Gombe 1661050 1595911 3256961 Tangale, Terawa, Hausa-Fulani, Bolewa etc.
Taraba 1564085 1502748 3066833 Jukun Tiv, Mumuye, Kuteb, Hausa- Fulani etc
Karai-karai,Ngamo,Mangawa,Ngizimawa,Badawa,Bolewa,
Yobe 1680009 1614127 3294136
Kanuri, Hausa-Fulani, Bura, etc.
GrandTotal 13394569 12869291 26263860
PopulationDataSource:NationalBureauofStatisticsProjectionsbasedonNationalCensus2006;EthnicGroupsSource:
Abubakar: 2003:46
In general, Nigeria’s North-East is extremely heterogeneous and reflects the diverse ethnic,
religious and cultural features of the Nigerian Federation. The people of the region [the north]
are generally referred as ‘‘Jama’arArewa,’’ meaning, a trans-ethnic community of the North
although some of these community groups have considerable internal opposition to the idea
of one north informed partly by a perceived non-recognition of cultural pluralism and the
projection of some dominant cultures over others.
1.3 The Historical and Political Background of the North East

The history of the North-East region is largely defined by the north region Premiership of
Sr. Ahmadu Bello who, on the eve of Nigeria’s independence in 1960, established a political
community in the northern part of Nigeria to negotiate a power sharing agreement with
Nigeria’s then other two regions -the east and west regions. The history of the present-day North-
East region is also defined by the politics of the Nigerian civil war (6 July 1967 – 15 January
1970) and the then prevailing perception of dominance over some minority ethnic groups that
informed the 1967 decision by then Colonel Yakubu Gowon (later military President of Nigeria)
to dissolve the colonially constructed three regions of the north, east and west Nigeria and in
their place create twelve states (States Creation and Transitional Provision Decree No. 14 of
1967 of May 27, 1967). As a result of this Decree, the former north region was divided into
Benue-Plateau; Kano; Kwara; North-Central; North-Western and the North-Eastern States. The
North-Eastern state became an amalgamation of Borno province, the Adamawa Emirate taken
from the Sokoto Caliphate and the northern Cameroon province which was initially a German
colony, but administered as a United Nations Trust Territory after the Germans were defeated
in World War II, with the capital located in Maiduguri.
On 3rd February 1976, the North-Eastern state was further divided into three states: Bauchi,
Borno and Gongola. Later on, Gombe was curved out of Bauchi; Yobe out of Borno while
Gongola was split into Taraba and Adamawa states. Currently, the North-Eastern region is
made up of the aforementioned six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and
Yobe (Fig 1.4). The administration of each of the states is overseen by an Executive Governor
who exercises political power, sometimes mobilizing political support along ethnic and religious
lines.
Fig.1.4 North East Nigeria showing the six states
1.4 Some Background to Each of the North-East States

Some historical background and geographic features relating to each of the six North East states
are briefly summarized here in order to lend clarity to some of the developmental issues discussed
in subsequent sections of the report.
1.4.1 Adamawa State
Adamawa State was created on 27th August, 1991 out of the former Gongola State and lies on the
South-eastern part of Borno State. Both Adamawa and Borno States have porous borders with
Cameroon and Chad which allows for easy movement of arms and cross-border crimes. The
strongholds of the Boko Haram in Adamawa State are in the mountainous areas of Madagali,
Mubi, Uba and Michika with the rough terrains providing ideal hideouts for the insurgents.
Topographically, Adamawa is mountainous and is crossed by the large river valleys of Benue,
Gongola and Yedsarem with the valleys of the Cameroon, Mandara and Adamawa mountains
forming part of the landscape. The major occupation of the people is farming as reflected in
their two notable vegetational zones - Sub-Sudan and Northern Guinea Savannah- known for
cotton and groundnuts as the main commercial crops while the food crops include maize, yam,
cassava, guinea corn, millet and rice. Communities living on the banks of the rivers engage in
fishing while others are herdsmen.
Fig.1.5 Adamawa State showing the 21 LGAs
1.4.2 Bauchi State
Bauchi State was created on 3rd February, 1976 out of the former North Eastern State and occupies
a total land area of 49,119 km² representing about 5.3 per cent of Nigeria’s total land mass. The
state is bordered by seven states of Kano and Jigawa to the north, Taraba and Plateau to the south,
Gombe and Yobe to the east and Kaduna to the west. Bauchi state is one of the states in the
northern part of Nigeria that spans two distinctive vegetation zones; i.e. the Sudan savannah and
the Sahel savannah with the former covering the southern part where it gets richer (agriculturally),
especially along water sources and the latter (also known as a semi-desert vegetation) manifest
from the middle of the state as one moves to the north, comprising mainly of isolated stands of
thorny shrubs. The southwestern part of the state is mountainous as a result of the continuation
of the Jos Plateau, while the northern part is generally sandy. The level of illiteracy and poverty
is very high in the State and it has witnessed several Boko Haram attacks particularly within the
metropolis.
Fig.1.6 Bauchi State showing the 20 LGAs
1.4.3 Borno State
Borno State was created on 3rd February, 1976 out of the former North Eastern State.
Maiduguri, the state capital is reputed to be the birth place and headquarters of Boko Haram.
Culturally, the state is heterogeneous but with the Kanuri as the undoubted majority. In spite
of their numerical strength in the state and across the entire Lake Chad region, the Kanuri
experienced a reversal of political fortunes after the re-establishment of democracy in 1999 and
are yet to regain similar status under the new democratic dispensation (Lewis, Robinson and
Rubin, (1998). The rough terrain, such as mountains and dense forests, provide safe havens for
insurgents and have periodically prompted deadly clashes along the border with Cameroon’s
army. The Sambisa forest, in particular, serves as a major sanctuary for insurgents and has been
used by Boko Haram to avoid capture. The Mountain ranges in Northern Cameroon also fulfil
a similar function, with the added benefit of being inaccessible to the Nigerian military in the
initial stages of the insurgency. Illiteracy and poverty are also very high. For various reasons
that are both historical, internal and external, Borno state has been the epicentre of the Boko
Haram rampage.
Fig.1.7 Borno State showing the 27 LGAs
1.4.4 Gombe State
Gombe State was created on October 1, 1996, out of the former Bauchi State and is multi-ethnic
in its composition with the dominant Tangale tribe inhabiting the southern part of the State. The
other ethnic groups are the Igala, Waja, Fulani and Hausa with their separate cultural as well
as ethnic identities. The State also comprises other minority ethnic groups such as the Bolewa,
Kanuri, Dadiya and Waja who occupy a sizeable part of some remote areas of the state. The state
capital of Gombe is a reflection of the heterogeneous composition of the state. Its location in the
North Eastern zone, right within the expansive savannah, allows the state to share common borders
with the Borno state, Yobe, Taraba, Adamawa and Bauchi states. It has an area of 20,265 km² and
an estimated population of 3.3 million people as of 2016. Gombe has two distinct climates: the
dry season (November–March) and the rainy season (April–October) with an average rainfall of
850mm. Although Gombe remains one of the most stable areas in the North East region, it is as
vulnerable to the violence given that it shares boundaries with Borno and Yobe states.
Fig.1.8 Gombe State showing the 11 LGAs
1.4.5 Taraba State
Taraba State was created on 27th August, 1991 out of the former Gongola State and is bordered in
the west by Nasarawa State and Benue State; in the northwest by Plateau State; north by Bauchi
State and Gombe State; northeast by Adamawa State; east and south by Cameroon. The state
lies largely within the middle of Nigeria and consists of an undulating landscape dotted with a
few mountainous features that include the scenic and prominent Mambilla Plateau. Most of the
state is within the tropical zone of low forest vegetation in the southern part and grassland in
the northern parts. The Mambilla Plateau with an altitude of 1,800 meters above sea level has a
temperate climate all year round. The rivers Benue, Donga, lau Taraba and Ibi are the main rivers
in the state, arising from the Cameroonian mountains and stretching almost the entire length of
the state in a general North-South direction to link up with the river Niger. Historically, Taraba
state has had the least number of Boko Haram attacks in the zone.
Fig.1.9 Taraba State showing the 16 LGAs
1.4.6 Yobe State
Yobe State was created on 27th August, 1991 out of the former Borno State and shares borders with
three states: to the eastern boundary with Borno State; to the West is Jigawa and Bauchi States
while to the North is the international border with Niger Republic. Yobe covers an area of about
45,502 Km2 with a population of about 3.3 million people (2016 population census projections).
Because the state lies mainly in the dry savanna belt, conditions are hot and dry for most of the
year, except in the southern part where the climate is much more mild. Whereas Yobe state is an
agricultural state, it also has rich fishing grounds and mineral deposits of gypsum in the Fune
LGA, kaolin, and quartz. The state’s agricultural products include gum arabic, groundnuts, beans,
and cotton and it is reported to have one of the largest cattle markets in West Africa, located in
Potiskum. The state however continues to register very high rates of illiteracy and poverty. The
major ethnic group in Yobe are Kanuri, while other ethnic communities include Ngizim, Karai-
Karai, Bolewa, Bade, Hausa, Ngamo, Shuwa, Fulani (Bura), and Maga.
Fig.1.10 Yobe State showing the 17 LGAs
1.5 Land Degradation and Loss of Livelihoods
The North East region occupies the Sahel - Savannah belt on the southern fringes of the Sahara
Desert, the area most affected by desertification and land degradation. Nicholson et al (1998) have
described this zone as the most “ecologically unstable” in the world, a phenomenon explained by
Zeng and Neelin (2000) as arising from the fact that these grassland ecosystems try to smoothen
large climatic variability between the (Sahara) desert to the north and the rain forest to the south,
thus creating a state of unsteadiness in-between. Although Desertification has been defined as a
land degradation process in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors,
including climate variation and human activities (UN, 1994), some authorities prefer to distinguish
desertification as simply being “the expansion of desert-like conditions and landscapes to areas
where they should not occur climatically (Graetz, 1991) while land degradation is exemplified by
the replacement of diverse and nutrient-rich plant species with vegetation of poorer quality due
to reduced soil quality (Nicholson, 2001). Land uses such as tree felling for fuel wood and timber;
pasture and crop production; and agricultural ‘extensification’ and intensification have all been
cited as important contributors to land degradation in Africa. Badejo (1998) suggested that land
use change has impacted the northern ecosystems of Nigeria over the years leading to a perceived
creeping of the savannah into the tropical rain forest zone. Using the Sahelian Land Use Model
(SALU), Taylor et al (2002) measured the changes in percent land use in Northern Nigeria over a
54-year (1961-2015) period. The results revealed the existence of an inverse relationship between
the land under forest cover and land used for pasture and crops with a continuous decrease in forest
cover and increase in land area used for pasture and cropland over this period. This situation, they
aver, could possibly have grave environmental and climatic consequences over time, since forests,
among many other functions such as carbon sequestration, act as nutrient pumps into ecosystems
and preserve water in case of low rainfall. The findings of Taylor, et al, based on changes in land
use in effect, confirmed gradual degradation of the land in Northern Nigeria over time.
Table 1.2: Percent land use in Northern Nigeria using the SALU
Land Use Type 1961 1996 2015
Forest 72 40 35
Pasture 14 16 17
Cropland 5 14 22
Fallow 9 16 15
Unused 0 13 11
— Source: Taylor et al ((2002)
Prior to independence and immediately thereafter, the North-East region enjoyed a comparative
advantage in agriculture and thus acted as the bread basket for the rest of the country. However,
the 1970s oil boom redirected the focus of the economy and deprived the region of the investment
needed to transition into large-scale commercial and sustainable agriculture. Simultaneously,
desertification, land degradation and the adverse impacts of climate change began to deprive
the region of its agricultural potential and means of livelihood. The sum total of all these is
that through a combination of anthropogenic and climatic factors the region’s natural resource
endowments have become systematically depleted. A classical case of resource depletion is the
Lake Chad which provides water for and is a source of livelihood to a population of 30 million
people across the four countries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria whose water became
depleted by up to 90% over the past three decades as depicted by satellite images in fig 1.11
below.
Fig.1.11 Receding Waters of the Lake Chad 1972 (left) and 2007 (right)
Source:https://www.google.com/search?q=receding+water+of+lake+chad&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=
0ahUKEwjvp_n4k4DcAhUIZVAKHeQXC2oQsAQIJA&biw=1391&bih=690#imgrc=pRkw1-SbgCDwdM:&spf=1530525749600
The effects of limited development of the agricultural sector and the degradation of the natural
environment have been exacerbated by failure to develop alternative industries given the limited
infrastructure and the lack of human capital in the region.
1.6 Religious Contests and Anti-Western Influence in the

North East
The North East region is well known for a fairly long period of well-documented religious
contestations. These contests, including the intermittent conflicts around religious supremacy
and dominance, in addition to their recurrent ethnic manifestations have evolved through the
various historical epochs, implicating as many actors and resulting in distinct outcomes that
can roughly be clustered around six themes.
1.6.1 The Abiding Influence of the 19th Century ‘Jihad’

With a predominantly Muslim population, the jihad war that was fought by the famed Sheik
Usman Dan Fodio in the early 19th century (Hickey, 1984) is illustrative. Usman Dan Fodio is
reported to have waged the jihad or religious war against what he described as the un-Islamic
and corrupt ruling elite leading to the establishment of the Sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate.
Joel (2014) has stated that the spread of Islam across the North-East states can be traced to that
19th Century jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, which also led to their incorporation into the Caliphate
and the institutionalization of the Emirate (and later Native Authority under colonization) type
of rule. The process of incorporation and its consolidation by the colonialists through “Indirect
Rule” however, led to misunderstandings and mistrust within and between diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious groups. The subsequent assertion of separate ethnic identities, coupled
with the religious and newly emergent political contests as well as the competition over the
control of productive resources among themselves are potential sources of the violent conflict
in the North-East area (Abubakar, 2003). Indeed, the very emergence of Boko Haram reflects a
long history of the militant type of the Islamic religion in northern Nigeria which forms a core
part of the movement of restoration (Agbiboa, 2013). Moreover, the late 1970s and early 1980s
marked the beginning of a period of agitation for Sharia law to be adopted across Nigeria as
result of which Sharia law was adopted in twelve northern states between 1999 and 2001. The
emergence of Boko Haram, which relies on violence ought therefore to be viewed within the
broader context of this restoration since the overriding goal continues to be the enforcement
of Sharia law.
1.6.2 The Quest for a Puritanical Brand of Islam in the Post-colonial Era
The jihad of Usman Dan Fodio has been viewed, in some quarters, as a war for religious
purification and the search for a political kingdom (Crowder, 1978; ICG, 2010) with the
outcome being that it has remained fundamental for the legitimacy of the northern ruling class
(Udoidem, 1997). The ruling class saw the British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, and
its subsequent dealings with colonial and post-colonial states as bringing about the corrupting
influence of secular political power (Agbiboa, 2013; Falola, 1998) and hence the resistance,
ever since, to Western Education by some Muslims (Marchal, 2012). For instance, northern
Nigeria in December 1980 experienced a violent confrontation between an Islamist sect known
as Maitatsine and the Nigerian Police Force in Kano which extended to Maiduguri in October
1982; to Yola in 1984, Gombe in 1985, Potiskum riots in 1994 and Jalingo 1992 (Abubakar,
2003). Scholars such as Hickey (1984), opine that the Maitatsine uprisings had their roots in the
deeply conservative practice of Islam which has been dominant in the region since Usman Dan
Fodio’s jihad. Muhammed Marwa the leader of Maitatsine was an Islamic scholar who believed
that Islam had come under the corrupting influence of westernization and the formation of the
modern state (Agbiboa, 2013). The Maitatsine had gone to the extent of rejecting Muslims who
had, in their eyes, gone astray; lived in secluded areas to avoid mixing with mainstream Muslims
and rejected material wealth on the grounds that it was associated with Western values.
1.6.3 Rebellion Against Western Education and Influence

European intervention in Africa and the subsequent colonization of Nigeria brought about
resistance against Western Education, especially in the Muslim dominated areas. In a sense,
it is this fact that accounts for the low educational attainment in the northern parts of the
country. In contrast, Western Education was generally welcomed in the southern territories.
The historical Northern resistance to Western Education was premised on the understanding
that Muslims had a parallel system; i.e. an Islamic Education in the form of the Qur’anic
school (makarantar allo) and advanced knowledge school (makarantar ilmi), which had
flourished for centuries. From this perspective, Western Education was seen as an attack on
the existing system given that it was introduced by Christian missionaries as a means for
evangelism. Accordingly, those who went to the schools providing Western Education known
as makarantar boko were regarded with no respect and earned the derisive name: ‘yan boko’
or simply, ‘western-educated’ (Salihi, 2012). But the early generation of ‘yan boko’ in Northern
Nigeria were not entirely uprooted from their Muslim traditional background which included
Islamic education. Equipped with Western Education, they were to provide the manpower for
the civil service and all other modern professions including political leadership. In fact, they
were to establish the legacies of meritorious service and exemplary life for the region, in spite
of the latent undercurrents.
1.6.4 The Failed Promise of Western Education

The later generation of beneficiaries of Western Education in the north did not however, offer
the demeanour and the opportunities of the pioneers. The political instability and economic
hardship experienced since the advent of the 1980s coupled with other problems, including
the diminishing capacity of government to deliver basic services and ensure prosperity led to
frustration, deeply held grievances and unlike the initial stage when boko was suspect because
of its evangelization credentials, it became despised for its failure to meet the expectations
of many, in terms of the prospects for a better form of education, employment and other
opportunities. More fundamentally, the wanton corruption and culpability of its products were
then related directly to the problems of the country as a whole (Salihi, 2012). This background is
particularly relevant to the emergence of Boko Haram, besides its identity as an Islamist group
(Isa 2010, Egwu 2011).
1.6.5 The Colonial Principle of Indirect Rule and Religious Contest

In addition to the foregoing, it is to be recalled that the British colonial administrators,
through the process of ‘Indirect Rule’ put several non-Moslem community enclaves under
the administration of the Emirs while at the same time, perhaps paradoxically, the indigenous
groups of these areas were being converted to Christianity and not Islam which was the religion
of the Emirs. The journey of the inhabitants of such enclaves to Christianity thus ensured
that they got Western Education and with it, power through the holding of state positions.
This implied the gaining of power, legitimacy and freedom. This narrative corroborates with
Idahosa’s (2015) findings; that whereas socio-economic factors facilitated the radicalization
and politicization of religious sects in the North East, the fundamental factor is also the fear
of domination and hence the fight for supremacy. The emergence of Boko Haram is therefore
sometimes understood within this context of a perception of possible future dominance of one
religion over the other.
1.6.6 The Effects of Latter-day Calls for a Universal Jihad

The emergence of Boko Haram also benefitted from the global developments following the
Tuesday September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States when there were, in some
quarters, an anti-Western campaign and calls for a universal jihad. In spite of widespread global
condemnation against the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States (US), there were
celebrations in some parts of Nigeria. To complicate matters, the military campaigns by ‘the
coalition forces’ in some parts of the world which commenced immediately after the attack
coincided with a period of general economic hardships and low levels of development in Nigeria
that inadvertently created the ideal environment for Boko Haram to capitalize on. In line with
this, several conspiracy theories emerged linking Boko-Haram with some external forces and as
a symptom of Nigeria as a failed state (Atim, 2014).
1.7 Proliferation of Arms and Ammunition
The proliferation of small arms and ammunition has also been put forward as a cause of the
Boko Haram insurgency. Kashim (2012) asserts that the peculiar geo-political setting of Borno
state’s neighbouring three countries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger in a sub-region generally
known for political upheaval, insecurity, religious extremism and terrorism is an important
predisposing factor. The relatively higher level of arms and ammunition in the North-East
axis can be attributed to the instability and armed conflict experienced in some neighbouring
African countries. Being the gateway to Nigeria from North and Central Africa and given the
porous nature of the international borders with Chad, Cameroon and Niger, Borno and Yobe
states have served as a natural route for illegal persons, arms and ammunition. This situation
could greatly have assisted the cause of the Boko Haram.
1.8 The Emergence of Boko Haram

It is instructive to note that prior to the advent of British colonization, the current region
of North-eastern Nigeria was a territory under the sovereign control of the Bornu Empire
composed of a majority of Kanuri-Muslims. However, the imposition of British control
contributed to an increased allegiance of the local people to the Bornu Sultanate, as well
as profound dissatisfaction with the activities of the British authorities. This contributed
to the rise of fundamentalism and could help to explain aspects of the genesis of sympathy
and popular support for Boko Haram among the local Kanuri people (Olojo, 2013). It is in
agreement with Olojo (2013), that Atim (2014) thus suggests that the territory currently under
Boko Haram sphere of influence was a sovereign constitutional Republic or Sultanate with
majority Kanuri Muslim population. But unlike the Sokoto Sultanate, the Bornu Sultanate
was run according to the principles of the constitution of Medina. The Bornu Sultanate was
thus distinct from the Sokoto Caliphate with the former emerging after the overthrow of the
Kanem- Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years
Boko Haram, a Hausa phrase meaning ‘Western Education is forbidden’ or ‘Western Education
is sinful’ is the name commonly used to refer to the organization ‘Ahlisunnah Lidda’awati
wa’l-Jihad’, or the ‘People Committed for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and
Jihad’. The movement has its origins in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. The name
gained popularity in the early 2000s and although now widely used and popularized by the
media, it does not adequately capture the real objective of the movement, which was and is, to
overthrow the secular government, and establish an Islamic state run under Sharia law with
assurance of ridding the territory of Western influences. The movement rejects Western
civilization at large and upholds the superiority of Muslim civilization. After a period of
relative ‘low activity’, the group re-emerged in 2010 and since then, its attacks have grown in
intensity and scope precipitating the current humanitarian and development crisis in North
East Nigeria. The cumulative impact of Boko Haram in terms of the deaths alone between 2011
and 2018 is partially captured in figure 1.12 herebelow. But the movement has since spread
its activities not only to the entire North-East but also to other parts of Nigeria and across
the borders into Cameroon, Chad and Niger effectively covering the entire Lake Chad basin
region. The movement has therefore become the most significant security and development
challenge facing the entire Lake Chad Basin.
Fig.1.12 Cumulative Deaths by Boko Haram 2011-2018
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
1.9 Conclusion
In essence, this chapter has introduced and attempted to locate the historical origins to the crisis
that is raging in Nigeria’s North East. It has chronicled the basic historical, ecological, socio-
cultural as well as the more contemporary sources of grievance that have fuelled the crisis.
The North East as a region has also been profiled in order to highlight some of its significant
demographic, climatic and developmental contexts. In the next chapter, an attempt will now be
made to provide a more in-depth look at each of the critical causal factors with a view to laying
bear the significant effects and consequences that have in essence, amounted to an atrocious
and cruel affront to the Human Development indices of the North East generally.
Chapter 2
An Assessment of the Root
Causal Factors of the Crisis
2.1 Introduction
The basic aim in this chapter is to provide a more pragmatic assessment of the root causal factors
that have fuelled the crisis in the North East region and more so during recent times. It is to be
appreciated at the outset, that although most of the directly relevant root causal factors have been
identified and outlined in the preceding chapter, their specific contributions and respective impact
in the context of overall Human Development in the North East region have not been assessed.
The intention here is therefore, to attempt a slightly more deepened analysis, by drawing from the
various survey findings and also cross-referencing these with the literatures and other sources
in order to establish how specific root causal factors have had quite an impact on the general
populace; on human development in particular, and how all these have in turn exacerbated what
has, ultimately, become a major developmental and humanitarian crisis.
2.2 Poverty, Deprivation and Low Human Development

2.2.1 Rising Poverty and Income Inequality
In a recent publication, the World Bank has reported all the six regions of Nigeria, with the
exception of the North East registered a decline in the poverty incidence. Simply put, the
poverty headcount index, over the 2004 – 2013 period (World Bank, 2016) has declined. Using
the 2004 poverty line of 28,830 a year deflated temporally using the national consumer price
index provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and spatially using zonal-level price
data, the report shows that the South West region performed particularly well and managed to
cut the poverty rate by more than half during this period, while poverty levels remained
particularly high in the North East and North West regions at 47.6 percent and 59.0 percent,
respectively. Importantly, the North East was the only region to have registered an increase in
the incidence of poverty from 45.56 percent to 47.56 percent over this period. Unsurprisingly,
the region also had a shrinking middle class and the largest increase in income inequality, as
measured by the Gini Coefficient, over this period.
Fig.2.1 Changes in Poverty Headcount ratio by region – 2004-2013
— Source: World Bank calculations based on NLSS 2003–04 and GHS 2010–11, 2012–13
Fig.2.2 Changes in percent middle income 2004-2013
Fig.2.3 Gini Coefficient Changes 2004 -2013
2.2.2 High Levels of Multiple Deprivation

Beyond the money metric poverty measure presented in the preceding section, in general
terms, practically all recent evaluations have confirmed that northern Nigeria, especially the
North-East region, is the most deprived part of the Nigerian federation. According to the
Oxford Poverty Human Development Initiative (OPHDI, 2017), the North of Nigeria is most
conspicuous for the flaming red indicators showing the highest incidence of deprivation as
measured by the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) across various domains with the
most deprived state being Yobe with an MPI of 0.635, followed closely by Zamfara state with
an MPI of 0.605. This is in stark contrast to the situation in the South West which has two of
the least deprived States – Lagos and Osun, with MPIs of 0.035 and 0.043, respectively.
Fig.2.4 Multidimensional Poverty Index – OPHDI 2017
The Oxford study used indicators of assets, cooking fuel, floor, drinking water, sanitation and
electricity while the others were nutrition and child mortality as well as school attendance and
years of schooling. More recently, UNDP Nigeria in collaboration with the National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS) in a study commissioned as part of the production of this report (see Annex
2) has undertaken a more contextualised computation of the MPI at the sub-national level
leading to pretty much similar results, albeit with different rankings of the states as shown in
fig 2.5 below. In this most recent UNDP Nigeria/NBS computation the indicators used included
assets, cooking fuel, floor type, source of water, sanitation, source of lighting, child mortality,
child school attendance, years of schooling and importantly, unemployment.
Fig.2.5 State level Multidimensional Poverty Index – UNDP 2018
The UNDP Nigeria/NBS computation also shows that the intensity of poverty, which measures
the percentage of dimensions in which poor people are deprived is highest in northern Nigeria
with the North East at 44 percent, just one percentage point below the North-West region where
the intensity of poverty is 45 percent and three percentage points above the North central region
where the intensity of poverty is 41 percent.
Fig.2.6 Intensity of Poverty by region
2.2.3 Low Human Development
The North-East region also lags other regions in terms of overall Human Development. Human
development is about people expanding their choices; and being able to live full and creative
lives, with freedom and dignity. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure
of human progress which takes into consideration the average achievements in three basic
dimensions of human development; a long and healthy life; access to knowledge and a decent
standard of living across geographic areas and over time. The recently UNDP Nigeria/NBS
computed HDI, at state level, shows that Nigeria has an average HDI of 0.521. All the North East
states have HDI scores below the national average; ranging from a high of 0.4286 in Taraba to
a low of 0.3238 in Bauchi, a figure less than half that of Lagos state at 0.6515, the state with the
highest HDI score (see Annex 2 for detailed State level HDI computations).
Fig.2.7 State level Human Development Index – UNDP 2018
These findings from different surveys carried out over diverse time periods are corroborated
by the findings of a field survey undertaken across the North East States to gauge respondents’
perception of the status of socio-economic development and the drivers of the prevailing crisis
(see section on study methodology). As can be seen from Table 2.1 below, some 43 percent of the
population have a household size of 1- 4; 34 percent, 5-9; 15 percent have 10-15 household size
while 8 percent of the households have 16 members or more. The implication of all these is that
the average household size in the North East region is between 4 and 9 except for Gombe State
which has an average household size of 1-4. By any measure, these are large size households which
at the very outset require significant resources to ensure their basic survival.
The field study also confirmed the significant co-relationship between the low attainments in the
basic indicators of socio-economic development and the evidently large household sizes. Thus, for
instance the figure 2.8 here below shows that an average of 46.3 percent of respondents across the
North-East states reported the low life expectancy of between 31 and 40; while about 41 percent
reported a life expectancy of between 40 and 59; and 12.2 percent as 60 and above with the overall
implication being that for a significant number of people in the area, life expectancy is between 31
and 40 and further highlighting the deficiency of health facilities and related services in the area.
Table 2.1: Household Size of Respondents

State Household Size Responses Percentage State Household Size Responses Percentage
1-4 32 53 16-above 00 00
5-9 26 43 Total 60 10
Adamawa 10-15 02 03 1-4 16 27
16-above 00 00 5-9 20 34
Total 60 100 Taraba 10-15 13 13
1-4 15 15 16-above 11 18
5-9 19 32 Total 60 100
Bauchi 10-15 20 34 1-4 27 45
16-above 06 10 5-9 28 47
Total 60 100 Yobe 10-15 05 08
1-4 30 50 16-above 00 00
5-9 18 30 Total 60 100
Bornu 10-15 10 17 1-4 156 43
16-above 02 03 5-9 123 34
Total 60 100 Grand 10-15 54 15
1-4 36 60 16-above 27 08
Gombe 5-9 20 34 Total 360 100
10-15 04 07 —Source: Field Survey, 2017
Fig.2.8 Perceptions about average Life Expectancy in the families in the North- Eastern States (%)
—Source: Field Survey, 2017
2.3 Unemployment and Underemployment
Women and young people are often victims of multiple and interlocking forms of discrimination
and exclusion that can lead to an imbalance of power that excludes them from participating in
economic development and affairs that affect them, ultimately undermining their needs and
aspirations. As shown in fig 1.1 Nigeria has a significant “youth bulge”, with an estimated 83
percent of the population below the age of 40 years while 62 percent are below the age of 25
years. But whether the “youth bulge” constitutes a threat depends largely on the degree to which
youth are included in economic, social, and political life; and the extent to which they can access
opportunities for education and socio-economic mobility.
Unemployment which has been on a general upward trend in the recent past has discernable gender
and spatial dimensions with the youth, women and those living in rural areas disproportionately
affected as shown in figures 2.9 to 2.13 below. Instructively, unemployment is highest among those
with the highest level of educational attainment (post-secondary education) which, as is observed in
the proceeding sections leads to a sense of frustration and poverty, especially among the educated.
Fig.2.9 Unemployment Trends (2010-2016)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics
Fig.2.10 Under- and Unemployment by Age Group – Q3-2017
—Source: National Bureau of Statistics
Fig.2.11 Under-and Unemployment by Gender – Q3-2017
Fig.2.12 Under- and Unemployment by Place of Residence – Q3-2017:
Fig.2.13 Under-and Unemployment by Educational Attainment – Q3-2017
The basic pattern of the NBS generated statistics appear to have also been vindicated from the
field survey undertaken in the course of producing this report. The figure 2.14 here below, for
instance, shows that an average of 76.78 percent of respondents surveyed in the six states agreed
that youth unemployment has contributed to the Boko Haram insurgency while 20.28 percent
disagreed. In Yobe state, Adamawa and Gombe, this co-relationship is particularly distinct;
with the former (Yobe), actually reflecting that nearly 100 percent of the survey respondents
agreed that youth unemployment is a major factor accounting for the insurgency. This general
perception suggests that widespread youth unemployment cannot be meaningfully delinked
from the insurgency in the North East given too, that “an idle mind is the devils workshop” as
the old adage goes.
Fig.2.14 Perceptions of Relationship Between Youth Unemployment and Insurgency (%)
In essence, the foregoing sections reveal that poverty in the North East is widespread and hence
confirming what has been described as a ‘failed promise’ that many Nigerians had hoped for
particularly at the advent of independence. Commenting on this perception of failure back in
August 2009, former US Secretary of State, Ms Hillary Clinton attributed the problem associated
with the rise of conflict in Nigeria to the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and poverty in the
rural communities. According to her, “the lack of transparency and accountability had eroded
the legitimacy of government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and
reject the authority of the state” (Clinton, 2009:1). In an apparent concurrence with Ms Clinton,
Mallam Hussaini Salisu, an Islamic cleric has asserted:
The level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for
activities of Boko Haram... their conduct is totally un-Islamic but the whole problem boils
down to the failure of government at all levels to make the welfare of the citizenry a priority,
a nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people
seek relief in religion (Tell, August 10, 2009:38).
In his contribution to an analysis of the root causes of Boko Haram, Adetiloye (2014), opined
that where there is a wide gap between the rich and the poor, class conflicts will always occur.
In addition, the arrogant display of ostentatious wealth by the elitist class which the majority
seem to regard as having been illegally acquired creates hatred (Adetiloye (2014). This line
of thought is shared by Nwagu (2014) who also attributes the cause of the insurgency to the
control of valuable resources by powerful people who deny the less privileged access, with the
disadvantaged segments resorting to fighting for what they believe belongs to them. Insurgency
in this context arises because a group decides that the gap between their political expectations
and the opportunities afforded them is unacceptable and this can only be remedied by force
(Metz, 2007).
2.4 Perceived Systematic Exclusion and Structural Inequality

Nigeria also appears to have borne the full brunt of many years of neglect and structural
inequalities stemming largely from the failure to address deplorable living conditions and
lack of economic opportunities, particularly in the North East. As the state continued to
retreat and the economy dwindled, the country got caught up with a small elite that was
deeply steeped in conspicuous consumption at the
expense of the majority. In the midst of widespread
and abundant poverty, a fertile environment was thus
created for Boko Haram to thrive (Kashim, 2012). It is to say that the effects of
Adeyemi (2006) has attributed this state of affairs to a frustration nurtures rebellion
lack of political legitimacy to which he proceeds to peg
most of the crises and especially, the inability to bring and apathy among the majority
about genuine development that responds adequately of the citizenry and brings
to the needs and aspirations of the masses. He thus
opines that tribalism and the manipulation of religious about insurgency, restiveness,
sentiments, as well as regionalism have been used to terrorism, violence and such like
justify unequal development.
anti-social activities. In such
The feeling of being unequally treated has fomented
frustration and could further lead to rebellion (Nwagu, unhealthy environments, people
2014). It is to say that the effects of frustration tend to identify more closely
nurtures rebellion and apathy among the majority of
the citizenry and brings about insurgency, restiveness, with their religious beliefs for
terrorism, violence and such like anti-social activities. all manner of reasons; including
In such unhealthy environments, people tend to
identify more closely with their religious beliefs for all
a desire to gain support; rise
manner of reasons; including a desire to gain support; against the system; mobilise
rise against the system; mobilise politically or for their
own security. Whereas the result is quite often the
politically or for their own
alienation from others on the basis of religious faith, security.
the fact remains that such beliefs will only have been
driven by hatred, anger, bitterness and envy which
therefore provide fodder for rebellion. The classic case
in point here is the situation which obtained in Maiduguri from 2009 to 2013 when, a feeling
of exclusion; envy and jealously appears to have been among the drivers of the conflict.
Some local communities left their business premises (shops, workshops, warehouses and
other places) with claims that ‘non-indigenes’ had dominated businesses and lucrative offices
leaving them in poverty.
2.5 Use of Religion as a Tool for Economic and Political
Mobilisation
Idahosa (2015) has suggested that the activities of Boko Haram could well be understood from
the perspective of the gridlock between religion and the State. He cites in this regard, claims and
counter claims of complicity that are traded between the political parties that have been at the
centre of political power in Nigeria and which apparently would put religion on the backseat
of causative factors. In thus accepting the view that Boko Haram has political connections, a
study by Mbaya (2013) revealed some of these uneasy political implications of the Boko Haram
insurgency in Maiduguri (see table 2.2 below). As can be seen from the table 2.2, some 38.6
percent of the respondents surveyed were of the view that the political implications of Boko
Haram in Maiduguri caused the rampant killings of political opponents and disenfranchised
many.
Table2.2:People Perceptions of the political implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Maiduguri

Implications (%) of respondents
• Manipulation of election results 26

• Forcing people to vote for candidates against their choice
• Using threats and assaults against political opponents and the electorate
• Assassination and killing of political opponents and the electorate 38.6

• Rampant political killings under the disguise of Boko Haram
• Destruction and burning of political party offices
• Brought incompetent leadership 19.4

• Brought unpopular candidates into power
• Masses are being alienated from having access to electoral positions
• Threat to democratization in Nigeria 5.6

• Political intolerance
• increase apathy towards voting
• Post-election violence 10.4

• Voting without choosing
• No confidence in election results
Total 100
—Source: Adapted from Mbaya, 2013
Given the foregoing, it becomes apparent that religious affiliation can play a significant role in
the overall quest for social solidarity. In his discussion on the role of religion in Nigerian’s body
polity, Adeyemi (2006) opined that the power of religion as a tool of political manoeuvring is
very fundamental as manifested in various religious crises across the country. In the words
of Atim (2014), there is a vital link between religious crises and the socio-cultural; political
and economic predicament of the North East. A cogent example was the 1980, 1982 and 1984
Maitatsine uprising in Kano; Maiduguri; Jimeta, Yola and Gombe respectively, where it was
established that the majority followers of Maitatsine were hawkers, the jobless and peasants
who in the absence of any societal security had to take cover under Maitatsine for a living
(Adibe, 2012).
In addition, Atim (2014), has observed that any frustrated individual can easily take the garb of
religion in order to protest against a prevailing social order. Atim (2014) thus suggests that Nigeria’s
dilemma stems from the fact that mischief makers who are out to control the national cake believe
that religion could be the most effective tool to use to their successful advantage. Thus, it is in
the interest of the various religious groups to use religion in order to climb up the power rungs
or in the event of failure to take direct control; they must control those in authority so that their
economic and political base is adequately protected. In this process, religious groups resort to
intimidation and the use of force in order to create fear and insecurity thereby threatening the
very foundations of the society. According to Olojo (2013) religion appears to be the language of
politics and is then exploited by both state and non-state actors towards ends that are essentially
parochial and self-serving.
Contributing further to this discourse, Elden (2009), attempted to link the September 11 terrorist
attacks targeted at US interests to the proliferation of religious crisis in Nigeria. According to
him, it was the message broadcasted on 11th February 2003 that informs an understanding of
why certain countries such as Nigeria were experiencing violence. In the said broadcast, Muslim
nations that were not operating Sharia law were roundly criticised and called upon to liberate
themselves through a jihad. The question may well be asked as to why such messages resonated
more in northern Nigeria and not in other parts of Nigeria and in other parts of Africa. The
answer to this could simply be that the structural economic inequalities had already provided a
strong foundation within which the prevailing religious sentiment and affiliations could be easily
exploited and ignited. It is therefore instructive to note that it is along these lines that Boko Haram
continues to advocate for the replacement of the Nigerian Federation with a pure Sharia state;
notwithstanding that this is contrary to Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which
clearly states that “the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as
State religion”.
Even thus from these cursory observations, it may be concluded that the fundamental problem
then is not the secular state, per se, but rather, the inability to transform the secular nature of
the Nigerian state into the desired and practical reality of good governance, shared opportunities
and excellent service delivery. Moreover, the dilemma is also a product of the inability to squarely
separate religion from state policy given that the general position would be that religious matters
are entirely personal and would have nothing to do with government.
In an earlier contribution to the debate, Bala Usman maintained that violence in the garb of
religion has always been a manipulation of the elite and the political class. He questioned the link
between violence and Islamic fundamentalism, by posing the questions:
What are they actually fanatical about? What beliefs, values and practices in contemporary
Nigeria are they specifically fanatically opposed to or in support of? What exactly in the Islamic
faith and practice in the contemporary world do they regard as so fundamental as to determine
all their actions so totally and exclusive” (Usman, 1987, 73) cited in Danjibo, (2009).
Usman thus refused to accept the fact that it was fanaticism that drove the Maitatsine sect
into violent demonstrations given that it is not just the Muslims youths that were hit by the
economic hardships in the country. Concurring that the lack of education and employment
among the youth in the North East is the cause of violence, Atim (2014), argues that those
engaged in the Boko Haram violence are mostly jobless and without skills or trade and hence
no sources of livelihood. Commenting further, Atim noted that the youth constitute over
70 percent of the population of Nigeria and yet over 60 percent of them lack jobs or better
opportunities and hence, a relationship between mass poverty as a result of bad governance
on one hand and frustration and violence on the other hand. Conclusively, it can be said that
religion by itself may not be the problem or cause of the crisis in northern Nigeria other than
its destructive exploitation by Boko Haram and turning it into a key driver of public support for
violence. This point is perhaps crucial in providing a nuanced understanding of how the cause
of conflict is not, essentially, the mere presence of the factor of religion but rather when this
factor, individually or collectively along with others, is manipulated in favour or disfavour of
certain political and economic interests.
But the foregoing notwithstanding, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the Boko Haram
insurgency is also fuelled by distinct ideological factors which are usually connected to
religion. The role of religion as already highlighted in the preceding section is certainly
significant due to its specific position in Nigerian society and politics. Indeed, much of the
Boko Haram sect’s demands are usually ‘Islamic’ in orientation both in terms of character
and content. They believe for instance that modern government based on democracy and its
principles is at variance with core ‘Islamic principles’ and as such it is prohibited to support
and work under the government and its institutions (Joel, 2014). In concurrence, Tukur and
Fausat (2015) have asserted that the fundamental ideology of Boko Haram is that Western
Education is forbidden and therefore, should not be allowed to prevail among nations;
particularly, Muslim dominated states.
2.6 Conclusion
From the foregoing, it is clear that there are five or six factors that can be said to directly
have contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram and ultimately, the on-going crisis in the
North East. The factors discussed so far include the widespread perception of a failed political
promise and hence the attendant retrogression of democratic expectations; the structural
inequalities best exemplified in widespread poverty and deprivation amid a sea of conspicuous
consumption, essentially gesturing to a socio-economic origin to the crisis, and more critically,
the very central role the religious factor plays in fostering an extremely sensitive societal
divide. The last factor is the ideological one itself closely linked to both politics and religion.
It must however be stressed that all these factors will certainly recur and be revisited from
other analytical perspectives; especially in terms of their proximate dimensions and impact on
Human Development generally, in the continuing analysis and exploration of how they have
impacted the North East Nigeria and ultimately affecting the country as a whole. In the chapter
that follows, an attempt is made to expand the assessment and analysis by examining how these
factors have in turn contributed to the making of a development and humanitarian crisis of
international dimensions.
Chapter 3
The Making of a Complex
and Multidimensional
Humanitarian Crisis in the
North East Region
3.1 Introduction
The resultant consequence of the conflict and violence followed by death and destruction in
Nigeria’s North East region has, undoubtedly seen to the emergence of an extremely complex
and multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis. The objective in this chapter is to focus on the telling
complexities and nuances that have a definitive and as a complex multidimensional nature. The
idea is to use these as a basis for highlighting the more significant causal and consequential aspects
of the crisis rather than to provide a full chronology of events that have taken place in their totality
in the North East. The aim therein, is to demonstrate how at various points in time and at various
geographic locations, the crisis impacted on the lives of people. In this regard, the analyses have
been closely cross-referenced with the basic socio-economic indices that are in line with the socio-
economic wellbeing and human development; notably indicators of life expectancy; health and
education; human productivity in terms of agriculture or business; the environment, physical
security as well as water sanitation and hygiene (the WASH factors). In so doing, the Report
hopes to provide a lens through which appropriate responses and redress can, and should be
conceptualised and analysed within the ‘nexus’ not just in Nigeria but in similarly-situated locales,
settings and contexts.
3.2 Violence, Loss of Lives and Destruction of Property

According to the Nigerian Security Tracker, there were 1044 incidences of terror attacks by Boko
Haram in the North-East region between 2009-2016, with diverse methods of attack in use. These
included armed attacks; bombing and explosions, midnight/terror attacks; mass murder/suicide raid,
assassination/murder and abductions. Although, the actual numbers of fatalities are often hard to
come by, the table 3.1 and figure 3.1 here below presents the estimated number of fatalities based on
the report of the Nigerian Security Tracker (2016), as further corroborated by a field survey conducted
in 2017. And as already indicated in the preceding chapter, the respondents survey revealed that an
estimated 46.3 percent of the population in the region reported life expectancy of between 31 and
40, significantly lower than the national average; 41 percent reported life expectancy of between
40-59 while only for 12.2 percent reported life expectancy of 60 years and above. Additionally,
46.7 percent of the respondents reported the loss of between 1 and 4 family members; about 23.61
percent reported loss of between 5 and 9 family members; 6.7 percent reported loss of between 10
and 15 family members and 3 percent had lost 16 or more family members. Instructively, all the
referenced losses were attributed to conflicts and violence in the area, further confirming that the
majority of the people have been negatively affected by conflict and violence in the region.
Table 3.1: DirectHumanCasualtiesfromtheBokoHaramInsurgencyinAdamawa,BornoandYobe
States
Year HumanCasualties Remarks
2009 2,320.00 Mostlywomenandchildrenlosttheirlives,includingcasesofrapeandGenderBased
Violence
2010 3,000.00 “
2011 3,560.00 “
2012 3,700.00 “
2013 4,420.00 “
2014 5,000.00 “
2015 5,220.00 “
2016 5,350.00 “
2009-2016 Over 600 School Teachers lost their lives
—Source: Field work, 2017
The table 3.2 herebelow adapted from a Human Rights Watch Report further disaggregates
the wave of human destruction and displacement in terms of states, actual locations as well
as comments that highlight the extent of devastation; whether resulting in deaths, casualties;
human dislocation or the destruction of property.
Table 3.2: A Chronology of Reported Boko Haram Insurgency attacks in North Eastern
States, 2009 to August, 2017
No of Deaths/
S/No Date States Location Disappearances Injuries and Destruction
1. 26th-29th July 2009 Borno, Yobe, Maiduguri,Bauchi,Potiskum, 1000+ 14
Bauchi Wudil
2. 7th sept 2010 Bauchi Bauchi prison 5 721 inmates freed from prison
3. 4 Nov 2011
th
Yobe Damaturu 150+ 18; churches, Banks and police
stations destroyed
4. 5th-6th Jan 2012 Adamawa, Mubi, Yola, Maiduguri & 37 + 21;churchesandbusinesscenters
Borno,Gombe Gombe destroyed
5. 25th Dec. 2012 Borno, Yobe Maiduguri, Potiskum 27+ severalchurchesweredestroyed
6. 19 -20 April2013
th th
Borno Baga town 228+ 29
7. 6th July 2013 Yobe Mamudo Government 41 students;
secondary school 1 teacher
8. 29th Sept 2013 Yobe Gujba college massacre 44+students and
teachers
9. 10th Oct. 2013 Borno Damboa 20+ 15
10. 19 Sept. 2013
th
Borno Benisheik 161+ 12
11. 29th Oct. 2013 Yobe Damaturu 128
12. 11th Jan 2014 Borno Kawuri massacre 85+
13. 11th Feb 2014 Borno Konduga 39+ 1000+ houses destroyed
14. 25 Feb 2014
th
Yobe FederalGovernmentcollege 59+
Buni yadi
15. 14th March, 2014 Borno Giwa Barrack Comrades freed from detention
16. 14 April 2014
th
Borno GovernmentGirlsSecondary 276+ Girls abducted
School Chibok
17. 5th May 2014 Borno Gamboru Ngala 300+ 38
18. 1st June, 2014 Adamawa Mubi 40
19. 2nd June 2014 Borno Gwoza 300+
20. 20th-23rd June, Borno North & Central Senatorial ------- 200+ women and children were
2014 Districts kidnaped
21. 3rd-7th Jan 2015 Borno Baga 100 2000+ unaccounted for
22. 30 Jan 2016
th
Borno Dalori village 86 62
23. 16th Jan 2017 Borno University of Maiduguri 1 Professor; several
others killed
24. 1st August 2017 Borno Chad Basin oil exploration 69+ 3 university staff held captive
25. 2nd August 2017 Adamawa Midlu Village of Vapura 7+
26. From 2009- Borno University of Maiduguri 5 lecturers killed About 70 lecturers left for other
August, 2017 Universities;
and 3 held captive, students
population dropped
—Source: Field work, 2017
Fig. 3.1 Number of people who lost their lives in a family in the last ten years (%)
Nil
1-4
5-9
10 - 15
16+
3.2.1 Maiduguri as a Case Study

A study carried out by Mbaya (2013), revealed some of the serious implications of the Boko Haram
insurgency in Maiduguri, Borno state. Maiduguri as already observed, has been the epicentre of
the Boko Haram violence and conflict and the perceived effects on the community are summarised
in table 3.3 here below.
Table 3.3: The implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Maiduguri
Implications (%) of Respondents
• Creates more widows and orphans in the community

• Cases of rape, sicknesses & diseases like hypertension 25.5
• Breakdown of marriages, separation of families
• Creates fear among community members

• Creates lack of trust among community members 3.2
• Brought about psychological instability
• Mass exodus of people out of Maiduguri metropolis

• Loss of lives & bread winners of families 37.5
• Abandoned children, the sick and the aged
• Brought about religious intolerance

• Burning &destruction of places of worship 13
• Dividing community members along religious lines
• Increase social vices in the community

20.8
• Criminality on the increase
Total 100
As is clearly evident from table 3.3, a majority of the respondents (37.5 percent) were of the view
that the social implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Maiduguri caused a mass exodus of people
out of Maiduguri city out of the need to look for safer places because of the fear of death. Moreover,
many, especially bread winners lost their lives resulting in the abandonment of children, sicknesses
and death of the aged. Some 25.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that the insurgency
caused several women to become widows and children to become orphans without any hope of
going to school. Similarly, many women were raped; many families separated; and fear created
among community members coupled with lack of trust and psychological instability. The study
further revealed other implications beyond the human casualties such as the increase in the number
of IDPs; houses and commercial areas that were destroyed and resulting in psychological trauma for
many, the rise in hypertension cases and other health problems.
Th table 3.4 shows that 21.6 percent of the respondents were of the view that the bread winners of
many families lost their lives and that houses and property worth millions of Naira were destroyed
with many people becoming refugees and displaced especially in London Chiki and Kellari wards
of Maiduguri city. Similarly, 19.4 percent and 18.4 percent of the respondents at Budum Market
and Dalla wards, respectively, reported that shops, business centres, property of various types
including cars worth millions of Naira were destroyed.
Table 3.4: The Human and Economic implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Maiduguri
AreasofBomb
explosion Implications %ofrespondents
• Lives lost, houses and property worth millions of naira were destroyed
Dalla • Cars & business areas burnt down 18.4
• Shops burnt and destroyed 19.4
Budum • Property worth millions of Naira burnt
Market • Many lives lost; cars burnt and houses destroyed
• Commercial places and property worth millions destroyed 11.1
Wulari • Manyliveslost,manypeoplelostjobsasaresultofdestructionofbusinessareas
London • Many lives lost, resulting in a mass exodus of people from the area 21.6
Ciki/ • Many people rendered IDPs and refugees
Kellari • Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed
• Bread winners of many families lost their lives
State low cost • People selling GSM accessories lost their shops 8.2
• Lives lost leading to a mass exodus of people to other areas to be refugees;
• Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed
Custom • Custom House affected, windows and glasses destroyed 7.4
House • Lives were lost, Cars got burnt
• Houses & property worth millions of naira were destroyed
Bulunkutu • Late Governor’s House affected 6.7
Round • Lives lost
about • Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed
Airport Area • Lives lost, Cars burnt 3.5
• Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed
Baga Road • People selling GSM accessories lost their shops 3.7
• Lives lost and property destroyed
Total 100
The Mbaya study further revealed the implications on institutions like schools, offices and
banks as shown in table 3.5 which further makes clear that the security challenge posed by
Boko Haram resulted in the closure of many educational and commercial institutions; a view
supported by 43.5 percent of the respondents. Similarly, commercial activities were paralyzed,
banks closed down, shops and markets closed down for weeks, as well as local, regional, national
and international commercial offices relocated to other parts of the country which caused many
people to lose their jobs as was asserted by 34.1 percent and 22.4 percent of the respondents,
respectively.
Table 3.5: Implications of the insurgency on Educational and Commercial Institutions
Implications %ofrespondents
• UniversityofMaiduguriandFederalGovernmentCollegecloseddownindefinitelybecauseofthe
security challenge posed by Boko Haram
• Private and Public secondary schools closed down in the metropolis 43.5
• Educational institutions generally came to a stand still
• Many University of Maiduguri students transferred to other universities
• Commercial activities paralyzed

• Banks closed down for one week 34.1
• Shops and markets closed down for weeks
• Local,regional,nationalandinternationalcommercialofficesrelocated/shiftedtootherpartsofthe
country 22.4
• Loss of jobs as many commercial offices relocate to other parts of the country
Total 100
Most of the above findings were corroborated by Mohammed (2011) who advanced the view
that the impact of the insurgency on July 26, 2009 in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa resulted in
the loss of over 1000 lives and billions of Naira worth of property destroyed. In the same vein,
Hamza and Kabiru (2011) reported that over 100 persons were killed on Friday 4th November
2011 in Damaturu, the Yobe State Capital as a result of suicide bombings and gunshots launched
by suspected members of the Yusifiyya movement, also called Boko Haram, on many security
and federal government formations. The violent activities of the insurgents are not limited to
the North East and instructively, Augustine (2012) reported the death of over 200 persons on
Friday 21st January 2012 in Kano as a result of multiple bomb blasts.
In terms of observed incidences and prevalence of conflict, the North-East geo-political zone
has therefore been the worst hit and is most prone and most vulnerable with the states of
Borno, Yobe and Adamawa as the critical flashpoints of the Boko Haram insurgency. Elsewhere,
in parts of Bauchi and Gombe, the activities of the terrorists have also been pronounced and
associated with a few isolated instances of attacks. Suffice it to state therefore, that practically
all the states in the North East have witnessed Boko Haram attacks. But Borno State is clearly
the most-affected and hence it has the largest number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
that stand at about one million five hundred according to Sidi (2015).
3.3 A Spectre of Internal Displacement Within Host
Communities
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states that Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) are:
“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.” (UN
1998:1)
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for its part describes IDPs as
“probably the largest group of vulnerable people in the world” (UN, (1998:1). The National
Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCREMIDS) recorded
an increasing number of IDPs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa which in 2014 stood at 102,560 in
Adamawa State; 257,694 in Borno State, and 76,354 in Yobe State. In 2015, Borno state alone
had about one million five hundred IDPs according to the National Emergency Management
Agency (NEMA).
Fig. 3.2 Internally Displaced Persons in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States
2016 1,687,703
2015 Over1.5million
2014 436,608
2013 290,000
2012 200,000
2011 150,000
2010 130,000
2009 100,000
In sum, the various types of attacks led to displacements of thousands of people in the region,
with Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states recording the highest number of IDPs. The rise in the
number of IDPs in registered camps of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states as presented in figure
3.2 above, confirms the strong relationship between the Boko Haram violence and the unfolding
humanitarian crises. In 2016 an estimated 1,687,703 were displaced in various camps in the three
states alone, with the larger percentage being women and children. The immediate consequence
of the influx of IDPs has been the concurrent increase in food insecurity, poor health services,
inadequate water supply and poor sanitation in the registered camps. An assessment conducted
by the NEMA in March 2015 reported that in Borno state 70 percent of IDP’s living with host
families reported that water and sanitation facilities were overstretched as a result of the influx of
populations from high risk LGAs to low risk LGAs. In Yobe State, only 60 percent of the IDP’s living
with host families reported that access to water and sanitation in the LGAs covered was adequate
while in Adamawa state, 65 percent of IDPs living with host families reported that the availability
of water supply had decreased from an estimated pre-crisis availability of 75 litres per person per
day to an average of 20 litres per person per day and that access to water treatment chemicals
had also become increasingly difficult and that water utilities establishments in most parts of the
affected LGAs had become moribund (Sidi, 2015). In all, the poor living conditions in IDP camps,
as well as in the host communities, are a source of great concern. Reports from both domestic and
international agencies have shown that IDPs have as far back as 2009 lacked adequate facilities
and endured poor sanitation with remarkable increases in diseases such as malaria, acute watery
diarrhoea, measles and pregnancy related diseases.
Given the magnitude of the crisis, the federal government and indeed, the Borno state
government faced capacity challenges to offer protection to all the displaced persons. It proved
difficult to ensure that IDPs do not suffer rape and thefts and that women and girls do not
resort to vices such as prostitution as an alternative means for self-support. Moreover, it proved
difficult to ensure that food or non-food items are not stolen from IDPs or that armed groups do
not live or circulate within the camps. The situation was further compounded by the insufficient
number of health and education facilities as well as the personnel to cater for these two critical
basic needs. And whereas there were NGOs and other non-state actors present in Maiduguri
it was reported that they appeared to be in competition with each other rather than working
collaboratively, often leading to the duplication of efforts instead of meeting the actual needs
of the IDPs.
3.4 Impacts on Practically all Aspects of Livelihood

The other aspect of the complex and multi-dimensional humanitarian and developmental
crisis in the North East region has been, evidently, in the impacts felt by IDPs in practically
every aspect of livelihood in the region. There have been impacts evidenced in the severe food
shortages, and hence, the increase in cases of malnutrition and the obvious compounded effects
on overall health. Similarly, the economic and purchasing power for most people, has been
severely eroded due to the loss of employment that mainly arose from disruptions on government
operations. Petty trade, day labour in construction, driving and government employment were
also common sources of livelihood engagement especially during the dry season. IDP farming
households often said they had access to land on a short-term basis but lacked the means to buy
seeds, tools and other farm inputs. None of the main livelihood activities was possible in Bama
LGA in 2016 (OCHA, 2016).
Host populations, IDPs, and recent returnees appear to have all lost their assets and income
sources which were mainly agriculture, livestock, or local trading activities. Traders from Mubi
and Yola which are the main towns in Adamawa state reported difficulties in resuming normal
business activities, including challenges with authorities, especially during customs clearance
and payments at road checkpoints. In December 2015, 62 percent of IDPs and host households
borrowed money to purchase food, cover health expenses, and meet other basic needs, including
the purchase of agricultural tools and inputs. By April 2016, 40 percent of households reported a
drop in income and only 23 percent an increase compared to December 2015, thereby suggesting
that a significant proportion of the population was being pushed further into debt (IRC, 2016).
3.4.1 The Emergence of Food Insecurity

The Boko Haram insurgency has disrupted livelihood activities and reduced trade flows. Staples
and other basic commodities have become scarce and prices have risen, preventing IDPs from
accessing basic foodstuffs. An inter-agency humanitarian needs assessment carried out in mid-
2014 found that it was common practice for IDP households to ration food portions as a means of
getting by (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, May-June 2014). At that point in time, almost five million
people in the region (8.5 million across the wider Lake Chad basin) were facing severe food
insecurity. The food insecurity situation was being exacerbated by inability of many aid agencies
to access those in need due to security challenges.
In essence, food production in the region plummeted as a result of able-bodied young men
either fleeing the region or having been killed by the insurgents. It has been reported that in
Borno state, cereal production plummeted between 2010 and 2015; sorghum by 82 per cent,
rice by 67 per cent and millet by 55 per cent. Livestock production was equally affected as of
February 2016 with 1,637 killed and over 200,000 cattle, sheep and goats, as well as 395,609
sacks of food items lost due to insurgents’ attacks. As from December 2014, the fishing industry
suffered a more or less similar fate as Boko Haram stepped up attacks on communities around
Lake Chad.
The Region faced

REDUCTION
in the production
of FOOD
Resulting from FLEEING or DEATH of ABLE-BODIED YOUNG MEN

Borno state
2010-2015
Cereal Production
dropped
BY
82% 67% 55%
SO
RGHUM RICE MI
LLET
The situation described above prompted the UN Secretary-General António Guterres to issue
a warning in mid-2017 that “more than 20 million people in South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and
North-East Nigeria were going hungry, and facing devastating levels of food insecurity”. More
specifically, it was reported that 5.2 million Nigerians in the North East urgently needed food
assistance, including 1.4 million facing an “emergency” and 38,000 famine-like conditions. In
Borno state, 1,099,000 people, or 19 per cent of the population, faced “emergency” food insecurity
(large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality) while
38,000 faced “famine” (extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even with full employment
of coping strategies; starvation, death, and destitution evident). In Adamawa state, 197,000 people
faced “emergency” and 5,800 in “catastrophic” phase; in Yobe state, 88,000 were in “emergency”.
In total, by mid-2017, in the north-eastern Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, an estimated 5.2
million people were facing severe food insecurity, with 450,000 children under the age of five
suffering severe acute malnutrition.
The food scarcity, initially the consequence of the plummeting production and massive
displacement, was compounded by the destruction of economic infrastructure as well as the
restriction imposed on several key economic activities in large sections of Borno state. The
fighting destroyed 30 per cent of houses, water sources, roads and bridges in the area, crippling
agriculture and other economic activities. Road closures and curfews further restricted trade and
free movement of persons. The trade in fish from Lake Chad was banned and the movement
of foodstuffs or sale of vehicle fuel and fertilizers, as well as transportation by motorcycle were
justified as short-term measures to help choke the insurgents. While these restrictions would
appear justified, the prolonged enforcement of the bans and restrictions however, not only
disrupted gainful economic activities but further aggravated the earlier miseries caused by the
direct attacks and the human displacement.
1.4 million
4.7 million facing an “emergency”
Nigerians in the North includes:
East urgently needed
food assistance 38,000
famine-like conditions
BORNO STATE
38,000 ADAMAWA STATE
1,099,000 people, Faced “famine” YOBE STATE
faced “emergency” food
(extreme lack of food and/or
insecurity
other basic needs even with 197,000 people 5,800 in 88,000
(large food consumption faced “emergency” “catastrophic” phase were in “emergency”
gaps resulting in very high full employment of coping
acute malnutrition and strategies; starvation, death,
excess mortality) and destitution evident)
out of which
mid-2017 Estimated 450,000 children
in North-eastern
[Adamawa, Borno 5.2 million people under the age of five
Facing severe food insecurity suffering severe acute
and Yobe states] malnutrition
3.4.2 A Malnutrition Crisis
Nigeria, especially the Northern region has historically registered
A rapid assessment in
some of the highest incidences of chronic malnutrition in the world, June 2016 in Bama LGA
often at emergency levels. In Borno state, available data on nutrition
have often masked severe conditions in isolated geographic areas. As of
found that 19 percent of
June 2016, some 750,000 people, excluding pregnant and breastfeeding the 24,000 people found
women, were in immediate need of nutrition assistance in newly
accessible areas. At that time, the Ministry of Health had estimated in a camp on a hospital
that, without intervention, 19 percent of children with Severe and compound, including
Acute Malnutrition (SAM) would die; which would translate to 128
SAM children dying every day (MOH, 2016). A rapid assessment in 15,000 children (among
June 2016 in Bama LGA found that 19 percent of the 24,000 people them 4,500 under
found in a camp on a hospital compound, including 15,000 children
(among them 4,500 under five) were severely malnourished and that five) were severely
from 23rd May, at least 188 people had died in the camp; that is almost malnourished and that
six people per day – mainly from diarrhoea and malnutrition. In
Adamawa state screening within IDP camps found a high proportion from 23rd May, at least
of children with SAM, with malnutrition as a chronic problem in the 188 people had died in
areas of Madagali, Michika, Uba and Mubi. In Yobe state the overall
nutrition information seemed to mask, again, significant pockets of the camp; that is almost
under nutrition. An assessment in Jakusko LGA, following a measles six people per day –
outbreak, showed an 8.9 percent SAM in children under five. The
scenario was the same for Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba where screening mainly from diarrhoea
within IDP camps found a high proportion of children with SAM in and malnutrition.
the Akko LGA.
3.4.3 Insecurity, Bureaucratic Bottlenecks and Logistical Challenges

Food aid delivery was greatly hampered by the prevalent state of insecurity and despite the
government’s efforts to address the security challenges, aid workers reported that roughly 80 per
cent of Borno state, along with parts of Adamawa and Yobe states, still presented high or very
high risks for humanitarian agencies’ operations. For instance, on 28 July, 2016 aid deliveries
(food and non-food items) had to be briefly suspended after insurgents attacked an aid convoy
between Maiduguri and the town of Bama. In some areas the effective hold was confined to
local government headquarters with the general security situation remaining too risky for aid
workers in several localities; as a result of which food aid delivery was weakest where probably
the food situation was most dire – in the remote, hard-to-reach areas.
The situation gets further complicated by the fact that the majority of the IDPs in Bauchi, Gombe
and Taraba were living with host communities and therefore making it difficult for both the
government and aid agencies to track and locate them; let alone prioritize their needs. Over and
above the challenge posed by insecurity, reports have pointed to the entrenched bureaucracy
and corruption that also impedes aid delivery. Together, all these factors mean that food aid
would not be reaching large numbers who are in need, including some of the most vulnerable.
Thus, whereas efforts were made to send food aid to IDPs, supply was not consistent. The net
result of delayed and inadequate funding, pervasive insecurity, poor and unreliable distribution,
corruption, as well as bureaucratic red tape is that as of April 2017, only 1.9 million of the 5.2
million (a mere 37 per cent) of the population at risk of severe food insecurity was being reached.
3.5 Crisis in the Health Sector
Provision of adequate health services is a key component of humanitarian response and community
stabilisation efforts. Whereas the inadequate access to health facilities has been reported for
more than 54.72 percent of the respondents surveyed in 2017 as well as the lack of access to
regular medical check-up by 51.39 percent of the population, the IDPs are clearly the worst hit.
The IDPs, like refugees, should enjoy access to health services that approximate those of the host
population at a minimum. However, reports from as far back as 2014 indicate that IDPs in Borno
state often had only minimal access to health services, and that this primarily affected women and
children. Most health facilities, some of which were deliberately targeted by Boko Haram were
closed as of mid-2014 while others were damaged or destroyed. As of March 2014, only 37 per
cent of the health facilities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states were functional. Moreover, health
facilities in the region were generally already poorly resourced even before the crisis and additional
resources have not been provided to meet the needs of the displaced populations. In fact, in some
communities there are no facilities or even staff to meet even the most basic health needs of IDPs
and their hosts. The primary health care services, in particular, have been overwhelmed by the
influx of IDPs. In Biu IDP camp, in Borno state, for instance, it was reported that an outbreak of
cholera involving some 375 cases resulted in 27 deaths with poor hygiene conditions facilitating
the outbreak and causing secondary displacement. The report showed that 40 percent of the
outbreaks of cholera in Maiduguri were reported to be from IDP camps and that this percentage
decreased significantly upon medical intervention.
The primary obstacle in accessing health care for many IDPs is the prohibitive cost of health services
and the inability to access local health facilities in time. Although the state ordered hospitals to
attend to IDPs free of charge upon receipt of a State Environment Management Agency (SEMA)
letter authorizing their expenses, the SEMAs have failed to reimburse the hospitals, leading them
to subsequently refuse to accept the letters in lieu of payment. This decision has effectively left
IDPs out of medical treatment, given that they have to pay an initial registration fee of 500 Naira
plus their consultation and medication costs. In communities without health programmes run by
international NGOs, many IDPs therefore have no access to health care of any kind. Outbreaks of
disease and malnutrition rates have increased in areas affected by displacement due to the absence
of, or poor health services. The number of cholera cases among IDPs and host communities
rose exponentially, with 26,204 cases and 404 deaths reported between January and July 2014,
compared with 167 cases during the same period in 2013. In an attempt to deal with the effect of
the outbreak, SEMA sank boreholes in all the IDPs camps in Maiduguri, while the NGOs through
the implementation of the WASH programme ensured that most of the camps were cholera free.
Existing health services and access are limited in host communities, especially in newly accessible
areas (UN Joint Multi-Sector Assessment 14/04/2016). Moreover, Health staff are reluctant to
work in the more remote LGAs, and local clinics are reportedly being staffed on a rotational
basis. The result is that expectant women do not have access to antenatal care while others give
birth while fleeing and without access to postnatal healthcare (PUI, 2016). A 2016 Assessment
of the North-eastern states highlighted Borno as the most affected in terms of impact on health
infrastructure with only 12 out of 29 hospitals functional while damaged equipment was recorded
in 75 percent of the primary healthcare facilities (PCNI, 2016). Some 14 percent of the hospitals
and 35 percent of PHCs have been destroyed and a further 7 percent of hospitals and 10 percent
of PHCs damaged (MOH, 2016).
In Adamawa, the lack of medicines and the cost of treatment are the key factors that prevent
IDPs from accessing health services. Only IDPs in official camps receive free treatment. In the
meantime, three main health centres: Madagali, Michika and Hong were destroyed thereby
significantly reducing access to health service coverage. In Yobe it was reported that 46 percent
of the states’ primary health centres and 23 percent of hospitals have been damaged or destroyed
and health coverage is extremely low partly because most of the qualified health workers fled the
area. A measles outbreak affecting some 840 was reported in Yobe state in the month of April
2016 with most of them in Damaturu and Jakusko LGAs and most cases affecting children under
one-year-old. In Gombe state all the health facilities and centres were reported as functional
and operating optimally but the cost of transportation to hospitals and the healthcare fees
severely restricts IDPs access. In Bauchi all of the 15 hospitals assessed in September 2015
were found to be functional except for the shortage of doctors: one doctor per 35,000 people.
Moreover, the health facilities lack basic amenities such as water and electricity, with as many
as 87 percent of the primary health facilities in Taraba lacking electricity supply, compared to
65 percent of facilities in the North-Eastern region. In Adamawa, about 32 percent of the state’s
primary health centres have been damaged or destroyed and are physically inaccessible to the
majority of the population. Although 87 percent of respondents in the eight of the most affected
LGAs reported being able to reach medical facilities within 30 minutes, 83 percent of the health
centres reported holding insufficient drug stocks. The hospitals in urban Yola and Mubi are
better stocked than facilities in rural areas, where stocks are lower and are replenished less
frequently and IDPs have limited access due to costs.
These findings by governmental and non-governmental agencies and other humanitarian actors
are corroborated by the results of the survey commissioned as part of the process of producing
this report referred to earlier. The figure 3.3 shows that an average of 42.78 percent of the
respondents in the North East reported having access to adequate health care facilities while
54.72 reported not having adequate access, thus indicating that the majority do not have access
to health care facilities except for Yobe state with about 73 percent of the respondents indicating
access to adequate health care facilities. The same scenario plays out with respect to satisfaction
with the level of health facilities as shown in figure 3.4 which shows that an average of 32.2
percent of the respondents in the six states are satisfied with the level of health facilities while
65 percent are not, implying that the majority are not satisfied with the level of health care
facilities except, again, in Yobe state where about 60 percent of respondents are satisfied with
the level of facilities.
Fig. 3.3 Easy accessibility of health care services by communities in the North Eastern States (%)
Fig. 3.4 Level of Health Care Facilities in the communities in the North Eastern States (%)
3.6 The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Crisis

3.6.1 Water
In 2002 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)), an organ and the supervisory body for
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted a General
Comment stressing that the human right to drinking water is fundamental for life and health.
The Comment urged state parties to ensure that refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced
persons and returnees have access to adequate drinking water irrespective of where they are.
Access to water however, remains problematic in the region in terms of availability, access and
quality, although these issues vary widely across geographic space. The provision of sufficient
water points and sanitation facilities is a priority need in locations where an influx of IDPs has
led to overcrowding (ACAPS, 2016). Payment for water from water vendors, and access to public
water sources and suitable water containers are all important challenges. In some areas, the
main water sources are water vendors and unprotected sources. In Flour Mills area of Maiduguri
where informal settlements are mixed within host communities, for instance, 16 percent of the
population were highly dependent on water vendors.
In Adamawa state access to water is an issue for IDPs, particularly those residing in informal
settlements or with host communities where water points are broken. There are also significant
issues around vector control and drainage systems, in camps, host communities, and informal
settlements (IRC, 2016). Open defecation in IDP camps is also a concern: an outbreak of
diarrhoea in one of the camps in Yola was attributed to contaminated water (OCHA, 2016).
Hygiene practices are relatively good although, with Lassa fever, Ebola, cholera, and severe
diarrhoea including dysentery ever-present, hygiene awareness and knowledge remains a need
(IRC, 2016).
In Yobe state the main water sources for IDPs and host communities are boreholes with motorised
or solar-powered pumps, and water trucking. Over 60 percent of IDPs in host communities
reported having insufficient containers for water collection and storage. IDPs living within host
communities in Yobe have been reported to have equal access with the host population to local
sources of drinking water. In most camps, there is access to sufficient water. However, in Kasaisa,
Kukareta, Bukari Ali camp, and Mohammadu camps it takes people
between 30 and 90 minutes to fetch water. However, 9 percent of An average of 30.83
water and sanitation facilities require rehabilitation. The situation percent of the
in Gombe state as far as water is concerned is that communities
in Akko and Nafada LGAs are facing problems accessing water respondents agreed that
and sanitation. In areas with a dam or a borehole, access is usually there is regular pipe-
limited for remote communities (Save the Children, 2016). Most
of the people have to buy water from vendors and the IDPs in
borne water supply in
particular do not have the money to pay. In Bauchi and Taraba their community while
states, access to clean water is a problem. Majority of the people in
64.45 percent disagreed
Taraba state rely on wells for their water.
thus showing that the
The commissioned perception study revealed that an average
of 30.83 percent of the respondents agreed that there is regular
majority did not have
pipe-borne water supply in their community while 64.45 percent access to regular pipe-
disagreed thus showing that the majority did not have access to
born water.
regular pipe-borne water other than for Yobe state where about
83.33 percent of the respondents agreed they had regular pipe-
borne water supply.
Fig. 3.5 Supply of Pipe-borne water to communities in the North Eastern States (%)
3.6.2 Sanitation and Hygiene

IDPs and host communities in the North-East have only limited access to safe drinking water
and adequate sanitation, leading to a decline in health and hygiene among both IDPs and their
host communities. Public latrines in informal camp-like settings such as schools are often non-
existent or unusable (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). Open defecation and the disposal of
children’s waste in the open are common, particularly in urban or densely populated camps
(Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). Open defecation raises health, security and dignity issues,
particularly for women and girls, and creates tension. In 2014, the contamination of water
sources was cited as a major contributor to cholera outbreaks in a number of displacement
sites in Biu and Maiduguri, Borno state (SRP, 2014). The overall environmental hygiene among
displaced households is poor as a result of overcrowded conditions and shortages of water and
other materials and this becomes a matter of particular concern to women and teenage girls
who face the challenge of maintaining menstrual hygiene in very constrained circumstances.
An illustrative case was witnessed in Adamawa NYSC IDP camp in 2014. In that instance, there
were hardly any bathing sites for women. The situation was also characterized by indiscriminate
waste disposal, poor management of waste and the practice of open defecation was rampant.
In Borno state, Municipal solid waste management is limited to main streets and official
IDP camps with open dumping and burning widespread across Maiduguri; including into
natural water bodies and drains. Hazardous healthcare waste (in particular, sharp objects and
pharmaceutical wastes) are disposed in dumpsites without treatment. Moreover, the informal
IDP camps are not integrated into the municipal waste collection and therefore, households
and other establishments have to manage their own waste pits. In Maiduguri, most households
burn waste when possible; otherwise, they dispose of the waste in an open field. In general, there
has been no regular public waste collection service in all the states in North East Nigeria and
household refuse is dumped indiscriminately. Some private contractors do however, provide
waste collection services to those willing to pay, usually the commercial entities such as shops,
and healthcare facilities. In official IDP camps, waste is regularly collected and brought to
predefined locations within camp boundaries, but elsewhere waste management remains a big
concern.
From the commissioned perception survey, the figure 3.6 below shows that an average of 48.06
percent of the respondents in the six North East states agreed that there is regular sanitation
exercise in their community while 58.06 percent, i.e. the majority disagreed. Adamawa, Borno
and Gombe appeared not to experience any regular sanitation exercises, but Bauchi, Taraba and
Yobe states indicated 66.67 percent, 68.33 percent and 83.33 percent, respectively, of respondents
reported having regular sanitation exercises.
Fig. 3.6 Environmental Sanitation in the communities in the North Eastern States (%)
3.7 The Educational Crisis

It is a generally accepted view that while governments and non-state actors often view protection,
food, water, shelter and health care as basic necessities during displacement; education does
not always have a similar level of support, particularly in the emergency phase of the cycle of
displacement. However, there are numerous reasons why formal education (e.g., school-based)
and non-formal education (e.g., out-of-school) are important for IDPs, in particular children
and young people. In addition to providing the essential building blocks for learning, education
during displacement can protect against exploitation and harm; offer structure, stability and
hope in a time of crisis; promote the acquisition of skills for life; and support conflict resolution
and peace building (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergency, 2004). With many IDPs
sheltering in schools and humanitarian assistance often limited to life-saving interventions,
displaced children are generally unable to pursue their education. Boko Haram attacks against
schools since 2012 and state governments’ closure of educational facilities in the worst affected
areas, such as Borno state, drastically decreased access. All schools in the towns of Baga, Bama,
Jajeri, Umarari Garnam, Mai Malari, Mungono and Gamboru were forced to close between
February 2012 and June 2013. Boko Haram destroyed 14 schools in the Borno state capital of
Maiduguri between January and April 2013, and at least 256 were destroyed across the state
(Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). At the height of the insurgency, all state schools in Borno
were closed in March 2014.
IDPs and members of the security forces occupying schools also damaged, and in some
cases destroyed the education infrastructure. A surge in displacement in northern Adamawa
state during the July to September 2014 holidays led to a large number of IDPs sheltering in
schools, which prevented classes from resuming at the start of the next academic year. Even
in areas where schools remained open, many children, including IDPs, do not attend for fear
of attack and abduction. The abduction of students in IDPs’ home areas has made parents
wary of sending their children to school, even in the comparative safety of the areas of refuge
in neighbouring states. Parents also tend to prioritize basic needs such as shelter and food
over education (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). Consequently, attendance rates declined
dramatically in the region.
3.7.1 Educational Crisis in Maiduguri,

Borno is Apical
Whereas displaced children’s access to education Whereas displaced children’s access
varies from state to state, the situation in Maiduguri, to education varies from state to
the Borno State capital at the height of the crisis
was particularly pathetic and, perhaps, most aptly state, the situation in Maiduguri, the
captures and illustrates the impact of the educational Borno State capital at the height of
crisis on IDPs in the entire North East. The IDPs
were often refused attendance at host community the crisis was particularly pathetic
schools that did not have the facilities or staff to take and, perhaps, most aptly captures
on any more students. Thus, during the first half of
2014, admission was denied to many IDP children
and illustrates the impact of the
in Maiduguri, Borno state because the school year educational crisis on IDPs in the
had already started (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, entire North East. The IDPs were
May-June 2014). Education in Borno was also
severely affected partly because schools were some often refused attendance at host
of the first targets of the Boko Haram insurgency. community schools that did not have
Many buildings were destroyed and rendered out of
use for a long time. Even prior to the crisis, many the facilities or staff to take on any
children, especially in northern Borno, were not more students.
attending school thus creating the need for a catch-up programme to enable older children
with no schooling background to enter school at an age-appropriate level (Borno Education
Sector, 01/07/2016). Moreover, all the 1,721 state schools in Borno closed in 2013 and only
the 212 private schools continued to operate. Between 2009 and October 2015, Boko Haram
murdered more than 600 teachers, half of whom were from Borno state, while others were
threatened, injured or kidnapped. The result has been that around 19,000 teachers fled their
posts (IRIN, 2015). As of July 2016, four schools were occupied by IDPs and a total of 547
schools were damaged or destroyed. Even though many schools were reopened in Maiduguri
after the satisfaction by the military that the capital was safe for academic purposes and in fact
being guarded by armed soldiers, many parents are still not willing to send their children back
to school.
19,000 547 schools

teachers were damaged SCHOOL
fled or destroyed
3.7.2 Severe and Diverse Impacts on Education Across the North East
In Gombe state, schools have reportedly been largely unaffected by the influxes of IDPs, but
some displaced children were still refused admission. In Taraba state, schools were attacked
and more than 100 forced to close in 2014. Others were open to IDPs, but were suffering severe
shortages of materials. Displaced children in Bauchi state were able to enrol in host community
schools, but overstretched resources lowered the quality of education for all. Classrooms were
overcrowded, under-resourced and under-staffed (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). The IDPs’
lack of financial resources and the distance their children need to travel to get to school are
further obstacles to their education.
In an assessment in Yola and Mubi, both in Adamawa state by IRC (2016), nearly 90 percent
of respondents said that there was a functional school near their home. This response was
equal between IDPs in camps and IDPs in informal settlements, host communities, as well as
returnees. For those who said that there was not a functional school close by, the reasons cited
were that school buildings had been destroyed by Boko Haram; lack of equipment or materials;
lack of teachers in the area; teachers not working due to lack of payment, and parents unable
to buy materials or pay fees. The poor security situation, especially in Madagali and Michika
LGAs, and the fear of attacks also prevented children from attending school.
In Yobe, Bauchi and Taraba states, IDPs seem to generally have access to schools within host
communities. However, similar problems to those experienced in other states, such as chronic
underfunding, lack of teaching personnel, insufficient spaces for all the IDP children and lack
of teaching materials persist. For instance, the majority of IDP children in Gombe may be
currently out of school due to the inability to pay school fees or buy uniforms and books. And
although the government officially allows IDPs to go to school without paying fees, the schools
themselves often refuse access to IDP children or students mainly due to lack of funds (Save the
Children, 2016).
3.7.3 Education in Favour of Male Children

The figure 3.7 here below derived from the commissioned perception survey shows that an
average of 60.83 percent of the respondents in the six states have more male children enrolled
in schools while 35 percent have more female children enrolled in schools. This result is an
indication of the skewed practice that favours male children’s education over female children.
Fig. 3.7 Number of children enrolled in school (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary institutions) by
Sex (%)
3.7.4 Some Promising Initiatives for Education in the North East

It is apparent from the survey undertaken that the provision of education to IDPs requires
collaboration between government and non-state actors. A good working example of such
collaboration was manifest under the leadership of the Ministry of Education and Technical
Secretariat led by the National Emergency Management Agency and within the design of
the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) Technical Committee’s Action Plan. The SSI is a response to
the attacks on schools to improve linkages between the communities, the schools and their
security. In Borno, a number of SSI activities have been undertaken in Maiduguri and Biu
whereas in Adamawa the SSI activities were concentrated in Yola city as well as some few
host communities of Mubi North and Mubi South LGAs. State Coordination Committees
(SCCs) whose responsibility it is to manage SSI activities within each state/location have
been established. The SCCs comprise membership from all stakeholders within the education
sector in emergency areas and other structures at the state level. These SCCs have overseen
the profiling of IDP learners, mapping of schools as well as the allocation of IDP learners to
schools. In addition, the SCCs have been playing a critical role in quality assurance of the
double shift schooling (UNICEF, 2015).
3.8 The Crisis of Shelter and Accommodation

The principles of the management of IDPs dictate that some form of decent accommodation is
necessary in ensuring quality standard of living. The lack of decent accommodation however,
has been one of the most critical challenges facing displaced persons. IDPs are sometimes able
to fi nd shelter with family or friends in urban areas but many others are forced to live in dire
conditions including in abandoned buildings. The greatest needs are among IDPs living in host
communities who are estimated at 92 percent and living in rented accommodation often under
extremely poor conditions. Various reports from multiple agencies confi rm that these IDPs
live in makeshift shelters made of sticks, grass and damaged zinc, while those in the recently
accessed areas were in more urgent need as they were spending their nights in the open. Others
pay rent to the landowner who continues living in one building or in one room of a building in
the compound and who remains in close physical proximity to the IDPs.
Estimated percent of IDPs
92%
livingwithhostcommunities
and having the greatest
needs for shelter and
accommodation.
3.8.1 The Sad Tale of ‘Secondary’ Displacement

In other instances, other IDPs rent an entire unit from an absent landlord and then rent part of it
to other IDPs. The inability to pay rent is a major factor in this form of ‘secondary displacement’
as landlords only allow IDPs to stay a few months without paying rent after which they get
consigned to abandoned buildings. According to a report by the International Office of Migration
(IOM), of the over 1.6 million IDPs identified in Borno, fewer than 10 percent resided in some 49
formal or informal camps as of 30th June 2016. Most camps were however informal, which means
that structured support was limited and several sites have been set up in unsafe locations. As of
this date, some 48,000 IDPs were residing in sub-standard shelter in locations where the most
common shelter type were tents, including self-made tents and almost 15,000 were residing in
or around schools. Various assessments and anecdotal information about informal settlements
found that the shelter conditions were not only makeshift and completely inadequate in terms of
protection but that they also exposed adolescent girls, unaccompanied children and female-headed
households to health and hygiene risks including the lack of privacy, potentially exacerbating
protection concerns. An assessment within New Prison IDP settlement in Maiduguri found more
than 3,000 IDPs living in makeshift shelters made of grass and plastic sheets, with water dripping
through the roofs. These were obviously inadequate during the rainy season. In the meantime,
a new informal camp was emerging in Rann in the outskirts of Maiduguri, with at least 10,000
IDPs. The story was repeated in Southern Borno where most of the shelters occupied by IDPs
are overcrowded and unfinished, with inadequate weather-proofing yet rents are high and many
households are indebted to landlords.
The story was repeated in Southern Borno where most of the shelters occupied by IDPs are
overcrowded and unfinished, with inadequate weather-proofing yet rents are high and many
households are indebted to landlords.
Secondary Displacement
1.6 million as of 30th June 2016, fewer than 10

IDPs FACT percent of IDPs resided in the 49
in Borno formal or informal camps
Thismeansthatstructuredsupport
some 48,000 of the IDPs is limited and several sites have
were residing in sub-standard shelter in been set up in unsafe locations.
locationswherethemostcommonsheltertype
were tents; including self-made tents.
Some 15,000
were residing in or around schools.
Assessment Information
•  Makeshift/Inadequate Shelters
•  Lack of Protection
•  Adolescent children, especially girls exposed to risks;
•  Lack of Privacy
—Adapted from, International Office of Migration (IOM) report.
A February to March 2015 assessment by the Adamawa State Insurgency Victims Support
Committee in seven LGAs (Gombi, Hong, Mahiha, Mubi North, and Mubi South) found that
private houses were the most affected by the conflict and accounted for two-thirds of damaged
and destroyed buildings. For Yobe there were only five IDP hosting camps with shelter becoming
an emergency need. In Gombe a 2016 report showed that IDPs had been living in a camp that had
been closed by the authorities which then forced them to live within host communities but the
majority could not afford the rent and were thus forced to shelter in abandoned buildings or to
keep moving.
3.9 Conclusion: A Proper Multi-Dimensional Crisis

As has been evidently demonstrated in this chapter, the Boko Haram insurgency as fuelled by
a number of causal factors; both immediate and historical, has had a monumental impact in
practically all spheres of the productive human life in the North East region. Its worst impact
is probably the death and destruction that it has left in its wake, coupled with the unending
scenarios of human displacement, currently emblematic in the hundreds of thousands of IDPs.
The closely related humanitarian crisis has been chronicled in terms of the multi-dimensional
crises in health, education, food security and the totality of productive livelihoods. The crisis
is also acutely evidenced in the water, sanitation and hygiene crises and quite graphically
pronounced in the shelter and accommodation crisis that has gripped millions of IDPs. Quite
clearly, the situation in the North East seems to have presented a classic case study of a major
developmental and humanitarian crisis.
In the next chapter of this report, an effort will therefore be made to present some possible
solutions and remedial measures that are informed by some innovative and current thinking
on strategies, interventions and approaches that can holistically tackle the complex effects of a
raging humanitarian crisis within a given nexus. A critical component of the remedy appears
to lie within the UNs pronouncement of ‘a New Way of Working’ but it is clearly also hinged on
a change and transformation theory accompanied with deliberate policy options that require
the collective will of both government and the people of Nigeria working in concert with well-
wishers in and out of Nigeria.
Chapter 4
Journeying Towards a
‘New Way of Working’: A
Framework Model for Achieving
Rehabilitation, Re-Integration
and Sustainable Development
4.1 In Search of Models that Deliver
This chapter sets as its objective, the need to look more deeply at models that can help deliver the
totality of rehabilitation, re-integration as well as inclusive and sustainable development in the
face of complex humanitarian emergencies and the resultant developmental challenges such as
Nigeria’s North East has experienced over the last decade or so. The premise is to [re] examine the
complex interplay of factors most of which have already been identified in this and many other
reports, but from the analytical paradigm and prism of “unpacking and operationalising the nexus.”
In ‘unpacking and operationalising the nexus’ the report sets the stage for innovations that are
aimed at improving the understanding as well as ways of resolving the increasing preponderance
of extremely complex development and humanitarian challenges that are in part, the result of the
ascent of terrorism in diverse global locations. Ultimately, a newer, if not entirely novel framework
model is proposed to aid the more comprehensive analysis and understanding of the Humanitarian
– Development- Peace “nexus,” with reliance on the experience of Nigeria’s North East region.
4.1.1 The UNs ‘New Way of Working’

The United Nation’s ‘New Way of Working’ provides a handy starting point for anchoring the
perspective being canvassed here. As has been aptly stated, the vision is to, “work towards
collective outcomes across the humanitarian and development community and wherever possible,
those efforts should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that already exist at national and local
levels; whilst ultimately working towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals”
(International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 5th October, 2017).1 For his part, the UN Secretary
General Antonio Gutierrez has also [re]-emphasized at the beginning of the year 2018 that,
this “New Way”, “… is about recognizing common goals and optimizing existing resources and
capabilities to help all people in situations of risk, vulnerability and crisis. It is about working
better together to reduce humanitarian needs over the medium to long-term” (Quoted on
January, 28, 2018). Ultimately, it is hoped that the chapter becomes a direct added value beyond
what presently exists in the literature and thus pushes the frontiers of knowledge, while also
stimulating more robust policy dialogue as the national authorities, together with the international
community, move towards concerted attention on Nigeria’s North East. It is to be noted in this
regard, that an increasingly vast amount of global developmental literature now deploys the notion
of ‘nexus’ to underpin the complexities and nuances attendant to emergency situations; whether
they be man-made or the consequence of natural disasters. Thus, “the nexus” is seen as the tool
for reinforcing the links between the two sectors (humanitarian and development), increasing the
complementarity of their actions in order to address the root causes of the crises and reduce needs
(ALNAP, 2018).
4.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Proposed

Response Framework
4.2.1 Conceptualising the Analytical Framework
An understanding of ‘Structure’ is an important starting point for any analytical and response
framework. In the context of the Boko Haram insurgency and the attendant crisis, structure
may usefully inform the response to its activities and impacts; especially given its tendency to
mutate quickly with passage of time and with changes in the socio-political environment in
1 See, https://www.icvanetwork.org/node/7609
which it operates. The analytical framework presented herein is accordingly made up of three
inter-related broad components, in essence capturing:
(i) The self-acclaimed causes, motivations and justifications of the insurgency;
including various forms of grievances and what, in some quarters, is viewed
as historical injustices and marginalisation, or more aptly development deficit,
experienced by the local communities;
(ii) The definitions of the primary and secondary perpetrators of the insurgency
and their force multipliers, noted as being a reflection of the multi-dimensional
characteristics that enables and fuels the multi-faceted broad impacts on the
socio-political and economic life of affected communities; and
(iii) The enabling factors and catalytic agents that lend the insurgency its apparent
physical and spiritual formidability. These enablers and catalytic agents emanate
from within both Nigeria’s internal and external environments and foster the
insurgency by supplying it with resources such as devoted fighters, technical and
logistical support as well as the religious and political-ideological articulation.
As will be evident in the later sections of this chapter, the analytical and response framework
is conceptualised by interweaving these three broad components into a matrix framework that
captures and presents the inter-play of the causes and manifestations of the insurgency; its
perpetration side effects in various forms; and the mitigation measures that could be taken to
ameliorate and ultimately, address the adverse impacts on affected communities so as to help
recover and restore their socio-economic well-being and livelihood systems over the medium-
to long-term. Importantly, all these are fused into an integrated wholesome matrix model that
sheds light on possible policy frameworks and actionable measures that could be taken as part
of an overall strategy for resilience building and reconstruction strategy to recover, restore
and reconstruct the affected communities and their livelihoods, as well as promote inclusive
economic growth, human development and environmental sustainability.
4.2.2 Understanding Why People Engage Violence

It is to be appreciated that the causes and motivational factors behind the Boko Haram
insurgency are complex and have been canvassed appropriately in preceding sections of this
report. Moreover, the tactics and extents of violent extremism are ruthless and devastating,
including the brutal destruction of human life and property; indiscriminate displacements of
whole communities; inhuman abductions and trafficking; and extreme religious radicalization,
particularly of the youth for unbridled violence. These tactics make it important and necessary
to present and consider some of the contemporary theories on why some people resort to
violence against others and society in general, including, ultimately, maiming and killing them.
Contemporary literature on violent extremism appear to suggest many and varied reasons why
people or groups visit violence against others. Here below, five main theoretical explanations for
why people or organised groups indulge in violence against others and society in general, including
killing, with particular, or at least some degree of, relevance to the Boko Haram are presented.
(i) The rational-choice utilitarian theory, predicts that people and organised groups
will indulge in violent acts for material gains and other benefits, including capture
and retention of political power. This theory presupposes that those who engage
violence for utilitarian purposes are for one reason or another, unable to obtain
the same through legitimate peaceful means; usually due to what may present as
discriminative systemic blockage of opportunities. Generally, the greater the value
of expected benefit, or the lower the cost of perpetrating violence to realize the
gain, the greater will be the motivation to engage violence.
(ii) The psychopathic mental state of mind as an illness, postulates the perpetration
of violence to a psychopathic mental state of mind as an illness hence; that those who
indulge in violence against others are psychopathic sadists who derive pleasure from
hurting or even killing others and they are therefore people who are ill and in need
of treatment.
(iii) The dis-inhibition theory propositions that an ordinary normal person, or rather
all human beings, have inherent violent impulses that are usually held in check and
that when their moral senses break down or are somehow blocked, they give in to
their dark sides and indulge in violence. The dis-inhibition theory however, avoids
the question of why people are motivated to engage violence in the first place.
(iv) The Sacred Value Theory has in turn been developed by anthropologists Jeremy
Ginges and Scott Atran, (2007) based on their survey carried out around the Israeli -
Palestinian conflict. They established that among the survey participants, there was a
group to whom their ancestral land was so sacredly tied to their communal identity,
that offering financial compensation as an incentive for them to agree to a deal for
settlement not only reduced their support for the settlement deal but actually elevated
levels of their anger and disgust, as well as increased their enthusiasm for violence.
Lastly,
(v) The moral justification theory, is propositioned by Tage Rai, MIT Sloan School of
Management, (2014) and propositions that people and organized groups will indulge
in violence when and if societal cultural values and norms permit it and more so, if
the societal moral values demand that they engage violence, either to right deemed
wrongs done to their own people, community or humanity in general or, in order to
uphold and sustain self-honour and moral order in the community or society.
4.3 Fitting the Violence Motivation Theories into the

Boko Haram Insurgency
From a theoretical perspective, the Boko Haram insurgency’s motivations and justifications
generally fit into some or all of the five theoretical bases cited above that attempt to explain the
motivation to violence. In the Boko Haram context these therefore include in particular, resistance
to Foreign Western Education; resistance to the imposition of cultural domination; the defence
and promotion of ‘sacred/purist’ Islamic values, as well as the protest against what is perceived
generally, as asymmetry in development and blocked opportunities.
4.3.1 Resistance to Foreign Western Education

European intervention and the subsequent colonization of Nigeria brought with it Western
Education which emphasized professional and technical skills for application in the secular public
and private spheres of life. Early awakening of the southern Nigerian ethnic nationalities to the
value of Western Education by pioneer European Christian missionaries made it a high value asset
and one in great demand. As bright students from among early converts to Christianity found their
way to Western Universities in Britain and the USA, the demand for Western Education by the
southern ethnic communities escalated. On the contrary, among the Muslim-dominated northern
Nigerian ethnic nationalities, Western Education was viewed negatively; primarily because it was
perceived as a forerunner to brain wash school-going youth to convert into Christianity. Secondly,
Western Education was tightly intertwined with Christian religious teachings that propagated
doctrines and beliefs, some of which were deemed to be fundamentally opposed, if not altogether
repugnant, to Islamic doctrines and commandments of Allah. Moroever, in most of the North,
the predominant Muslim territory already had a functioning system of Islamic education in
the two forms of the Qur’anic school, (Makarantar Allo) and the advanced knowledge school
of Makarantar Ilmi. The system had flourished in northern Nigeria for centuries and Western
Education was therefore considered as an unwelcome invasive attack on the well-established
traditional dual education system. In a nutshell, resistance to Western Education therefore stands
out as a core rallying point and clarion call of the Boko Haram movement.
4.3.2 Resistance Against Cultural Domination

Prior to British colonization, the North-Eastern territory had been under the sovereign rule of
the Bornu Empire composed of majority Kanuri-Muslims, which subsequently became part
of the expansive Sokoto Caliphate. The imposition of British rule thus instigated anti-foreign
conquest sentiments, resulting in increased allegiance of local populations to the Bornu Sultanate,
and by extension to the Sokoto Caliphate. In the process, this contributed to increased Islamic
fundamentalism as a self-actualisation response to the profound disaffection with the activities
of the Christian British colonial authority. In the complex socio-political situation that emerged,
the spirit of resistance to “foreign” authority manifested at two levels; one, at the local regional
level where various minority ethnic communities were forcefully converted to Islam, via Jihad,
as well as being forcefully incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate, and by so doing, subject to
what was perceived, in some quarters, as the Hausa-Fulani dominance. At the second level, the
spirit of resistance is religiously articulated, manifesting in the form of the Sokoto Caliphate and
its expanded territory, uprising against imposition of British colonial rule in the first instance.
Later, this resistance is manifest in the context of the successor to the Caliphate, i.e the Federal
Government of Nigeria. These two-tier levels of disenchantment further explain aspects of the
genesis of the empathy and popular support, in some quarters, for Boko Haram. While thus, some
of the local people perceive Boko Haram as a liberation movement, others see it as a devoted army
of champion Islamic warriors who are wedging a legitimate war against Western cultural, cum
Christian religious dominance camouflaging as Western Education.
4.3.3 The Defence and Promotion of Sacred Islamic Values

The emergence of Boko Haram is further seen as an extension of the long history of militant
Islamic resistance to the invasive external political influence alongside Christian religious
doctrines. The North-Eastern Nigeria which is the epicentre of the insurgency is a region with
predominantly Muslim populations with a history of religious extremism, dating as far back
as the time when Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio waged the jihadist war against what he described
as un-Islamic and corrupt ruling elites, in the early 19th century. The long history of religious
extremism in turn, invariably, entrenched religiously-articulated intolerance and an endemic
sense of Islamic sacred values worthy of fighting for unto martyrdom among the local populations.
Importantly, the victorious jihadist wars led to the establishment of the sharia law that were
administered under the Sokoto Caliphate, whereupon there was forceful spread of Islam amongst
the proliferate minority ethnic communities, apart from their being forcefully incorporated into
the Caliphate. Importantly too, the Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio led jihadist war was followed by the
institutionalization of the Emirate (which later on became the North’s Native Authority), as the
universally-accepted legitimate rulers of the expansive Sokoto Caliphate. The result is that given
the two centuries of long unbroken experience of northern Nigeria with traditional self-rule, the
local population that had been accustomed to sharia law and traditional administration under
the Sokoto Caliphate would inevitably consider the imposition of British colonial administration,
(even though it was camouflaged as “Indirect Rule”), as foreign invasion of their long established
socio-political and governance structure.
The colonial period therefore saw the seed of resistance against the ‘invasive’ British protectorate
authority germinate and flourish in the context of we vs. them construct. In that sense it was also
not lost on the expansive Sokoto Caliphate that with British colonial administration also came
Christianity. The British protectorate, and by extension its successor, the Federal Government
of Nigeria, were thus perceived as part of the Christian evangelizing crusade, or at least as its
enablers, to the detriment of Islam. On the basis of all this, it is not difficult to see Boko Haram
frame the Government of Nigeria and its devolved units as enemies of Islam that true Muslims
would morally be justified and spiritually bound to resist by all means, including by violent
means. By waging such a war, Boko Haram becomes perceived as fighting and standing for the
advancement and consolidation of Islamic religious ethos, in itself, a ‘sacred calling’.
4.3.4 Movement Against Blocked Opportunities

As already shown in chapter one of this Report, there are more than 100 different ethnic groups
in the North East Nigeria which is also the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency. In their
normal and natural search for respective ethnic identity and political space; and in order to jostle
for contestable shared economic opportunities, these ethnic nationalities would engage stiff inter-
ethnic competitive stances. In such an environment, opportunities for the less powerful minority
ethnic communities, at the local level, would invariably be somewhat blocked or severely curtailed
by the more powerful and populous ones. At the national level, northern Nigerian populations
have had generally, limited access to Western Education, in part as already alluded to, due to
their disdain for it from the very beginning, in preference for the traditional Islamic education
system. This meant that less of the northern populations attained professional and technical skills
and qualifications necessary for accessing jobs in the secular public and private sectors. The sum
total of this is that opportunities have seemingly been blocked for them at both regional and
national levels. This resonates with the Cloward and Ohlin’s Opportunity Theory, (1960), which
prepositions that those who engage violence for utilitarian purposes are for one reason or another,
unable to obtain the same through legitimate peaceful means; usually due to what may present as
discriminative systemic blockage of opportunities.
A toxic environment contaminated with widespread endemic senses of discriminative denial

and oppression among its proliferate ethnic groups interfaces with grievance-filled mind-sets of
the local populations to render them vulnerable to religious radicalization and violent extremist
political propaganda. Feeling aggrieved at their inability to secure livelihoods, such population
groups are likely to withdraw their support for conventional legitimate norms and instead, turn
to organized criminal gang action as vehicular or instrumental means of achieving their dreams.
4.3.5 Movement Against Perceived Historical Marginalization

European expeditionary entry and subsequent spread into inland Nigeria was made from its
coastal southern regions. Western Education was accordingly, introduced first in the Nigerian
southern territories, where it was welcomed and embraced by the populations. Coming with
Western Education as a package, was on the one hand, Christianity, and on the other, training in
professions and technical skills needed by the nascent public and private sectors of a westernizing
Nigeria. The early embracement of Western Education and attainment of secular professional and
technical skills and qualifications by southern populations meant that they had a head-start, firstly
to embed themselves and subsequently to dominate key positions in various domains of the public
and private sectors of the emergent nation-state of Nigeria. Ever since then, the southerners have
indeed seemingly dominated and controlled Nigeria’s public administration, and its professions,
both in the public and private sectors. In contrast, Nigeria’s northern populations, relatively not
having attained as much secular professional and technical skills and qualifications, in as many
numbers as the southerners had done, considered themselves disadvantaged. They subsequently
developed the grievance mind-sets that have persisted to date.
4.3.6 Protest Against Governance Deficit and Perceived State Failure

State failure as already articulated elsewhere in this report represents the manifestations of ‘the failed
promise’ of independence, not just in Nigeria but elsewhere in Africa. Other than the economic,
political, socio-ethnic and religiously articulated reasons for the general sense of disaffection, Boko
Haram has also managed to project itself as a protest movement against endemic corruption,
misuse of public resources and abuse of office by successive post-independence regimes in
Nigeria. The claimed poor governance and perceived inability of the government to deliver basic
public goods and services to its citizens has been attributed to endemic corruption. These basic
public goods and services include peace and security; basic education and health care; enabling
environment for private investments; equitable socio-economic development; and the creation of
employment opportunities for the youth, in tandem with population growth. It is arguable that
these are plausible claims that helped embolden Boko Haram and its sympathizers to describe
Nigeria in such terms as a ‘failed state.’
The figure 4.1 below presents a graphic illustration of the framework model of grievance-based causes
and motivations of the Boko Haram insurgency, as explained in terms of the foregoing analysis.
Fig. 4.1 Schematic Graphic Presentation of Causes, Motivations and Justifications for the Boko
Haram Insurgency
Motivation
Cluster 1
Resisting Western

Education
Motivation Motivation
Cluster 5 Cluster 2
Self-Claimed
Motivations,
Protesting State

Failure and Blocked
Justifications and Defending and

advancing Sacred
Opportunities Legitimacy of Islamic Values
and Endemic
Governmental
Boko Haram
Corruption
Motivation Motivation
Cluster 4 Cluster 3
Fighting
 Fighting Imposition

Discrimination and of Cultural and
Marginalisation Political Dominance
4.4 Support Systems and Identity Framework of
Perpetrators and Enablers
From both the historical and contemporary perspectives, the primary causes and motivation
of the Boko Haram insurgency is a complex web of competing socio-political and economic
interests informed and juxtaposed by multiplicities of causal and motivation factors. The ethno-
cultural and socio-economic as well as political grievance narratives that help explain the
insurgency are particularly exacerbated by deep and longstanding historical rivalry between
religious precepts and ideologies. A framework model that is capable of profiling identities of
perpetrators and enablers of the insurgency is thus critically important, not only for broad-based
appreciation of its operations and likely trajectory, but also for contextualizing its formidability
to effect the violent destruction of human life and property; human abduction and trafficking –
mostly of boy children used as foot soldiers, and girl children used as sex slaves; displacements
of persons from their homes and livelihoods; breakdown of social and physical infrastructures;
disruption of provision of basic social services, especially health and education; and radicalizing
mind-sets of large populations through religiously articulated indoctrination and extremist
political propaganda.
To sustain its insurgency, Boko Haram requires both human and material resources as well
as technical and logistical support, which it sources both internally and externally. For its soft
power, the insurgency employs religiously articulated radical narratives and extremist political
propaganda to also make claim to spiritual formidability. The framework model presented herein
is principally intended to help profile identities of perpetrators and enablers of the Boko Haram
and illustrate its structural layers which put together constitute its support system of internal and
external factors.
4.4.1 The Internal Support System and Enablers of Boko Haram

The internal support and enabling system for Boko Haram consists of at least five layers of direct
and indirect perpetrators and general enablers of the insurgency. The first layer is that of core
planners and the central command while the second comprises the various formations of field
units of fighters and suicide bombers. The third layer envisages clandestine supporters and
collaborators. The fourth layer envisages sections of the masses of the population and sympathizers
of the insurgency; some informed by ethnic affiliations while others are prompted by a shared
political ideology, religious identity as well as the doctrinal articulations. The mass populations of
sympathizers would invariably offer support and facilitation to the insurgency in diverse covert
ways such as financial and logistical support. The fifth layer of enablers envisages the multitudes
of mostly unemployed youth, both boys and girls that are, mostly, excluded from mainstream
livelihoods. They, in most cases, strongly feel aggrieved by their deplorable socio-economic statuses
and therefore making them highly vulnerable to recruitment into the insurgency. Characteristically
they would often resort to violence to express their grievances.
It is indisputable that the multitudes of unemployed youth hold the political class responsible for
their plight and that of the majority of poor citizens. Youth unemployment in North Eastern Nigeria
has long been an issue especially when it became conspicuously evident that a large number of
graduates of tertiary institutions started being noticed in the streets of Maiduguri, and secondary
school leavers could not proceed to higher institutions of learning. What presents as a case of
blocked opportunities for the youth therefore generated a large number of idle, hungry, frustrated
and desperate youth who remain vulnerable to recruitment by Boko Haram. In a nutshell, youth
unemployment and pervasive poverty have thus greatly engendered the Boko Haram insurgency by
placing at its disposal large populations of unemployed youth that are vulnerable to radicalization
and recruitment into the insurgency.
Fig. 4.2 ModularAnatomyofBokoHaramSupportSystemandIdentityFrameworkofPerpetrators
and Enablers
Eternal Sources
of Foreign Fighters & Arms
Supply
Mass Populations
of Supporters
& Sympathizers
Willing Recruits
among Unemployed
Youth
Clandestine
Supporters in Public,
Religious & Private Sector
Institutions
Formations
of Devoted Fighters
& Suicide Bombers
Innercore
Planners
and
Central
Command
4.4.2 The External Enabling Environment and Support System for Boko
Haram
There exits, historically, a strong interface between the predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria
to Islam in the Maghreb and the wider Sahel, with the long-standing relationship dating back
to hundreds of years before. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the early 2010s Arab Spring
movement that affected several Maghreb and Middle-East countries caused a new awakening of
Islamic fervour in northern Nigeria in a rather significant way. The epic events re-energized and
redefined the historical relationships in the context of enhanced awareness of democratic rights
of youth and populist demands for political accountability and equal access to shared prosperity.
Moreover, the youth were emboldened by the concurrent emergence of other jihadist movements
on the global scene, and what presented as their spiritual and physical formidability against
Western dominance.
Northern Nigeria, apart from being predominantly Muslim, also borders several Islamic states
to its north, north-west and north-east. Some elements within these neighbouring states share in
the globalization agenda of Islam. The Boko Haram being a product of some of these externally
inspired and religiously informed conspiracies therefore also presents as part of a globalizing
Islam. The emergence and entrenchments of Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria is
therefore, to be viewed from the wider perspective of worldwide manifestations of fundamentalist
Islam that is inspired by the global jihadist ambitions.
4.4.3 Availabilityand Easy Access to Foreign Arms and Munitions as Enablers

The proliferation of arms and munitions trafficked across the expansive sparsely populated and
largely inadequately governed spaces of the Sahel into the Lake Chad region gives Boko Haram
easy access to sophisticated weaponry from outside the region. Being the gateway into Nigeria
from North and Central Africa, and given the porosity of Nigeria’s international borders with
Chad, Cameroon and Niger, the Borno and Yobe States have for long served as entry points for
the illegal arms and ammunitions trafficked along the north-south corridor. Additionally, arms
and munitions are also trafficked along the wide east-coast to west-coast corridor, and across the
sparsely populated and weakly governed spaces of the greater Sahel. The arms then enter the Lake
Chad enclaves and finally find their way into North East Nigeria. By occupying the particularly
vantage region of North Eastern Nigeria, which is the intersection point of the north-south and
east-west arms trafficking routes, Boko Haram is doubly endowed and enabled as far as accessing
arms and munitions is concerned. The figure 4.2 above illustrates the enabling support system for
Boko Haram and the identities framework for perpetrators and enablers of the insurgency.
4.5 A Proposed Conceptual, Analytical and Response

Framework
The framework model proposed herein is for the better understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency
and developing an appropriate mitigation intervention strategy that would suppress its impacts in
North East Nigeria and even beyond. The evolution of
the framework is informed by a deeper understanding
There exists a Humanitarian- and appreciation of the root, as well as proximate, causal
factors of the crisis; the violence motivation theories in
Development – Peace Nexus, defined
the context of the insurgency; the support systems and
as the continuum of inter-connections identity frameworks of the insurgency perpetrators and
and inter-relationships between enablers; and contextual development and governance
humanitarian and development, as challenges that bedevil the region. The framework is
also informed by the need to move the region onto
well as the security crises characterized an equitable and sustainable development trajectory
by, on the one hand fairly nuanced and consequently, the realisation of the promise of
conceptual, analytical and operational prosperity. The framework is founded on two critical
realities; first, that the architecture and manifestations
challenges; and on the other hand, of the insurgency are multi-dimensional in terms of
opportunities for durable positive both causes and effects. The second reality is that there
change and sustainable development exists a Humanitarian-Development – Peace Nexus,
defined as the continuum of inter-connections and inter-
and that a clear understanding and relationships between humanitarian and development, as
unpacking of the ‘nexus’ is the basis well as the security crises characterized by, on the one hand
of credible and effective mitigation fairly nuanced conceptual, analytical and operational
challenges; and on the other hand, opportunities for durable
strategies against the adverse multi-
positive change and sustainable development and that a
faceted impacts of the insurgency. clear understanding and unpacking of the ‘nexus’ is
the basis of credible and effective mitigation strategies
against the adverse multi-faceted impacts of the insurgency. These two realities need to be
isolated, defined, understood, contextualised and assessed as part of understanding the insurgency
and developing a long-term mitigation intervention strategy. The isolation, redefinition and re-
assessments of the key parameters need to be done from an analytical paradigm and prism of
policy making and as well as from mitigation intervention strategy development view point. This is
necessary, not only for the North-East region per se, as the epicentre of the insurgency, but also as
a pre-requisite for broader mitigation intervention focussing on the entire Lake Chad geo-political
and socio-economic system, which realistically and broadly speaking is the operating environment
of Boko Haram.
4.5.1 Unpacking the Humanitarian-Development - Peace Nexus

The novel way to unpack and help [re]conceptualise the Humanitarian-Development-Peace
(H-D-P) nexus is to render it in terms of what this report has conceptualised as the ‘Three plus
Five (3+5) Integrated Framework. The Framework envisages, at the apex Three Foundational
Response Pillars, which correspond to the three inter-related components of the nexus which
are in turn guided and underpinned by Five Guiding Principles. In the context of any conflict,
violence and hence a raging humanitarian and development crisis, the three critical ‘Foundational
Response Pillars’, the continuum, inter-relationships and interactions of which forms the ‘nexus,’
automatically tend to be the following:
1. Humanitarian Assistance;
2. Development; and
3. Peace and Security
These three always tend to top the list in practically all cases, mainly because of the immediate
emergencies that arise as a result of the sudden disruptions and the threat posed to lives and
livelihoods. Historically, the responses to emergencies and humanitarian crises have been
rather linear and indeed sequential with distinct and separately pronounced humanitarian and
development phases. Security and peace building would then be infused at various points along
the response pathway depending on prevailing circumstances, including sometimes at the tail
end of the pathway. Such a lineal response model entailed disparate approaches with different
actors and response mechanisms along the pathway, often un-coordinated and certainly, not
integrated. Thus, in the event of an emergency or crisis, the humanitarian actors would ordinarily
move in first to offer the necessary humanitarian assistance and stabilise the situation long
before development actors subsequently move in during what is presumably the reconstruction
and rehabilitation phase. Such an approach would, evidently, not leverage the limited resources
available and synergies across sectors and actors; and over time, build on their comparative
advantages, resources and experiences.
The ‘Three Plus Five’ Integrated Framework is thus, conceptually founded on a clear understanding
of the parameters and key variables that define the ‘Foundational Pillars’ and necessary ‘Guiding
Principles; including the key policy and programmatic levers; actors and success indicators that
are specifically applicable in the context of North-East Nigeria, but also applicable more generally.
4.5.2 Humanitarian Assistance Pillar

The parameters and indicators associated with humanitarian interventions are well documented
and include the basic life-saving assistance that has to be immediately availed whenever large
scale violence erupts. The basic life-saving assistance are often provided by the respective Local
Governments, the State Government and a host of Humanitarian actors (inter-governmental and
non-governmental) as well as community groups. However, beyond the immediate needs of food
and non-food items including medical supplies; water and sanitation; and protection, ‘the nexus’
approach calls for long-term perspectives that can handle the nuances and complexities that arise
in such situations; notably the long-term needs and aspirations of the affected people especially,
the more vulnerable populations such as the defenceless women and children; the physically
challenged; the youth and more fundamentally, the hordes of displaced populations who live among
host communities in the most unpredictable and unusual circumstances. Embedded within this
pillar therefore, is the need to take full cognisance of the long-term aspirations of, and hope for a
secure and more prosperous future by, the people who find themselves in such crisis situations.
The crisis situation that they find themselves in does not in any way diminish or extinguish their
own desires and hope for fulfilled lives and prosperous future. In short, a humanitarian situation
such as has occurred in Nigeria’s North East presents a fairly complex scenario that requires both
short term and long-term measures in order to uncover and deal with nuances not so obvious in
typical emergency situations. These long-term measures therefore, should be integrated into the
response framework as early as possible and not only at a later stage.
4.5.3 Development Pillar

Development is, in turn always incremental and basically, builds on society’s own aspirations and
goals. It entails the progressive experience of the people in order to weed themselves out of the
primordial lifestyles of poverty, want and deprivation. The innate desire of people to weed themselves
out of poverty and deprivation provides a useful starting point for adopting long-term development
view and instituting [long-term] development measures even during the ‘humanitarian phase’. In
general, development has to be felt in terms of indicators that include sustainable access to basic
goods and services, principally health and education; descent and durable jobs; and economic
opportunities that are created for the majority of the population. The Development Pillar therefore,
includes such elements as restoration of livelihoods - agriculture, commerce; skills acquisition and
entrepreneurship; and basic economic and social infrastructure, including especially those necessary
for educational advancement and health services. It includes easy and sustainable access to basic
services, particularly water, sanitation and hygiene all without which the former focus on purely
emergency measures is doomed to fail. It also involves reconstruction and rehabilitation of the basic
economic and social infrastructures Needless to say, while both Federal and State Governments
have the primary responsibility for developing policies and creating the conducive environment for
development to thrive in such crisis situations, development partners, other non-state actors, and
especially the private sector, all have an important role to play as anchors of the Development Pillar.
4.5.4 Peace and Security Pillar

This constitutes the third Foundational Pillar of the “nexus” approach. As the adage goes, peace
is not merely the absence of war; rather it conceptualises the feeling of being both physically and
emotionally secure wherever one lives. Peace and security does however, presume the existence
of capacity to defend one self, family and property from internal and external threats and ability
to go about one’s business unhindered. In the nexus context therefore, it implies the existence
of both the Federal Government as well as State and local area capabilities to deal with real and
perceived threats to security. The Nigerian government’s capabilities in forestalling both the
sources of intra- and inter-national threats to peace and security are extremely important. Beyond
the national responsibility however, the broader international security apparatus is obviously
implicated because within the nexus approach and as the North-East shows, Nigeria is part of the
community of nations; bordered as already noted by other equally restive countries and where in
particular, porous borders are a noted avenue for cross-border conflicts and violence as well as a
source of illicit arms. In short, the continuum around security becomes one in which, beyond the
national response capacity, neighbouring countries and the wider international community have
to be involved as well.
4.6 The ‘Plus 5’ Guiding Principles

Conceptually speaking, the foregoing approach based on an understanding of the three pillars and
their inter-connectedness and non-linearity is doomed to fail if they are not, in turn underpinned-
or have as their bedrock- the following five pre-requisites, or as it were, the supporting Five
Guiding Principles each of which is unpacked here below:
1. Good Governance;
2. Partnerships and Capacity Building;
3. Funding and Sustainable Financing;
4. Environmental Sustainability; and
5. Deeper and Granular Analytics
4.6.1 Good Governance as the Irreducible Nexus Core

The experience of Nigeria’s North East as described elsewhere in this report confirms without
a shadow of doubt, that good governance is undoubtedly, the primary core around which any
society can experience its birth and renewal, and ultimately, realise its full potential. As various
studies have shown, good governance allows for unfettered public participation in the manner
and style in which society is governed; it allows for accountability across the board for what
people, and especially leaders, do and finally, it entails a society in which the people as a majority
have voice and the confidence that they can peacefully choose and elect leaders of their choice.
In the words of former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, “Good Governance is ensuring respect
for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and
capacity in public administration.” In echoing the sentiments around Good Governance, the UN
enumerated the eight principles that are presumably definitive:2
i) Participation; i.e. People should be able to voice their own opinions through legitimate
immediate organizations or representatives;
ii) Rule of Law, i.e. a Legal framework that should be enforced impartially, especially on
human right laws;
iii) Consensus Oriented, i.e. the mediation of differing interests to meet the broad consensus
on the best interests of a community;
iv) Equity and Inclusiveness, implying people should have opportunities to improve or
maintain their well-being;
v) Effectiveness and Efficiency, meaning that processes and institutions should be able to
produce results that meet the needs of their community while making the best of their
resources;
vi) Accountability implying that government institutions, private sectors, and civil
society organizations should all be held accountable to the public and institutional
stakeholders;
2 For these eight principles, see for instance: https://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/g-attributes.html
vii) Transparency, i.e. information being made accessible to the public and should be
understandable and monitored; and
viii) Responsiveness, implying that institutions and processes should serve all stakeholders.
4.6.2 Partnerships and Capacity Building

Unpacking and operationalising the ‘nexus’ requires various vertical and horizontal partnerships
built around strong and accountable institutions; and healthy, skilled, motivated and committed
human capital. It requires strong institutional capacities founded on functional systems,
procedures and reliable infrastructure. While these may have been destroyed or disrupted as
result of the insurgency and the resultant crisis, embedding them in the response model as part
of the ‘nexus’ approach is desirable. As has been shown, in most emergency and humanitarian
situations, the educational and health as well other public infrastructure suffer most while any
skilled manpower would either have been killed or those who manage to do so, escape to safe
territories or, at best, the most qualified persons migrate. The North East of Nigeria has, as a result
of the decade-long conflict and violence, not been spared this familiar curse, leading to critical
shortages affecting practically every shade of manpower needs. The manpower is often required
not only to offer highly specialised services such as in health or education, but sustainability
requires educated people who can be relied upon to put in place efficient and accountable public
administration systems. Coupled with this is the imperative of restoring or upgrading, as the case
might be, the total range of infrastructure requirements such as buildings, equipment, supplies
and communication so that public goods and services can be delivered. Central to the success of
the nexus in this context is the effective partnerships between the diverse range of stakeholders:
Federal, State and Local authorities on the one hand, and with the international community
and non-state actors on the other hand built around their mandates, comparative strengths and
leveraging all available resources.
4.6.3 Ensuring Predictable Funding and Sustainable Financing

Traditionally, emergency and crisis response funding is mobilised at short notice, particularly
by international NGOs, the UN and other aid organisations, often following appeals by
governments under whose watch the humanitarian emergencies have erupted. The reality
however, is that in the nexus context, concurrent mechanisms ought to be put in place to create
conditions under which there can be more assured and predictable funding, preferably over
the medium-term. Such funding must, of essence, be primarily sourced from Government
which retains the ultimate accountability for rehabilitation and restoration of livelihoods.
Sustainable funding of crisis is a win-win situation for Government, for it allows for restoration
of livelihoods and economic activities which not only strengthen the bonds of accountability
between Government and the population it governs but also leads to the generation of
revenue needed for development. Concurrently, and especially over the medium-to long-term,
appropriate development financing mechanisms, principally founded on government’s own
revenue as well as a multiplicity of financing mechanisms involving, principally, the private
sector, should be developed. There is a strong business and moral case to be made for the
deeper involvement of the Private Sector in the financing of crises response under the ‘nexus’
approach. The North East represents a potentially important source of inputs, including
labour needed by, and market outlet for goods and services produced by the private sector.
But sustainable financing cuts across the entire spectrum of the nexus as the private sector is
often an important beneficiary of the humanitarian response as suppliers of critical goods and
services, including food and non-food items. As may be appreciated, such sustainable financing
can only be predicated upon the existence of all the other aforementioned principles; especially
the requisite institutional capacities; sound policies, respect for the rule of law, super-essence
of peace, followed by a corresponding strategy that ensures the return to an accountable,
transparent governance system that can create belief in the sort of public institutions entrusted
with unfettered responsibilities to formulate laws, policies and legislate for budgetary provisions
that deliver the totality of human development to the people who so badly need it. Needless to
say, greater financial inclusion – vertical and horizontal-, through a multiplicity of institutional
mechanisms such as banking and non-banking financial services; savings and credit societies;
local cooperatives; and insurance is a critical ingredient of the sustainable financing principle
and ultimately, a thriving local economy.
4.6.4 Environmental Sustainability

One of the findings to be gleaned from this report is that
conflict and violence have serious compounded effect on Undoubtedly, proper waste
the environment, both in the immediate areas habited by
displaced and host populations and the wider geographic area management; clear and
affected by the crisis. As noted elsewhere in the report, life in appropriate tenure systems
IDP camps by the thousands of displaced families has severe
compounding effect on dignity, health and productivity of the and property regimes, as
people. It was also noted that environmental degradation is a well as land use systems
major cause of the conflict and hence, the raging humanitarian
crisis. A region such as the North East of Nigeria that was in that promote conservation
the earlier years the literal bread basket for the nation is no of natural resources, restore
longer capable of feeding itself. Agricultural production has
been particularly affected. Population pressure; land and
productivity; restoration
habitat degradation; loss of grazing lands and climate change of the waters of the Lake
right across the region have created major stresses on the
environment and led to conflicts over access to and use of
Chad; and adapting to and
resources, in effect exacerbating the conflict within the region mitigating climate change
and also, evidently, leading to spread of the conflict to other
and its debilitating effects
neighbouring geographic areas. With an encroaching Sahara
Desert and the diminishing Lake Chad waters, conditions are will be needed as part of the
being set up for unending resource-based conflicts and erosion overall response strategy.
of livelihoods. In light of all these, the ‘nexus’ will require
robust strategic engagements that will ensure environmental
conservation and sustainable utilisation of water, land and
land-based resources. Undoubtedly, proper waste management; clear and appropriate tenure
systems and property regimes, as well as land use systems that promote conservation of
natural resources, restore productivity; restoration of the waters of the Lake Chad; and
adapting to and mitigating climate change and its debilitating effects will be needed as part
of the overall response strategy.
4.6.5 Deeper and Granular Analytics

The pillar relating to ‘Deeper and Granular Analytics’ is extremely important in an
interventional sense since it would ensure that ‘no one is left behind’ and that ‘the furthest
behind are reached first’ with life-saving and development interventions. It would promote
equity, inclusiveness and justice. Its core is the need to strive for comprehensive, reliable,
accurate and up-to-date data that can support the overall process of planning and implementing
humanitarian and development interventions over space and time. Far too often, in crisis
situations, numbers are in doubt because they are either underplayed or exaggerated leading
to poor decision making. More often than not, the analysis is carried in a disjointed and
sometimes repetitive manner failing to leverage on the experience and expertise of the full
range of all the actors involved. Regular and comprehensive collection of data and information;
fine-grained analysis of data and information to generate the necessary statistics, focusing on
small geographic areas as well as different gender and socio-economic groups will ensure that
the needy are clearly identified and interventional measures are well targeted to those most
in need. It will also ensure that the impact of interventions is easily and readily quantifiable.
In the North East, it has already been acknowledged in this report that the data capture of
those embedded into communities has been elusive and therefore their levels of need has
remained uncertain. More critical is also the fact that owing to historic and institutionalised
discrimination against women, and the youth, the full impact of the conflict and violence on
the gender dimension remains uncertain. Granularity in, and deepening of, analysis covering
various dimensions of the crisis could help address this. Deeper and Granular analysis also
calls for looking beyond the traditional sources of data and information (usually the surveys
and administrative data) and hence, the leveraging of ‘Big Data’ and the ‘Data Revolution’ by
sourcing data from non-traditional sources.
4.7 Proposed Models for Addressing Violence Motivation

Factors and Unpacking the Nexus
4.7.1 The Insurgency Quantum Factor (IQF)
The modular framework model proposed herein lends itself for use as a tool for analysis
and developing a range of interventions that can help address the Boko Haram insurgency
and its impacts. It is also a useful tool that can help address the motivational factors, guide
reconstruction and resilience building in the regions and communities already devastated
by the insurgency and hence continuing to endure serious humanitarian and development
challenges. There are three objectives to the model; analytical; interventional, as well as
reconstruction and resilience building. This renders it versatile enough in scope, to take care
of the key parameters including providing a conceptual framework for the realistic assessment
of the insurgency’s impacts.
The fundamental premise of the model is that Boko Haram’s several acts of insurgency are
perpetrated by different role players whose combined actions result in four core end-effects
referred to hitherto; i.e., violent destruction of human life and property; abduction and
trafficking of persons, mostly boy children used as foot soldiers and girl children used as
sex slaves; displacement of persons from their homes and livelihoods; and radicalization of
populations through religiously articulated ideological indoctrination and extremist political
propaganda.
Envisaged intervention measures would include concerted steps to suppress the insurgency
as well as coordinated measures for reconstruction, and resilience building to restore affected
communities. Accomplishing these would have to focus on a multiple number of intervention
areas, the key ones being; improved security and peace building; social infrastructures
development; economic and livelihoods recovery; rehabilitation and reintegration of displaced
persons and deserting fighters; and establishment of institutional infrastructures for inclusive
governance systems.
The key indicator variables are thus, on the one hand; the quantum factor of the Boko Haram
insurgency, made up of levels of its recruitment, perpetration and radicalization; all these
having negative impacts; and on the other hand, positively impacting variables, namely;
levels and intensity of counter-insurgency measures; rehabilitation and reintegration efforts;
rebuilding community resilience, depending on degrees of degradation of original resilience
levels; and the amount of reconstruction of physical and social-economic infrastructures in
affected regions.
The model matrix presented below captures selected possible mitigation intervention measures
against a backdrop of negative and positive dimensions of the insurgency. In a modular sense,
positive impacts of reconstructive resilience building; restoration of affected communities’
infrastructures and livelihoods; de-radicalization, reintegration, resettlement and psycho-social
support for abductees, displaced persons and fighters deserting the insurgency, etc, would net
off negative direct impacts of the insurgency and corresponding ripple effects, to arrive at what is
referred to as the Insurgency Quantum Factor (IQF) as shown in the illustrated schematic figure
4.3 set out below.
Fig. 4.3 SchematicIllustration*ofMultivariableIndicatorsandRestorativeInterventionMeasures

in Respect to the Boko Haram Insurgency
Dimension: 1 Radicalization
Population
Displacements
Lost Livelihoods
Marginalization Ideology Justice Peer Engagement Criminal Activity
Communities may possess certain characteristics that make the likelihood of radicalization higher.
Resilience Building &
Dimension: 2 Restorative Reconstruction
Community Attachment/Detachment Community Reporting Avenues Security Tiers

Narrative
Resilientcommunitiesmaydeterorpreventterrorism, pushitbackorblock/minimiseitseffectsandimpacts
on the community
INTERVENTIONS
INDICATORS
Dimension: 3 Psycho-Rehabilitation,
Returnees Reintegration,
Livelihoods Restoration Stakeholder Psychosocial

Socio-economic Support (Government) Support
Action/In-action
The grater the amount of restorative services available the lesser the level of impact of insurgency on
community.
The Basic assumption; there is a relationship between insurgency and its direct and indirect impact on the
community
Dimension 4 Cost of Insurgency
Radicalised mindsets, Broken-down Loss of Direct/indirect Investments,

Population Social &Physical Governance systems,
Displacements, Infrastructures, Social Harmony
Increased School-Dropouts, Lost Businesses &
Low School Enrolments Livelihoods
—**Adapted from, Pawson, R. & Tilley, N. (1997), Realistic Evaluation, London, SAGE
Based on the multivariable indicators and intervention measures possible, as captured in the
schematic diagram above, we would surmise the overall Insurgency Quantum Factor (IQF)
as follows; IQF = (amount of terrorism + recruitment + radicalization) - (resilience +
rehabilitation + socio-economic support)
4.7.2 Integrated Framework for Unpacking and Operationalising the Nexus

To complete the analytical framework for conceptualising and operationalising the nexus
approach, we propose an integrated crisis response framework which takes into account the
Insurgency Quantum Factor approach and the holistic and non-linear as well as the inter-
connectedness of, and inter-relationships between the Three Foundational Pillars and the Five
Guiding Principles as aforementioned.
Fig. 4.4 An Integrated Framework for Unpacking and Operationalising the Nexus in N.E Nigeria
Countering Violent Etremism

Identification of drivers
Counter-terrorism narratives
Conflict prevention
Social harmony
Peer engagement
Community policing and reporting channels
Enhancing Livelihoods and Rehabilitation, Reconstruction

Opportunities and Resilience Building
Improve security and restore social order
Reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure Conflict resolution and peace building
Broad-based training and skills acquisition Psychosocial support and psycho-rehabilitation
Improving access to factors of production – land, Reconstruction of physical and institutional
capital and entrepreneurals infrastructures
Facilitate local and international commerce Re-integration of displaced persons
Strengthening and legal and regulatory frameworks
Rebuilding community resilience
4.8 Conclusions
The tenable conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis undertaken in this chapter is simply
that intervention and response models that comprehensively assures Rehabilitation, Re-Integration
and Sustainable Development are those in which key actors work in concert, leveraging as it were,
on the experiences of each other while taking into account the complex causal factors some of
which are extremely long-standing in nature and the non-linear and multidimensional nature of
the crisis. Good governance has been found to be an irreducible minimum without which even
petty grievances; including the lack of employment and other opportunities for young people can
spiral out of proportion into irreconcilable levels. The three core pillars of peace and security; a
humanitarian operations and response, followed closely by the developmental pillar are still core,
but it is also clearly evident that the former (peace and security) is a major off-shoot from good
governance.
The analysis relating to root causes; particularly the internal and external enabling factors,
also referred as the main drivers of the Boko Haram violence, and as fundamentally; the role of
comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date data in facilitating long-range planning are extremely
essential to the quest for appropriately targeted responses to the crisis. In a word, this report is
categorical that only a holistic and a properly integrated response framework whose applicability
relies on mutually interdependent and reinforcing mechanisms will produce the desired
outcomes. Such interdependence and integration as illustrated in figure 4.4, implies and includes
the focused and deliberate attention to countering violent extremism, particularly through the
identification of its key motivating factors or drivers. It also entails the developmental response,
unpacked to its bare minimum as rehabilitation, reconstruction and resilience-building that
has to be championed by all involved actors, including the Federal Government of Nigeria.
Measures that enhance livelihoods and opportunities in the long term, such as broad-based
training and skills acquisition, access to the main factors of production such as land and capital;
the facilitation of local and international commerce as well as deliberate measures to strengthen
polices and regulatory frameworks are vital.
Conclusively, there is no doubt from the perspective of this report, that only such an integrated
approach will yield an inclusive and purposive growth, ensure shared prosperity and provide
some decent comfort as Nigeria races with the rest of the global community towards achieving
sustainable development in the context of the global Agenda 2030.
Technical Notes and Data Sources
Technical Note 1:
Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality Adjusted Human
Development Index (I-HDI)
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of achievements in three basic
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent
standard of living. It is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.
The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (I-HDI) on the other hand adjusts the
HDI for inequality in distribution of each dimension across the population. It is computed as a
geometric mean of the inequality adjusted dimensions of human development. The IHDI accounts
for inequalities in HDI dimensions by discounting each dimension’s average value according to its
level of inequality. The I-HDI thus equals the HDI when there is no inequality within the population
but reduces as inequality rises. The “loss” in potential human development due to inequality is
given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, expressed as a percentage.
Graphically;
Calaculating the HDI

The specific equation used to estimate the HDI is given as:
HDI = (IHealth . IEducation . IIncome) 1/3
Where Ihealth is the Health Index; Ieducation is the Education Index and Iincome is the Income
Index
Each Dimension Index is calculated using the formula:
Dimension index = actual value – minimum value

Maximum value- minimum value
While the various indicators are calculated using the following formulae:
Mean Years of Schooling Index (MYSI) = MYS

13.2
Expected Years of Schooling Index (EYSI) = EYS

20.6
Educational Index (EI) = (MYSI) * (EYSI)

Life Expectancy at Birth ex = Tx

lx
 where
 (MYS) is the number of years a 25 years old and above have spent in school
 EYS is the total number of years a 5year old child will spend in his/her education in
his/her whole life time.
 Tx signifies the total stationary or life table population at age x
 lx denotes the survivors of a cohort of live born babies to the exact age x
Calculating the I-HDI

The I-HDI draws on the Artkinson family of inequality measures and sets the aversion parameter
α equal to 1.
The inequality measure A x = 1-µ/β where µ is the geometric mean and β if the arithmetic mean
The Inequality-adjusted HDI (I-HDI*) = [(1– AHealth). 1– AEducation). (1– AIncome)]1/3. HDI.
While the loss in human development index due to inequality is given by

Loss % = 1 – [(1–AHealth). (1–AEducation). (1–AIncome)]1/3.
Data Sources
 Projected Population from National Population Commission
 GNI per Capita in dollars from GNI Group – National Bureau of Statistics
 Human Development Indices Survey 2017- National Bureau of Statistics
Technical Note 2:
Gender Inequality Index (GII)
Gender Inequality Index (GII) is the percentage of potential human development lost due to gender
inequality. It reflects gender-based disadvantage or inequality in achievement in specific dimensions
and the extent to which such inequality affects human development. It varies between 0 (when
women and men fare equally) and 1 (when one gender fares as poorly as possible) in all measured
dimensions. In this report, GII is measured on the basis of the three dimensions of reproductive
health, empowerment and labour market represented by the indicators shown below.
GII Dimensions
Reproductive health Empowerment Labour market
Indicators 1.MaternalMortalityRatio(MMR) 1. Parliamentary seats by each sex 1. Labour force
Participation Rate
2.AdolescentFertilityRate(AFR) 2. Educational attainment of ages (LFPR) by sex
25 years and above with at least
secondary
DimensionIndex Reproductive Health Index Empowerment Index Labour Market Index
GII
The GII is calculated in five iterative steps:
Step 1: Treatment of zero and extreme values

Since the geometric mean cannot have a zero value, a minimum value of 0.1 was set for
adolescent fertility rate and proportion of parliamentary seats held by women; lower
and upper limits for MMR were set at 10 and 1000, respectively on the basis of the
assumption that states where maternal mortality ratios exceed 1,000 do not differ in
their inability to create conditions and support for maternal health while states with
1-10 deaths per 100,000 births are performing at essentially the same level.
Step 2: Aggregating indicators across dimensions within each gender using geometric
mean
For women and girls, the aggregation formula is
½
GF = 3
( MMR
10 x 1
AFR ) x (PRF x SEF)½ x LFPRF
For men and boys, the formula is

GM = 3 1 x (PR M x SEM)½ x LFPR M
Step 3: Aggregating indicators across gender groups, using harmonic mean

Female and male indices are aggregated using the harmonic mean to create equally
distributed gender index, that is, capture the inequality between women and men and
adjust for association between dimensions.
Step 4: Calculating the geometric mean of the arithmetic means for each indicator
In this step, the female and male indices are aggregated using equal weights (thus treating
the genders equally) and then aggregating the indices across dimensions.
Where
Step 5: Calculating the Gender Inequality Index

In the final step, the geometric mean is then used to divide the harmonic mean and
the resulting quotient is subtracted from 1 to give the Gender Inequality Index at the
particular level.
Data Sources
The data required for computing all the indicators in the three dimensions are sourced from:
 Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) – Human Development Indices Survey 2017 - NBS
 Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR) – MICS5 -2016
 Share of Parliamentary Seats by Sex (PR) – Human Development Indices Survey

-2017
 Educational Attainment of ages 25 and above with at least secondary education by

sex (SE) – Human Development Indices Survey 2017
 Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) by sex – Human Development Indices Survey
2017.
Technical Note 3:
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
The Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is a measure of acute poverty developed by Oxford
Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) in collaboration with UNDP’s Human
Development Report Office. It was first published in the 2010 UNDP Global Human Development
Report. The purpose of MPI is to present the status of poverty level at the national level and
for purposes of this report, at the sub-national (regional and state) levels. The MPI presents the
number of people who are multi-dimensionally poor and the deprivations such people face at the
household level. It is a measure of the share of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor
adjusted by the intensity of deprivation.
Poverty is not merely the impoverished state in which a person actually lives, but a lack of real
opportunities due to social and other constrains and circumstances that inhibit living a valuable
and dignified life. The concept of poverty goes beyond absence of or low income to inadequate
amenities but include poor health and nutrition; low education and skills; inadequate livelihoods;
poor housing conditions; lack of jobs; and social exclusion, as well as lack of participation in
household decisions.
For this report we have adopted a nationally contextualized MPI (2016) with dimension of health
measured by a long and healthy life, education measured by knowledge, living standards measured
by decent standard of living; and labour force measured by unemployment.
The Nigeria MPI Dimensions

The Nigerian MPI is composed of four dimensions made up of eleven indicators
Dimension Indicator Description
Health Nutrition(measuredbyadultBody A household is deprived if there is any adult with malnourished (BMI<18.5kg/m2)
Mass Index (BMI) nutritional information
Child mortality (measured by Ahouseholdissaidtobedeprivedifanychild lessthan15yearsinthehousehold have
death in the family) died
Education Years of Schooling Householdissaidtobedeprivedifanyhouseholdmember15yearsandabovehasnot
completed five years of schooling
Child School attendance Householdisdeprivedifanychildinthehouseholdbetweenages5and15yearsisnot
attending school.
Standard of Lighting Household is deprived if it has no electricity.
living
Access to water Householdisdeprivedifitdoesnothaveaccesstosafedrinkingwater(accordingtoMDG
guidelines)
Sanitation Household is deprived if the sanitation facility is not improved (according to MDG
guidelines), or it is improved but shared with other households
Floor type Household is deprived if it has a dirt, sand or dung floor.
Coking fuel Householdisdeprivedifitcookswithdung,woodorcharcoaletc.Useof“dirty”fuellike
firewood/charcoal/dung to cook is an indication of poverty
Asset ownership Householdisdeprivedifithaslessthantwoassets(radio,TV,bike/motorcycle,mobile
phone, refrigerator and bicycle) and does not own a car.
Labour force Unemployment householdissaidtobedeprivedifanyhouseholdmember(15–64years)islookingfor
work and available for work but did not secure a job.
Indicator Weighting
Each dimension and each indicator of each dimension were assigned equal weights as shown
below:
Dimensions Indicators Deprived if Weight TotalWeight

Yearsofschooling Any household member 15 years and above has not
1/9
completed five years of schooling
Education 1/4
Child school Anychildinthehouseholdbetweenages5and15years
1/8
attendance is not attending school
Child mortality Anychildlessthan15yearsinthehouseholdhave???? 1/8
Health Nurtrition Anyadultforwhomthereisnutritionalinformationis 1/4
1/8
malnourished (BM|<18.5kg/m2)
Lighting The household has no electricity 1/24
Sanitation The houshold’s sanitation facility is not improved
(according to MDG guidelines), or it is improved but 1/24
shared with other households
Use of Water The household does not have access to safe drinking
Living Standard 1/24 1/4
water (according to MDG guidelines)
Floor The houshold has a dirt, sand or dung floor 1/24
Cooking fuel Thehouseholdcookswithdung,woodorcharcoaletc 1/24
Asset The household has less than two assets and does not
1/24
own a car
Unemployment Unemployment Any household member 15 years above is lookng for
1/4 1/4
work and available for work
Definition of MPI Concepts
Incidence of Poverty (H) — This is the share of the population who are identified as poor
or simply, the head count ratio. It is the proportion of those
who are deprived in more than one fourth of the weighted
indicators.
Intensity of Poverty (A) — This is the average share of deprivations people experience at
the same time. In other words, it is the average poverty gap as
a proportion of the poverty line.
Poverty Cut Off (k) — The Poverty Cut off (k) used for calculating the NMPI is k
= 26%. Households whose sum of weighted deprivation
experience are equal to or greater than 26%, are classified as
multidimensionally poor
Adjusted headcount ratio (Mo) — The adjusted head count ratio which is referred to as MPI
value is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty
by the intensity of poverty (H*A).It shows the proportion of
deprivations that the country’s poor people experience out of
the total possible deprivations that would be experienced if
every person in the society were poor and deprived in every
indicator. The MPI value ranges from zero to one.
Identifying the multidimensionally poor

There are two types of poverty cut-off points used when identifying the multidimensionally poor:
Deprivationcut-off– Each individual in the household is assigned a deprivation score according

to the deprivations in the component indicators. The deprivation score of
each individual in the household is calculated by assigning a value 1 if the
individual is deprived and the value 0 if the individual is not deprived in that
indicator.
Poverty cut-off – the deprivation values of each household is aggregated and if the deprivation
score is equal to or greater than the poverty cut-off denoted as K, the household
is identified as multi-dimensionally poor. A household is identified as poor
if the deprivation score is higher than or equal to 26% that is the deprivation
must be more than one-fourth of the weighted considered indicators to
be multidimensionally poor. For households whose deprivation scores are
below the poverty cut-off, even if it is non-zero, their score is replaced by the
value of 0 and any existing deprivations are not considered in the censored
head counts. This step is referred to as censoring the deprivations of the non-
poor And to differentiate the original deprivation score from the censored
one, we use the notation ci (k) for the censored deprivation score.
Computing the MPI

The MPI is a product of two components:
(1) The incidence of poverty within a given population which identifies the percentage of
people who are poor or the Headcount ratio (H)
q
H=—
n Where q is the number of people who are multi-dimensionally poor and n is the
total population.
(2) The intensity of poverty which is the average deprivation score or percentage of
dimensions in which poor people are deprived denoted as (A)
Where, ci (k) is the censored deprivation score of individual i and q is the number of people who
are multi-dimensionally poor.
The MPI denoted as M0 is the percentage of deprivations poor people experience, as a share of
the possible deprivations that would be experienced if all people were deprived in all dimensions.
M0 =H*A
Decomposing the MPI by geography and population groups

MPI can be decomposed by population into sub-groups. For instance, the MPI can be
decomposed by geographic areas such as rural – urban; States/sub-national geographic areas or
any other classification so long as the respective populations add up to the total population. When
decomposing MPI by rural -urban, for instance, the formula used is:
Where U denotes ‘urban’ and R denotes ‘rural’, and nu / n is the population of urban areas divided
by the total population, and similarly for nR / n is the population of rural areas divided by total
population; where nu + nR = n.
The contribution of each area/group to overall poverty is computed using the following formula:
Contribution of indicator i to MPI =
Whenever the contribution to poverty of a geographic area or some other group widely exceeds its
population share, this suggests that some geographic areas or groups may bear a disproportionate
share of poverty.
Decomposition of the MPI by dimensions and indicators

To decompose by indicators, censored headcount ratio for each indicator was computed. This was
obtained by adding up the number of poor people who are deprived in that indicator and dividing
by the total population. Once computed using the eleven indicators, it can be verified that the
weighted sum of the censored headcount ratios equal the MPI.
Where w1 is the weight of indicator 1 and CH1 is the censored headcount ratio of indicator 1, and
so on for the other ten indicators, with .
The percentage contribution of each indicator to overall poverty is computed as follows:

Contribution of indicator i to MPI =
Whenever the contribution to poverty of a certain indicator widely exceeds its weight, this suggests
that there is a relative high deprivation in this indicator in the country. The poor are more deprived
in this indicator than in others. As can be seen in the figure below, Nigerians are more deprived
in the employment and education domains, with 24.89% and 21.98% contributions to poverty,
respectively.
Source of Data
For the computation of MPI, only one source of data - the 2017 Human Development Indices
Survey-, was used.
The 2017 Human Development Indices Survey generated data on:

• Demographic Characteristics
• General Mortality (i.e. deaths in the last 12 months)
• Maternal Mortality
• Employment History
• Access to water
• Sanitation
• Housing Characteristics
• Information major industries including Cement Companies and Oil Refineries
• Supplementary data from selected MDAs
• Educational attainment among households
• Anthropometry
The survey covered households in both urban and rural areas in all the 36 states of the
Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja using the Enumeration Areas
(EAs), which established through the National Integrated Survey of Households (NISH). A
total sample 120 Enumeration Areas (EAs) were selected in each of the 36 states, and the
FCT. In each EA, a sample of 15 households (HHs) was selected for the study, making a
total of 1,800 households per State and a national sample size of 66,600 households.
Statistical Annexes
Annex 1: Human Development Index and its Components
Change
Human Development Index Life Exp. Human Dev. Change in in HDI
2016 Life Expentacy at Birth Index Education Gross National Income (GNI) Index 2013 HDI Value Rank
GNI/ GNI
Mean Education Capita Rank
Year of Exp. years Index GNI per ($) - HDI 2013-
Rank State Value Male Female Total Sch. of sch. (EI) Capita GNI Index Rank Rank Rank Value 2013-2016 2016
1 Lagos 0.6515 48 51 49 0.4589 12.3039 20.2653 1.0069 7,972.40 0.5986 2 1 1 0.6716 0.0201 0
2 FCT 0.6289 50 55 52 0.5063 10.3757 15.7526 0.8152 8,174.17 0.6025 1 1 7 0.5112 0.1177 5
3 Bayelsa 0.5909 47 53 50 0.4747 11.7345 17.9684 0.9259 3,441.38 0.4693 3 0 2 0.6121 0.0212 1
Akwa-
4 Ibom 0.5642 49 51 51 0.4905 11.2759 17.8731 0.9053 2,258.60 0.4045 7 3 4 0.5698 0.0056 0
5 Ekiti 0.5608 48 53 53 0.5222 11.3473 17.3358 0.8944 1,897.60 0.3777 9 4 16 0.4333 0.1275 11
6 Delta 0.5564 48 50 49 0.4589 11.2446 17.9446 0.9058 2,408.07 0.4144 4 2 3 0.6090 0.0526 3
7 Cross River 0.5510 51 56 54 0.5380 10.7340 16.8429 0.8574 1,720.18 0.3626 11 4 13 0.4726 0.0784 6
8 Ogun 0.5493 50 53 53 0.5222 9.8485 15.1824 0.7797 2,297.46 0.4072 5 3 5 0.5393 0.0100 -3
9 Rivers 0.5422 46 49 47 0.4272 11.3738 18.3619 0.9215 2,264.25 0.4049 6 3 23 0.3881 0.1541 14
10 Abia 0.5406 49 53 52 0.5063 11.0208 17.3137 0.8808 1,629.44 0.3543 12 2 10 0.4923 0.0483 0
11 Enugu 0.5405 49 53 52 0.5063 11.1715 17.5783 0.8936 1,573.48 0.3489 13 2 15 0.4366 0.1039 4
12 Edo 0.5299 46 48 50 0.4747 10.6874 16.5716 0.8486 1,798.07 0.3695 10 2 8 0.5087 0.0212 4
13 Imo 0.5182 50 52 53 0.5222 11.3759 18.1352 0.9159 1,079.72 0.2910 20 7 6 0.5200 0.0018 7
14 Osun 0.5123 52 55 52 0.5063 10.7262 16.7655 0.8551 1,225.47 0.3105 17 3 9 0.4938 0.0185 5
15 Kwara 0.5112 48 53 52 0.5063 9.1789 13.0040 0.6967 1,909.62 0.3787 8 7 17 0.4316 0.0796 2
16 Nasarawa 0.5063 45 51 50 0.4747 10.2699 14.7970 0.7861 1,561.87 0.3478 14 2 22 0.3983 0.1080 6
17 Ondo 0.5002 50 52 52 0.5063 10.9027 17.1099 0.8709 1,031.01 0.2839 22 5 11 0.4768 0.0234 6
18 Anambra 0.4709 47 50 48 0.4430 11.4198 18.2672 0.9210 859.73 0.2559 27 9 18 0.4281 0.0428 0
19 Plateau 0.4629 43 47 46 0.4114 9.7777 14.7554 0.7659 1,261.18 0.3149 16 3 21 0.3995 0.0634 2
20 Benue 0.4624 46 50 47 0.4272 10.1141 15.8003 0.8061 1,052.84 0.2871 21 1 20 0.4038 0.0586 0
21 Taraba 0.4613 48 51 47 0.4272 9.8251 14.2723 0.7551 1,177.98 0.3044 18 3 27 0.3315 0.1298 6
22 Kogi 0.4509 45 48 46 0.4114 10.7632 16.7890 0.8572 883.13 0.2600 26 4 19 0.4057 0.0452 3
23 Oyo 0.4401 51 55 51 0.4905 8.6150 13.3182 0.6830 851.34 0.2544 28 5 12 0.4765 0.0364 11
24 Ebonyi 0.4343 47 52 48 0.4430 9.9539 14.3740 0.7628 787.82 0.2425 30 6 26 0.3433 0.0910 2
25 Adamawa 0.4286 42 44 43 0.3639 8.6187 12.4528 0.6606 1,368.85 0.3275 15 10 25 0.3653 .0633 0
26 Kaduna 0.4043 43 48 45 0.3956 8.1201 12.4671 0.6416 885.36 0.2604 25 1 14 0.4432 0.0389 12
27 Gombe 0.4010 45 49 48 0.4430 6.4268 9.2733 0.4923 1,113.35 0.2957 19 8 31 0.2368 0.1642 4
28 Niger 0.3991 47 53 50 0.4747 6.4296 11.9763 0.5596 771.80 0.2393 31 3 28 0.3256 0.0735 0
29 Kebbi 0.3815 48 50 52 0.5063 4.5400 8.4711 0.3955 988.44 0.2774 23 6 33 0.2184 0.1631 4
30 Jigawa 0.3596 44 48 47 0.4272 4.7561 9.6106 0.4311 840.87 0.2525 29 1 35 0.1968 0.1628 5
31 Kano 0.3592 46 49 47 0.4272 5.6805 10.6397 0.4957 675.83 0.2189 32 1 24 0.3812 0.0220 7
32 Zamfara 0.3392 47 50 50 0.4747 4.8421 9.1213 0.4238 574.81 0.1939 34 2 30 0.2623 0.0769 2
33 Borno 0.3276 42 48 43 0.3639 7.6342 11.1041 0.5871 474.96 0.1646 35 2 34 0.2135 0.1141 1
34 Yobe 0.3249 42 46 44 0.3797 3.3827 7.8910 0.3295 967.26 0.2740 24 10 37 0.1247 0.2002 3
35 Bauchi 0.3238 45 49 45 0.3956 4.7611 8.8727 0.4145 626.28 0.2071 33 2 29 0.2636 0.0602 6
36 Katsina 0.3031 47 51 49 0.4589 4.9587 9.5791 0.4395 399.98 0.1381 37 1 32 0.2364 0.0667 4
37 Sokoto 0.2910 48 51 50 0.4747 4.0190 6.8091 0.3336 447.88 0.1555 36 1 36 0.1942 0.0968 1
National 0.5114 47 51 49 0.4589 9.9569 15.6743 0.7966 1,756.56 0.3659 0.5060 0.0054
Statistical Annexes
Annex 2: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)

Human Development Index Inequality Adjusted Human Change in
Life Expentancy (LE) Education Income IHDI
2016 Dev. Index (IHDI) 2016 IHDI
Inequality Ineq. Adj. 2016 HDI
Ineq. Adj. Inequality Ineq. Adj. Ineq. in Loss in
Rank States Value in Life Income Value Rank 2013 2013 - 2016 Rank - IHDI
LE Index in Edu. Edu. Index Income HDI
Exp. Index Rank
1 Lagos 0.6515 0.7760 0.3561 0.5362 0.5399 0.9925 0.5941 0.4852 1 0.5245 0.0393 0
2 FCT 0.6289 0.7847 0.3973 0.4617 0.3764 0.9926 0.5980 0.4472 2 0.2889 0.4577 0.0105 0
3 Bayelsa 0.5909 0.7790 0.3698 0.5059 0.4685 0.9868 0.4632 0.4313 3 0.2701 0.5577 0.1264 0
4 Akwa-Ibom 0.5642 0.7819 0.3835 0.5001 0.4527 0.9826 0.3975 0.4102 4 0.2730 0.4816 0.0714 0
5 Ekiti 0.5608 0.7874 0.4111 0.4943 0.4421 0.9804 0.3703 0.4068 5 0.2747 0.3725 0.0343 0
6 Delta 0.5564 0.7760 0.3561 0.5007 0.4535 0.9833 0.4075 0.4037 6 0.2744 0.5132 0.1095 0
7 Cross River 0.5510 0.7900 0.4250 0.4812 0.4126 0.9791 0.3551 0.3963 7 0.2807 0.3990 0.0027 0
8 Ogun 0.5493 0.7874 0.4111 0.4463 0.3480 0.9828 0.4002 0.3854 11 0.2984 0.4587 0.0733 3
9 Rivers 0.5422 0.7696 0.3288 0.5069 0.4672 0.9826 0.3979 0.3939 8 0.2735 0.3158 0.0781 1
10 Abia 0.5406 0.7847 0.3973 0.4905 0.4320 0.9783 0.3466 0.3904 10 0.2779 0.4238 0.0334 0
11 Enugu 0.5405 0.7847 0.3973 0.4954 0.4427 0.9778 0.3412 0.3915 9 0.2756 0.3622 0.0293 2
12 Edo 0.5299 0.7790 0.3698 0.4770 0.4048 0.9797 0.3620 0.3784 12 0.2860 0.4309 0.0525 0
13 Imo 0.5182 0.7874 0.4111 0.5043 0.4619 0.9715 0.2827 0.3772 13 0.2720 0.4346 0.0574 0
14 Osun 0.5123 0.7847 0.3973 0.4800 0.4105 0.9738 0.3023 0.3667 14 0.2842 0.4189 0.0522 0
15 Kwara 0.5112 0.7847 0.3973 0.3988 0.2778 0.9805 0.3713 0.3448 17 0.3255 0.3835 0.0387 2
16 Nasarawa 0.5063 0.7790 0.3698 0.4460 0.3506 0.9777 0.3400 0.3533 16 0.3022 0.3573 0.0040 0
17 Ondo 0.5002 0.7847 0.3973 0.4866 0.4238 0.9706 0.2755 0.3593 15 0.2817 0.4033 0.0440 2
18 Anambra 0.4709 0.7729 0.3424 0.5063 0.4663 0.9668 0.2474 0.3406 18 0.2768 0.3362 0.0044 0
19 Plateau 0.4629 0.7663 0.3153 0.4386 0.3359 0.9743 0.3068 0.3191 21 0.3107 0.3141 0.0050 2
20 Benue 0.4624 0.7696 0.3288 0.4592 0.3701 0.9710 0.2788 0.3237 19 0.2999 0.3265 0.0028 1
21 Taraba 0.4613 0.7696 0.3288 0.4314 0.3257 0.9731 0.2962 0.3166 22 0.3138 0.2900 0.0266 1
22 Kogi 0.4509 0.7663 0.3153 0.4808 0.4121 0.9674 0.2516 0.3197 20 0.2910 0.3326 0.0129 2
23 Oyo 0.4401 0.7819 0.3835 0.3954 0.2701 0.9666 0.2459 0.2942 24 0.3315 0.3864 0.0922 1
24 Ebonyi 0.4343 0.7729 0.3424 0.4349 0.3317 0.9648 0.2339 0.2984 23 0.3130 0.3000 0.0016 1
25 Adamawa 0.4286 0.7556 0.2750 0.3781 0.2498 0.9757 0.3195 0.2800 25 0.3468 0.3090 0.0290 0
26 Kaduna 0.4043 0.7629 0.3018 0.3692 0.2369 0.9675 0.2519 0.2621 26 0.3517 0.3473 0.0852 0
27 Gombe 0.4010 0.7729 0.3424 0.2433 0.1198 0.9721 0.2874 0.2276 28 0.4325 0.2095 0.0181 1
28 Niger 0.3991 0.7790 0.3698 0.3240 0.1813 0.9643 0.2308 0.2492 27 0.3756 0.2701 0.0209 1
29 Kebbi 0.3815 0.7847 0.3973 0.1482 0.0586 0.9698 0.2690 0.1843 32 0.5169 0.1876 0.0033 3
30 Jigawa 0.3596 0.7696 0.3288 0.2049 0.0883 0.9663 0.2440 0.1921 31 0.4659 0.1613 0.0308 1
31 Kano 0.3592 0.7696 0.3288 0.2677 0.1327 0.9610 0.2103 0.2094 29 0.4171 0.3018 0.0924 2
32 Zamfara 0.3392 0.7790 0.3698 0.1876 0.0795 0.9566 0.1855 0.1760 33 0.4810 0.2217 0.0457 1
33 Borno 0.3276 0.7556 0.2750 0.3276 0.1923 0.9507 0.1565 0.2023 30 0.3826 0.1744 0.0279 3
34 Yobe 0.3249 0.7593 0.2883 0.0708 0.0233 0.9693 0.2656 0.1213 36 0.6266 0.1063 0.0150 2
35 Bauchi 0.3238 0.7629 0.3018 0.1743 0.0722 0.9590 0.1987 0.1630 34 0.4967 0.2176 0.0546 1
36 Katsina 0.3031 0.7760 0.3561 0.2098 0.0922 0.9447 0.1305 0.1624 35 0.4642 0.1817 0.0193 1
37 Sokoto 0.2910 0.7790 0.3698 0.0344 0.0115 0.9488 0.1476 0.0855 37 0.7060 0.1561 0.0706 0
National 0.5114 0.7760 0.3561 0.4553 0.3627 0.9794 0.3583 0.3590 0.2980
Statistical Annexes
Annex 3: Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and its Components

Censored Headcount Ratio by State at K=26%
Component of MPI
Multi-dimensional Poverty
Health Education Standard of Living Unemployment (Adjusted Headcount
Index (MPI)
M0) by state
Type Incidence Intensity of
Child Year of School Lighte- Use of Cooking HDI HDI Rank -
Rank State Mpi (M0) Nutrition Sanitary of Assets Unemployed of Poverty Deprivation
Mortality Schooling Attendance ning Water Fuel Rank Mpi Rank
Floor (H) (A)
1 OSUN 0.062038 1.7 0.1 12.5 1 10.6 6.7 13.6 5.4 16.9 9.6 6.7 17.5 35.5 14 13
2 ANAMBRA 0.091454 0.7 0 8.4 2 7.3 9.7 12 1.9 24.3 7.8 20.5 25.4 36.1 18 16
3 LAGOS 0.1023 2.6 0.1 6 2.4 2.5 16.5 21.4 0.7 17.8 7.6 24.3 27.8 36.8 1 2
4 OGUN 0.115106 4.7 0.3 19.8 5.1 15.7 13.6 26.8 9.9 26.5 16.3 13 29.7 38.7 8 4
5 EKITI 0.115275 4.6 0.2 15.6 1.3 14.7 9.1 25.6 6.7 29.1 15.2 18.6 30.6 37.7 5 0
6 DELTA 0.117001 1.2 0.4 18.4 2.1 12 12.3 23.1 2 27.7 12.8 20.8 30.6 38.2 6 0
7 ONDO 0.120314 3.2 0.2 18.5 2.3 21.3 13.5 29 5.2 29.9 17.2 16.6 32.4 37.1 17 10
8 EDO 0.144214 3.1 0.6 19.6 4.7 9.8 12.5 20.5 6.2 35.6 19 26.4 37.6 38.3 12 4
9 OYO 0.152048 9.8 0 28.3 10.8 24.9 14.4 36.5 13.5 37.3 28.1 10.5 38.3 39.7 23 14
10 ENUGU 0.152061 2.9 0 17.5 1.7 15.7 22.6 26.7 5.2 37.5 16 29.1 39.7 38.2 11 1
C R O S S
11 0.159753 5.5 0.5 18.8 3.8 17.7 20.2 32.1 9.2 40.8 22.6 25.9 41.4 38.6 7 4
RIVER
12 KWARA 0.161384 2.8 1.2 32.5 10.8 21.6 2 35.3 11.2 40.2 20.5 16 40.8 39.5 15 3
13 ABIA 0.164706 0 0.4 14.3 3 13.6 9.5 16.3 6.4 43.1 16 39.6 44.4 37.1 10 3
14 IMO 0.164752 1.7 0.8 11.8 1.2 14.4 3.8 20.7 3.5 45.1 13.1 41.4 45.4 36.3 13 1
15 BENUE 0.165513 6.2 2 29.9 8.4 32.3 18.7 27.9 21.5 43.7 27.2 14.4 44 37.6 20 5
16 FCT 0.174368 3.4 1.1 29.3 8.8 24.8 25.1 36.3 11 39.7 17.9 22.7 43.5 40.1 2 14
17 KOGI 0.188412 1.9 1 27.9 4.8 24.6 22.9 35.8 6.7 46.1 20.8 31.4 47.3 39.9 22 5
18 ADAMAWA 0.202785 5.5 6.2 44.2 28.9 39.7 25.2 15.2 29 50 24.6 8.1 50 40.5 25 7
19 KADUNA 0.207843 4 4.3 41.1 19.8 29.3 13.8 26.6 13.5 48 19.9 23.4 50.4 41.3 26 7
20 RIVERS 0.222939 1.4 0.1 9.5 3.3 11.4 11.3 44.4 4.3 56.6 23.5 56.8 58.9 37.9 9 11
21 BAYELSA 0.227215 4.8 1.5 18.4 4 30.1 27.1 47.5 7.4 51.8 29.7 44.3 53.7 42.3 3 18
22 NASARAWA 0.237637 2.1 3.2 38.4 11.6 39.8 29.1 36.5 13.8 54.6 20.7 35 56.4 42.1 16 6
23 AKWA IBOM 0.244742 9.2 0.9 18.4 5.8 24.6 17.1 27.2 14.4 59.4 28.3 52.2 59.7 41 4 19
24 EBONYI 0.248383 10.2 0.3 43.6 5.7 53.6 28.5 55.3 28.7 58.9 37.7 25.7 58.9 42.2 24 0
25 NIGER 0.266353 6.3 7.1 59.4 42.3 38.3 28.8 43.5 14.3 63.8 30.1 12.5 64.4 41.4 28 3
26 TARABA 0.281892 2.7 5.1 63.1 22.2 73.2 60.5 45.6 45.3 73.7 41.9 9.5 73.8 38.2 21 5
27 PLATEAU 0.29196 8.9 4 48.8 16.5 50.2 35.4 45.9 25 66.3 36 34.6 66.7 43.8 19 8
28 KASTINA 0.312977 8.6 5.3 74.7 59.1 60.5 22 29.4 45.7 75.1 55.3 3.3 76.2 41.1 36 8
29 BORNO 0.314512 4.9 4.7 59.8 39 39.5 20.6 23.9 18.8 70.4 43.7 35.5 71.6 43.9 33 4
30 BAUCHI 0.314751 16.8 3 69.5 56.6 57.9 33.8 12.5 43.8 71.5 42.8 9.2 71.9 43.7 35 5
31 KANO 0.331384 15.1 4.5 64.3 49.9 48.1 33 16.8 47.9 70.4 38 23.3 71.1 46.6 31 0
32 ZAMFARA 0.337014 2.9 7.8 77.8 55.5 73.3 58.8 20.8 52.7 78.4 45.4 7.9 79.3 42.5 32 0
33 GOMBE 0.353391 18.1 4.6 72.9 60.3 57.5 52.3 17.5 55.7 77.2 55.3 10.8 77.6 45.6 27 6
34 KEBBI 0.354203 7.4 6 80.7 71 51.4 44.2 31.3 32.9 81.8 43.3 11.6 82.3 43 29 5
35 YOBE 0.38488 10.4 7 77.9 60.7 62.2 32.2 39.7 65.3 78.4 52.6 20.9 79.2 48.6 34 1
36 JIGAWA 0.399312 17.6 8 81.8 66.6 71.4 7.2 21.2 72.3 85.9 59.8 19.8 86.1 46.4 30 6
37 SOKOTO 0.452799 14.8 10.5 88.4 71.4 68.6 71 32.2 68.3 89.6 60.1 23.6 89.9 50.4 37 0
NATIONAL 6.6 2.8 39.6 23.8 33.2 23.3 27.4 22.7 52 28.8 22.4 53.7 41.9
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National Human

Development Report 2018

© Published by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2018,

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

The analysis and policy recommendation of the report do not necessarily

Report Summary, Conclusions and Key Messages xii

Technical Notes and Data Sources 74

To one and all, I say a big thank you.

FCT Federal Capital Tertiary

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HCD Human Capital Development

HDR Human Development Report

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IEDs improvised explosive devices

INEC Independent National Electoral Commission

IPOB Indigenous People of Biafra

LGAs Local Government Areas

MASSOB Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

NDPVF Niger Delta People Volunteer Force

NPE National Policy on Education

NYSC National Youth Service Corps

OPC Oduwa People’s Congress

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

WHO World Health Organisation

WIR World Investment Report

1. The Report Objectives 2. The NHDR’s Specific Focus on the

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016

Fig.1.3 Map of Nigeria Showing the Location of the North-East Region

1.3 The Historical and Political Background of the North East

1.4 Some Background to Each of the North-East States

Fig.1.5 Adamawa State showing the 21 LGAs

Fig.1.6 Bauchi State showing the 20 LGAs

Fig.1.8 Gombe State showing the 11 LGAs

Fig.1.9 Taraba State showing the 16 LGAs

Fig.1.10 Yobe State showing the 17 LGAs

1.6 Religious Contests and Anti-Western Influence in the

1.6.1 The Abiding Influence of the 19th Century ‘Jihad’

1.6.3 Rebellion Against Western Education and Influence

1.6.4 The Failed Promise of Western Education

1.6.5 The Colonial Principle of Indirect Rule and Religious Contest

1.6.6 The Effects of Latter-day Calls for a Universal Jihad

1.8 The Emergence of Boko Haram

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

2.2 Poverty, Deprivation and Low Human Development

Fig.2.3 Gini Coefficient Changes 2004 -2013

2.2.2 High Levels of Multiple Deprivation

Table 2.1: Household Size of Respondents

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.10 Under- and Unemployment by Age Group – Q3-2017

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.12 Under- and Unemployment by Place of Residence – Q3-2017:

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.13 Under-and Unemployment by Educational Attainment – Q3-2017