THE CANIBIUM MARITIMUM CONTRACT

ACCORDING TO THE GENOESE

NOTARIAL RECORDSOF THE
TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES
RAYMOND DE ROOVER
Brooklw~ (‘ollrge

The Genoese notarial records are one of the most important

sources perhaps the most important and certainly the most abundant
source-for the study of the roots of capitalism and the origins of
many business institutions. Around the turn of this century, some of
these records became available and were first utilized by German legal
and institutional historians, such as Levin Goldschmidt, Heinrich
Sieveking, and Adolf Schaube, to whom economic history perhaps
owes its existence as an independent discipline. Since the available
records were fragmentary and incomplete, it was inevitable that their
interpretation was sometimes incorrect and gave rise to the formula-
tion of hypotheses which were unsubstantiated by adequate evidence
and led to quite bitter controversies. Even now that nearly all the ex-
tant notarial records of the twelfth century and many of the following
century are available in print, although some progress has been made,
it would be rash to state that all problems have been solved.
The late Professor Eugene H. Byrne, realizing the historical
value of the Genoese records, had entire notarial cartularies photo-
graphed and formed a collection of photostats at the University of
Wisconsin. Not to be outdone, the Italians then created the collection
Doucumenti e studi per la storia del commercio e del diritto com-
merciale italiano under the editorship of Federico Patetta and Mario
Chiaudano. Several volumes were published, beginning with the
contracts of the earliest and most famous of the Genoese notaries, the
cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. When this undertaking ran into trouble
because the expected financial support was not forthcoming, Professor
Robert L. Reynolds took the laudable initiative of making arrange-
ments for continuing publication in collaboration with the R. Depu-
tazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria. As a result, the acts of several
16 Economy, Society, and Government In Medieval ttaly

more notaries were published. In the meantime, a Belgian scholar,

Madame Renee Doehaerd, began doing research in the Genoese ar-
chives and eventually published a selection of notarial contracts of
the thirteenth century under the auspices of the Academia Belgica
in Rome.
The present study is based mainly on this printed material. I have
also made use of the records of Amalric, a notary active in Marseilles
around 1248. No attempt has been made to consult any unpublished
sources, since there are so many good examples of cambium mariti-
mum in the published volumes. The purpose of this study is twofold.
The first intent is to show how the cambium maritimum, or the cam-
bium nauticum. contract differed from the sea loan, on the one hand,
and from the ordinary cambium, on the other hand. The second pur-
pose is to illustrate how the lender’s profit, since it was not stated
openly, was cleverly concealed in the exchange rate or rates, so that
the usurious character of the contract was not apparent at the first
glance. In the course of this demonstration an attempt will be made
to clarify the dispute of long standing between Levin Goldschmidt and
Adolf Schaube about the origins, the legal nature, and the economic
character of the exchange contract, because misunderstanding on
this point can only lead to hopeless confusion. In truth, this dispute
is part of a broader controversy which was not started by those two
German scholars but dates back to the time of the Genoese notaries,
when some rigorous theologians argued that the cambium was essen-
tially a loan, while others, more kindly disposed toward business,
held the view that it was a permutafio or a conversion of currencies.
Many Italians use the phrase cambio mariftimo rather loosely
by extending its meaning to cover any kind of sea loan including the
bottomry loan. This is not what I mean here. This study deals exclu-
sively with the cambium maritimum in a narrow and well defined
sense. Like the sea loan, or foenus nauticum, such a contract
always contained a conditional clause which made the repayment of a
loan contingent upon the safe arrival of a ship or of a cargo at the port
of destination. In addition to the credit risk, the lender therefore as-
sumed the sea risk, that is, the risk of losing any claim to repayment
of the loan if the goods or the ship pledged as security failed to reach
port safely because of an act of God, the fortunes of the sea, or the
assaults of men-of-war, such as enemies, corsairs, or pirates. This is
what was understood by the formula ad risicum et fortunam Dei,
maris et gentium.’
The cambium maritimum contract differed, however, from the
foenus nauticum or sea loan in one important respect: instead of being
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 17

repayable in the same currency upon safe return or arrival of a certain

ship or a certain cargo, the cambium maritimum always involved an
exchange transaction and was repayable not in the same, but in a dif-
ferent, currency, usually that circulating at the place of destination.
On the other hand, the cambium maritimum differed from an ordin-
ary cambium because implementation of the contract was conditional
and depended upon the fulfillment of an uncertain event: the safe
arrival of a ship or of its cargo.
Thecambium maritimum was thus a hybrid form of contract that
combined some of the features of the cambium and others of the sea
loan or foenus nauticum. Such a contract may be defined as a cov-
enant between a lender and a borrower by which the latter promised
to repay the former in a foreign port and in a foreign currency on con-
dition that a certain ship or the major part of its cargo made port.’ If
not, the borrower was freed from any further obligation. Usually the
contract did not stipulate how much the lender would earn by lending
his money and assuming a rather heavy risk. As we shall see, his profit
was determined by undervaluing the foreign currency in which the
loan was repayable.
Before going more deeply into the matter of the cambium mariti-
mum proper, let us have a look at the two contracts whose character-
istics were merged in it, and first at thefoenus nauticum or sea loan.
This is a very old contract whose origins date back to Greek and
Roman times.3 It is even likely that the Phoenicians knew this con-
tract. It was still very popular in the twelfth century and up to 1234
when it was branded as usurious in the famous decretal Naviganti,
promulgated in that year or earlier by Gregory IX.’ Many examples
of sea loans are found among the acts of John the Scribe or Giovanni
Scriba, the earliest of the Genoese notaries whose cartulary has come
down to us. A typical contract is the one dated August 6, 1156, by
which a merchant named Tado acknowledged receipt of six pounds,
Genoese currency, and promised to repay eight pounds one month
after the ship on which he was sailing to Alexandria had safely
returned to Genoa or after his own safe return, should he decide to
come back on another ship.5 This loan was apparently secured by
the goods which Tado carried to Alexandria and those which he in-
tended to purchase there and bring back to Genoa. In this period
most merchants were still peregrinators who accompanied their own
goods on sea or on land. According to the above figures, the lender
earned two pounds or 33Ys per cent for interest and risk-taking on a
round trip from Genoa to Alexandria that, it is true, might have lasted
several months.6 Nevertheless, this figure may seem high, and it is.
 18 Economy, Society, and Government In Medieval IralJ,

However, one should not forget that the twelfth century was a period
of rapid economic expansion, that capital was scarce, and that the
perils of the sea were still very real. On shorter trips from Genoa to
Provence or to Sicily, the rate was lower but still as high as 25 per
cent.’
AS the reader will notice, the profit made by the lender is stated
quite openly. Prior to 1234, it could still be argued that the sea loan
was not usurious, because the lender ran the risk of losing his capital
through disaster at sea; but the canon Naviganti altered the situation
by refusing to recognize perk&m sortis as a valid title to interest.
The promulgation of this decretal had therefore an adverse effect on
the popularity of the sea loan.R In so far as I am able to judge from the
Genoese records, its use declined in favor of the cambium maritimum
to which the ban did not extend.g It should, however, be emphasized
that the cambium maritimum contract did not owe its existence to
the tightening of the usury prohibition, since numerous examples are
found in the cartulary of John the Scribe, long before the appearance
of the Exfravagantes. the collection of canons issued by Gregory IX
(l234).‘O The early medieval sea loan usually applied to a round trip,
for example the successful completion of a voyage to Alexandria
and back to Genoa (navi sana eunfe Alexandriam et inde redeunte).”
The cambium maritimum contract, on the other hand, usually ap-
plied only to an outbound or an inbound voyage, seldom to a round
trip. Moreover, the use of this contract presupposed a more sophisti-
cated organization of foreign trade, since the lender needed to have a
representative abroad to transact his business, unless he travelled on
the same ship as the borrower.
Ordinary cambium contracts occur less frequently in the Genoese
notarial records than sea loans and then only with reference to the
fairs of Champagne or inland towns, such as Milan or Pavia, excep-
tionally in connection with Pisa. Levin Goldschmidt, around 1900 the
most prominent German specialist on the history of commercial law,
saw in the cambium contract only a transfer instrument to effect inter-
national settlements.” His thesis was promptly challenged by Adolf
Schaube, who pointed out that such a contract could also be used to
cover up a loan and to grant credit.13 Since Adolf Schaube was only a
simple Gymnasiallehrer (high school teacher) in Brieg (Silesia), his
boldness created quite a scandal in Wilhelminian Germany where
hierarchy was so strictly observed not only in the army but in all
fields. How did such an unimportant pedagogue dare question the
opinions of Professor L. Goldschmidt of the University of Berlin,
 The Cambium Mari!imum Contract 19

author of the celebrated Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts and

editor of the Zeitschri’t fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht, called Gold-
Schmidt’s Zeitschrijt, even sometimes in reference notes?‘” This
was inadmissible. Nonetheless, Schaube was right and Goldschmidt
wrong. Of the two, Schaube was the better historian whose strong
point was that he read documents with meticulous care and did not
allow himself to be influenced by preconceived legal theories.
Despite evidence to the contrary, Goldschmidt was firmly con-
vinced that the usury doctrine of the Church did not affect business
practices and was simply disregarded.‘” He refused to admit that,
since usurious contracts were invalid at law, the merchants were com-
pelled to resort to subterfuges in order to conceal, more or less suc-
cessfully, the true character of their credit operations--if possible,
in a manner approved by the theologians. The cambium contract of-
fered the merchants such a possibility and they did not fail to seize this
golden opportunity.
Here is the text of a typical exchange contract taken from the
cartulary of the Genoese notary Giovanni di Guiberto (1200- I21 I):
Petrus Pixis of Pavia acknowledges that he has received in loan
[mutuo] from Bergonzo Ruba. also of Pavia, 9 pounds, Genoese cur-
rency, and promises to pay him and Johannes, his partner, or one of
them, or the certain attorney of either one of them [vel cerfo miss0
alrerius eorum], 14 pounds 5 sol., Pavese currency, in Pavia at the
coming feast of All Saints. And if he (Petrus] does not carry this out,
he promises to indemnify them for all expenses, damages and interest
which they might incur after the said term in connection with the
collection of the said debt, and they are to be given credence on their
word without oath. And in security he obligates all his property, pres-
ent and future. Witnesses: Benzo Guastoni and Jacob of Como, both
of Pavia. Done in Genoa under the Bakers’ Gallery on September 25,
1203.1”

As is clear from the text of this contract, a debtor confessed that

he had received nine pounds in Genoese currency on September 25,
1203, and promised to repay the equivalent, I4 pounds 5 sol., in
Pavese currency on the coming first of November. This contract
consequently involved a conversion of Genoese currency into Pavese
currency as well as a loan, since money borrowed on September 2.5
in Genoa was repayable about five weeks later in Pavia. According to
the figures given, the exchange rate was 19 denarii, Pavese currency,
for one sou or shilling Genoese. No interest was explicitly stipu-
lated, but it was presumably hidden by estimating the Pavese cur-
rency below its real value, say 19 den. per sou instead of 18 den. or
20 Economy. Society, and Government In Medieval Italy

18X? den. per sou, although this is merely a guess, since the contract
does not give this information.
The above contract is one among many similar ones and may
safely be regarded as typical.” If so, a cambium may be defined as a
contract involving an advance of funds in one place and its repayment
in another place at a later date and in a different currency. By denni-
tion, such a contract involved both an exchange transaction and a
credit transaction which were so closely interlocked that they
could not be separated.
In this connection, L. Goldschmidt made several mistakes. First
of all, he called such a contract an Eigenwechsel. which is the German
term for promissory note.18 It is true that the contract took the form
of a promise to pay, since the bill of exchange in draft form was not
yet in use.” Nevertheless, Goldschmidt used terminology that is not
only wrong but positively misleading. The Latin expression found in
contemporary documents is instrumentum ex causa cambii. which
may be rendered in English as an exchange contract in notarial form.2”
Instead of being an informal note, the above contract is a deed written
in the verbose style of the medieval notaries.
Second, the primary purpose of a cambium contract, Goldschmidt
contended, was to transfer funds from one place to another place.*’
This might, or might not, be so: all depended on the intentions of
the contracting parties in each particular case, and notarial contracts
usually do not reveal intentions. In any case, the exchange contract
might serve the purpose either of transferring funds or of granting
credit. It was even possible to cancel a first exchange transaction by
re-exchange in the opposite direction, as it is possible today to con-
vert dollars into English pounds and then to reconvert those pounds
into dollars. Such exchange and re-exchange transactions could easily
lead to abuse and be transformed into a device for concealing a loan,
pure and simple, as in the case of dry exchange and fictitious
exchange.22
Last, Goldschmidt advanced the opinion that in the cambium
maritimum the lender received a premium for assuming the sea risk,
but that in the ordinary cambium it was the Wechselgeber. that is,
the borrower or the seller of a draft, who collected a commission
supposedly as a reward for shipping specie or making it available in a
distant place.23 Goldschmidt was right about the cambium mariti-
mum, although he failed to explain exactly how the lender earned his
premium or compensation for risk. With regard to the ordinary
cambium, Goldschmidt’s theory applied only to the special case of
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 21

bankers who sold letters of credit to travelers going abroad. The same
is still true today: the American Express Company charges a com-
mission when issuing travelers’ checks payable by its agencies in
other countries. In the normal course of business, however, it was not
the Wechselgeber (the debtor) but the Wechselnehmer. the creditor
or the buyer of a foreign draft, who gained at the expense of the
seller.24 In reality there was no difference between the ordinary cam-
bium and the cambium maritimum in this respect: in both cases, the
lender’s profit was adroitly concealed in the exchange rate by placing
a higher value on the local than on the foreign currency or, as the
medieval theologians put it, by estimating present money more than
absent money.25 The only difference is that, in the case of cambium
maritimum, the margin of profit was even greater because an insur-
ance premium was added to interest.
Goldschmidt’s theory was promptly challenged by Schaube, who
used ingenious ways to prove that the remitter, or Wechselnehmer.
far from paying a commission to the Wechselgeber, earned interest
by accommodating some one who needed local currency but who had,
or expected to have, funds available abroad.26 The remitter, in one
of the cases cited by Schaube, happened to be the Venetian bailo of
Trebizond who, in 1320, had a surplus of funds to remit to his gov-
ernment. According to the records, he concluded for this purpose an
exchange contract with merchants and disbursed 1958 pounds 4 sol.
3 den. ad grossos for a promise to pay 2164 pounds 14 sol. thus
making a profit of nearly 9 per cent for the Venetian government.
Circumstantial evidence shows definitely that the bailo’s primary
purpose was to remit to Venice without running the risk and the ex-
pense of shipping specie (salvos in terra sine pericufo), whereas the
other party viewed the transaction in a different light, as a means
of financing a business venture with borrowed funds.27 This confirms
what has been said before about the dual character and the dual pur-
pose of exchange transactions.
Recently published documents fully corroborate the correctness
of Schaube’s viewpoint. One of the most convincing proofs is af-
forded by a contract dated October 31, 1252, according to which
Roffredo Bramanzoni, the representative in Genoa of the powerful
Sienese banking house of the Bonsignori, acknowledged in his own
name and that of his partners that he had received 1416 pounds 13 sol.
4 den., Genoese currency, from Gherardo Oltramare and promised
to repay the equivalent, 1000 pounds of Provins, at the forthcoming
fair of Troyes ad rectum pagamentum. on December 3, 1252. How-
22 Economy, Society, and Government In Medieval Italy

ever, if this payment should not take place, then the loan was repay-
able in Genoa at the rate of 19 den., Genoese currency, per sou of
Provins not later than the feast of the Purification of the Virgin (Feb-
ruary 2, 1253).‘8 This is consequently a contract involving exchange
(from Genoa to Champagne) and re-exchange (from Champagne to
Genoa). Such contracts later came to be known as dry exchange and,
not entirely without reason, aroused the suspicions of the theologians.
Of course, the contract does not disclose what the contracting
parties intended to do, whether or not to make a settlement at the
fairs of Champagne. Let us suppose the borrower decided to take
advantage of the option to repay in Genoa on the feast of the Purifi-
cation of the Virgin. In that case, a simple computation will show that
the borrower lost and the lender gained 2 den. per sou of Provins,
since the 1000 pounds were borrowed in Genoa at the rate of 17 den.
per sou and were repayable three months later at I9 den. per SOU.‘~
This difference presumably represented interest and was obtained by
the simple process of undervaluing the French currency in Genoa and
overvaluing it at the fairs of Champagne. What further proof
is needed to establish the fact that interest was concealed in the rate
of exchange?
Even more conclusive evidence is found in another contract which
is most interesting because it anticipates future developments in the
money market. Its date is uncertain: either April 3, 1201 or 1203. Ac-
cording to this contract a certain Manfredus de Galaneo recognized
that he had borrowed an unspecified amount of Genoese currency
from Beltranus Bertaldus, banker, and promised to repay 6 pounds of
Provins at the forthcoming May fair of Provins and, if he failed to do
this, he was bound to give 16 den. Genoese per sou of Provins cur-
rency upon the return to Genoa of the merchants who had attended
the said fair (reditu proximo ipsiusferie).30 Should he still be unable
to pay off the loan, then it might be renewed from fair to fair at the
exchange rate of 13 den. of Provins per sou and at the rechange rate
of I6 den. In other words, Manfredus de Galaneo would be paying 3
den. interest for each extension, As there were six fairs a year, interest
charges reached the fantastically high rate of I35 per cent per
annum.31 This was clearly a usurious deal and the banker, Beltranus
Bertaldus, was little better than a loan shark.32 Especially noteworthy
about this contract is the fact that it foreshadows the cambi con con-
tinuazioni that became so popular during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries in the business of the famous fairs of Besancon. It
is no wonder that such exchanges were frowned upon by the theolo-
gians as fictitious and branded by them as disguised loans at usury.
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 23

As a matter of fact, a cambium maritimum differed little from

an ordinary cambium -except for the conditional clause that made re-
payment depend upon the fortunate outcome of a sea voyage. Being
conditional, the cam&m maritimum was rarely, if ever, used for
the purpose of remitting funds to another country. It was usually a fa-
qade to cover up a loan by concealing interest as well as an insurance
premium in the exchange rate. Without more information about the
state of the money market, it is quite impossible to figure out the
lender’s profit from the data given in the contract itself, unless the
latter involved exchange and rechange, which it rarely did -al-
though there are a few cases on record.
This happens to be true of the earliest contract recorded by
Giovanni Scriba. Its date is June 8, 1156, and it relates to a loan of
115 pounds Genoese in exchange for which a company of merchai;ts,
acting jointly, promised to pay 460 perpers one month after reaching
safely the court of the Byzantine Emperor, either in Constantinople or
wherever he would be holding court. The creditor was promised an
additional 40 perpers if he accompanied the debtors to the Em-
peror’s court. If the debtors did not visit the court, they would still
owe 500 perpers and promised to pay them before All Saints (Nov-
ember I, 1 l56), presumably in Constantinople. Finally, if the borrow-
ers were remiss in carrying out any of these promises, they were
bound to pay IO sol. per perper in Genoa without risk (sinepericulo)
by August I, 1157.“” Disregarding the additional 40 perpers due to
the lender if he performed certain services, it is clear from the
contract that perpers borrowed at the exchange rate of 5 sol. per per-
per were repayable at the rate of IO sol. yielding to the lender a profit
of exactly 100 percent on the exchange from Genoa to Constantin-
ople and the rechange from Constantinople to Genoa.
This profit is exceptionally high, about thrice the normal return
on sea loans in times of peace.“? This raises the suspicion that the
above contract refers to an abnormal situation due to the interference
of political events. This is actually the case. In 1156 the Greek emper-
or, Manuel I Comnenes (reigned 1143 IlgO), was seeking support
from the Genoese republic in his struggle against William I (1154-
1166) the Norman king of Sicily, offering as bait an extension of trade
privileges and a reduction of customs duties.“” The Genoese actually
dispatched three galleys to Constantinople but were hesitant to com-
mit themselves further. These must be the galleys mentioned in the
contract which also casually refers to soldiers traveling on them. At
any rate, the unusually high profit must be concomitant with an
unusually high risk. From the point of view of this study, the main
24 Economy, Society. and Government In Medieval Italy

point of interest is the way in which this profit was determined by

manipulating the exchange rates and setting arbitrary values on the
Byzantine perper. At par this coin was worth about 7 sol. 6 den.,
Genoese currency, or about 2.7 perpers to a Genoese pound. Yet
the contract under discussion rated the perper below its value (5 sol.)
when it was lent out and above its value when it was repayable (10
sol.).
A more normal and less puzzling contract, also found in the cartul-
ary of Giovanni Scriba, is a cambium maritimum dated July 19,
1 157.36 According to its provisions, Amico de Mirta and his spouse,
Alda, acknowledged having received 100 pounds Genoese and prom-
ised to pay 3 perpers per pound, or 300 perpers in all, in Constantino-
ple before Carnival, upon condition that Ruffino’s ship and the major
part of the specie it carried (vel maiori parte pecunie que in ea por-
fat) arrived safely at destination. However, if this payment did not
take place, the debtors were expected to repay the creditor, a certain
Guglielmo de Candida, at the rate of 9 sol. 6 den. Genoese per perper
one month after the safe return of the ship on which Amico de
Mirta and the said Guglielmo chose to come back to Genoa. Appar-
ently both debtor and creditor intended to make a trip to Constan-
tinople and to travel on the same ship.“’ Using the data given in the
contract, I figure that it called for the repayment in Genoa of 142
pounds IO sol., Genoese currency, which corresponds exactly to a
profit of 42.5 per cent. This is less exorbitant than the preceding con-
tract but still well above normal.
Most likely, this anomaly is due to the fact that trade and poli-
tical relations between Genoa and the Byzantine Empire were still
uncertain. Amico de Mirta, other sources reveal, was actually sent as
an ambassador to Constantinople to negotiate a settlement.38 His
mission was a failure, because the Republic of Genoa had concluded
a treaty of non-intervention with the King of Sicily in January 1157,
and the disappointed Greek Emperor was not going to make con-
cessions without obtaining in return some tangible aid against his
enemy.
At this time trade relations between Genoa and Sicily or be-
tween Genoa and Syria were much more active than with Constan-
tinople where the Pisans still occupied a well entrenched position and
hampered Genoese efforts to gain a firmer foothold. The cartularies
of the Genoese notaries contain quite a number of contracts (partner-
ships, commendas, and sea loans) concluded for the trade with
Sicily where the Genoese sold mainly “French” cloth and made re-
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 2s

turns in wheat. The cambium maritimum contract was also used as a

method to finance this trade. Here is a literal translation of such a
contract enacted by the Genoese notary Lanfranco:
I, Henglesius, draper, acknowledge that I have received as a loan
[mutuo] from you, Gisulfo, 55 pounds, Genoese currency. Renounc-
ing all exceptions, I promise that either I or my representative will
pay in Sicily to you or your certain attorney 25 ounces of gold of old
tari according to the weight of Messina, free from duties and any ex-
penses or charges, upon safe arrival of the ship on which you are sail-
ing or most of the cargo of the said ship. For this purpose, I pledge
to you the security that you acknowledge to have in your possession,
namely a bale containing five capes of Montreuil and one piece of
blue Stamford cloth. This pledge is entrusted to you to be carried to
the said country [of Sicily] and to be sold there in the presence of
witnesses in discharge of the said debt, and if there is a deficiency
after deducting the proceeds of the goods pledged as security, I promise
to pay you 65 sol., Genoese currency, for each unpaid ounce, one
month after your return to Genoa upon safe arrival of the ship on
which you and the witnesses decide to return or upon safe arrival of
the major part of this vessel’s cargo. If I fail to do this, I bind myself
and all my property, with penalty of twice the amount due, etc. And
you promise me to invest in merchandise any surplus [above the
amount of the loan], to bring it back to Genoa at my risk, and to
hand it over to me. Enacted in Genoa on September 21, 1210.38

The surprising feature of this contract is that the debtor stayed

at home in Genoa and that the creditor accompanied the goods that
were pledged to him as security. Moreover, they were not only
entrusted to his ca.re but he was in charge of selling them at the best
price obtainable. Therefore he was entitled to a commission as a
selling agent, in addition to interest for paying in advance, and to a
premium for assuming the sea risk. This contract is consequently
more than a loan; besides involving a cambium it embodies some traits
of a partnership agreement.
As in preceding cambium contracts, the lender’s profit was de-
termined by manipulating the exchange rate of the foreign currency.
In this period, the Sicilian ounce of 30 tari was worth about 50 sol. or
2% pounds, Genoese currency, but the contract valued it at 44 sol.
when borrowed and at 65 sol. when repayable. There was conse-
quently a margin of 21 sol. which corresponds to nearly 48 per cent of
the principal. This is far above the normal rate of 25 per cent
charged on ordinary sea loans according to many examples in the
Genoese notarial records.40 Since the contracting parties certainly
would not ship goods to Sicily if they did not intend to sell them
26 Econom,v, Society, and Government In Medieval Ital)

there, the provision about repaying the loan or rather part of it in

Genoa was introduced only as a penalty clause that was not expected
to enter into play unless something went seriously wrong.
The cartulary of the notary Lanfranco contains a similar contract,
dated September 18, 1210, involving a cctmbium maritimum of only
8 pounds 8 sol. Genoese currency, or four Sicilian ounces, secured
by twenty pieces of fustian?’ This corresponds to a rate of 42 sol. per
ounce repayable at the rate of 60 sol. in Genoa, if the sale of the
fustians failed to cover the loan, which was not expected to happen.
The difference of I8 sol. between the two rates represents 43 per cent,
not much less than the preceding contract.
The terms of a third contract were much more favorable to the
borrower than those of the other two by giving him the benefit of a
high exchange rate in converting the Genoese pounds into Sicilian
ounces. In this case, the loan amounted to 75 pounds, Genoese cur-
rency, equivalent in Sicily to 30 ounces.42 Simple arithmetic will
show that this equation is based on a rate of 50 sol. per ounce. Settle-
ment of any unpaid balance was to take place in Genoa at the rate of
60 sol., a difference of only 20 percent against 40 percent in the other
two cases. The debtor received the same favorable treatment in still
another contract enacted by the notary Cassinese in 1192. It relates to
a loan of 800 pounds which called for the payment of 410 ounces in
Sicily, that is, at the rate of 39 sol. an ounce.‘” An unpaid portion
was repayable in Genoa at the rate of 50 sol. per ounce, which would
be a difference of only 28 per cent. This document is unfortunately
unreliable because the reading of the figure “50” is uncertain. Why
there existed these discrepancies is hard to explain without knowing
the circumstances attending each case or the conditions prevailing
in the money market at a given time.
The notarial records by their very nature give little information
about the state of the money market, although such an organization
was emerging in important trading centers, such as Genoa, Mar-
seilles, and Siena, and at the fairs of Champagne. Certainly different
rates were quoted according to whether the foreign currency was pay-
able salvos in terra or subject to sea risk. It is, however, difficult to se-
cure positive evidence. Nevertheless, I was able to find some infor-
mation among the records of the notary Amalric of Marseilles.
On April 14, 1248, some one borrowed 100 sol., or 5 pounds mixed
money current in Marseilles, and promised to repay 4 pounds Gen-
oese currency, in Genoa eight days after the safe arrival of the bor-
rower’s ship named “Bonaventure.““4 According to these data, the
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 27

exchange rate was 15 den. currency of Marseilles, for 12 den. or

one sou Genoese currency. Four days later, on April 18, the same
notary drew up another contract, also ex causa permutacionis seu
cambii. involving a straight cambium of 130 pounds Marseilles cur-
rency, equal to 100 pounds Genoese currency, repayable in Genoa
salvos in terra, that is, unconditionally without risk, on May 1.45 On
this latter transaction the rate was consequently 15N den. of Marseilles
for 12 den. or one Genoese sou. If one assumes that,during the four
days from April 14 to April 18, there was no major change in the con-
ditions of the money market-which is most likely--there was a dif-
ference of three-fifths of a denier between the rate salvos in terra
and the rate on a cambium maritimum including the sea risk. This
corresponds exactly to a premium of 4 per cent to cover the perils of
the sea. This would be excessive today for the short voyage from
Marseilles to Genoa, but was quite normal in the thirteenth century
when navigation was still surrounded by many dangers.
In their excellent collection of commercial documents, Robert S.
Lopez and Irving W. Raymond publish a Genoese exchange con-
tract which they label somewhat facetiously “Dry” Sea Exchange.46
I hate to disagree with the authors, whose work I greatly esteem,
although they must have known that their label is somewhat con-
tradictory and that the sea far from being dry is a watery expanse.
The contract, it is true, mentions Benedetto Zaccaria, a Genoese
admiral in the service of the Byzantine Empire, who is one of the
contracting parties. Nevertheless, it does not mention the sea risk and
is strictly dry, since it refers to exchange from Genoa to Constantino-
ple and rechange from Constantinople to Genoa. It has, however, the
interesting feature that it does not reveal how much the borrower
actually received and states only that he borrowed an unspecified sum
in Genoese currency (tot denarios Januinos). Without this vital infor-
mation, it is impossible to figure out how onerous this loan was. The
appearance of this formula indicates, however, the growing impact
of the Church’s usury doctrine.
The actual influence of the Church’s attitude in the matter of
usury has been another bone of contention among economic histor-
ians. Some, who question Max Weber’s thesis, go even so far as to
deny that it had any effect at all. The Genoese records seem to indi-
cate, however, that the teachings of the Church in economic matters
did not remain without some repercussion on business practices. The
thirteenth century was a great century of intellectual ferment and the
codification of the canon law brought forth attempts to enforce its reg-
28 Economy, Society, and Government In Medieval Italy

ulations and to apply its provisions to the matter of contracts. It is

within this framework, de contractibus. that economic questions
were considered. It is not surprising that the new contracts that were
gaining ground in the bustling sea ports and in particular in Genoa
came under the scrutiny of the canonists and of the theologians. The
canon In civitate tua condemning credit sales at increased prices is an
excerpt from a letter addressed by the Pope to the Archbishop of
Genoa (1213) and the famous Naviganti is directly aimed at the sea
loan and at similar deals concluded in the trade with the fairs of
Champagne.47
The effect of the usury doctrine is perceptible in a subtle change in
the terminology used in the Genoese records. In Giovanni Scriba’s
cartulary and in the earlier notaries, the word mutuum is commonly
found in connection with straight loans as well as with other con-
tracts.48 This was a dangerous word to use, because it had the same
effect on canonists and theologians as the waving of a red banner in
front of a bull. A mufuum was always usurious, if it ceased to be gra-
tuitous (gratis et amore). It is amazing that the canon Naviganti was
not stretched to outlaw the cambium contract as well. The canonists,
for example Geoffrey of Trani (d. 1245) Henry of Susa, Cardinal
Hostiensis (d. 1271) and Monaldus Justinopolitanus (d. 1288) were
already moving in this direction by defining the cambium as a dis-
guised loan, especially if the lender intended to make a profit by buy-
ing for cash a foreign currency payable at the fairs or in another place
at a future date.4g
To counter this undesirable development, the Genoese notaries
began gradually to drop the objectionable word mu&urn and to
adopt more innocuous formulas such as nomine cambii or nomine
vendifionis.50 The Marseilles notary Almaric favored the formula ex
causa permutacionis seu cambii. Often the amount borrowed is not
specified and the contract states only that the borrower received an
undetermined amount of Genoese pennies (tot januinos).” Even if full
information was given, the contract was drafted in such a way that
one often needs paper and pencil in order to figure out how the lend-
er’s profit was determined. This was presumably done to befuddle
the theologians.
It was Alexander Lombard, or Alexander of Alexandria, O.F.M.
(d. 1314), who saved the situation by arguing in his Treatise on
Usury that the Church condemned usurers but protected exchangers
and that, moreover, a cambium was not a mutuum but a permutatio
pecunie which was not usurious, if there was the least doubt about the
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 29

future course of the exchange rate.52 By making this qualifica-

tion, he opened the door to a flood of evasions. Since his doctrine
was accepted from then onward by all the leading theologians, it
had the important consequence that banking activities could hence-
forth be carried on under the cloak of exchange. Alexander Lombard
was certainly well informed about Genoese business practices and
his treatise was most probably composed in connection with a quodli-
betic debate held in Genoa in 1306 or 1307, in which the whole
matter of licit and illicit contracts came up for discussion.53 It was
the start of a heated controversy which, originating in the type of
contracts drafted by the Genoese notaries of the period of the Cru-
sades, was to last until well into the eighteenth century. One may even
say that it is still going on today and stirring up conflicts among
historians interested in the development of banking, the origins of
credit instruments, and scholastic economic doctrines, not to mention
the supporters and the opponents of the Max Weber thesis.

NOTES

1. Enrico Besta, Le obbligazioni nella storia de! diritto italiano (Padua,

1937) p. 234.
2. Ibid., p. 235. Besta is one of the few legal historians who distinguishes
clearly between afoenus nauticum and a cambium maritimum.
3. Ugo Enrico Paoli, “Prestito a cambio marittimo,” Nuovo Digest0
Italian0 (Turin, 1939); George M. Calhoun, “Risk in Sea Loans in Ancient
Athens,” Journal of-Economic and Business History, II (1930). 561-84. Note
the title of Paoli’s article, which deals with sea loans, not with cambium
maritimum as defined above.
4. Corpus juris canonici, Decretales: canon Naviganti, Extravagantes
Gregory IX, V, 19, 19.
5. I1 cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, eds. Mario Chiaudano and Mattia
Moresco (Turin, 1935), I, 56, No. 104.
6. An additional clause of the contract stipulated that, should Tado
decide to stay in Egypt longer than usual, the loan became due nevertheless
in the summer of 1157, if most of the Genoese fleet returned safely from
Alexandria.
7. Ibid., p, 116, No. 218; p. 130, Nos. 239, 240; p. 319, No. 588, and
passim. To Tunis the standard rate was 33% per cent, the same as to Alexan-
dria.
8. This is the opinion of Riniero Zeno, Storia de1 diritto marittimo
nel Mediterraneo (Catania, 1915). pp. 160-161. It is not shared by Calvin
B. Hoover, “The Sea Loan in Genoa in the Twelfth Century,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, XL (1926), 495-529.
9. Florence Edler de Roover, “Early Examples of Marine Insurance,”
Journal of Economic History, V (1945). 175576.
 IO. The influence of Naviganri on the development of the c~amhium
mirritimunr contract is rather overstressed by Adolf Schaube, “Der Ver-
sicherungzgedanke in den Vertrggen de> Seeverkehrs vor der Entstehung
des Versicherungswesens,” Zeitschrif’t jiir Sociul- und Wirr.cchaft.sge.cchic,h[e,
II (1894), 176 77. However, Schaube ih not entirely wrong. He is certainly
right in criticizing L. Goldschmidt for seeing in the carnbiunz maritimum ;i
Remitrierungsge.schiif’t, or a transfer-of-funds device. See L. Goldschmidt,
Universulgeschirhre de.s Hondel.srechrs, I (Stuttgart, 1891), 354. Only one
volume published.
I I. C‘arrolare di Giovanni Scriha. p. 56, No. 104.
12. In German: “Es ist ein RimessengeschEft.” (Universalge.schichre,
pp. 403-408). Even if the granting of credit may be involved, the primary
purpose of c,ambium was to transfer funds (Geldzu~~ei.sung). For a discus-
sion of Goldschmidt’s views, see And&E. Sayous, “L’histoire universelle
de L&in Goldschmidt et les mithodes commerciales des pays chr&iens de
la MCditerranPe aux XII’ et XIII’ si&les.” Annales de Droit commerciai
jrancais, 6tranger et international. XL (193 I), 199 217 and 309~-22. On p.
205 the author makes the following statement: “Le renom de I’auteur
(Goldschmidt) en impose aux itudiants et aux Amkricains au point d’aider
h la propagation d’erreurs.” This is a dart aimed at the “Wisconsin School.”
13. Especially in his article, “Studien zur Geschichte und Natur des
:;lltesten Cambiums.” Jahrhiicher fiir Narionalijhorlomie und Statislih,
LXV (1895). I53 91 and 51 I 34.
14. To the great annoyance of American students who do not find
Goldschmidt’s Zeir.cchrifr, Hildebrand’s Jahrhiicher. or Schmoller’s Jahr-
huch in any library catalogue.
15. Ciniver.salge.schichte, pp. 140~ 141, esp. n. 168. Goldschmidt criti-
cized Wilhelm Endemann sharply for stressing the persistent influence of
the usury doctrine in general and, especially, in connection with the early
development of marine insurance. For a rebuff of Goldschmidt on this
point, see Richard Ehrenberg, Das Zeitalterder Fugger (Jena, 1922), I, 32n.
16. Giovunni di Guiherto (1200 l-7/1/, eds. M. W. Hall-Cole et al.
(Turin, 1939), I. 409. No. 8X2.
17. Other examples in Goldschmidt, Universalges~hichte, pp. 420-427.
These examples are not all taken from the Genoese records.
18. Ibid., pp. 418 419. More precisely Goldschmidt used the term
“domizilirter Eigenwechsel.”
19. For the transition from the insfrumentum ex cause cambii to the
bill of exchange, an important document is a contract dated February 26,
1253, and published by Roberto S. Lopez, La primu crisi della Banca di
Geneva, /250&/2SY (Milan, 1956), p. 153, No. 98. This is a notarial contract
already drafted in the form of a letter missive addressed by the drawer to
the drawee.
20. On this whole question consult also Raymond de Roover, L’kh-
lion de la lerrre de change, XIV~XVIIle.si&-les (Paris, 19.53), ch. I, esp. pp.
29m 3 I.
21. tiniversulgeschichre, p. 403. Cf. Schaube, “Studien,” p. 156, and
R. de Roover, L’Pvolution, pp. I2 -13.
 The Cambium Mwitimum Contract 31

22. On this whole question of the bill of exchange there has been a long
and tortuous controversy, extending over the past seventy-five years and
involving W. Endemann, L. Goldschmidt, Adolf Schaube, Carl Freundt,
Andre-E. Sayous, A. P. Usher, and others. Although some points are now
well established and generally accepted, differences of opinion persist and the
quarrel is still smoldering. For bibliography, consult R. de Roover, L’hvo-
lution, pp. 161~170. An up-to-date Spanish edition of this book is in pre-
paration.
23. Universalgeschichte, p. 415.
24. The use of these terms by Goldschmidt has created endless con-
fusion, since foreigners have even given them the reverse of their real
meaning. I am therefore giving here the equivalents in several languages
in the vain hope of avoiding further misunderstanding:
Wechselnehmer= Valutageber= remitter= buyer of a draft = bailieur de
fonds=datore=remittente.
Wechselgeber= Valuranehmer=drawer=seller of a draft=borrower=
lireur=prenditore (old meaning)? traente.
In the Middle Ages, prenditore always referred to the drawer, not to the
beneficiary, of a bill of exchange.
25. John T. Noonan Jr., The Scholastic Analysis oj Usury (Cambridge,
Mass., 1957) pp. 317-327.
26. Adolf Schaube, “Studien.” op. cir., pp. 153-191, 51 l-534.
27. Ibid., pp. l54- 155.
28. The text of this contract is published by RenCe Doehaerd, Les
relations commerciales entre G&es. la Beigique et I’Oufremont (Rome,
1941), II, 418-419, No. 775. Cf. ibid., pp. 419-420, No. 7’76 for another con-
tract of the same kind between the same parties. The contract is discussed
in R. de Roover, L’hvolution, pp. 32-33.
29. The computations are as follows:
Pounds Sol. Den. Genoese
Amount repayable in Genoa
1000 pounds of Provins
or 20,000 sous at 19 den.
per sou. . . . . . 1583 6 8
Deduct: amount borrowed
1000 pounds or 20,000
sous at 17 den. per sou. 1416 13 4
Profit: 2 den. per sou or
40,000 den. . . , . . 166 13 4
30. Doehaerd, Relations, II, 63, No. 131. Cf. ibid., p. 57, No. 119.
31. Six times 3 den. is I8 den. a year; I8 den. interest on I3 den. capital
corresponds to 135 percent a year and more, because interest was com-
pounded and added to principal at each renewal.
32. The amount of the loan, 6 pounds Genoese, is modest, which sug-
gests that Beltranus Bertaldus made personal loans to small people who had
no security to offer but whom he could exploit. Bertaldus always called him-
self banker and had a partner, Wilhelmus Scarampus of Asti, who was
32 Economy-. Society. and Government In Medieval Ital)

engaged in trade rather than in banking. See Robert L. Reynolds, “Genoese

Trade in the Late Twelfth Century, Particularly in Cloth from the Fairs of
Champagne,” Journal o/ Economic and Business History*, II I (193 I), 378.
33. Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, I, 45, No. 84. The borrowers were
Amigono de Curia and two brothers, Raimondo and Ribaldo. Cf. Gold-
Schmidt, Universalgeschichre, p. 420.
34. The normal rate on sea loans for Constantinople was 33% per cent
(de rribus quatruor). See Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba. I, 233 and 249, Nos.
438 and 468.
35. Adolf Schaube, Storia del commercio dei popoli latini nel Medi-
ferruneo (Turin, 1915), p. 280, No. 177; Wilhelm Heyd, Histoire du com-
merce du Levunt au moyen cige (Leipzig, I923), I, 202 204.
36. Cartolure di Giovanni Scribe, I, 117, No. 219. This contract is
discussed by R. de Roover, “The organization of Trade,” Cambridge
Economic History oj Europe, eds. M. M. Postan et al., 111 (Cambridge,
1963), 55-56.
37. ” . sana veniente illa navi quam ego Amicus tecum Wuilielme,
eligero Constantinopolim ad mensem post quam venero.. ‘*
38. Heyd, Commerce du Levant, I, 204; Schaube, Storia, p. 281, No.
177.
39. Lanjranco (1202-1226). eds. H. C. Krueger and R. L. Reynolds
(Genoa, 1951), I, 336-337, No. 752; Doehaerd, Les relations commerciales,
II, 126, No. 260.
40. Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, I, 130, Nos. 239 and 240; 157. No.
295; 159, NO. 298; 229, No. 430; 240, No. 451, er passim.
41. Lanjranco, I, 331, No. 739.
42. Doehaerd, Relations, II, 176, No. 348.
43. Notari liguri del secolo XII: Guglielmo Cassinese (I 190-I l92), eds.
Margaret W. Hall ef al. (Turin, 1938), II, 235-236, No. 1701.
44. Documents inidits sur le commerce de Marseille au moyen rige,
ed. Louis Blancard (Marseilles, l885), II, 67, No. 497.
45. Ibid., II, 94, No. 553.
46. Medieval Trade in rhe Mediterranean World (New York, l955),
l72m173,No.81.
47. Corpus juris canonici. Decretales: canons In Civitate tua and Navi-
gunti, Extra. of Gregory IX, V, l9,6 and 19.
48. Giovanni Scriba, I, 17, No. 32; II, 54, No. 917; Giovanni di
Guiberto, I, 79, No. 136; I IO, No. 206; 252, No. 544; 262-263, NO. 558; 270,
No. 572, et passim. The formula mutuo nomine cambii, sometimes used by
Giovanni di Guiberto, made matters worse: p. 215, No. 454; 251, NO. 542;
Doehaerd, Relations, Nos. 260, 303, 348 etpassim.
49. R. de Roover, L’&olution, pp. 186, 187; Noonan, Scholastic
Analysis of Usury, p. I8 I.
50. Examples of nomine cambii: Doehaerd, Relations, Nos. 570. 577,
587, 588, 620 et passim. Nomine vendicionis: ibid., Nos. 603, 616, 824 et
passim
51. Examples: ibid., Nos. 118, 297, 347, 577, 721. According to Ales-
sandro Lattes, the presence of the formula fat januinos or its equivalent
always indicated that the contract was a concealed loan, presumably
 The Cambium Maritimum Contract 33

usurious (A. Lattes, “Di una singolare formula genovese nei contratti di
mutuo,” Rivista deldiritro commerciale. XXII (1924) 542-50.)
52. Alonzo M. Hamelin, L/n trait6 de morale dconomique au XIV’
sikle: Le tractatus de Usuris de Maitre Alexandre d’Alexandrie (Louvain,
1962) pp. l79- 180, 181, 182, 185; Raymond de Roover, “Les doctrines
Cconomiques des scolastiques: a propos du trait6 sur I’usure d’Alexandre
Lombard,” Revue d’hisloire eccl&iastique, LIX (1964) 858-60.
53. Alexander Lombard probably visited Genoa when, in 1306 or 1307,
he went from Rome to Paris to succeed John Duns Scotus as professor at
the university (Hamelin, I/n traire’, pp. 60-63).