9/9/21, 10:25 PM G.R. No.

126480, August 10, 2001

415 Phil. 1

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126480, August 10, 2001

MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, PETITIONER, VS.

PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 5, 1993, finding the
accused (now petitioner) Maria Tin @ “Maria Ty” @ “Maria Dy” guilty of estafa and
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to
20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the private complainant, Dr. Francisca
M. Santiago, the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12 percent interest per annum from the filing of
the information and P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Petitioner was charged in an Information which reads:

That, on or about February 8, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
FRANCISCA M. SANTIAGO in the following manner, to wit: the accused received
in trust from said Francisca M. Santiago several pieces of jewelry with an estimated
value of more than P220,000.00 as collateral to the loan in the amount of
P220,000.00 which the latter obtained from the accused, under the express
obligation of returning the said pieces of jewelry to said Francisca M. Santiago
immediately upon demand for redemption, but the said accused once in possession
of the said pieces of jewelry far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed
and refused, and still fails and refuses to do so despite repeated demands made upon
her to that effect and with intent to defraud the said accused denied having received
the said pieces of jewelry to the damage and prejudice of the said Francisca M.
Santiago.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago testified that on February 8, 1980, she
and Aurora Jose went to Mady’s Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of
jewelry. She initially asked for P250,000.00 but petitioner offered only P220,000.00,

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P200,000.00 first and then the P20,000.00 a week later.  A list of the jewelries was typewritten
by a helper of the petitioner.  This list was signed by petitioner as evidence of her receipt of the
said jewelries.[2] Dr. Santiago also averred that from 1980 to 1982, she made 19 payments of
various amounts totaling P95,600.00.[3] She said that the loan was under a “white-paper”
system where there is no maturity/expiration date and where the jewelry can be redeemed
anytime provided the interests were paid.[4]

On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago said, she went to the pawnshop with a certain Mrs. Dava and
a Mrs. Zuñiga to redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of P450,000.00 to settle
her loan. However, petitioner told her that the jewelries were already sold.[5] This prompted Dr.
Santiago to consult Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote to Maria Tin[6] asking her to allow
Dr. Santiago to redeem the pieces of jewelry. On March 2, 1984, petitioner replied through her
counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming that Dr. Santiago has an unsettled obligation of
P220,000.00 and demanding payment. The letter also stated that no jewelries were received as
collateral for the loan.[7] In a handwritten letter dated March 7, 1984, Dr. Santiago pleaded for
the redemption of her jewelries.[8] Maria Tin, also in a handwritten letter dated March 16, 1984,
replied that she merely acted as guarantor of the loan and since she was made to pay the loan
she now was demanding payment therefor.[9] In said letter, Tin narrated the circumstances
behind the loan, and alleged that it was another person who gave the loan and received the
jewelry as collateral.

Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law,
Mia Chan. She merely introduced them to one another and it was Mia Chan who signed the
acknowledgment receipt and who actually received the pieces of jewelry.[10]

Mia Chan, for her part, corroborated the testimony of petitioner, her mother-in-law. She stated
that she was the one who extended the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she merely asked petitioner
to appraise the pieces of jewelry for her. She also requested petitioner to collect payments from
Dr. Santiago. According to Mia Chan, the loan was for a three-month term with 14 percent
interest per annum. She stated she signed the receipt upon request of Dr. Santiago.[11]

On May 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty. The dispositive
portion of the said decision reads:

From the foregoing, the court finds MARIA TIN, alias MARIA TY or MARIA DY,
the accused, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA. Accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused is hereby ordered to pay Dr. Francisca M. Santiago the amount of

P280,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and
P40,000.00 as Attorney’s Fees.

Dr. Francisca M. Santiago is required to pay the docket fees of the civil aspect of this
case.
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SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Her
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in:

I. … NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE IS FULL OF

LOOPHOLES AND SELF-CONTRADICTIONS, APART FROM BEING
INHERENTLY INCREDIBLE, AND HENCE GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT FOR
CONVICTION.

II. … RELYING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVED TO BE WEAKNESSES OF THE

DEFENSE RATHER ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE.

III. … NOT UPHOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CONTENTION (A) THAT

SANTIAGO LIED WHEN SHE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN SHE
ARRIVED AT MADY’S PAWNSHOP THAT SHE CAME TO KNOW FROM
WHOM SHE WAS GOING TO OBTAIN A LOAN AND THAT IT WAS
SANTIAGO WHO TYPED AND PREPARED EXH. “A” AND (B) THAT DRA.
SANTIAGO HERSELF PREPARED EXH. “A” AND WROTE THE NAME
“MARIA TIN” AS THE LENDER.

Essentially, in our view, petitioner raises issues of fact by assailing the credibility of witnesses.
As a general rule, this Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will review only
errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over
again.[13] However, there are certain exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts.[14] In this case, the decisions of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are allegedly based on misapprehensions of vital facts, making their
review necessary.

A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts: (1) that accused was the one who
extended the loan; (2) that accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as collateral
for the loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was for an indefinite term. These factual
circumstances must relate directly to the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[15]

Both trial and appellate courts held that it was petitioner who extended the loan and who
actually received the jewelries from Dr. Santiago. Their conclusion stemmed from the following
circumstances:

(1) In a letter she wrote to Fiscal Jumino, one Aurora Jose who had allegedly
introduced Dr. Santiago to Maria Tin and who was present when the transaction took
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place, corroborated Dr. Santiago’s testimony;

(2) The signature of appellant [petitioner] appears on the document[16]

acknowledging receipt of the pieces of jewelry;

(3) Receipts evidencing payments made by Dr. Santiago and which appeared to be
signed by the petitioner were not denied by the latter;

(4) Petitioner did not deny that she sent a note (Exh. “M-2”) to Dr. Santiago
reminding her to update her payments, or else she would auction the pieces of
jewelry.

A careful review of the records, however, reveals that, first, it was erroneous for the Court of
Appeals to consider in evidence the letter which a certain Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal Jumino.[17]
Aurora Jose was never presented to testify on the veracity of said letter, much less its contents.
A private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never presented as
a witness.[18] The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora Jose’s alleged
letter is obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value.[19]

Second, the signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit “A”, apparently differs from the
specimen signatures provided by petitioner Maria Tin in open court.[20] But it has striking and
obvious similarities to Mia Chan’s specimen signatures.[21] The differences and similarities are
so obvious to the eye. They could not be casually disregarded. Expert handwriting analysis is
probably useful here, but it is not indispensable.[22] As said in People vs. Pagpaguitan, 315
SCRA 226:

When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be
the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted
in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also
recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation;
similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for
truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made
by the court, with or without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis
for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person
himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the
work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but need
not, be assisted in this task by experts.[23]

In the present case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the signature in Exhibit “A”
was the petitioner’s, not Mia Chan’s. This the prosecution did not do.

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Third, petitioner did not deny that she received payments and made demands for payment from
private complainant. They do not show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan
and accepted the jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan received certain payments from Dr.
Santiago, as shown by Exhibits “8”, “8-A”, “10” and “10-A”. A certain “Viring” also received
payment from Dr. Santiago.[24] These instances only prove that a person who received
payments from another is not necessarily the person who extended the loan.

Fourth, Exhibit “M-2”[25] which the Court of Appeals considered proof that petitioner was in
possession of the jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not properly identified or
introduced as evidence at the trial. It was marked as an exhibit upon mere manifestation of
counsel.[26] It was not touched upon during the testimony of the private complainant nor listed
in the list of exhibits for the prosecution,[27] hence deemed inadmissible in evidence.[28]

Fifth, Mia Chan’s admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the
jewelries, deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored. That admission is one
against self-interest, amounting to an incriminatory statement, which the witness could not have
volunteered if not the truth.

Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But private complainant
averred that it was extended under a so-called “white-paper” system, or a loan with an indefinite
term. Petitioner presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for
a three-month period. Private complainant did not present evidence to substantiate her claim,
other than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied on the acknowledgment receipt
allegedly signed by petitioner in the presence of two witnesses. However, the prosecution did
not present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava
and Mrs. Zuñiga who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried to redeem her
jewelries. While non-presentation of certain witnesses is not a valid defense nor does it work
against the prosecution’s cause,[29] this holds true only if the evidence of the prosecution is
sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the prosecution
evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the prosecution to present evidence which
can help further its case, or explain why such evidence is not presented. When the sole
testimony of the complainant is met by an equally credible evidence of the defense, then the
prosecution must present credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to
present corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why they were not produced, weakens
the testimony of the witness who named those corroborating witnesses in her testimony.[30] In
this case, the prosecution’s failure to present the corroborative witnesses, without any
explanation for their non-appearance, makes private complainant’s testimony weak.

Further, since it was private complainant who asserted that the loan was for an indefinite term
under the so-called “white-paper system” of the pawnshop, she had the burden of proving that
fact as true. In this she failed, and her failure undermines the case for the prosecution.

Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where
the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.[31] The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,

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one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to
produce a conviction.[32] Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of
the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent
and set free.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14818,
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin is ACQUITTED of the charge against her under Article
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 1.

[2] TSN, September 3, 1990, pp. 5-16.

[3] Records, p. 243.

[4] TSN, January 22, 1992, p. 31.

[5] Id. at 31-32.

[6] Records, p. 259.

[7] Id. at 260.

[8] Id. at 261.

[9] Id. at 262.

[10] TSN, August 19, 1992, pp. 3-4.

[11] TSN, July 1, 1992, pp. 8-15.

[12] Records, pp. 474-475.

[13] Co vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 195, 200 (1995).

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[14] Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16, 19 (1994).

[15] The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision no. 1 (b), of Art. 315
are:

(1) That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or in commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the

offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;

(3) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

and

(4) That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. (Reyes,
Revised Penal Code, Book 2, 12th edition, pp. 716-717.)

[16] Records, p. 242.

[17] CA Decision, p. 5, CA Rollo, pp. 114-122.

[18] People vs. Narciso, 262 SCRA 1, 8 (1996).

[19] De la Torre vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 204 (1998).

[20] Records, back of p. 240.

[21] Records, p. 241.

[22] People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 721 (1995).

[23] 315 SCRA 226, 241 (1999).

[24] Records, p. 306.

[25] Id. at 253.

[26] TSN, January 29, 1992, p. 2.

[27] Records, p. 197.

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[28]General Enterprises, Inc. vs. Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc., 11 SCRA 733, 746
(1964).

[29] People vs. Correa, 285 SCRA 679, 689 (1998).

[30] People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251, 273 (1998).

[31] Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 673, 682 (1998).

[32] People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 307 (1998).

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