( F) Division of matrimonial assets

Broad principles
• Section 112(1) WC
– Family court can order the division between the parties of any matrimonial asset in
such proportions as the court thinks ‘just and equitable’
Power of court to order division of matrimonial assets
112. —(1) The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a
judgment of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, to order the division
between the parties of any matrimonial asset or the sale of any such asset and the
division between the parties of the proceeds of the sale of any such asset in such
proportions as the court thinks just and equitable.

[42/2005]

(2) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under
subsection (1) and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of
the case, including the following matters:
(a) the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work
towards acquiring, improving or maintaining the matrimonial assets;
(b) any debt owing or obligation incurred or undertaken by either party for their joint
benefit or for the benefit of any child of the marriage;
(c) the needs of the children (if any) of the marriage;
(d) the extent of the contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family,
including looking after the home or caring for the family or any aged or infirm
relative or dependant of either party;
(e) any agreement between the parties with respect to the ownership and division of
the matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce;
(f) any period of rent-free occupation or other benefit enjoyed by one party in the
matrimonial home to the exclusion of the other party;
(g) the giving of assistance or support by one party to the other party (whether or not
of a material kind), including the giving of assistance or support which aids the other
party in the carrying on of his or her occupation or business; and
(h) the matters referred to in section 114(1) so far as they are relevant.
[42/2005]
(3) The court may make all such other orders and give such directions as may be
necessary or expedient to give effect to any order made under this section.
[42/2005]
(4) The court may, at any time it thinks fit, extend, vary, revoke or discharge any
order made under this section, and may vary any term or condition upon or subject to
which any such order has been made.
[42/2005]
(5) In particular, but without limiting the generality of subsections (3) and (4), the
court may make any one or more of the following orders:
(a) an order for the sale of any matrimonial asset or any part thereof, and for the
division, vesting or settlement of the proceeds;
(b) an order vesting any matrimonial asset owned by both parties jointly in both the
parties in common in such shares as the court considers just and equitable;
(c) an order vesting any matrimonial asset or any part thereof in either party;
(d) an order for any matrimonial asset, or the sale proceeds thereof, to be vested in
any person (including either party) to be held on trust for such period and on such

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 terms as may be specified in the order;
(e) an order postponing the sale or vesting of any share in any matrimonial asset, or
any part of such share, until such future date or until the occurrence of such future
event or until the fulfilment of such condition as may be specified in the order;
(f) an order granting to either party, for such period and on such terms as the court
thinks fit, the right personally to occupy the matrimonial home to the exclusion of the
other party; and
(g) an order for the payment of a sum of money by one party to the other party.
[42/2005]
(6) Where under any order made under this section one party is or may become liable
to pay to the other party a sum of money, the court may direct that it shall be paid
either in one sum or in instalments, and either with or without security, and otherwise
in such manner and subject to such conditions (including a condition requiring the
payment of interest) as the court thinks fit.
[42/2005]
(7) Where, pursuant to this section, the court makes an order for the sale of any
matrimonial asset and for the division, application or settlement of the proceeds, the
court may appoint a person to sell the asset and divide, apply or settle the proceeds
accordingly; and the execution of any instrument by the person so appointed shall
have the same force and validity as if it had been executed by the person in whom the
asset is vested.
[42/2005]
(8) Any order under this section may be made upon such terms and subject to such
conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit.
[42/2005]
(9) Where the court, by any order under this section, appoints a person (including the
Registrar or other officer of the court) to act as a trustee or to sell any matrimonial
asset and to divide, apply and settle the proceeds thereof, the court may make
provision in that order for the payment of remuneration to that person and for the
reimbursement of his costs and expenses.
[42/2005]
(10) In this section, “matrimonial asset” means —
(a) any asset acquired before the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage
—
(i) ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while
the parties are residing together for shelter or transportation or for household,
education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes; or
(ii) which has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or
by both parties to the marriage; and
(b) any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both
parties to the marriage,
but does not include any asset (not being a matrimonial home) that has been acquired
by one party at any time by gift or inheritance and that has not been substantially
improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage.
[42/2005]

• LWK
– General ratios
• 50:50 or 60:40
• Exceptional circumstances that justify a deviation are
• Where the value of the assets is so low that unless W receives
more than 50% she does not obtain enough to be able to

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 purchase a small flat for her own needs with perhaps a little
cash left over.
• Value of the assets so high that a seemingly small proportion
gives the wife a large amount
• Court is convinced that not all H’s properties at divorce have
been divulged so that giving the wife a seemingly large
proportion of those assets that have been divulged should not
leave the H badly off.
• LWK: it is only in extremely brief marriages where the court
may choose to exercise the power just to return to each
spouse the financial contribution which he or she made to the
purchase of the matrimonial assets
–
• Shirley Koo; Yeong Swan Ann: any asset acquired during marriage is liable to
division. Court found it impossible to quantify with any precision in monetary terms
the amount of each party’s contribution and approached the problem in a broad
manner. The assets were divided in a manner considered fair and reasonable
– 1989 predates s 112 (different definition of MA)

– Is this consistent with s 112?

Koo Shirley v Mok Kong Chua Kenneth [1989] SLR 342

(applied in Yeong Swan Ann v Lim Fei Yen)

H and W were married fro 9 years before one spouse left the other. They had 3
children. H continued to work and managed to go work in Japan while W was a
housewife. Spouses prospered and at their divorce, owned their matrimonial home,
an apartment, membership of a country club and cash balances in the H’s bank
accounts.

H argued that only the matrimonial home was liable to division under the then s 106
of WC. W asked for a share of everything and maintenance for herself and the
children.

LP Thean J:
 All the assets were acquired during the marriage and came within s 106 (now
112) for division between W and H
 Impossible task to quantify with any precision in monetary terms the amt of
each party’s contributions
 Problem should be approached in a broad manner
1. Any asset acquired during marriage, rather than just the matrimonial
home, is liable to division
2. Power is to be exercised in broad strokes rather than a misguided
attempt at mathematical precision
3. Aim of the court is to reach a fair and reasonable division of the assets
between the spouses

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 • Cf AJR v AJS [2010] 4 SLR 617
– Chan seng onn: seems to contradict s 112 because it was too mathematical; Chan J
said that he was aware of this limitation. Formula vs Broad Brush approach?

Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy and another appeal [2011] SGCA 8

– The 8-step approach is much too detailed and seeks to make it appear as if the court’s
determination of the division of matrimonial assets is an exercise which is capable of
being reduced to mathematical precision
 But in fact it is not so.
 Indeed, the High Court judge had to make certain assumptions in order to find
that the importance of total direct contributions and indirect contributions to the
overall welfare of the family was in the ratio of 65-35.
o Section 112 of the Charter is concerned with dividing surplus matrimonial assets
between the Husband and Wife based on their respective contributions. To make a
finding that both parties contributed 65% by total direct contributions and 35% by total
indirect contributions to the welfare of the family adds little value to the final
determination.
o The 8-step approach is a fine brush approach rather than a broad brush approach. As the
two approaches are quite distinct and different, we have reservations as to whether it
will really be appropriate to use the result of one approach to verify the correctness of
the other. At the end of the day, we wish to underscore the point that the broad brush
approach, as stated in [66], is all about feel and the court’s sense of justice.

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Adverse inferences

Koo Shirley v Mok Kong Chua Kenneth [1989] SLR 342

 H working in Japan; failed to make full disclosure of his income (did not
mention other living allowances)
 Court drew adverse inferences from H’s failure to disclose
 Court will award a higher proportion of known assets to the W if H is
unwilling to reveal

Koh Kim Lan Angela v Choong Kian Haw [1994] 1 SLR 22

Marriage lasted only four years; no children; W did not put in much homemaking effort.
Former H had benefited somewhat from her efforts at helping him in the biz.
H’s father had given him shares in the family’s boutique biz before the marriage. H played a
significant role in running the business.

The biz became public and after the marriage had ended, underwent major re-organisation
which resulted in the biz being worth a great deal of money. The husband only offered the
value of the shares after the re-organisation.

 Court decided to use the valuation the H chose to give despite it being clear
that this value would be inflated because the structural re-organisation his
family business had just undergone happened after the marriage had already
ended.
 H was actually very rich, with shares and a substantial CPF savings account.
However, he was ‘unable to recall’ his expenditure towards his three credit
cards and said that he only had a few thousand
 W had no access to information about H’s assets
 Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences against the husband and to treat
him as a man in a position to command a very substantial income
 W got 15% of the property

BG v BF [2007] 3 SLR(R) 233; [2007] SGCA 32

Chan Sek Keong CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA and Andrew Ang J

– Every party to court proceedings owed to the court the duty to make full and
frank disclosure of all relevant information within his or her knowledge. In its
absence the court was entitled to draw inferences adverse to the party who failed
to do so.
– The evidence showed that there were certain non-disclosures by the Husband in
respect of his income and an adverse inference could properly be drawn against
the Husband.
– Apart from the said non-disclosures, in coming to a "just and equitable" division
the court should also have regard to the Wife's non-financial contributions. The

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 Wife had effectively given up a lucrative career to be at home to care for the
children. Taking that into account together with the Husband's non-disclosures,
there was no reason to disturb the judge's award of 40% of the matrimonial assets
to the Wife

AAE v AAF [2009] 3 SLR(R) 827; [2009] SGHC 104

W failed to comply with her duty to make full and frank disclosure of her assets and means, despite
being given opportunities to do so throughout the course of the ancillary proceedings.

Wife had not accounted for

(a) the moneys the Husband had given her over the years in the total sum of $629,000 of
which $500,000 was given to the Wife in 1999; and
(b) the sum of $124,000 being her share of the sale proceeds of the property at [MG] ("the
[MG] property") which she purchased with her sister.

Of the sale proceeds, the Wife withdrew $123,317 from her UOB bank account. In addition, the Wife
appeared to be involved in several companies but details of the nature of the businesses, her
participation and income from the various enterprises were sketchy and incomplete

An adverse inference that she had more assets and income than disclosed was drawn against her.
This gave rise to the inference that the defendant had the means to support herself, and accordingly
no maintenance was payable by the plaintiff to the defendant

In principle a premium could be awarded to the former wife for being out of occupation of the
matrimonial home post-division. This premium could take the form of a percentage of the total value
of divisible assets. However, in the present case there was no basis for the defendant wife to seek a
higher percentage seeing that before divorce proceedings were initiated, the defendant's indirect
contribution to the family and home had waned.

Tan Siew Eng @ Tan Siew Eng Irene (mw) v Ng Meng Hin [2003] 3 SLR 474

22 year marriage, 2 children. H had been working in Indonesia for a long time and amassed
great wealth. Disclosed m-assets was worth $3.7 million.

– Spouses had entered into a settlement agreement tgt but the court found that this had
been repudiated. However, court gave effect to the substantive terms which resulted in
W getting 94% of the disclosed assets.
– Unlikely that H would have put himself in such a disadvantaged position of keeping only
5.6% of the m-assets for himself and his other family in Indonesia.
– LWK: bold decision

NK v NL [2010] 4 SLR 792; [2010] SGCA 32

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H and W did not agree on valuation of TFI (companies held, considered m-assets). The court-
appointed valuer, KPMG, gave the value of TFI as between $2.22m and $2.247m, and
suggested the median value of $2.32m to be the final value. The husband disagreed with
KPMG's valuation and applied for a revaluation, arguing, inter alia, that KPMG should not
have valued TFI on a going concern basis. The wife applied to compel the husband to pay her
share of the value of TFI as given by KPMG.

Held, inter alia, determining the value of TFI to be the lower limit of the range given by the
expert, ie, $2.22m:

A court could intervene if a court-appointed valuer did not act in accordance with his terms
of reference, or if his valuation was patently or manifestly in error. This was subject to the
caveat that the court would be slow to find that the valuation was in error, since by
appointing an expert in the first place it had taken the position that the matter was best left
to the expert

The court left the valuation to the discretion of independent experts. In such circumstances,
it could not be said that KPMG's method of valuation departed from the court order, unless
it could be shown that the method was wholly inappropriate for valuing shares of a private
company, such as TFI, for the purposes of a division of matrimonial assets. There was no
argument or expert evidence to this effect

Since KPMG did not state any substantive reason for preferring the median value, it was fair
to say that KPMG, applying its expert knowledge, could only give the value for TFI within a
range, and not down to a precise figure. In such circumstances, the court had a residual
discretion in determining the precise value of TFI within the range given by KPMG. The
discretion fell to be exercised according to the underlying purpose of the valuation, in this
case the division of matrimonial assets. On the facts, since the main judgment had made
ample provision for the wife, it was fair for the husband to be given the benefit of any
doubt in the valuation of TFI. Accordingly, the lower limit of the range given by KPMG, ie,
$2.2m, was adopted

Tay Sin Tor v Tan Chay Eng [1999] 2 SLR(R) 385; [1999] SGHC 126

An adverse inference was drawn against the husband that he had not disclosed all his assets. The
district judge should not stop after drawing the inference and should have gone on to determine the
value of the undeclared assets.

This cannot be done with precision because it springs from a lack of information, but nevertheless a
value should be inferred from the information available, and it is for the party which is dissatisfied
with it to show that it is unreasonable. This has to be done so that a value for the undisclosed assets
can be included in the division.

Value of undisclosed assets can be inferred from other known assets

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Discretionary powers and relationship with other statues

• Section 112 WC

Lee Leh Hua v Yip Kok Leong [1999] 3 SLR 506

H had earlier agreed with W that she should be entitled to keep the proceeds of sale of their
former matrimonial home and kept repeating this in the presence of a HDB officer.

Held, H’s application dismissed

 Where the spouses’ respective proprietary interests under the general
principles of property law are clear, there is no room for the exercise of the
court’s discretion to divide matrimonial assets.

LWK disagrees
 Purpose of the power is to ensure that both spouses receive due credit for
their contributions and doing so will often require the court to order division
in proportions that do not mirror the parties’ entitlement under property law
that generally only credits financial contribution
 It cannot be that the court under the power of s 112 should not vary either
spouse’s vested interests. That restraint is only true of s 59(1) of the WC.

Wong Kam Fong Anne v Ang Ann Liang [1993] 2 SLR 192

H applied to divide the MA. Application dismissed where the spouses had their own
agreement on division under which the W was to receive a proportion which the court
described as ‘not unreasonable’.

 Court noted that the spousal agreement was comprehensive and the H
appeared able to protect his own interests.
 The way to properly exercise the discretion is to consider if there is a good
reason not to exercise the power to divide matrimonial assets.
 W was able to provide that good reason.: if not for a good reason, an
application to exercise the power should generally result in an order of
division being made. Court should decline to exercise the power only where
the parties have already made an agreement to divide the matrimonial assets
fairly

Michael Hwang JC
 Deed was intended as a comprehensive financial and property settlement
between the parties
 Deed was made a at time when the parties had already been separated and
divorce was viewed as a real possibility

Tan Siew Eng @ Tan Siew Eng Irene (mw) v Ng Meng Hin [2003] 3 SLR 474

SGHC decided to follow the terms of the spouses’ agreement on division despite finding that

8
the spouses had rescinded their agreement before the application.

Woo Bih Li J
 Terms of the Settlement agreement were just and equitable

Ong Boon Huat Samuel v Chan Mei Lan Kristine [2007] 2 SLR 729

19 month marriage; W’s application for leave to divorce was not successful and had to wait
out the required 3 years. No children. W did not claim that she made any non-financial
contribution to the welfare of the family that might be of note in deciding the just and
equitable division of the MAs.

Before the marriage was legally terminated by the grant of the final judgment of divorce, a
second property was acquired apart from the matrimonial home. At the time of the
acquisition, the relationship had deteriorated so much that W kept reminding H that she
wanted no part of this acquisition. The last unusual feature of this case was that, while the
property that was the matrimonial home lost value, the 2 nd property gained in value.

W is now arguing that she should receive a share of its gain in value. (she helped H obtain a
bank loan for the purchase)

CA:
 Should exercise discretion to hold that it was not enough that the acquisition
took place ‘technically’ during the marriage and the present case is one in
which there is good reason for the court not to divide the second property.

CPF v Lau Eng Mui [1995] 3 SLR 109

Matrimonial proceedings; elderly couple whose only matrimonial asset was the H’s CPF
account that he would have access to only in a few years’ time.
Court imposed a charge over H’s CPF account so that when he is able to withdraw the funds
he will have to pay over to his former wife the amount of money ordered as her rightful
share of matrimonial assets

TJ:
$20,000 of the money belongs to the W and account be charged so that the sum will be paid
over to her when the H gains access to it

Appeal:
CPF argued that the objectives of CPF does not accommodate the purpose of the power to
divide matrimonial assets.
S 25(1) of the CPF act prohibits the imposition of a charge over a member’s CPF moneys

LP Thean JA:
 A court order under s 106 is not inconsistent with the spirit or letters of the CPF Act
nor is it contrary to the intention of the legislature
 The CPF moneys of a member are his savings intended for the benefit of the
member himself and his family upon his retirement
 In the unfortunate event that the marriage breaks down, it is only just that a division

9
 of such savings between him and his spouse ought to be made on a fair and
equitable basis

Problems with Lau Eng Mui?

W did not contribute
When exactly can the court touch the CPF assets

10
Prenuptial agreements

• TQ v TR
– Insofar as prenuptial agreements relating to the division of matrimonial assets are
concerned, the governing provision is s 112 of WC
– The ultimate power resides in the court to order the division of matrimonial assets
“in such proportions as the court thinks just and equitable”, having regard to all
circumstances of the case, and a prenuptial agreement cannot be construed in such
a manner as to detract from this ultimate power. It follows that the prenuptial
agreement cannot be enforced, in and of itself
– However, this does not mean that such a prenuptial agreement cannot (where
relevant) be utilized to aid the court in exercising its power pursuant to s 112 of WC.
What weight the prenuptial agreement would be given would depend on the precise
facts and circumstances of the case
– In an appropriate situation, a prenuptial agreement might be accorded significant -
even conclusive - weight. It might well be the case that a prenuptial agreement is,
given the circumstances as a whole, considered to be so crucial that it would, in
effect, be enforced in its entirety
– However, everything will depend upon the precise circumstances before the court

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Definition of matrimonial assets
• Law before 1996 amendment
• Relevance of pre-1996 cases:
– Pre 1996 cases apply to the same fundamental principles
– The Select Committtee of Parliament suggested that s 112 merely elaborates and
improves on the former s 106 so that the developments thus far are not jettisoned.
– CA in Yeong Swan Ann v Lim Fei Yen [1999] 1 SLR 651 cited and relied on cases
decided under the old s 106 without differentiating the current s 112 from it (LWK
agrees)

Section 112(10) WC

(10) In this section, “matrimonial asset” means —

(a) any asset acquired before the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage —
(i) ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while the parties are
residing together for shelter or transportation or for household, education, recreational, social or
aesthetic purposes; or
(ii) which has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to
the marriage; and
(b) any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the
marriage,
but does not include any asset (not being a matrimonial home) that has been acquired by one party at
any time by gift or inheritance and that has not been substantially improved during the marriage by the
other party or by both parties to the marriage.

Meaning of words
 ‘Acquired’  simple meaning as when one of the spouses come into ownership of
the property by any means whatsoever
o No need to show that party had put in effort
 ‘During the marriage’
o Whole period from solemnization until judgment of divorce is made final

Old s 106
 Included assets held during the period of the marriage
 Equality of division
 Reasonable division
 Can we apply s 106 cases to s 112? (take note)
– Is the qualifier “but does not” for (a) or (b) or both?
• both
– Siew Hwee said both (a) and (b) should each be read with the qualifier; alternative
view is “but does not” is effectively a part (c): Edwin Lee
– LWK: no difference because (a) and (b) already covers the whole spectrum of
possibilities
– Is “means” = exhaustive definition?
• Seems to suggest that it is exhaustive (contrast to previous s 106 that uses
‘includes’)

NK v NL

The broad conferment of judicial discretion is necessarily limited by s 112(10) of the Act, which
defines a matrimonial asset as:
...

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(a)    any asset acquired before the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage -
(i)    ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while the parties are
residing together for shelter or transportation or for household, education, recreational, social or
aesthetic purposes; or
(ii)   which has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties
to the marriage; and
(b)    any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the
marriage,
but does not include any asset (not being a matrimonial home) that has been acquired by one party
at any time by gift or inheritance and that has not been substantially improved during the marriage
by the other party or by both parties to the marriage.

The abolition of the s 106 distinction between joint and sole acquisition of assets paves the way for
the court to put financial and non-financial contributions on an equal footing. Where before, a
spouse's financial contribution by paying for the property was dominant in determining the
proportions of division, it is now only one among many factors for consideration (and see Leong Wai
Kum, "The Just and Equitable Division of Gains Between Equal Former Partners in Marriage" [2000]
Sing JLS 208 at 209). It is therefore the duty of the court to recognise the reality of family dynamics
and to give due weight to all indirect contributions of the other party which are by their nature not
reducible to monetary terms.

Essential that courts resist the temptation to lapse into a minute scrutiny of the conduct and efforts
of both spouses, which may be objectionable in disadvantaging the spouse whose efforts are difficult
to evaluate in financial terms.

Methodology of dividing m-assets

Global approach
Consists of four distinct phases: viz, identification, assessment, division and apportionment ("the
global assessment methodology"). According to this approach, the court's duty is to (a) identify and
pool all the matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112(10) of the Act; (b) assess the net value of the pool
of assets; (c) determine a just and equitable division in the light of all the circumstances of the case;
and (d) decide on the most convenient way to achieve these proportions of division, ie, how the
order of division should be satisfied from the assets

Classification approach
Assimilation of all four of the above steps into a broad judicial discretion which, in the first instance,
separately considers and divides classes of matrimonial assets ("the classification methodology").
Pursuant to this method, the court apportions classes of matrimonial assets separately, for example,
the matrimonial home, cash in bank accounts, shares, and businesses, etc. Any direct financial
contributions and indirect contributions are considered in relation to each class of assets, rather than
by way of a global assessment.

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Quintessential matrimonial asset: property acquired during marriage
by own efforts
• Section 112(10)(b) WC
• Nature or value of property is irrelevant. Focus on the time and fact that is acquired. No
formula required, which explains why there are no sub-sub-sub parts to (b)
• LWK: dividing a quintessential MA between the former spouses relates the power to divide
perfectly with the character of marriage as the spouses’ equal co-operative partnership of
efforts
• Shirley Koo: all the assets (several employment-derived properties, including matrimonial
home, another property, bank a/cs, CPF, insurance policies, car, country club, jewellery) were
acquired during marriage, but all acquired by H. H argued would only concede matrimonial
home, but court held all the assets were divisible.
– LWK: this case gave us an exact foretaste of what s 112(10)(b) would be like. The best
case to give sense to what s 112(10)(b) means. Note: liable to divided does not in
itself mean court cannot decide the fair proportion

Other examples of divisible property

– Matrimonial home: almost all applications from Shirley Koo
– Property bought with proceeds of sale of former matrimonial home despite home
being gift to H before marriage: Hoong Khai Soon

Hoong Khai Soon v Cheng Kwee Eng [1993] 3 SLR 34

MA includes a property that replaced the spouses’ former matrimonial

home although the new property never served as the matrimonial home.

Former wife to get 35% of the H’s half-share of the new property that
replaced the former matrimonial home, despite the fact that H’s half-share
in the former matrimonial home was a gift to him from his parents before he
married. TJ gave 45%, but LKC J was of the opinion that the parties’
relationship had already been strained when the second home was
purchased.

H’s share in the family’s restaurant business was not liable to division

W’s claim to have substantially improved the H’s share in the family
restaurant by her carrying out domestic chores and helping out in some other
restaurant owned by the family was rejected.

Lam Chih Kian v Ong The fact that the fund in a member's CPF account was subject to restrictions
Chin Ngoh as to its use and disposal until the member reached the age of 55 and was
[1993] 1 SLR(R) 460; inviolable except to the extent set out in the CPF Act did not make it any less
[1993] SGCA 18 capable of being a matrimonial asset. If the fund was accumulated during
the marriage, it constituted a matrimonial asset within the ambit of s 106(3)
CPF and of the Charter.
property/investment
s from CPF The restrictions as to the use and disposal of CPF funds are transient
considered m-assets problems faced by the CPF account holder. These transient problems should
not in any way affect the character of CPF funds as matrimonial assets if
they were accumulated during marriage. In making a division of matrimonial

14
 assets, the court was entitled to take into account all the circumstances of
the case in accordance with ss 106(3) and 106(4) of the Charter. The court
would make an order with which the parties were likely to be in a position
to comply

Court combined the parties’ CPF savings into the total m-assets ($300k) and
awarded W 40% which worked out to be around $140k. As she had $70,000
in her CPF account and the value of the flat was $140,000, she was ordered
to pay the husband $67,040.58 in consideration of him transferring his joint
interest in the flat to her

Chan Teck Hock David v Leong Mei Chuan [2002] 1 SLR 177

Stock options as long as they have vested or become due to vest as remuneration for employment
during the course of the marriage
– Three groups:
• Vested and been exercised by the grant of interim judgment
• Clearly subject to division as property acquired (W gets 30% )
• Vested but not yet exercised by interim judgment
• Available for division (W gets 15%)
• Not yet vested by the interim judgment
• Only available for the future provided H continues to work satisfactorily for the
Co
• W gets 15% when profits are realized but only those that vested in the H for his
employment during the course of the marriage.
– Other stuff: W to receive 20% of m-home, 20% profits realized from the stock options that he
had exercise (US$2.5million before tax) and 15% of the profits of those options that were part of
the H’s remuneration for services render to the Co during the course of the marriage

– Business assets: Edwin Lee; Hillfield Int Ltd

– Car, jewellery (where not de minimis), insurance policies, country club: Ng Hwee
Keng

CH v CI [2004] SGDC 131

– If a life insurance policy (to which the W is named as a B), is purchased by the H after the
date of the marriage, and the premiums have been paid during the marriage, the policy
should be a amtrimonial asset, though it would be the W’s asset rather than the H’s asset
as she has the beneficial interest in the policy.
• What if the B is a 3rd party?
– Depends on the term of the trust created. If 3P cannot be removed as a B to the
policy and the policy is therefore not a m-asset
– Unless the court finds that the gift had been made with the intention of dissipating
the pool of matrimonial assets
– If the policyholder can remove the 3P as B or name a new B, then the insurance
policy is a m-asset.

– Ng Sylvia v Oon Choon Huat Peter [2002] 1 SLR 435

15
 • Property acquired in a windfall can also be counted as m-asset
• H co-owned an apartment with his siblings but claimed that he was only
entitled to ¼ of it. His siblings and him regularly pooled their money to buy
4D and the apartment was purchased with such prize money.
• Court held that the ¼ share was liable for division
• LWK: Problems as s 112(10) excludes propety acquried by gift or inheritance
and by analogy ‘gift’ would exclude windfalls such as these
–

16
Property other than quintessential asset: overview
• Two categories: either
– acquired before marriage
– given as gift (the qualifier)
• There is a formula common to (a), ie, (a)(ii), and qualifier, viz, substantial
improvement by other party or both parties during the marriage
• Unique to (a), ie, (a)(i): ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of
their children while the parties are residing together for shelter or transportation or
for household, education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes
• Unique to qualifier: matrimonial home
• Any of these three formulae may be used as an argument to convert something into
a matrimonial asset
• LWK: but, there is an imbalance to these formulae, which reflects poorly on the
statutory definition, especially when they are all supposed to serve the same
objective. The imbalance is that the common formula requires substantiality, yet the
unique formula to (a) only requires ordinary usage. Qualifier is even weirder
– Imbalance acknowledged in Chen Siew Hwee

How asset acquired before marriage can be converted in matrimonial asset:

substantial improvement by other party or both parties
• What does “improve substantially” mean? Easiest way is to show value increase
traceable to the effort. The idea underlying the common formula is both
commonsensical and of some vintage. This formula was already found in s 106(5)
• Yet, there is a problem in does it matter who contributed to substantial
improvement? Under (a)(ii) and the qualifier, it must be by “the other” or by “both”.
– This seemingly contravenes the spirit of s 46 WC, that marriage is a co-
operative enterprise; what if somebody had put in only non-financial efforts
throughout the marriage, thereby never having an impact on the value of
properties?

Ryan v Berger – H acquired property prior to marriage. W had only stayed

[2001] 1 SLR 419 in the property for 21 days during the marriage

Judith Prakash J read it purposively:

– W’s stay at the Sydney property (21 days out of 14 years
of marriage) was so short that the property could not
ordinarily be qualified as an asset ordinarily used by the
parties for recreational purposes.
– Sydney property excluded from matrimonial assets

Lee Yong Chuan The shares concerned were in fact issued to the donee
Edwin v Tan Soan spouse in exchange for shares which were given to him
Lian [2001] 1 SLR previously by his grandparents and father.
377
The court in Lee Edwin observed at [35] that the shares
concerned continued to represent the same proportionate

17
 share in the underlying family business. .

Shi Fang v Koh Pee – H’s shares were substantially improved during
Huat [1996] 1 SLR(R) the course of the marriage by both H and W’s efforts 
906; [1996] SGCA 28 property liable to division
– However, W helping to direct renovation and
taking charge of the household were insufficient to
constitute substantial improvent to the bungalow
– H had also received shares in his father’s
companies
• Held: H did not play a significant role in
the biz; W’s claim of having made connections in
China on behalf of the companies was also
rejected. W’s contributions were too remote
• 1 year marriage

Chow Hoo Siong v – Indirect contribution was not taken into account
Lee Dawn Audrey – Substantial improvement must not have emanated from
[2003] 4 SLR 481 the ‘wrong’ spouse
– Test is whether substantial improvements had been made
by ‘the other party or by other parties to the marriage’
– H had chosen to receive a low salary in exchange for the
shares and had enhanced the profits of the company. His
sacrifice affected the lifestyle of the W who had
contributed financially towards the household and hence
had participated towards the acquisition of the asset by
her efforts towards the family life.  too remote

Chen Siew Hwee v 17 years marriage, no children although H had a son from his
Low Kee Guan first marriage.
[2006] 4 SLR 605 Disputed property: shares that H had been given before the
marriage

Andrew Phang JA
 Not substantially improved, no direct causal
connection whatsoever between these contributions
and the share  not matrimonial assets
 Court rejected LWK’s suggestion of reading the phrase
more liberally (Cooperative efforts point does not
count because the gift was not acquired through any
effort)

Koh Kim Lan Despite the major effort having clearly been expended by H
Angela v Choong who had been given shares in his own family’s boutique
Kian Haw [1994] 1 business by his father before he married, regarded the H to
SLR 22 have coalesced his efforts with the W’s meagre efforts to
satisfy the former provisions’ requirement of such property

18
 being substantially improved  liable for division

LWK approves of such flexibility

How asset acquired before marriage can be converted into matrimonial asset: ordinary
usage
• Weakest part of definition compared to formula of choice
• Why should ordinary use for aesthetic purpose convert when effort at improvement only
relevant if substantial; idea is to read in substantiality, especially if it was used for “shelter”
• Ryan v Berger
– Apartment in Australia; too little usage
• LWK: should read a requirement of substantiality into the statute (does the statute allow
such a reading?

A gift acquired at any time must be substantially improved by other party or by both
parties, unless it is a matrimonial home
• Is it a gift
– Tan Bee Giok v Loh Kum Yong [1997] 1 SLR 153
• Before Mother passed away, she made it clear that she wanted the house to
be given to H.
• Test: whether the W had a joint effort with the H to contribute to the
renovations of the property
• Effort invested? Money invested? Intention for it to be a gift?
– Ang Teng Siong v Lee Su Min [2000] 3 SLR 55
• A property given to both H and W during the subsistence of the marriage is
simply a m-asset under s 112(10)(b) of the WC
• Is the whole thing a gift
– Tan Bee Giok v Loh Kum Yong [1997] 1 SLR 153 
• Court will scrutinise property and determine whether the whole thing is a
gift
• The part that is not a gift is a matrimonial asset because it was acquired by
the spouses’ efforts expended during the subsistence of marriage

• Implied: it does not matter who substantially improved

– Koh Kim Lan Angela v Choong Kian Haw [1994] 1 SLR 22
• W did not make direct financial contributions to the business but the shares
were liable for division

• It matters who substantially improved

– Chow Hoo Siong v Lee Dawn Audrey [2003] 4 SLR 481
• Test is whether substantial improvements had been made by ‘the other
party or by other parties to the marriage’
• H had chosen to receive a low salary in exchange for the shares and had
enhanced the profits of the company. His sacrifice affected the lifestyle of
the W who had contributed financially towards the household and hence
had participated towards the acquisition of the asset by her efforts towards
the family life.  too remote

– Chen Siew Hwee

19
 • 17 year marriage, no children, H had a son from a first marriage. 2 groups of
shares given to H alone before he was married were gifts
• W argued that the gift to the H had been transformed into m-asset by way of
the arguments in s 1112(10)
• Court held that literal reading of the relevant parts of the definition
sufficed for a fair decision
• It could not have been the donor’s intention to give the
spouse even before the marriage had occurred

Tang Ngai Sheung Peggy v Wong Yeu Yu [2008] SGHC 221

The parties were married on 19 March 1975. W is now aged 58 and H is 63 years
old. The Decree Nisi was granted on 28 January 2003 on W’s Amended Petition.

The key asset in dispute was the 5311 (45.24%) ordinary shares in the capital of
MCCL held by H and now represented by the disputed properties. It is not
disputed that the shares were a gift to H from WSC, his late father.

The distribution in specie – that converted the MCCL shares to real property - did
not cause the MCCL shares to lose their character as a gift (as was the case of the
shares before distribution in specie was ordered).

• Gift from one spouse to the other can exceptionally not be a m-asset
– Usually gift from spouse to another spouse is a matrimonial sset when it
depletes the pool of m-assets.
– Wong Ser Wan v Ng Cheong Ling [2006] 1 SLR 416
Process of deterioration of the marriage was particularly protracted and
during this long period of time the H became very poor. The gifts which he
had earlier made to his W to persuade her not to carry out her plan to
terminate their marriage were set out in a fninacial agreement which he
sought to have rescinded so that those properties would revert as m-assets.

AAE v AAF [2009] 3 SLR(R) 827; [2009] SGHC 104

The plaintiff (H) contended that two properties (the [XXX] and [YYY] properties), paid for as
they were with proceeds from the sale of pre-marriage assets, did not qualify as
matrimonial assets for the purposes of division.

Held,

– The [XXX] property was the matrimonial home, and as such was irrefutably a
matrimonial asset
– While the [YYY] property was purchased with proceeds from the sale of pre-marriage
assets, the plaintiff and the defendant had both been registered as joint tenants of it.
 This was evidence that the [YYY] property had not been intended to remain as a
non-matrimonial asset

20
Can a gift change status during marriage?

Hoong Khai Soon v Cheng Kwee Eng [1993] 3 SLR 34

Lai Kew Chai J

• Gift could become source of funds for another matrimonial asset.

• H paid for half of the new m-home that replaced the old m-home. The money for this
came from the proceeds of sale of the old house.
• Court: although the latter property was a gift, we should not trace the source of
funds for a purchase to its origin. It would be inimical to the concept of a
matrimonial partnership if the source of funds for every asset acquired during the
marriage had to be shown to not originate from the generosity of the third party
• W received 35% of her H’s half-share in the new property which replaced their m-
home.

Cf Chen Siew Hwee v Low Kee Guan [2006] 4 SLR 605

Andrew Phang JA

• Court-ordered liquidation of one of the companies that H held shares in and H would
have received a significant amount of money from this liquidation. However, court
held that such a ‘transformation’ was merely literal and ‘forced’. To allow this to be
construed as a m-asset would be allowing the W to go by the ‘back door’
• W has to demonstrate that there was a real and unambiguous intention on the part
of the H that the present assets which had their original source in the shares were to
constitute part of the pool of m-assets
– H had no such intention as he was forced by the court to convert the
proceeds from the shares
• Before one can decide whether the nature of the original asset should be that of the
new asset, it would be necessary to see whether the new asset is traceable to the
assets which constituted the original gift.
– If cannot trace, it would be logically impossible to additionally consider
whether the ‘new’ asset continues to be in the nature of a gift.
• Differentiating factor from Hoong Khai Soon: H in Hoong had the intention to
combine the gift into the matrimonial assets but not in this case

• LWK: Marriage for 17 years—is it unreasonable for the H to be told that he should
share that with his W?
– One should not be too strict with these rules when dealing with spousal
disputes
– Requirement of intention is too unrealistic—how to expect spouse to concede
gracefully that he or she did exhibit such intention during the marriage?

White v White [2001] 1 AC 596

21
 Facts
• Marriage lasted more than 30 years producing 3 children. H and W cooperated in
running a farm while W took care of the home and cared for the children. Successful
equal partnership of marriage and biz.
• At the start of the marriage, both contributed equally. A year later, H’s dad provided
an interest-free loan that paid for some 34% of the farm which the spouses bought
and owned jointly. F also provided some working capital.
• Over time, the spouse bought more land and the farm grew.
• At divorce, farm was worth £3.5mil.
• H’s father also bought another estate at a good price that he transferred to himself
and his 3 sons. The H’s share of the cost was met from the profits of the farming biz
which he owned with W. H and W also farmed the farm within this estate. Farm was
worth £1.25 mil at divorce and they also had pension provisions so that their
combined worth at divorce was £4.6 mil.
• Couple requested a ‘clean break’

Held,
• High Court awarded W £980,000 to meet her reasonable requirements and she
would receive 20% of the spouses’ combined wealth.
• CA doubled her award to recognize her contribution to the family as W and mother.
• After both appealed, HOL dismissed both appeals so that the W was entitled to 40%
which was twice as much as her reasonable requirements.

Lord Nicholls
• Yardstick of equality in division that will act as a check so that orders do not deviate
too much from it but not to be equated with a presumption of equal division or even
equal division as a starting point
• Although the point was not argued, the initial cash contribution by H’s father cannot
carry much weight 33 years later (OD)
• Character of the property acquired by gift can cease to be significant in 2
circumstances:
– Where the applicant’s financial needs cannot be met without recourse to the
property originally acquired as gift.
– Through the passage of years of the marriage.
• LWK: fair if you consider marriage equal cooperative partnership
• Courts should take the opportunity to convey moral messages such as
‘this is the person you have been engaging in an equal co-operative
partnership of efforts with for all these years’

LWK: 2 factors by Lord Nicholls is fair

– IS this consistent with Chen Siew Hwee?

• No. Chen: must take into consideration fairness
• White: factor would carry little weight

22
 • Exceptions to the gift rule in Chen Siew Hwee v Low Kee Guan [2006] 4 SLR 605
(justice and fairness)
• Matrimonial home  just and fair for that asset to constitute part of
the pool of m-assets
• Substantially improved on by the other party
• Joint contribution to improve the gift substantially
– All the above scenarios are contained within the qualifying words and such
situations are grounded in considerations of justice and fairness
– LWK has other suggestions
• Would justice and fairness require the ct to ignore a parent’s narrow
intention to benefit only his or her child to the exclusion of the child’s
future spouse?
• Would J&F convince a ct to find the parent’s intention more
generously as to benefit both the child and his or her spouse
whenever there is some ambiguity
• Would J&F lead to a parent’s intention losing significance with the
passage of time?
• Would J&F require a spouse who gained a windfall before marriage to
share a part of this with his marital partner

Should a matrimonial home qualify so easily as a matrimonial asset?

• A gift in form of matrimonial home could, under the literal reading of the qualifier, be
converted, even if the W only lived in it for a month and divorced thereafter
• Matrimonial home is the ‘cradle of the family’
• So the issue is how can this be equated with substantial usage or even substantial
improvement, which seems to be underlying rationale of other parts of s 112?

Shi Fang v Koh Pee There being no agreement or understanding reached between Koh
Huat [1996] 1 SLR(R) and Shi that the house was to be shared beneficially, either express
906; [1996] SGCA 28 or inferred, or any representation made by Koh to Shi that she would
have such a share, there could be no reliance on her part that part of
the house was hers, and thus there could be no constructive trust of
a share in the house in favour of Shi: at [37].

The house was owned by Koh at the time of marriage, and if Shi was
to be entitled to a share in the house, she must rely on s 106(5) of
the Women's Charter and show that the house had been
substantially improved during the marriage by her or by the joint
efforts of herself and Koh. As Shi had little financial means, she could
not have made substantial improvement to the property;
contributions such as conceptualisation of the renovations and
purchase of decorative items were de minimis and could not be
taken into account.

Ong Boon Huat – 19 mth marriage; towards the end H bought a second property
Samuel v Chan Mei and W kept on reminding him that she wanted no share in the
Lan Kristine [2007] 2 property. H paid both the 10% downpayment and another 10%

23
SLR 729 instalment and has been paying the monthly loan instalments
ever since.

Held, rejecting W’s claim

– W cannot now claim what she once rejected. If the property was
not profitable, W would be equally quick to disassociate herself
from it.
– While it may be that the property was acquired during the
marriage and it technically falls under the definition of a m-asset
contained in s 112(10) of the act, the court still retains power to
exercise its discretion in dividing m-assets.
TV v TW [2007] 7-year marriage with 3 young children.
SGHC 113
A number of properties that the couple did not reside in:

1. Jalan Isnin property (not m-asset)

Jalan Isnin property was never used by the parties as a matrimonial
home
This property was purchased in 1998, again before the marriage. It
was registered in the names of the Wife, her parents and an uncle of
hers as tenants in common with a quarter share for each. As alluded
to in [31(a)], the Wife used $55,445.51 from her CPF account to help
pay for this property. The Wife and the children stayed there after
they left the Bukit Regency matrimonial home and continue to reside
there with her parents.

2. Brisbane property (not m-asset)

H claimed a portion of the sale proceeds but W claimed that since it
was acquired before the marriage and it was not ordinarily used by
either of the parties or any of the children and it was not
substantially improved by the Husband or both the parties during the
marriage. Court aargeed with W

3. Second Joo Chia Terrace House (not m-asset)

W was not involved in the purchase of the second Joo Chiat Terrace
house at all and if the Husband had been pressed to make any
mortgage payment for the same, I have no doubt she would have
asserted, rightly, that that was entirely his responsibility.
Bearing in mind that the second Joo Chiat Terrace house was
acquired by the Husband after the marriage had broken down,
although not yet dissolved, and what I have said above including the
short marriage (up to the date of the divorce petition), I was not
inclined to allow any division of the balance of the sale proceeds in
favour of the Wife unless the interests of the children required me to
allow the Wife something from the balance. I shall say more on this
later.

24
 Matrimonial home that couple resided in was a m-asset liable for
division
Husband’s position was that the Wife should not be entitled to any
part of the surplus as she had abandoned the Bukit Regency
matrimonial home, leaving it to the Husband to re-finance the
mortgage and look for a buyer.

It would be inequitable to say that the Wife should not be entitled to

any part of the surplus. Taking into account the parties’ direct
financial contributions and the Husband’s retention of the rent and
the Wife’s non-financial contribution, which I shall elaborate on later
when I deal with the issue of maintenance, I allow the Wife 15% of
$7,563.96

Reformulate s 112(10)?
• Begin with quintessential matrimonial asset
• Every other property becomes matrimonial asset where good evidence of any or all of
following
– Substantial effort of either spouse to improve property or increase its value
– Owner has allowed its substantial usage by spouses and/or children
– Owner-spouse demonstrated intention to turn it into part of family property
• Any other good reason to include the property into the pool for division

• Sim Geok Seng

– Prevailing principles for division
– Marriage is generally intended to be a close relationship; should not be too picky
about who contributed financially

• NK v NL [2010] 4 SLR 792; [2010] SGCA 32

– Considerations not exhaustive
– Idea of marriage as an equal cooperative partnership
– Both roles must work if the marriage has to flourish
– Traditional approach: direct contributions as a prima facie starting point
• Courts will resist the temptation to lapse into a minute scrutiny of actions of
both spouses
– Current approach: Courts must make a rough approximation
• In the absence of documentary evidence, courts must indeed make a "rough
and ready approximation" (see Hoong Khai Soon v Cheng Kwee Eng [1993]
1 SLR(R) 823 ("Hoong Khai Soon") at [17]) and avoid falling back on the
view that favours financial contribution to the acquisition of property. To
borrow the words of Rubin J in Nam Wen Jet Bernadette ([20] supra) at [45],
"it would not profit either party to embark upon an exercise with a view to
determine with mathematical precision the amount of their respective
contributions". And, in a similar vein, L P Thean JA, in a decision of this
court in Ng Hwee Keng v Chia Soon Hin William [1995] 1 SLR(R) 819,
observed (at [28]) that division is "not a pure exercise in arithmetic that
would yield some degree of exactitude and certainty".
– Paramount that courts do not focus on direct/indirect contributions
– Indirect contributions
• Identify, divide assess apportion
• Broad judicial discretion

25
• Where one spouse has devoted his or her time entirely to the family, indirect
contributions should not be overvalued

26
Proportion of division

Post-2007 sentiments

Lock Yeng Fun v 30 year marriage; W was a homemaker with substantial investments
Chua Hock Chye and H was a banker.
[2007] SGCA 33
Until Parliament changed its mind with regard to s 112 of the Act and
No default 50-50 amended it accordingly, there was a need to discourage the perpetuation of
starting point the proposition to the effect that equality of division was either the starting
point or the norm in any given case, as this could induce in the judge
concerned a state of mind that sought to achieve equality as the norm as an
end point, regardless of the actual facts and merits concerned. This would
be wrong in law as it was contrary to legislative intent. Finally, whilst
equality of division of matrimonial assets in the courts was not the norm,
the courts would nevertheless not hesitate to award half (or even more
than half) of the matrimonial assets if such a decision was justified on the
facts.

The experience of the courts in dealing with the division of matrimonial

assets showed that equality of division was not the norm; indeed in the
large majority of cases decided by the courts, equality of division was not
achievable on the facts. This was not surprising given the current social
conditions in Singapore, notwithstanding the fact that more and more
women work and there was generally more equality in the work place.
However, the focus of the court was on the attainment of a just and
equitable division of matrimonial assets (as required under s 112(1) of the
Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) ("the Act"). Consistent with this
aim, there was a need to give the fullest effect to the non-financial
contributions of the spouse concerned.

Koh Bee Choo v Choo Mdm Koh Bee Choo (“the Wife”) and Mr Choo Chai Huah (“the Husband”)
Chai Huah were married in 1984. They had three children who are aged 16, 18 and 22.
[2007] SGCA 21 In August 1996, the Husband purchased an apartment at 53 Hume Avenue
CA is unlikely to #07-02 Parc Palais (“the Parc Palais flat”), which served as the home of the
disturb decisions couple and their children. In July 2003, however, the Husband left the
unless there is an matrimonial home to live with Ms Sun Chang Yun. The Husband and Ms Sun
error of law and their two children currently reside at 346 Balestier Road #05-13 Ritz
Mansion (“the Ritz Mansion flat”).

Pang Rosaline 40-60 in favour of H

30 years marriage

 The Neptune Court property was purchased in November 1980,

in the parties' joint names, for $55,450. The monthly mortgage
instalment and conservancy charges were deducted solely from
the husband's salary between 1980 and 1992. The parties
moved into the Neptune Court property in 1983.
 In August 1992, the parties purchased the Sennett Road

27
 property for $775,000. The husband and wife contributed
$253,000 and $164,000, respectively, towards the purchase
price. The stamp and legal fees were paid for by the husband.
To part-finance the rest of the purchase price, the husband
obtained a loan of $308,000 under the Government Officers'
Housing Loan scheme and also borrowed a further $60,000
from his mother.
 Both husband and wife had, for the better part of their marriage
conceived a system in which it mattered not how or how much
each party contributed to the family's finances. In the
circumstances, it was disingenuous for the husband to claim,
post-marriage, that he had paid wholly for the Neptune Court
property.
 The wife had in fact made indirect contributions to the
marriage as well as the fact that she had in fact contributed
(albeit in a much smaller proportion) towards the direct
financing of the Neptune Court property (we pause to observe,
parenthetically, that, if these additional reasons were not taken
into account, the Judge's decision with respect to the Neptune
Court property would, in fact, have been rather generous). In
arriving at our decision, we also bore in mind the husband's
indirect contributions (see also NK v NL ([21] supra) at [37])
as well as the fact that he had contributed significantly more
towards the direct financing of the Sennett Road property

• Pre-2007 sentiments
– Still relevant? As long as they do not say that there is a 50-50 starting position
– Court included towards equality of division only for assets acquired by spouses
during marriage
– Party by whose assets were acquired should get the larger portion
– AS far as the motivation behind 1996 amendments; s 112 would truly equalize non-
fin contributions

Lau Loon Seng v Sia Peck Eng [1999] 2 SLR(R) 688; [1999] SGHC 166

The parties married in 1957, had three children and divorced in 1998. In 1972, the couple
set up a retail business to sell books, magazines and stationery with the wife as sole
proprietor. The wife looked after the home, attended to their three children and managed
the business while the husband continued to work as a shop assistant. The business became
the distributor for a Hong Kong company in 1976. The husband left his job and joined the
business. He took charge of wholesale business while the wife attended to the retail sales. In
1983 he became the sole proprietor in place of the wife. The business expanded further
under the management of the husband and a son of the marriage.

With regard to the division of matrimonial assets, the district judge ordered that the
matrimonial home be transferred to the wife and that an amount equivalent to 40% of the
value of the remaining assets be paid by the husband to the wife, with the cost of the
valuation to be borne by the husband.

28
The husband appealed. He argued that the district judge erred in (a) finding that the shares
in the names of third parties were held in trust for the husband and including them in the
list of matrimonial assets; (b) finding that the wife was entitled to "at least 50% of the value
of all the matrimonial assets"; (c) ordering the division of assets in the proportion decided;
(d) finding that the husband had not made full and frank disclosure of his assets and drawing
an adverse influence against him; and (e) ordering that the husband should pay for the
valuations to be carried out.

Held, allowing the appeal in part and varying the orders made:

– Equal division not applicable to all m-assets

o Even under the old s 106, which it replaced, the principle of equal division did
not apply to all matrimonial assets. T
o The reference to equality of division previously embodied in s 106(2) was
omitted in s 112 which instead provided for "just and equitable" division.
o Having referred to the parliamentary records to ascertain the purpose of the
change in terminology, it could not be said that the principle of equal division
was preserved in the just and equitable formulation.
 Where a marriage is of short duration with no children, the law must
not put judges under constraint to incline towards equality when
what is equal may not be just. Since the provisions call for judges to
take into account all circumstances and to order the division
according to what is just and equitable and that the circumstances for
consideration have also be enlarged and clarified, the provisions in
the Bill are fair. The Bill also makes explicit the recognition of the
home-making efforts of a spouse regardless of whether the spouse is
working or not.
o What was just and equitable had to be decided on the facts of each case: at
[15], [19] and [20].
– The judge ordered that the matrimonial home should go entirely to the wife as she was
accustomed to it and should be allowed to continue to occupy it. Whether to effect a
division of this matrimonial asset and whether it should be sold were distinct matters for
consideration.
o An order for division need not necessarily result in the sale of an asset as the
division could be effected by the payment by one party to the other party of
an amount equivalent to the receiving party's share in the asset, and one
party's share in one asset may be set off against the other party's share in
another asset. There was therefore no basis to treat the matrimonial home
differently from the other matrimonial assets which were to be divided: at
[22] to [24].
– The judge ordered a division, in a uniform 60:40 apportionment between the husband
and the wife of all the other assets. The judge, on appeal, deduced that it proceeded on
the basis that the wife was entitled to at least 50% of the value of all the matrimonial
assets. This was then adjusted to 40% after taking into account the transfer of the whole
of the matrimonial home to her.
– The judge, on appeal, did not find that an equal division was justified or just and
equitable because

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 o the wife had not been involved in the family businesses since 1982, 16 years
before the divorce, whereas the husband had been actively and continuously
in charge from 1983;
o her needs and expectations were not high, as the husband had been miserly
towards her during the marriage; and
o she had no debts or financial burdens.
– A 70:30 division in favour of the husband covering all the assets was just and equitable
and was so ordered
– Adverse inference
o When the court drew an adverse inference that the husband had more
means than he was prepared to disclose, it should make a finding of the value
of the undisclosed assets, because the drawing of the inference was not an
end in itself, but a basis for not accepting the value of the declared assets as
conclusive, and for employing a higher sum instead.
– It is for the party which is dissatisfied with it to show that it is unreasonable

– Whether the factors in s 112 detract from equality

• Equality is not de facto 50-50
– What happens when there is a spouse who is a homemaker
• >35% more common
• < 35%
• If assets are exceptionally valueless, spouse may get 100%
• 1 matrimonial asset usually 60-80% of value
• Marriage between 10 to 40 years MA between 150000 – 2.5million 
defacto 50-50
• Should there nevertheless be a defacto 50-50 position?
• Miller v miller (HOL) tendency for spouses to exaggerate the worth of their
contributions

• Closing thoughts

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