Daf Ditty Beitzah 21: Baleshet

The First Marauding Army - The soldiers of Count Mansfield live upon the
country

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§ They raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: With regard to the Jewish residents of a village
[baga] upon whom the authorities imposed the obligation to supply flour and bread to the gentile
military troops serving in the area, what is the halakha with regard to baking it on a Festival?
Rav Huna said to them: We examine the matter: If those villagers can give bread from the
soldiers’ quota to a child and the soldiers are not particular about it, then each and every one
of the loaves is fit for a Jewish child, and therefore it is permitted to bake them. But if the soldiers
do not allow anyone else to partake of their bread, it is prohibited to bake the loaves for them on
a Festival.

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The Gemara challenges Rav Huna’s lenient ruling: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: There was an
incident involving Shimon the Timnite, who did not come on the night of the Festival to the
study hall. In the morning, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava found him and said to him: Why did you
not come last night to the study hall? He said to him: A military unit on a search mission
[balleshet] came to our city and wanted to pillage the entire city. We slaughtered a calf in
order to placate them, and we fed them with it and had them depart in peace.

RASHI

JASTROW

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MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: A person may not heat water on a Festival in order to wash his
feet unless it is also fit for drinking, as they hold that kindling a fire on a Festival is permitted
only for the sake of preparing food, but not for washing. But Beit Hillel permit one to kindle a
fire on a Festival even for washing. A person may kindle a large fire and warm himself at it.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: This halakha with regard to a fire, who
taught it? Is it a statement accepted by all, including Beit Shammai, and Beit Shammai
differentiate between benefit affecting one’s entire body and benefit affecting a single limb,
so that they agree that kindling a fire to heat one’s entire body is similar to kindling a fire for food
and is therefore permitted, while heating water to wash one’s feet remains prohibited? Or perhaps
Beit Hillel taught it, but Beit Shammai do not differentiate between the two cases, and they
permit kindling a fire on a Festival only for the purpose of preparing food.

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Come and hear a proof from an explicit baraita: Beit Shammai say: A person may not make a
fire and warm himself at it, but Beit Hillel permit it. It is clear from here that the latter clause
of the mishna was taught only in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

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MISHNA: Rabban Gamliel was stringent about three things in accordance with the
statement of Beit Shammai: One may not insulate hot food on a Festival for Shabbat ab initio,
but rather one ought to do so on the eve of the Festival; and one may not set up a metal
candelabrum that fell on a Festival; and one may not bake thick loaves on a Festival but only
thin ones, due to the great effort entailed in preparing the former. Rabban Gamliel said: From
the days of my father’s household they would never bake thick loaves on a Festival, but only
thin ones. The Sages said to him: What shall we do for your father’s household, who were
stringent with themselves but lenient with all of the Jewish people, to allow them to bake thick
loaves and cakes baked on coals.

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that Rabban Gamliel would not permit the
insulation of hot water on a Festival ab initio, the Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If
it is referring to a case where he prepared a joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin], what is
the reason that Beit Shammai prohibit it? And if it speaks of a case where he did not set aside
an eiruv tavshilin, what is the reason for the lenient ruling of Beit Hillel? Rav Huna said:
Actually, I will say to you that the mishna is referring to a case where one did not prepare an

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eiruv tavshilin, but Beit Hillel hold that the Sages nevertheless permitted him to prepare what he
needs for his basic sustenance.

The Gemara comments: And Rav Huna conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav Huna
said: With regard to one who did not prepare an eiruv tavshilin on the eve of a Festival, others
may bake one loaf of bread for him, and cook one pot of food for him,

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and kindle a lamp for him. They said in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak: They may even roast a
small fish for him. That is also taught in a baraita: With regard to one who did not prepare an
eiruv tavshilin, others may bake one loaf of bread for him, and insulate one pot of food for
him, and kindle a lamp for him, and heat one small jug [kiton] of water for him. And some
say: They may even roast a small fish for him.

Rava said: Actually, one can say that the mishna is referring to a case where one prepared an
eiruv tavshilin, and nevertheless, if he did not insulate hot food on the eve of the Festival for
Shabbat he may not do so on the Festival itself, because insulating hot food is different, as it is

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evident that he is acting with Shabbat in mind and not for the Festival. Beit Shammai view this
as a desecration of the sanctity of the Festival.

Summary

Introduction It is permitted to make a fire on Yom Tov in order that one can cook food. Our
mishnah discusses making a fire so that one can heat up water to wash one’s feet.

Bet Shammai says: a man may not heat water for his feet unless it is also fit for drinking. Bet
Shammai holds that labors that are permitted on Yom Tov because they are necessary for preparing
food are permitted only if they are done in the preparation of food. One may not heat water just to
wash one’s body. The only leniency for which Bet Shammai allows is that if one heats up water

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that is fit for drinking, one can also use it for other purposes. This is similar to cooking on Yom
Tov for the day after. If one can eat some of the food cooked on Yom Tov, one is allowed to cook,
knowing that there will be leftovers.

But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Hillel generally holds that labors permitted in order to prepare food
are permitted even if they are done not to prepare food. Hence, heating water is permitted whether
one does so for drinking water or to wash one’s feet.

A man may make a fire and warm himself at it. The final clause in the mishnah seems to also
go according to Bet Hillel. It is not only permitted to heat water in order to wash one’s feet, but
one may also even make a fire just to keep warm. The reason we might have thought that Bet Hillel
prohibits this is that in this case there is no water being heated, water which one could claim one
might drink in time of great thirst. This section lets us know that Bet Hillel allows one to make a
fire on Yom Tov even if there is no chance that it will lead to food preparation.

Shabbat halachot are consider with greater stringency by the rabbis than halachot of the
Festivals. So the rabbis ask questions to better understand these specific, Festival halachot.1

Are we permitted to offer an animal - or dough - that is owned jointly by a Jew and a Gentile? Are
we permitted to bake for military troops (not Jews) on a Festival? We walk through a number of
stories to illuminate the rabbis' thinking. These include a number of rabbis, but Rav Huna is the
central leader in these examples.

Rav Huna may even misdirect the great Rabbi Avya the Elder when he answers his question with,
"look, a raven flies through the sky". The rabbis wonder about this evasion - was it intentional,
based on exhaustion? Was it a metaphor? Was it a mystical reference? Rav Huna teaches us that
troops intent on looting a Jewish village were appeased when a rabbi prepared food for them. But
if that animal was fit for Jewish consumption, was it permitted to the Gentiles? And if the animal
was not allowed to Jews, were Jews permitted to prepare it on a Festival?

Rav Chisda and Rabba disagree about whether or not a person is flogged for improperly preparing
or serving loaves of bread that are fit for dogs and for people. These rabbis bring up the principle
of ho'il, or 'since'. Interestingly, one of the explanations for Rav Chisda's argument involves ho'il,
but we learn that Rav Chisda did not himself subscribe to that principle!

The rabbis use their logic to prove an opinion about whether "for you" is referring to Jews and not
Gentiles or Jews and not animals. But in addition to their proof, a wonderful interpretation of a
baraita is elucidated. We learn the baraita says, "only that which every soul must eat, that shall
be done for you." Further, in Leviticus 24:18, we learn that "and he that kills the soul of an animal

1
https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/04/

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shall pay it." The rabbis understand this to mean that every being, animals included, has a
soul. How can we separate the human nefesh from the animal nefesh? How should we understand
that the Torah tells us that animals are created for our human use if each animal and each person
has a nefesh?

Following their (and not my) line of reasoning, the rabbis look to understand when and how we
can give food to dogs on Festivals. If a date pit, for example, is unfit for human consumption, it
should be muktze, set aside. We are not allowed to derive any benefit at all, even for our dogs,
from things that are muktze. How could we give the pit to a dog? Or even carry it or throw it to
the fire?

The rabbis ask about inviting Gentiles to Shabbat and Festival meals. Shabbat meals are permitted,
as ruled by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. But Festival meals are not. We cannot prepare extra food
for a Gentile - though we can send food to his or her home on a Festival. These rulings seem to
rest on the mitzvot - the obligations of Jews. We are obliged to do certain things including eating
specific foods, lighting candles, etc. as part of these meals. If we gear our meals toward the
inclusion of Gentiles, we are not focusing on our obligations; our fulfilling of the
mitzvot. Somehow this rings hollow to me, but the reasoning might be sound for people in
particular cultures/places/times.

The rabbis had looked at how we might carry date pits by placing them on bread. They now
wonder about moving other items that are muktze, from cups to chamber pots. The rabbis want to
understand how these things might affect whether or not we share our sacred meals with
Gentiles. A wonderful idea is posed by Mareimar and Mar Zutre. They would tell a visiting non-
Jew, if you enjoy your meal with us, that is good. If not, we will not be able to go to any extra
trouble on your account. Honesty might be the way to maintain good relationships - and to educate
people who might otherwise have reason to become anti-semitic!

A new Mishna teaches about an argument between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The former tells
us that water cannot be heated to wash our feet on a Festival unless it is also fit for drinking. Beit
Hillel tell us that we can light a fire for washing on a Festival - in fact, we can even light a fire to
warm ourselves.

And another Mishna just as our daf concludes. It teaches us about the three things that Rav Gamliel
is stringent about when considering Beit Shammai's opinions. First, one does not heat anything to
insulate food on a Festival ab initio. Second, one does not right a fallen metal menorah on a
Festival. Third, one does take the time and effort to bake thick loaves and instead bakes thin loaves
on a Festival.

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The Gemara questions whether or not we are considering this heated food as an eiruv tavshilin, or
a connector between domains. That conversation has just begun as our daf ends.

COOKING OR BAKING FOR A "NOCHRI" ON YOM TOV

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

Rav Chisda rules that on Yom Tov one may not bake dough which is owned by both a Jew and a
Nochri. Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi (21b) rules that one may not cook food for a Nochri on Yom
Tov even when the food is owned entirely by the Jew and the Jew may take some for himself if he
wishes. Rav Huna disagrees and permits one to bake for a Nochri even when the food is owned
entirely by the Nochri, as long as the Nochri permits the Jew to give some of the food to a Jewish
child.

What is the Halachah? May one cook for a Nochri on Yom Tov, and if so, under what
circumstances?

(a) RASHI (DH Kol Chada) and RABEINU CHANANEL explain that Rav Chisda and Rebbi
Yehoshua ben Levi argue with Rav Huna and maintain that the right to take a portion for himself
does not permit a Jew to cook for a Nochri, because his actual intention is to cook for the Nochri.
If a Jew wants to cook food for himself, he must cook it individually; he may not cook for the
Nochri and keep part of it for himself.

Why, though, may a Jew not bake bread for the Nochri while he bakes bread for oneself? The
Gemara earlier (17a) says in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar that one is permitted to bake
many loaves in one oven on Yom Tov even though he does not need all of them.

According to one answer cited by the RAN and TOSFOS, these Amora'im follow the view of a
Tana who argues with Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar.

Alternatively, the Ran and Tosfos answer that the law is different when some of the dough belongs
to a Nochri, because in such a case the Jew may not eat all of the loaves even if he wants to eat
them. In contrast, in the case earlier (17a) the Jew owns the dough, and he may eat all of the loaves
if he wants.

(b) TOSFOS (DH Chazinan) suggests that all of the Amora'im agree that the Jew, when possible,
should bake his bread by itself and he should not bake any bread for the Nochri with his own bread
on the pretense that he could eat some of it. The only reason why Rav Huna permitted a Jew to
bake bread for the Nochri soldiers was because the flour was supplied by the king, and thus the
Nochrim would not have permitted the Jews to bake bread for themselves from that flour because
doing so would be like stealing from the king. However, once the Jews baked the flour for the

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/beitzah/insites/bt-dt-021.htm

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Nochrim, the Nochrim did not care if they give some of it to a child. In such a case, one is permitted
to bake bread for Nochrim and for Jews together. Rav Chisda agrees with Rav Huna on this point.

Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, however, argues with Rav Huna and does not permit a Jew to bake for
a Nochri even when it is not possible to divide the dough and bake for oneself alone.
According to Tosfos, cooking for soldiers (who are Nochrim) is similar to cooking for a guest who
is a Nochri. In both cases, one cannot simply separate some of the raw food and cook it for himself
without cooking for the Nochri, because he needs to cook something for the guest to eat.
Nevertheless, Rebbi Yehoshua prohibits a Jew from cooking for a Nochri.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Yom Tov 1:14) cites the opinions of both Rav Huna and Rav Chisda
as the Halachah. (The Rambam rules like Tosfos, that the two do not disagree.) He permits a Jew
to bake for soldiers if they allow him to give a loaf to a child. However, in the preceding Halachah
(1:13) the Rambam rules like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that one is not permitted to invite a Nochri
to one's home on Yom Tov lest he cook extra for the Nochri.
Why does the Rambam rule that one may not invite a Nochri to one's home lest he cook for the
Nochri? It should be permitted to cook extra food for the Nochri, since one cannot cook food for
himself without providing for the Nochri as well. It should be the same as Rav Huna's case and be
permitted!
Apparently, according to the Rambam cooking with one's own ingredients for a Nochri is
prohibited since one may cook food for himself even if he decides not to cook for the Nochri at
all. In the case of the king's men, this is not so; had he decided to eat all that he cooked by himself,
he would not have been allowed by the king to cook the flour at all. For this reason it is permitted
to cook for the Nochri as well as for his child (who will be given a loaf after all is prepared) - since
that is the only way to cook this food for his child.

How does the Rambam understand the Gemara later (21b) which explicitly states that Rebbi
Yehoshua ben Levi argues with Rav Huna ("u'Peliga...")? The MAGID MISHNEH cites
the RAN who suggests that perhaps the Rambam did not have the word "u'Peliga" in his text of
the Gemara, and thus he learned that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi does not argue with Rav Huna.
Alternatively, even if the Rambam's text included the word "u'Peliga," the Rambam learned that
Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi argues not with Rav Huna but with the immediately preceding Sugya
(which discusses the status of items given to recipients (such as animals) for whom one may not
do a Melachah of Ochel Nefesh on Yom Tov).

The RA'AVAD endorses the Rambam's ruling, although he points out that the RIF rules
differently.

MAY ONE ADD FOOD FOR A "NOCHRI" ON YOM TOV

The Gemara says that one may not invite a Nochri to his home on Yom Tov lest he add more food
to the pot and cook specifically for the Nochri ("Shema Yarbeh Bishvilo").

Why is one prohibited from adding food to the pot for the Nochri? The Gemara earlier (17a)
teaches that one is permitted to add as much food as he wants to one pot, even if he does not intend
to eat all of it on Yom Tov.

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(a) The RASHBA and the RAN explain that the concern is that he will cook more for the Nochri
in a separate pot.

(b) The ME'IRI answers that the concern is that he will add meat to the pot after it is already on
the flame. In that case, the Jew performs the act of cooking (putting meat on the flame) solely for
the Nochri. He is permitted only to add extra meat before the pot is placed on the fire.
According to both explanations, the prohibition for a Jew to cook for a Nochri apparently is only
mid'Rabanan, because mid'Oraisa the principle of "Ho'il" (20a) states that since guests might arrive
at one's home during Yom Tov, he may cook more food for them now even though no guests
actually come. The Rabanan prohibited one from inviting a Nochri to his home lest he cook more
food for the Nochri. Even though the Gezeirah not to invite a Nochri seems to be a Gezeirah to
safeguard another Gezeirah (that is, one may not invite a Nochri lest he cook food for him, an act
which itself is prohibited only mid'Rabanan), both enactments are actually parts of a single
Gezeirah. Alternatively, the Rabanan were concerned that one might cook non-kosher meat in a
separate pot for the Nochri, in which case "Ho'il" does not apply (since the food is not fit for Jewish
guests) and cooking such food for a Nochri is forbidden mid'Oraisa (and thus the Gezeirah not to
invite a Nochri to one's home on Yom Tov was enacted to safeguard an Isur d'Oraisa). (RAN)

WASHING ONE'S ENTIRE BODY ON YOM TOV

Beis Hillel permits one to heat water on Yom Tov for the purpose of washing his feet.
Why is one not permitted to heat water to wash his entire body?

(a) TOSFOS (DH Lo) says that the allowance to heat water to wash one's feet is based on the
principle of "Mitoch" (which Beis Hillel espouses (12a)). "Mitoch," however, permits only
Melachos which are "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." One may not heat water in order to wash his entire
body because washing the entire body is not an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" -- not everyone
considers it pleasurable to wash his entire body daily.

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Yom Tov 1:16) explains that the reason for why one is permitted to
heat water to wash his feet is because washing is a subcategory of eating and drinking (just as
spreading oil on one's body is a subcategory of those acts). Therefore, the allowance of Ochel
Nefesh permits one to heat water on Yom Tov for the sake of washing.

One may not heat water to wash his entire body because of the Gezeirah of "Merchatz" (Shabbos
40a). The Rabanan prohibited washing the entire body on Shabbos lest one heat the water on
Shabbos. They extended the Gezeirah to Yom Tov so that people would not confuse Shabbos with
Yom Tov and mistakenly think that heating water on Shabbos is permitted.

The RAMBAM is consistent with his opinion (ibid. 1:4) that the only Melachos which "Mitoch"
permits are Hav'arah and Hotza'ah, but not Bishul. Bishul is permitted only for actual Ochel
Nefesh, and therefore the Rambam maintains that one may cook water for the sake of washing,
because washing is considered a need of Ochel Nefesh.

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HALACHAH: The Halachah follows Beis Hillel. One may not heat water on Yom Tov to
wash his entire body, but he may heat water to wash his feet as well as his hands and face
(SHULCHAN ARUCH OC 511:2). (With regard to whether one may wash his entire body
with water heated before Yom Tov, see the RAN here, SHULCHAN ARUCH (loc. cit.),
and REMA.)

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:3

Rav Huna was asked to rule on the following question: when the government requires villagers to
bake for soldiers who are stationed in the area, are they permitted to do so on Yom Tov?

Rav Huna ruled that it would be permitted to bake for the soldiers if the bakers were permitted to
give bread to the Jewish children who were around, as well. In such a case, every loaf of bread
could be seen as potentially being baked for the children. If the soldiers were careful that none of
the bread be given away and insisted that it all be delivered to the soldiers, then it would be
forbidden to bake for them.

A parallel story was told about Shimon ha-Timni who did not appear in the bet midrash one day
on Yom Tov. When Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava asked where he had been, Shimon explained that
a baleshet had come to the town and threatened to steal the possessions of the inhabitants. To save
the town a calf was butchered and prepared, and the baleshet left them in peace. Rabbi Yehudah
ben Bava objected to this story, pointing out that the passage permitting cooking on Yom
Tov (Shemot 12:16) only allows it lahem – for you – not for non-Jews. As the Gemara explains,
in this case the animal that was prepared for the baleshet was not kosher, so it could not have been
eaten by Jews and the entire preparation was for non-Jews only.

The term baleshet apparently refers to an army unit that was sent to search for valuables (in modern
Hebrew the word balash means a detective). Usually these units were employed in enforcing
payment of taxes, which made it essential for the local communities to stay on good terms with
them, since their broad mandate often allowed them to stray well-beyond their official tasks into
violence and looting.

Rabbi Akiva allows ‫ מלאכה‬to be done on Yom Tov for the sake of animals.4

The rule is that the halachah follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva when he argues with another
individual, but not when he argues with more than one person.

3
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_beitzah_2127/
4

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Nevertheless, Tosafos (‫ )לכלבים ולא לכם ה”ד‬explains that in this case we follow the opinion of Rabbi
Yose HaGalili who prohibits performing any ‫ מלאכה‬for animal food. The reason for this is that the
Mishnah in Challah (1:8) follows his opinion, where we find that dough may not be baked on Yom
Tov if it will not be eaten by the shepherds, and it is prepared only for the dogs. Ba’ar HaMaor
argues on Tosafos, and he rules that the halachah follows Rabbi Akiva. He notes that not only do
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yose HaGalili argue about whether cooking food for an animal is
prohibited on Yom Tov, but even handling food of an animal hinges upon this ‫ מחלוקת‬.

Rabbi Akiva is of the opinion that food designated for animals is treated the same as human food,
and it is therefore not muktzah. Rabbi Yose HaGalili understands that food for an animal may not
be cooked, and such food is muktzah as well. Because we find many Mishnayos which regularly
describe handling of such food (e.g., Shabbos 156b) , we see that the halachah is according to
Rabbi Akiva.

The Mishnah in Challah which was cited by Tosafos is not enough to disregard all of these
Mishnayos. Shulchan Aruch rules according to Rabbi Yose HaGalili in regard to prohibiting
cooking or any other ‫ מלאכה‬for the sake of one’s animal. However, Rema notes that handling food
for an animal is permitted. We do not link the halachah of doing ‫ מלאכה‬and that of the food being
muktzah as the Ba’al HaMaor had suggested.

[R’ Yehudah ben Bava] said to him, I wonder whether your loss outweighs your gain because the
Torah says, “For you,” and not for non- Jews. Rav Moshe Isserles (1), the Rema, rules that one
does not have to spend more than one-fifth of one’s assets to fulfill a positive commandment. On
the other hand, in order to avoid violating a prohibition one must forfeit all his assets.

Rav Tzvi Hirsh Eisenstadt (2), the Pischei Teshuva records a dispute how to categorize a
prohibition that is a derivative of a positive commandment (‫)עשה מכלל הבא לאו‬. According to some
opinions, the critical question is whether we are dealing with a positive commandment (‫( עשה‬or
whether we are dealing with a negative prohibition (‫) לאו‬.

Mishnas Chachamim, however, maintains that the critical issue is whether the violation is
transgressed actively or passively. Normally one who transgresses a negative prohibition must
perform an action and one who transgresses a positive commandment does so by behaving
passively. In the case of a ‫ לאו עשה מכלל הבא‬, the ‫ עשה‬is violated by an action and is therefore treated
like a prohibition rather than a positive mitzvah. Thus, concludes Mishnas Chachamim, one is
obligated to forfeit all his money to avoid violating a ‫ הבא לאו עשה מכלל‬.

Rav Mordechai Sholom Schwadron (3) the Maharsham, cites our Gemara as proof to the position
of Mishnas Chachamim. The prohibition against cooking on Yom Tov is a ‫ עשה מכלל הבא לאו‬the
prohibition is derived from the Torah’s use of the word ‫— ”לכם‬For you.”

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 From this Chazal derive that one may cook for Jews but not for non-Jews. Nonetheless, R’
Yehudah ben Baba told Shimon HaTimni that he should have forfeited all his money rather than
cook for a non-Jew on Yom Tov.

Thus we see that a ‫ מכלל הבא לאו עשה‬is considered for this matter a ‫ לאו‬.Others4 dispute this
conclusion and the issue has no clear resolution.

In the Mishnah on our daf we find that Rabban Gamliel ruled stringently in accordance with three
opinions of Beis Shammai. Regarding the last of the three opinions mentioned, taking care to avoid
making a thick batter on Yom Tov, Rabban Gamliel defended his position by stating, “In my
father’s house, they always took care to only prepare a thin batter instead of a thick dough.” The
Chachomim responded, “Your family ruled stringently for themselves.

But for others, they were lenient.” Sometimes we find that the stringencies adopted by tzaddikim
were not intended to be emulated blindly by other people. Someone once came to Rav Dovid of
Skvere, zt”l, and spoke about a number of his own spiritual practices to the tzaddik, clearly seeking
approval. “I’m stringent about immersing every single day, and I also fast often,” the man said.
The Skeverer Rebbe heard his visitor out patiently, and then asked, “Tell me—why do you follow
these practices?” The man answered, “Why? Because these are the practices of the tzaddikim, and
I want to follow in their footsteps!”

Rav Dovid nodded understandingly, and then said, “So you really want to emulate the ways of
tzaddikim, do you?” “Yes, of course,” assented his visitor. Rav Dovid continued, “If so, you must
first refrain from doing those forbidden acts that they avoid. Then you can go and do the extra
avodos that they do!”

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Rabbi Elliot Goldberg writes:5
On our daf, the conversation about the permissibility of particular labors on a festival continues
with a question from Rav Avya the Elder to Rav Huna. The question is a bit technical, but it’s the
response that calls out for an explanation.

Rav Avya asks:

If an animal is owned in partnership, half of it belonging to a Gentile and half of it to a Jew,

what is the halakhah with regard to slaughtering it on a festival?

You might think that, on a festival, a Jew would be forbidden to slaughter an animal if ownership
was split between the Jew and a non-Jewish partner. Since half of the animal belongs to a non-
Jew, and the non-Jew is not celebrating the festival, that half of the animal is muktzeh (set aside).
And, since animals come in units of one, you could argue that the entire animal should be
considered muktzeh. But:

Rav Huna said to him: It is permitted.

The Gemara has already established that animals can be slaughtered on a festival if they are going
to be eaten on the holiday. Ritual slaughtering always yields some parts of the animal that will not
be consumed because they are not kosher. In his response, Rav Huna presumes those parts of the
animal that a Jew can’t eat therefore belong to the no-Jewish owner.

Based upon Rav Huna’s response, Rav Avya asks about a similar case:

And what is the difference between this case and that of vow offerings and gift offerings?

Similar to the case of jointly owned animals, these sacrifices each yield some meat that will be
sacrificed upon the altar (i.e. “owned” by God) and some that will be eaten (i.e. “owned” by the
owner and the priest). So, Rav Avya asks, why is it not also permitted to offer these “jointly
owned” sacrifices on a festival?

What a great (or maybe, typical) talmudic question, you might be thinking, can’t wait to hear the
answer.

Rav Huna: Look, a raven flies in the sky.

Huh?

The commentators offer a wide range of explanations. Some say that Rav sought to distract Rav
Avya — “Hey look, a raven!” — as a way to change the subject and avoid the question. Others
suggest that Rav Huna was offering a critique: “The case you raised is not at all relevant here —

5
Myjewishlearning.com

18
you might as well have pointed out that a raven was passing by; that would have been just as
relevant.” Either way, it seems to be dismissive.

Rav Huna’s son is taken aback by his father’s treatment of Rav Avya, a respected elder, and
demands an explanation. Rav Huna responds:

What should I have done for him? Today I am in a state best described by the verse: Let me
lean against the stout trunks, let me couch among the apple trees. (Song of Songs 2:5) — and
he asked me about something that requires reasoning.

Rav Huna is having a bad day. He is tired and would rather kick back in his shady orchard than
puzzle through a complex question — the sort rabbis ordinarily find energizing. But some days,
even the rabbis aren’t so interested in talmudic argumentation.

Ideally, Rav Huna would have said this more kindly: “Great question! Can I ponder it a bit and get
back to you tomorrow?” Instead, he was impatient and condescending. Once again, the Talmud
catches a rabbi in a human, less-than-perfect moment and records it for posterity.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:6

On our daf (Beitzah 21a) we read that Rav Avya the Elder asked Rav Huna a technical and

theoretical question about the laws of Yom Tov concerning slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov

that is partially owned by a Jew and partially owned by an idolater.

Notwithstanding the fact that, as Rashi explains, Rav Huna had just delivered a lengthy public

shiur and was exhausted, he answered Rav Avya and ruled that this is permitted.

However, Rav Avya then asked Rav Huna a further follow-up question concerning why this

permissive answer differs from the law of slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov that has been vowed

and donated to the Temple which Rav Avya presumed was forbidden?

6
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

19
At this point, Rav Huna cryptically responded to Rav Avya with the words ‫ עורבא פרח‬- ‘a raven

flew by’, which is understood by Rav Chaim Soloveitchik (as quoted in Likutei Batar Likutei,

Drashot Vol. 1 p. 26) to be a veiled reference to the story of Noach where Noach sent out a raven

to determine whether there was dry land, but which didn’t bring back a clear response (see

Bereishit 8:7). In this same spirit, by invoking the term ‘a raven flew by’, Rav Huna communicated

to Rav Avya that – at least at this point in time - he was not going to get an answer from him for

his question.

Once Rav Avya left, Rabbah the son of Rav Huna then asked his father why he didn’t provide an

answer to this second question especially given the esteem with which Rav Huna held Rav Avya

the Elder. To this, Rav Huna answered by quoting a verse from Shir HaShirim 2:5, saying: ‫אני היום‬

‫''''סמכוני באשישות רפדוני בתפוחים‬.

Since these words literally mean ‘I am today [feeling the need for you to] “sustain me with dainty

cakes, spread apples about me’’’, it seems, as Rashi suggests, that given Rav Huna’s exhaustion

having just delivered a lengthy public shiur, he was feeling weak and hungry and that only after

he ate could he focus his attention in answering this technical question of Rav Avya.

However, it should be noted that elsewhere Chazal (see Sofrim Ch. 16) interpret the phrase ‫סמכוני‬

‫ באשישות‬as referring to Halacha, while ‫ רפדוני בתפוחים‬refers to Aggada. Given this explanation, it

may be that what Rav Huna was saying to his son was that while he was not able or was not in the

mood to discuss detailed and technical halacha (which, as he proceeds to add, is ‫מלתא דבעיא טעמא‬

– something that requires detailed explanations), he was prepared to discuss Aggada.

20
Admittedly, this explanation is mere conjecture. Still, it resonates, because just as there are times

when I am in the mood for detailed halachic study and analysis, there are other times when I’d

much prefer immersing myself in aggadic thought and deliberation, and when I am in the mood

for one, it is not always easy to immediately move into the gear of the other.

Ultimately, Torah comes in different shapes and sizes, with some parts of Torah more comparable

to ‘cake’ and other parts more comparable to ‘apple’. And just as each of us connect to different

foods and often at different times, so too, each of us connect to different parts of Torah at different

times. And it is when we learn what we want, just like when we eat what we need, we – like Rav

Huna – then feel restored.

Cooking on Yom Tov for the Next Day

Rav David Brofsky writes:7

Cooking on Yom Tov for a Weekday

As we discussed previously, the Torah permits cooking or performing

other melakhot on Yom Tov for the sake of food preparation. The Talmud (Beitza 21a), however,
does place certain limitations upon the allowance of okhel nefesh. For example,
the gemara prohibits cooking for non-Jews or for animals on Yom Tov. In addition,
the gemara discusses whether one may cook on Yom Tov for the following weekday.

First, the gemara (Pesachim 46b; see also Beitza 21a) cites a debate regarding whether one
may cook, mi-de’oraita, on Yom Tov for the following day.

It was stated: [With regard to] one who bakes [food] on a Festival for [consumption on]
a weekday, R. Chisda said: He received lashes; Rabba said: He does not receive lashes.
R. Chisda said: He receives lashes, [because] we do not say that since (ho il) if guests
visited him, it would be fit for him [to eat on the Festival itself]. Rabba said: He does not

7
https://etzion.org.il/en/halakha/orach-chaim/holidays/cooking-yom-tov-next-day-1-marbeh-be-shiurim

21
 receive lashes, [because] we say that since [if guests visited him, he could serve them this
food].

Rabba maintains that we may view one who cooks on Yom Tov for a weekday as if he in some
respect is cooking for Yom Tov itself, due to the principle of ho’il, since (ho’il) if guests visited
him, it would be fit for him. In other words, since guests may visit this person after he has cooked
on Yom Tov, and he would then serve the food that he originally cooked for the following day to
these guests, we view one who cooks on Yom Tov for a weekday as one who cooks for Yom
Tov itself. R. Chisda, however, rejects this principle, stating that cooking on Yom Tov for the next
day is prohibited mi-de’oraita.

The Rishonim debate whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabba

(Rif, Pesachim 15a; Rambam, Hilkhot Yom Tov 1:15;

Ramban, Milchamot Hashem, Pesachim 14b-15a; Rosh, Pesachim 3:6) or R. Chisda (Rabbeinu
Efraim, cited by Ramban in Milchamot Hashem; Ba’al Ha-Ma’or, Pesachim 14b-15a).
Practically, however, both opinions agree that one may not cook on Yom Tov for the next day; the
question is whether the prohibition is mi-de’oraita (R. Chisda) or mi-derabbanan (Rabba).

Cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbat

Although the Talmud clearly prohibits cooking on Yom Tov for the next day,
the gemara permits, under certain circumstances, cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbat.
The mishna (Beitza 15b) describes how one who prepares an eiruv tavshilin before Yom Tov may
cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat. Before we discuss the details of this halakhic mechanism, we must
first examine the halakhic foundations for permitting cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbat.

The gemara cited above continues:

Said Rabba to R. Chisda: According to you, who maintain that we do not say ho’il, how
may we bake on a Festival for the Sabbath? On account of eiruv tavshilin, [R. Chisda]
answered him. [Rabba questioned:] And on account of an eiruv tavshilin we permit a
Biblical prohibition?! [R. Chisda] responded: By biblical law, the Shabbat needs may be
prepared on a Festival, and it was only the Rabbis who forbade it, lest it be said that you
may bake on a Festival even for weekdays; but since the Rabbis necessitated an eiruv
tavshilin for it, he has a distinguishing feature.

The gemara assumes that the permissibility of cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbat is understandable
according to Rabba, who maintains that mi-deoraita one may cook on Yom Tov for the next day.
The gemara questions, however, how this would be permissible according to R. Chisda, who
maintains that cooking on Yom Tov for the next day is biblically prohibited. How could the
rabbinically instituted eruv tavshilin permit a biblically prohibited activity? The gemara explains
that R. Chisda maintains that tzorkhei Shabbat na’asin be-Yom Tov mi-de’oraita, Shabbat needs

22
may be prepared on a Festival. Since it was the Rabbis who forbade this practice, they were able
to permit it through the execution of an eruv tavshilin.

What is the basis for R. Chisda’s assertion that one may cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat?
Rashi (s.v. mi-de’oraita) explains that an adjoining Yom Tov and Shabbat are considered to be
kedusha achat one long day. Therefore, he writes, just as one may cook for Yom Tov on Yom Tov,
he may cook for Shabbat as well. The Ri, however, cited by Tosafot (47a, s.v. ve-i), offers a
different approach. He explains that since one is commanded to prepare for Shabbat
(see Kiddushin 41a; see also Ha-Amek She'eila 169), and this mitzva may only be fulfilled on Yom
Tov in this situation, preparing for Shabbat is actually considered to be a Yom Tov need, and is
therefore permitted on Yom Tov.

Both Rabba and R. Chisda maintain that mi-de oraita one may cook on Yom Tov for
Shabbat, but the Rabbis prohibited preparing on Yom Tov for Shabbat. Since the need to prepare
for Shabbat on Yom Tov is considered to be a she’at ha-dechak (extenuating circumstances), the
Rabbis permitted preparing on Yom Tov for Shabbat when one first performs an eiruv tavshilin.

The Rishonim raise a practical difference between the opinions of Rabba who maintains
that cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbat is biblically permitted due to the principle of ho’il and R.
Chisda who maintains that it is biblically permitted due to the principle of tzorkhei Shabbat na’asin
be-Yom Tov. Tosafot suggests (s.v. Rabba) that according to Rabba, if one prepares the food too
late in the day for it to be eaten by guests, the reasoning of ho’il would not apply. Thus, such
cooking would be prohibited even mi-de’oraita.

If, like Rabba, we accept the reasoning of ho il and reject that of tzarkhei Shabbat
na asin be-Yom Tov, it is prohibited to cook on late Friday afternoon of Yom Tov for Shabbat;
this is how R. Avraham Gombiner (1633-1687) rules in his Magen Avraham (527). Furthermore,
he explains that it is customary to begin Shabbat early when Yom Tov falls out on Friday, in order
to ensure that people do not cook so close to dark. Although many Acharonim, including
the Mishna Berura (527:3), cite this stringency, the Mishna Berura (see also Bi’ur Halakha 527)
writes that in extenuating circumstances, one may rely upon those who rule in accordance with R.
Chisda (see Rambam Hilkhot Yom Tov 6:1; see also 1:9 and 1:15) and prepare food for Shabbat
even close to the evening. The Arukh Ha-Shulchan (527:3) reports that this is not the custom is
not to be concerned with this stringency.

Permissible Methods of Cooking on Yom Tov for the Next Day - Marbeh Be-
Shi’urim

Although one may not cook on Yom Tov for another day, even for Shabbat,
the gemara suggests two methods through which one may cook on Yom Tov for another
day: Marbeh Be-Shi’urim and Eruv Tavshilin. The gemara teaches:

Our Rabbis taught: One may not bake on the first day of a Festival for the second. In
truth they said: A woman may fill the whole pot with meat, although she only needs one

23
 portion and a baker may fill a barrel with water, although he only needs one handful,
but as for baking he may bake only what he needs. R. Shimon ben Elazar says: A
housewife may fill the entire oven with loaves, because bread is baked better in a full
oven. Said Rabba: The halakha is as R. Shimon ben Elazar. (Beitza 17a)

R. Shimon ben Elazar permits one to cook larger quantities than one needs on Yom Tov in order to
prepare for the following day. As long as one cooks or bakes a larger quantity in the same pot or
oven, this is not considered to be cooking for the next day and is permitted.

The Rishonim grapple with a number of fundamental and practical questions.

First, why is it permitted to cook additional food on Yom Tov for the next day, while
regarding Shabbat, the gemara seems to prohibit cutting a stem with more figs than one needs to
aid a sick person (Menachot 64a)? In both cases, one is performing a permissible act (cooking
on Yom Tov or performing a melakha for a sick person) but doing more than necessary. The
Rashba (Beitza 17a, s.v. memaleh) explains that mi-de’oraita, marbeh be-shiurim is permitted
both on Shabbat and on Yom Tov. The Rabbis, however, prohibited marbeh be-shiurim on
Shabbat, when the prohibition of melakha is more severe, and did not prohibit marbeh be-
shiurim on Yom Tov.

The Ran (Rif 9b, s.v. u-miha), however, distinguishes between cooking on Yom Tov and
performing a melakha for a sick person on Shabbat. He explains that there is an essential difference
between the nature of pikuach nefesh, the permission to violate a prohibition in order to save a life,
and the permission to cook on Yom Tov. He offers two explanations.

In his first answer, he explains that on Shabbat, the prohibition of melakha is ‘dechuya’
suspended or set aside in order to save a life. Therefore, one may only do that which is absolutely
necessary in order to save the life. On Yom Tov, however, certain melakhot which pertain to okhel
nefesh are ‘hutra’ completely permitted and therefore it is even permissible to add on to
the melakha. In his second answer, the Ran explains that since the Torah permitted certain actions
for the sake of okhel nefesh, one is not required to weigh and measure in order that one does not
cook more than one needs.

There may be a practical difference between these two reasons. The Acharonim discuss the
following question: If one carries an item on Yom Tov for a permissible reason, may he carry other
items that are not needed as well? For example, may one carry a key chain on Yom Tov that
contains keys needed on Yom Tov along with others that are not? Seemingly, according to the first
reason, which maintains that melekhet okhel nefesh are ‘hutra’ i.e. as long as one carries for the
sake of okhel nefesh, the action is completely permitted, and it should not matter what or how
much one carries. According to the second reason, however, the halakha of marbeh be-
shiurim does not indicate that certain melakhot are absolutely permitted on Yom Tov, but rather
that one need not account for every quantity that one carries for Yom Tov, and therefore although
one may add carry more food than necessary, one may not carry items which have no use on Yom
Tov.

24
 R. Moshe Feinstein writes that one may carry a full pack of cigarettes on Yom Tov, even
though one may not intend to smoke all of them (Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:103). Based on
this responsum, the Shemirat Shabbat Ke-Hilkhata (19:6, n.14) assumes that R. Feinstein would
permit carrying keys that are not needed on Yom Tov as well. In a later responsum, however, R.
Feinstein rules that one may not carry a key chain with extra keys (Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chaim
5:35). Others (see Teshuvot Ve-Hanhagot 1:348, for example) permit one to carry a key chain with
additional keys on Yom Tov.

The Acharonim also disagree as to when the gemara s case of adding more food to a pot
is permitted. The Tur (503) cites a debate regarding whether one may add additional food even if
one explicitly states that his intention is to cook for the next day. The Beit Yosef explains that
Rashi (s.v. memale) holds that one may add extra food because the action is performed in one
effort (ke-chad tircha sagi). Others, such as the Maggid Mishna (Hilkhot Yom Tov 1:10), rule that
one may be marbeh be-shiurim, adding more meat even after the food has been placed on the fire,
because the additional food enhances the taste of the entire dish. The Beit Yosef notes that the Tur
concludes in accordance with the latter explanation (and against the opinion of the Rokeach, 298).
Thus, one may add food even after explicitly stating his intention to prepare food for the next day,
since the extra food enhances the entire dish regardless of his intention. Rashi, however, who
explains that marbeh be-shiurim is permitted because it is performed in one exertion, might
maintain that if one explicitly declares his intentions, even though it is performed in one action, it
would still be prohibited.

The Tur concludes by citing the Ittur, who prohibits increasing the quantity of food after
one has already eaten, as that certainly constitutes an act of cooking for the next day.

The Shulchan Arukh (603:1) rules that one should only add food before the morning meal.
After the meal, the food is clearly added for the next day, and to add more food is thus strictly
forbidden. After the fact (be-diavad), however, the food would still be permitted. The Mishna
Berura (5) rules that the food must also be cooked at one time and not added later. Furthermore,
he adds (12) that one should not increase his efforts in order to prepare for the next day. Therefore,
for example, one should not prepare and fry extra chicken cutlets, as this requires extra effort, and
they are cooked separately.

Finally, the Acahronim question whether the entire scenario described by

the gemara refers to one who intends to eat some of the food on Yom Tov or to merely taste the
food in order to be able to add additional food to be eaten the next day (see Magen Avraham 2
and Mishna Berura 7). The Mishna Berura records that it is its customary to be lenient, although
one who is strict regarding this matter should be blessed.

25
 Meknes Morocco by Moulay Idriss

Women Heroines of Torah Study As portrayed by rabbi Joseph

Mesas
Zvi Zohar writes:81

The issue of a Jewish woman's right to learn Torah - and the options that should be available to
her in order to truly exercise such right - continues to this day to be a topic of debate and the subject
of disagreements between contemporary halakhic authorities. In the 1970's rabbi Moshe Feinstein
ruled outright that women should not be taught Torah at all. However, if they nevertheless studied
the Written Torah (i.e., Bible) they would not be considered as if 'studying obscenity' – while if
they studied Mishnah, they would indeed be so considered, since they are forbidden to study the
Oral Torah.2

Dramatic developments in the realm of Torah study by women have occurred since then, especially
in Israel during the recent two or three decades.3 Nevertheless, these changes are widely regarded
as a post-modern feminist phenomenon. It is therefore of great interest to see earlier sources that
express a highly positive view of women devoting themselves to the highest levels of Torah study.

8
https://law.biu.ac.il/sites/law/files/shared/segel/mesaswomentorahheroinesfornashim.pdf

26
Rabbi Joseph Mesas' lesson on the first mishna in Avot ch. 6 is a fine example of such a positive
view, and it is to the analysis and discussion of his teaching that this article is devoted. But first, a
few words introducing Rabbi Mesas' biography and his Torah writings.

View of the historical city of Tlemcen, Algeria

Rabbi Joseph Mesas9

Rabbi Joseph Mesas was born in 1892 in Meknes, Morocco, where he received a broad Torah
education and was ordained as qualified to serve as a dayyan (judge in a rabbinic court). From
1924 to 1939 he served as the rabbi of Tlemcen, Algeria. In 1940 he returned to Meknes where he
was appointed judge in the rabbinical court. Later he was also appointed president of the all-
Moroccan rabbinical tribunal for adjudication of disputes concerning rabbinical serara, a position
that was bestowed only upon those recognized for outstanding probity.4 In 1964 he made Aliya
and was appointed Chief Rabbi of Haifa, a position in which he served until his death in 1974.

9
Joseph Mesas (Mesas), the scion of a distinguished Sephardi rabbinical family and the son of Rabbi Ḥayyim Mesas, was born in
1892 in Meknes. In 1912 he participated in the establishment of a new institution for rabbinical training in Meknes, founded on the
initiative of Rabbi Zeʾev Wolf Halperin, who was also the founder of the Em Habanim educational organization. In 1924 Mesas
accepted a position as rabbi of Tlemcen in Algeria. He returned to Meknes in the spring of 1940 and was appointed dayyan, a post
he retained until 1964, when he made aliya and was elected chief rabbi of Haifa,

27
Rabbi Mesas had a broad Torah education, and was in addition keenly interested in other areas of
human knowledge and endeavor - including history, medicine, science, technology, politics, etc.
He saw intellectual openness as a religious value and regarded Torah erudition that was ignorant
of the accomplishments of human culture as flawed. In his commentary on the words of
Ecclesiastes (7, 11) "Wisdom is good with an inheritance, yea, a profit to them that see the sun",
Rabbi Mesas offered the following explanation:

Rabbi Mesas was also a preacher and a poet. His writings reflect his comprehensive scholarship
and his detailed and original consideration of a range of questions that arose at the interface
between North African Jewry and the modern European Western world.

Many of his writings remained in manuscript form, and the following are those that were
published:10

Rabbi Joseph Mesas' original and wide-ranging creativity has not yet received the scholarly
attention it fully merits.6 This article focusses on one aspect of rabbi Mesas' thought, by analyzing
a lesson on Pirqei Avot he taught in Meknes in the early 1950's. The text under consideration was
the opening mishna of the 6th chapter of Pirkei Avot ('Ethics of the Fathers') – a chapter that sings
the praises of Torah study and of those engaged in it:

10
Responsa Mayyim Ḥayyim (vol. 1 Fez, 5694/1934, vol. 2 Jerusalem, 5745/1985); Geresh Yeraḥim on the laws of divorce
(facsimile of the author's manuscript, Jerusalem, 5749/1989); Zevaḥ Todah on the laws of ritual slaughter (printed facsimile of the
author's manuscript from 5689/1929, Jerusalem, n.d.); Naḥalat Avot – lessons and sermons on Ethics of the Fathers (vol. 1-8,
Jerusalem 5731/1971 – 5747/1987); Otzar haMikhtavim – Collected Correspondence (vol. 1-3, Jerusalem 5728/1968 – 5735/1975);
Ner Mitzvah, on matters of Hanukkah and other timely issues (Fez 5699/1939); Vayizkor Joseph – a Passover Hagadah (facsimile
of the author's manuscript from 5677/1917, Haifa 5739/1979); Bigdei Yesh'a – on the prayers and customs of the Sukkot holiday
(Jerusalem 5750/1990)

28
The reader has certainly noted that the entire text is written in the masculine: The person who
studies Torah is a man, and as a result of this study he merits all those wonderful virtues, strengths,
and character traits that Rabbi Meir lists in detail. And what of a woman who wants to study Torah?

Who Merits Many Things?

Early in the summer of 5713/19539 rabbi Mesas opened a class on Ethics of the Fathers by saying
that one needs to take note of the word "Kol"10 in the beginning of Rabbi Meir's words – what
does that word add to the content of the sentence? He replies that the general function of the word
"Kol", here and elsewhere, is to make a statement more inclusive. Rabbi Meir could have simply
said "he who studies Torah for its own sake"; by opening with the word "kol" he seeks to expand
the category of those who merit these things and to include among them also those who at first
glance seem to be excluded. To whom, then, is he referring?

29
Halakhic tradition has ruled that the commandment to study Torah does not obligate women; Rabbi
Mesas acknowledges this and specifically declares that this is indeed the case. But he differentiates
between Torah study as an obligation and Torah study as a source of virtue and merit and holds
that the study of Torah possesses great value and significance, whether the one studying it is
commanded or not. Moreover, Rabbi Mesas explains that the "many things" merited by those who
study Torah for its own sake are not a reward received in return for observance of a commandment.
Rather, these "many things" are "natural" positive consequences that follow from the quality and
essence of "engaging in Torah for its own sake".12

The women that Rabbi Mesas refers to as exemplars are divided into three categories: Biblical
figures – Devorah and Ḥulda; women from the Talmudic period – Ima Shalom and Beruriah; and
women from the Middle Ages. The latter include women from Rashi's family – his sister Chilit,
his daughter (who is nameless), and Miriam (wife of Rashi's grandson, Rabeinu Tam) – as well as
another woman from Rashi's circle – Ḥana, sister of the Tosafist Rabbi Yitzḥak Bar Menaḥem.13

The passage gives the impression that these women were generally acknowledged by traditional
sources to have been scholars, but examination of those sources reveals another picture. For
example, the notion that Ḥulda's prophecy was bestowed upon her by virtue of her Torah erudition
is moot in the Talmudic tradition. According to one opinion her husband, Shalum Ben Tikvah "was
among the great men of his generation, and he used to perform righteous deeds day in and day
out… and as a result of his righteous deeds the Holy Spirit resided in his wife."14 A second
tradition gives no explanation at all as to why Ḥulda merited prophecy.15 A third view indeed
presents Ḥulda as learned: Yonatan translated the words that describe the prophetess Ḥulda – "she
dwelt in Jerusalem in the second quarter (bamishneh)" (Kings II, 22, 14) as "she sat in Jerusalem
in the house of study",16 i.e., in the Beit Midrash. But even Yonatan, who presented Ḥulda as
learned, did not state that this is why she merited prophecy. Thus it is clear that Rabbi Mesas made
two cumulative exegetical choices, in order to link Ḥulda's prophecy to her study of Torah: first,
he opted for Yonatan's position in attributing to Torah wisdom to Ḥulda, and then determined that
this wisdom was the reason that she merited Divine inspiration. Similarly, his determination with
regard to the reason Devorah merited prophecy was also not necessitated by the sources.17

30
Among the two women mentioned by Rabbi Mesas who lived during the Tanaitic period, Ima
Shalom18 and Beruriah, only Beruriah is clearly presented as exceptionally learned in Torah.
Rabbi Mesas does not refer to relevant Talmudic sources about Beruriah, but instead points his
readers to the entry "Beruriah" in the Otsar Yisrael Encyclopedia. 19 This might reflect
ambivalence with regard to other aspects of her persona, as reflected in Talmudic sources.20

The entry Nashim in Otsar Yisrael is distinctly apologetic and reads like a paean to the virtues of
the Jewish woman. While the author of the entry admitted that "there were some among the sages
who thought that women were at a lower level than men", he invested great effort to give the
impression that this was a minority opinion, and that women were very positively regarded, both
in the Bible and among Jewish sages throughout the generations. However, he held a conservative
stance with regard to women's social role, and with regard to the structure of the family: "Nature
limited women's traits to dwelling in the home and caring for all its internal needs…. The woman
should cook and sew and weave for herself and for her husband and children, and the husband
should support them through a craft or business".21 Further on it is said that it is because of the
wonderful way that Jewish women were (and are) treated, "that they show no inclination to join
the cult of women demanding for themselves legal status and equal rights to men in all matters of
state (Suffrage)". Considering the article's characteristics, it is worthy of note to see how Rabbi
Mesas extracted only the specific information that suited his needs, and subsequently presented
his audience with a quite non-conservative position with regard to the right of Jewish women to
study Torah.

So far we have seen how Rabbi Mesas presented examples of learned women, some of whom lived
in the Land of Israel during the time of the Bible or the Talmud, and some of whom lived in
eleventh and twelth century France. However, in his introduction to Naḥalat Avot, Rabbi Mesas
states that when teaching classes on Ethics of the Fathers he frequently included "stories from the
lives of exemplary individuals (tzadikim) … because stories are a powerful means of awakening
people and motivating them to the service of the Lord who dwells on high".22 Many times in that
multi-volume work, he cites such tales from manuscripts that were shown to him or that he had
discovered. 23 The current lesson is a case in point: after referring to women of earlier times, rabbi
Mesas devotes a major part of his teaching to two stories he found in the manuscript of book, that
portray two women much closer in place and time.24 We will now present these tales and analyze
their implications with regard to the value and status of a woman who studies Torah.

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The Story

The story is placed in Algiers, in "the time of the Gaon Rabbi 'Ayyash". The 'Ayyash family was
a well-known rabbinic family in Algiers; its most famous member was Rabbi Yehuda ben Yitzhak
'Ayyash, who presided over the rabbinical court in Algiers between the years 1728-1756, and it is
most likely he to whom the tale relates.25 If so, the tale unfolds around the second quarter of the
eighteenth century.

The heroine of the story is a beautiful young woman, daughter to a wealthy father; she was also
very learned in Torah. Her beauty, her wealth, and her wisdom made her a very sought-after match,
and many wanted to marry her. However, she categorically refused to consider any suitor, because
marriage would drastically reduce the time available to her to study Torah. The figure that she
adopted as her role model, and whom she undoubtedly would not have known about had she herself
not been learned, is the Talmudic sage Ben 'Azzai, who throughout his life refused to marry,
claiming "What can I do? My soul yearns for Torah".26 The norm in traditional Jewish society
was that a daughter should not interfere with the choice of her future husband, instead accepting
the match arranged for her by her parents.27 In the story before us, the young woman's expertise
in Torah literature enabled her to deviate from these norms, relying on a source from within the
Torah tradition itself.

Her father, on the other hand, was sure that daughter's future well-being was contingent upon
marriage and attempted to change her mind. When he saw that his efforts to convince her were of
no avail, he turned in his despair to Rabbi 'Ayyash, assuming that his learned daughter would
accept the words of the sage, even if she rejected those same words when they came from him.
The daughter agreed to meet with the rabbi, but her learning enabled her to construct a strong
argument refuting conventional societal attitudes, by employing one of the thirteen modes of
classic Torah interpretation – qal ve-ḥomer. 28

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Rabbinic tradition sees God's words in the book of Genesis "Be fruitful, and multiply, and
replenish the earth, and subdue it"29 as the source for a man's obligation to bring into the world a
minimum of a boy and a girl (with an implicit obligation to marry a woman for that purpose).
Although God's words cited above seem to be directed to men and women alike, Talmudic tradition
identified the male as bearing the specific obligation to fulfill this commandment, because finding
a partner was an active endeavor, and it was socially accepted that men were the initiating and
active gender.30

Our story's heroine knew all this, and on its basis she constructed a "qal ve-ḥomer" argument: The
obligation to be fruitful and multiply is the men, and despite this if a man's soul desires Torah he
is permitted to refrain from fulfilling this commandment and to study Torah. If this is the case,
then a fortiori I, who am not commanded to be fruitful and multiply, am permitted to study Torah
and to refrain from getting married!

Rabbi 'Ayyash challenged this position:

From Rabbi 'Ayyash's response it is evident that he understood the Talmud's logic concerning Ben
'Azzai in the following manner: Ben 'Azzai found himself under two concurrent obligations that
he experienced as contradictory – to study Torah and to be fruitful and multiply. Since he felt able
to fulfill only one of them, Ben 'Azzai chose to study Torah, and not to father children.32 However,
Rabbi 'Ayyash claims, once Ben 'Azzai forfeited his obligation to have children, he could devote
himself to fulfillment of the commandment to study Torah, for which he would be greatly
rewarded; whereas if the young woman before him decided not to marry and have children, she
would nevertheless be under no obligation to study Torah, and thus (unlike Ben 'Azzai) would
receive no reward for doing so. That being the case, what point would there be to her Torah study?
The young woman responded spontaneously that despite her not being obligated to study Torah,
she would receive Heavenly reward if she chose to study, "for a woman too has a reward for
learning", in Maimonides' opinion.33 While phrasing herself politely by saying that rabbi 'Ayyash
"must have momentarily forgotten" Maimonides' position, she simultaneously delicately
demonstrated that in this case she was better versed in the sources than he.

Had our heroine's argument ended at this point, her debate with the rabbi would have been about
the relative advantage to be gained from a woman's reward for Torah study, vs. the loss incurred
by lack of family life. However, her next words shifted the discussion to an entirely different plane,
completely removing it from the formal halakhic categories of commandment, obligation, and

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reward: our heroine declared that she studied Torah not for any reward at all, but solely out of love
for Torah. At that very moment, the elderly rabbi recognized that the young woman standing before
him was a veritable embodiment of one of the most exalted ideal types in rabbinic culture – the
very figure praised by rabbi Meir in chapter six of Avot: "One who studies Torah for its own sake".
Immediately upon realizing the quality of her personality and the nature of the pathos that
motivated her, he stopped pleading with her:

The rabbi understood that the father of the young woman was a decent man, but far from the
extraordinary quality of his daughter. Thus, it was important to speak with him in utilitarian terms:
If he would permit his daughter to continue her study of Torah, this would be to the benefit of the
townspeople, as her merit would be great in the eyes of God, and this would protect them from
calamities that might come their way in the future. The father acceded – and the story proceeds:

The event anticipated by rabbi 'Ayyash's dream – raiders35 approaching the city of Algiers in order
to kill and plunder – was not rare in those times: invasions by foreign marine forces were a
recurring phenomenon in the coastal cities of North Africa during the early modern period (16th -
18th centuries).36 Two raids in particular were experienced by the Jews of Algiers as terribly
threatening, to the extent that when the raiders retreated in failure, the communal leadership
instituted an annual feast in commemoration and thanks for their salvation. Thus the Jews of
Algiers celebrated two 'local Purims': on the 4th of Heshvan to mark events of 154137 and on the
10th and 11th of Tammuz to mark events of 1775.38 Each of these days, as well as the Shabbat
preceding them, was also the occasion for recital of liturgical poems composed by local rabbis in
honor of the miraculous delivery experienced by the community. 39

However, rabbi 'Ayyash was no longer alive during the Spanish raid of 1775; and of the two events
described above, it was the 1541 attack of the Holy Roman Empire that was terminated by a

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catastrophic storm. Thus, the raid described in the manuscript cannot be identified with a specific
historical event. Rather, generic memories of those times were invoked by the tale's author, to
provide a dramatic context for the actions of the two central figures: rabbi 'Ayyash and our
outstanding heroine, lover of Torah.

Rabbi 'Ayyash's response to the dream's message was to sit in fast; armed action was not an option
for Jews of that time and place. For this reason the rabbi was surprised by the military response of
"the girl" in the beginning of the dream. Subsequent events enabled him to interpret the dream's
meaning: responding to the merit of her learnedness, God protected the city from a Spanish naval
invasion, by causing a storm to destroy the approaching fleet.

The story's last sentence emphasizes that the city was saved by the merit of that young woman –
i.e., not by Rabbi 'Ayyash's own virtue, righteousness and Torah study. Was the storyteller hinting
that this was because she studied Torah purely for its own sake, while his Torah and scholarship
earned him status and honor?

After this dramatic event corroborating and validating our heroine's choice, the narrator brings the
tale to a positive conclusion:

Did Rabbi 'Ayyash tell her of his dream, and inform her (or others) that the city was saved thanks
to her? We are not told. In any case, she did not change the course of her life, but remained totally
devoted to Torah – and unmarried. Upon reaching the age of sixty, she made another choice – one
considered extremely virtuous in traditional Jewish culture.40 She made Aliyah to the land of
Israel where she studied Torah for over forty more years, ending her life in peace and holiness.

Ethical and Religious Messages

What ethical and religious messages did Rabbi Mesas convey to his listeners and readers by means
of the above lesson on The Ethics of the Fathers? One message, mentioned above, is the lack of
contingence between the commandment to study Torah and the ideal of studying Torah for its own
sake. The obligation to study Torah is a commandment anchored in rabbinic Biblical exegesis and
linked to an established social structure. The obligation to study Torah can exist when it is binding
only upon men, and when women accept upon themselves to take care of everything else in the
home, thereby facilitating the establishment and functioning of the male Torah world. In contrast,
Torah study for its own sake is not an obligation or a commandment. Rather, it is a vocation, and
as such it is not dependent on an individual's position in the existing social structure or on birth
into a specific status. Rabbi Mesas's innovation is his unequivocal and radical explication of this
message, as well as his outright clarification that there is no difference in this matter between
women and men: "Whosoever studies Torah for Torah's sake alone merits many things".

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The second message is the frank discussion of what this first message implies with regard to the
institution of marriage. Rabbi Mesas never raises a doubt with regard to the importance of the
institution of marriage nor does he seek to undermine the validity of the conventional Jewish view
that men and women should marry, live together as a couple, and have children. However, he does
not at all agree that realization of this convention is the highest value according to which every
person must fashion his life. One who desires Torah study more than a partner is exempt from
marriage. Undeniably striking is the fact that Rabbi Mesas clarifies point blank that this option
relates not only to men. In fact, he goes even further: The significance of the "qal ve-ḥomer from
Ben 'Azzai" posed by the heroine of the first story is that the right to forego marriage in order to
study Torah is even more compelling for women than it is for men.

A third message that emerges from Rabbi Mesas's lesson has to do with the ideal paradigm that
should govern relations between men in positions of authority – whether fathers or rabbis – and
women who wish to choose a lifestyle that deviates from social norms. The three men described
in the stories before us – the father of the young woman from Algiers, Rabbi 'Ayyash, and the
father of the young woman from Tlemcen – do not even consider the option of forcing the young
women to marry against their will. This holds true even for the poor and needy father of the young
woman from Tlemcen, despite the fact that his own fate depended on his daughter's decision. They
treat the women's desires, attitudes, and opinions with great respect, even when they do not fully
understand them in depth. The differences in approach and opinion between these men and women
are worked through in a discourse filled with mutual respect. Ultimately, the men accept the stance
of the young women, and change their previously held perceptions. These men certainly were not
in agreement with the well-known phrase "A woman's mind is flighty".

A fourth lesson can be derived from the first story, with regard to the connection(s) between Torah,
Jews, and non-Jews. Not only the Jews of Algiers are saved by the first heroine's devotion to
"Torah for its own sake", but also the city's entire non-Jewish population. The Torah is not only a
blessing for the Jews but for all of God's creatures, whether or not they themselves are aware of
the virtues and holiness of the Torah. Rabbi Mesas' view regarding the value of the lives all human
beings in God's eyes, and about the positive contribution of Torah also to the well-being of
proximate non-Jews, is in line with what he wrote in other contexts about the appropriate attitude
of Jews toward non-Jews.43 In doing so he may be seen as echoing an ancient midrashic statement:
"… By merit of the Torah and those who study it the world will be saved". 44

Conclusion

Our study of Rabbi Mesas' teaching enables us to reflect on his views with regard to the tension
between the conventional social roles of women – endorsed by Jewish tradition -- and their
intellectual-spiritual aspirations. The heroines of both stories faced a choice between socially
mandated roles and their desire to study Torah. Each of these options is an object of erotic desire:
On the one, desire for sexual intimacy and family, and on the other hand desire for deep intellectual
and spiritual engagement. However, an underlying assumption of the narratives as posed is, that
the heroines cannot have both: they must choose either one or the other. Each heroine opted for
passionate devotion to Torah, and Rabbi Mesas unequivocally states that such a choice can be
entirely justified within the framework of Jewish tradition. It clearly follows from his portrayal

36
that after that justification is acknowledged -- as it should be -- the fact that such a choice by a
woman is socially unconventional should have no relevance at all in the eyes of anyone.

In these two tales, the role model who provides a paradigm for such complete devotion to Torah
at the expense of marriage is the great scholar Ben 'Azzai. But how many women in the past even
knew of the existence of such a person? How many women in the past repressed their desire for
Torah in order to satisfy their desire for intimacy and family? How many women never even dared
to consider the possibility that there could be other options, because their socialization led them to
feel that only one path was open to them? Indeed, it is quite likely that many of the all-male
participants of rabbi Mesas' weekly class in Ethics of the Fathers were themselves unaware of Ben
'Azzai – and it is virtually certain that none of them had considered the qal ve-ḥomer implication
for women of Ben 'Azzai's refusal to marry. By teaching this Mishna in the manner he did, Rabbi
Mesas was hoping to open the eyes of his listeners (and readers) to be aware of such options for
women. Perhaps women too would ultimately benefit from these men's expanded horizons….

All that being said, it must be recalled that in the rabbinic world Ben 'Azzai was an anomaly; in
general, scholars were expected to integrate commitment to Torah and commitment to marriage.
After reading Rabbi Mesas, one is moved to ask: Does traditional Judaism contain within it the
possibility of change, of social structures that can enable not only men but also women to integrate
family life and desire for Torah? Rabbi Mesas' portrayal of the heroines and of the men in their
lives indicates that such a change depends on a combination of two factors. On the one hand, the
willingness of women to defy religiously validated social convention for the sake of realizing their
own religious aspirations. And on the other hand, the willingness of relevant male figures –
husbands, fathers, and rabbis – to respect and support women who seek to follow that previously
uncharted path. In recent years we have begun to see a vanguard of women who are passionate
scholars of Torah. Having read Rabbi Mesas' teaching, we can have no doubt that he is looking
down from Heaven in benign satisfaction.

NOTES

1 Chauncey Stillman Professor of Sephardic Law and Ethics, Bar Ilan University; Senior Fellow, Shalom Hartman Institute,
Jerusalem. This article is an updated and revised rendering of an earlier version that appeared Pe'amim 82 (2000). I would like to
thank Israel Sykes for his translation skills that were of great help.

2 Responsa Iggerot Moshe, vol. 6, Yoreh De'ah, responsum 87(b).

3 For an overview of developments in women's Torah study in the U.S. during the last decades of the second millennium see
Fishman. And see especially ibid. at pp. 144-148, where she notes the impact of Israeli Orthodox institutions for women's study of
Torah upon the U.S. Modern Orthodox scene. For a survey of developments in Israel in recent decades, as well as the continued
opposition of many leading Orthodox-Zionist rabbis to women's study of Talmud (especially if it is at a high-level), see
Feuchtwanger, especially at pp. 5-29. Fuchs (2014) charts 20th century developments in the attitudes of Ashkenazic Orthodox
rabbis to women's Torah study.

4 Some of the individuals and families among the rabbinic leaders in Morocco were recognized as having the right to oversee the
management and functioning of different religious institutions. Such a right provided its owner with a considerable economic base,
as well as a great deal of honor (on this see Deshen). It is therefore not surprising that controversies tended to arise with regard to
the question of the right to run one institution or another. These controversies involved the religious leaders themselves, and a
special court was set up whose judges needed to combine extraordinary erudition, reputation among the rabbis, and public
recognition for integrity and ethical behavior.

5 Naḥalat Avot, sermon 454, p. 79.

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6 Two doctorates nearing completion promise to somewhat alleviate this situation: David Biton's work on the halakhic responses
of Moroccan rabbis to the challenges of modern times (Bar Ilan University) and Yehuda Maimaran's work on the educational-
halakhic thought of rabbi Joseph Mesas (Hebrew University).

7 Hebrew: Kol ha-oseq ba-Torah li-shmah.

8 The speaker (feminine in the Hebrew) is Wisdom, which was identified by the sages with the Torah – see for example Urbach,
p. 287.

9 The dating is based on the fact that in the previous sermon, number 441, the author summarizes the sermons and lessons that he
gave on Israel "Independence Day", and from their content it is evident that this was five years after Israel's establishment. From
this we can see that the sermon we are discussing was given soon after that, in the early summer of 1953.

10 Kol is usually translated as "all". Above, due to the requirements of English syntax, it is rendered as "anyone".

11 Naḥalat Avot, p. 13.

12 Study of Rabbi Meir's words in the Mishnah reinforces this reading. The things merited by the person who studies Torah is in
the area of the personality, quality traits, and religious virtues. There is no "reward" here of the kind usually found in discussions
of "reward and punishment". Thus it makes sense to interpret the expressions "malkhut u-memshala veḥikur din" (sovereignty,
dominion, and the faculty of searching in judgment) as referring to acquired capabilities in the realm of Torah exegesis and
discernment of the true law.

13 Rabbi Mesas combined here two different women mentioned under "women" in the Otzar Yisrael Encyclopedia: Rabeinu Tam's
sister Ḥana, and Rabbi Yitzchak Bar Menaḥem's sister Bilit.

14 Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer, chapter 33, s.v. Rabbi 'Azaryah says (folio 76a in the Warsaw 5612/1852 edition)
15 This exegetical stance can be attributed to those commentators who interpreted "she dwelt in Jerusalem in the second quarter"
literally – see in the next footnote. 16

16 The Yonatan translation is an Aramaic translation of the Bible, attributed by tradition to the Tana Yonatan ben Uzziel. The
prevalent scholarly opinion today identifies the Yonatan translation of the Prophets as a translation that was composed in the Land
of Israel in the first few centuries of the common era and underwent an additional editing in Babylonia during the Amoraic period
(my thanks to Prof. Menachem Cohen who made me aware of this matter). Comparison of the interpretations given by medieval
Bible commentators ad.loc. shows that some of them rejected Yonatan and a literal interpretation of the biblical text; these included
Rashi, Rabbi Yosef Caro, and Rabbi Yosef Kaspi ad.loc. Radak and Ralbag, however, followed the view of Yonatan.

17 Rabbinic sources generally agree that Devorah was a woman well-versed in Torah – see: Ḥidushei Ha-Ritva on Kiddushin 35b
s.v. "asher tasim bifneihem"; Ritva on Shevuot 31 s.v. shevuat ha'edut; Tosefot Ro"sh, ad.loc.; Tosefot on Gittin 88b s.v. velo lifnei
hediotot; Tosefot on Nida 50a s.v. kol hakasher ladun; Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, positive commandment 77. And see Zohar, part 3, 19b:
"Woe unto the nation who could find no one to judge them but a single female". However, I did not find any source stating that the
reason Devorah merited prophecy was her learnedness. See for example Tana Devei Eliyahu, beginning of ch. 9, where Devorah
is presented as having merited her prophecy because she convinced her ignorant husband to make thick wicks for the Temple
Menorah.

18 The source to which Rabbi Mesas refers (Shabbat 116a-b) presents Ima Shalom as intelligent and sharp-witted, but there is no
mention of her having been learned. For more on Ima Shalom, see Ilan.

19 Rabbi Mesas' citations from Otzar Yisrael indicate the authoritative status that encyclopedia achieved among many Torah
scholars, who regarded it as a "Kosher" Hebrew window into the world of enlightenment and science .

20For discussions of Beruriah's character and the significance of her literary construction in traditional sources, see for example:
Sarah; Drori; Gerwin; Hoshen; Levin Katz; Monikandem; Boyarin, pp. 181 ff.

21 Otzar Yisrael, entry "nashim", p. 117.

22 There are no page numbers.

23 For some examples see Naḥalat Avot vol. 1 pp. 58, 201, 289, 302, 321; vol. 3 pp. 32, 90, 111, 115, 311; vol. 6, pp. 88-89. 148,
169.

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24 For other lessons in which rabbi Mesas relates tales he found in manuscript or that were shown to him by others in whose
possession the manuscript was, see Naḥalat Avot vol. 1 pp. 58, 201, 289, 302; vol. 6, pp. 88-89.

25 On Rabbi Yehuda 'Ayyash see: Marciano, pp. 190-191; Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol. 3, col. 994. Rabbi Mesas relates tales in
which Rabbi 'Ayyash is a central figure also elsewhere in Naḥalat Avot; see e.g. Naḥalat Avot vol. 3 pp. 115-120; vol 5b p. 206;
vol. 6 p. 148; ibid. pp. 157-159. 26 The discussion between Ben 'Azzai and his colleagues is cited in Tosefta Yevamot, chapter 8,
7 [p. 26 in the Lieberman edition]; compare with Babylonian Talmud Yevamot 63b. Significantly, elsewhere in Tamudic literature
Ben 'Azzai holds that "A man is obligated to teach his daughter Torah" (Mishnah Sota 3, 4) – in direct opposition to rabbi Eliezer's
very negative view of women's Torah study (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 3, 4; Babylonian Talmud Yoma 66b). And see also Seḥayeq.

27 A classic description of traditional European Jewish society can be found in Katz; on the parents' choice of a husband see there,
p. 163 and beyond. With regard to Jewish society in Islamic countries, see for example Gabbay, pp. 121-126, who shows that in
Baghdad, even in the 1930's and 1940's, it was the parents who chose whom their daughter would marry, and their daughter
acquiesced (even if she was otherwise quite educated and independent).

28 A-fortiori.

29 Genesis 1, 28

30 Relying upon the word "vekivshuha" (and subdue it) in the biblical verse, rabbinic Midrash identified the commandment as
directed to the man because "It is the nature of a man to subdue but it is not the nature of a woman to subdue" (Yevamot, 65b). And
see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ishut 15,2; 'Arukh Hashulḥan, Even Ha'ezer, ch. 1 section 2. Note, that we have before
us an interesting example of a transition from social reality to normative ruling: Since in social reality men were the active ones,
the obligation to bring children into the world was placed upon them.

31 I.e., Shulḥan 'Arukh Yoreh De'ah. This work by rabbi Joseph Caro is cited here by Rabbi Mesas himself, as it quotes Maimonides'
view. For the original source in Maimonides' Mishneh Torah see note 27. <=33>

32 On Ben 'Azzai and the tension between having a family and studying Torah, see Boyarin, p. 134 and beyond.

33 Mishnah Torah, laws of Talmud Torah 1, 16.

34 The heavenly intervention is described by Rabbi 'Ayyash using turns of phrase reminiscent of the Biblical "Song of the
Sea"(Exodus XV). Thus, the Spanish ships "sank as lead in the mighty waters" (comp. Exodus XV:10); "And God saved … from
the hands of metzeirim" (compare: Exodus XIV:30). The latter verse describes the Lord as a savior from the hands of the Egyptians
(Mitzraim); the story before us alludes to the same verse, and by a play of words describes Him as saving from the hands of
oppressors (Metzeirim).

35 Hebrew "Baleshet" (cf. Mishnah 'Avodah Zarah 5, 6). In bTBeitzah 21a Rashi explains that this means "a big military force of
Gentile brigades who are scouting out opportunities for pillage". Our text thus employs this term in accordance with Rashi's
explanation.

36 On this see Wolff, pp. 299-307; Spencer.

37 On these events see Garnier, pp. 202-208.

38 On these events see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Algiers_(1775) (accessed on 18 May 2014).

39 For these liturgical creations see Qrovetz.In a lecture he gave in 1927, M.J. Kaoua discusses the historical events leading to the
two local Purim festivities of the Jews of Algiers (see: Kaoua).

43 See for example Mayyim Ḥayyim vol. 1 responsum 82; vol. 2 responsa 108(b), 109.

44 Shir Hashirim Raba 2:6.

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