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    of 2

    Maranan v Perez

    GR NO. L-22272

    June 26, 1967

    FACTS:

    Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and
    killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.

    Valenzuela was then prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found
    guilty. While the appeal was pending, Antonia Maranan, Corachea’s mother, filed an action to recover
    damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. In response, Perez and Valenzuela
    asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing the
    latter from behind. Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier like
    him was not liable. The trial court ruled against Perez and dismissed the claim against Valenzuela.

    ISSUE:

    Whether or not Perez is liable for the crime committed by Valenzuela while the latter was in the
    performance of his duty as driver of the taxicab?

    RULING: Yes, unlike Old Civil Code, Article 1759 of the New Civil Code expressly makes a common carrier
    liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers. It provides that:

    Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
    acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
    authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

    To be liable, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee’s duty. It is not a
    defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of its orders. Such
    liability is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from all assaults committed by
    its own employees. It is the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely that is the principle
    behind this.

    At least three reasons underlie the above rule. First, the special undertaking of the carrier requires that
    it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree or
    care prescribed by the law from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but
    above all, from the acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the passenger’s safety. Second the
    result of the carrier confiding in the servant’s hands with the performance of his contract to safely
    transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care
    prescribed by law. Third, as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of
    wrongful acts or negligence of its employees against the passengers since it, and not the passengers, has
    power to select and remove them. Accordingly, it is the carrier’s strict obligation to select its drivers and
    other employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability but also to
    their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

    In the case at bar, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in
    whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. The incident took
    place in the course of the duty of the guilty employee. As such, Perez is liable under Article 1759 of the
    Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against Valenzuela is correct as well. Maranan’s action was
    predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability
    is covered in the criminal case.

    National Food Authority v CA

    GR NO. 96453

    August 4, 1999

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