No. L-23815. June 28, 1974.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge

of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City,
respondent.
Attorneys; Counsel de oficio; Withdrawal as counsel de officio by attorney on the
ground of his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections;
When withdrawal not allowed.—There is the overriding concern for the right to
counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In
appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily
discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the
assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be
very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk
an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing,
should fulfill.

Same; Same; High degree of fidelity to duty required of one designated as counsel
de oficio; Reasons.—What is readily apparent, therefore, is that petitioner was
less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de ofido is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it
may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then
why a high degree of f delity to duty is required of one so designated.

Constitutional law; Right of the accused to counsel; Right to counsel could in

effect be rendered nugatory if withdrawal
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ledesma vs. Climaco

allowed.—The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to

reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel," there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against them. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." Thus is
made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed
to withdraw as counsel de oficio.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
     Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
     Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge

denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio.1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his
appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in
a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by
respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the
defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case."2 It was
likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was
previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio
counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to
counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In
appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily
discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to

________________
1 Petition, Annex B.
2 Ibid, Annex C.
VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974
Ledesma vs. Climaco

comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too,
even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is
likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for
him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good
standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was

appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was
counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of
respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent
Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of
the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume
or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November
6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he
instituted this certiorari proceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of

petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself, It began with a
reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the
proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then
respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16,1964 which reads thus: "In
view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of
October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue
appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on
Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who
are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion
for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as
Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since

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3 Petition, pars. 3-9.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ledesma vs. Climaco
October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not
to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby
designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963,
November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964, July 26,
1964, and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of
February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging
indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to
March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the
government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it
was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of
petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an
election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice
"would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel
de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful
of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers,
especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an
irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that
counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even
more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service
and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to
duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found
in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay
stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a
trade or

________________
4 Petition, Annex C.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.

VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974

Ledesma vs. Climaco

a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of
one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any
frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may
be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the
contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete
for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance
possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he
cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent
upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled filled."8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent
was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This
Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous
performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases * * *."10 Justice Sanchez in People

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8 Ibid, 186. Cf. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798; People v.
Solacito, L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61; People v. Serafica, L-29092-93, Aug.
28,1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Englatera, L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245;
People v. Aguilar, L30932, Jan. 29, 1971, 37 SCRA 115; People v. Estebia, L-26868,
July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 90; People v. Flores, L-32692, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 230;
People v. Alincastre, L-29891, Aug. 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 391; People v. Valera, L-
30039; Feb. 8, 1972, 43 SCRA 207; People v. Francisco, L-30763, June 29, 1972, 45
SCRA 451; People v. Espiña, L33028, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 614; People v.
Esteves, L-34811, Aug. 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 680; People v. Simeon, L-33730, Sept.
28, 1972, 47 SCRA 129; People v. Daeng, L-34091, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 221;
People v. Ricalde, L-34673, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 228; People v. Martinez, L-
35353, April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 509; People v. Silvestre, L-33821, June 22, 1973,
51 SCRA 286; People v. Busa, L-32047, June 25 1973, 51 SCRA 317; People v.
Alamada, L-34594, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103; People v. Andaya, L-29644, July 25,
1973, 52 SCRA 137; People v. Duque, L-33267, Sept. 27, 1973, 53 SCRA 132;
People v. Saligan, L-35792, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190; People v. Bacong, L36161,
Dec. 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288.

9 4 Phil. 298.
10 Ibid, 300.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ledesma vs. Climaco

v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-
appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a
duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as
in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability
in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance.
The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. * * * For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of
self-interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to
the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and
reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced.
His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was
rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if
it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed. so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic

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11 L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106.
12 Ibid, 109-110. Cf. Javellana v. Lutero, L-23956, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 717;
Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5 1967 21 SCRA 1.
13 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950).
VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974
Ledesma vs. Climaco

Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to

reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the
defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not
being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his
lack of enthusiasm for the task estrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did
point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith,
no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the
immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed,
considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself
sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with
zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession
in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of
legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to
court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of selfinterest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

     Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

     Barredo, J., did not take part.

________________

14 Cf. United States v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); United States v. Palisoc, 4 Phil.
207 (1905); United States v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912); United States v. Laranja,
21 Phil. 500 (1912); United States v. Ramirez, 26 Phil. 616 (1914); United States v.
Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); United States v. Custan, 28 Phil. 19 (1914); United States
v. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371 (1915); United States v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917);
People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil. 722 (1929).

15 Cf. Article IV, Section 19.

16 Section 20.

480

480

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ledesma vs. Climaco

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—a) Attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office.—The only
attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the Solicitor General
(Section 32, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court]). The lawyer involved, not being among them, remained as
counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-
appellant's counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was
substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the
defendant-appellant. (People vs. Williams, CAG.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28,
1963).

b) Right of accused to counsel.—The right of an accused in a criminal case to be

represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and
there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of
his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado,
L-2809, March 22, 1950). The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide
the accused with a counsel de oficio for such action as it may deem fit to
safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz
Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1960).

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 177 on Attorneys; and page 375
on Constitutional Law,

Batacan, D. Fl., Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1973 Edition.

Fernando, E.M., The Bill of Rights, 1972 Edition with 1973 Supplement. Ledesma
vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473, No. L-23815 June 28, 1974