CrimPro - 110 - G.R. No. 213847 Enrile V Sandiganbayan - Digest
CrimPro - 110 - G.R. No. 213847 Enrile V Sandiganbayan - Digest
CrimPro - 110 - G.R. No. 213847 Enrile V Sandiganbayan - Digest
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against
him;
The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the
ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law;
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail
arguing that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only
be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered;
The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail and his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration;
The Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail is a matter of discretion by the trial court. (NO)
RULING:
All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise,
bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995),
“such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for
the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a
hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
{Personal Comment} Please note that Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail is forwarded or argued as a matter of right. The
foregoing conditions that will classify bail as a matter of discretion of the trial court does not apply in this case.
Further, the Motion to Bail was granted not so much as whether it was a matter of right or discretion but more so in
consideration of Enrile’s age, health condition and with a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he
had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.