G.R. No.

204289

FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., Petitioner

vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari  is the Decision  dated February 22, 2012 and
1 2

Resolution  dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Visayas Station in CA-G.R.
3

CEB-CV No. 03030, affirming the Orders dated June 13, 2008,  November 4, 2008  and April 17,
4 5

2009  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 923.
6

Factual Antecedents

Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for
Negotiated Sale on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a residential lot with a two-storey
building (subject property) covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City, and
with Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 990100600931  and 990100600479  with a purchase price of
7 8

₱l,326,000. 9

In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)  appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on his
10

behalf, the sale of the subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated
Offer to Purchase  and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-
11

Come First Served Basis.  DBP then issued an Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 3440018  dated October
12 13

13, 2004, in the name of Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount
of ₱265,200, as initial payment for the purchase price of the subject property. During the
negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the transfer of
title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get rid
of the occupants of the subject property. 14

Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of ₱1,060,800, as evidenced by O.R. No. 3440451  dated 15

December 10, 2004. Thereafter, DBP, through its Branch Manager Jorge B. Albarillo, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale,  in petitioner's favor.
16

On December 21, 2004, petitioner made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and
documentary stamp tax (DST) in the amount of ₱99,450. DBP acknowledged the deposit and issued
O.R. No. 3440537. 17

Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to
the petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and issued a Manager's Check (MC) No.
0000956475  in the amount of ₱99,450.
18 19

In a Letter  dated February 21, 2006, petitioner through its counsel demanded from DBP to comply
20

with its verbal undertaking. He returned the MC and all pertinent documents affecting the sale of the
subject property to DBP.
DBP, through its Letter  dated April 22, 2006, disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and
21

reminded petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of
title of the lot in petitioner's name.

Meanwhile, Mancol, Sr. wrote a Letter  dated May 15, 2006 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
22

requesting for a detailed computation of the CGT and DST with penalties and surcharges thereof
affecting the sale of the subject property. The BIR, through its Letter  dated May 24, 2006 came out
23

with a detailed computation in the total of ₱160,700.88.

In a Letter  dated June 2, 2006, petitioner proposed to DBP that he will facilitate the payment of the
24

CGT and DST but DBP should shoulder the penalties and surcharges. The proposal, however, was
turned down. As of March 7, 2007, the total amount to be paid which is necessary for the transfer of
the title in petitioner's name ballooned to ₱183,553.61 and counting. 25

On August 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint  for damages for breach of contract against DBP
26

before the RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31. He prayed that DBP be found to have breached its
obligation with petitioner; that DBP be held liable to pay the aggregate amount of ₱160,700.88 and
surcharges which may be imposed by the BIR at the time of payment; that DBP be ordered to pay
damages and attorney's fees; and that DBP be ordered to return the MC dated February 8, 2006 for
₱99,450.

In its Answer with Counter-Claim,  DBP alleged that the terms of the
27

Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to
eject the occupants thereon.  Assuming that DBP's officials made such a promise, DBP alleged that
28

the same would not be possible since the petitioner did not give any money to DBP for other
expenses in going to and from Calbayog City. DBP likewise alleged that it is not the bank's policy to
work for the registration of the instrument of sale of properties.  DBP further claimed that petitioner's
29

unilateral act in issuing a check to DBP does not constitute as evidence to prove that DBP assumed
the responsibility of registering the instrument of sale. By way of counterclaim, DBP averred that
petitioner grossly violated the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale.  Petitioner failed to
30

pay, reimburse or assume the financial obligation consequent to the initiation and filing of the writ of
possession by DBP against the occupants. Petitioner's failure was contrary to his promise and
assurance that he will pay. Petitioner did not comply with the clear and express provisions of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and of the rules and procedures of sale on negotiation. DBP, thus, prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that petitioner be ordered to assume the
burden of initiating the ejectment suit and to pay DBP damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit
amounting to ₱200,000.

On February 20, 2007, the RTC issued an Order  declaring DBP in default by reason of its counsel's
31

failure to appear during the pre-trial and to file its pre-trial brief.

Trial ensued.

During the trial, Rodel Villanueva testified  that he was the one commissioned or ordered by a
32

certain Atty. Mar De Asis (Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and to bring the following
documents: a check worth PhP99,450.00, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, and the deed of
sale.33

Mancol, Sr. testified  that he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules
34

and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis on behalf of his son, by
virtue of the SPA.  He stated that after the execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP
35
verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause the
vacation of the occupants of the house and lot. Although he admitted that the verbal agreement
contradicted the negotiated rules and agreement.  He stated that DBP undertook to get rid of the
36

occupants, when its lawyer filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession  dated
37

January 11, 2005, which is pending in the RTC. 38

On April 14, 2008, the R TC Decision  ruled in favor of the petitioner, and ordered DBP to return to
39

petitioner the amount of ₱99,450 deposited to it for payment of the CGT and DST; to pay the
surcharges and/or interests on the CGT and DST as may be determined by the BIR from June 12,
2005 up to the date of payment; and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of ₱l5,000.
The RTC likewise dismissed DBP's counterclaim. 40

Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration  of the RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among others,
41

that the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were
based on facts relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge.

On June 13, 2008, the RTC Order  granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
42

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration  of the June 13, 2008 Order. For the first time, petitioner
43

alleged that through his father, Mancol, Sr., he entered into a contemporaneous verbal agreement
with DBP. He argued that since his father was his attorney-in-fact, then his father had personal
knowledge of all transactions involving the sale of the subject property. The motion, however, was
denied in the RTC Order  dated November 4, 2008. The RTC affirmed with modification its June 13,
44

2008 Order, to read thus:

WHEREFORE, this court finds no reason to disturb its order dated June 13, 2008, subject only to a
modification that [DBP] is directed to return to the [petitioner], the total amount of ₱99,450.00
deposited to it for the payment of the [CGT] and [DST], with interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from December 21, 2004 until its return to the [petitioner].

SO ORDERED. 45

DBP sought reconsideration  of the RTC Order dated November 4, 2008, which however, was
46

denied by the RTC in its Order  dated April 17, 2009. The RTC ruled that DBP has waived its right to
47

question the return of ₱99,450 to the petitioner since DBP failed to refute such an issue in the RTC
Decision dated April 14, 2008.

Both petitioner  and DBP  appealed the RTC Order dated June 13, 2008 and November 4, 2008,
48 49

respectively, with the CA.

On February 22, 2012, the CA in its Decision,  denied both appeals, the dispositive portion of which
50

reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeals filed in this case are hereby DENIED.
The assailed Orders dated June 13, 2008, November 4, 2008 and April 17, 2009 of the [RTC],
Branch 31 of Calbayog City in Civil Case No. 923 are AFFIRMED. Costs to be shouldered equally by
both parties.

SO ORDERED. 51
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,  while DBP filed a Motion for
52

Reconsideration,  seeking the reversal of the CA Decision dated February 22, 2012. Both motions,
53

however, were denied in the CA Resolution  dated September 27, 2012.

54

Henceforth, only the petitioner filed the instant appeal anchored on the following arguments:

I. THE TESTIMONIES OF [PETITIONER'S] WITNESSES, [VILLANUEVA] AND [MANCOL, SR.]

ARE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NOT HEARSAY EVIDENCE, AND THAT THEY
SUFFICIENTI.JY ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF A SUBSEQUENT ORAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN [PETITIONER] AND DBP TO (1) ARRANGE AND EFFECT THE
TRANSFER OF THE TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF [PETITIONER], INCLUDING PAYMENT
OF [CGT] AND [DSTs], AND (2) TO GET RID OF THE OCCUPANTS IN THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY[;]

II. UNDISPUTED RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHED THE

EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN MANCOL,
JR. AND DBP, AND THAT TO IGNORE THEM IS TO SANCTION VIOLATION OF MANCOL. JR.'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS[; AND]

III. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF' MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT. 55

The petition/ails.

The above assignment of errors make it evident that the only issue involved in this appeal is one of
fact: whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be
given probative value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale
contract, i.e., that DBP bound itself to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's
name; and, get rid of the occupants of the subject property.

We answer in the negative.

"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement
by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the purport of the written contract." 56

This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the
exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9  of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a
57

party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement. "Moreover, as
with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely object is deemed
a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained. 58

In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA,  the Court held that:
59

The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become
reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become
apparent only by reason of such answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence will
form part of the records of the case as competent and complete evidence and all parties are thus
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.  (Citations omitted)
60
Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth
exception under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement, by offering the testimonies
of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.

The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection against the said testimonies during the trial
since DBP was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.

This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to
the parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight. Admissibility of evidence
should not be confounded with its probative value.

"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade."  The 61

admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which
its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted in the case in
arriving at a decision as to the truth.  The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by
62

the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical
effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case.  "Admissibility refers to the question
63

of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue."  "Thus, a particular item of evidence
64

may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence." 65

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own
personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.  A witness may not
66

testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard.  Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has
67

heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written
statements. 68

The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence
that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.  A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed
69

fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value not from the
credit accorded to him as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of his information. 70

Guided by these precepts, Villanueva's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal
agreement between petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As admitted
by the petitioner, the alleged verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and Mancol, Sr., by
virtue of the SP A. Villanueva has no personal knowledge of such fact. His testimony related only to
the fact that Atty. De Asis ordered him to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and bring the following documents:
a check worth ₱99,450, the amount for the CGT, title, TD, and the deed of sale. None of Villanueva's
acts would suggest, even remotely, that he personally knew about the verbal agreement.

As correctly pointed out by the CA:

[Villanueva] did not personally witness the perfection of the alleged contemporaneous agreement
between Mancol, Jr. and DBP. Furthermore, he had no personal knowledge of its existence. His
testimony merely touched on the alleged denial by the Revenue Office of the payment of the [CGT]
on the subject property and the subsequent execution of a new deed of conveyance by the DBP. It is
clear then that his testimony did not bolster [petitioner's] allegation to any degree.
71

The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s testimony. Although the records show that by
virtue of an SP A executed by the petitioner, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase,
including the Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First
Served Basis, and that he made the initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of evidence to prove
that indeed, he personally entered into a verbal agreement with DBP. Upon being asked what
transpired after the delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mancol, Sr. simply answered that DBP
agreed to undertake the transfer of title of the lot, and to oust the occupants. There was no mention
as to who actually and personally appeared before DBP or any of its officials in order to forge the
alleged verbal agreement. Thus:

(DIRECT EXAMINATION by Atty. Elino Chin, counsel for

Witness: [Mancol, Sr.])

xxxx

ATTY. CHIN

Q After the delivery of this Exh. "H'', what transpired?

A The bank agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title and the payment of the [CGT] to get rid of the
present occupants of the house and lot.

Q You said that the bank agreed, is that in writing?

A Only verbal.

Q That does not contradict the negotiated rules and agreement?

A Yes, but there was a verbal undertaking for them to do what was agreed upon.

x x x x. 72

Additionally, the RTC aptly observed that:

[N]owhere in the records would also reveal that the agreement to arrange and effect the transfer of
title over the subject lot was entered into between [DBP] and [Mancol, Sr.], for and on behalf of the
[petitioner].

x x x The [SPA] authorizes [Mancol, Sr.] to represent the [petitioner] and negotiate before the DBP,
Catarman Branch on the invitation to bid on he sale of the lot covered by TCT No. 2041 scheduled
on October 13, 2004, as well as to sign or execute and receive any paper or document necessary for
said purposes. This explains why it was Mancol, Sr. who signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase
and the Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedure, and who paid to DBP the initial payment of the
purchase price on October 13, 2004 in [petitioner's] behalf. It was not established however whether
the subsequent payments and other transactions, including the act of entering into an oral
agreement with [DBP] that it will effect the transfer of the subject title, were also carried out by
Fernando Mancol, Sr. in behalf of [petitioner].
The [petitioner] fails [sic] to show with whom the [DBP] agreed to arrange and effect the transfer of
the title in his name.  Thus, as there is no showing that it was [Mancol, Sr.] who entered into such
1âwphi1

agreement with [DBP] or that he was personally present during the perfection of the agreement and
witnessed the same, any statement from the latter as to the circumstances relative to the perfection
of such oral agreement would indeed be hearsay. 73

Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf of petitioner, entered into a verbal
agreement with DBP, such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite petitioner's insistence,
the act of entering into a verbal agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The authority given to
Mancol, Sr. was limited to representing and negotiating, on petitioner's behalf, the invitation to bid on
the sale of the subject lot, which is specifically worded as follows:

I, FERNANDO R. MANCOL, JR., xxx by these presents do hereby name, constitute and appoint my
father Fernando M. Manco, Sr., as true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me, in my name, place and to
do and perform the following:

1. To represent and negotiate before the DBP Catarman Branch regarding the INVITATION TO BID
FOR NEGOTIATED SALE scheduled on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, the subject
Residential Lot with two storey building (TCT No. 2041) located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City;
and

2. To sign, or execute and receive any paper or document necessary for the above purpose.

x x x x.
74

There is nothing in the language of the SP A from which We could deduce the intention of petitioner
to authorize Mancol, Sr. to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP. Indeed, it has been held that
"[w]here powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties
are limited and are confined to those which are specified and defined, and all other powers and
duties are excluded."  Clearly, the power to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP is conspicuously
75

inexistent in the SPA.

To adopt the intent theory advanced by petitioner, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to that effect, would run afoul of the express tenor of the SPA. It would likewise be contrary to "the
rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to
grant only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor
deviate from the power of attorney." 76

It is axiomatic that this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the CA,
especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since this Court
is not a trier of facts.

All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution dated
September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 03030
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152807            August 12, 2003

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN,

DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ
TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS
OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS
COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H.
COMORPOSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece
of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
August 7, 2001 Decision and the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 60645. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Decision dated
22 June 2000 rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Su[r]."4

The assailed Resolution5 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:

"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No.
845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In
1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

"In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from
his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being
a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos
Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity
and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land
of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a
portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a
portion of Marcos Saez' property without paying any rental.
 "Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioners' tolerance.

"On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises
but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed
with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was issued by the
said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against
respondents.

"Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged
that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful
claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present
time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by
ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI
has already upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they [were]
the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set
aside the said decision. x x x"6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and
possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional
executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full
force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the
DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any
person.

According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious,
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The appellate court deemed
as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza
and Paulina Paran.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court's consideration:

"I

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional
executive director?
 "II

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial
Court's ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile
of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised
for the first time on appeal?

"III

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject
matter of this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?

"IV

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, 'neither is
there error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the
affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self
serving?'"8

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be discussed in reverse sequence.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional
director of the DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the claim of
respondents, was supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August 23,
1999,9 issued later by the DENR regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of the
earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act,10 the management and the disposition of public land is under the primary
control of the director of lands11 (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or
LMB),12 subject to review by the DENR secretary.13 As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to
intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not,
however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or
applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations.14 The power to determine who
has actual physical possession or occupation of public land and who has the better right of
possession over it remains with the courts.15 But once the DENR has decided, particularly through
the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these points
will normally prevail.16

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land remains
pending with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter
that may be addressed to the courts.
 Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because
the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida
v. Sales Jr.17 and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first
time on appeal.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x"18

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such,
they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or
authentic.19

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of
CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to
in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature
produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business
transactions.20

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director
has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997, certified
among others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x
x was not allocated to any person x x x."21

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it
as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to
take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as
the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been
marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order.22 The Certification was not
formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure23 nor jurisprudence24 would sanction the admission of evidence that
has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary
trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is
held.25

Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners' Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the
Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of
respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an
admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to
the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value
refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.26 Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.27

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies,
the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly
proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones
asserting an affirmative relief.28

Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription

Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of prescription proffered by
respondents. It is the former's contention that since the latter's possession of the land was merely
being tolerated, there was no basis for the claim of prescription. We disagree.

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support
their claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey
dated May 22, 1936.29 Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that
the contested lot had not yet been allocated to any person when the survey was conducted.30 The
testimony of petitioners' witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents' continued and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time.

Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45.31

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177407               February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in
turn, assailed the Orders2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative
Case No. 1882.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for
check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr.
Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests
revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-
functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.

On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin,
III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said
doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence,
private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to
"D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:

"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the
criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally,
this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document
marked as Annex ‘2’ to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;

"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997,
which is also marked as Annex ‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
 connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo
copy of the document marked as Annex ‘3’ which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which
is appended as such Annex ‘3’ to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x
Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.

"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination.

"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which
is also marked as Annex ‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of
the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the
typewritten final report of the same examination which is the document appended as
Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’ respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega
and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however,
the document which is marked as Annex ‘4’ is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of
Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex ‘1’ is a certified photocopy. Both documents are
of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit
‘D.’

Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of
exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not
properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He
added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

Dispositions of the Board of Medicine

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the
[BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:

"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of

[herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of
[therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may
serve in the resolution of this case.

"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the
respondents.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons
stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.

The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It
concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative
value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is
relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, assailing the BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:

WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE

FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND

DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD
THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT
BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A
PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.4

We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely
or finally disposes of the case.5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that the BOM
did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits
of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.

Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay;
and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.

We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.8

From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights
leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20,
Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The
Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not
prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10

As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive
rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of
Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,

but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxxx

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January
30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The
documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits
were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed
by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure.
To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both
in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered
by mandatory judicial notice.11

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a
matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature
involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,14 include the structural make-up and composition
of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys
before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical
locations.

Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.  Section 3 of Rule
1awphil

130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning
kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established
not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s
kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-
ray of her abdominal area.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15 Witness
Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits
"because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building."16 Ultimately, since the
originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence and,
thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178300               March 17, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y
VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision,1 dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution,2 dated 18 October 2006, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 affirming with modifications the Decision,3 dated 26
February 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case
No. 1611-M-99 finding herein accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y
Avena (Arnaldo) and Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of
death.

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

On 11 August 1999, an Information4 was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The accusatory portion of the information
reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses Domingo Reyes y
Paje, Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed as follows:

That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves
together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y
Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force
and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong
Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang
Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of
extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (₱5,000,000.00), that during the detention of
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully
strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs
in such amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court.

During their arraignment,5 appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to the
charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert Yao (Robert), Yao
San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien, Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous)
and Atty. Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies, taken together, attest to the following:
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and
Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren),
and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a
poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the
their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the
van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray
(Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant
Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male
companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took
the driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded
each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.6

After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants and their
cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of
the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions.7 Appellant
Flores, with the other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family
inside the vehicle.8

Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the
amount of five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong
Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion
left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the
van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry
farm and sought the help of relatives.9

Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous
part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.10

On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their cohorts tried to
contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be reached. Thus,
appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and one male companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon
arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Thereafter,
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went
back to the safe-house.11

In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in
locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and after 30 minutes of trekking,
appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry
farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants.
Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and
their cohorts.12

On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of
₱5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants’ demand.
Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim.13
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and
threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports
regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police
and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then
instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of ₱5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan
dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off
at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellant’s
call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.14

On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam,
Novaliches, Quezon City.15 Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.16

On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance
of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the
incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and
Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of
his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.17

Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and
Abagatnan as their kidnappers.18

On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan, Batangas.
Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written extra-judicial
confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores
was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their
kidnappers.19

The prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations, to wit: (1)
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan (Exhibit A);20 (2) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B);21 (3) sketch made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C);22 (4) death
certificates of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond (Exhibits D & E);23 (5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Robert (Exhibit F);24 (6) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San (Exhibit H);25 (7) joint affidavit of Police
Senior Inspector Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien (Exhibit I);26 (8) joint affidavit of PO3 Alex
Alberto and PO3 Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J);27 (9) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Flores
(Exhibit K);28 (10) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit L);29 and (11) sketch
made by appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit M).30

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes, Irene Flores
Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo. Appellants denied any
liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by
their witnesses, are as follows:

Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an "asset" of the PAOCTF. He narrated that on 25 July 1999,
while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, a police
officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed
light on a kidnapping case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and by members
of the Aguirre and Bautista families. He accepted the invitation. Subsequently, he proceeded to
Camp Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF. Colonel
Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and certain persons named
Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao instructed him to identify said persons as
responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused to do so because he feared Brgy. Capt.
Ramos. The day after, Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his office. Upon arriving thereat,
the latter saw Yao San. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended
through his cooperation, he would give him ₱500,000.00. He accepted Yao San’s offer under the
condition that he would identify a different set of suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave him
₱30,000.00.31

Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the Yao
family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with them, since the two had
previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the
sale.32

He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter when he was forced by
the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. Further,
he claimed that while he was under the custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as
a drug pusher. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF
agents and thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of
the Yao family.33

On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from 6:00 p.m.
of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the early morning of 26 July 1999, five
policemen barged into his house and arrested him; that the policemen told him that he was a
suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house;
that the policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently tortured; that
he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the family’s poultry farm at Brgy. Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and
that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held
a grudge against him.34

For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sister’s house at Antipolo City from 12
July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday
of her child; that he worked as a construction worker during his stay in his sister’s house; that he was
arrested in Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by policemen
for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that after three days of beating,
he was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession;
that he never met nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near
the family’s poultry farm, and he used to work therein as a welder; that he had no participation in the
kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family
because he and appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago.35

The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing claims, to wit: (1)
prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant Arnaldo);36 (2) calling card of Colonel
Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo);37 and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores
working as a carpenter in Antipolo City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores).38

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family
₱150,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y
AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby
sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,000.00), and all the private offended parties or victims,
including the heirs of the deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00)
as moral damages, subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.39

By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case was elevated to
us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,40 we remanded the
instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.

On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the
RTC Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the
appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also
decreased the amount of civil indemnity from ₱150,000.00 to ₱100,000.00. Further, it directed
appellants to pay jointly and severally the Yao family ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The fallo
of the Court of Appeals’ decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 convicting accused-appellants
of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that:

1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to ₱100,000; and

3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount of

₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.41

Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision but this was denied.
Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.

In their separate briefs,42 appellants assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANTS;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES;
 IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENSE;

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN
APPELLANTS’ GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.43

Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao San.

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following
well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless
there is a showing that the latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.44

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case,
we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified
appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial.
Abagatnan specifically testified during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts forcibly entered
the van where she and the Yao family were, appellant Flores drove the van away from the poultry
farm; that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded her, Robert,
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house; and that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo
accompanied her in going to the poultry farm to search for Yao San and remind him about the
ransom demanded.45 Robert confirmed that appellants and their cohorts blindfolded them inside the
van during the incident. He also recounted that appellants and their cohorts detained him and Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house. He was later instructed by appellants to
find Yao San and remind him about the ransom.46 Yao San declared that during the incident,
appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him, poked their guns at him, and dragged him into the
van. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told him to produce ₱5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan.47

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their
respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their
ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in
harmony with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals found their testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.

Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not have identified
their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of the night; (2) they were
blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were covered by T-shirts.

It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the incident. At that time, there was a light
from a fluorescent bulb hanging above the gate of the poultry farm wherein Yao San was held at
gunpoint by appellant Reyes and Pataray.48 The headlights of the van were also turned on, making it
possible for Abagatnan and Robert to see the faces of appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two
approached and poked their guns at Yao San.49 Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which
turned on when the door’s van was opened. This bulb lighted up when appellants and their cohorts
forcibly boarded the van, thus, allowing Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to glance at the faces of
appellants and their cohorts.50

Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took
appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all members of the Yao family were
blindfolded.51 During this considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to
take a good look at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert
narrated that their respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have
a glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.52

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads of appellants and their cohorts
were covered by T-shirts, their faces were, nonetheless, exposed and uncovered, allowing them to
see their faces.53 Robert and Yao San also declared that they recognized the faces of appellants
during the incident because the latter resided near the poultry farm of the Yao family, which used to
hire them several times in the farm as carpenters/welders.54

Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San that they were
able to recognize the kidnappers -- because although the kidnappers’ heads were covered with T-
shirts, their faces were nevertheless exposed or uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants argue that it
is against human nature and experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their
faces in concealing their identities.

It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and their cohorts to cover their heads with T-
shirts, while leaving their faces exposed and uncovered when they kidnapped the Yao family.
Perhaps, appellants and their cohorts thought that putting T-shirts on their heads without covering
their faces was sufficient to conceal their identities. Regardless of their reason, the fact remains that
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San positively identified appellants as their kidnappers, and their said
identification and testimonies were found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals and by this Court to be
credible. In People v. Barredo,55 the victim testified that he was able to identify the accused as his
assailants because the latter took off their masks during the assault. The accused argued that the
victim’s testimony was incredible because persons who wore masks would not take them off so
casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would reveal their identities. The trial court,
nonetheless, ruled that the victim’s testimony was credible and truthful. We sustained such ruling of
the trial court and ratiocinated:

Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhano’s claim that he was able to identify the
assailants because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks would not take them off so
casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would thereby reveal their identities. x x x.

The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated that the men
who entered his home removed their masks when he was brought downstairs. Why they did so was
known only to them. It is possible that they thought that there was no one in the vicinity who could
identify them, or that they wanted Enrico to see who they were so as to intimidate him. It is also
possible that they felt secure because there were 14 of them who were all armed. In any event, what
is important is that the trial court found Enrico Cebuhano’s testimony to be both credible and
believable, and that he was able to positively identify appellants herein, because the men who
entered his home removed their masks, x x x.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the
kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their
cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness’ relationship to the victim of a crime
makes his testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a
crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.56 Relationship with a victim
of a crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural
and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true
justice for the death of a relative.57

Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the incident and
identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that they recognized appellants, as the
latter used to work in the poultry farm.

Robert and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident to the authorities.
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts when the ransom
was demanded for their release. Appellants and their cohorts were armed and dangerous.
Appellants and their cohorts also threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San
and Robert would report the incident to the authorities.58 Understandably, Yao San and Robert were
extremely fearful for the safety of their loved ones, and this caused them to refrain from reporting the
incident. Robert and Yao San cannot also be blamed for not reporting the incident to the police even
after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had already been found, and appellants and
their cohorts had cut their communication with them. Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond had a chilling/paralyzing effect on Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their
cohorts were still at large then, and the possibility that they would harm the remaining members of
the Yao family was not remote, considering that appellants and their cohorts were familiar with the
whereabouts of the Yao family. At any rate, we have held that failure to immediately report the
kidnapping incident does not diminish the credibility of the witnesses.59 The lapse of a considerable
length of time before a witness comes forward to reveal the identities of the perpetrators of the crime
does not taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is satisfactorily
explained.60

Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove that they
conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective among the accused.61 When the accused by their acts aimed at
the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the
crime, with a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.62

As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and
Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray63 approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter
dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the driver’s seat and drove the van, while
each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts
inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of ₱5 million
as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded
Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied
Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the
ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial
confessions64 how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial
confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their
cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their
cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose
of extorting ransom.

Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.

Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based
solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains,
however, that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were
obtained in violation of his co-appellants’ constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their
own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF
did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their
own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF
suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga
and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-
judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him.

Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence,
because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his
own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was
elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not
assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported
confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he
suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who,
according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.

Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as
evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of
his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his
counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether
he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents
of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.

An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement

by a person under custodial investigation, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime.65 In order that an extra-judicial confession may be
admitted in evidence, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following
safeguards be observed66:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 1awphi.zw+

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention
are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following
requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.67

The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period
from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
offense although not yet in custody.68

The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of
an abstract constitutional principle.69 Such right contemplates effective communication which results
in the subject understanding what is conveyed.70

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false.71 The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the accused.72 The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one
furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused.73 A competent and independent counsel is
logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter
answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the
lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under
investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-
vis his constitutional rights. 74

However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he
voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to
admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.75

We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised
appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations.

The Pasubali76 of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows
that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them
that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family.
Thereafter, the PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain
silent, and that anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also
told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice, and that they would be provided with
one if they had none. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own, appellant Arnaldo replied that he
would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous.
Thereafter, when asked if they understood their said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The
appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the
Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by them. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and
their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also signed and thumbmarked the extra-
judicial confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in
their respective court testimonies.77 Indeed, the appraisal of appellants’ constitutional rights was not
merely perfunctory, because it appeared certain that appellants had understood and, in fact,
exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof.

Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent
and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.

As regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of appellant Arnaldo
about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators and agents to give him and
appellant Arnaldo space and privacy, so that they could freely converse. After the PAOCTF
investigators and agents left them, he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of
them were present. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latter’s
personal circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a
lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the
kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he asked appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his
assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his confession. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned
appellant Arnaldo that he might be sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident.
Appellant Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by his
conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated into giving self-
incriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Appellant Arnaldo answered in the negative.
He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if there were torture marks on
his body, but he found none. He also observed that appellant Arnaldo’s appearance and movements
were normal. His conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Thereafter, he
allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo.78

Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to the latter’s
entire confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldo’s confession, Atty. Uminga requested the
PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldo’s confession. Upon obtaining such
copy, he read it entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo
to read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification
and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession. Appellant Arnaldo
read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Atty. Uminga asked him if he had objections
to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter
could still change his mind, and that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested
that he would sign his written confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to
the written confession.79

With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF investigators began
questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside a room, where only the two of
them were present. He asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores
replied that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a
confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant Flores whether he
would accept his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked
appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession. Appellant Flores answered that he was
bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his confession would be used
against him in a court of law, and that the death penalty might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores
told him that he wanted to tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind. He requested appellant
Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture marks or bruises on his body, but
found none. Again, he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession,
but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he permitted the PAOCTF
investigators to question appellant Flores.80
Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving statements to the
PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant Flores’ statements, he instructed appellant
Flores to read and check his written confession. Appellant Flores read the same and made some
minor corrections. He also read appellant Flores’ written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant
Flores signed the latter’s written confession.81

It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and
Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically
imply that their right to counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of
competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without
any intervening conflict of interest.82 There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal
assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no interest adverse to
appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless, clarified that he had been separated therefrom since
199483 when he went into private practice. Atty. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private
practitioner when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.84 It appears that
Atty. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Uminga’s
telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF.
Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Quezon City at the time he rendered legal assistance to appellant Flores.85 Part of
Atty. Rous’ duty as member of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents
including suspects under custodial investigation. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Rous
had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the PAOCTF office to
assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer manning the office when the
PAOCTF called.86 In People v. Fabro,87 we stated:

The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration.
Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible fact
is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a
lackey of the lawmen.

Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is
entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase
"preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.88 While the
choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the
services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he
does not raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer.89 Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty.
Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo
manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be
counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial
confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of
appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional
guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.90 Consequently, the burden of proving that undue
pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.91

In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they
were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than their self-serving
statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any
plausible proof to substantiate their claims.  They did not submit any medical report showing that
lawphil.net

their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the
persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite
several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family
members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report such allegations to
proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective
confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements, and that they were
not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. Records also bear out that they were
physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions.92 Their physical examination
reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their
examination.93 In People v. Pia,94 we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-
judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on
their bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim.

It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are
replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out the
possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how
appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before,
during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.95

With respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled that although an extra-judicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.96 In People v.
Alvarez,97 we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a
co-accused. In People v. Encipido98 we elucidated as follows:

It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS’ extrajudicial confessions were independently made without
collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They
are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime. They
are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the
commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking
confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions
are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.

Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes
participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements are, therefore, admissible as
corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes’ guilt.

Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, evidence
on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of appellant Reyes. As earlier found,
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao positively identified appellant Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They
specifically testified that during the incident, appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at
Yao San and dragged the latter inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going
to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC, Court
of Appeals and this Court found such testimonies credible.

Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt. Appellant Reyes avers
that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999
at around 11:00 p.m., because he was sleeping with his family in their residence during such time
and date. Likewise, appellant Flores asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime
scene on such date and time, as he was already sleeping in his sister’s house at Antipolo City. For
his part, appellant Arnaldo asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up. He alleges that he was an
asset of the PAOCTF, but was later utilized as a drug pusher by the said agency. Upon failing to
remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the PAOCTF officers, he was beaten up and included as
accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family.

Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is
not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed.
He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.99

The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can
easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.100

It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he claimed to have
slept when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.101 This is the same barangay where the Yao family’s poultry farm is situated. Appellant
Reyes, in fact, admitted that the poultry farm is near his residence.102 There is a huge possibility that
appellant Reyes slept for a while, woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao
family’s poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family. The same is true with appellant
Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores’ nephew, testified that he and appellant went to bed and slept
together in the house of appellant’s sister in Antipolo City at about 8:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999.103 It is
greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice when appellant Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and
immediately proceeded to the Yao family’s poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family,
arriving therein at about 11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person coming from Antipolo City may reach
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle, considering that there was no more
heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and Flores failed to prove
convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene during the incident.
Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he worked as a
construction worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying in his sister’s house at
Antipolo City. These pictures, however, do not clearly and convincingly support such claim, because
(1) the pictures were undated; (2) the shots were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the
man in the pictures which appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost
hidden, as such person is wearing a cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions
of his head and body are visible.

Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of frame-up. Aside from
his self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent and that he was beaten and included
as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family by the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to
the PAOCTF officers the proceeds of his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to
support said allegations. He submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have
been signed by the latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which indicates or verifies that
appellant Arnaldo was indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He also submitted a prayer book containing
his handwritten narration of torture he allegedly experienced at the hands of the PAOCTF agents,
but this does not conclusively show that he was beaten by the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found,
appellant Arnaldo did not produce any medical records/certificates or file any complaint against the
PAOCTF agents to bolster his claim of maltreatment.

It is true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up of appellant
Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some of their relatives/friends. We
have, however, held that alibi and the defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are
corroborated only by relatives and friends because of perceived partiality.104

Indeed, the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San prevail over the
alibis and defense of frame-up of appellants.105

We shall now determine the propriety of appellants’ conviction for the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding penalties imposed.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer.106 All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are
private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control
of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against their
will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.

Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two qualifying
circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the motive of the kidnappers is to
extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned
under paragraph four of the elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him
from captivity.107 Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no
moment.108 It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of exacting
ransom;109 and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or was
raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are
alleged in the information and proven during trial.

As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts demanded the
amount of ₱5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to
the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money to
appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond were killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and
their cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were
still under their custody, because they heard the radio report that the incident was already known to
the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found
dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show that they died of asphyxia by
strangulation.

Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. In
accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty that should be meted out to the appellants is
reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted
accordingly in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of
the appellants.

The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and severally pay civil
indemnity and exemplary damages to the Yao family. Nonetheless, their corresponding amounts
should be modified. In People v. Quiachon,110 we explained that even if the death penalty was not to
be imposed on accused because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 was still proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both the qualifying circumstances
of demand for ransom and the double killing or death of two of the kidnap victims were alleged in the
information and proven during trial. Thus, for the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond,
their heirs (Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are entitled to a total amount of
₱150,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good.111 In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be recovered when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying.112 Since
both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap
victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and
proven during trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable acts, the award
of exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages should
be modified. In several cases,113 we awarded an amount of ₱100,000.00 to each of the kidnap
victims. As in this case, the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be awarded each
to Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount
of exemplary damages add up to ₱700,000.00.

The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of
the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. Article 2219 of the same Code provides
that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each
member of the Yao family suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal,
especially because two of the family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity. Pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence,114 Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea
should each receive the amount of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages. Per computation, the total
amount of moral damages is ₱700,000.00 and not ₱500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court
of Appeals.

Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by
appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double
homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping. The word
"double" should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a
consequence of the kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil indemnity is ₱150,000.00; (2) the total amount of
exemplary damages is ₱700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral damages is ₱700,000.00; and (4)
the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190846

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari  challenging the August 28, 2009 decision  and
1 2

November 17, 2009 resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645.
3

The Facts

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14,

1979.  During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga
4

City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21229. 5

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property,
as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.  The Deed of Sale stated
6

that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00.  After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled
7

and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of Tomas. 8

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga
City.  The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the
9

complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s signature making it appear
that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. 10

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value.  Before he paid
11

the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told
him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order.  Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA
12

authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the title. 13

Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral damages,
attorney’s fees, and expenses for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in favor of Jose. 14

The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose’s complaint and
Tomas’ cross-claim.  On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas’ complaint against the Register of
15

Deeds since it was only a nominal party. 16

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 17

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he
learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros’ son.  When Bonifacio confronted Milagros
18

that Jose would get angry because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because
she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale. 19

Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio
verified with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed property had
been transferred to Tomas. 20

Bonifacio further testified that Jose’s signature in the SPA was forged.  Bonifacio presented
21

documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit,
duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate,
voter’s affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten letter. 22

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana Robles
(Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the
house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by
Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the sale and
had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose’s
confirmation.23

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of
P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of
Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only
P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the actual consideration
paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that
she needed money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money. 24

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006,  the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of
25

the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose
supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00
as temperate damages. 26

The CA Ruling

Tomas appealed the RTC’s ruling to the CA.

In a decision dated August 28, 2009,  the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the
27

SPA were void. However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of
temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase
price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas’
allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing
evidence that established this claim.
28

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the amount of
P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not
supported by the evidence formally offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that
the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his
testimony before the RTC. 29

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30

The Petition

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of
P700,000.00. 31

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated,
cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not
specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale;  third, his testimony establishing the
32

actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted;  and, fourth, Jose must return the
33

full amount actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.

34

Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the purchase price
indicated in the deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of
an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and no other
evidence can be admitted other than the terms of the agreement itself. 35

The Issues

The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of
consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual
purchase price of the sale.

OUR RULING

We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.

Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a petition
for review on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the appellate
court's factual findings are not the functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of facts.
36

This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts,"  except in the following cases:
37

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 38

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual
question that the CA had already resolved in the negative.  The CA found Tomas’ claim of paying
39

P700,000.00 for the subject property to be unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing
evidence to establish his claim.

We uphold the CA’s finding.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence.  Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
40

not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. 41

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence."  Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last
42

analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.43

We agree with the CA that Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00
cannot be considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this
claim. Tomas’ bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given
weight and credence.

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it;  the burden
44

rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.  A mere
45

allegation is not evidence,  and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his or her
46

allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust
enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as
basis for the reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot be used as evidence.

We find no merit in the petitioner’s argument.

A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning.  This rule applies to
47

contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
property without the other spouse’s written consent.  A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
48

absolutely wanting in civil effects.  It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.  When,
49 50

however, any of the terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. 51

It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been given
is in order."  This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that "every
52

person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it
does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the
course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact,

sanctioned by the Rules of Court.  The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain
53

the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in
the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of
the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as
evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of
a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in
the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void
contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these
rules.  There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void
54

document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its
admissibility.
55

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as

evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the
document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be

of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out
later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them. 56

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law
prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent.  It does not, however,
1âwphi1

preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed
of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence which
appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.

An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to determine
the presence of the essential elements of the sale, including the consideration paid.

Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of
the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.

The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence.  Tomas, in
57

fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the sale.58

The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the lower courts to consider
the terms written therein to determine whether all the essential elements  for a valid contract of sale
59

are present, including the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void
does not prevent the court from relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the
actual amount paid by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the sale is not
necessary since it is necessarily included in determining the regular execution of the sale.

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein.
60

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party’s claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.
61

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of
the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce
satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual consideration and
amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of
both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of
the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale
has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration
paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or
testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas’ sole
testimony. Tomas’ sole testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove
that Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount
the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust
enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity,
and good conscience."  The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the
62

State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code. 63

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the
void contract which presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P,200,000.00 since this the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose
expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him in the
amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28,
2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 230664

EDWARD M. COSUE, Petitioner
vs.
FERRITZINTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MELISSA TANYA F. GERMINO AND
ANTONIO A. FERNANDO, Respondents

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals'
(CA's) Decision  dated December 2, 2016 and Resolution  dated February 23, 2017, in CA-G.R. SP
1 2

No. 142491, which affirmed the Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)  upholding the Labor Arbiter's finding  that petitioner Edward M. Cosue was not illegally
3 4

dismissed.

The Facts

Petitioner started working for respondent Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation (FIDC) on
August 23, 1993 as a construction worker. He subsequently became a regular employee of FIDC,
performing work as janitor/maintenance staff.

Around 5 p.m. of July 10, 2014, respondent Melissa Tanya Germino (Germino), as Head of FIDC's
Property Management Division, asked petitioner to stay in the FIDC's building to watch over the
generator due to the frequent power outage, and to assist the guards on duty since they were newly
hired. Petitioner agreed.

According to petitioner, around 9 p.m. on July 10, 2014, he saw two security guards (the Officer-in-
Charge and one Gomez), together with an unidentified man, on their way to the electrical room.
They had a knapsack which did not look heavy. When they left the room, petitioner saw Gomez
carrying the knapsack which, by this time, appeared to contain something heavy. The next morning,
petitioner borrowed the key to the electrical room and together with fellow maintenance personnel,
Joel Alcallaga (Alcallaga), looked for the electrical wires that were stored therein. Unfortunately, the
wires were no longer there. Petitioner was convinced that the two guards and their unidentified
companion took the wires. At 1 p.m., he was summoned by Germino who verbally informed him that
he was suspended from July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2014 on suspicion that he stole the electrical
wires. Beginning July 16, 2014 until August 13, 2014, he was no longer allowed to work.  Thus, on
5

October 9, 2014, he filed a Complaint against FIDC, Germino and FIDC President Antonio Fernando
(collectively, respondents), for actual illegal dismissal and underpayment of salaries, with prayer for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.  In his Position Paper, petitioner additionally
6

made claims for underpayment of his holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
He sought to recover on the alleged underpayments for the period covering "three (3) years
backward from the time of the filing of (his) complaint."7

Refuting petitioner's version of the events, respondents alleged that at 7 p.m. on July 10, 2014,
Alcallaga's bag was found to contain bundled wires when it was examined by the security personnel,
per routine, as he checked out from his shift. Alcallaga returned the wires to the electrical room
shortly after he was interrogated by the security personnel. The following day, petitioner and
Alcallaga obtained the keys to the electrical room after misrepresenting to the key custodian that
they had been ordered by the head of the FIDC electrical staff to inspect the room. Thereafter, it was
discovered that the electrical wires returned by Alcallaga to the electrical room were nowhere to be
found. Following an investigation, Germino issued a memorandum of suspension to petitioner for
obtaining the keys to the electrical room and entering without permission, and for leaving his post
and joining Alcallaga in the electrical room. Petitioner was suspended for twenty-five (25) days from
July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2014, pending further investigation. Petitioner returned to FIDC on
August 13, 2014, but was told to come back as Germino was on leave. When petitioner came back
on August 27, 2014, he was able to speak to Germino and they agreed that he would voluntarily
resign. However, petitioner did not file his resignation, and eventually instituted his Complaint for
illegal dismissal. 8

Respondents further averred that years ago, petitioner admitted to acting as messenger and
depositing money in the bank for Rizza Alenzuela, the company accountant, who was later
discovered to have stolen hundreds of thousands of pesos by collecting from tenants and depositing
said collection to her account. However, because petitioner was the son of their longest-staying
employee who died due to an illness, he was given a second chance on condition that another
offense would lead to the termination of his employment. 9

Respondents argued that there was no illegal dismissal as there was an agreement between FIDC
and petitioner that the latter would just resign. As petitioner reneged on this agreement and chose to
be absent, he should be considered absent without leave. As for petitioner's money claims, FIDC
averred that petitioner was entitled to receive only his latest unpaid salary, if any, and his pro rata l
3th month pay.  Respondents, however, would later concede that there were underpayments which
10

would have to be computed.

The Labor Arbiter's Rulin2

On February 12, 2015, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered her Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal dismissal is dismissed for lack of
evidence to support the same. Respondent Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, is hereby
ordered to reinstate complainant, Edward M. Cosue, to his former position, without loss of seniority
rights but without backwages.

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the respondents are hereby directed to
submit a report of compliance to the said order without (sic) ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
the said decision.

Respondent Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation is further ordered to pay salary differentials
in the amount of P8,819.0l.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 11

The LA held that other than petitioner's general assertion that he was dismissed, no evidence was
presented to support such claim. Petitioner was admittedly suspended from July 16, 2014 to August
13, 2014. Thus, as of July 27, 2014, the date of dismissal as averred in petitioner's Complaint, he
was still serving his preventive suspension. In fact, he was not barred from the premises or
categorically informed that he was already dismissed from work. 12

The LA stressed that the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
could not be applied as respondents denied dismissing petitioner. 13

The LA, however, found no reason to conclude that petitioner abandoned his job, absent proof of
petitioner's clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.

Backwages were not awarded as there was neither dismissal nor abandonment. However, finding
that there was underpayment of salaries, the LA awarded salary differentials computed at
PhP8,8l9.01.

Petitioner's Partial Appeal

In his partial appeal from the LA's Decision, petitioner asked the NLRC to declare him to have been
"illegally (constructively) dismissed" and entitled to full backwages from the time of illegal dismissal
up to actual reinstatement. He also prayed for the payment of his service incentive leave pay,
underpaid 13th month pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, his 13th month pay for 2014, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

The NLRC's Resolutions

In its Resolution  dated May 29, 2015, the NLRC denied petitioner's partial appeal and affirmed the
14

LA's Decision, holding that the established facts showed that petitioner was not dismissed by FIDC.
The NLRC also held that since the claims for service incentive leave, overtime pay and 13th month
pay were not indicated in the Complaint nor prayed for in petitioner's Position Paper, the LA did not
gravely abuse her discretion in not awarding them. Furthermore, the NLRC found it improper to
award damages and attorney's fees given its finding that there was no illegal dismissal.

The NLRC denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution  dated July 20, 2015.
15

The CA's Ruling

The NLRC's Resolutions were affirmed in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA issued in
the certiorari proceeding instituted by petitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA found sufficient reasons to uphold respondents' position. It rejected petitioner's argument
that he had been constructively dismissed, holding that petitioner was merely suspended for 25
days. Such suspension, said the CA, was a valid exercise of management prerogative pending
administrative investigation on the incident of theft.

Hence, the instant Petition.

Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner maintained that he was constructively dismissed because he reported to work immediately
after his suspension but was not anymore allowed to work. He argued that mere absence or failure
to report to work is not tantamount to abandonment of work. He also asserted that to be dismissed
for abandonment, an employee must be shown to have been absent without a valid or justifiable
reason, and to have a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, and that the
burden of proof falls on the employer. Petitioner further averred that FIDC failed to show proof of
payment of his other monetary claims.

The Court's Ruling

Only errors of law are generally reviewed in Rule 45 petitions assailing decisions of the CA, and
questions of fact are not entertained.  Accordingly, the Court does not re-examine conflicting
16

evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.  The Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine
17

applies with greater force in labor cases.  When supported by substantial evidence, factual findings
18

of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, more so when upheld by the
CA.19

Petitioner has not shown cause for the Court to depart from this rule.

As the LA, NLRC and the CA found, petitioner was not illegally dismissed. This common finding is
supported by substantial evidence, defined as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." 20

Petitioner himself alleged that he was suspended from July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2014 pending
further investigation of the pilferage of electrical wires. Thus, on July 27, 2014, the date of dismissal
alleged in his Complaint, petitioner was still serving his suspension; his employment was not
terminated.

Petitioner's claim that he was not allowed to report for work after his suspension was
unsubstantiated. Petitioner has not shown by any evidence that he was barred from the premises.
Furthermore, an entry in the FIDC security logbook for August 27, 2014, which petitioner had not
challenged, showed him informing security personnel that he came to FIDC because he was asked
to report to the office. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.  This is true even if by its nature, the
21

evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time. 22

Petitioner's claim of constructive dismissal fails. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, as in this case, cannot be given credence. 23

In Jo mar S. Verdadero v. Barney A utolines Group of Companies Transport, Inc., et. al., the Court
24

held that:

Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because "continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay" and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of
clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of
the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. 25
In this case, records do not show any demotion in rank or a diminution in pay made against
petitioner.  Neither was there any act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain committed by
1âwphi1

respondents against petitioner which would justify or force him to terminate his employment from the
company. 26

Respondents' decision to give petitioner a graceful exit is perfectly within their discretion. It is settled
that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the employee a chance to
resign and save face rather than smear the latter's employment record. 27

The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioner was burdened to
prove his allegation that respondents dismissed him from his employment. It must be stressed that
the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer
bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the
respondents deny having dismissed the petitioner.  In illegal dismissal cases, while the employer
28

bears the burden to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service. 29

In the instant case, other than petitioner's bare allegation of having been dismissed, there was no
evidence presented to show that his employment was indeed terminated by respondents. In the
absence of any showing of an overt or positive act proving that respondents had dismissed
petitioner, the latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained - as the same would be self-
serving, conjectural and of no probative value. 30

Petitioner's insistence that he had been unjustifiably dismissed for abandonment of his job, without
the benefit of due process, is untenable. Firstly, petitioner failed to establish that he had been
dismissed. Secondly, it was not respondents' position that petitioner abandoned his job. As they
were waiting for petitioner to tender his resignation conformably with their agreement, they did not
consider petitioner's absence as an abandonment of his job which would necessitate the sending of
a notice of abandonment or an order to return to work. 31

In this regard, the Court's ruling in Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Nestor
Lumahan, reiterated in Dee Jay's Inn and Cafe and/or Melinda Ferraris v. Ma. Lorina Raneses, is
32 33

instructive:

We find that the CA erred in disregarding the NLRC's conclusion that there had been no dismissal,
and in immediately proceeding to tackle Nightowl's defense that Lumahan abandoned his work.

The CA should have first considered whether there had been a dismissal in the first place. To our
mind, the CA missed this crucial point as it presumed that Lumahan had actually been dismissed.
The CA's failure to properly appreciate this point - which led to its erroneous conclusion - constitutes
reversible error that justifies the Court's exercise of its factual review power.

xxxx

We agree with the NLRC that Lumahan stopped reporting for work on April 22, 1999, and never
returned, as Nightowl sufficiently supported this position with documentary evidence.

xxxx

In addition, we find that Lumahan failed to substantiate his claim that he was constructively
dismissed when Nightowl allegedly refused to accept him back when he allegedly reported for work
from April 22, 1999 to June 9, 1999. In short, Lumahan did not present any evidence to prove that he
had, in fact, reported back to work.

xxxx

All told, we cannot agree with the CA in finding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in evaluating the facts based on the records and in concluding therefrom that Lumahan had not been
dismissed.

xxxx

As no dismissal was carried out in this case, any consideration of abandonment - as a defense
raised by an employer in dismissal situations - was clearly misplaced. To our mind, the CA again
committed a reversible error in considering that Nightowl raised abandonment as a defense.

xxxx

The CA, agreeing with LA Demaisip, concluded that Lumahan was illegally dismissed because
Nightowl failed to prove the existence of an overt act showing Lumahan's intention to sever his
employment. To the CA, the fact that Nightowl failed to send Lumahan notices for him to report back
to work all the more showed no abandonment took place.

The critical point the CA missed, however, was the fact that Nightowl never raised abandonment as
a defense. What Nightowl persistently argued was that Lumahan stopped reporting for work
beginning April 22, 1999; and that it had been waiting for Lumahan to show up so that it could
impose on him the necessary disciplinary action for abandoning his post at Steelwork, only to learn
that Lumahan had filed an illegal dismissal complaint. Nightowl did not at all argue that Lumahan
had abandoned his work, thereby warranting the termination of his employment.

Significantly, the CA construed these arguments as abandonment of work under the labor law
construct. We find it clear, however, that Nightowl did not dismiss Lumahan; hence, it never raised
the defense of abandonment.

xxxx

Finally, failure to send notices to Lumahan to report back to work should not be taken against
Nightowl despite the fact that it would have been prudent, given the circumstance, had it done so.
Report to work notices are required, as an aspect of procedural due process, only in situations
involving the dismissal, or the possibility of dismissal, of the employee. Verily, report-to-work notices
could not be required when dismissal, or the possibility of dismissal, of the employee does not
exist. (Citation ommitted and emphasis ours.)

Since there was neither dismissal nor abandonment, the CA correctly sustained the LA and the
NLRC's decision to order petitioner's reinstatement but without backwages, consistent with the
following pronouncement in Danilo Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission and
Reynaldo's Marketing Corporation, et. al.: 34

Accordingly, given that FUERTE may not be deemed to have abandoned his job, and neither was he
constructively dismissed by private respondent, the Commission did not err in ordering his
reinstatement but without backwages. In a case where the employee's failure to work was
occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not
rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss.  (Citation ommitted)
35

Although not specified in the proforma Complaint, petitioner's claim for underpayment of holiday pay,
13th month pay and service incentive leave pay was alleged in his Position Paper.  In fact,
36

respondents squarely addressed this issue in their Rejoinder, stating that "(w)hat is left therefore that
respondent should pay are the underpayments which should now be computed properly."  Thus, the37

labor tribunals were not precluded from passing upon this cause of action.  Petitioner's cause of
38

action "should be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint alone but also from a consideration
and evaluation of both his complaint and position paper." 39

Petitioner was found to have been paid salaries below the minimum wage rates and was, thus,
awarded salary differentials in the amount of ₱8,819.01 for the period October 9, 2011 to July 27,
2014.  Holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay are all computed based on an
40

employee's salary. Therefore, there is necessarily an underpayment if these benefits were computed
and paid based on salaries below minimum wage rates.

Anent petitioner's claim for his 13th month pay for 2014, the same was not alleged in his Complaint
or his Position Paper. It appears to have been raised for the first time in his partial appeal to the
NLRC. However, it should be noted that respondents effectively admitted in their Position Paper that
petitioner was entitled to his pro-rata 13th month pay for 2014.  To withhold this benefit from
41

petitioner, despite respondents' admission that he should be paid the same, will not serve the ends
of substantial justice. Hand in hand with the concept of admission against interest, the concept of
estoppel, a legal and equitable concept, necessarily must come into play.  Furthermore, it is settled
42

that technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demands of substantial
justice. 43

The LA is, thus, directed to determine any underpayment of holiday pay, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay for the period covered by the award of salary differentials, and to compute the
corresponding differentials. The LA is further directed to compute petitioner's pro rata 13th month
pay for 2014.

In San Miguel Corporation v. Eduardo L. Teodosio , the Court held that:

44

xxxx

Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or
fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. On the other hand, exemplary damages are proper when the dismissal was
e:ff ected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner, and public policy requires that these acts
must be suppressed and discouraged. 45

In the present case, petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that he had been dismissed, let alone in
bad faith or in an oppressive or malevolent manner. Petitioner, thus, cannot rightfully claim moral
and exemplary damages. 46

Petitioner, however, is entitled to attorney's fees at ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.  It
47

has been determined that petitioner was underpaid his wages. Attorney's fees may be recovered by
an employee whose wages have been unlawfully withheld.  There need not even be any showing
48

that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith; there need only be a showing that lawful wages
were not paid accordingly, as in this case. 49
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 2, 2016 and Resolution dated
February 23, 2017, in CA-G.R. SP No. 142491, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
petitioner is additionally entitled to: (a) differentials in any underpaid holiday pay, 13th month pay
and service incentive leave pay for the period October 9, 2011 to July 27, 2014; (b) pro rata 13th
month pay for 2014; and (c) attorney's fees at ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the determination of any underpayment of holiday
pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay for the period October 9, 2011 to July 27, 2014,
and for the proper computation of the corresponding differentials. The Labor Arbiter is also directed
to compute petitioner's pro rata 13th month pay for 2014. The Labor Arbiter shall report compliance
with these directives within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.