EASA Safety Information Bulletin: SIB No.: 2011-07 Issued: 05 May 2011

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EASA SIB No: 2011-07

EASA Safety Information Bulletin

SIB No.: 2011-07


Issued: 05 May 2011

Subject: Functional Check Flights

Applicability: All aircraft, certificated in any category, operated under an Air


Operator Certificate (AOC).

Ref. Publications: - France Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) Accident Report


Ref ISBN 978-2-11-099128-7.
- United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)
Report EW/C2009/01/02, AAIB Bulletin 9/2010.
- UK AAIB Report EW/C2009/11/03, AAIB Bulletin 12/2010.
- FAA Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 08024.

Background: A number of accidents/incidents have occurred recently on


European registered aircraft during functional check flights.
For the purpose of this SIB, a functional check flight is any non-
revenue flight performed to assess or demonstrate aircraft
serviceability, for in service aircraft already having a valid
certificate of airworthiness. This could be a flight after maintenance
or before lease transfer, or troubleshooting checks on the ground
where the aircraft is operated by a flight crew.
The core business of an operator may not necessarily include the
conduct of such flights on a regular basis; thus, the level of
expertise to conduct these flights safely may not be available.
As a first step, this SIB is published to raise awareness of the
hazards. The content of this SIB has been produced in
consultation with the European National Aviation Authorities
(NAAs).
Secondly, EASA included into the OPS Comment Response
Document (CRD) to Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2008-
22c and 2009-02c proposal for the new implementing rules OPS
an obligation on operators to describe non-commercial flights of
aircraft included under their Air Operator Certificate (AOC) in detail
in the operations manual, including:
- identification of the applicable requirements;
- a clear identification of any differences between operating
procedures used when conducting commercial and non-
commercial operations; and
- a means of ensuring that all personnel involved in the operation
are fully familiar with the associated procedures.

This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.


EASA Form 117 Page 1/3
EASA SIB No: 2011-07

These procedures would require prior approval of the competent


authority.
Thirdly, EASA will conduct Rulemaking activities to address
maintenance check flights and non-revenue flights 1 in more detail
(MDM 097 and OPS.075).
The FAA pointed out that a significant number of accidents
have occurred during non-revenue flights on US-registered
aircraft over the past decade and published SAFO 08024.

Description: In the context of the transfer of an Airbus A320 at the end of a


leasing contract, a non-revenue flight ended in a fatal accident, as
a result of stalling. The flight programme was based on that used
for customer acceptance flights, which is normally performed in
conjunction with the manufacturers’ test pilot. In this occurrence,
the manufacturer was not involved. The French Bureau
d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) identified that the accident was
caused by the loss of control of the aeroplane by the crew
following the check of the functioning of the angle of attack
protections, while the blockage of the angle of attack sensors
made it impossible for these protections to trigger. The crew was
not aware of the blockage of the angle of attack sensors. They did
not take into account the speeds mentioned in the programme of
checks available to them and consequently did not abort the check
before the stall.
In another event, in the context of a combined maintenance check
and demonstration flight to confirm the serviceability of the
aeroplane at the end of a lease agreement, a non-revenue
functional check flight on a Boeing 737 ended in a serious incident
investigated by the United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation
Branch (AAIB). The investigation showed that a manual reversion
check was being conducted on the flight controls and the aircraft
pitched rapidly nose-down, descending approximately 9 000 feet
before control was regained.
A third event occurred on a Dassault Falcon 2000. In the context
of maintenance troubleshooting, the crew performed eight (8)
accelerate/stop runs without due consideration of the brake energy
effects which resulted in a landing gear fire propagating on the
airframe. The investigation conducted by the UK AAIB identified
that the information available in the Aircraft Flight Manual was not
appropriate for the purpose of such an activity.
In the first two events mentioned above, the flights were performed
to confirm aircraft serviceability before lease transfer. The
investigation results highlighted the vulnerability of operating an
aircraft outside the normal operational practices that apply to
commercial flights.
In the third case, tests were performed in the framework of
systems troubleshooting without considering all related hazards,
specifically brake energy effects.

1
Non-revenue flight is the term presently used in EU-OPS and JAR-OPS 3, however the task could also
impact non-commercial and specialised (aerial work) operators. One of the first tasks will be to list and
define the different types of ‘non-revenue flights’

This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.


EASA Form 117 Page 2/3
EASA SIB No: 2011-07

Recommendations: EASA recommends operators, intending to conduct flights and


manoeuvres that could be classified as functional check flights, to
seek advice from the competent authorities (European NAAs in
charge of their oversight, or EASA for design-related issues) and
from the type certificate holder of the aircraft.
The operator should also establish:
 A flight operational risk assessment specific to functional
check flights;
 Risk mitigation measures including operating procedures
for such flights as expanded in the Operating Manual.
EASA further recommends that the following be clearly
communicated to all personnel involved:
- the intentions of the functional checks;
- the way the functional checks are intended to be performed;
- procedures that are different or in addition to standard
operating procedures; and
- roles and responsibilities of all personnel involved.
Such flights should only be performed by crew with appropriate
knowledge, experience and training.

Contact: For further information, contact the Airworthiness Directives,


Safety Management & Research Section, Certification
Directorate, EASA. E-mail: [email protected].

This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.


EASA Form 117 Page 3/3

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