Bernas Constitutional Structure PDF

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
AND
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Notes and Cases
Part I
by
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.
Third Edition
2010
L
Table of Contents
Introduction j
Philippine Constitutionalism, Birth Pangs and Traumatic Growth 1
1. Early Organic Acts 1
2. The 1935 Constitution 2
3. The 1973 Constitution : 3
4. The Freedom Constitution 4
5. The 1987 Constitution 4
Preamble ; q
1. Notes on the Preamble 6
Article I: The National Territory 7

tiJSfeJ
Section 1 7
1. The Philippine Territory 7
Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies 10

Prenote \q
PRINCIPLES 10
Section 1. Republicanism 10
1. A "democratic and republican state." 10
NOTE: "Constitutional Authoritarianism." 11
2. Nature and functions of government 11
3. Sovereignty 13
A. PEOPLE V.GOZO :,,.. 13
4. Governments de jure and de facto. 14
A. CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH 14
B. IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO 18
C. REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN 20
5. Patterns of government 24
TheSecond Pattern: Assembly Goyernment. 25
The Third Pattern: Parliamentarism*.?.?. 25
The Fourth Pattern: Cabinet Government 27
The Fifth Pattern: Presidentialism 29
Sec. 2. War and peace 29
1. Renunciation of war 29
L 2 . Adoption of international law 30
3. Adherence to policy of peace, freedom, amity 31
Sec. 3. Role of armed forces 32
1. Civilian authority and the role of the military 32
2. Role of the armed forces 32
Sec. 4. Compulsory military and civil service 33
•m 1. Compulsory military and civil service; protection of people and State. 33
Sec. 5. Peace and order 35
1. Peace and order, general welfare , 35
Sec. 6. Separation of Church and State 35
r STATE POLICIES 35
1^, Sec. 7. Independent foreign policy 35
1. An independent foreign policy 35
Sec. 8. Nuclear policy 36
1. A policy of freedom from nuclear weapons 36
r Sec. 9. Social order and prosperity 37
Sec. 10. Social justice 38
1. Social justice 38
A. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V.
to COURT OF APPEALS 38
Sec. 11. Dignity of the person 39
Sec. 12 . Sanctity of family life 39
Sec. 13. Youth 39
1. The family and the unborn 39
m 2. Education 39
Sec. 14. Women 40
1. Equality of women and men 40
Sec. 15. Health 40
Sec. 16. Ecology ; 40
km 1. The Right to a balanced ecology 40
A. OPOSA V. FACTORAN, JR 40
B. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V.
COURT OF APPEALS.. 43
Sec. 17. Education ! 48
Sec. 18. Labor : 48
Sec. 19. Independent economy 48
A. GARCIA V. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS 48
Sec. 20. Role ofprivate sector 52
Sec. 21. Rural development and agrarian reform 52
Sec. 22. Indigenous cultural communities 52
Sec. 23. Non-government organizations 52
Sec. 24. Communications 52
Sec. 25. Local autonomy c„
Sec. 26. Equal access to public service 52
1. Equal access topublic service 50
A. PAMATONG V. COMELEC 52
Sec. 27. Honesty in public service 54
Sec. 28. Transparency policy 54
Article VI: Legislative Department 55
Section 1. Legislative power 5R
1. Legislative power eg
2. Initiative and referendum 55
A. GARCIA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 56
3. Non-delegability oflegislative power 59
- 4. Non-delegability: CASES 60
A. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION 60
B. TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ 62
C. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION V. MINISTER OFLABOR.. 63
D. CEBUOXYGEN &ACETYLENE CO., INC. V.
SECRETARY DRILON 64
E. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY 65
F. PEOPLE V. DACUYCUY 68
G. EMPLOYEES CONFEDERATION V. NATIONAL
WAGES COMMISSION 70
NOTE: Penal rules 72
NOTE: Separation ofpowers in local governments 72
Sec. 2. Composition ofCongress 72
Sec. 3. Qualification ofSenators 73
A. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD 73
Sec. 4. Theterm ofSenators 73
Sec. 5. House ofRepresentatives 74
1. Sectoral representation and party-list representation 74
2. Cases on Party-List 76
A. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMELEC 76
B. ANG BAGONG BAYANIV. COMELEC 83
C. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY,
ETAL.V. COMELEC, ETAL. 88
D. BANAT V. COMELEC. _ 92
3. Apportionment. 204
A. TOBIAS V. ABALOS :>#. 104
B. MARIANO, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 106
C. MONTEJO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HO
D. BAGABUYO V. COMELEC ln
Sec. 6. Qualifications of House members H3
1. Qualifications of District Representatives H3
2. Qualifications of party-list Representatives li4
3. Residence qualification: CASES H4
A. GALLEGOV.VERRA ; 114
B. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC 117
C. AQUINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS m
D. DOMINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 122
(Si) 3. Citizenship qualification: CASES 124
A. CO V. HOUSEÊLECTORAL TRIBUNAL 124
B. BENGZON V. CRUZ 128
*» C. VALLES V. COMELEC 132
Sec. 7. Term of House members 135
1. Term andtenure ; -,05
A. DIMAPORO V. MITRA, JR ; 135
B. FARINAS, ETAL. V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 136
sj Sec. 8. Date ofelection 141
1. Election ; 1yl1
r 141
A. CODILLA V. DE VENECIA 141
Sec. 9. Filling vacancies 142
1. Special Election 142
m A. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC 142
Sec. 10. Compensation , 150
1. Salaries, emoluments, allowances 150
**> Sec. 11.Immunities \ • 150-
1. Immunity from arrest 150
lm 2- ^^ IIIIIIIIZZ 150
A. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS 150
3. Scope ofthe privilege of speech 154
A. JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG 155
B. ANTONINO V. VALENCIA 155
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Sec. 12. Disclosures 15g
Sec. 13. Disqualifications 153
A. LIBAN V.GORDON 158
Sec. 14. Prohibitions 159
1. Prohibitions 15g
A. PUYATV.DE GUZMAN, JR 159
Sec. 15. Sessions 16Q
Sec. 16. Officers and rules 160
1. Officers : 16i
A. AVELINO V. CUENCO 161
B. SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA 164
C. ARROYO, ET AL. V. DE VENECIA 168
2. Internal discipline , 172
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A. OSMENA V. PENDATUN 172
B. PAREDES, JR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN 175
m 3. Journals 175
A. UNITED STATES V. PONS 175
B. CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. V. GIMENEZ 177
C. ASTORGAV.VILLEGAS 177
Sec. 17. Electoral Tribunals 182
m 1. The Electoral Tribunals 182
A. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 182
B. ABBAS, ET AL. V. SENATE 187
^ C. BONDOC V. PINEDA 188
r D. GUERREROV. COMELEC 195
E. GARCIA, ET AL. V. HRET 196
F. PIMENTEL, ET AL. V. HRET 197
G. VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC 200
*» H. LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC 200
r Sec. 18. Commission onAppointments 204
1. Composition of the Commission on Appointments 204
A. DAZAV. SINGSON 204
B. COSETENG V. MITRA, JR 208
m C. GUINGONA, JR. V. GONZALES 208
Sec. 19. Formation of Commissions 213
Sec. 20. Records 213
Sec. 21. Legislative investigations 213
1. Legislative investigations 213
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m A. BENGZON, JR. V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 213
B. SABIO V. GORDON 21g
C. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE 221
w D- SENATE BLUE RIBBON V. JUDGE MAJADUCON. 224
Sec. 22. Executive privilege
1. Executive Privilege
A. SENATE V. ERMITA IZ....1 229
B. NERIV. SENATE COMMITTEE 244
,w Sec. 23. War and emergency powers .- 252
1. War powers
f AoA
2. Emergency powers oco
_ ZoZ
to Sec. 24. Origin ofbills
zoo
, 1. The Origination clause s 2c«
^
Sec. 25. Appropriations „ Q
zoo
L Riders • 254
A. GARCIA V. MATA 254
m 2. Transfer offunds 9__
A. DEMETRIAV. ALBA 255
St>
Sec. 26. 'Subject and title ofbills OKC
ZOO
1. Subject and title of bills ne„
zo/
A. TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD 257

m B. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO 259
C. FARINAS, ET AL. V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 261
D. TAN V. DEL ROSARIO 1ZZZ 261
E- TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE 262
F. TOBIAS V. ABALOS ' 275
km Sec. 27. Passage of bills
• z/5
1. Legislation ^ 2?
2. Item veto „__
A to
A. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V COURT

OF TAX APPEALS 275
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B. GONZALES V. MACARAIG .'.' " 278
C. PHILCONSAV. ENRIQUEZ 286
D. ARROYO V. DE VENECIA '" 304
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Sec. 28. Taxation
o04
1. The power to tax 304
A. GEROCHIV. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 305
2. Exemptions o0ft
3- CASES :....I~IIIIZIIIIIZZ 308
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A. GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 308
B. SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE V. CALOOCAN CITY 312
v C. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. DEPARTMENT
•M& OF AGRARIAN REFORM 313
D. COMMISSIONER OF BIR V. COURT OF APPEALS 315
E. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. SANTOS.:.... 317
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F. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V.
VICTOR LIM 318
Sec. 29. Control of public funds 325
1. Expenditure of public funds 325
A. GUINGONA, JR. V. CARAGUE 325
2. Public purpose 331
3. Special Fund 331
A. OSMENAV. ORBOS 331
Sec. 30. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 334
A! FABIAN V. DESIERTO 334
Sec. 31. Title of royalty or nobility 338
Sec. 32. Initiative and referendum 338
Article VII: The Executive Department 339

Section 1. Executive power ? 339
1. Executive power 339
A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, ET AL 339
2. Executive immunity 344
ijijil A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO 344
B. SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR 347
3. Head of State 348
4. Chief Executive 348
5. The Cabinet 348
6. Executive Privilege 348
Sec. 2. Qualifications of President 349
1. Citizenship and Qualification 349
U A. TECSONV. COMELEC 349
Sec. 3. The Vice-President 364
Sec. 4. Election and term of President and Vice-President 364
1. Election and Canvass 365
A. MACALINTALV. COMELEC 365
B. CONGRESSMAN LOPEZ V. SENATE AND HOUSE 366
C. PIMENTEL V. JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE 366
D. FERNANDO POE, JR. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 368
A. GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 308
B. SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE V. CALOOCAN CITY 312
C. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM 313
D. COMMISSIONER OF BIRV. COURT OF APPEALS 315
E. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. SANTOS 317
VICTOR LIM 318
Sec. 29. Control of public funds 325
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1. Expenditure of public funds 325
A. GUINGONA, JR. V. CARAGUE 325
2. Public purpose 331
3. Special Fund 331
A. OSMENAV. ORBOS 331
Sec. 30. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 334
A. FABIAN V. DESIERTO :'. 334
Sec. 31. Title of royalty or nobility 338
Sec. 32. Initiative and referendum 338
Article VII: The Executive Department 339

Section 1. Executive power 339
1. Executive power v 339
A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, ET AL 339
2. Executive immunity 344
A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO 344
B. SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR 347
3. Headof State 348
4. Chief Executive 348
5. The Cabinet , , 348
6. Executive Privilege 348
Sec. 2. Qualifications of President 349
1. Citizenship and Qualification 349
A. TECSON V. COMELEC 349
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Sec. 3. The Vice-President 364
Sec. 4. Election and term of President and Vice-President. 364
1. Election and Canvass • 365
A. MACALINTALV. COMELEC ?... 365
B. CONGRESSMAN LOPEZ V. SENATE AND HOUSE 366
C. PIMENTEL V. JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE 366
D. FERNANDO POE, JR. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 368
A. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. V. PANO 462
m B. ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO ....;.... 465
C. NAMARCO V. ARCA 466
(^ D. DE LEON V. CARPIO.. 467
E. BLAQUERA, ETAL. V. ALCASID 468
F. DADOLE, ET AL. V. COA 469
» G. DENRV. DENR EMPLOYEES..... * 470
Sec. 18. The Commander in Chief.... 471
1. Commander in Chief. 472
fowl
2. Martial law 473

3. CASES 474
b» A. IBP V. ZAMORA 474
B. LACSON V. PEREZ 482
C. SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 483
D. RANDOLF DAVID V. ERMITA.. 486
" Sec. 19. Executive clemency.... 501
iai> 1. Executive clemency in general 501
2. Pardon 501
A. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN, JR 501
*" B. TORRES V. GONZALES 507
r C. IN RE: TORRES V. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF PRISON.. 512
m D. GARCIA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 513
E. LLAMAS V. ORBOS 515
F. DRILON V. COURT OF APPEALS 521
*** 3. Amnesty 523
f NOTE: Tax amnesty 524.
4. Limits on executive clemencj' : 524
A. PEOPLE V. SALLE, JR 524
B. ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 528
») Sec. 20. Foreign loans 535
Sec. 21. International agreements 535
1. Foreign relations powers '. 535
2. International agreements 535
3. Deportation of aliens 537
to 4. Cases 537
A. PIMENTELV. ERMITA 537
B. LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ." 540
C. BAYANV. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 547
r D. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. JUDGE LANTION 564
M'l
Sec. 5. Oath of Office ti 3gg
('%> Sec. 6. Residence and emoluments 370
Sec. 7. Assumption of office 37Q
1. Vacancy situations at the beginningofthe term 370
&y
Sec-8 370
1. Vacancy situations during the term 371
2. Cases 372
B. ESTRADA V.ARROYO 392
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Sec. 9. Vacancy in the office of the Vice-President 397
Sec. 10. Procedure 397
Sec. 11. Temporarydisability of the President '. 397
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1. Temporary disability 393
m Sec. 12. Serious illness of President 398
Sec. 13. Prohibitions * 393
1. Prohibitions 398
*" A. DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN 398
{ B. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 399
C. BITONIO, JR. V. COA 407
D. PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA 412
Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President ?. 413
to Sec. 15. Prohibited appointments 413
1. Prohibited appointments 413
A. IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA 413
U B. DE LA RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS 417
Sec. 16. Presidential appointments ~^ ;. 418
1. Power of appointment •.. 418
A. GOVERNMENT V. SPRINGER 418
[ B. BERMUDEZ V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 419
b C. FLORES V. DRILON AND GORDON '.' 421
D. SARMIENTO V. MISON 423
E. QUINTOS-DELES, ET AL. V. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS 433
I F. CALDERON V. CARALE 438
L G. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO 444
H. RUFINO V. ENDRIGA 456
Sec. 17. Power of control 461
1, Power of control 462
r 2. CASES 462
t&3
Sec. 22. Budget preparation 566

Sec. 23. State of the nation address ; 566
Article VIII: The Judicial Department 567

Section 1. Judicial power 567
1. Judicial power 567
2. CASES 568
A. SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA ;, 568
B. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS 570
C. ECHEGARAY V. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 571
D. UNITED STATES V. NIXON 573
E. INFOTECH FOUNDATION, ET AL. V. COMELEC 575
Sec. 2. Creation of courts 575
1. Congress and judicial power 575
L 2. Cases '. 576
A. MALAGA V. PENACHOS, JR /. 576
Sec. 3. Fiscal autonomy 576
1. Fiscal autonomy 576
2. Cases 577
A. RADIOWEALTH, INC. V. AGREGADO 577
B. BENGZON V.DRILON 579
Sec. 4. The Supreme Court 583
1. Cases 583
A. FORTICH V. CORONA 583
B. PEOPLE V.DY 584
C. PEOPLE V.EBIO / 584
Sec. 5. Powers of Supreme Court xr. 585
1. Powers of the Supreme Court classified 586
2. Judicial review 586
3. Judicial review: Cases and controversy v 587
A. MARBURY V. MADISON 587
B. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 589
C. TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE 590
D. TAN V. MACAPAGAL 591
E. PACUV. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 592
L 4. Judicial review: locus standi ; 593
A. JOYAV.PCGG 593
B. MACASIANO V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 596
C. MARIANO, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 597
D. OPOSAV. FACTORAN.JR 598
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xii
E. KILOSBAYANV. GUINGONA, JR 600
F. TATAD V. GARCIA, JR .'., 602
G. KILOSBAYANV. MORATO 605
H. TELEBAP V. COMELEC 614
iiiii
I. GONZALES V. NARVASA 615

J. DEL MAR, ET AL. V. PAGCOR 616
to K. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO * 618
L. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 618
M. BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 618
N. IBPV.ZAMORA 618
0. MACALINTALV. COMELEC....°. 618
m ' P. WHITE LIGHT CORP. V. CITY OF MANILA 619
5. Political Questions 620
6. Political Questions: CASES... 621
U A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS 621
B. DAZAV.SINGSON 621
m C. SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA 621
D. THE DAVIDE IMPEACHMENT 621
7. Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality 621
*** 8. Rule-making power ; 622
r A. BUSTOS V. LUCERO 622
L B. IN RE CUNANAN 623
C. JAVELLANA V. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT : 625
m 9. Review of Death Penalty 626
A. PEOPLE V. MATEO 626
-
10. Bar integration 627

^ A. IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. DE VERA 628
r Sec. 6. Supervision of courts 629
1. Supervision of courts 629
A. MACEDA V. VASQUEZ 629
B. PEOPLE V. GACOTT, JR 630.
C. JUDGE CAOIBES, JR. V. OMBUDSMAN 632
Sec. 7. Qualifications 632
A. IN RE JBC V. JUDGE QUITAIN 633
B. KILOSBAYANV. ERMITA 633
Sec. 8. Judicial and Bar Council 634

Sec. 9. Appointment 635
Sec. 10. Salary 635
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1. Salary of Justices and judges. ,-..., 635
A. NITAFAN V. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE 635
Sec. 11. Security of tenure : 639
1. Security of tenure ; 639
tfoffi)
A. VARGAS V. RILLORAZA 639

| j B. DE LA LLANA V. ALBA ,, 643
\m Sec. 12. Prohibited designation 646
Sec. 13. Decision process : 646
.1. Certification 646
Sec. 14. Content of decisions 646
1. "Decisions" and "petitions," "minute resolutions." 646
m A. AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO 647
B. VALDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 648
C. PEOPLE V. LIZADA 649
*" D. VELARDE, JR. V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY 651
Sec. 15. Time frame for decisions 657
1. Time frame for decisions 657
A. RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN ! 657
•m B. COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. QUINANOLA 658
Sec. 16. Annual report ^ 658
L Article IX: Constitutional Commissions 659

A. COMMON PROVISIONS 659
Section 1. The Commissions 659
1. Independent Commissions , 659
A. MACALINTALV. COMELEC '. _ 659
Sec. 2. Prohibitions 660
Sec. 3. Salary 660
Sec. 4. Appointment of officials and employees 660
1. Independent 660
1. Automatic release of funds 661

Sec. 6. Procedure 661
1. Rules of procedure 661
A. ARUELO, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS 661
B. ANTONIO V. COMELEC 661
Sec. 7. Decisions 662
1. Judicial review 662
A. CUA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 662

ha
B. MISON V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 663

C. MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS.. .; 663
D. AMBIL V. COMELEC 664
E. DUMAYAS, JR. V. COMELEC 664
~ 2. Comelec decisions 664
Sec. 8.. 665
la) B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 9 f 665
Section 1. Organization 665
1. Organization of the Commission 665
**» A. GAMINDE V. COA 665
r Sec. 2. Scope 669
1. Scope and purpose of the system 669
2. CASES ; 670
A. EIIB V. COURT OF APPEALS 670
*» B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. PAGCOR 671
C. CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE 675
D. SECRETARY GLORIAV. COURT OF APPEALS ! 679
E. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 680
F. DIMAYUGA V. BENEDICTO II : 683
m G. MIRANDA V. CARREON > 686
H. SENERES V. COMELEC AND ROBLES 690
3. Competitive and non-competitive positions 691

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4. CASES 692
A. NASECO V. NLRC 692
B. SAMSON V. COURT OF APPEALS 693

C. HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS 693
D. ACHACOSO V.'MACARAIG 694
E. BRIONES V. OSMENA 694
F. MAYOR V.MACARAIG 695
G. BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO, JR 696
H. LUEGO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 699
I. SANTIAGO, JR. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 700
J. ASTRAQUILLO, ET AL. V. MANGLAPUS 702
K. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. CA 704
L. AQUINO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 706
M. PNOC V. NLRC 707
N. LAPINID V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 708
NOTE: Temporary appointees 709
Sec. 3. Personnel agency 709
L
1. Mass Appointments 709
Sec. 4. Oath : 710
Sec. 5. Standardization of compensation 710
Sec. 6. "Lame ducks." 710
A. PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN 710
Sec. 7. Prohibited appointments „.. 711
A. FLORES V. DRILON AND GORDON 711
Sec. 8. Compensation 715
1. Additional or double compensation 715
2. Case 716
A. SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS 716
B. BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY V. COA 718
C. HERRERAV. NAPOCOR ; 719
3. Prohibited Compensation 719
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 719
Section 1. Organization....: .'. 720
1.- CASES 720
A. BRILLIANTES V. YORAC 720
B. CAYETANO V. MONSOD 721
Sec. 2. Powers and functions 731
1. Nature of COMELEC powers „ 732
2. CASES 734
A. GALIDO V. COMELEC 734
B. PEOPLE V. HON. DELGADO 735
C. PEOPLE V. JUDGE INTIMG 736
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D. CORPUS V. TANODBAYAN >, 738

E. TAN V. COMELEC ;. — '. 738
F. REYES V. RTC 740
G. KILOSBAYAN V. COMELEC 740
H. BUAC AND BAUTISTA V. COMELEC .„ 741
I. LDP V. COMELEC 742
J. MANANZALA V. COMELEC 747
NOTE: Power to annul 748
NOTE: Power to call special elections. ., 748
NOTE: COMELEC non-powers 748
NOTE: Registration of political parties 748
Sec. 3. En Banc or division..'. 749
i§)
A. BAYTAN V. COMELEC 749
B. BALINDONG V. COMELEC 750
Sec. 4. Election period powers 751
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xvi
1. Supervision of media and public utilities 752.
A. SANIDADV. COMELEC 752
B. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION V. COMELEC 753
C. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS V. COMELEC 755
Sec. 5. Executive clemency 758
Sec. 6. Multi-party system. .; 758
NOTE: Political parties; registration ; .» 758
Sec. 7. Invalid votes 758
Sec. 8. Political parties 759
NOTE: The two-party system , 759
Sec. 9. Election period 759
SQj&l Sec. 10. Protection of candidates. •. » 759
Sec. 11. Funds 759
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT 759
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' Sec. 2. Powers and functions 760
1. Functions of the COA 760
2. CASES 761
A. DINGCONG V. GUINGONA, JR 761
B." DANVILLE MARITIME, INC. V. COA 763
C. RAMOS V. AQUINO 764
D. MAMARIL V.DOMINGO 767
±0
E. SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA 767

F. OSMENA V. COA 768
G. BUSTAMANTE V. COA 770
H. OROCIO V. COA 771
I. CALTEX PHILIPPINES V. COA 772
jjpj
J. POLLOSO V. GANGAN AND COA 774
K. DBPV. COA 777 °
L. PARRENO V. COA 781
Sec. 3. Coverage 782
Sec. 4. Annual report 782
Article X: Local Government 783
GENERAL PROVISIONS 783

Section 1. Territorial and political subdivisions 783
1. Territorial and political subdivisions 783
ittiiii) Sec. 2. The temtorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 783
1. Local autonomy 783
jijjffiA
1. Supervision of media and public utilities 752.
A. SANIDAD V. COMELEC 752
B. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION V. COMELEC 753
C. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS V. COMELEC ' 755
Sec. 5. Executive clemency 758
Sec. 6. Multi-party system. .'. 758
NOTE: Political parties; registration .» 758
Sec. 7. Invalid votes 758
Sec. 8. Political parties 759
NOTE: The two-party system 759
Sec. 9. Election period .' 759
Sec. 10. Protection of candidates .- 759
Sec. 11. Funds .' 759

D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT 759
"Sec. 2. Powers and functions 760
1. Functions of the COA 760

2. CASES 761
A. DINGCONG V. GUINGONA, JR 7C1
B. DANVILLE MARITIME, INC. V. COA.;.... 763
C. RAMOS V. AQUINO 764
D. MAMARIL V. DOMINGO •/. 767
E. SAMBELIV. PROVINCE OF ISABELA 767
F. OSMENA V. COA 768
G. BUSTAMANTE V. COA 770
H. OROCIOV. COA 771
I. CALTEX PHILIPPINES V. COA 772
J. POLLOSO V. GANGAN AND COA 774
K. DBPV.COA • 777
L. PARRENO V. COA 781
Sec. 3. Coverage : 782
Sec. 4. Annual report 782
Article X: Local Government 783
GENERAL PROVISIONS 783
Section 1.Territorial and political subdivisions 783
1. Territorial and political subdivisions 783
Sec. 2. The territorial andpolitical subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 783
700
1. Local autonomy
A. SAN JUAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION , 78:
B. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. COURT
OF APPEALS 78,
C. MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES 78!
D. PHIL. PETROLEUM CORP.V. MUN. OF PILILLA 79!
E. DADOLE, ET AL. V. COA 79(
VICTOR LIM , 79{
G. LEYNESV. COA 80(
H. BATANGAS CATV V. CA, BATANGAS CITY '. 801
Sec. 3. Local government code 80$
1. Local Government Code 802
A. SANCHEZ V. COMELEC 805
B. GARCIA V. COMELEC " 802
Sec. 4. Power of President 80S
1. General supervision r 809
A. DRILON V. MAYOR LIM 809
Sec. 5. Local finances 812
1. CASE 812
A. MANILA ELECTRIC V. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA 812
B. NPC V. CABANATUAN CITY 815
C. PETRON CORPORATION V. MAYOR TIANGCO ?. 818
Sec. 6. Share in national taxes 819
1. CASE 819
A. PIMENTELV.AGUIRRE 819
Sec. 7. Share in national resources ,-f 821
1. Local government resources n- 821
Sec. 8. Term of elective officials 822
1. CASES : 822
A. BORJA, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 822
B. DAVID V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 827
Sec. 9. Sectoral representation 828
1. Local sectoral representatives 828
A. SUPANGAN, JR. V. SANTOS 828
Sec. 10. Creation, abolition, mergers. ; 833
1. Creation of political units 833
A. TAN V. COMELEC '. 833
B. PADILLA, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 839
C. LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC 842
Ljflal
Sec. 11. Metropolital political subdivisions '. 853

1. Metropolitan political subdivisions 853
A. MMDA V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC 853
frrjfoi
Sec. 12. Classification of cities 858
1. Classification of cities 858
A. ABELLA V. COMELEC 858
** Sec. 13. Local groupings *. • 860
r Sec. 14. Regional development councils '. 860
iivfifri
A. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 860
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS 860
Sec. 15. Two autonomous regions 860
\m
1. Autonomous regions 860
Sec. 16. Power of President 861
jffici Sec. 17. Powers not granted 861
1. Powers which are not given to autonomous regions 861
Sec. 18. Organic Act 861
Sj)
1. Creation of autonomous region 861
A. ABBAS V. COMELEC 861
fojftft
B. CORDILLERA REGIONAL ASSEMBLY V. COMELEC 866
C. LEONOR V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION 867
Sec. 19. Enactment of Organic Act ••••• 868.
Sec. 20. Powers granted y 868
1. Conflict of laws 868
MJ
2. CASE < 869
A. PANDIV. COURT OF APPEALS 869
Sec. 21. Peace and order, national defense —• 869
im
Article XIÂccountability of Public Officers • 870

Section 1. Publicoffice a public trust : 870
1. Public office a public trust 870
A. HIPOLITO V. MERGAS 870
Sec. 2. Impeachable officers 871
Sec. 3. Impeachment rules • 871
1. Impeachment 871
folAA
A. ROMULO V. YNIGUEZ 871
B. IN RE GONZALES 872
C. FRANCISCO, ET AL. V. HOUSE SPEAKER, ET AL.
(THE DAVIDE IMPEACHMENT) :'. 872
Sec. 4. The Sandiganbayan 888
XIX
1. • The Sandiganbayan 888
A. NUNEZ^V. SANDIGANBAYAN ; 888
B. MAYOR LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN 888
Sec. 5. The Ombudsman 889
Sec. 6. 889
Sec. 7. The Special Prosecutor 889
1. The Ombudsman and the Tanodbayan 890
A. ZALDIVARV. SANDIGANBAYAN 890
B. BIR V. OMBUDSMAN ; 890
C. LAUREL V. DESIERTO 891
D. AZARCON V. GUERRERO 893
Sec. 8 Qualifications 893
Sec. 9. Appointment 893
Sec. 10. Rank. r 893
Sec. 11. Term ; 893
Sec. 12. Powers 893
Sec. 13 893
1. Powers and Responsibilities of Ombudsman and Deputies '.. 894
Sec. 15. Recovery of ill-gotten wealth v 897
Sec. 16. Prohibitions r. 897
Sec. 17. Declaration of assets and liabilities 897
Sec. 18. Allegiance 897 •
Article XII: National Economy: and Patrimony 898

Section 1. The goals of the national economy ( : 898
1. The national economy..'. 7. 898
Sec. 2. Development of natural resources 898
1. The Regalian Doctrine 899
2. Limits imposed on jura regalia ?. 899
3. The IPRA Case. .'. 900
A. CRUZ V. SEC. OF DENR , 900
4. Filipinization of natural resources 912
5. Alienation of natural resources 912
A. SANTA ROSA MINING CO. V. LEIDO, JR 912
B. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS... 914
C. CHAVEZ V. PEA AND AMARI .-.' - 916
D. LAUREL V. GARCIA , ,. 942
6. Utilization of natural resources 949
^jJ
A. MINERS ASSOCIATION V. FACTORAN, JR. , 949
B. REPUBLIC V. ROSEMOOR .,......, 956
C. LA BUGAL B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. V. DENR ,..:..............'........ 961
D. LA BUGAL B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. V. DENR
(RECONSIDERATION) , 992
E. PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. V. NAPOCOR 1017
Sec. 3. Land of the public domain * 1019
1. Classification of lands 1020
<j£ij
A. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. JUDGE AQUINO ! 1020
B. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 1023
2. Disposition and exploitation of agricultural lands of public domain 1028
&&1
3. Right of corporations to acquire land 1028
A. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS.. 1028
I B. TEN FORTY REALTY V. LORENZANA 1033
4. Acquisition by private individuals 1034
"Sec. 4. Forest lands and parks 1034
s> Sec*. 5. Rights of indigenous cultural communities 1035
1. Ancestral lands 1035
[ A. CRUZ AND EUROPA V. SECRETARY 1035
Sec. 6. Social character of property 1035
NOTE: Property and the common good 1035
•m Sec. 7. Capacity to acquire private lands ' 1035
Sec. 8. Former Filipinos 1035
1. Private lands 1035
iigl
2. Aliens and private lands 1035
A. RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ 1035
B. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 1036
3. Recovery of invalidly sold private land 1041
A. HALILIV. COURT OF APPEALS 1042
B. FRENZEL V. CATITO •: 1044
4. Right of former Filipinos 1048
Sec. 9. Economic planning agency 1049
Sec. 10. Filipinization ofinvestments 1049
1. Foreigninvestment 1049
A. GARCIA V. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS 1049
NOTE: Filipinization and nationalization !049
2. Nationalism • 1049
A. MANILA PRINCE V. GSIS 1049
B. TANADA, ETAL. V. ANGARA 1060
[jjijjj
Sec. 11. Franchises ;.; , 106{
1. Public utilities ; 106,'
A. ALBANO V. REYES 106(
B. TATAD V. GARCIA, JR 106*
C. ILOILO ICE AND STORAGE V. PUBLIC UTILITY BOARD 1071
D. ASSOCIATED COMMUNICATIONS V. NTC 107S
E. JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC. V. CA 107£
Sec. 12. Preferential use of Filipino labor and materials 107£
Sec. 13. Trade policy 1076
Sec. 14. Practice of professions 1076
Sec. 15. Cooperatives '. >. 1076
Sec. 16. Formation of corporations 1076
1. Formation of private corporations 1076
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. AND NEW AGRIX,
INC. V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK 1076
Sec. 17. Emergency takeovers 1077
1. Takeover of Public Utilities 1077
Sec. 18. Expropriation of public utilities 1077
1. Telephone interconnections 1077
A. REPUBLIC V. PLDT , 1077
B. PLDT V. NTC AND CELLCOM, INC .^ 1079
NOTE: Business affected with public interest 1083
C. AGAN,JR.,ETAL.V.PIATCO , 1083
Sec. 19 .». 1086
1. Monopolies and Restraint of Trade 1086
A. EASTERN ASSURANCE V. LTFRB....' :. 1086
Sec. 20. Central monetary authority 1088
Sec. 21. Foreign loans '. 1088
1. Restrictions on contracting of foreign loans 1088
Sec. 22. Circumventions .7. 1088
Article XVI: General Provisions 1089

Section 1. The Philippine flag 1089
Sec. 2. Name, anthem and seal 1089
Sec. 3. The State may not be sued without its consent :.. 1089
1. State immunity from suit 1089
A. METRANV.PAREDES. 1089
B. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP. V. TEODORO 1090
C. PHILROCK V. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS 1090
D. REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO 1092
xxii
E. MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION V. CUSTOMS
ARRASTRE SERVICE 1093
F. TRADERS ROYAL BANK V. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT. 1096
G. FESTEJO V. FERNANDO , 1099
H. MINISTERIO V. CFI 1101
I. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO V. JUDGE FIRME :.7~~ U04
J. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. NLRC *. 1105
K. PNR V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 1106
L. REPUBLIC V. SANDOVAL 1106
NOTE: Statutory waiver 1107
NOTE: Suability vs. liability 1107
2. Immunity in international law 1107
A. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA V. VINZON 1107
B. GTZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 1110
Sec. 4. The Armed Forces 1111
Sec. 5. Oath of affirmation of Armed Forces 1111
Sec. 6. The National Police 1111
1. National police 1111
A. QUILONAV. THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL 1111
B. CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 1112
NOTE: The Integrated National Police 1118

Sec. 7. War veterans 1119
Sec. 8. Retirees! 1119
Sec. 9. Consumer protection 1119
Sec. 10. Communication structures 1119
Sec. 11. Ownership of mass media and advertising agencies 1119
Sec. 12. Indigenous cultural communities 1119
Article XVII: Amendments or Revisions 1120

Section 1. Amendment or revision 1120
Sec. 2. Amendment by initiative 1120
1. Amendment by initiative and referendum 1120
A. SANTIAGO V. COMELEC 1120
B. LAMBINO V. COMELEC '. 1125
Sec. 3. Constitutional Convention 1134
1. Amendment, Revision, Revolution H34
2. Proposal of amendments • 1135
3. Proposal ofamendments: CASES 1136
A. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC 1136*
B. DEL ROSARIO V. COMELEC /.... „. 1141
C. IMBONG V. COMELEC ;.......,..'.. - 1142
D. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC. ,..v.;.-.^..;....:... 1143
s«t NOTE: What amendments or revision may be proposed 1147
NOTE: In the realm of the unusual ...' 1147
Sec. 4. Ratification 1148
• 1. Ratification '. 1148
r A. PLANAS V. COMELEC 1148
m B. JAVELLANA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 1154
C. MITRA, JR. V. COMELEC 0 1168
Article XVIII: Transitory Provisions 1171

'Mi .
Section 1. First elections 1171

1. Purpose of the Transitory Provisions : , 1171
^ Sec. 2. Term of Senators and Congressmen ..;.... 1171
Sec. 3. Continuity of decrees ? 1171
Sec. 4. Treaties ,....:V. 1171
Sec. 5. Term of President and Vice-President 1171
Sec. 6. Legislative power of President 1172
m Sec. 7. Sectoral representatives ; ; 1172
Sec. 8. Metropolitan Authority 1172
Sec. 9. Subprovinces .;.:... 1172
Sec. 10. Continuity of courts .;.....'. 1172
Sec. 11. Tenure of judiciary members '.;..*.,:..;." 1172
Sec. 12. Unclogging the courts .......;............;:. 1172
Sec. 13. Case / U„„:.^..^..~v. 1172
Sec. 14. Filed before new Constitution r.r..:....;... ..:: 1173
1. Legal effect of the lapse of the applicable period ...•...:.......... 1173
Sec. 15. The Constitutional Commissions ...;..... ... 1173
Sec. 16. Reorganization of Civil Service u I..:.....'......... 1173
1. Security of tenure 1173
A. DARIO V. MISON ....:. 1173
h%&\ B. MENDOZA V. QUISUMBING 1182
Sec. 17. Compensation of National Officials ;...;....... 1187
Sec. 18. Salary scales 1187
Sec. 19. Disposition of office properties , 1187
Sec. 20. Free secondary schools a 1187
Sec. 21. Reversion of ill-gotten lands M............. 1187
Sec. 22. Expropriation of idle lands 1187
Sec. 23. Advertising entities. ......<. 1187
XXIV
L
Sec. 24. Private armies ..;.. H87
Sec. 25. US Military Bases H87
r . 1. U.S. Military Bases ; 1188
Sec. 26. Power of sequestration 1188
1. Sequestration, freeze order, provisional takeover 1189
2. Extent of PCGG's power 1190
*» A. COJUANGCO, JR. V. ROXAS, ETAL * ;. 1190
Sec. 27. Date of effectivity 1195
1. Date of effectivity of the Constitution 1195
A. DE LEON V. ESGUERRA 1195
iiM-l
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u
Introduction
Philippine Constitutionalism,
Birth Pangs and Traumatic Growth
1. Early Organic Acts.
"A constitution, in the American sense ofthe word, is awritten instrument by which the funda
mental powers of government are established, limited, and denned, and by which these powers are
distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of
the body politic. Justice Miller's oft-quoted definition of aconstitution in the American sense also
defines aconstitution in the Philippine sense, for the Philippine concept ofconstitutionalism started
as a transplant from American soil. Inthis definition, the fundamental purpose of a constitution is
presented primarily as both agrant and alimitation ofgovernmental authority. Itis in fact the organic
instrument to which government owes its being: "It is ... to the departments of government what
law is to individuals - nay, itis that from which their existence flows, and by which the powers (or
portions of the right to govern), which may have been committed to them, are prescribed. Itis their
commission - nay, it is their creator."2 It is"the written instrument agreed upon by the people
as the absolute rule ofaction and decision for all departments and officers of the government and
mopposition to which any act orrule of any department orofficer ofthe government, oreven of the
people themselves, will be altogether void."3 It is, inother words, the supreme written law of the land.
Constitutions are usually classified into written and unwritten, or flexible and rigid constitutions
These classifications are of general knowledge and are of very little usefulness for understanding
contemporary constitutions. Hence, the following classification is suggested instead. It is based not
on the content or form ofconstitutions but on the extent to which constitutions are observed as norms
of governmental action.4
1. Normative constitution: its norms direct value is educational. It points towards the ma
governmentalaction, and governmenthabitually ture state to which a fledging polity must grow.
adjusts its actions to the norms. It is like a suit It is like a suit that is in storage waiting for the
that fits and is actually worn. wearer to grow to the proper size.
2. Nominal constitution: it is a constitution 3. Semantic constitution: The primary
which cannot yet be fully operative because of purpose of a constitution is to limit power. A
existing socio-economic conditions. Its principal semantic constitution does just the opposite.
•Miller, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (1893); 1SCHWARTZ THE POWERS
OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1963).
2Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 24 (1793).
3COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 3 (1868).
*See LOWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 147-153.
1
fea CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
It is a tool for the perpetuation of power in the Constitutionalism in the Philippines, under
hands of power holders. It is not a suit at all but stood in the American sense, dates back to the
a disguise. It has certain unmistakable marks: ratification of the Treaty of Paris transferring
"A state president can perpetuate himself in Spanish sovereignty over the Islands to the Unit
office; he is empowered to veto the actions of ed States. Thereafter, Philippine constitutional
<m
the legislature without ultimate recourse to the law grew from a series of organic documents
electorate; the representative assembly is wholly enacted by the United States government. These
or in its majority nominated; the confirmation of were: (1) President McKinle^s Instruction to the
policy decisions is left to plebiscites instead of to a Second Philippine Commission,8 (2) the Philip
freely elected parhament; elections are conducted pine Bill of 1902,9 (3) the Philippine Autonomy
on the single-party ticket."5 Act of 1916.10
A constitutional document may be divided In language and in spirit, these constitu
into three parts: tional documents were transplants from Ameri
1. Constitution of government: those provi can constitutionalism. Hence, in the process of
sions which set up the governmental structure. interpreting these documents and applying them
to Philippine political and governmental process,
2. Constitution of liberty: the provisions Philippine courts relied on the authoritative
which guarantee individual fundamental liber teachings of American jurisprudence. By 1934,
ties against governmental abuse. when the United States Congress enacted the
Tydings-McDuffie Law,11 which provided for the
3. Constitution of sovereignty:the provisions
establishment of a Commonwealth Government
which outline the process whereby the sovereign
$HJ to be established under a constitution drafted
people may change the constitution.
and ratified by the Filipino people, the Philip
The subject of this volume is Philippine pines already had a solid'body of constitutional
constitutional law. Constitutional law, as un jurisprudence on which to build.
derstood both in American and Philippine law, is
not just the text of the constitution itself. It is "a 2. The 1935 Constitution.
body of rules resulting from the interpretation by By authority of the Tydings-McDuffie Law,
a high court of cases in which the validity, in rela a Constitutional Convention was called. It met
tion to the constitutional instrument, of some act on July 30,1934, and held its final session Feb
of governmental power,... has been challenged. ruary 8, 1935. On March 3, 1935, the President
This function, conveniently labeled 'Judicial Re of the United States approved the draft of the
view,' involves the power and duty on the part Constitution and on May 14, 1935, the Filipino
of the Court of pronouncing void any such act electorate ratified the same by an overwhelm
which does not square with its own reading of the ing majority vote. On November 15, 1935, the
constitutional instrument.. ."6 Although we are Commonwealth Government established by the
under a constitution, the constitution, as Chief Constitution became operative.
Justice Hughes once said, is what the judges say
it is. The task of the student of constitutional law, Philippine Independence came on July 4,
therefore, cannot be reduced to mere exegesis of 1946. The Philippine Republic continued to
operate under the Constitution formulated in
the constitutional text. He must plow through
the thousands of pages of court decisions in order 1934-1935. Many felt a certain unease, in that, an
to find the mass of "judge-made" laws that have independent republic should continue to operate
under a Constitution that had been fashioned un-
grown from the text.7
hId. at 150. 81 Public Laws [of the Philippines] lxiii, February 2,

6CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 1900.
STATES OF AMERICA 1 (1963). 9Id. at 1056. Act July 1,1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691.
7For a discussion of the various types of constitutions, 1011 Public Laws [of the Philippines] 237. Act Aug. 29,
written or unwritten, evolved or enacted, rigid or flexible, see 1916, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545.
any standard textbook of political science. uAct Mar. 24,1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 546.
INTRODUCTION • 3
der colonial auspices.,12 Gradually, the agitation that the proposed Constitution had been ratified
for a thorough overhaul of the 1935 Constitution by an overwhelming vote of the members of the
gathered momentum. Citizens Assemblies.
3. The 1973 Constitution. Many could not and would not believe the
news. Some asked the Supreme Court to say
On March 16, 1967, the PhilippineCongress, that it was not so.
pursuant to the authority given to it by the 1935
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 (later On March 31,1973, a divided Supreme Court
amended by Resolution No. 4 passed on June 17, ruled that "there is no further judicial obstacle to
1969) calling a Convention to propose amend the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect."13
ments to the Constitution. Election of Delegates
to the Convention were held on November 20, The import of the Supreme Court decision
1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been examined elsewhere.u Suffice it here to
began on June 1, 1971. recall the oft-quoted observation of Holmes that
Before the Constitutional Convention could "Great cases like hard cases make bad law."15
finish its work, martial law was imposed on the History will judge whether Javellana v. Execu
entire Philippines on September 21, 1972. Even tive Secretary is a great case. But to judge by the
as some delegates were placed under detention splintering of the Supreme Court justices who
and others went into hiding or voluntary exile, collectively wrote the longest set of opinions yet
the Constitutional Convention continued its in the history of the Philippine Supreme Court
deliberations under an atmosphere of fear and — a total of 338 pages — it was a hard case.
uncertainty. To what extent and how martial Whether Javellana v. Executive Secretary
law conditions affected the final outcome of the made good or bad law, four facts cannot be de
convention has not yet been assessed. At any nied: (1) the Supreme Court ruled "that there
rate, on November 29, 1972, the Convention ap [was] no further judicial obstacle to the new
proved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic Constitution being considered in force and effect";
of the Philippines. (2) the Executive Department, with vigor and
On November 30, 1972, the President issued with all the resources at its command, proceeded
Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the to implement it; (3) the Legislative Department
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the was nowhere to be found to object; (4) meanwhile,
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines ordinary mortals lived and found their fortunes
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention" (and misfortunes) under the new Constitution.
and setting the date of the plebiscite on January One need not agree with Justice Antonio's
15, 1973. opiate that at bottom of the divergent views in
the Javellana case was "the degree of one's faith
On January 7, 1973, however, the President
— in the nation's leadership and in the matu
issued General Order No. 20 directing "that the
rity of judgment of our people."16 Nevertheless,
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15,
believers and infidels alike cowered through the
1973, be postponed until further notice."
most difficult parts of the Marcos regime.
Meanwhile, the Citizen's Assemblies, orga
For over a decade, the principal dramatis
nized by Presidential Decree No. 86, were being
personae did not change. But the script under
asked to answer certain questions, among which
went some change. In 1976. the Constitution was
was: "Do you approve of the New Constitution?"
amended to give birth to the interim Batasang
Then, suddenly, on January 17, 1973, while the
Supreme Court was hearing arguments on peti
"Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, 141
tions to enjoin the holding of a plebiscite, the (1973).
President, by Proclamation No. 1102, announced "Bernas, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
803-819 (1984).
"Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
l2See BERNAS, "DOES TH E PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC 197, 400 (1904).
HAVE A CONSTITUTION?" 16 ATENEO L.J. 132 (1967). ,650 SCRA at 376, italics added.
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Pambansa, a legislative body which functioned Constitution and without the sanction of'the
no better than as a rubber-stamp for the will of Batasan Pambansa which had chosen to give the
the President which found a new authoritarian presidency to Mr. Marcos, was proclaimed first
vehicle in Amendment 6 which was also a self- woman President of the Philippines in simple
bestowed gift packaged with the 1976 amend rites held at the Club Filipino and was immedi
ments. In 1981, the 1973 Constitution was once ately sworn in by Senior Associate Justice of the
again amended to depart from the parliamentary Supreme Court Claudio Teehankee.
form of the original 1973 Constitution to the
Meanwhile, at almost the same time and in
presidential. Soon the interim Batasang Pam
bansa gave way to a regularBatasang Pambansa
virtue of the Batasan proclamation of February
15, 1986, Mr. Marcos was sworn in by Chief
which, however, was not much sturdier than its
Justice Ramon Aquino atMalacanang. The night
predecessor. Meanwhile, the faith in the leader
of the same day, Mr. Marcos, accompanied by a
ship about v/hich Justice Antonio had spoken in
large entourage of family and supporters, went
1973 was totally crumbling.
into exile.
4. The Freedom Constitution. President Aquino could have made herself

subject to the provisions of the 1973 Constitu
The 1973 Constitution ended the same way tion by allowing herself to be proclaimed by the
that it started — unceremoniously. Batasan. She, however, chose not to allow the
In November 1985, as the regime of Mr. Mar Batasan members to undo their perfidy. She
cos sunk deeper into unpopularity, the President hoped thereby to be able to more effectively re
gambled by calling for a special presidential spond to the extraordinary challenge thrown at
election. Corazon Aquino challenged President her by a heroic nation which had stood against
Marcos for the presidency and elections were a long reigning dictator. She turned her back on
held on February 8,1986. On February 15,1986, the 1973 Constitution whose officials had denied
the Batasan Pambansa, in the exercise of pow her the presidency. Barred by the processes of the
ers given by the 1973 Constitution, proclaimed 1973 Constitution, she chose instead to govern
Ferdinand Marcos President amid widespread under a Provisional Constitution designed to
protest. Subsequently, starting on the afternoon enable her to meet the people's challenge. The
of February 22, 1986, Minister of National De document of revolutionary defiance was Proc
fense Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff lamation No. 3.17 Proclamation No. 3 became
General Fidel Ramos initiated a revolt against popularly known as the "Freedom Constitution."
Ferdinand Marcos. Ramos and Enrile placed
5. The 1987 Constitution.
their support instead behind Corazon C. Aquino.
Article VI of Proclamation No. 3 said:
Completely outnumbered by the Marcos
forces and confined to Camp Crame and Camp ARTICLE VI
Aguinaldo, the Enrile-Ramos forces could have
easily been crushed by the Marcos forces. But ADOPTING A NEW CONSTITUTION
hordes of unarmed civilians came to their rescue
SECTION 1. Within sixty (60) days from
by surrounding the two military camps with
date of this Proclamation, a Commission
masses of human bodies. They dared tanks and
shall be appointed by the President to draft
armored vehicles to come at them. The civilian
a New Constitution. The Commission shall
support given to the outnumbered Enrile-Ramos
be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor
forces caused other military elements to switch
more than fifty (50) natural-born citizens
their support to Corazon Aquino. By the morning
of the Philippines, of recognized probity,
of February 24, 1986, after elements of the Air
known for their independence, nationalism
Force switched, it was all over for Mr. Marcos
and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the
and all those who had connived to proclaim him
President after consultation with various
President under the 1973 Constitution. Finally,
sectors of society.
on the morning of February 25,1986, Corazon C.
Aquino, in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 "See Appendix.
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 2. The Commission shall of the votes cast in such which shall be held
complete its work within as short a period within a period of sixty (60) days following
as may be consistent with the need both to its submission to the President.
hasten the return of normal constitutional
government and to draft a document truly The 1986 Constitutional Commission con
reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the vened on June 1, 1986 and finished its work on
Filipino people. October 15, 1986. A plebiscite, held on Febru
ary 2, 1987, overwhelmingly ratified the new
SECTION 3. The Commission shall Constitution.
conduct public hearings to insure that the
people will have adequate participation in The 1987 Constitution has nowbeen in op
the formulation of the New Constitution. eration formorethan sixteen years. The govern
mentit set up overcame attempted coups against
SECTION 4. The plenary sessions of the presidency of Corazon Aquino. It overcame
the Commission shall be public and fully another coup attempt on July 27, 2003.
recorded.
Since the 1987 Constitution took effect vari
SECTION 5. The new Constitution ous movements have been initiated to amend or
shall be presented by the Commission to revise the Constitution. No attempt so far has
the President who shall fix the date for the gone beyond informal debate. At the time of this
holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid writing (2010), the Constitution has already
and effectiveupon ratification by a majority lasted twenty-three years.
Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane socdzty and establish a government that shall embody our ide
als and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace,
do ordain and promulgate this constitution.
I. Notes on the Preamble.
The Preamble is not a source of rights or of obligations. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
II, 22 (1905). Because, however, it sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution, it
is useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of the Constitu
tion. It is thus a source of light.
Its authorship belongs to the "sovereign tain his or her fullest development economically,
Filipino people." Its scope and purpose is "to politically, culturally, and spiritually. The phrase
build a just and humane society and to estab "general welfare" was avoided because it could be
lish a government that shall embody our ideals interpreted as "the greatest good for the greatest
and aspirations, promote the common good, number" even if what the greater number wants
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure does violence to human dignity, as for instance
to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of when the greater majority might want the exter
independence and democracy under the rule of mination of those who are considered inferior.
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, The specification of "equality" emphasizes
equality and peace." that a major problem in Philippine society is
The use of the first person "We" stresses the the prevalence of gross economic and political
active and sovereign role of the Filipino people inequalities.
as author of the Constitution. The language thus Othe"r departures from the 1935 version are
differs from that of the 1935 Constitution which the following: It adds the final phrase "under the
used the third person "The Filipino people," rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
thereby suggesting that another power was love, equality and peace." "Love" is inserted as a
merely announcing that the Filipinos werefinally monument to the love that prevented bloodshed
being allowed to promulgate a constitution. in the February Revolution. The mention of
The phrase "Almighty God," in place of "truth" is a protest against the deception which
"Divine Providence" found in the 1935 Constitu characterized the previous regime. And "peace"
tion, is more personal and more consonant with is mentioned last as the fruit of the convergence
personalistFilipino religiosity. The invocation of of truth, justice, freedom, and love. The phrase
God is also a signal that, while church and state "the rule of law" expresses the concept that gov
are institutionally separate, God and people are ernment officials have only the authority given
not. them by law and defined by law, and that such
authority continues only with the consent of the
The phrase "common good" projects the idea people.
of a social order that enables every citizen to at
Article I
The National Territory
SECTION 1. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY COMPRISES THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPEL

AGO, WITH ALL THE ISLANDS AND WATERS EMBRACED THEREIN, AND ALL OTHER
TERRITORIES OVER WHICH THE PHILIPPINES HAS SOVEREIGNTY OR JURISDIC
TION, CONSISTING OF ITS TERRESTRIAL, FLUVIAL, AND AERIAL DOMAINS, INCLUD
ING ITS TERRITORIAL SEA, THE SEABED, THE SUBSOIL, THE INSULAR SHELVES,
AND OTHER SUBMARINE AREAS. THE WATERS AROUND, BETWEEN, AND CONNECT
ING f HE ISLANDS OF THE ARCHIPELAGO, REGARDLESS OF THEIR BREADTH AND
DIMENSIONS, FORM PART OF THE INTERNAL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
1. The Philippine Territory.

It is sometimes asked why a Constitution should have a definition of national territory at all.
Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the new Constitution defines the national territory of the
Philippines. But the 1935 Constitution had a very special reason for defining it. To be effective, the
1935 Constitution had to be accepted by the President of the United States. Since at the time of the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution there was still some fear that the United States government might
dismember Philippine territory, the delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention believed that
such dismemberment could be prevented by including a definition of Philippine territory in the Con
stitution. It was argued that acceptance of the Constitution by the U.S. President would oblige the
American government topreserve the integrityofPhilippine territoryas defined in the Constitution.
No such special reason compelled the del apprehension that it would be difficult to explain
egates to the 1971 Constitutional Conventionto why after the 1935 and 1973 provisions on the
include a definition of National Territory in the national territory the new Constitution should
1973 Constitution. Some delegates, however, ar fail to provide for one.
guedthat a definition ofnationalterritoryshould It should be remembered, however, that a
be placed in the constitution for the preservation constitution is municipal law. As such, it binds
of the national wealth, for national security, and onlythe nation promulgating it. Hence, a defini
as a manifestation of our solidarity as a people. tion of national territory in the constitution will
More importantly, it was the wish of some to bind internationally only if it is supported by
projectin the ConstitutionPhilippineadherence proofthat can stand in international law.
to the "archipelagic principle" (which will be
Article I sets down the scope of the national
discussed below).
territory. It includes: (1) the Philippine archi
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional pelago; (2) all other territories over which the
Commission on the subject repeated much of the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction; and
discussion of the 1971 Constitutional Conven (3) the territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
tion. In the end, there was recognition of the the insular shelves, and other submarine areas
fact that an article on national territory would corresponding to (1) and (2). Moreover, (1) and (2)
have an educational value. Moreover, there was consist of terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains.
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
An archipelago is a body of water studded unilateral assertions in a constitution, which is

with islands. The Philippine archipelago is that municipal law, by themselves do not establish a
body of water studded with islands which is de right to a territory.
lineated in the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898, as modified by the Treaty of Washington The extent of the Philippine claim to its
of November 7,1900 and the Treaty with Great aerial domain, territorial sea, the seabed, the
Britain of January 2, 1930. These are the same subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine
treaties which were enumerated in the 1935 areas is not specified. The Philippines simply
Constitution to delineate Philippine territory. lays claim to them to the extent recognized by
international law.
The 1973 Constitution, however, omitted specific
mention of these treaties because the Constitu The Philippines makes a special claim with
tional Convention delegates hoped to erase every respect to the "waters around, between and con
possible trace of our colonial history from the necting the islands of the archipelago." These
new. organic document. The 1987 Constitution are claimed as part of its "internal waters"
has likewise omitted an explicit enumeration of irrespective of their breadth and. dimension.
the relevant treaties. Article 53 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of
The clause "all other territories over which the Sea tails these "archipelagic" waters. Article
the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction" 8(2) affirms the existence of the right ofinnocent
includes any territory which presently belongs passage through such archipelagic waters. Since,
or-might in the future belong to the Philippines however, there is no right cf innocent passage
through any of the internationally accepted through "internal waters," to this extent the 1982
modes of acquiring territory. Foremost among Convention on the Law of the Sea conflicts with
these territories are what are referred to by the the Philippine Constitution.
1935 Constitution as "all territory over which the The Philippine government is clearly aware
present (1935) Government of the Philippine Is of these possible conflicts. Hence, upon its rati
lands exercises jurisdiction." This had reference fication of the Convention on the Law of the Sea
to the Batanes Islands which, although undisput- on August 5,1984, it added a declaration that the
edly belonging to the Philippines, apparently lay "signing of the Convention by the Government
outside the lines drawn by the Treaty of Paris. of the Republic of the Philippines shall not in
The clause also includes what was referred any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign
to under the 1973 Constitution as territories
rights of the Republic of the Philippines under
"belonging to the Philippines.by historic right and arising from the Constitution of the Philip
or legal title," that is, other territories which, pines" nor "nullify or impair the sovereignty of
depending on available evidence, might belong the Philippines as an archipelagic State over
to the Philippines {e.g., Sabah, the Marianas,
the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority
Freedomland).
to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty,
independence, and security."1
The 1987 Constitution has dropped the
Another element of the archipelagic prin
phrase "belonging to the Philippines by historic
ciple is the straight baseline method of drawing
right or legal title" found in the 1973 Constitu
baselines. This consists of drawing straight lines
tion. The intention in dropping such phrase was
connecting appropriate points on the coast with
not to surrender the Philippines' claim to Sabah.
out departing to any appreciable extent from the
The change is merely semantic. It is meant to
general direction of the coast.
avoid the use of language historically offensive
to Malaysia. The new Constitution now uses the Baselines are important because they are
phrase [all territory] "over which the Philippines the dividing line between internal waters and
has sovereignty or jurisdiction." It neither claims territorial waters. The 1982 Convention on the
nor disclaims Sabah but asserts a legal situation
in which Sabah can have a place in Philippine 'U.N. Office for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
territory depending on the outcome of the cur Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue 1, March 1987, An
nex II, p. 6, quoted in SWEENEY, OLIVER, LEECH, THE
rent dispute. It is a recognition of the fact that INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 193 (3RD ED., 1988).
\sj ARTICLE I: THE NATIONAL TERRITORY • 9
Law of the Sea requires coastal states to draw Finally, in 2009 Congress passed a new baseline
baselines in conformity with the provisions of law, R.A. 9522.
the Convention. Prior to 1982, Congress had
already passed two baseline laws, R.A. 3046 and R.A. 9522 provides one set of baselines for the
R.A. 5446. These, however, do not conform com archipelago and another set ofbasehnes for what
pletely with the requirements of the Convention. it callsa regime ofislandsoutsidethe archipelago
but belonging to the Philippines.
Article II
Declaration of Principles
and State Policies
Prenote
The "Declaration ofPrinciples and State Policies" is astatement ofthe basic ideological principles
and policies that underlie the Constitution. As such, the provisions shed light on the meaning ofthe
other provisions of the Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of the government in
the implementation of the Constitution.
The Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution ballooned from the
five sections of 1935 and the ten sections of 1973 to twenty-eight sections. The 1987 provisions were
written in the same spirit as their counterparts in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions; buttherfe-was
an attempt todistinguish "principles" from "policies." The "principles" arebinding rules which must
beobserved in the conduct ofgovernment whereas "policies" are guidelines for the orientation of
the state.1 In fact, however, the distinction is of little significance because not all of the six "prin
ciples" are self-executory and some of the. "policies" already anchor justiciable rights.2 Kilosbayan
v. Morato,3 for instance, read Sections 5, 12,13 and 17 as mere "guidelines" which do not yet confer
rights enforceable by the courts but recognized Section 16 as a right-conferring provision because it
speaks of "the right of the people."
PRINCIPLES
SECTION 1. THE PHILIPPINES IS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE

SOVEREIGNTY RESIDES IN THE PEOPLEAND ALL GOVERNMENTAUTHORITY EMA
NATES FROM THEM.
1. A "democratic and republican state."

A state is generally defined as a community Although for the purpose of political sociol
of persons more or less numerous, permanently ogy a state, which is a legal concept, may be
occupying a definite portion of territory, inde distinguished from nation, which is an ethnic
pendent of external control, and possessing an concept, for the purpose of constitutional law
organized government to which the great body the two terms are not distinct. The Constitution
ofinhabitants render habitual obedience. Hence, uses them interchangeably to designate the legal
commentators break down the concept into the concept of state as defined above.
followingfour elements: people, territory, sover
eignty, government. As an element of a state, "people" simply
means a community of persons sufficient in num-
lSee IV RECORD OP THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 768 and 580.

2See e.g. the right to ecological balance in Section 15, infra.
3G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1935, on reconsideration.
10
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 11
ber and capable of maintaining the continued is nothing more than a state where sovereignty
existence of the community and held together resides in the people and where all government
by a common bond of law. It is of no legal conse authority emanates from the people.
quence if they possess diverse racial, cultural, or
The new Constitution does not allow "con
economic interests.
stitutional authoritarianism." See Article VII,
Legal sovereignty is the supreme power to Section 18.
make law. This is lodged in the people. Political
sovereignty is the sum total ofall the influences in 2. Nature and functions of government.
(iiiiilJ
a state, legal and non-legal, which determine the Government, as an element of a state, is
course oflaw. Stated in terms of auto-limitation, defined as "that institution or aggregate of insti
sovereignty "is the property of a state-force due to tutions by which an independent society makes
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self- and carries out those rules of action which are
determination and self-restriction." (Jellinek). A necessary to enable men to live in a social state,
change in the seat of sovereignty has the effect or which are imposed upon the people forming
of abolishing all political laws. Thus, upon the that society by those who possess the power or
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United authority of prescribing them."4 Section 2 of the
States, all political laws of Spain were abrogated, Revised Administrative Code (1917) defined the
whether- compatible or not with the laws of the "Government of the Republic of the Philippines"
new sovereign. Macariola v.Asuncion, 114 SCRA thus:5
77 (May 31,1982.)
The Government of the Philippine Is
A republican state simply means a state lands is a term which refers to the corporate
wherein all government authority emanates from governmental entity through which the func
the people and is exercised by representatives tions of government are exercised throughout
chosen by the people. The hew Constitution calls the Philippine Islands, including, save as the
the Philippines a "democratic" state. What this contrary appears from the context, the vari
imports is that in the view of the Constitution ous arms through which political authority
the Philippines is not only a representative or is made effective in said Islands, whether
republican state but also shares some aspects pertaining to the central Government or to
of direct democracy such as "initiative and ref the provincial or municipal branches or other
erendum" in Article VI, Section 32, and Article form of local government.
XVII, Section 2. The word is also a monument to
the February Revolution which re-won freedom On the national scale, therefore, the term
through direct action of the people. "government of the Philippines" refers to the
three great departments —legislative, executive,
NOTE: "Constitutional Authoritarian
and judicial - mandated by the Constitution,
ism."
and on the local level, it means the regional,
"Constitutional authoritarianism," as under provincial, city, municipal and barrio govern
stood and practiced in the Marcos regime under ments. It does not include government entities
the 1973 Constitution, was the assumption of which are given a corporate personality separate
extraordinary powers by the President, includ and distinct from the government and which are
ing legislative and judicial and even constituent governed by the corporation law.6Moreover, for
powers, where such assumption is authorized by purposes of international law, it is the national
the letter or at least by the spirit of a legitimately government that has legal personality and it is
enacted Constitution. the national government that is internationally
Constitutional authoritarianism is compat
responsible for the actions of other agencies and
instrumentalities of the state.
ijffi^
ible with a republican state if the Constitution
upon which the Executive bases his assumption
of power is a legitimate expression ofthe people's
4U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, cited in Bacani v. NACOCO,
will and if the Executive who assumes power
100 Phil. 468, 471 (1956).
received his office through a valid election by 5Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil, at 471.
the people. This is so because a republican state 6Id. at 474.
12
The functions ofgovernment may be classi whether NACOCO was part of"government" or
fied into constituent and ministrant functions. not. And since NACOCO was a corporation with
The former are the compulsory functions which personality distinct from the government, it was
constitute the very bonds of society. President clearly notpart ofthe government andcould not
Wilson's enumeration of the constituent func therefore claim the privileges which flow from
tion of government was adopted in Bacani v sovereignty. When, however, government chooses
NACOCO.1 They are:8
to operate not through a government-owned
(1) The keeping of order and providing for corporation but through an unincorporated
the protection ofpersons andproperty from vio agency, the distinctionbetween constituent and
lence and robbery. ministrant functions can be useful. The concepts,
(2) Thefixing ofthe legalrelations between
however, seem to belong more to the field of po
manand wife and between parents andchildren.
litical science thantolaw. Law prefers to use the
termgovernmental and proprietary.
(3) The regulation ofthe holding, transmis Whether one, however, uses the terms con
sion, andinterchange ofproperty, andthedeter stituent and ministrant or governmental and
mination ofits liabilities for debt or for crime. proprietary, what is important to remember is
(4) The determination of contract rights that the enumeration of specific government
between individuals. functions under these headings cannot bestatic.
This was emphasized in the case ofACCFA v.
(5) The definition and punishmentofcrime. CUGCO.10 At issue was the characterization of
(6) The administration of justice in civil the functions of a government agency charged
cases. with the implementation of the land reform
program. The function, the Court said, may not
(7) The determination ofthepolitical duties, strictly be "constituent" in the sense ofBacani,
privileges, and relations of citizens. but the compelling urgency with which the Con
(8) Dealings ofthe state with foreign pow stitution speaks of social justice does not leave
ers: the preservation of the state from external any doubt that land reform is not an optional
danger or encroachment and the advancement but a compulsory function of sovereignty.11 In
of its international interest. the language of Justice Makalintal:12 "
Ministrant functions are the optional func The growing complexities of modern soci
tions of government intended for achieving a ety, however, have rendered this traditional
better life for thecommunity. "The principles for classification of the functions of government
determining whether or not a government shall quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas
exercise certain of these optional functions are: which used to be left to private enterprise and
(1) that a government should do for the public initiative and which the government wascalled
welfare those thingswhich privatecapital would upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
not naturally undertake, and (2) that a govern was better equipped toadminister for thepublic
ment should do those things which by its very welfare than isany private individual orgroup of
nature it is better equipped to administer for the individuals," continue to lose their well-defined
publicwelfare than is any private individualor boundaries and to be absorbed within activities
group of individuals."9 that the government must undertake in its sover
eign capacity ifit is tomeet theincreasing social
For thepurpose ofthedecision inBacani, the challenges of the times. Here as almost every
disquisition on the functions ofgovernment was where else thetendency is undoubtedly towards
really oflittle moment. The issue in the casewas a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course this development was envisioned, indeed
"Id. adopted as a national policy, bythe Constitution
*Id. at 472.
*Id. The whole discussion onfunctions ofgovernment in 1030 SCRA649 (1969).
Bacani was liftedfrom MALCOLM, THE GOVERNMENT "Id. at 661.
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 19-20. 12Id. at 662 (1969).
itself in. its declaration of principle concerning rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise
the promotion of social justice. therein administrative jurisdiction. To state the
proposition is to make patent how much it is
Among more recent decisions, housing has
tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower
been found to be a governmental function since
court decision must be affirmed with the sole
housing is considered an essential service.13 But
modification that she is given thirty days from
undertaking to supply water for a price, as does the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, fail
the government corporation National Irrigation ing which, she is required to demolish the same.
Authority, is considered a trade and not a gov
iyj> ernmental activity.14
NOTE: "Administration" is distinguished There is, as mentioned in the opening para
from "government" as the "aggregate of persons graph of this petition, no support in law for the
in whose hands the reigns of government are stand taken by appellant.
for the time being (the chief ministers or heads 1. Much less is a reversal indicated because
of departments)." But the terms are often inter of the alleged absence of the rather novel con
changed.15 cept of administrative jurisdiction on the part
of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing
3. Sovereignty. that may be said against it. Far worse is the as
A. People v. Gozo sumption at war with controlling and authorita
53.SCRA476, October 26, 1973 tive doctrines that the mere existence of military
or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply
into the power to govern. Two leading cases may
FERNANDO, J.:
be cited to show how offensive is such thinking
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v.
Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting Acierto,16 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Inter
her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, nal Revenue.19 As was so emphatically set forth
Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement,
mayor for the construction or erection of a build it should be noted, the Philippine Government
ing, as well as any modification, alternation, merely consents that the United States exercise
repair or demolition thereof. She questions its jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was
validity, or at the very least, its applicability to given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy,
her, by invoking due process,16 a contention she or expediency. The Philippine Government has
would premise on what for her is the teaching not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
of People v. Fajardo.11 If such a ground were far part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
from being impressed with solidity,'she stands completely of jurisdiction over offenses commit
on quicksand when she would deny the appli ted therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
cability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext United States Government has prior or prefer
that her house was constructed within the naval
ential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such of
base leased to the American armed forces. While
fenses. The Philippine Government retains not
yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does only jurisdiction rights not granted, but also all
not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to
would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign
make use of. The first proposition is implied
from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the
,3PHHC v. Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA bases; the second from the express provisions of
296, 310 (1987). the treaty."20 There was a reiteration of such a
"Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman, G.R. No. 55963
& 61045, February 27,1991.
view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled
,5United States v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, 339 (1903). than that the Philippines being independent and
,6According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be 1892 Phil. 543 (1953); 30 SCRA 968 (December 27,1969).
denied the equal protection of the laws." ,930 SCRA 968 (December 27, 1969).
"104 Phil. 443 (1958). M92 Phil. 534, 542.
14
P&l CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its legislative, executive, and judicial departments
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that ofa defacto government are goodand valid. The
is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees question to be determined is whether or not the
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws governments established in these Islands under
govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies the names of Philippine Executive Commission
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of and Republic ofthe Philippines during the Japa
its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. nese military occupation or regime were defacto
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If governments. If they were, the judicial acts and
it were not thus, there is a diminution of its proceedings of those governments remain good
sovereignty."21 Then came this paragraph deal and valid even after the liberation or reoccupa-
ing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to tion of the Philippines by the American and
be admitted that any state may, by its consent, Filipino forces.
express or implied, submit to a restriction of
its sovereign rights. There may thus be a cur There are several kinds of de facto govern
tailment ofwhat otherwise is a powerplenary in ments. The first, or government de facto in a
character. That, is the concept of sovereignty as proper legalsense, is that government that gets
auto-limitation, which, in the succinctlanguage possession and control of, or usurps, by force or
ofJellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self- government and maintains itselfagainst the will
determination and self-restriction.' A state then, ofthe latter, such as the government ofEngland
if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise under the Commonwealth, iirst by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second
of what otherwise is illimitable competence.22'
The opinion was at pains to point out though is that which is established and maintained by
that even then, there is 'at the most diminution
militaryforces whoinvade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.
The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to denominated a government of paramount force,
as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was
some persons found within its territory no lon
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812,
ger control. Nor does the matter end there. It is
and ofTampico, Mexico, occupied during the war
not precluded from allowing another power to
with Mexico by the troops of the United States.
participate in the exercise ofjurisdictional right And the third is that established as an indepen
over certain portions of its territory. If it does so,
dent government by the inhabitants ofa country
it by no means follows that such areas become
whorise in insurrection against the parent 3tate,
impressed with an alien character. They retain
such as the government of the Southern Confed
their status as native soil.They are still subjectto eracy in revolt against the Union during the war
its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, ofsecession. Weare not concerned in the present
but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases case with the first kind, but only with the second
under the lease of the American armed forces by and third kinds of de facto governments.
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947.
They are not and cannot be foreign territory."23 Speaking of government "de facto" of the
second kind, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Thorington v. Smith (8
4. Governments de jure and de facto. Wall.,1), said: "But there is another description
ofgovernment, called also by publicists a govern
A. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
ment defacto, but which might, perhaps, be more
75 Phil 113(1945) aptly denominated a government of paramount
force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1)
1. It is a legal truism in political and inter that its existence is maintained by active mili
national law that all acts and proceedings of the tary power within the territories, and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful
2130 SCRA 968, 973.
government; and (2), that while it exists it must
ZiIbid. necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
i3Ibid.t 973-974. citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in
submission to such force, do not become respon considered as suspended or in abeyance during
sible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not the military occupation. Although the local and
warranted by the laws of the rightful govern civil administration of justice is suspended as a
ment. Actual governments of this sort are estab matter of course as soon as a country is militarily
lished over districts differing greatly in extent occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take
and conditions. They are usually administered the whole administration into his own hands. In
directly by military authority, but they may be practice, the local ordinary tribunals are autho
administered, also, by civil authority, supported rized to continue administering justice; and the
more or less directly by military force * * *. One judges and other judicial officers are kept in their
example of this sort of governments is found in posts if they accept the authority of the belliger
the case of Castine, in Maine, reduced to Bri ent occupant or are required to continue in their
liiHjJ
tish possession in the war of 1812 * * *. U.S. v. positions under the supervision of the military
Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found or civil authorities appointed by the Commander
in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war in Chief of the occupant. These principles and
with Mexico, by the troops of the United States practice have the sanction of all publicists who
* * *. Fleming v. Page (9 Howard, 614). These have considered the subject, and have been as
were cases of temporary possession of territory serted by the Supreme Court and applied by the
by lawful and regular governments at war with Presidents of the United States.
.the country of which the territory so possessed
was part.". The doctrine upon this subject is thus
summed up by Halleck, in his work on Inter
The powers and duties of de facto govern national Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one
ments of this description are regulated in Section belligerent to occupy* and govern the territory
III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a of the enemy while in its military possession,
revision of the provisions of the Hague Conven is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly
tions of 1899 on the same subject of Military from the right to conquer. .We, therefore, do not
i$$}
Authority over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of look to the Constitution or political institutions
said Section III provides that "the authority of of the conqueror, for authority to establish a
the legitimate power having actually passed into government for the territory of the enemy in
fjifi
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take his possession, during its military occupation,
all steps in his power to reestablish, and insure, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
as far as possible, public order and safety, while government are regulated and limited. Such
respecting, unless absolutely presented, the laws authority and such rules are delivered directly
'm$i\
in force in the country." from the laws of war, as established by the us
age of the world and confirmed by the writings of
According to these precepts of the Hague
publicists and decisions of courts - in fine, from
Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the
the law of nations * * *. The municipal laws of a
right and is burdened with the duty to insure
conquered territory or the laws which regulate
public order and safety during his military oc
private rights continue in force during military
cupation he possesses all the powers of a de facto
occupation, except so far as they are suspended
government, and he can suspend the old laws and
or changed by the acts of the conqueror * * *. He,
promulgate new ones and make such changes
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto gov
in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined
ernment, and can at his pleasure either change
to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the
the existing laws or make new ones."
circumstances prevailing in the occupied terri
tory, the municipal laws in force in the country, And applying the principles for the exercise
that is, those laws which enforce public order of military authority in an occupied territory,
fai and regulate the social and commercial life of the which were later embodied in the said Hague
country. On the other hand, laws of a political Conventions, President McKinley, in his exec
nature or affecting political relations, sucb as, utive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,
lm
among others, the right of assembly, the right 1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines
to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the by United States forces, said in part: "Though
right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are the powers of the military occupant are absolute
16 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
and supreme, and immediately operate upon the regular administration of the laws. Order
the political condition of the inhabitants, the was to be preserved, police regulations main
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such tained, crime prosecuted, property protected,
as affect private rights of person and property contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates
and provide for the punishment of crime, are settled, and the transfer and descentofproperty
considered as continuing in force, so far as they regulated, precisely,as in the time of peace. No
are compatible with the new order of things, one, that we are aware of, seriously questions
until they are suspended or superseded by the the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in
occupying belligerent; and in practice they are the insurrectionary" States touching these and
not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain kindred subjects, where they were not hostile
in force and to be administered by the ordinary in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
tribunals, substantially as they were before the authority of the National Government, and did
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as not impair the rights of citizens under the Con
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. stitution.' The same doctrine has been asserted
The judges and the other officials connected with in numerous other cases."
the administration ofjustice may, if they accept
the authority of the United States, continue to Andthe same court, in the case of Baldy v.
administer the ordinary law of the land *as be Hunter (171 U.S., 388, 400), held: 'That what
tween man and man under the supervision of the occurred or was done in respect of such matters
iii£) American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's under the authority of the laws of these local de;
Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.) facto governments should not be disregarded or
held to be invalid merely because these govern
As to "de facto"government of the third kind, ments were organized in hostility to the Union
the Supreme Court of the LTnited States, in the established by the national Constitution; this,
same case of Thorington v. Smith, supra, recog because the existence of war between the United
nized the government set up by the Confederate States and the Confederate States did not relieve
States as a de facto government. In that case, it those who were within the insurrectionary lines
was held that "the central government estab from the necessity of civil obedience, nor de
lished for the insurgent States differed from the stroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil
temporary governments at Castine and Tampico government or the regular administration of the
in the circumstance that its authority did not laws, and because transactions in the ordinary
originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was course of civil society -as organized within the
not, on that account, less actual or less supreme. enemy's territory although they may have indi
And we think that it must be classed among the rectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de
governments of which these are examples * * *." factoor unlawful government organized to effect
In the case of Williams v. Bruffy (96 U.S., a dissolution of the Union, were without blame
176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United 'except when proved to have been entered into
States, discussing the validity of the acts of the with actual intent to further invasion or insur
Confederate States, said: "The same general rection,"' and 'That judicial and legislative acts
form of government, the same general laws for in the respective states composing the so-called
the administration of justice and the protection Confederate States should be respected by the
of private rights, which had existed in the States courts if they were not hostile in their purpose
prior to the rebellion, remained during its con or mode of enforcement to the authority of the
tinuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of National Government, and did not impair the
the States do not impair or tend to impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."
supremacy of the national authority, or the just In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the
rights of citizens under the Constitution, they Philippine Executive Commission, which was
are, in general, to be treated as valid and bind organized by Order No. 1, issued on January
ing. As we said in Horn v. Lockhart (17 Wall., 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese
570; 21 Law, ed., 657): 'The existence of a state forces, was a civilgovernment established by the
of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds military forces ofoccupation and therefore, a de
of society, or do away with civil government or facto government of the second kind. It was not
>m
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OFPRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES • 17
different from the government established by ment of the United States." Japan had no legal
the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United power to grant independence to the Philippines
States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The or transfer the sovereignty of the United States
government established over an enemy's terri to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the
tory during the military occupation may exercise Filipinopeople,beforeits military occupation and
all the powers given by the laws of war to the possession of the Islands had matured into an
conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to absolute andpermanentdominion orsovereignty
all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of by a treaty of peace or other means recognized
â little consequence whether such government be in the law of nations. For it is a well-established
called a military or civil government. Its charac doctrine in international law, recognized in
ter is the same and the source of its authority the Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907
same. In either case it is a government imposed (whichprohibits compulsion ofthe population of
by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the hostilepower), that belligerentoccupation, being
world, those laws alone determine the legality essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer
or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact sovereigntyoverthe territory controlled although
that the Philippine Executive Commission was the de jure government is during the period of
a civil and not a military government and was occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its
run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v.
is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States v. Rice, 4
occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained Wheat., 246; Fleming v. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
the existing administration under the general Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 345.) The formation
direction of a French official (Langfrey, History of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme
of Napoleon, I, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people
Duke of Wellington, on invading France, autho into believing in the apparent magnanimity of
rized the local authorities to continue the exercise the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning
oftheir functions, apparently without appointing over the rights of government into the hands of
an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken
307.) The Germans, on the other hand, when they belief that, by doing so, Japan would secure the
î
invaded France in 1870, appointed their own of cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Fili
ficials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every pino people in her war against the United States
department of administration and of every rank. and other allied nations.
ggs) (Galvo, pars." 2186-93; Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 505, note 2.) Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philip
pines had been established by the free will of
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people who, taking advantage of
apparently established and organized as a sov the withdrawal of the American forces from
ereign state independent from any other gov the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the
ernment by the Filipino people, was, in truth Japanese forces of invasion, had organized
gjj
and reality, a government established by the an independent government under that name
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of with the support and backing of Japan, such
occupation. It was of the same character as the government would have been considered as one
Philippine Executive Commission, and the ulti established by the Filipinos in insurrection or
mate source of its authority was the same — the rebellion against the parent state or the United
Japanese military authority and government. States. And, as such, it would have been a de
As General McArthur stated in his proclama facto government similar to that organized by
tion of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has the confederate states during the war of secession
been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a and recognized as such by the Supreme Court
so-called government styled as the 'Republic of of the United States in numerous cases, notably
the Philippines' was established on October 14, those of Thorington v. Smith, Williams v.Bruffy,
4^>
1943, based upon neither the free expression of and Badly v. Hunter, above quoted; and similar
the people's will nor the sanction of the Govern to the short-lived government established by the
18 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during life of a community would be paralyzed by an
the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de invasion; and as between the state and individu
facto government by the Supreme Court of the als the evil would be scarcely less, — it would be
United States in the case of McCleod v. United hard for example that payment of taxes made
States (299 U.S., 416). According to the facts in under duress should be ignored, and it would be
the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacu contrary to the general interest that sentences
ated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, passed upon criminals should be annulled by
having first appointed a provisional government, the disappearance of the intrusive government."
and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And
in insurrection against Spain, took possession of when the occupation and the abandonment have
the Island and established a republic, governing been each an incident of the same war as in the
until possession thereof was surrendered to the present case, postliminy applies, even though
United States on February 22,1898. And the said the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the
Supreme Court held in that case that "such gov time substituted his own sovereignty, as the
ernment was ofthe class ofde facto governments Japanese intended to do apparently in granting
described in I Moore's International Law Digest, independence to the Philippines and establishing
S 20, * * * 'called also by publicists a government the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor,
de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more International Law, p. 615.)
aptly denominated a government of paramount
force * * *."' That is to say, that the government That not only judicial but also legislative
of a country in possession of belligerent forces acts of de facto governments which aire not of a
in insurrection or rebellion against the parent pohtical complexion, are and remain valid after
state, rests upon the same principles as that of reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belliger
a territory occupied by the hostile army of an ent occupant is confirmed by the Proclamation
enemy at regular war with the legitimate power. issued by General Douglas McArthur on October
23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws,
The governments by the Philippine Execu
regulations and processes of the governments es
tive Commission and the, Republic of the Philip
tablished in the Philippines during the Japanese
pines during the Japanese military occupation
occupation, for it would not have been necessary
being de facto governments,, it necessarily follows
for said proclamation to abrogate them if they
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court
were invalid ad initio.
of justice of those governments, which are not
of a political complexion, were good and valid,
^>
and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
B. In re Letter of Associate Justice
postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or Reynato Puno
occupation of the Philippines by the American AM. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29,1992
and Filipino forces under the leadership of A revolution has been defined as "the com
General Douglas McArthur. According to that plete overthrow of the established government
well-known principle in international law, the in any country or state by those who were pre
1£j^>
fact that a territory which has been occupied viously subject to it"24 or as "a sudden, radical
by an enemy comes again into the power of its and fundamental change in the government or
legitimate government or sovereignty, "does not, political system, usually effected with violence or
except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of at least some acts ofviolence."25 In Kelsen's book,
acts done by an invader, which for one reason or General Theory of Law and State, it is defined
another it is within his competence to do. Thus as that which "occurs whenever the legal order
judicial acts done under his control, when they of a community is nullified and replaced by a
are not of a political complexion, administrative new order ... a way not prescribed by the first
acts so done, to the extent that they take effect order itself."26
during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by pri
"Kitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. Ed. 227, 232.
vate persons under the sanction of municipal law,
26State v. Diamond, 202 P. 988, 991.
remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social 26P. 117 (1946).
fj&0
It was through the February 1986 revolu in defiance of existing legal processes"30and that
tion, a relatively peaceful one, and more popu it was a revolutionary government "instituted
larly known as "people power revolution" that by the direct action of the people in opposition
the Filipino people tore themselves away from to the authoritarian values and practices of the
an existing regime. This revolution also saw overthrown government."31
the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government. A question which naturally comes to mind
is whether the then existing legal order was
From the natural law point of view, the overthrown by the Aquino government. "A legal
right of revolution has been defined as "an in order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such
herent right of a people to cast out their rulers, code consists of all the rules found in the enact
change their policy or effect radical reforms in ments of the organs of the polity. Where the state
|pi their system of government or institutions by operates under a written constitution, its organs
force or a general uprising when the legal and may be readily determined from a reading of its
constitutional methods of making change have provisions. Once such organs are ascertained,
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be it becomes an easy matter to locate their enact
unavailable."27 It has been said that "the locus of ments. The rules in such enactments, along with
positive law-making power hes with the people of those in the constitution, comprise the legal order
the state" and from there is derived "the right of of that constitutional s'tate."32 It is assumed that
the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any the legal order remains as a "culture system" of
existing form of government without regard to the polity as long as the latter endures33 and that
the existing constitution."28 a point may be reached, however, where the legal
system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is
ffijjî The three (3) clauses that precede the text of
the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution,29 read: no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced
by the officials.34
WHEREAS, the new government under
President Corazon C. Aquino was installed
It is widely know that Mrs. Aquino's rise to
through direct exercise of the power of the the presidency was not due to constitutional pro
cesses; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines; provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang
Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
WHEREAS, the heroic action of the Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
people was done in defiance of the provisions election. Thus it can be said that the organiza
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; tion of Mrs. Aquino's government which was met
by little resistance and her control of the state
WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino,
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
and other key officers of the administration, the
powers vested in me by the sovereign man
departure of Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of
date of the people, do hereby promulgate the
the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point
following Provisional Constitution.
where the legal system then in effect had ceased
These summarize the Aquino government's to be obeyed by the Filipino people.
position that its mandate is taken from "a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people."
Discussions and opinions oflegal experts also
proclaim that the Aquino government was "revo
lutionary in the sense that it came into existence ^J. Bernas, Proclamation No. 3, with Notes by Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. 3 (1986).
31Address by U.P. President, now Senator Edgardo An
*7H. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law gara, Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, March 21, 1986,
II, 4th edition, 1927. 27 U.P Gazette 28,29.
"Political Rights as Political Questions, The Paradox "•'Fernandez, Law and Polity: Towards a Systems Con
f^t of Luther v. Borden, 100 Harvard Law Review 1125, 1133 cept of Legal Validity, 46 Phil. Law Journal, 390-391 (1971).
(1987). 33Jd. at 422.
^Proclamation No. 3 (1986). **Id. at 390-391.
i|^j
C. Republic v. Sandiganbayan search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of

G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not
present during the raid but Dimaano's cousins
CARPIO, J.:
witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the
The Case items detailed in the seizure receipt together
with other items not included in the search
Antecedent Facts
warrant. The raiding team seized these items:
Immediately, upon her assumption to office once baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40
following the successful EDSARevolution, then rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive .45; communications equipment, cash consist
Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presiden ing of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and
tial Commission on GoodGovernment ("PCGG"). land titles.
EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial
all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdi notice that the raiding team conducted the
nand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, search and seizure on March 3,1986 or five days
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct argues that a revolutionary government was
investigation as may be necessary in order to ac operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation
complish and carry out the purposes of this order" No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and
and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the the name and by the will of the Filipino people."
purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary govern
through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, ment effectively withheld the operation of the
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFPBoard") 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained respondents' exclusionary right.
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclu
sionary right arising from an illegal search ap
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board inves plies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
mp tigated various reports of alleged unexplained ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights
Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). Oh 27 July 1987, the AFP had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
Board issued a Resolution on its findings and the time of the search. Therefore, the government
i^
recommendation on the reported unexplained
may confiscate the monies and items taken from
wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Reso
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against
lution reads:
her since at the time of their seizure, private re
iiiJ
spondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
Seizure
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
erred in declaring the properties confiscated Aquino's Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March
from Dimaano's house as illegally seized and 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defi
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue ance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."
bears a significant effect on petitioner's case since The resulting government was indisputably a
these properties comprise most of petitioner's revolutionary government bound by no constitu
^gj evidence against private respondents. Petitioner tion or legal limitations except treaty obligations
will not have much evidence to support its case that the revolutionary government, as the dejure
against private respondents if these properties government in the Philippines, assumed under
are inadmissible in evidence. international law.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raid The correct issues are: (1) whether the revo
ing team served at Dimaano's residence a lutionary government was bound by the Bill of
Rights ofthe 1973 Constitution during the inter From the natural lawpointofview, the right
regnum, that is, after the actual and effective of revolution has been defined as "an inherent
take-over ofpower by the revolutionary govern right ofa people to cast out their rulers, change
ment following the cessation of resistance by their policy or effect radical reforms in their
loyalist forces upto24 March 1986 (immediately system of government or institutions by force
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitu
tion); and (2)whether the protection accordedto or a general uprising when the legal and consti
individuals under the International Covenant tutional methods of making such change have
on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of
("Declaration") remained in effect during the positive law-making power lies with the people
interregnum. ofthe state"andfrom there is derived "theright
of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the any existingform ofgovernment without regard
1973 Constitution was not operative duringthe to the existing constitution."
interregnum. However, werule that the protec
tion accorded to individuals under the Covenant xxx XXX XXX
and the Declaration remained in effect during It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino's rise to
the interregnum.
the presidency was not due to constitutionalpro
During the interregnum, the directives and cesses; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
orders of the revolutionary government were the provisions ofthe 1973 Constitution as a Batasang
supreme law because no constitution limited the Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
extent and scope of such directives and orders. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
Withthe abrogation ofthe 1973 Constitution by election. Thus it can be said that the organiza
the successful revolution, there was no munici tion of Mrs. Aquino's Government which was met
pal law higher than the directives and orders of by little resistance and her control of the state
the revolutionary government. Thus, during evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any and other key officers of the administration, the
exclusionaryright under a BillofRights because departure ofthe Marcos Cabinetofficials, revamp
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the
Rights during the interregnum. As the Court point where the legal system then in effect, had
explained in Letter ofAssociateJustice Reynato ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
S. Puno, 29 June 1992, 210 SCRA 589:
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the
A revolution has been defined as "the com
plete overthrow of the established government 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
in any country or state by those who were pre interregnum would render void all sequestration
viously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
and fundamental change in the government or Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption
political system, usually effected with violence or of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, orders, which direct the freezing and even the
General Theory of Law and State, it is defined take-over of private property by mere executive
as that which "occurs whenever the legal order issuance without judicial action, would violate
of a community is nullified and replaced by a the due process and search and seizure clauses
new order ... a way not prescribed by the first of the Bill of Rights.
order itself."
During the interregnum, the government in
It was through the February 1986revolution, power was concededly a revolutionary govern
a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly ment bound by no constitution. No one could
known as the "people power revolution" that validly question the sequestration orders as vio
the Filipino people tore themselves away from lative of the Bill of Rights because there was no
an existing regime. This revolution also saw Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However,
the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution,
government. the sequestered companies assailed the seques-
Is*I
22 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
tration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major
the Freedom Constitution. portion of his lecture developing that argument.
On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he
In Bataan Shipyard &Engineering Co.,Inc. says that in the end what matters are the results
v.Presidential Commissionon GoodGovernment, and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that
May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181, petitioner Baseco, the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
while conceding there was no Bill of Rights dur shortcuts, another wordfor niceties or exceptions.
ing the interregnum, questioned the continued Now,if everything the PCGG is doing is legal,
L validity of the sequestration orders upon adop
tion of the Freedom Constitution in view of the
why is it asking the CONCOM for special protec
tion? The answer is clear. What they are doing
due process clause in its Bill ofRights. The Court will not stand the test of ordinary due process,
ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later hence they are asking for protection, for excep
the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the tions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine,
validity of sequestration orders, thus: as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes
malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
If any doubt should still persist in the face allowableextrapolation. Hence, we should not give
of the foregoing considerations as to the valid the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and
ity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and give three reasons:
takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the First, the whole point of the February Revolu
fact that these particular remedies and the au tion and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
thority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional normalization. Very much at the
constitutional approbation and sanction. As al heart of the constitutional normalization is the
ready mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" lull effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in
iiiiiii
Constitution recognizes the power and duty of one breath, ask for constitutional normalization
the President to enact "measures to achieve the and at the same time.ask for a temporary halt to
the full functioning of what is at the heart of con
mandate of the people to .. . (r)ecover ill-gotten
stitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that
properties amassed by the leaders and support-" would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation
ers of the previous regime and protect the inter of due process and rule of law. The New Society
est of the people through orders ofsequestration word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when
or freezing of assets or accounts." And as also we begin to backslide even before we get there.
already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of
Second, this is really a corollary of the first.
the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee
"authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,1986." Bill of Rights for six months after the convening
of Congress, and Congress may even extend this
The framers of both the Freedom Constitu
longer.
tion and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware
that the sequestration orders would clash with Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad
the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both deeds repeated become vice. What the committee
constitutions had to include specific language report is asking for is that we should allow the
new government to acquire the vice of disregard
recognizing the validity of the sequestration or
fowl ing the Bill of Rights.
ders. The following discourse by Commissioner
Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of Vices, once they become ingrained, become
the Constitutional Commission is instructive: difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice
begin to think that they have a vested right to its
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep
something schizophrenic about the arguments in the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
defense of the present amendment. consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
For instance, I have carefully studied Min Third, the argument that what matters are
ister Salonga's lecture in. the Gregorio Araneta the results and not the legal niceties is an argu
University Foundation, of which all of us have ment that is very disturbing. When it comes from
been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga,
that everything the Commission is doing is tradi a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another
tionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it
f^f.i
becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobu- interregnum, absent a constitutional provision
L lating. The argument makes the PCGG an auc
tioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration or
block. If the price is right, the search and seizure
clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account
ders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
to us and we will award you the search and seizure even during the interregnum the Filipino people
clause. You can keep it in your private safe." continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the
Alternatively, the argument looks on the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
present government as hostage to the hoarders
of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the The revolutionary government, after install
hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ing itself as the dejure government, assumed re
ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the sponsibility for the State's good faith compliance
due process in the search and seizure clauses. with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
So, there is something positively revolving about signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
each signatory State "to respect and to ensure
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom
captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow to all individuals within its territory and subject
strong, only if it would become convinced of the to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
values enshrined in the Constitution of a price present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the
that is beyond monetary estimation. Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected
For these reasons, the honorable course for
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of
Section 8 of the committee report and allow the privacy, family, home or correspondence."
new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If The Declaration, to which the Philippines
Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)
First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
argument—that what the PCGG has been doing
his property." Although the signatories to the
has been completely within the pale of the law.
If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
able to go on, even without the support of Section document, being only a declaration, the Court
8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty generally accepted principles of international
of the Bill of Rights. law and binding on the State. [Andreu v. Com
missioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347 (1951);
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is de
fended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude
Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90
with what another Christian replied when asked Phil. 256 (1951); Borovsky v. Commissioner of
to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Immigration, 90 Phil. 107 (1951); Mejoff v. Di
Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of rector of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951)]. Thus, the
law for my nation's safety sake." I ask the Com revolutionary government was also obligated
mission to give the devil benefit of law for our under international law to observe the rights of
nation's sake. And we should delete Section 8. individuals under the Declaration.
Thank you, Madam President. The revolutionary government did not re
Despite the impassioned plea by Commis pudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during
sioner Bernas against the amendment excepting the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the government could have repudiated all its obliga
tions under the Covenant or the Declaration is
Constitutional Commission still adopted the
another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice
amendment as Section 26, Article XVIII of the
it to say that the Court considers the Declara
1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitu-,
tion as part of customary international law, and
tion were fully aware that absent Section 26,.,
that Filipinos as human beings are proper sub
sequestration orders would not stand the test of
jects of the rules of international law laid down
due process under the Bill of Rights.
$fi)
in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the government did not repudiate the Covenant or
1973 Constitution remained in force during the the Declaration in the same way it repudiated
24
the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure govern se, and they are not, they must be returned to
faai ment, the revolutionary government could not theperson from whom the raiding seized them.
escape responsibility for the State's good faith However, we do not declare that such person is
compliance with its treaty obligations under thelawful owner ofthese items, merely that the
international law.
search and seizure warrant could not be used as
It was only upon the adoption of the Provi basisto seize and withhold these itemsfrom the
sional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the possessor. We thus hold that these items should
directives and orders oftherevolutionary govern be returned immediately to Dimaano.
ment became subject to a higher municipal law WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
that, if contravened, rendered such directives DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions ofthe
and orders void. The Provisional Constitution Sandiganbayan dated 18November 1991 and 25
adopted verbatim the BillofRights ofthe 1973 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding
Constitution. The Provisional Constitution the records of this case to the Ombudsman for
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary such appropriate action as the evidence may
tori
governmentto avoidabuses ofthe absolute pow warrant, and referring this case to the Commis
ers entrusted to it by the people. sioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
During the interregnum when no constitu determination ofany taxhabihty ofrespondent
tion or Bill of Rights existed, directives and or Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
dersissuedby government officers werevalidso SO ORDERED.
long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. 5. Patterns of government.
The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration.-In [The following selection gives a conspectus
this case, the revolutionary government pre of the various forms of government that are im
sumptively sanctioned the warrant since the portant for an understanding of the Philippine
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. situation:35]
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper ap What superficially appears to be a bewil
plication,specified the items to be searched and dering variety of applications of constitutional
seized. The warrantis thusvalid with respect to democracy can be reduced tothefollowing basic
the items specifically described in the warrant. patterns:
However, the Constabulary raiding team
L seized items not included in the warrant. As ad
1. Ifthepeople, organized as the electorate,
are the preponderant power holder, the pattern
mitted by petitioner's witnesses, theraiding team ofgovernment is known as "direct democracy."
confiscateditems not included in the warrant...
2. "Assemblygovernment" is the name for
the pattern in which theparliament asthe rep
It is obvious from the testimony ofCaptain resentation ofthe people is the ascendant power
Sebastian that the warrant did not include the holder.
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and 3. "Parliamentarism" is the name for the
land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
pattern in which an equilibrium between the
The search warrantdid notparticularly describe
L these items and the raiding team confiscated independent power holders, parliament and
government, is attempted by integrating the
them on its own authority. The raiding team latter into the former: thepersonnel of the gov
had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of ernment - cabinet - are simultaneously mem
warrantless searchandseizure. Clearly, the raid bers of the assembly. Parliamentarism, thus,
ing team exceeded its authority when it seized is interdependence by integration. In actual-
these items. practice, however, parliamentarism presents
The seizure of these items was therefore
void, and unless these items arecontraband per 3sLOEWNSTEIN, POLITICAL POWERAND GOVERN
MENTAL PROCESS, 73-106 (1965).
£fofrl
itself in two widely divergent forms, depending holders, the assembly and the government, with
Im on whether the parliament is superior in political reciprocally matching powers — in assembly
power to the cabinet or whether the latter is in government the executive is strictly subordi
a position to control the former. The supremacy nated, the servant of the assembly, appointed
of the assembly over the government is reflected and dismissed at the assembly's discretion. The
by the classical French type of parliamentarism. devolution of executive functions to a government
The ascendancy of the cabinet over the parlia or to ministers is of a strictly technical character
ment is institutionalized in the British cabinet and does not create rights exercisable outside the
government. instructions and supervision of the assembly.
4. If the independent power holders, gov
No other state organ is legally in the position
to interfere with the autonomy and the power
ernment and parliament, are kept separated
monopoly of the assembly. Consequently, there
but are constitutionally obligated to corporate
exists no right of dissolution by the government,
for the formation of the will of the state, interde
though recall by the sovereign electorate may be
pendence is achieVed by coordination instead of
feasible. Bicameralism is basically incompatible
integration. In view of the executive leadership
with assembly government. Nor does a chief of
implied, this pattern is called "presidentialism";
state or president, except for strictly ceremonial
in the United States it is colloquially if erro
functions, or a monarchical establishment be
neously known as "separation of powers."
yond the control of the assembly fit into the pat
5. Finally, constitutional theorist are in the tern. In short, the pure type of assembly govern
habit of assigning to the Swiss governmental ment is undiluted and unadulterated Rousseau,
system a pattern of its own, for which because arch-democratic, arch-republican, "monolithic" in
of the collegiate structure of the governmental the extreme. It presents the strange phenomenon
power holder, the appellation "directory govern of power concentrated in a democratically elected
ment" is common. assembly as the single power holder.
The Second Pattern: Assembly

Government. The Third Pattern: Parliamentarism.
Of all patterns of constitutional-democratic Parliamentarism, in its various applications,

government, assembly government is the least is by far the most common pattern of constitu
known to constitutional theory and, by what little tional-democratic government today. In contrast
is known of it, the most discredited because when to assembly government and presidentialism,
it made its first appearance in revolutionary both artificially constructed products of political
France it was held responsible for Robespierre's theory, parliamentarism grew organically and
dictatorship and the Terror. Yet, in our time, it pragmatically after the eclipse of the royal
has experienced a most unexpected and truly prerogative by the Glorious Revolution. Subse
phenomenal revival by having become the stan quently, the principle of parliamentary govern
dard pattern of government in the [former] Soviet ment slowly gained recognition: that the king's
orbit. As a pattern of government it is Janus- government — the cabinet — requires the sup
faced, capable of serving as the organizational port of the majority of parliament, or at least of
tool for democracy and autocracy alike. the Commons, and that its political responsibility
to parliament is best served if its members are
simultaneously members of the parliament.. .
Briefly stated, assembly government Parliamentarism likewise is a generic term
amounts to this: the legislative assembly, popu including several widely divergent applications.
larly elected, holds undisputed supremacy over For its proper understanding, three points should
all other state organs, subject only to the sover be noted. First, the existence ofrepresentative or
eign electorate renewing it at regularly recur "parliamentary" institutions in a state is not tan
rent intervals. In contrast to the dual structure tamount to its being operated by the parliamen
of parliamentary government — which, at least tary form of government. Second, parliamentary
in theory, presupposes two independent power government is by no means identical with cabinet
26
government. Since the latter is a specific version of the parliament. . . The rationale behind the
of parliamentary government, the term as such requirement liesin thefactthat the assembly has
should be reserved for the British institutional greater control over its own members than it has
ization. Third, tobequalified as "parliamentary," over outsiders and can subject them to political
the governmental structure must posses certain responsibility by making them stand up in its
features common to all its variants and not found midst and account for their conduct of office.
in any other pattern of government.
Second, the government or cabinet consists
Basically, parliamentary government is of the political leaders of the majority party or
an attempt to establish between the two inde a coalition of parties forming a majority. Since
pendent andseparatepower holders —assembly they must be members of the parliament, the
and government — such an equilibrium that
L neither oneofthem can gain ascendancyoverthe
cabinet is a committee of the assembly, fused
and integrated with it. Although there exists a
other. Under this dualism the two powerholders personal identity between the membership in
share in policy decision and policy execution by the cabinet and membership in the parliament,
legislation. Moreover, since both are endowed the two power holdersare functionally separate
with reciprocal restraints and mutual controls and independent. In view of the character of the
— inter-organ controls — they also share in cabinet as a committee of the parliament, the
policy control. As a dualist power configuration, pattern is appropriately called interdependence
parliamentarism fitted early constitutionalism by integration.
not yet perfected by the admission of the elec
torate as the supreme power holder. This stage Third, the government-cabinet in itself has
Visa l was finallyreached when the electorate, either in a pyramidal structure with the prime minister,
periodical elections or, in the case of dissolution president ofthe council, minister-president, etc.,
of the parliament, at irregular intervals, deter as its apex and recognized leader. Though the
mined the political complexion of the assembly degree ofascendancy ofthe prime minister may
and, through it, of the government. vary from oneparliamentary regime to the other,
the sharing of political power between him and
The "ideal type" of this structural arrange
ment is the complete equilibrium of the two in his collaboration in the government has lately
Bad
dependent power holders, government (cabinet) sufficientlydecreased to allowthe generalization
and parliament, subject to the periodicalpolitical that, within the collective group of the govern
reorientation by the verdict of the electorate, ment, the prime minister exercises undisputed
each ofthem endowedwith restraining and con supremacy over his ministerial colleagues. The
trolling powerssymmetrically matching those of power ofthegovernment actually isconcentrated
the other power holder. The history of constitu in the person of the prime minister as its leader.
tional government since 1789is nothing but the Fourth, the government remains in powerso
search for the magic formula by which a stable longas it commands the support ofthe majority
equilibrium between government and parliament of the members of the parliament. Power is lost
could be established and maintained. The quest if the majority withdraws its support or if the
has proved unsuccessful. Almost at all time the general elections change the majority structure
one orthe otherofthe two power holders weighed of the parliament.
heavieron the scalesofthe powerdynamism, and
the oscillations betweenexecutive leadership and Fifth, on principle, policy decision is shared
'%£}
the supremacy of the representative parliament by the government and the parliament. Both
appear intrinsically inherent in the practice of concur in the legislation implementing thepolicy
constitutional government. decision. In practice, however, their respective
share in the initiating of policy decisions - and
The following structural elements are com
even the drafting of the statute - depends on
mon to all variants of genuine parliamentary
government.
the variant ofparliamentarism prevailingin the
specific state. Policy execution byadministration,
First, the members of the government or on the other hand, is entrusted to the government
cabinet are, as a rule, simultaneously members under constant supervision of the parliament.
Sixth, it is in policy control that the crux of sure is restricted, the regime is slanted toward
E&&1
the pattern of parliamentary government lies. the supremacy of the governmental power holder.
To be genuine, parliamentarism must be oper In either case much depends on the prevailing
ated by reciprocal control devices at the disposal party structure, whether the system is multi
of both power holders, the government and the party or two party, and on the degree of1 inter
parliament. The most effective instrumentality nal party discipline, which is naturally greater
for the benefit of the parliament, is the invoca under the two-party configuration than under
tion of political responsibility — a constant multi-partism. The choice of these alternatives,
M
contingency — of the cabinet as a whole (collec by a nation, is neither voluntary or national. It
tive responsibility) or of an individual member is conditioned by national experience and char
of the cabinet (individual responsibility). The acter. A specific variant cannot be enjoined by
ultima ratio of parliamentary control is the vote constitutional provisions.
of non-confidence (censure) carried by the par
liamentary majority against the government, or
vice versa, the rejections of a vote of confidence The Fourth Pattern: Cabinet
requested by the government. Resignation of Government.
the government, in this situation, may or may In striking contrast to France, parliamen
not lead to dissolution of the parliament and to tarism in Great Britain and the nations following
new elections. Contrariwise, the most stringent the British model signifies the undisputed ascen
control device at the disposal of the government dancy of the government — prime minister and
is the right to dissolve the parliament and call cabinet—over the parliament or, more precisely,
for new elections. In this case, the sovereign elec since the Parliament Act of 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V,
torate serves as the arbiter between the party or c. 13), over the House of Commons.
parties in opposition to the government and the
government itself; if the opposition is victorious The main features of the British version of
at the polls, the electorate is presumed to have parliamentary government may be summarized
disowned the government in power, and the new thus:
government has to be formed by the victorious 1. It is predicated on the existence of two
&jjj party or party coalition. If, on the other hand, the alternating parties possessing even chances in
government majority is returned, the electorate the long run of becoming the majority party at
is presumed to have indorsed the governmental the general elections. This traditional situation
policies, and the government remains in power. suffered a temporary interruption when, with
However, the electoral verdict can be accurately the rise of labor, the dilemma of a three-party
ascertained only in the case of the two-party configuration presented itself (1923-31). After
system. several minority governments (1923-24 and
Dissolution and vote of non-confidence belong 1929-31) the realistic British solved by it by
together like piston and cylinder. It is their po eliminating the third party of the Liberals and
tential reciprocity that makes the wheels of the returning to the two-party system, which alone
parliamentary mechanism turn. Where these makes a cabinet government possible. For the
reciprocal powers are not adequately matched, same reason the British people stubbornly ad
for example, if the dissolution power of the here to the majority technique in (mostly) single-
membered constituencies. Resisting the tempta
government is atrophied or, contrariwise, if the
fc%l
power of parliamentary disapproval is limited, tion of proportional representation, they prefer
a workable government and the unavoidable
the parliamentary system in its authentic form
has difficulty operating and may even cease to
inequalities ofmajority elections to a mechanical
equality involving the risk of unstable govern
exist. In the former case — atrophy of the disso
ments. Population shifts are largely remedied
lution power — the regime is slanted toward the by a periodical redistribution of seats.
supremacy of the parliamentary power holder.
The government is weakened; the parliament, 2. The cabinet is a relatively small com
strengthened. If, on the other hand, the tech mittee, composed of the leaders of the majority
nique of removing a government by a vote of cen party. All its members and the other ministers,
t*i
28
that is, members ofthe government whoare not ute book. Thelegislative initiativeofthe private
members ofthe inner circleofthe cabinet, must members —that is, deputies ofboth parties not
be members ofthe parliament. The majority of belonging to the cabinet and ministry — has
them sit in the Commons: the share ofthe Lords almost completely vanished; it is limited to
inthecomposition of the cabinet was statutorily non-controversial improvements of the existing
regulated by the Ministers of the Crown Act of laws. The government has complete control over
1937. (3 Edw. VII and Geo. VI, c. 38.) the entire legislative process; the drafting ofthe
3. The official leader of the majority win bills is undertaken by the ministerial bureau
ning the general elections is the prime minister cracy primarily of the Treasury; agenda and
designate. He isthe undisputed leader and supe timetable ofthe Commons are arranged to suit
rior ofhis cabinet, whose members he chooses at thegovernmental legislative planning. However,
his discretion. His position vis-a-vis his cabinet less to avoid retaliation in case the pendulum
is socommanding that, in actual practice, in the has swung to the other end than in deference to
triangular power configuration he has eclipsed democratic fairness, the legislative business is
the cabinet. He determines the policy decisions conducted in loyal cooperation with the leaders
afrijijJ
and the manner by which they are tobe executed. of the opposition.
How farheaccepts theadvice ofhis colleagues in 5. Policy control, on the other hand, is
thecabinet depends on hispersonality prestige. vested in both houses of the parliament and in
A minimum degree of consultation implying the electorate. Within the Commons it isprimar7
shared poweris secured by the otherwiserather ily the opposition, lessfrequently alsothe back
elastic rules governing the cabinet's procedure. benchers ofthe government majority, which acts
But policy determination is monopolized by the asthesemaphore ofpublic opinion and thepeople
prime minister to such an extent that his role at large. The reports that the representatives
is sometimes spoken of as "constitutional dic bring back from their weeklyvisits to their con
tatorship." However, this qualification is far off stituencies and relay, through the partywhips,
the mark. The British cabinet system is pre to the leadership is an important control device.
vented from sliding into authoritarianism by
the self-restraint of the prime minister and the The outwardly most conspicuous control
cabinet; by their respect for therights oftheop technique, however, is the daily practice ofques
position which, by a turn ofthe political wheel, tion time. Questions addressed to the individual
may become the government andretaliate; and, ministers serve most ofall the purpose ofcheck
most of all, by the sensitiveness of the govern ingonthe administrative sideofpolicy execution
ment to public opinion. which otherwise - a universal phenomenon of
the transformation of the legislative into the
4. In view of the concentration of policy administrative state not confined to Britain -
decision in the hands ofthe prime minister and tends to emancipate the administration more and
hiscabinet, the Commons are granted only that more from the effective control of the Commons.
degree ofparticipation inthepolicy execution by The House ofLords likewise, though politically
legislation that the prevailing political climate emasculated since the Parliament Act of 1911,
ofpublic opinion demands. By themselves, the has its sharein policy control through its more
Commons share in the policy decisions only to leisurelyconduct ofthe legislativebusinessand
thelimited extent that they confirm inprinciple its frequent high-level debates onmajor policies.
those previously taken by thecabinet. The rejec
t>gji/
tion ofa major legislative plan indorsed by the
government would lead to dissolution and the
6. The British parliamentary personnel
arbitration of the electorate between Commons is still one ofthe best existing, if no longer the
and the cabinet. No such contingency ofa Com elite it used to be in the nineteen century, the
mons majority disowning its cabinet has arisen great majority ofthem are men ofintelligence,
since the eighties ofthe last century. This situ integrity, and experience. How does one account
ation implies thatlegislative initiative isstrictly for the truly amazing phenomenon that these
monopolized by the government. No bill unless elected representatives submitlikegood soldiers
indorsed by the government can reach the stat to the commands oftheir superiors? The key for
§aj
the understanding of British cabinet government demonstrated by the French constitution of 1791,
lies in party discipline . . . which attempted to apply Montesquieu's separa
tion of functions to a practical test.
From the viewpoint of the process of politi
cal power, cabinet government should be recog
nized as a fusion of the two independent power NOTE: The only cdnstitutional form of
holders, cabinet and parliament, into a single government the Philippines has experienced
power mechanism in which the two organs are since 1935 is the presidential form. Even the
practically integrated. It is, in essence, interde government of President Marcos under the
pendence ofthe two power holders by integration. 1973 Constitution, as revised in 1981, had the
The counterweight lies in the continuous control distinguishing marks of a presidential form of
of public opinion, represented by the opposition, government: (1) separation of powers and (2)
and the recurrent general elections. Easily one the preeminence of the President. The President
of the most successful patterns of government was "head of state and chief executive" (VII, 1);
of our time and, possibly, of all times — it he inherited the powers of the President under
is predicated on the existence of two, and not the 1935 Constitution (VII, 16); he was superior
more, competing and alternating parties with to the Prime Minister by the fact that he nomi
the electorate holding the balance between them. nated the Prime Minister (LX, 1), approved the
program of government to be administered by
The Fifth Pattern: Presidentialism. the Prime Minister (LX, 2), terminated the term
The American [Filipino] reader does not need of the Prime Minister when he nominated the
a detailed presentation of the American pattern successor (IX, 4), and could delegate powers to
of government... the Prime Minister. He also had control over
the ministries (VII, 7). Moreover, while there
The American government is commonly was closer relationship between the executive
spoken of as one with "separation of powers," a and the legislature (an understatement!), thus
designation lately refined to "separated and co manifesting "features ofparliamentarism," there
ordinated powers." Abroad, because of the belief was separation between them. Separation from
in the dominant position of the president, it is the Judiciary also conceptually remained. (Free
better known as "presidential government" or Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor,
"presidentialism." As has been pointed out previ 108 SCRA 757, October 30,1981.)
ously, the term "powers," figurative rather than
structural, should be replaced by "functions," SEC. 2. THE PHILIPPINES RENOUNC
denoting different areas of state activity. ES WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NA
The early concept of a strict and rigid sepa TIONAL POLICY, ADOPTS THE GENER
ration of functions, used by both the American ALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTER
and the contemporaneous French constitutional NATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE LAW
theory and practice, appears an artificial prod OF THE LAND AND ADHERES TO THE
uct, period-and-environment-conditioned by the POLICY OF PEACE, EQUALITY, JUSTICE,
speculative rationalism of the Enlightenment. FREEDOM, COOPERATION, AND AMITY
It was nurtured by the infusion of Newtonian WITH ALL NATIONS.
mechanistic premises into the socio-political
1. Renunciation of war.
realm and inspired by the belief that the equi
librium established between the several power There are three parts to Section 2: (1) renun
holders will result in the permanent harmony of ciation of war; (2) adoption of the principles of
the state society. The assumption that the power international law; and (3) adherence to a policy
holders in equipoise would voluntarily dedicate of peace, freedom, and amity with all nations.
themselves to cooperation for the common wel The first two parts were copied by the 1973 Con
fare was psychologically unsound. It neglected, to stitution from Article II, Section 3, of the 1935
its peril, the demonism of the power dynamism. Constitution. The third part is an addition made
The co-existence of several power holders in rigid by the 1973 Constitution. The present Section2
isolation was an unworkable illusion, as clearly is an exact copy of the 1973 provision.
30
Theinspirationofthis provision onrenuncia ifit isincorporated intomunicipal law. What the

tion ofwar, when first adopted in 1935, was the secondpart ofSection 2 does is to make interna
Kellogg-Briand PactofAugust 27,1928. ThePact tional law part of the law of the land.
renouncedwars ofaggression. And this is all that
the Constitution renounces, for the power to wage In other jurisdictions, international law
a defensive war is of the very essence of sover can become part of municipal law only if it is
eignty. Forthat matter, the Constitution makes transformed into domestic law through the ap
defense ofthe state a dutyofgovernment andof propriate constitutional machinery such as an
the people36 andgives to Congress the power to act of Parliament. This method follows what is
declare a state of war.37 As one writer, however, called the doctrine of transformation. Another
has putit, theprovision is a political gesture of theory is the doctrine of incorporation. Black-
no significance and a pompous declaration that stone expressed this in his Commentary when
impresses no one. By stating thatthe Philippines he said that:
"renounces" war as an instrument of national
policy, the implication is that at onetimewarwas the lawofnations, wherever anyquestion arises
which is properly the object ofits jurisdiction, is
part of Philippine policy. "If the intention were here adopted initsfull extent by the common law,
todeclare the doctrine ofanti-militarism, which and it is held to be part of the law ofthe land.
apparently was what the moral and political
leadership ofthe country desired, bettercrafts The second part of Section 2 accepts the
manship could have more accurately expressed doctrine ofincorporation. This provision makes
it bya statementthatrthe Philippines condemns the Philippines one of the states which make a
war as an instrument ofnationalpolicy orwords specific declaration that international law has
to this effect."38 Apparently, however, this criti the force also of domestic law.39 International
cism, valid as it is, impressed noonein the 1971 law therefor can beused byPhilippine courts to
Convention nor in the 1986 Commission. Thus, settle domestic disputes in much the same way
the phraseology of the 1935 provision has been that they would use the Civil Code or the Penal
retained. Code and other laws passed by Congress.
It shouldbe noted, however, that as a mem What elements of international law become
berofthe United Nations the Philippines does part ofPhilippine law by incorporation through
not merely renounce war, which is a limited con Article II, Section 2? Since treaties become part
cept which does not include someformsofforce. ofPhilippine law only by ratification, the prin
Asa signatoryto the UnitedNationsCharterthe ciple ofincorporation applies only to customary
Philippines adheres to Article 2(4) of the U.N. law and to treaties which have become part of
Charter which says: "All Members shallrefrain customary law. This distinction, however, is
in their international relations from the threat sometimes blurred in some Philippine Supreme
or use offorce against the territorial integrity Court decisions.40
orpolitical independence of any state, or inany A problem, however, which the provision
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of poses is the matter of determining what these
the United Nations." generally acceptedprinciples ofinternational law
arewhich thePhilippines accepts. Ultimately, in
2. Adoption of international law. the absence of the guiding direction of treaties
Implicit in this provision is the acceptance
ofthe dualist view oflegal systems, namely that MSimilar provisions are found in the Austrian Consti
domestic law is distinct from international law. tution, Article 9: 'The generally recognized rules ofinter
Since dualism holds that international lawand national law shall beconsidered as component parts ofthe
municipal lawbelong todifferent spheres, inter Federal Law," and in Article 25 ofthe Constitution ofthe
Federal Republic of Germany: 'The general rules ofpublic
national law becomes part ofmunicipal law only international law are an integral part of federal law."
*°See Aloysius Llamzon, "The Generally Accepted Prin
38Article II, Section 4. ciples ofInternational Law as Philippine Law: Towards a
"Article VI, Section 23(1). Structurally Consistent Use ofCustomary International Law
MSINCO, supra, note 1 at 120. inPhilippine Courts," aJ.D. Thesis presented to the College
ofLaw, Ateneo deManila University, 2002.
or statutes, the process of selecting what these been established in a long Hne of cases starting
iijvjiij accepted principles are will have to be done by with Raquiza v. Bradford,44and was summarized
the courts. The Supreme Court as a matter of and reaffirmed in Baer v. Tizon45
fact, has had occasion to perform this function.
More recently, in Agustin v. Edu,46 a case
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,41 an alien of
involving a presidential Letter of Instruction pre
Russian descent who had been detained pending
scribing the use of early warning devices (EWD),
execution of the order of deportation was ordered
the Court said that the constitutional provision
released on bail when after two years the depor '"possesses relevance." The Court pointed out
tation order could not be carried out because no
that the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
ship or country would take the alien. The Court and Signals had been ratified by the Philippine
said in part:42 government under Presidential Decree No. 207.
JiiffiJ
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 'It is not for this country to repudiate a com
3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted mitment to which it had pledged its word. The
principles of international law as part of the law of concept Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way
the Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Univerr of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war
sal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved with the principle of international morality."4*
by the General Assembly of the United Nations of Likewise, the international duty of protecting
which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary foreign embassies was recognized in J.B.L. Reyes
meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life v. Bagatsing.46
and liberty and all other fundamental rights as ap
plied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was
3. Adherence to policy of peace, freedom,
there resolved that "All human beings are born
free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. l)j-that amity.
!>i->
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom The third part of Section 2 states that the
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction Philippines "adheres to the policy of peace, equal
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, ity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
religion, political or other opinion, nationality
all nations." This is an abbreviated statement of
or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2); that "Everyone has the right to an effec
Section 1 and Section 3 of an article on Foreign
tive remedy by the competent nationals for acts Relations approved by the 1971 Convention on
violating the fundamental rights granted him by second reading on June 2,1972.
the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one
Section 1 of the article read:
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile" (Art. 9); etc. The Philippines shall pursue a foreign policy
'iii&
aimed at the fulfillment of the national interest in
Earlier, in Kuroda v. Jalandoni,43 the Court
a world order based on equality, peace, freedom,
had said that the provision "is not confined to
justice, and prosperity for all nations.
the recognition of rules and principles of inter
national law as contained in treaties to which Thus, it is seen that the guiding principle of
our government may have been or shall be a Philippine foreign policy will be, as it is with all
signatory." Thus, although the Philippines is other nations, the national interest. This "self
not a signatory to the Hague Convention and ish" policy, however, is tempered with concern
became a signatory to the Geneva Convention for "equality, peace, freedom, justice."
only in 1947, the Court held that a Philippine
Military Commission had jurisdiction over war The last two items of the section — "coopera
crimes committed in violation of the two conven tion, and amity with all nations" — were more
tions prior to 1947. fully expressed by Section 2 of the earlier ap
proved article which said:
bj The doctrine of immunity from suit of a for
eign state is likewise a principle of international "75 Phil. 50 (1945).
law whose acceptance in this jurisdiction has 4557 SCRA1,6-8 (1974). Along line of cases to the same
effect have followed.
"90 Phil. 70 (1951). <6S8 SCRA 195, 213 (February 2,1979).
i2Id. at 73-4. "Id.
"83 Phil. 171,178 (1949). «G.R. No. 65366, October 25,1983.
32
In the national interest andofinternational

peace and cooperation, the Philippines may ex faith in civilian supremacy began to wane. The
tend recognition, exchange diplomatic relations waning ofthat faithbegan when civilian officials
and establish consular, trade, andcultural rela started using military elements for furthering
tions with other nations irrespective of ideology. their ambitions and when military officers began
allowing themselves to be so used. The author
toil
While thewords "cooperation and amity with of The Power Elite, put it thus: "As politics gets
all nations" found in Section 2do not expressly into the army, the army gets into politics." Hence,
manifest the intent to establish diplomatic and when theFilipinos drafted the1973 Constitution
other relations with all nations irrespective of it was thought necessary, just to emphasize the
ideology, theintentis nonetheless there. Howev point, tomake theprinciple supremacy ofcivilian
er, constitutionally, the provision is without real authority explicit.
significance; the decision whether toestabhsh or
nottoestabhsh suchrelations remains, asin the 2. Role of the. armed forces.
1935 Constitution, a policy question addressed
tothe discretion ofthe political departments. The period ofmartial rule up until EDSAI
was another phase inthe constitutional develop
Finally, while the 1987 text preserves the ment. Military abuses were rampantthen.Hence
1973 counterpart, the 1986 Commission read the 1986 Constitutional Commission thought it
into the word "amity" the concept "love" found necessary to put down the positive role of the
in the Preamble.49 military in explicit terms. "The Armed Forces of
the Philippines isthe protector ofthe people and
SEC. 3. CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty
AT ALL TIMES, SUPREME OVER THE of the State and the integrity of the national
MILITARY. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE territory."
PHILIPPINES IS THE PROTECTOR OF The second and third sentences ofSection 3,
THE PEOPLE ANDTHE STATE. ITS GOAL originally discussed by the 1986 Constitutional
IS TO SECURE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF Commission under the General Provisions, are
THE STATEAND THE INTEGRITY OF THE meant to express the philosophy that underlies
NATIONAL TERRITORY.
the existence of armed forces. The original for
1. Civilian authority and the role of the mulation made by Commissioner Ople read: "The
military. purpose ofa militaryestablishmentis to secure
the sovereignty of the people and the integrity
tiiiiy
Under the 1935 Constitution, civilian su ofthe national territory and to serve the general
premacy was implied from its Article VII, Sec welfare."51 The provision was born of a desire
tion 10(2) which made the President; a civilian to express in positive terms the Commission's
and as civilian, Commander-in:Chief. The 1973 disapproval ofabuses committed by the military
Constitution made the principle explicit. The againstcivilians duringthe period ofauthoritar
first sentence of the present Section 3, except ianrule.'2 The transposition ofthe two sentences
for the two commas, is a copy of the 1973 provi from the General Provisions to the Declaration
sion. The commas were added for emphasis on of Principles and specifically asa continuation of
iiiiiiiiiii)
"at all times."60 the principle ofcivilian supremacy was meant to
add emphasis on the philosophy they express.53
Civilian supremacy came as a legacy of the
Liiyi American conquerors. The process of locally The phrase "protector ofthepeople" was not
instilling the principle was so successful under meant to be an assertion of the political role of
American rule that, up until the World War II the military. But the temptation to read it that
and even beyond, there was no serious problem way against thebackground ofthe EDSA eventof
which arose from military submission tocivilian 1986 isunderstandable. The intent of the phrase
authority. As the nation developed, however, "protector ofthe people" was rather to make it
"IV RECORD 772. MV RECORD 246.

KId. at 959. S2See id. at 104-106.
i3Id. at 298-299.
l$0
foiiifr
act as corrective to military abuses experienced the State is a prime duty of the government and
during martial rule. the people, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law to render
Does this mean, however, that the military
personal military or civil service." It was almost
has no political role? It does not mean that be
a literal reproduction of Article II, Section 2 of
cause the political role is found in the following
the 1935 Constitution.
sentence. "Its goal is to secure the sovereignty
of the State and the integrity of the national In the light of the recent experience with the
territory." Thus there are two thoughts in the Marcos regime which placed inordinate empha
constitutional provision: disapproval of military sis on national security, it was understandable
abuses and guardianship of state sovereignty, that the Commission should opt for a provision
which of course means sovereignty of the people. more people-centered than national security-
The military exercise of political power can be centered.55 Thus the old provision was recast to
justified as a last resort — when civilian author read: "The prime duty of the Government is to
ity has lost its legitimacy. serve and protect the people." National defense
The two sentences, therefore, also yield a is placed merely as one of the modes of serving
meaning which was not articulated during the and protecting the people.
Commission debates. When one reads them in
The 1935 provision had been inspired by
the light of the unsuccessful military coups of Section 37 of the Constitution of the Spanish
&ffij|4
1987 and the reasons given for them, and espe Republic.56 The 1935 provision was thought
cially in the light of the successful and civilian- necessary because of the recognized inadequacy
approved coup of February 1986 which became
of a volunteer system both in terms of military
known as the February Revolution, one cannot
effectiveness and in terms of equality between
escape the conclusion that the armed forces can
the rich and the poor. The report of the Commit
be a legitimate instrument for the overthrow of
tee on National Defense said in part:57
a civilian government that has ceased to be a
servant of the people. Such conclusion also finds The volunteer system is not suitable for a
support in the principle, accepted by the Commis poor country which cannot afford to pay the army
sion but not made explicit, that a long standing well enough to attract well qualified, able-bodied
tyranny can be legitimately overthrown.54 Civil young men to the service. The volunteer system
ian supremacy, in other words, is, in the final involves the objectionable feature of entrusting
analysis, not a guaranteed supremacy of civil the sacred mission of defending the country to
ian officers who are in power but of supremacy men lacking in capacity who have proved failures
in other fields of activity. The volunteer system
of the sovereign people. The Armed Forces, in.
is undemocratic, because the cannon fodder, with
this sense, "is the protector of the people and
very few exceptions, consists of proletarians. The
the State."
sons of the wealthy can evade the sacred duty of
defending their country, though it is they who
SEC. 4. THE PRIME DUTY OF THE
enjoy the advantages obtained through the ser
GOVERNMENT IS TO SERVE AND PRO vices rendered and blood spilled by men to whom
TECT THE PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT fortune has been unkind. A high morale, which
•jffljjft MAY CALL UPON THE PEOPLE TO DE only a person fighting for an ideal can possess, is
FEND THE STATE AND, IN THE FULFILL very necessary in an army, and with mercenar
MENT THEREOF, ALL CITIZENS MAY BE ies fighting for a pittance, such a morale cannot
REQUIRED, UNDER CONDITIONS PRO be attained.
ffiffi*
VIDED BY LAW, TO RENDER PERSONAL
While the inspiration of the 1935 provision
MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE.
came from the Spanish Constitution, compulsory
1. Compulsory military and civil service;
protection of people and State. KSee IV RECORD at 831-832. See speech of Commis
The 1973 counterpart of this provision was sioner Rama against the provision depicting it as a remnant
of the old spirit, id. at 831.
Article II, Section 2 which read: "The defense of Î ARUEGO, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION at 135.
ASee supra, notes 34 and 35 and text. *Vd. at 136.
t^^
34
military service is not without precedent in the the right ofthe Government to require compulsory
American constitutional system to which the military service is a consequence ofits duty to
1935 Constitution was heir. The right of the defend the State and isreciprocal with itsduty to
state to exact compulsory military serviceof its defend thelife, liberty, andproperty ofthecitizen.
citizens, as against the contention that such an In the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197
exaction would violate the prohibition ofinvolun U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that,
tary servitude found in the Thirteenth Amend without violating the Constitution; a person may
ment, was definitively established in 1918. In be compelled by force, ifneed be, against his will,
the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme against his pecuniary interests, and even against
Court declared that the argument based on the his religious or political convictions, to take his
place inthe ranks ofthe army ofhis country, and
Thirteenth Amendment refuted itself:58 "We are risk the chance ofbeingshot down in its defense.
unable toconceive upon whattheory the exaction In the case ofUnited States vs. Olson (253 Fed.,
by the government from the citizen of the per 233), it was also said that this is notdeprivation
formance ofhis supreme and noble duty of con of property without due process oflaw, because,
tributing to the defense of the rights and honor in its justsense, there is no right ofproperty to
of the nation, as the result of a war declared by an office or employment. The circumstancethat
the great representative body ofthepeople, can these decisions refer tolaws enacted by reason of
be said tobe the imposition ofinvoluntary ser theactual existence ofwardoes notmake ourcase
vitude." Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis,
whatjustifies compulsory militaryservice is the
upheld laws passed in the exercise of this same defense of the State whether actual or whether
state powerrequiring compulsorycivilianlabor in preparation to make it more effective, in case
ofthose who areexcused from military service.59 of need.
The first Philippine case onthe subject was The circumstance that the appellants have
People v. Lagman.60 The accused in this case, dependent families to support does not excuse
prosecuted for failure toregister for military ser them from their duty to present themselves
vice underthe National Defense Act, assailed the before the Acceptance Board because, if such
validity ofthe Act. The Supreme Court upheld circumstance exists, they can ask fordeferment
m complying with their duty and, at all events,
the lawonthe basisofSection 2 [1935 Constitu they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance
tion] saying:61
i|ffj
to these family responsibilities (Sees. 65 and 69
of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory militaryservice, does not After the Second World War, the Supreme
go against this constitutional provision butis, on Court once more hadoccasion toappeal toSection
pi)
the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. 2[1935 Constitution]. InPeople v. Manayao, the
The dutyofthe Government to defend the State Supreme Court said:62
cannot beperformed except through an army. To
leave theorganization ofan armytothewill ofthe Thisconstitutional provision covers bothtime
citizens would betomake this dutyoftheGovern of peace and time ofwar, butit is brought more
ment excusable should there be no sufficient men immediately and peremptorily into play when the
who volunteer to enlist therein. country is involved in war. During such a period
In the United States the courts have held in of stress, under a constitution enshrining such
a series ofdecisions thatthecompulsory military tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to
service adopted by reason of the civil war and cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the
the world war does not violate the Constitution, Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without
because the power to establish it is derived from reflecting on the patriotism and intelligence ofthe
that granted to Congress to declare war and to Legislature, thatinpromulgating Commonwealth
organize and maintainan army.Thisissobecause Act No. 63, under the aegis ofour Constitution,
it intended (but did not declare) that the duties
M245 U.S. 366, 390(1918). of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-
59SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTI quoted constitutional precept could be effectively
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PART III RIGHTS cast offby him even when his country isat war, by
OFTHEPERSON 805 (1968). thesimple expedient ofsubscribing to an oath of
6066 Phil. 13 (1938).
G1Id. at 15-6.
6278 Phil. 721, 727(1947).
m>
[a>
allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a SEC. 5. THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or AND ORDER, THE PROTECTION OF
i^j
by accepting a commission in the military, naval LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY, AND
or air service of such country, or by deserting from THE PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL
the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps. WELFARE ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE EN
a) It would shock the conscience of any en JOYMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE
lightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by BLESSINGS OF DEMOCRACY.
the very fact of committing the treasonous acts
charged against him, the doing ofwhich under the 1. Peace and order, general welfare.
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested
himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby This provision has no counterpart either
placed himself beyond the arm of the law. For if in the 1935 or in the 1973 Constitution. The
this were so, his very crime would be the shield mention of "maintenance of peace and order"
that would protect him from punishment. provoked the objection that it could create the no
tion that peace and order must be promoted at all
The 1973 provision altered the 1935 version cost and even at the expense of justice and could
and declared national defense to be a prime duty encourage the use of military solutions to what
not just ofthe government but also ofthe people. could normally be treated as social, economic and
The addition of the words "and the people" was political problems. But its author, Commissioner
objected to on the ground that national defense Ambrosio Padilla, explained that the provision
Ifjjj
was the duty only of citizens and not of all the recognized a hierarchy of rights - first, life; sec
people, citizens and aliens alike. Sponsors ofthe ond, liberty; and only third, property.66
provision immediately explained that people in
this section meant citizens. Reference was made SEC. 6. THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH
to Article V, Section 1 (1973), which said: 'It shall AND STATE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE.
be the duty ofthe citizens ... to defend the state
. . ."63 Moreover, reflecting the preoccupation of NOTE: This will be treated under Article
the martial law period which overtook the Con III, Section 5.
vention, it was pointed out that the citizen's duty STATE POLICIES
was to defend the state against both external and
f|ftfrl internal aggression.64 SEC. 7. THE STATE SHALL PURSUE
AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. IN
As far as the constitutional doctrine on com
ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES
pulsory military and civil service is concerned, THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION
the 1987 provision has preserved existing juris SHALL BE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY,
prudence on the subject. One alteration made TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NATIONAL
on the text is the addition of the phrase "under INTEREST, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
conditions provided by law." This was placed in DETERMINATION.
lieu of "with due regard for objections of con
science" and was intended to give to Congress a 1. An independent foreign policy.
flexible guideline for dealing with conscientious
objectors; but no new doctrine was thereby for • Although Section 7 might read like a coldly
mulated.65 detached statement of a principle, it in fact is a
by-productofthe less than detached discussions
of the future of the military bases in Clark and
Subic. The word "relations" covers the whole
"Session of November 25, 1972. Later, however, on
November 27, 1972, Delegate de Guzman said that while gamut of treaties and international agreements
aliens may not be compelled to render personal military or and other kinds of intercourse. The Section is
civil service, all those enjoying the protection ofthe state may the closest reference to military bases that a
be required in some other manner to assist in the defense dominant majority in the Constitutional Com
of the state.
The 1987 Constitution no longer contains a separate mission would allow in the body of the Consti-
article on duties and obligations of citizens.
"Session of November 27, 1972.
^See IV RECORD 666-667, 681, 691-692, 742. 66V RECORD 11-14.
to
tution. Although the overwhelming sentiment An explosion of a nuclear bomb, Madam

was that only American military bases could President, is considered an uncontrolled nuclear
ever be allowed, and under terms dictated in reaction. That is the definition of a nuclear
Article XVIII, Section 25, for some inexplicable explosion. What we seek to prevent from hap
logic the dominant majority refused to accept the pening within our land is the occurrence of an
explicitation of the general principle that "No uncontrolled nuclear reaction. Why put it in the
foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall Constitution? Why not leave it to the President,
be allowed in Philippine territory."67 why not leave it to the Senate, to deal with these
matters? Madam President, we are here fram
Section 7 states a principle which no one
gig) ing a constitution. We are here in that part of
will dispute but fidelity to which will always be the Constitution which we call the Article on
a matter of debate.68
the Declaration of Principles. We say that the
Constitution is a reflection of the aspirations
SEC. 8. THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIS and the ideals, and even the fears, ofour people.
TENT WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Then why be silent about this?
ADOPTS AND PURSUES A POLICY OF
FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS The provision, as it stands now, raises two
IN ITS TERRITORY. questions. First, what are banned by the provi
sion? Second, how absolute is the ban?
1. A policy of freedom from nuclear weap Clearly, the ban is only on nuclear arms
iiiisll
ons.
— that is, the use and stockpihng of nuclear
The original formulation of this provision weapons, devices, and parts thereof. And this
read thus: "The Philippines is a nuclear-free includes, according to Commissioner Azcuna,
country. No portion of its territory shall be used "not only possessing, controlling and manufac
for the purpose of storing or stockpiling nuclear turing nuclear weapons, but also nuclear tests in
weapons, devices or parts thereof." Speaking for our territory, as well as the use of our territory
•ffl the provision, Commissioner Azcuna said:69 as dumping ground for radioactive wastes."70
Moreover the ban suggests that, in our relations
I do not have to elaborate, Madame President, with other states., there must be a mechanism for
the enormous destructive capacity of nuclear the verification of the existence or non-existence
weapons, particularly, because Asia has had the of nuclear arms.71 This will therefore affect the
distinct misfortune of being the only place in the terms of any renewal the country might agree to
world where nuclear weapons were dropped and
exploded during war. It was not too long ago that of existing military bases agreements with the
Asia and the world commemorated that fate United States. The provision must be read as a
ful event. Since the dropping of atomic bombs mandate to the Philippine government to insist
in Japan towards the end of World War II, the that the pursuit of a policy on nuclear weapons
technology of nuclear weapons has multiplied is a controlling guideline if there should be any
tremendously such that the weapons dropped new negotiation with the United States on the
in Japan are only used as trigger devices for subject of military bases.72
the weapons of today. Those bombs were merely
atomic bombs. The bombs of today are hydrogen The provision, however, is not a ban on the
Sag)
bombs. Those bombs merely used fission as a peaceful uses of nuclear energy.73 Nor is it a ban
principle. The bombs of today use fusion, the very on all "nuclear-capable vessels." For a vessel to
power of the sun — fusion of nuclear particles, be banned, it is not enough that it is capable of
releasing tremendous energy. carrying nuclear arms; it must actually carry
nuclear arms.74
The original formulation ofthe provision, cit

"See IV RECORD 778-813 and discussions of Article ed above, might suggest that the ban on nuclear
XVHI, Section 25.
68The issue of neutrality was discussed in connection 70/rf. at 818.
with this provision but the proposal to adopt neutrality as 77d. at 815.
pi) a policy was abandoned. See id. at 583, 592-593, 613-615, 12ld. at 816.
635-636, 655-656, 669, 741-742, 753-755. nId. at 663, 666, 667-668
69Id. at 587. See also id. at 588-589, 681, 815. uId. at 819. See also 828.
jj^
arms is absolute. But, as explained by Commis by the executive and legislative departments.76
sioner Azcuna, that was never the intention:75 Later the word "solely" was dropped in order not
ffijf^
to suggest that the nation's commitment to a
In my sponsorship speech, I pointed out that policy against nuclear arms was dictated solely
this is a policy, albeit a basic policy because it is by national interest; the opposition could also
stated in the Declaration of Principles and State be based, for example, on the desire for peace in
Policies in the Constitution. Consequently, what
the region.77
we are seeking here is primarily a statement ofan
orientation, a basic direction in the Constitution, But that was not to be the end of the dis
that as a matter of policy, we are against nuclear cussion. Concerned about media reports which
weapons in our territory. As practiced by other tended to read the provision as a total and abso
states, that means prohibition not only of pos lute ban on nuclear arms, Commissioner Monsod
sessing, controlling and manufacturing nuclear
wanted to be doubly sure of what the meaning
weapons, but also of nuclear tests in our territory,
as well as the use of our territory as a dumping was of the phrase "consistent with the national
ground for radioactive wastes. This is embraced interest" and so he wanted it rephrased to read
in the policyagainst nuclear weapons in one's ter "subjectto the national interest." Thus he elicited
iaJ ritory. As practiced both in Latin America, under from Commissioner Azcuna the explanation that
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as by the South "consistent with" means "subject to," that is, "that
Pacific countries that endorsed the Treaty of Raro- both the adoption and the pursuit ofthe policy, as
tonga, passage ofships, whether nuclear-powered well as any exception therefrom, must be subject
or nuclear-arms-bearing, is left to the determina t©the national interest."78 Still uneasy about the
tion of every state on a case-to-case basis. It is not possibility of misinterpretation, Commissioner
per se a violation of a nuclear weapons free zone
to allow a ship that is nuclear-powered or bearing Monsod asked for the approval of a clarificatory
nuclear weapons to pass or enter one's territory. resolution. Co-authored by several Commission
However, it has to be done in the light of policy. ers, the resolution read:79
There is a policy against the presence of Resolved that since it is the intent and sense
nuclear weapons and, therefore, the exceptions to ofthe Constitutional Commission that the phrase
that policy would have to be strictly construed or "consistent with the national interest" in Section
justified. What weare saying with the formulation 7 [now Section 8] ofthe Article on Declaration of
now is that it can be justified only on the basis Principles involving the policy on nuclear weap
or on the crucible of the national interest. If it is
ons in Philippine territory also means "subject
consistent with the national interest, then really
there is the possibility of deviating from that to the national interest" as borne by the records
policybut the policyis there. The basic direction of the proceedings and the unanimous manifes
is there. There can be deviations now and then tation of the Members of the Commission, the
because we said that this is not a 100 percent motion to reconsider and amend such provision
rule; this is not absolute. But deviations must be filed by 28 Commissioners is deemed unneces
justified on the basis and the crucible or test of sary and withdrawn from further consideration
national interest. but is hereby incorporated in the records of the
Azcuna, however, did not explicitate what Commission.
iiiiiiii
the exception would be. No one objected to the resolution and the
The exception first surfaced in the reformu problem was deemed settled.
lation which was worded thus: 'The Philippines
shall, consistent with considerations solely of SEC. 9. THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE
national interest, pursue a policy of freedom from A JUST AND DYNAMIC SOCIAL ORDER
nuclear weapons in its territory." Explaining THAT WILL ENSURE THE PROSPERITY
this reformulation, Commissioner Monsod said AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATION
^j
that whether or. not to allow nuclear weapons AND FREE THE PEOPLE FROM POVERTY
would be decided on the basis of what is best for
the "national interest" as this might be defined ™Id. at 814.
"Id. at 816.
™Id. at 826.
™Id. at 818. See also id. at 819-821. "Id. at 648.
38
THROUGH POLICIES THAT PROVIDE AD Petitioners alleged that the implementation

EQUATE SOCIAL SERVICES, PROMOTE of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in
FULL EMPLOYMENT, A RISING STAN makingfree medicine and free medical services
DARD OF LIVING, AND AN IMPROVED inaccessible to economically disadvantaged
QUALITY OF LIFE FOR ALL. Filipinos. ...
SEC. 10. THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ALL PHASES OF NA declared void, since it runs counter tothe aspira
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT. tion andideals ofthe Filipino people as embodied
in the Constitution. Theyclaim that the HSRA's
1. Social justice.
policies offiscal autonomy, income.generation,
The underlying premises of Sections 9 and and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5,'
10 are that poverty and gross inequality are 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1
major problems besetting the nation and that ofArticle III; Sections 11 and 14 ofArticle XHI;
theseproblems assaultthe dignity ofthehuman and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV ofthe 1987
person. Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted
in making inaccessible free medicine and free
Social justice, in the sense it is used in the medical services. This contention is unfounded.
Constitution, simply means the equalization of
economic, political, and socialopportunitieswith
specialemphasis on the duty of the state to tilt As a general rule, the provisions ofthe Con
the balance ofsocial forces by favoring the dis stitution areconsidered self-executing, anddo not
advantaged in life. In the language ofthe 1935 require future legislation for their enforcement.
Convention, it means justice for thecommon'^; For ifthey are not treated as self-executing, the
in the shibboleth ofthe 1973 Convention, those mandate of the fundamental law can be easily
who have less in life must have more in law. nullified by the inaction ofCongress. However,
The social justice provision hasbeen chiefly some provisions have already been categorically
instrumental in the socialization ofthe attitude declared by this Court as non self-executing.
ofjurisprudence to property rights thus gradu In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically
ally eradicating the vestiges of laissez faire in set apart the sections found under Article H of
Philippine society. the 1987 Constitution asnonself-executing and
For more on socialjustice, see Article XIII. ruled thatsuch broad principles need legislative
I sj»t enactments before they can be implemented:
A. Tondo Medical Center Employees v.
Court of Appeals Byits verytitle, Article II ofthe Constitution
G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007 isa"declaration ofprinciples andstate policies." x
x x.Theseprinciplesin ArticleII are not intended
to be self-executing principles ready for enforce
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: ment through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aidsor as guides in the exercise ofits
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, power ofjudicial review, andbythelegislature in
under Rule 45 ofthe Rules ofCourt, assailing the its enactment of laws.
Decision, promulgated by the Court ofAppeals
on26November 2004, denying a petition forthe In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
nullification ofthe Health Sector Reform Agenda Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Depart Sections 11, 12, and 13ofArticle II; Section 13
ment ofHealth (DOH); and Executive Order No. of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of
102, "Redirecting theFunctions andOperations the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing
ofthe Department ofHealth," which was issued provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance,
by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII
24 May 1999. and Section 2 ofArticle XIV of the Constitution
as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights. These provisions,
igjj
ARTICLE II: DECLARATIONOF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 39
which merely lay down a general principle, 1. The family and the unborn.
kiJft are distinguished from other constitutional
provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, "Family" in Section 12 simply means a stable
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the heterosexual relationship. Section 12 also ac
courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable cepts the principle that the family is anterior
constitutional rights. to the State and is not a creature of the State.
It protects the family from instrumentalization
Some ofthe constitutional provisions invoked by the State.
in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9,10, Two points should be noted about the legal
11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the meaning and purpose of the protection that is
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing guaranteed for the unborn. First, this is not an
in the aforecited case of Tanada v.Angara. assertion that the unborn is a legal person. Sec
ond, this is not an assertion that the life of the
unborn is placed exactly on the level ofthe life of
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely the mother. When necessary to save the life ofthe
on petitioners' bare allegations that it violates. mother, the life ofthe unborn may be sacrificed;
the general principles expressed in the non self- but not when the purpose is merely to save the
executing provisions they cite herein. There are mother from emotional suffering, for which other
taj
two reasons for denying a cause of action to an remedies must be sought, or to spare the child
alleged infringement of broad constitutional from a life of poverty, which can be attended to
-principles: basic considerations of due process by welfare institutions.
and the limitations of judicial power. Moreover, the overriding purpose in assert
ing that the protection begins from the time of
SEC. 11. THE STATE VALUES THE
conception is to prevent the State from adopting
DIGNITY OF EVERY HUMAN PERSON
L the doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court deci
AND GUARANTEES FULL RESPECT FOR
sion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) which
HUMAN RIGHTS.
liberalized abortion laws up to the sixth month
SEC. 12. THE STATE RECOGNIZES of pregnancy by allowing abortion any time dur
i'M
THE SANCTITY OF FAMILY LIFE AND ing the first six months of pregnancy provided it
SHALL PROTECT AND STRENGTHEN can be done without danger to the mother. The
THE FAMILY AS A BASIC AUTONOMOUS understanding is that life begins at conception,
SOCIAL INSTITUTION. IT SHALL EQUAL although the definition of conception can be a
LY PROTECT THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER matter for science to specify.
AND THE LIFE OF THE UNBORN FROM
CONCEPTION. THE NATURAL AND PRI Incidentally, the respect for life manifested
&j
MARY RIGHT AND DUTY OF PARENTS IN by the provision harmonizes with the abolition of
THE REARING OF THE YOUTH FOR CIVIC the death penalty and the ban on nuclear arms.
EFFICIENCY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
2. Education.
â) OF MORAL CHARACTER SHALL RECEIVE
THE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. In the matter of education, the respective
SEC. 13. THE STATE RECOGNIZES rights of parents and ofthe State are delineated.
THE VITAL ROLE OF THE YOUTH IN The primary and natural right belongs to the
NATION-BUILDING AND SHALL PRO parents. The Constitution affirms the primary
MOTE AND PROTECT THEIR PHYSICAL, right of parents in the rearing of children to
MORAL, SPIRITUAL, INTELLECTUAL, prepare them for a productive civic and social
AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING. IT SHALL IN life and at the same time it affirms the secondary
CULCATE IN THE YOUTH PATRIOTISM and supportive role of the State. The principle
AND NATIONALISM, AND ENCOURAGE is also rooted in the basic philosophy of liberty
THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC AND guaranteed by the due process clause.
CIVIC AFFAIRS.
This will be taken up under Article XIV.
40
SEC. 14. THE STATE RECOGNIZES And so the matter was left at that.
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN NATION-BUILD
Wj&
ING, AND SHALL ENSURE THE FUNDA SEC. 15. THE STATE SHALL PROTECT
MENTAL EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW AND PROMOTE THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
OF WOMEN AND MEN.
OF THE PEOPLE AND INSTILL HEALTH
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG THEM.
1. Equality of women and men.
SEC. 16. THE STATE SHALL PROTECT
This provision is new. Beyond stating that AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT OF THE
women do havea role in nation-building, the pro PEOPLE TO A BALANCED AND HEALTH
vision makes the more important assertion that FUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE
there exists a fundamental equality of women RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE.
EiiJ
and menbefore the law. There was, however, no
intent to advocate absolute sameness because 1. The Right to a balanced ecology.
there are obvious biological differences between
men and women.81! It was preciselyto make room A. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.
^J for these natural differences that the provision G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
was made to read "fundamental equality before
the law."81
DAVIDE, JR., J:
During the period of.sponsorship and inter • In a broader sense, this petition bears upon
pellation, Commissioner Felicitas Aquino took the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
the position that the intention was to formulate
the provision in language that wouldbe "self-im
ecology which thepetitioners dramatically associ
plementing" andwould repeal alldiscriminatory ate withthe twinconcepts of"inter-generational
andanti-feminist laws in the Civil Code. During responsibility" and "inter-generationaljustice."
the period of amendment, however, Commis Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
sioner Aquino changed her position. Answering the said petitioners have a cause of action to
questions from the floor, she made it clear that "prevent the misappropriation orimpairment" of
theintentwas nottoachieve an ipso facto repeal Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
oflaws offensive to equality but merely to give hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support
a push to statutory legislation that-would elimi systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
nate the inequalities found in existing law. The Thecontroversyhas its genesisin CivilCase
following exchange should shed light:82 No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66
FR. BERNAS. My problem is that a mere
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
intent unspecified in a constitutional provision Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
and an intent which runs contrary to the letter The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
is not just a vagueness in the letter. The letter petitioners, are all minorsdulyrepresented and
would havetoprevail over whatever unexpressed joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
intent there is since the letter is clear. The letter an additional plaintiff is thePhilippine Ecologi
expresses equal protection and every inequality cal Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
in existing law must yield to it. andnon-profit corporation organized for the pur- ,
MS. AQUINO. The problem is that if we pose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
provide for an ipsofacto amendment of the Civil geared for the protection ofour environment and
Code, particularly pertaining to thelaws on per natural resources. The original defendant was
sonal and family relations, the determination of the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
the rights and duties pertaining thereto carries Secretary of the Department of Environment
with it intricate details which could not proceed and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitu
from a vacuum ...
tion in this petition by the new Secretary, the
TV RECORD 685, 726-727. Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
87d. at 882-885. Butironically, it is in some fundamen ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
tals that men and women are most different. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers'
e2Id. at 878.
class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
'$$y
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss
SBl
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
The same was filed for themselves and others approximately the size of the entire island of
who are equally concerned about the preserva Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction
tion of said resource but are "so numerous that of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
it is impracticable to bring them all before the and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
Court." The minors further asseverate that they cultural communities, including the disappear
"represent their generation as well as genera ance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the
tions yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
that judgment be rendered: destruction cf corals and other aquatic life lead
ing to a critical reduction in marine resource
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as
representatives and other persons acting in is presently experienced by the entire country,
his behalf to (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
(1) Cancel all existing timber license result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
agreements in the country;
flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains aris
ing from the absence ofthe absorbent mechanism
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, ac of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
cepting, processing, renewing or approving lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed
new timber license agreements." and operated for the purpose of supplying water
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
reliefs just and equitable under the premises." of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
The complaint starts off with the general which has led to perplexing and catastrophic cli
averments that the Philippine archipelago of matic changes such as the phenomenon of global
7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, effect."
lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, detrimental consequences of continued defores
biological and chemical pool which is irreplace tation are so capable of unquestionable demon
able; they are also the habitat of indigenous stration that the same may be submitted as a
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific they expressed their intention to present expert
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a bal witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
anced and healthful ecology, the country's land and film evidence in the course of the trial.
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and
forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residen This case, however, has a special and novel
tial, industrial, commercial and other uses; the element. Petitioners minors assert that they
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a represent their generation as well as genera
consequence of deforestation have resulted in tions yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) that they can, for themselves, for others of their
water shortages resulting from the drying up of generation and for the succeeding generations,
the water table, otherwise known as the "aqui file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
fer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) of the succeeding generations can only be based
salinization of the water table as a result of the on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
examples of which may be found in the island ecology is concerned. Such a right, as herein
of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, after expounded, considers the "rhythm and
42
harmony of nature." Nature means the created

world in its entirety. Such rhythm andharmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious Wedo not agree with the trial court's conclu
disposition, utilization, management, renewal sion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with suf
andconservation ofthe country's forest, mineral, ficient definiteness a specific legal rightinvolved
L land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas' or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
and other natural resources to the end that complaint isrepletewithvague assumptions and
their exploration, development and utilization conclusions based onunverified data. Areading
be equitably accessible to the present as well ofthe complaint itself belies these conclusions.
as future generations. Needless to say, every The complaint focuses on one specific fun
generation has a responsibility to the next to
damental legal right the right to a balanced and
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full healthful ecology which, for the first time in
enjoyment ofa balanced and healthful ecology. our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obli
16, Article II ofthe 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
gation to ensure the protection ofthat right for
the generations to come. "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and ad
gj
vance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord withthe rhythmand
After a careful perusal of the complaint in harmony of nature."
question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments This right unites with the right to health
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
for the petitioners and rule against the respon
dent Judge's challenged order for having been "SEC. 15. The State shall protect and pro
issued with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting mote the right to health of the people and instill
to lackofjurisdiction. The pertinent portions of health consciousness among them."
the said order read as follows:
While the right to a balanced and healthful
xxx xxx xxx ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation Principles and State Policies and not under the
ofthe Complaint, the Court cannot help butagree Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less im
with the defendant. For although webelieve that portant than anyofthe civil and political rights
• plaintiffs have but the noblest ofallintentions, enumeratedin the latter. Such a right belongs
it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient defi- to a different categoryofrights altogether for it
niteness, a specific legal right they are seeking concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong self-perpetuation aptly andfittingly stressed by
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, the petitioners the advancement ofwhich may
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that even be said to predate all governments and con
the Complaint is replete withvague assumptions stitutions. As a matter offact, these basic rights
and vague conclusions based on unverified data. need not even be written in the Constitution for
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action they are assumed to exist from the inception of
in its Complaint against the herein defendant. humankind. Iftheyare now explicitly mentioned
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
the. matter before it, being impressed with politi rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
cal color and involving a matter ofpublic policy, to health are mandated as state policies by the
may not be taken cognizance of by this Court Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
without doing violence to the sacred principle of continuing importance and imposing upon the
'Separation of Powers' ofthe three (3) co-equal state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
branches of the Government. protect and advance the second, the day would
iMH
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCD7LES AND STATE POLICIES 43

rial
not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those, to
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all
come generations which stand to inherit nothing
those they represent) to a balanced and health
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
ful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Adminis
impairing the environment. During the debates trative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
on this right in one ofthe plenary sessions ofthe said right.
Mi
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
A denial or violation of that right by the other
exchange transpired between Commissioner
who has the correlative duty or obligation to
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
Azcuna who sponsored tho section in question:
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting
"MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section man
of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
date the State to provide sanctions against all grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to
iîJ forms of pollution air, water aha' noise pollution? a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
MR. AZCUNA Yes, Madam President. The
should be renewed or granted.
right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
•mi carries with it the correlative duty of not impair
ing the same and, therefore, sanction's may be pro
vided for impairment of environmental balance."83 After a careful examination of the petition
ers' complaint, We find the statements under
The said right implies, among many other the introductory affirmative allegations, as. well
things, the judicious management and conserva as the specific averments under the subheading
tion ofthe country's forests! Without such forests, CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
the ecological or environmental balance would be show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
aftl
irreversibly disrupted. rights. On the basis thereof* they may thus be
Conformably with the enunciated right to a
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
ai
cancellation ofthe TLAs is concerned, there is the
health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation,
need to implead, as party defendants, the grant
development and utilization of the country's
ees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
^&j natural resources, then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit,
the Department of Environment and Natural Re the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and
MJ
sources "shall be the primary government agency
the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18
responsible for the conservation, management, July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
development and proper use of the country's hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
i^j
environment and natural resources, specifically amend their complaint to implead as defendants
forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, the holders or grantees ofthe questioned timber
including those in reservation and watershed license agreements.
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well
as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in or B. Laguna Lake Development
der to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits, Authority v. Court of Appeals
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present Q.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994
and future generations of Filipinos." ...
ROMERO, J.:
83IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COM

The clash between the responsibility to the
MISSION 913. City Government of Caloocan to dispose of the
Mî
350tons ofgarbage it collects daily and the grow dumping any form or kind of garbage and other
jgjjjj) ing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free en waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
vironmentofthe residents ofBarangay Camarin,
Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of The dumping operation was forthwith
garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
controversy elevated by the protagonists to the However, sometime in August 1992 the dump
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) ing operation was resumed after a meeting
for adjudication. held in July 1992 among the City Government
of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are Environmental Management Bureau Director
undisputed. Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin After an investigation by its team of legal
Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Ba and technical personnel on August 14,1992, the
rangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter- LLDA issued another order reiterating the De
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development cember 5,1991,'order and issued an Alias Cease
Authority seeking to stop the operation ofthe 8.6 and Desist Order enjoining the.City Government
hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, of Caloocan from continuing its dumping opera
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its tions at the Camarin area.
harmful effects on the health ofthe residents and
On September 25; 1992, the LLDA, with
the possibility of pollution of the water content
of the surrounding area.
the assistanceofthe Philippine National Police,
iiii enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by
On November 15,1991, the LLDA conducted prohibiting the entry ofall garbage dump trucks
an on-site investigation, monitoring and test into the Tala Estate, Camarin area beingutilized
sampling of the leachate that seeps from said as a dumpsite.
dumpsiteto the nearbycreekwhich is a tributary
Pending resolution of its motion for recon
ofthe Marilao River. The LLDALegal and Tech
nical personnel found that the City Government sideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan
at the Camarin area withoutfirst securingan En filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
vironmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the Environmental ManagementBureau (EMB) the cease and desist order with prayer for the
of the Department of Environment and Natural issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City
No. 1586, and clearancefromLLDA as required Government of Caloocan sought to be declared
under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by as the sole authority empowered to promote the
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order health and safety and enhance the right of the
No. 927, series of 1983. people in- Caloocan City to a balanced ecology
within its territorial jurisdiction.
After a public hearing conducted on Decem
ber 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint OnSeptember 25,1992, the Executive Judge
ofTask Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan Cityis
water collected from the leachate and the receiv sued a temporary restraining order enjoining
ingstreamscould considerably affect the quality, the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist
in turn, ofthe receiving waters since it indicates order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the
the presence of bacteria, other than conform, Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan
jgj which may have contaminated the sample during which, at the time, was presided over by Judge
collection or handling. OnDecember 5,1991,the Manuel Jn. Serapio ofthe Regional Trial Court,
LLDA issued a Cease andDesist Order ordering Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-
the City Government ofCaloocan, Metropolitan retired presiding judge.
Manila Authority, their contractors, and other The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2,
entities, to completelyhalt, stop and desist from 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as tive agency which was granted regulatory and
amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, oth adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic
erwise known as the Pollution ControlLaw, the Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presi
cease and desist order issued by it which is the dential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No.
subject matter of the complaint is reviewable 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power
both upon the law and the facts of the case by and authority to issue a cease and desist order
the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g)
Trial Court. of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which
provides, thus:
It is significant to note that while both par SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Func
ties in this case agree on the need to protect the tions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions: .
environment and to maintain the ecological bal
ance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin xxx xxx xxx
open dumpsite, the question as to whichagency
can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter (c) Issue-orders or decisions to compel com
remains highly open to question. pliance with the provisions of this Executive Or
der and its implementing rules and regulations
The City Government of Caloocan claims only after proper notice and hearing.
that it is within its power, as a localgovernment
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring
unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
ofthe Local Government Code, to determine the conditions and the time within which such dis
effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the continuance must be accomplished.
ecological balance and to see that such balance
is maintained. On the basis of said contention, (e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under
r
it questioned, from the inception of the dispute such conditions as it may determine to be rea
before the Regional Trial CourtofCaloocan City, sonable, for the prevention and abatement of
the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of waste, or for the installation or operation of sew
garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which age works and industrial disposal system or parts
the City Government of Caloocan has territorial thereof.
jurisdiction. (f) After due notice and hearing, the Au
The Court ofAppeals sustained the position thority may also revoke^ suspend or modify any
of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Sec permit issued under this Order whenever the
tion 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing (g) Deputize in writing or request assis
the defunct National Pollution Control Commis tance of appropriate government agencies or
sion to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing
was not incorporated in Presidential Decree the Executive Order and its implementing rules
No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series and regulations and the orders and decisions of
of 1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under the Authority.
Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850,
as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to The LLDA claims that the appellate court
deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded
institute the necessarylegal proceeding against
the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927,
any person who shall commence to implement
series of 1983, which granted administrative
or continue implementation of any project, plan quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
SSSiili
or program within the Laguna de Bay region abatement cases.
withoutprevious clearance from the Authority."
In light ofthe relevant environmental protec
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for tion laws cited which are applicable in this case,'
review, the abovementionedruling ofthe Court and the correspondingoverlapping jurisdiction of
of Appeals, contending that, as an administra government agencies implementing these laws,
rtfiftA
the resolution of the issue of whether or not the to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
LLDA has the authority and power to issue an region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
order which, in its nature and effect was injunc emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
tive, necessarily requires a determination ofthe surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforemen
threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake De tioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated,
velopment Authority, under its Charter and its among others, to pass upon and approve or disap
amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain prove all plans, programs, and projects proposed
the complaint against the dumping of garbage in by local government offices/agencies within the
the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin autho region, public corporations, and private persons
rized by the City Government of Caloocan which or enterprises where such plans, programs and/
is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and or projects are related to those of the LLDA for
welfare of the residents therein and the sanita the development of the region.
tion and quality ofthe water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such In the instant case, when the complainant
open garbage dumpsite? Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
lai Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
The matter of determining whether there is City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA,
such pollution ofthe environment that requires the latter's jurisdiction under it charter was val
control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a idly invoked by complainant on the basis of its
business establishment is essentially addressed allegation that the open dumpsite project ofthe
to the Environmental Management Bureau City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Cama
(EMB) ofthe DENR which, by virtue of Section rin was undertaken without a clearance from the
16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of
has assumed the powers and functions of the Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
defunct National Pollution Control Commission 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is
created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said also an allegation that the said project was with
ts«J
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board out an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary from the Environmental Management Bureau
now assumes the powers and functions of the (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction
iâi National Pollution Control Commission with of the LLDA over this case was recognized by
respect to adjudication of pollution cases. the Environmental Management Bureau of the
As a general rule, the adjudication of pol DENR when the latter acted as intermediary
lution cases generally pertains to the Pollution at the meeting among the representatives of
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
,the special law provides for another forum. Camarin Dumpsite and LLDAsometime in July
It must be recognized in this regard that the 1992 to discuss the possibility of re:opening the
open dumpsite.
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency,
is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. Having thus resolved the threshold question,
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and the inquiry then narrows down to the following
make effective the declared national policy of issue; Does the LLDA have the power and au
promoting and accelerating the development and thority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
and the cities ofSan Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Que enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
zon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
provisions for environmental management and
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
control, preservation of the quality of human
life and ecological systems, and the prevention The cease and desist order issued by the
of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloo
and pollution. Under such a broad grant and can to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin
power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been
special charter, obviously has the responsibility done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES • 47
amended, and other relevant environment laws, allowable standards set by the anti-pollution
cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise lawsto the country.Theponente,Associate Jus
bythe LLDA ofinjunctive powers. By its express tice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series "Exparte ceaseand desistordersare per
of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter mitted by law and regulations in situations
or modify order requiring the discontinuance like that here presented precisely because
or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, stopping the continuous discharge of pollut-
par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make ive and untreated effluents into the rivers
whatever order may be necessaryin the exercise and other inland waters of the Philippines
of its jurisdiction. cannot be made to wait until protracted liti
gation over the ultimate correctnessor pro
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly priety of such orders has run its full course,
conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease including multiple and sequential appeals
anddesist order" in a language, as suggested by suchas those whichSolarhas taken, whichof
fijjffij
the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the course may take several years. The relevant
express grant to the defunct National Pollution pollution control statute and implementing
Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. regulations were enacted and promulgated
984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. power to protect the safety, health, and gen
However, it would be a mistake to draw there eral welfareand comfortofthe public, as-well
from the conclusion that there is a denial ofthe as the protection of plant and animal life,
power to issue the order in question when the commonly designated as the police power.
power "tomake, alter ormodify orders requiring It is a constitutional commonplace that the
the discontinuance ofpollution" is expressly and ordinary requirements of procedural due
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive process yield to the necessities of protecting
Order No. 927, series of 1983. vital publicinterests like those here involved,
Assumingarguendothat the authority to is through the exercise of police power....
suea "cease and desist order" were notexpressly The immediate response to the demands of
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough "the necessities of protecting vital public inter
to the effectthat the rule granting such author ests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology
ity need not necessarilybe express. While it is a embodied in the Declaration of Principles and
iHi^
fundamental rule thatan administrative agency State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article
has only such powers as are expressly granted II, Section 16 which provides:
to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
The State shall protect and advance the
administrative agency has also such powers right of the people to a balanced and healthful
as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its of nature.
express powers under its charter as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body withrespect topollution As a constitutionally guaranteed right of
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority every person, it carries the correlative duty of
of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be the declared policy of the state "to protect and
reduced to a "toothless" paper agency. promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them." It
In this connection, it must be noted that in is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is
PollutionAdjudication Board v. Court ofAppeals, party to the Universal Declaration of Human
et a/.,84 the Courtruledthat the Pollution Adjudi Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of
cation Board (PAB) has the powerto issue an ex- 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental
parte cease and desist order whenthere isprima human right.85
facie evidence ofan establishment exceeding the
8SIII RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COM
84195 SCRA 112 (1991). MISSION 119.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and NOTE: Article XTV is devoted to this topic.
desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter
ofprocedure under the circumstances ofthe case, SEC. 18. THE STATE AFFIRMS LABOR
is a proper exercise of its power and authority AS A PRIMARY SOCIAL ECONOMIC
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had FORCE. IT SHALL PROTECT THE RIGHTS
the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA OF WORKERS AND PROMOTE THEIR
been complied with by the City Government of WELFARE.
Caloocanas it did in the first instance, no further
p^
legal steps would have been necessary. NOTE: When labor is called "a primary
social economic force," what is meant is that the
This charter ofLLDA, Republic ActNo. 4850, human factor has primacy over the non-human
&g^
as amended, instead ofconferring upon the LLDA factors in production.
the means of directly enforcing such orders,
have provided under its Section 4(d) the power The rights of labor are discussed under
to institute "necessary legal proceedingagainst Article XIII.
î
any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or SEC. 19. THE STATE SHALL DEVELOP
program within the Laguna de Bay region with A SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT
out previous clearance from the LLDA." . NATIONAL ECONOMY EFFECTIVELY
CONTROLLED BY FILIPINOS.
Clearly, said provisionwas designed to invest
the LLDAwith sufficiently broad powers in the NOTE: This is a guide for interpreting pro
regulation ofall projects initiated in the Laguna visions onthe nationaleconomy and patrimony.
Lake region, whether by the government or the Any doubt must be resolved in favor of self-reli
private sector, insofar as the implementation of ance and independence and in favor ofFilipinos.
these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
as> A. Garcia v. Board of Investments
with cases which might possibly arise where deci G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990
sions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of
suchbroad powers maynot be obeyed, resulting GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
in the thwarting ofits laudabe objective.To meet
such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus This is a petition to annul and set aside the
and injunction which are beyond the powerofthe decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/De-
LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper partment ofTrade and Industry (DTI) approving
courts. the transfer ofthe site ofthe proposed petrochem
ical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift
Insofar as the implementation of relevant offeedstock for that plant from naphtha onlyto
anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns
are concerned, the Court will not dwell further
This petition is a sequel to the petition in
on the related issues raised which are more
G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique
la T. Garcia v. the Board ofInvestments,"Septem
appropriately addressed to an administrative ber 7, 1989, where this Courtissued a decision, •
agency with the special knowledge and expertise ordering the BOI as follows:
of the LLDA.
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
granted.The BoardofInvestments is ordered: (1)
to publish the amended application forregistra
SEC. 17. THE STATE SHALL GIVE tion of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation,
PRIORITY TO EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its
TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE, AND records on the originaland amendedapplications
SPORTS TO FOSTER PATRIOTISM AND for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer,
NATIONALISM, ACCELERATE SOCIAL ofthe respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corpo
PROGRESS, AND PROMOTE TOTAL HU ration, excluding, however, privileged papers
containing its trade secrets and other business
MAN LIBERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. and financialinformation, and (3)to set forhear-
ia)
ARTICLE II:DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES • 49
ing the petitioner's opposition to the amended "Does theinvestor havea 'rightoffinal choice'
EMJ
application in order that he may present at such of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution
hearing all the evidence in his possession in sup nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there
port of his opposition to the transfer ofthe site of such a 'right offinal choice.'In the first place,the
the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas prov investor's choice is subject to processing and ap
ince. The hearing shall not exceed a period of ten provalor disapprovalby the BOI(Art. 7, Chapter
(10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice II,Omnibus Investments Code). By submitting its
of which should be served by personal service to application and amended application to the BOI
the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) for approval, theinvestor recognizes thesovereign
days in advance. The hearingsmaybe held from prerogativeofour Government, through the BOI,
day to day for a period of ten (10) days without to approve or disapprove the same after determin
postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibi ing whether its proposedproject will be feasible,
tion or preliminary injunction is denied. No costs." desirableand beneficial toour country.Byasking
(Rollo, pages 450-451) that his opposition to the LPC'samendedapplica
tion be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise
However, acting on the petitioner's motion acknowledges that the BOI. not the investor, has
jjg$£)
for partial reconsideration asking that we rule the last word or the 'final choice' on the matter.
on the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on
the foreign investor's claimofright offinal choice Secondly, as this case has shown, even a
choice that had been approved by the BOI may
of plant site, in the light ofthe provisions ofthe not be 'final,' for supervening circumstances and
Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code changesin the conditions of a place may dictate
of1987,this Court on October24,1989, made the a corresponding change in the choice of plant site
observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not in order that the project will not fail. After all, our
^) provide that the Limay site should be the only country will benefit only when a project succeeds,
petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit not when it fails." (Rollo, pp. 538-539)
the establishment of a petrochemical plant else
where in the country, that the establishment of a Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration
petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate ofthe petitioner was denied.
P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803."
Our resolution skirted the issue of whether Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16,
the investor given the initial inducements and 1981, 576 hectares ofthe public domain located
other circumstances surrounding its first choice in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for
ofplant site may change it simplybecause it has the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
the final choice on the matter. TheCourt merely administration, management, and ownershipof
ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost in the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
terest in the case by his failure to appear at the
hearing that was set bythe BOI after receipt of The Bataan RefiningCorporation(BRC) is a
the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived whollygovernment owned corporation, located at
the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output
motion for partial reconsideration was denied. of naphtha.
iii
A motion for reconsideration of said resolu Taiwaneseinvestors in a petrochemical proj

tion was filed by the petitioner asking that we ect formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corpora
a^J
resolve the basic issue of whether or not the for tion (BPC) and applied with BOIforregistration
eigninvestorhas the right offinal choice ofplant as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals.
site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner Its application specified Bataan as the plant site.
at the hearing was because the decision was not Oneofthe terms and conditions forregistration
yet final and executory; and that the petitioner of the project was the use of "naphtha cracker"
had not therefor waived the right to a hearing and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petro
before the BOI. chemicalplant. The petrochemical plant was to
be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued
In the Court's resolution dated January 17, a certificateof registration on February 24,1988
1990, we stated:
by BOI.
$&1
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded and respects the principle that the final choice is
fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like, (1) still with the proponent who would in the final
exemption from taxes on raw materials; (2) re analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the
patriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation project. (Petition, p. 13; Annex D to the petition)
investments in currency originally made and This position has not been denied by BOI in
fofri
at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the pres
repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on ent petition.
investments. As additional incentive, the House
fo&l of Representatives approved a bill introduced by Section 1, Article VIII ofthe 1987 Constitu
the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tion provides:
tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw "SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3, Rollo, pp. courts as may be established by law.
441-442)
Judicial power includes the duty ofthe courts
^1 However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, of justice to settle actual controversies involving
chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major rights which are legally demandable and enforce
investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade able, and to determine whether or not there has
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire .to amend
or instrumentality of the Government."
the original registration certificate of its project
by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to There is before us an actual controversy
Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer whether the petrochemical plant should remain
was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas,
and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha
petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philip only should be changed to naphtha and/or liq
pine Shell Corporation. uefied petroleum gas as the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemi
cal Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light
Notwithstanding opposition from many quar of the categorical submission of the BOI that it
ters and the request of the petitioner addressed is the investor who has the final choice of the
to Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy site and the decision on the feedstock, whether
ofthe proposed amendment with its attachments or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989, for the BOI to yield to the wishes ofthe investor,
BOI approved the revision of the registration of national interest notwithstanding.
BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F;
Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. We rule that the Court has a constitutional
.88637; supra) duty to step into this controversy and determine
the paramount issue. We grant the petition.
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara tes
tifying before the Committee on Ways and Means First, Bataan was the original choice as the
of the Senate asserted that: plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed.
That is why it organized itself into a corporation
'The BOI has taken a public position pre bearing the name Bataan. There is available
ferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as
petrochemical complex, as this would provide a
the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under
better distribution of industries around the Metro
Manila area, x x x In advocating the choice of P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive
Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical real estate for the site unlike in the proposed
complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of
would like to repeat this that the BOI made it careful study long before any covetous interests
clear in its view that the BOI or the government intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not
for that matter could only recommend as to where unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The
theproject should be located. TheBOI recognizes respondents have not shown nor reiterated that
iM
ARTICLE II:DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES • 51
the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan the project and its feedstock shall be limited.to
or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of naphtha which is certainly more economical,
the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, thesewere more readily available than LPG, and does not
taken into account when the firm named itself have to be imported.
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover,
the evidence proves the contrary. Sixth, if the. plant site is maintained in
Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the
Second, the BRC, a government-owned Fili venture to the great benefit and advantage ofthe
iipi
pinocorporation, located in Bataan produces 60% government which shall have a participation in
of the national output of naphtha which can be the management ofthe project instead of a firm
used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can which is a huge multinational corporation.
provide the feedstock requirement of the plant.
On the other hand, the country is short ofLPG In the light ofall the clear advantages mani
and there is need to import the same for use fest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practi
of the plant in Batangas. The local production cally nothing is shown to justify the transfer to
thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of Batangasexcept a near-absolute discretion given
the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarcedol by BOIto investors not onlyto freelychoose the
lars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally, site but to transfer it from their own first choice
essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of forreasonswhich remainmurkytosaythe least.
the transferred petrochemical plant. And this brings us to a prime consideration
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been ex which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
empted by law from the ad valorem tax by the Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution
approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President provides that:
Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from
advalorem tax.The lawwas enacted specifically xxx xxx xxx
ilii forthe petrochemical industry. The policy deter "The State shall promote industrialization
mination by both Congress and the President is and full employmentbased on sound agricultural
clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should development and agrarian reform, through indus
disregard orcontravene expressed policy by shift tries that make full and efficient use of human and
ing the feedstock from naphtha to LPG. natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However,the
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against
' ^J
1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
"regulate and exercise authority over foreign in xxx xxx xxx
vestments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities." Every provision of the Constitution on the
The development of a self-reliant and indepen national economyand patrimony is infused with
dent national economy effectively controlled by the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation
Filipinos is mandated in Section 19,Article II of of natural resources, the State's full control over
§0 the. Constitution. the development and utilization of our scarce re
sources, agreements with foreigners being based
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments on real contributions to the economic growth and
Code of 1987"the sound development ofthe na general welfare of the country and the regula
pd tional economy in consonance with the principles tion of foreign investments in accordance with
and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set national goals and priorities are too explicitnot
goal of government. to be noticed and understood.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the inves A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary
tor is raising the greater portion of the capital investment opportunity. It should not be treated
for the project from local sources by way ofloan like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-
which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal," making venture or even an assembler of cars
the capitalrequirements would be greatlymini or manufacturer of computer chips, where the
mized if LPC does not have to buy the land for BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and
sp
••Ipli
credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to Agrarian reform is discussed under Article
its) the national interest. In other ASEAN countries XIII.
like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government
superintends the industry by controlling the SEC. 22. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
upstream or cracker facility. AND PROMOTES THE RIGHTS OF IN
DIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT.
'jj0 the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
NOTE: Indigenous cultural communities
approving the transfer ofthe petrochemical plant
are discussed under the National Economy and
from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
change of feedstock from naphtha only to naph Patrimony (Article XII) and under Local Govern
ments (Article X).
tha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final
say is in the investor all other circumstances to
SEC. 23. THE STATE SHALL ENCOUR
the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advan
tage to the government has been shown by this AGE NON-GOVERNMENTAL, COMMUNI
transfer. This is a repudiation ofthe independent TY-BASED, OR SECTORAL ORGANIZA
policy ofthe government expressed in numerous TIONS THAT PROMOTE THE WELFARE
laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs OF THE NATION.
the way it deems best for the national interest. SEC. 24. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
THE VITAL ROLE OF COMMUNICATION
AND INFORMATION IN NATION-BUILD
fcjjjjA
SEC. 20. THE STATE RECOGNIZES ING.
THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF THE PRI SEC. 25. THE STATE SHALL ENSURE
VATE SECTOR, ENCOURAGES PRIVATE THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERN
ENTERPRISE, AND PROVIDES INCEN MENTS.
TIVES TO NEEDED INVESTMENTS.
NOTE: See Article X.
NOTE: When the government unveiled a
iS^J maritime coastal communication system proj
SEC. 26. THE STATE SHALL GUARAN
ect designed to ensure the safety of lives at sea,
petitioners who were operating marine ship-to- TEE EQUAL ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES
shore and shore-to-ship radio under a certificate FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, AND PROHIBIT
iiiîi
of public convenience alleged that under Article POLITICAL DYNASTIES AS MAY BE DE
II, Section 20 the government cannot compete in FINED BY LAW.
the business of public correspondence. The Court
answered that Article II, Section 20 "is no more 1. Equal access to public service.
than an acknowledgement of the importance of A. Pamatong v. COMELEC
private initiative in building the nation. How G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
ever, it is hot a call for official abdication of duty
ipj
to citizenry." Marine Radio Communications
TINGA, J.'.
Association v. Reyes, G.R. No. 86953, November
6, 1990. Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for President on
SEC. 21. THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on
COMPREHENSIVE RURAL DEVELOP Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course
•^[li
MENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM. to petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy in its
Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004
NOTE: Comprehensive rural development
includes not only agrarian reform. It also encom In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, pe
passes a broad spectrum of social, economic, titioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which
human, cultural, political, and even industrial were allegedly rendered in violation of his right
development. to "equal access to opportunities for public ser-
vice" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 guideline for legislative or executive action. The
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified disregard of the provision does not give rise to
candidates only to those who can afford to wage any cause of action before the courts.
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
An inquiry into the intent of the framers
political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues
produces the same determination that the provi
that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
sion is not self-executory. The original wording of
constitutional provisions on the electoral process
the present Section 26, Article II had read, 'The
and limited the power of the sovereign people to
State shall broaden opportunities to public office
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. success
qualified among all the presidential candidates,
fully brought forth an amendment that changed
i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal
qualifications for the office of the president, he
access," and the substitution ofthe word "office"
is capable of waging a national campaign since
to "service." He explained his proposal in this
he has numerous national organizations under
wise:
his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage
an international campaign since he has practiced I changed the word "broaden" to "EN
law in other countries, and he has a platform of SURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what
government. Petitioner likewise attacks the va is important would be equal access to the
lidity ofthe form for the Certificate of Candidacy opportunity. If you broaden, it would neces
prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims sarily mean that the government would be
that the form does not provide clear and reason mandated to create as many offices as are
able guidelines for determining the qualifications possible to accommodate as many people
of candidates since it does not ask for the candi as are also possible. That is the meaning of
date's bio-data and his program of government. broadening opportunities to public service.
&jfij So, in order that we should not mandate the
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions
State to make the government the number
involved.
one employer and to limit offices only to what
Implicit in the petitioner's invocation of the may be necessary and expedient yet offering
constitutional provision ensuring "equal access equal opportunities to access to it, I change
to opportunities for public office" is the claim the word "broaden."
that there is a constitutional right to run for or Obviously, the provision is not intended to
;**%!
hold public office and, particularly in his case, compel the State to enact positive measures that
to seek the presidency. There is none. What is would accommodate as many people as possible
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limi into public office. The approval of the "Davide
SiiiiiJ tations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of amendment" indicates the design ofthe framers
the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforce desired policy objective and not reflective of the
able right. There.is nothing in the plain language imposition of a clear State burden.
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret
part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled the clause as operative in the absence of legisla
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." tion since its effective means and reach are not
The provisions under the Article are generally properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of.
considered not self-executing, and there is no claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
plausible reason for according a different treat appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and
ment to the "equal access" provision. Like the phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities,"
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the and "public service" are susceptible to countless
provision does not contain any judicially enforce interpretations owing to their inherent impre-
able constitutional right but merely specifies a ciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
L
the framers to inflict on the people an operative of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC
but amorphous foundation from which innately Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003.
unenforceable rights may be sourced. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to be accorded due weight.
to opportunities to public office may be subjected Clearly, therefore, petitioner's reliance on
to limitations. Somevalid limitations specifically the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in of the Constitution is misplaced.
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolu
tion No.6452 dated December 10, 2002outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu SEC. 27. THE STATE SHALL MAINTAIN
proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a HONESTY AND INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC
Certificate of Candidacy. SERVICE AND TAKE POSITIVE AND EF
FECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST GRAFT
As long as the limitations apply to everybody AND CORRUPTION.
&&i equally without discrimination, however, the
equal access clause is not violated. Equality is NOTE: See Article XI.
not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered
•&M
by the hmitations are meant to be borne by any SEC. 28. SUBJECT TO REASONABLE
one who is minded to file a certificate of candi CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED BYLAW, THE
dacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that STATE ADOPTS AND IMPLEMENTS A
any person is exempt from the limitations or the POLICY OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
^j burdens which they create. OF ALL ITS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
PUBLIC INTEREST.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge
the constitutionality or validity of Section 69
feiffi-j
Article VI
Legislative Department
SECTION 1. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF

THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRE
SENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVI
SION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.
1. Legislative power.
iiiii
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. It is vested "in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except
to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum" in Section 32.
The 1987 Constitution has thus restored There are two kinds of limits on legislative
bicameralism. The supposed advantages of bi power, substantive and procedural. Substantive
cameralism are that it (1) allows for a body with limits curtail the contents of a law. For example,
a national perspective to check the parochial no law may be passed which impairs freedom of
tendency of representatives elected by district; speech. Procedural limits curtail the manner of
all
(2) allows for more careful study of legislation; passing laws. For example, a bill must generally
(3) makes the legislature less susceptible to be approved by the President before it becomes
control by the Executive; (4) serves as training law.
ground for national leaders. On the other hand,
Provided that the substantive and proce
the supposed advantages of unicameralism are
dural limitations found in the Constitution are
simplicity of organization resulting in economy
and efficiency, facility in pinpointing responsibil observed, the Congress may legislate on any
«sl
ity for legislation, and avoidance of duplication. subject matter. In other words, the legislative
power of Congress is plenary. (This is different
In republican systems, there are generally from the legislative power of the United States
two kinds of legislative power, original and de Congress which consists only of the legislative
rivative. Original legislative power is possessed powers enumerated in the Federal Constitution.)
by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated by the One ofthe things Congress may not do is pass
sovereign people to legislative bodies and is sub irrepealable laws. The power of present and fu
ordinate to the original power ofthe people. This ture legislatures must remain plenary. When one
is the kind of power that is vested in Congress. legislature attempts to pass an irrepealable law,
to that extent it attempts to limit the power of
Legislative power may also be classified into future legislatures. The power of any legislature
constituent, which is" the power to amend or re can be limited only by the Constitution.
vise the Constitution, and ordinary, which is the
power to pass ordinary laws. The people, through 2. Initiative and Referendum.
the amendatory process, exercise constituent
power, and, through initiative and referendum, The grant of national legislative power to
ordinary legislative power. Congress under the 1987 Constitution is not
55
i&aal
exclusive. Section 1 says that legislative power is On May 24,1993, petitioners filed a petition
vested in Congress "except to the extent reserved with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
to the people by the provision on initiative and Pambayang Kapasyahan Big. 10, Serye 1993.
referendum." Section 32 elaborates on this The petition states: [omitted]
saying: "The Congress shall, as early as possible,
providefor a system ofinitiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the .The municipality of Morong did not take any
people can directly propose and enact laws or action on the petition within thirty (30)days after
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their
i&jj passed by the Congress or local legislative body power of initiative under the Local Government
after the registration of a petition therefor signed Codeof 1991.2 They started to solicit the required
by at least ten per centum of the total number number of signatures3 to cause the repeal of said
of registered voters, of which every legislative resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however,
district must be represented by at least three per the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor
centum of the registered voters thereof." and Presiding Officer ofthe Sangguniang Bayan
The power of initiative and referendum is ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11,1993 to
the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting
thus the power ofthe people directly to "propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law the denial of"... the petition for a local initiative
or part thereof passed by the Congress or local and/or referendum because the exercise will just
legislative body." In republican constitutional promote divisiveness, counter productive and
theory, the original legislative power belongs to futility."
the peoplewho,through the Constitution, confer
derivative legislative power on the legislature.
Through Section 1, however, in connection with In its session of July 6,1993, the COMELEC
Section 32, the people have, in addition to their en banc resolved to deny the petition for local
constituent power, reserved for themselves initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely
&pj ordinary legislative power. The purpose is to a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not
institutionalize "people power" by providing for an ordinance." ..
an instrument which can be used should the
legislature show itself indifferent to the needs
ofthe people.1 We grant the petition.
i
The case at bench is of transcendental sig

A. Garcia v. Commission on Elections nificance because it involves an issue of first
isMi
G.R. No. 111230, September 30,1994 impression — delineating the extent of the all
important original power of the people to legis
PUNO, J.: late. Father Bernas explains that "in republican
The 1987 Constitution is borne ofthe convic systems, there are generally two kinds of legis
tion that people power can be trusted to check lative power, original and derivative. Original
excesses of government. One of the means by legislative power is possessed by the sovereign
which people power can be exercised is thru ini people. Derivative legislative power is that which
tiatives where local ordinances and resolutions has been delegated by the sovereign people to leg
can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize islative bodies and is subordinate to the original
the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to power of the people."4
be rejected.
Our constitutional odyssey shows that up
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Big. 10, Serye until 1987,our people have not directly exercised
1993, The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bata legislative power, both the constituent power to
an agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
2Sec. 122, par. (b) of R.A. No. 7160.
Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227.
3Sec. 122, par. (e) of R.A. No. 7160.
'Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government,
m RECORD 45. 1991 ed., p. 39.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 57
amend or revise the Constitution or the power to of registered voters, of which every legislative
enact ordinary laws. Section 1, Article VI ofthe district must be represented by at least three
&Mi 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power per centum of the registered voters therein."
to Congress, thus "the legislative power shall be Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also
vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which endowed with the power to enact or reject any
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Repre act or law by congresspr local legislative body.
sentatives." Similarly, Section 1, Article VIII of [Sections 1 and 32 of Article VQ
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided
that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a
MiA Batasang Pambansa." The COMELEC was also empowered to
enforce and.administer all laws and regula
Implicit in the set up was the trust of the
tions relative to the conduct of an initiative and
people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit.
referendum. Worthwhile noting is the scope of
So total was their trust that the people did not
coverage of an initiative or referendum as delin
reserve for themselves the same power to make
eated by Section 32, Art. VI ofthe Constitution,
or repeal laws. The omission was to prove unfor
. . . any act or law passed by Congress or local
^J tunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolu
legislative body.
tion, the legislature failed the expectations ofthe
people especially when former President Marcos In due time, Congress responded to the man
wielded lawmaking powers under Amendment date of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which into operation the constitutionalized concept of
could have bridled the nation's downslide from initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989,
democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An
fc&&i saw the light of day. Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
In February 1986, the people took a direct
Liberally borrowed from American laws, RA. No.
hand in the determination of their destiny. They
6735, among others, spelled out the requirements
toppled down the government of former President
for the exercise of the power of initiative and
Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The
referendum, the conduct of national initiative
Constitution was rewritten to embody the les
and referendum; procedure of local initiative and
iilJ sons of their sad experience. One of the lessons referendum; and their limitations. Then came
is the folly of completely surrendering the power Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The
to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title
perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of
new Constitution became "less trusting of public local initiative and referendum.
officials than the American Constitution."5
In light of this legal backdrop, the essential
For the first time in 1987, the system of issue to be resolved in the case at bench is wheth
people's initiative was thus installed in our fun er Pambayang Kapasyahan Big. 10, serye 1993
damental law. To be sure, it was a late awaken ofthe Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is
ing. ... In any event, the framers of our 1987 the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents
Constitution realized the value of initiative and take the negative stance as they contend that
referendum as an ultimate weapon ofthe people under the Local Government Code of 1991 only
to negate government malfeasance and mis an ordinance can be the subject of initiative
feasance and they put in place an overarching
system. Thus, thru an initiative, the people were We reject respondents' narrow and literal
given the power to amend the Constitution itself. reading of the above provision for it will collide
Sec. 2 ofArt. XVII provides: "Amendments to this with the Constitution and will subvert the intent
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of
by the people through initiative upon a petition the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative
of at least twelve per centum ofthe total number and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only

'Sounding Board, Today's Issue of September 6,1994. ordinances but resolutions as appropriate sub-
jects of a local initiative. Section 32 ofArticle VI in provided shall not be repealed, modified or
provides in luminous language: 'The Congress amended, by the local legislative bodyconcerned
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system within six (6) months from the date therefrom
of initiative and referendum' and the exceptions . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also
therefrom, whereby the people can directly pro .promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In
pose and enact laws or approve or reject any act Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct
or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
or local legislative body x x x." An act includes arid Referendum, on National and Local Laws."
a resolution. Black [Law Dictionary] defines an It likewise recognized resolutions as proper
act as "an expression of will or purpose ... it subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its
may denote something done ... as a legislature, Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative the
including not merely physical acts, but also de power ofinitiative may be exercised to amend the
crees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a
and determinations . . ." It is basic that a law regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
should be construed in harmony with and not in law, resolution or ordinance."
violation of the Constitution. .. There can hardly be any doubt that when
The constitutional command to include acts Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it in
(i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of ini tended resolutions to be proper subjects of local
tiative was implemented by Congress when it initiatives...
enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Contrary to the submission of the respon
Providing for a System of Initiative and Referen dents, the subsequent enactment of the Local
dum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with
its Section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions local initiative did not change the scope of its
as subjects of initiative on local legislations, viz: coverage.More specifically, the Codedid not limit
the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances
"Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — For pur alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I
&&i.j| poses of this act, the following terms shall of the Code cited by respondents merely defines
mean:
the concept of local initiative as the legal process
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people whereby the registered voters of a local govern
to propose amendments to the Constitution ment unit may directly propose, enact, or amend
or to propose and enact legislations through any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with
an election called for the purpose. the subjects or matters t&at can be taken up in
a local initiative. It is Section 124 of the same
There are three (3) systems of initiative, Code which does. It states:
namely:
"Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initia
a. 1. Initiative on the Constitution which tives. — (a) The power oflocal initiative shall
refers to a petition proposing amendments to not be exercised more than once a year.
the Constitution.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to sub
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers jects or matters which are within the legal
to a petition proposing to enact a national powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
legislation; and
xxx xxx xxx.
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which

;J!*J This provision clearly does not limit the ap
refers to a petition proposing to enact a re
plication of local initiatives to ordinances, but
gional, provincial, city, municipal, or baran
to all "subjects or matters which are within the
gay law, resolution or ordinance." (Emphasis
legal powers ofthe Sanggunians to enact," which
ours).
undoubtedly includes resolutions...
Similarly, its Section 16 states: "Limitations
Upon Local Legislative Bodies any proposition
on ordinance or resolution approved through Considering the lasting changes that will
the system of initiative and referendum as here be wrought in the social, political, and economic
existence ofthe people ofMorong by the inclusion the Judicial branch, or if by law-it attempts
of their municipality in the Subic Special to invest itself or its members with either
Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their executive power or judicial power. This is
voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not not to say that the three branches are not
material that the decision ofthe municipality of co-ordinate parts of one government and
Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a that each in the field of its duties may not
resolution for what matters is its enduring effect invoke the action of the two other branches
on the welfare of the people of Morong. in so far as the action invoked shall not be
an assumption of the constitutional field of
action of another branch. In determining
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is what it may do in seeking assistance from
GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 another branch, the extent and character of
dated July 6,1993 and Resolution 93-1676dated that assistance must be fixed according to
July 13,1993 are ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE. common sense and the inherent necessities
No costs. of the governmental coordination."
fxtol
In spite ofthe principle ofnon-delegabilityof
3. Nondelegability of legislative power. legislative power, it is common knowledge that
Ifi his commentary on the Constitution ofthe numerous statutes have been passed creating
United States, Corwin wrote thus:6 administrative agencies and authorizing them to
exercise vast regulatory powers. The rules and
At least three distinct ideas have con regulations they issue havethefbrce oflaw. This
tributed to the development of the principle phenomenonhas been justified by two different
iJM
that legislative power cannot be delegated. theories. The first theory is that a non-legislative
One is the doctrine of separation of pow bodymay be authorized to "fillup the details" of
ers: Why go to the trouble of separating a statute. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1825:
the three powers of government if they can "It will not be contended, that Congress can
l&sA
straightway remerge on their own motion? delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunal,
The second is the concept of due process of powers which are strictly and exclusively legis
law, which precludes the transfer of regula lative. But Congress may certainly delegate to
tory functions to private persons. Lastly, others powers which the legislature may right
there is the maxim of agency "Delegata fully exercise itself . . . The line has not been
potestas non potest delegari," which John exactly drawn which separate those important
Locke borrowed and formulated as a dogma subjects, which must be entirely regulated by
of political science ... Chief Justice Taft of the legislature itself, from those of less interest,
fered the following explanation ofthe origin in which a general provision may be made, and
and limitations of this idea as a postulate of power given to those who are to act under such
constitutional law: "The well-known maxim general provisions, to fill up the details."7 The
'delegata potestas non potest delegari,' ap other theory, also enunciated by Marshall, is
plicable to the law of agency in the general that Congress may pass contingent legislation,
Si^
common law, is well understood and has had that is, legislation which leaves to anotherbody
wider application in the construction of our the business of ascertaining the facts necessary
Federal and State Constitutions than it has to bring the law into actual operation.8
in private law ... The Federal Constitution
and State Constitutions of this country divide Under both of the above theories, the func
the governmental power into three branches tion performed by the administrative agency is
... In carrying out that constitutional divi notlaw-making but law-execution. In orderto en
sion ... it is a breach ofthe National funda
sure that the powerdelegatedby the legislature
mental law if Congress gives up its legislative is notlaw-making power, the statute makingthe
[ power and transfers it to the President, or to delegation must —
6CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED dayman v.Southward, 10Wheat 1, 42(1825).

STATES OF AMERICA, 95 (1964). sThe BrigAurora, 7 Cr. 382 (1813).
(a) be complete in itself — it must set in Tokyo, Japan, March 15,1985. His widow sue<
forth therein the policy to be carried out or for damages under Executive Order No. 797 am
implemented by the delegate ... and (b) fix Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. Tin
a standard — the limits of which are suffi petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued tha
ciently determinate or determinable — to the complaint was cognizable not by the POE/
which the delegate must conform in the but the Social Security System and should hav<
performance of his functions . . . Indeed, been filed against the State Insurance Fund
without a statutory declaration of policy, the The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdictior
delegate would in effect, make or formulate and after considering the position papers of the
M such policy, which is the essence of every law; parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The
and, without the aforementioned standard, award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits
there would be no means to determine, with and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate The Philippine Overseas Employment Ad
upon himself the power not only to make law, ministration was created under Executive Ordei
M but, also, — and this is worse — to unmake Nc; 797, promulgated on May 1,1982, to promote
it, by adoptingmeasures inconsistent with and monitor the overseas employment of Filipi
the end sought to be attained by the Act of nos and to protect their rights. It replaced the
||j> Congress.. .9 National Seamen Board created earlier under
Article 20 ofthe Labor Code in 1974. Under Sec
Provided the above requirements of com tion 4(a) ofthe said executive order, the POEA is
pleteness and sufficiency of standards are satis vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
fied, the regulations passed by an administrative over all cases, including money claims, involving
body pursuant to the delegation made by the employee-employer relations arising out of or by
statute are just as binding as if the regulation virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
had been written in the original statute itself. contract workers, including seamen." These
If, however, these requirements are not satis- cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regula
.yfied, the regulation will not be allowed to affect tions on Overseas Employment issued by the
private rights. ' POEA, include "claims for death, disability and
other benefits" arising out of such employment.,0
4. Non-delegability.
CASES.
The award of PI80,000.00 for death benefits
A. Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
Overseas Employment Administration the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular
166 SCRA 533 (1988) No. 2, which became effective on February 1,
1984. This circular prescribed a standard con
CRUZ, J: tract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino sea
^fiijffi The private respondent in this case was men for overseas employment.
awarded the sum of Pi92,000.00 by the Phil
But the petitioner questions the validity of
ippine Overseas Employment Administration
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
(POEA) for the death of her husband. The deci
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
sion is challenged by the petitioner on the prin
power. It contends that no authority had been
cipal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
given the POEA to promulgate the said regu
over the case as the husband was not an overseas
lation; and even with such authorization, the
worker.
regulation represents an exercise of legislative
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer ofthe M/V discretion which under the principle, is not sub
Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident ject to delegation.
"Pelaezv. Auditor General, 15 SCRA569, 576-7(1965). °Sec. 1(d), Rule I, Book VI (1985 Rules).
The authority to issue the said regulation become more frequent, bi not necessary. This
is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive had led to the observation that the delegation
Order No. 797, reading as follows: of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.
"x x x The governing Board of the Ad
ministration (POEA) as hereunder provided, The reason is the increasing complexity ofthe
shall promulgate the necessary rules and task of government an,d the growing inability of
regulations to govern the exercise of the the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
adjudicatory functions ofthe Administration problems demanding its attention. The growth
(POEA)." of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
The second challenge is more serious as comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
it is true that legislative discretion as to the has become necessary. To many ofthe problems
substantive contents of the law cannot be dele attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
gated. What can be delegated is the discretion to legislature may not have the competence to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what provide Lhe required direct and efficacious, not
the law shall be. The ascertainment ofthe latter to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This however, be expected from its delegates, who are
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered supposed to be experts in the particular fields
by the legislature to the delegate. assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation
of legislative powers in general are particularly
There are two accepted tests to determine applicable to administrative bodies. With the
whether or not there is a valid delegation of proliferation of specialized activities and their
legislative power, viz., the completeness test attendant peculiar problems, the national legis
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first lature has found it more necessary to entrust to
test, the law must be complete in all its terms administrative agencies the authority to issue
and conditions when it leaves the legislature rules to carry out the general provisions of the
such that when it reaches the delegate the only statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
thing he will have to do is enforce it.11 Under the legislation."
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out With this power, administrative bodies may
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and implement the broad policies laid down in a stat
prevent the delegation from running riot.12 Both ute by "fillingin" the details which the Congress
tests are intended to prevent a total transference may not have the opportunity or competence to
oflegislative authority to the delegate, who is not provide. Thisis effected bytheir promulgation of
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature what are known as supplementary regulations,
and exercise a power essentially legislative. such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is Theseregulationshave the force and effect oflaw.
applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such
case ofthe legislative power because ofthe many administrative regulation. The model contract
instances when its delegation is permitted. The prescribed thereby has been applied in a sig
occasions are rare when executive or judicial nificant number of the cases without challenge
powers have to be delegated by the authorities by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
to which they legally pertain. In the case of the before it the National Seamen Board) in requir
legislative power, however, such occasions have ingthe model contract is not unlimited as there
is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in
the exercise of said authority. That standard is
'"'People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56. discoverable in the executive order itself which,
12Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359; People v.
Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328.
in creating thePhilippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel
of overseas Fihpino workers to "fair and equitable stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan
employment practices." Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service
Commission:20
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court
has accepted as sufficient standards "public inter One thing, however is apparent in the
est" in People v. Rosenthal,13 "justice and equity"* development of the principle of separation
in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR,14 "public conve of powers and that is that the maxim of
nience and welfare" in Calalarig v. Williams,15 delegatus non potest delegare or delegata
iî
and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in potestas non potest delegarei adopted this
Cervantes v. Auditor General,16 to mention only practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia
a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University
experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
Corp. v. Industrial Commission,1'' and "national recognized in principle in the Roman Law
security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.18 (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adopt itself to
the complexities of modern government, giv
ing rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, o£ the principle of 'subordinate legislation,'
with costs against the petitioner. The temporary not only in the United States and England
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is but in practically all modern governments.
hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeiia, 68 Phil.
318 [1939]). Accordingly, with the growing
B. Tablarin v. Gutierrez complexity of modern life, the multiplication
tei 152 SCRA 730 (1987) of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty ofadministering
FELICIANO, J.: the laws, there is a constantly growing ten
dency toward the delegation ofgreaterpower
by the legislature, and toward the approval
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the of the practice by the courts."21
argument that Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic
The standards set for subordinate legisla
Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the un tion in tjie exercise of rule making authority
due delegation of legislative power, by failing to by an administrative agency like the Board of
establish the necessary standard to be followed Medical Education are necessarily broad and
by the delegate, the Board of Medical Educa highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta22 —
tion. The general principle of non-delegation
of legislative power, which both flows from and The standard may be either expressed
reinforces the more fundamental rule of the sepa [sic] or implied. If the former, the non-dele
ration and allocation of powers among the three gation objection is easily met. The standard
great departments of government,19 must be ap though does not have to be spelled out spe
plied with circumspection in respect of statutes cifically. It could be implied from the policy
which, like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with and purpose ofthe act considered as a whole.
subjects as obviously complex and technical as In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
medical education and the practice of medicine objective is public safety. What is sought to
be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe
l*Supra.
transit upon the roads.'23 —
"70 Phil. 340.
>s70 Phil. 726. *°70 Phil. 221 (1940).
^Supra. 2,70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.
"236 U.S. 247. 2235SCRA 481 (1970).
,8320 U.S. 99. M35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point,
"See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v. Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the fol
Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965). lowing tenor:
I
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT • 63
We believe and so hold that the necessary mode of treating offenders, it may pose difficulty
standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 for socialand economic legislation needed by the
•Sb
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation times. Even prior to the above-cited Pangasinan
of medical education" and in Sections 5(a) and Transportation decision, Justice Laurel himself
7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, in an earlier decision, People, v. Rosenthal in
and that these considered together are sufficient 1939, promulgated less than two years after
compliance with the requirements of the non Vera, pointed out that such doctrine of non
delegation principle. delegation "has been made to adopt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in
C. Free Telephone Workers Union v. the United States and England but in practically
m Minister of Labor all modern governments. The difficulty lies in
* 108 SCRA 757 (1981) the fixing of the limit and extent of the author
ity. While courts have undertaken to lay down
general principles, the safest is to decide each
tiiiii) Even on the assumption, indulged in solely
case according to its peculiar environment, hav
because of the claim earnestly and vigorously
ing in mind the wholesome legislative purpose
pressed by counsel for petitioner, that the author intended to be achieved."26 After which, in came
ity conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of
^J
the even more explicit formulation in Pangasinan
legislative character, still no case of an unlawful
Transportation appearing in the quoted excerpt
delegation of such power, may be discerned... from Edu v. Ericta. There is no question therefore
that there is a marked drift in the direction of
a more liberal approach. It is partly in recogni
The strict rule on non delegation was enun
tion of the ever-increasing needs for the type of
ciated by Justice Laurel in People v. Vera,24 which legislation allowing rule-making in accordance
declared unconstitutional the then Probation
with standards, explicit or implicit, discernible
Act.25 Such an approach, conceded, by some con from a perusal of the'entire enactment that in
stitutionalists to be both scholarly and erudite,
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financ
nonetheless aroused apprehension for being too
ing Administration v. Confederation of Unions
rigid and inflexible. While no doubt appropriate in Government Corporations and Offices21 the
in that particular case, the institution of a new then Justice, now the retired Chief Justice and
presently Speaker, Makalintal had occasion to
"This Court has considered as sufficient standards,
'public welfare,' Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36
refer to "the growing complexities of society"
Phil. 547 (1917); 'necessary in the interest of law and order,' as well as "the increasing social challenges of
Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); 'public inter the times."28 It would be self-defeating in the
est,* People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); and 'justice extreme if the legislation intended to cope with
and equity and substantial merits of the case,' International
Hardwood v.Pangil Federation of Labor,70 Phil. 602 (1940). the grave social and economic problems of the
In People v. Bxconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice present and foreseeable future would founder on
J.B.L. Reyes said: the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly
"It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
ofnon-delegation. Fortunately with the retention
constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and in the amended Constitution of some features
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate of the 1973 Constitution as originally adopted
its policies, for the reason that legislature often finds it im leading to an appreciable measure ofconcordand
practicable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in
harmony between the policy-makingbranches of
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the the government, executive and legislative, the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of objection on the grounds ofnon-delegation would
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it,
but conform to the standards that the law prescribes." (101
Phil., at 1129; underscoring supplied). 2668Phil. 328, 343 (1939).
"65 Phil. 56 (1937). 27L-21484, November 29,1969, 30 SCRA 649.
25Act No. 4221 (1935). ™Ibid., 662.
$$
64 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS QF GOVERNMENT
be even less persuasive. It is worth repeating without the assistance of a delegate or withou
that the Prime Minister, while the choice of the an expenditure of time so great as to lead to thi
President, must have the approval of the major neglect ofequally important business. Delegatioi
ity of all members of the Batasang Pambansa.29 is most commonly indicated where the relation*
At least a majority of the cabinet members, the to be regulated are highly technical or wher<
Ministers being appointed by the President, if their regulation requires, a course of continuous
heads of ministries, shall come from its regional decision."35 His perceptive study could rightfullj
representatives.30 So, also, while the Prime Min conclude that even in a strictly presidential sys
ister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Bata tem like that of the United States, the doctrine
sang Pambansa for the program of government, of non-delegation reflects the American "politi
it must be one "approved by the President."31 cal philosophy that insofar as possible issues b«
While conceptually, there still exists a distinction settled [by legislative bodies], an essentially
between formulation and implementation, the restrictive approach" may ignore "deep currents
fundamental principle of separation of powers ofsocial force."36 In plainer terms, and as applied
of which non-delegation is a logical corollary be- to the Philippines under the amended Constitu
' comes even more flexible and malleable. Even the tion with the close ties that bind the executive
j&ffil
case of the United States, with its adherence to and legislative departments, certain features 61
the Madisonian concept of separation of powers, parliamentarism having been retained, it may
President Kennedy could state that its Constitu be a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation.
tion did not make "the Presidency and Congress The spectre of the non-delegation concept need
rivals for power but partners for progress [with not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet
the two branches] being trustee for the people, sessions or legislative chambers.
custodians of their heritage."32 With the closer
Ijgjj) 5. By way of summary, this Court holds
relationship provided for by the amended Consti
that Batas Fambansa Big. 130 insofar as it
tution in our case, there is likely to be even more
empowers the Minister of Labor to assume ju
promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies
risdiction over labor disputes causing or likely
MB
and thereafter unity and vigor in their execution.
to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine,
the national interest and thereafter decide it or
therefore would be an obstacle to national efforts
certify the same [to] the National Labor Relations
at development and progress. There is accord
Commission is not on its face unconstitutional for
ingly more receptivity to laws,leaving to admin
being vi6late of the doctrine of non-delegationof
istrative and executive agencies the adoption of legislative power
such means as may be necessary to effectuate
ji%i
a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting
that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor
Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delega D. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v.
tion as the "dynamo of modern government."33 Secretary Drilon
He then went on to state that "the occasions for 176 SCRA 24 (1989)
delegating power to administrative offices[could
be] compassed by a single generalization."34
Thus: Tower should be delegated where there is GANCAYCO, J.:
agreement that a task must be performed and it The principal issue raised in this petition is
cannot be effectivelyperformed by the legislature whether or not an Implementing Order of the
Secretary ofLabor and Employment (DOLE) can
MCf. Article DC, Sec. 1. provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the
^Cf. Ibid.
. "Cf. Ibid. Sec. 2.
law it seeks to implement.
"KENNEDY, THE SECOND STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGE (1962),in Nevins ed., The Burden and the Glory,
3 (1964).
^Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47
Col. Law Review, 359 (1947). KIbid.
uIbid. 361. Îbid.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATE DEPARTMENT ' • 65
On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. Labor before going to court. It is fundamental
6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, that in a case where only pure questions of
iS> as follows: law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot apply because
"Sec. 2. The statutory minimum wage
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality
rates of workers and employees in the
by the administrative officer. Appeal to the ad
private sector, whether agricultural or non-
ministrative officer of orders involving questions
agricultural, shall be increased by ten pesos
of law would be an exercise in futility since
(P10.00) per day, except non-agricultural
administrative officers cannot decide such is
workers and employees outside Metro Ma
sues with finality.37 The questions raised in this
nila who 3hall receive an increase of eleven
petition are questions of law. Hence, the failure
pesos (Pi 1.00) per day: Provided, That those
to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be
already receiving above the minimum wage
considered fatal to this petition.
up to one hundred pesos (P100.00) shall
receive an increase often pesos (P10.00) per As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of
day. Excepted from the provisions of this Act the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640,
are domestic helpers and persons employed which prohibits the employer from crediting the
in the personal service of another." anniversary wage increases provided in collective
bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule
The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent
that implementing rules cannot add or detract
rules implementing the provisions of Republic from the provisions oflaw it is designed to imple
Act No. 6640. Section 8 thereof provides:
ment. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640,
"Section 8. Wage Increase Tinder Indi do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary
vidual/Collective Agreements. — No wage wage increases for purposes of compliance with
increase shall be credited as compliance Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules
with the increase prescribed herein unless cannot provide for such a prohibition not contem
expressly provided under valid individual plated by the law.
written/collective agreements; and, provided Administrative regulations adopted under
further, that such wage increase was granted legislative authority by a particular department
in anticipation of the legislative wage in must be in harmony with the provisions of the
crease under the act. Such increases shall not law, and should be for the sole purpose of car
include anniversary wage increase provided rying into effect its general provisions. The law
on collective agreements." itself cannot be expanded by such regulations.
In sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules An administrative agency cannot amend an act
prohibits the employer from crediting anniver of Congress.38
sary wage increases negotiated under a collec
tive bargaining agreement against such wage
increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. E. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
;$0
The thrust of the argument of petitioner is PUNO, J.:
that Section 8 of the rules implementing the pro
The petitions at bar challenge the constitu
visions of Republic Act No. 6640 particularly the
tionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An
provision excluding anniversary wage increases
Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry
from being credited to the wage increase provided
and For Other Purposes." R.A. No. 8180 ends
by said law is null and void on the ground that
twenty-six (26) years of government regulation
the same unduly expands the provisions of the
py of the downstream oil industry...
said law.
This petition is impressed with merit. 37Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil.
466 (1959); Mondanov. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
Public respondents aver that petitioner 38Manuel v. General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA 660
should have first appealed to the Secretary of (1971).
iljjiiii
"WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Apt

The deregulation process has two phases: No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Down
the transition phase and the full deregulation stream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
phase.. .. 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement full de
The first phase of deregulation commenced regulation of the downstream oil industry not
on August 12, 1996. later than March, 1997.'Asfar as practicable;
On February 8, 1997, the President imple the DOE shall time the full deregulation
mented the full deregulation of the Downstream
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372. products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in
The petitions at bar assail the constitution relation to the US dollar is stable;
ality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and
'WHEREAS, pursuant to the lecom-
E.O. No. 372.
mendation of the Department of Energy,
there is an imperative need to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil
In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C.
industry because of the following recent de
Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wig-
velopments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund
berto Tariada, Flag Human Rights Foundation,
on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the
Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and
Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16
Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of Section
January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had
15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15
been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since Octo
provides:
ber 1996 while prices of petroleum products
in the world market had been stable since
"Sec. 15. Implementation ofFull Deregu
mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude
lation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) ofRepublic
oil prices are beginning to soften for the last
pj Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval
few days while prices of some petroleum
of the President, implement the full deregu
products had already declined; and (iii) the
lation of the downstream oil industry not
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
later than March 1997. As far as practicable,
feffifri US dollar has been stable for the past twelve
the DOE shall time the full deregulation
(12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
one US dollar;
products in the world market are declining
tej and when the exchange rate of the peso in "WHEREAS, Executive Order No, 377
relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon dated 31 October 1996 provides for an insti
the implementation of the full deregulation tutional framework for the administration
's$$)
as provided herein, the transition phase is of the deregulated industry by defining the
deemed terminated and the following laws functions and responsibilities of various
are deemed repealed: government agencies;
XXX XXX XXX "WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry
E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:
will foster a truly competitive market which
"WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, can better achieve the social policy objectives
otherwise known as the "Department of En of fair prices and adequate, continuous sup
ergy Act of 1992, provides that, at the end of ply of environmentally-clean and high qual
four years from its effectivity last December ity petroleum products;
1992, the Department (of Energy) shall, "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V.
upon approval of the President, institute the. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
programs and time table of deregulation of Philippines, by the powers vested in me by
appropriate energy projects and activities of law, do hereby declare the full deregulation
the energy sector; of the downstream oil industry."
igj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT .67
In assailing Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and world market" and "stability ofthe pesoexchange
E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear
submissions: and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that
First, Section 15 ofR.A. No. 8180 constitutes they do not provide the "determinate or determin
an undue delegation of legislative power to the able standards" which can guide the President in
<m
President and the Secretary of Energy because his decision to fully deregulate the downstream
it does not provide a determinate or determin oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O.
able standard to guide the Executive Branch in No.392which advanced the date offull deregula
Iflj determining when to implement the full deregu tion is voidfor it illegally considered the depletion
of the OPSF fund as a factor.
lation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners
contend that the law does not define when it is The power of Congress to delegate the execu
practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recom tion of laws has long been settled by this Court.
mend to the President the full deregulation of .... Over the years, as the legal engineering of
the downstream oil industry or when the Presi men's relationship became more difficult, Con
dent may consider it practicable to declare full gress has to rely more on the practice of delegat
Z@2) deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any ing the execution of laws to the executive and
specific standard to determine when the prices of other administrative agencies. Two tests have
crude oil in the world market are considered to been developed to determine whether the delega
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the tion of the power to execute laws does not involve
peso to the US dollar is considered stable. the abdication of the power to make law itself.
We delineated the metes and bounds of these
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently
defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
'M(i\
E.O. No. 392 Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the
We shall now resolve the petitions on the attempt of petitioners to strike down Section 15
merit. . . . The substantive issues are: ... (3) on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
whether or not Section 15 violates the constitu
power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both
tional prohibition on undue delegation of power; the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. It will be noted that Congress expressly
1^1 provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation
will start at the end of March 1997, regardless
We shall now slide to the substantive issues of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation
in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail Section at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the
15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
for the full deregulation of the downstream oil purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on
industry. We restate its pertinent portion for the question of the final date of full deregulation.
>yff-l
emphasis, viz.: The discretion given to the President is to ad
vance the date of full deregulation before the end
"Sec. 15. Implementation ofFull Deregu of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard
^4 lation. —Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic to guide the judgment of the President — he is
Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval to time it as far as practicable when the prices
of the President, implement the full deregu of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
lation of the downstream oil industry not market are declining and when the exchange rate
later than March 1997. As far as practicable, of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum Petitioners contend that the words "as far
products in the world market are declining as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should
and when the exchange rate of the peso in have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do
relation to the US dollar is stable..." not set determinate or determinable standards.
The stubborn submission deserves scant con
g£)
Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as sideration. The dictionary meanings of these
practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the words are well settled and cannot confuse men of
m
reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practi to transgress the principle of separation of pow
cable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, ers. The exercise of delegated power is given i
"decline" as meaning to take a downward direc strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a men
tion, and "stable" as meaning firmly established. agent whose action cannot infringe the term;
The fear of petitioners that these words will of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executivi
•&m1
result in the exercise of executive discretion that co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSI
will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the fund with the factors of decline of the price o
Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not crude oil in the world market and the stability
more general standards in other cases. of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of th<
text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine
It ought to follow that the argument that
the weight given by the Executive departmen
E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on
to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could wel
indeterminate standards set by R.A. No. 8180
l$d
must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack
be the principal consideration for the early de
regulation. It could have been accorded an equa
against the validity of E.O. No. .392, the issue
significance. Or its importance could be nil. Ir
need not further detain our discourse. But peti
tioners further posit the thesis that the Executive light of this uncertainty, we rule that the earlj
i^J
misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes i
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
•3
deregulating the downstream oil industry in

February 1997. F. People v. Dacuycuy.
A perusal of Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors
to be considered by the Department of Energy REGALADO, J.:
and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time Involved in this special civil action is the
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum prod unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase,
ucts in the world market are declining, and (2) of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment
the time when the exchange rate of the peso in
imposed by law but without a specification as to
relation to the US dollar is stable. .Section 15 did
the term or duration thereof.
jflftjl
not mention the depletion of the QPSF fund as a
factor to be given weight by the'Executive before
ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No.
debates in Congress will show that some of our
4670 provides:
, ^)
legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition
to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person
must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that who shall willfully interfere with, restrain
the Executive department failed to follow faith or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his
fully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in
considered the extraneous factor of depletion of any other manner commit any act to defeat
the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
factor cannot be justified on the ground that the conviction, be punished by a fine of not less
Executive department considered anyway the than one hundred pesos nor more than one
stability of the prices of crude oil in the world thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the
$M market and the stability of the exchange rate of discretion of the court. (Italics supplied).
the peso to the dollar. By considering another
factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive Two alternative and distinct penalties are
department rewrote the standards set forth in consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging
R.A. No. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any from PlOO.OO to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment.
right to alter either by subtraction or addition It is apparent that the law has no prescribed
the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no period or term for the imposable penalty of im
power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the prisonment. While a minimum and maximum
power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there
feu
tjj i
lii&ft
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATT7E DEPARTMENT 69

tai
is no equivalent provision for the penalty of im In his commentary on the Constitution of

prisonment, although both appear to be qualified the United States, Corwin wrote:
by the phrase "in the discretion of the court."
x x x At least three distinct ideas have
Private respondents contend that a judicial contributed to the development of the prin
determination of what Congress intended to be ciple that legislative power cannot be del
sat
the duration of the penalty of imprisonment egated. One is the doctrine of separation of
would be violative of the constitutional prohi powers: Why go to the trouble of separating
bition against undue delegation of legislative the three powers of government if they can
IM
power, that the absence of a provision on the straightway remerge on their own motion?
specific term of imprisonment constitutes that The second is the concept of due process of
penalty into a cruel and unusual form of pun laws which precludes the transfer of regula
ishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said tory function to private persons. Lastly, there
j^f£
Section 32 is unconstitutional. is the maxim of agency Delegatapotestas non
potest delegari. *°
We turn now to the argument of private An apparent exception to the general rule
respondents that the entire penal provision in forbidding the delegation of legislative authority
question should be invalidated as an "undue to the courts exists in cases where discretion is
delegation of legislative power, the duration of conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however,
M
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the that when the courts are said to exercise a discre
discretion of the court as if the latter were the tion, it-must be a mere legal discretion which is
legislative department of the government." exercised in discerning the course prescribed by
law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of
Petitioner counters that the discretion the court to follow.41
granted therein by the legislature to the courts to
determine the period of imprisonment is a mat So it was held by the Supreme Court of the
ter of statutory construction and not an undue United States that the principle of separation of
delegation of legislative power. It is contended powers is not violated by vesting in courts discre
that the prohibition against undue delegation tion as to the length of sentence or the amount
of legislative power is concerned only with the of fine between designated limits in sentencing
SJ
delegation of power to make laws and not to persons convicted of a crime.42
interpret the same. It is also submitted that In the case under consideration, the respon
Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the dent judge erroneously assumed that since the
discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, penalty of imprisonment has been provided for
but to choose which of the alternative penalties by the legislature, the court is endowed with
shall be imposed. the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
Respondent judge sustained these theses imprisonment. We cannot agree with this pos
of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of tulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting imprisonment where no points of reference have
in courts discretion as to the length of sentence been provided by the legislature. What valid del
or amount of fine between designated limits in egation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise
sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such of discretion to fix the length of service of a term
instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by of imprisonment which must be encompassed
the courts is not an attempt to use legislative within specific or designated limits provided by
power or to prescribe and create a law but is law, the absence of which designated limits will
an instance of the administration of justice and constitute such exercise as an undue delegation,
SjJ the application of existing laws to the facts of
particular cases."39What respondent judge obvi
<°Cited in BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ously overlooked is his own reference to penalties REPUBLIC OF THE PHnJPPINES, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., 73.
"between designated limits." "16 Am. Jur. 2d, 902.
aOhio ex rei. Lloyds v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, cited in
^Rollo, 98-99. 16 Am.Jur. 2d, 903.
if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, ity Commission's Order of November 6, 1990,
of legislative power. the Commission noted that the determination
of wages has generally involved two methods,
the "floor-wage" method and the "salary-ceiling-
On the foregoing considerations, and by method. We quote:
ml
virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprison Historically, legislation involving the
ment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, adjustment of the minimum wage made use
as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional. of two methods. The first method involves the
fixing of determinate amount that would be
added to the prevailing statutory minimum
wage. The other involves "the salary-ceiling-
G. Employees Confederation v. National method" whereby the wage adjustment is
Wages Commission applied to employees receiving a certain
G.R. No. 96169, September 24, 1991 denominated salary ceiling. The first method
was adopted in the earlier wage orders, while
SARMIENTO, J.: the latter method was used in R.A. Nos. 6640
The Employers Confederation of the Philip send 6727. Prior to this, the salary-ceiling-
pines (ECOP) is questioning the validity of Wage method was also used in no less than eleven
ia)
Order No. NCR-01-A dated October 2.3, 1990 of issuances mandating the grant of Cost-of-
the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity living allowances (P.D. Nos. 525,1123,1614,
Board, National Capital Region, promulgated 1634, 1678,1713 <md Wage Order Nos. 1, 2,
^ pursuant to the authority of Republic Act No. 3, 5 and 6). The shift from the first method
6727, "AN ACT TO RATIONALIZE WAGE to the second method was brought about by
POLICY DETERMINATION BY ESTABLISH labor disputes arising from wage distortions,
ING THE MECHANISM AND PROPER STAN a consequence of the implementation of the
DARDS THEREFORE, AMENDING FOR THE said wage orders. Apparently, the wage
PURPOSE ARTICLE 99 OF, AND INCORPO order provisions that wage distortions shall
RATING ARTICLES 120,121,122,123,124,126, be resolved through the grievance procedure
M»l AND 127 INTO, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. was perceived by legislators as ineffective in
442 AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS checking industrial unrest resulting from
THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, wage order implementations. With the estab
FIXING NEW WAGE RATES, PROVIDING lishment of the second method as a practice
WAGE INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DIS in minimum wage fixing, wage distortion
PERSAL TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND FOR disputes were minimized.
OTHER PURPOSES," was approved by the As the Commission noted, the increasing
President on June 9,1989. Aside from providing trend is toward the second mode, the salary-cap
new wage rates,43 the "Wage Rationalization Act" method, which has reduced disputes arising from
also provides, among other things, for various Re wage distortions (brought about, apparently, by
gional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards
foffil
the floor-wage method). Of course, disputes are
in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates
appropriate subjects of collective bargaining and
for all workers in the various regions, and for a
grievance procedures, but as the Commission
National Wages and Productivity Commission
observed and as we are ourselves agreed, bar
to review, among other functions, wage levels
gaining has helped very little in correcting wage
determined by the boards.
distortions. Precisely, Republic Act No. 6727 was-
ail
intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing
for full-time boards to police wages round-the-
The Court is inclined to agree with the Gov
ernment. In the National Wages and Productiv-
clock, and second, by giving the boards enough
powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of
\m the opinion that Congress meant the boards to
3R.A. No. 6727, Sec. 4(ca). be creative in resolving the annual question of
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATD7E'DEPARTMENT 71
wages without labor and management knock an unlawful act "of legislation. It- is true that
ing on the legislature's door at every turn. The wage-fixing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act
Court's opinion is that if Republic Act No. 6727 Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress
intended the boards alone to set floor wages, may delegate the power to fix rates provided that,
the Act would have no need for a board but an as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves suf
accountant to keep track of the latest consumer ficient standards. As#this Court has indicated,
price index, or better, would have Congress done it is impressed that the above-quoted standards
it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to are sufficient, and in the Hght of the floor-wage
the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the method's failure, the Court believes that the
matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board
of men and women bound by statutory standards. of the National Capital Region.
We quote:
Apparently, ECOP is of the mistaken impres
ART. 124. Standards/Criteria for Mini sion that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to "get
mum WageFixing. —The regional minimum the Government out of the industry" and leave
wages to be established by the Regional labor and management alone in deciding wages.
îiaii
Board shall be as nearly adequate as is eco The Court does not think that the law intended to
nomically feasible to maintain the minimum deregulate the relation between labor and capital
standards of living necessary for the health, for several reasons: (1) The Constitution calls
efficiency and general well-being of the em upon the State to protect the rights of workers
ployees within the framework of the national and promote their welfare; (2) the Constitution
economic and social development program. In also makes it a duty of the State "to intervene
the determination of such regional minimum when the common goal so demands" in regulating
wages, the Regional Board shall, among property and property relations; (3) the Charter
other relevant factors, consider the following: urges Congress to give priority to the enactment
of measures, among other things, to diffuse the
"(a) The demand for living wages;
wealth of the nation and to regulate the use of
"(b) Wage adjustment vis-a-vis the con property; (4) the Charter recognizes, the "just
sumer price index; share of labor in the fruits of production"; (5)
under the Labor Code, the State shall regulate
"(c) The cost of living and changes or
the relations between labor and management;
increases therein;
(6) under Republic Act No. 6727 itself, the State
"(d) The needs of workers and their is interested in seeing that workers receive fair
families; and equitable wages; and (7) the Constitution
"(e) The need to induce industries to is primarily a document of social justice, and
invest in the countryside; although it has recognized the importance of
the private sector, it has not embraced fully the
"(f) Improvements in standards ofliving; concept of laissez faire or otherwise, relied on
"(g) The prevailing wage levels; pure market forces to govern the economy; We
can not give to the Act a meaning or intent that
"(h) Fair return of the capital invested will conflict with these basic principles.
and capacity to pay of employers;
"(i) Effects of employment generation
NOTE: Recent cases.
and. family income; and
"(j) The equitable distribution of income The Supreme Court has continued to apply
and wealth along the imperatives of economic the same principles that have been developed
and social development."
in the past. Thus the standby authority given
to the President to increase the value added tax
The Court is not convinced that the Re rate in the Vat Law, R.A. No. 9337, was upheld
gional Board of the National Capital Region, in as an example of contingent legislation where
decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed the effectivity of the law is made to depend on
L
i&&ij
the verification by the executive of the existence ing statute itself46 that the penalty be provided
of certain conditions.44 by the statute itself,47 and that the regulation
i&tl be published.48
In Gerochi v. DENR,45 the power delegated
to the Energy Regulator Board to fix and impose NOTE: Separation of powers in local
a universal charge on electricity end-users was governments.
•&iftl
challenged as an undue delegation of the power
to tax. The Court, however, said that, since the It should be noted, however, that on the local
purpose of the law was not revenue generation level the principle of separation of powers does
but energy regulation, the power involved was not apply strictly between the executive and
more police power than the power to tax. More the law-making body. This was true under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions and this remains
over, the Court added that the power to tax can
be used for regulation. As to the validity of the true under the 1987 Constitution. Hence, a local
delegation to an executive agency, the Court was law-making agency may be given executive func
satisfied that the delegating law was complete tions. When what is given to a local legislative
in itself and the amount to be charged was made
body is executive power, the rules applicable to
the empowerment of administrative agencies
tag certain by the parameters set by the law itself.
also becomes applicable to the local law-making
The Attrition Act body. Thus, in People v. Vera49 the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a statute which left the
R.A. No. 9335, the Attrition Act of 1995,
activation of a probation system to the discretion
authorizes the BIR and BOC to give awards to
of the Provincial Board. Among the defects which
those who surpass the BIRtargets and to impose
the Court found in the statute was invalid delega
sanctions on those who fall short. The awards
tion of legislative power. The Court ruled that
are taken from the excess over target as set up
the principles for delegation to administrative
by a Board. The Rules for implementation are agencies had not been satisfied. But this, only
subject to review by an Oversight Committee because the Court said that for the purpose of
of Congress. The validity of the law was chal the statute involved "the provincial boards may
lenged on the ground that the delegation to the be regarded as administrative bodies."50
President of the power to set targets'was invalid.
The Constitution itself, of course, may create
However, the law is completeând has stan other exceptions to the rule on non-delegability.
dards for the President to follow. Revenue targets Thus, for instance, Article VI, Section 23(2),
are based on the original estimated revenue col authorizes Congress, in times of war and other
lection expected respectively of the BIR and the national emergency, to give to the President
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the "powers necessary and proper to carry out a de
DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the clared national policy," and again, Section 28(2)
President to Congress. Thus, the determination authorizes Congress to delegate the power to
Igj of revenue targets does not rest solely on the fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, ton
President. nage and wharfage dues, and other duties and
imposts.
. NOTE: Penal rules.
&fll
Since rules and regulations promulgated SEC. 2. THE SENATE SHALL BE COM
by administrative agencies pursuant to a valid POSED OF TWENTY-FOUR SENATORS
delegating statute have the force of law, their WHO SHALL BE ELECTED AT LARGE BY
violation may be punished as a penal offense. THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE PHILIP
However, for an administrative regulation to PINES, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
have the force of penal law it is necessary that
such violation be made a crime by the delegat 46United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).<
«7Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398, 404 (1944).
See also United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908); United
"Abakada Guro Party List Officers v. Executive Sec States v. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 608 (1914).
retary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005. Reconsidered 48Peoplev. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, 642 (1954).
October 18, 2005. 4965 Phil. 56 (1937).
"G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007. "Jd. at 116.
&&&J
SEC. 3. NO PERSON SHALL BE A of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge

SENATOR UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL- the Constitution.
£§£) BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accord
AND, ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS
AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, ingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, A REGIS hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic
TERED VOTER, AND A RESIDENT OF THE that if a law or an administrative rule violates
PHILIPPINES FOR NOT LESS THAN TWO any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE null and void and has no effect. The Constitution
liijiij
DAY OF THE ELECTION. is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Con
A. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous stitution. In the discharge of their defined func
Drugs Board tions, the three departments of government have
G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008 no choice but to yield obedience to the commands
of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
In these kindred petitions, the constitu must be observed.
tionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it re It may of course be argued, in defense of the
quires mandatory drug testing of candidates for validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provi
public office, students of secondary and tertiary sion does not expressly state that non-compliance
schools, officers and employees of public and with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying
private offices, and persons charged before the factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among candidacy. This argument may be accorded plau
other personalities, is put ir issue. sibility if the drug test requirement is optional.
But the particular section of. the law, without
exception, made drug-testing on those covered
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
consequences for not adhering to the statutory
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
command. And since the provision deals with
public office in connection with the May 10,2004
candidates for public office, it stands to reason
synchronized national and local elections....
that the adverse consequence adverted to can
only refer to and revolve around the election and
the assumption of public office of the candidates.
Pimentel Petition
Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon
of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 without meaning and effect whatsoever.
illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, sub SEC. 4. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
^J
ject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, THE SENATORS SHALL BE SIX YEARS
a candidate for senator needs only to meet AND SHALL COMMENCE, UNLESS OTH
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI ERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON
of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.
residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not NO SENATOR SHALL SERVE FOR
possess any other qualification to run for senator MORE THAN TWO CONSECUTIVE TERMS.
and be voted upon and elected as member of the VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OF
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or FICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL
otherwise modify these qualification standards, NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUP
as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force TION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SER-
tt&A
VICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH 1. Sectoral representation and party-lisi
HE WAS ELECTED. representation.
SEC. 5. (1) THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN There are two related but distinct concepts
TATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT found in Section 5: sectoral representation and
MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY party-list or proportional representation. Both
MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED are important for a full understanding of the
BY LAW,WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM provision.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED Sectoral representation, was explained by
AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND Commissioner Villacorta thus:51
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF The idea of giving meaningful repre
THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND sentation, particularly to the farmers and
ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PRO^ the workers, would be our Commission's
GRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS humble gesture of extending protection to
PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED the interests of these groups which are not
THROUGH A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF adequately attended to in normal legislative
REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL, deliberations. Sectoral representation is a
AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANI necessity, especially in these times when
ZATIONS. the people are giving the democratic process
another chance, ifnot its last chance. Provid
(2) THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTA ing for mechanisms which would enhance the
TIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER chances of marginalized sectors in electing
CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF their Representatives to the National Assem
REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE bly will keep their hopes alive in the principle
UNDER THE PARTY-LIST. FOR THREE of peaceful change. This imperative becomes
CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATI more urgent when this Commission recently
FICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE- adopted a bicameral system of legislature.
HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO We have heard apprehensions that the Upper
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL House might be monopolized by the moneyed
BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED" BY LAW, BY sectors and might protect vested property
SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE interests....
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIG
ENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES,WOM
Party-list representation was elucidated by
iii>
Commissioner Monsod, its main sponsor:52
EN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS
AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT I would like to make a distinction from
iiiiii)
THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. the beginning that the proposal for the party
list system is not synonymous with that of
(3) EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
the sectoral representation. Precisely, the
SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTI
party-list system seeks to avoid the dilemma
CABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT AND
of choice of sectors and who constitute the
ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY
members of the sectors. In making the pro
WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST TWO
posal on the party list system, we were made
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, OR EACH
aware of the problems precisely cited by
PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will
REPRESENTATIVE.
have reserved seats....
&i*a
(4) WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOW Under the party list system, there are no
ING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS,
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, labor
THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAP ers and farmers can form a sectoral party or
PORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DIS
TRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS "Zd. at 84-85,146-147.
PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION. 62Jd. at 85-86.
j£g>
a sectoral organization that will then register but at the same time it is meant to motivate
and present candidates of their party. How them to strengthen their organizations so that
do the mechanics go? they will eventually be able to compete in the
Essentially, under the party-list system, regular party-list system three consecutive
every voter has two votes, so there is no terms after the operation ofthe party-list system
commences.55 In the concrete this would mean
discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. that by the elections of 1998 the sectors would
That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will have to compete in the party-list system of the
electoral process.56
j&ffii
be asked: What party or organization or co
alition do you wish to be represented in the The original list of sectors to be represented
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of included only labor, peasant, urban poor, and
the parties, organizations or coalitions that youth sectors. There was a recognition, however,
•$$)
have been registered with the COMELEC that these sectors could further be subdivided
and are entitled to be put in that list. This by law into sub-sectors.57 Eventually, two other
can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a sectors — indigenous cultural communities and
national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a re women — were added,58 and also "such other sec
gional party in Mindanao. One need not be tors as may be provided by law."69And Commis
« farmer to say that he wants the farmers' sioner Rigos added: "except the religious sector."60
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any But, upon question by Commissioner Villacorta,
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of Rigos explained that a member of the religious
the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate sector may become a sectoral representative but
the votes that had been garnered by each not as representing the religious sector."1
party or each organization — one does not
have to be a political party and register in
Originally, the manner of choosing the
sectoral representatives during the transition
order to participate as a party — and count
the votes and from there derive the percent
period was to be left to ordinary legislation.62
Eventually, however, the Constitutional Com
age of the votes that had been cast in favor
mission added a supplemental alternative which
of a party, organization or coalition.
became Article XVIII, Section 7: "Until a law is
Much of the discussion on the party-list passed*, the President may fill by appointment
system revolved around the question of how from a list of nominees by the respective sectors
sectors, that is, especially disadvantaged sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation
of society, should be represented. One view was in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this
that sectoral parties or organizations should be Constitution."63 Should the President appoint
assured reserved seats in the House; another such sectoral representatives, their term would
view was that they should compete in the party- be that found in the Constitution. A subsequent
iijiijp list system just like any other party or organi law passed by Congress would not oust those
zation.53 The desire to give them reserved seats appointed by the President.64
was born of the recognition of the inability of the
It should be noted, however, that the text
disadvantaged sectors to compete in the political
says "may fill by appointment." The use of the
process.54 In the end, the Commission approved a
word "may," which is permissive, was deliberate
compromise: "For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives"
"Id. at 567-570, 577-582.
will be reserved for sectoral representatives who
"Id at 585-586.
will be chosen "as provided by law." "Id. 573.
"Id. 574.
This compromise recognizes the handicap • "Id. at 587.
under which disadvantaged sectors operate "Id.
81M-at589.
Ârticle VI, Section 5(2).
"Id. at 252-259; 560-583. otV RECORD 328-338.
uId. at 561-567. **Id. 332.
3i)
in order to give to the President ample leeway.63 Although the Constitution does not s<
However, the President was not free to choose down the mechanics for the operation of tt
L any one he pleases. He or she must choose from system but leaves these to ordinary legislatioj
"a list of nominees by the respective sectors;" but the 1986 Constitutional Commission had a clef
if the President did not like the list of nominees, understanding of the rough outlines of how tt
%1/tii
she could ask for another list or may decide not system should operate.69 Parties or organizatior
to appoint anyone.66 desiring to participate in the party-list systej
register themselves together with a list of th
Must the sectoral representative appointed
party's or organization's list of nominees fc
•iiityl by the President be confirmed by the Commis
party-list representatives. The maximum nun
sion on Appointment? This was hot discussed in
ber will be prescribed by law and the nominee
the Constitutional Commission because sectoral
will be arranged by the party or organizatio
representation was approved before the commis
igj according to an order of priorities. In every ele«
sion had done its work on the Commission on
tion for the House of Representatives, each vote
Appointments. When later the matter went to
casts two votes: one for the district representativ
the Supreme Court, the Court ruled in Quintos-
of his or her choice and another for the party c
!is5 Deles v. Commission on Appointments6"1 that
organization of his or her choice. .The votes cas
confirmation was needed. TJie Court reasoned
for'the parties and organizations are totale
that, since the sectoral representative would be,
nationwide. The number of party-list seats
under Article XVIII. Section 7, appointed by the
party or organization will get will depend on th
President, he came under Article VII, Section
number of votes it receives in proportion to th
16 which includes among those needing confir
total number of votes cast nationwide.70
mation "other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution."
2. Cases on party-list.
In sum, therefore, Section 5 provides two
A. Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec
regimes: a temporary regime of sectoral repre
G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000
sentation — for three consecutive .terms >— and
a permanent party-list or proportional represen
tation regime. The temporary sectoral represen PANGANIBAN, J.:
tation regime was an answer to the recognized To determine the winners in a Philippine
disadvantage of the marginalized sectors. At the style party-list election, the Constitution an«
same time it was a signal to these sectors that Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least fou
within a period of three congressional terms they inviolable parameters. These are:
should prepare to compete with other organiza
tions and traditional political parties in a system First, the twenty percent allocation — th
of proportional representation that would treat combined number of all party-list congressmei
parties and organization on the same level. shall not exceed twenty percent of the tota
membership of the House of Representatives
Those qualified to participate in the party-list including those elected under the party list.
system are "registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations" in the manner Second, the two percent threshold — onl;
explained by Commissioner Monsod. The party- those parties garnering a minimum of two per
list representatives will constitute "twenty per cent of the total valid votes cast for the party-lis
centum of the total number of representatives system are "qualified" to have a seat in the Housi
iaa)
including those under the party-list." Thus, un of Representatives;

der a total membership of 250, a fully/operative Third, the three-seat limit — each quali
party-list system would mean 200 district rep fied party, regardless of the number of votes i
resentatives and 50 party-list representatives.68
65Jd. at 333-336. 69The Commission was also quite aware of the practica
iati aM 338. difficulties which the system could encounter. E.g., see I
67177SCRA 259 (1989). RECORD 571-572.
"V RECORD 664-666. ™Id. at 253-254.
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of group interests in the House ofRepresentatives

three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two by enhancing their chances to compete for and
additional seats. win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
Fourth, proportional representation — the the simplest scheme possible." (emphasis ours.)
additional seats which a qualified party is en The requirements for entitlement toa party-
titled to shall be computed "in proportion to their list seat in the. House are prescribed bythis law
total number of votes." (RA 7941) in this wise:
Because the'Comelec violated these legal "SECTION 11. Number of Party-List
parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be Representatives. —The party-list represen
struck down for having been issued in grave tatives shall constitute twenty per centum
abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to (20%) of the total number of the members of
«&p enforce and administer election-related laws. It theHouse ofRepresentatives including those
has no power to contravene or amend them. Nei under the party-list.
ther does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress. For purposes of the May 1998 elections
the first five (5)major political parties on the
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regula basis of party representation in the House
tions", methods and formulas to implement elec of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
toy tion laws — not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct Congress of the Philippines shall not be en
or circumvent them. titled to participate in the party-list system.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the In determining the allocation of seats
party-list system — a normal feature of parlia for the second vote, the following procedure
mentary democracies — into our presidential shall be observed:
form of government, modified by unique Filipino
statutory parameters, presents new paradigms (a) The parties, organizations, and coali
s^)
and novel questions, which demand innovative tions shall be ranked from the highest to the
legal solutions convertible into mathematical lowest based on the number of votes they
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on garnered during the elections.
^$e) time-tested jurisprudence. (b) The parties, organizations, and coali
tions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system
Complying with its constitutional duty to shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
provide by law the "selection or election" ofparty- That those garnering more than two percent
list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 (2%) ofthe votes shall be entitled to addition
on March 3,1995. Under this statute's policy dec al seats in proportion to their total number
laration, the State shall "promote proportional of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
representation in the election of representatives organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
to the House of Representatives through a party- not more than three (3) seats."
list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Com-
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens be elec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
longing to marginalized and underrepresented prescribing the rules and regulations governing
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack the election ofparty-list representatives through
well-defined political constituencies but who the party-list system.
could contribute to the formulation and enact
Si) ment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
The Issues
the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the The Court believes, and so holds, that the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and main question of how to determine the winners
s#J
open party system in order to attain the broad of the subject party-list election can be settled
est possible representation of party, sectoral or by addressing the following issues:
fcj
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party- Clearly, the Constitution makes the numbe
list representatives mentioned in Section 5(2), of district representatives the determinant in ai
lli)
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is riving at the number of seats allocated for party
it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty pe
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be centum of the total number of representative
filled up completely and all the time? including those under the party-list." .. .
2. Are the two percent threshold require This means that any increase in the numbe
ment and the three-seat limit provided in Section of district representatives, as may be provide*
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? by law, will necessarily result in a correspond
ing increase in the number of party-list seats..
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirma
tive, how should the additional seats of a quali The problematic question, however, is this
^J
fied party be determined? Does the Constitution require all such allocate*
seats to be filled up all the time and under al
The Court's Ruling circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
The Constitution simply states that "[t]h<

First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is i
The pertinent provision of the Constitution ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be fillec
on the composition of the House of Representa up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its
tives reads as follows: prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, bj
which it prescribed that aparty, organization oi
"SECTION 5. (1) The House of Repre
coalition participating in the party-list electior
sentatives shall be composed of not more must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
than two hundred and fifty members, unless cast for the system in order to qualify for a seal
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected in the House of Representatives.
from legislative districts appprtioned among
:$$s
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number We'rule that a simple reading of Section 5.
of their respective inhabitants, and on the Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, equally simple message that Congress was vested
and those who, as provided by law, shall be with the broad power to define and prescribe the
elected by a party-list, system of registered mechanics of the party-list system of representa
national, regional, and sectoral parties or tion. The Constitution explicitly sets down only
organizations. the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list
(2) The party-list representatives shall
representatives.
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those In the exercise of its constitutional preroga
under the party-list. For three consecutive tive, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
terms after the ratification of this Consti Congress declared therein a policy to promote
WtJ
tution, one half of the seats allocated to "proportional representation" in the election
party-list representatives shall be filled, as of party-list representatives in order to enable
provided by law, by selection or election from Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and un
i%|
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous derrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
cultural communities, women, youth, and that would benefit them. It however deemed it
such other sectors as may be provided by necessary to require parties, organizations and
^) law, except the religious sector." coalitions participating in the system to obtain
at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to
liij
a party-list seat. Those garnering more than of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who
this percentage could have "additional seats has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets
in proportion to their total number of votes." a seat. There are about 20 million who. cast
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or their votes in the last elections. Two-and-
coalition can have more than three seats in the a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
House of Representatives... Anybody who has a, constituency of 500,000
votes nationwide deserves a seat in the As
sembly. If we bring that down to two percent,
Considering the foregoing statutory require we are talking about 400,000 votes. The aver
ii)
ments, it will be shown presently that Section age vote per family is three. So, here we are
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not manda talking about 134,000 families. We believe
tory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list that there are many sectors who will be able
seats in Congress. to get seats in the Assembly because many
of them have memberships of over 10,000.
On the contention that a strict application
In effect* that is the operational implication
of the two percent threshold may result in a
of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say
is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat
that the prerogative to determine whether to
system. We believe that it is our job to open
adjust or change this percentage requirement
up the system and that we should not have
rests in Congress. Our task now, as should
within that system a reserve seat. We think
have been the Comelec's, is not to find fault in
that people should organize, should-work
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely
hard, and should earn their seats within
scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an in
that system.''
novative mathematical formula that can, as far
as practicable, implement it within the context The two percent threshold is consistent
of the actual election process. not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very es
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as
sence of "representation." Under a republican or
well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,
representative state, all government authority
is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent
emanates from the people, but is exercised by
or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitu
representatives chosen by them. But to have
tional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void
meaningful representation, the elected persons
by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid
must have the mandate of a sufficient number
command of sovereignty that must be respected
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature features
and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of
the party-list system, the result might be the
the rule of law.
proliferation of small groups which are inca
Second Issue: pable ofcontributing significant legislation, and
which might even pose a threat to the stability
In imposing a two percent threshold, Con
of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
gress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
apportioned according to "the number of their
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
respectiveinhabitants, and on the basis ofa uni
number of constituents deserving of representa
form and progressive ratio"to ensure meaningful
tion are actually represented in Congress. This
local representation.
intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on
\$g} the proposed bill. .. Allin all, we hold that the statutory provision
on this two percent requirement is precise and
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitu crystalline. When the law is clear, the function
tion had in mind a minimum-vote requirement,
^)
ofcourtsis simple application, not interpretation
the specification of which they left to Congress
or circumvention.
to properly determine. Constitutional Commis
sioner Christian S. Monsod explained: The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable Animportant consideration in adopting the

to modifications in the minimum percentage party-Ust system is to promote and encourage a
mi
igi j
multi-party system of representation. Again, we ber of votes cast for the party-list system is then
quote Commissioner Monsod: determined. All those that garnered at least two
W0 percent of the total votes cast have an assured
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just or guaranteed seat in the House of Representa
want to say that we suggested or proposed tives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than
the party-list system because we wanted to two percent of the votes shall be entitled to ad
open up the political system to a pluralistic ditional seats in proportion to their total number
society through a multiparty system. But we of votes." The problem is how to distribute ad
also wanted to avoid the problems of mechan ditional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind
ics and operation in the implementation of the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
a concept that has very serious shortcom
ings of classification and of double or triple One Additional Seat Per Two
votes. We are for opening up the system, Percent Increment
and we would like very much for the sectors
to be there. That is why one of the ways to One proposed formula is to allocate one ad
do that is to put a ceiling on the number of ditional seat for every additional proportion of
representatives from any single party that the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent
can sit within the 50 allocated under the vote Requirement for the first seat. Translated
party-list system. This way, we will open in figures, a party that wins at least six percent
it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe of the total votes cast still be entitled to three
regional groups, to earn their seats among seats; another party that gets four percent will
the fifty...." be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This
Consistent with the Constitutional Com proposal has the advantage of simplicity and
mission's pronouncements, Congress set the ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however,
seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, when the parties get very lop-sided votes — for
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the
having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of vari C, 6 percent. Under the method just described,
ous interest-representations into the legislature; Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B. to
thus, no single group, no matter'how large its 5 seats and Party C, to .3 seats. Considering the
membership, would dominate the party-list three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties
seats, if not the entire House. will each uniformly have„three seats only. We
We shall not belabor this point, because the
would then have the spectacle of a party garner
validity of the three seat limit is not seriously ing two or more times the number of votes ob
challenged in these consolidated cases. tained by another, yet getting the same number
of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will
Third Issue: Method ofAllocating
be contravened and the law rendered nugatory
Additional Seats
by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
Having determined that the twenty percent discarded it.
seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having
upheld the constitutionality of the two percent
vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
The Legal and Logical Formula
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method
for the Philippines
of determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions It is now obvious that the Philippine style
â)
are entitled to. The very first step — there is no party-list system is a unique paradigm which
dispute on this —is to rank all the participating demands an equally unique formula. In craft
parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter ing a legally defensible and logical solution to
collectively referred to as "parties") according to determine the number of additional seats that a
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of qualified party is entitled to, we need to review
their respective votes as against the total num the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in top Prologue, they be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
are as follows: exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
First, the twenty percent allocation — the
combined number of all party-list congressmen For example,.the first party received
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled
membership of the House of Representatives, to two additional seat&. Another qualified party
including those elected under the party list: which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled
to the same number of seats, since it garnered
Second, the two percent threshold — only
Sjijf
only fifty percent of the votes won by the first
those parties garnering a minimum of two per
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes
cent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
relative to that of the first party whose number
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of seats has already been predetermined, the
of Representatives. second party should be given less than that to
Third, the three-seat limit — each quali which the first one is entitled.
fied party, regardless of the number of votes it The other qualified parties will always be
m actuaUy obtained, is entitled to a maximum of allotted less additional seats than the first party
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties
additional seats. and the first party will always be less than 1:1,
Fourth, proportional representation — the (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
additional seats which a qualified party is en rounding off, because there is no such thing as
titled to shall be computed "in proportion to their a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary round
total number of votes." ing off could result in a violation of the twenty
w$
percent allocation. An academic mathematical
The problem, as already stated, is to find a demonstration of such incipient violation is not
way to translate "proportional representation" necessary because the present set of facts, given
into a mathematical formula that will not contra the number of qualified parties and the voting
vene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned percentages obtained, will definitely not end up
parameters. in such constitutional contravention.
After careful deliberation, we now explain The Court has previously ruled in Guingona,
such formula, step by step. Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, October 20,1992;
Step One. There is no dispute among the pe 219 SCRA 329, March 1,1993, that a fractional
titioners, the public and the private respondents, membership cannot be converted into a whole
membership of one when it would, in effect,
as well as the members of this Court, that the
deprive another party's fractional membership.
initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
It would be a violation of the constitutional
organizations and coalitions from the highest to
mandate of proportional representation. We said
the lowest based on the number of votes they each
further that "no party can claim more than what
received. Then the ratio for each party is com
it is entitled to ..."
puted by dividing its votes by the total votes cast
for all the parties participating in the system. In any case, the decision on whether to round
All parties with at least two percent of the total off the fractions is better left to the legislature.
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these Since Congress did not provide for it in the pres
parties shall be considered in the computation of ent law, neither will this Court. The Supreme
additional seats. The party receiving the highest Court does not make the law; it merely applies
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to it to a given set of facts.
as the "first" party.
Formula for Determining Additional
Step Two. The next step is to determine the
Seats for the First Party
number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other Now, how do we determine the.number of
parties. Since the distribution is based on pro seatsthefirstpartyis entitledto? Theonly basis
portional representation, the number of seats to given by thelaw is that a partyreceiving at least
''/$$
two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to the party receiving six percent, additional seats
one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to in proportion to those of the first party.
receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's Formula for Additional Seats of Other
number of seats and so on... Qualified Parties
la
If the proportion of votes received by the first Step Three The next step is to solve for the
party without rounding it off is equal to at least number of additional seats that the other quali
six percent of the total valid votes cast for all fied parties are entitled to, based on proportional
m the party list groups, then the first party shall representation. The formula is encompassed by
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of the following complex fraction:
three seats overall. If the proportion of votes
without a rounding off is equal to or greater than
sgi
four percent, but less than six percent, then the In simplified form, it is written as follows:
first party shall have one additional or a total of
two seats. And if the proportion is less than four No. of votes of
i jjM percent, then the first party shall not be entitled Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned x seats allocated to
to any additional seat. party No. of votes of
We adopted this six percent bench mark, be the first party
first party (APEC)
|0 cause the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise,
it would prevent the allotment of more than the Thus, in the case ofABA, the additional num
total number of available seats, such as in an ber of seats it would be entitled to is computed
^)
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for as follows:
the highest rank and are thus entitled to three No. of votes of
seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats Additional seats ABA No. of additional
i^l
to which all the parties are entitled may exceed for concerned x seats allocated to
the maximum number of party-list seats reserved party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
in the House of Representatives. /
ffrj-l Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled
to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
Note that the above formula will be ap number of votes for the other party to that for
plicable only in determining the number of the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result
il&j
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It would be zero additional seat for each of the other
cannot be used to determine the number of ad qualified parties as well.
ditional seats of the other qualified parties. As
explained earlier, the use of the same formula The above formula does not give an exact
for all would contravene the proportional rep-" mathematical representation of the number of
resentation parameter. For example, a second additional seats to be awarded since, in order
party obtains six percent of the total number of to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
ffi>
votes cast. According to the above formula, the whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the
said parts would be entitled to two additional actual mathematical proportions are not whole
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons
if the first party received a significantly higher explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to result in the awarding of a number of seats in
grant it the same number of seats as the second excess.of that provided by the law. Furthermore,
K«J party would violate the statutory mandate of Obtaining absolute proportional representation
proportional representation, since a party getting is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
only six percent of the votes will have an equal' a maximum of two additional slots. An increase
number of representatives as the one obtaining in the maximum number of additional represen
twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is tatives a party may be entitled to would result
to grant the first party a total of three seats; and in a more accurate proportional representation.
fc&llj-lj
But the law itself has set the limit: only two ad "3. Whether or not the party-list system is
ditional seats. Hence, we need to work within exclusive to 'marginalizedand underrepresented'
ffffii such extant parameter. sectors and organizations.
The net result of the foregoing formula for "4. Whether or not the Comelec committed
determining additional seats happily coincides grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Om
with the present number of incumbents; namely, nibus Resolution No. 3?85."
two for the first party (APEC) and one each for
the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we The Court's Ruling
affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different Second Issue: Participation
formula and methodology. of Political Parties
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW La
our methodology for being too strict. We say, bor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
however, that our formula merely translated the parties in the party-list system is the most ob
Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical jectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."
equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wis For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
dom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less participation of "major political parties." On the
strict;" then the formula will also be modified other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General,
&fy\
to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers. like the impleaded political parties, submits that
the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. It
argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open
&$)
B. Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001 parties or organizations."
We now rule on this issue. Under the Con
PANGANIBAN, J.:
stitution and RA 7941, private respondents can
The Case not be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus' provides that members of the House of Repre
Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission sentatives may "be elected through a party-list
on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This system of registered national, regional, and
iiî'Ji Resolution approved the participation of 154 or sectoral parties or organizations."
ganizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article
Petitioners seek the disqualification of private IX(C) of the Constitution, political parties may
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list be registered under the party-list system.
system was intended to benefit the marginal
ized and underrepresented; not the mainstream During the deliberations in the Constitu
political parties, the non-marginalized or over- tional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
represented. pointed out that the participants in the party-
list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral
$&J party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a
Issues: regional party in Mindanao." This was also clear
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the from the following exchange between Comms.
Court directed the parties to address the follow Jaime Tadeo and Bias Ople:
ing issues:
"MR.TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay

as) "2. Whether or not political parties may pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO.. PDP-
participate in the party-list elections. Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
™j
^ffet ]i
MR. OPLE. Indubitably, therefore, political parties —

even the major ones — may participate in the
ff)
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party party-list elections.
list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Third Issue: Marginalized
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that and Underrepresented
the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to That political parties may participate in
parties that consistently place third or fourth the party-list elections does not mean, however,
in congressional district elections to win a seat that any political party — or any organization or
in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this group for that matter —may do so.The requisite
is to open the system. In the past elections, we character of these parties or organizations must
found out that there were certain groups or par be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
ties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they 7941. Section 5...
were always third or, fourth place in each of the

<nj
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly.
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the
But this way, they would have five or six repre
provision,a distinguished member ofthe Consti
sentatives in the Assembly even if they would
tutional Commission declared that the purpose
ii> not win individually in legislative districts. So,
of the party-list provision was to give "genuine
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose
power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when
and objectives of the party-list system." the provision was discussed, he exultantly an
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also pro nounced: "On this first day of August 1986, we
vides for "a party-list system of registered nation shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our
al, regional and sectoral parties or organizations national history, by giving"genuine power to our
or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly people in the legislature."
states that a "party" is "either a political party The foregoing provision on the party-list
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, inter
to the point, the law defines "political part}'" as spersed with phrases like "in accordance with
"an organized group of citizens advocating an law" or 'jas may be provided bylaw"; it wasthus
ideology or platform, principles and policies for up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
the general conduct of government and which, objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941
i^y
as the most immediate means of securing their was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in
adoption, regularly nominates and supports this wise:
certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office." "SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. —
The State shall promote proportional repre
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no sentation in the election of representatives
doubt as to the participation of political parties to the House of Representatives through a
in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent party-list system of registered national, re
provision below: gional and sectoral parties or organizations
XXX XXX XXX or coalitions thereof; which will enable Fili
iiiiii pino citizens belonging to marginalized and
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, underrepresented sectors, organizations and
the first five (5) major political parties on the parties, and who lack well-defined political
basis of party representation in the House constituencies but who could contribute to
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth the formulation and enactment of appropri
Congress of the Philippines shall not be en ate legislation that will benefit the nation
titled to participate in the party-list system. as a whole, to become members of the House
XXX XXX XXX
of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to at Finally, "lack ofwell-defined constituency]"
tain the broadest possible representation refers to the absence of a traditionally identifi
of party, sectoral or group interests in the able electoral group, like voters of a congres
House ofRepresentatives by enhancing their sional district or territorial unit of government.
chances to compete for and win seats in the Rather, it points again to those with disparate
;*jj
legislature, and shall provide the simplest interests identified wjjth the "marginalized or
scheme possible." underrepresented."
TheMarginalized and Underrepresented: to In the end, the role ofthe Comelec is to see to
Become Lawmakers Themselves it that onlythose Filipinoswhoare "marginalized
and underrepresented" become members of Con
The foregoing provision mandates a state gress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
policy of promoting proportional representation
t^J by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, The intent ofthe Constitution is clear: to give
which will "enable" the election to the House of genuine power to the people, not only by giving
Representatives of Filipino citizens, more law to those who have less in life, but more
so by enabling them to become veritable lawmak
•M
1. .who belong to marginalized and under- ers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
represented sectors, organizations and parties; policyofthe implementing law, we repeat, is like
and "
wise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging
iiiij)
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
Organizations and parties,..., to become mem
3. who could contribute to the formulation
bers of the House of Representatives." Where the
and enactment of appropriate legislation that language of the law is clear, it must be applied
will benefit the nation as a whole.
according to its express terms.
The key words in this policyare "proportional
The marginalized and underrepresented
representation," "marginalized and underrepre
sectors to be represented under the party-list
sented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituen
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,
cies."
which states:
"Proportional representation" here does not
iiiiii
refer to the number of people in a particular dis "SECTION 5. Registration. — Any or
trict, because the party-list election is national ganized group of persons may register as a
in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical party, organization or coalition for purposes
^j strength in a distressed or oppressed group. of the party-list system by filing with the
Rather, it refers to the representation of the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
"marginalized and underrepresented" as exem before the election a petition verified by its
plified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the president or secretary stating its desire to
law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban participate in the party-list system as a
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, national, regional or sectoral party or orga
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas nization or a coalition of such parties or orga
m workers, and professionals." nizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government,
However, it is not enough for the candidate to list of officers, coalition agreement and other
claim representation of the marginalized and un relevant information as the COMELEC may
derrepresented, because representation is easy require; Provided, That the sector shall in
to claim and to feign. The party-list organization clude labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
or party must factually and truly represent the indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
marginalized and underrepresented constituen handicapped, women, youth, veterans, Over
cies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the seas workers, and professionals."
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging While the enumeration of marginalized and
^\ to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
organizations and parties." demonstrates the clear intent of the law that
&&J

a)
not all, sectors can be represented under the While the business moguls and the mega-rich
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, thej
- of statutory construction that words employed are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.
in a statute are interpreted in connection with, for the stark reality is that their economic clout
and their meaning is ascertained by reference engenders political power more awesome than
Mfi
to, the words and the phrases with which they their numerical limitation. Traditionally, politi
are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of cal power does not necessarily emanate from the
a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely tc
specialized by those in immediate association. arise more directly from the number and amount
of one's bank accounts.
The Party-List System Desecrated It is ironic, therefore, that the marginal
by the OSG Contentions ized and underrepresented in our midst are the
o
fel
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and
policy, the Office ofthe Solicitor General submits infirmity. It was for them that the party-list sys
that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participa tem was enacted — to give them not only genuine
'S
tion in the party-list system to the marginalized hope, but genuine power; to give them the oppor
and underrepresented sectors of society." In fact, tunity to be.elected and to represent the specific
it contends that any party or group that is not concerns of their constituencies; and simply, to
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
aSifll
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted larger affairs ofthe State. In its noblest sense, the
during the Oral Argument that even an organiza party-list system truly empowers the masses and
tion representing the super rich of Forbes Park ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
^
or Dasmarinas Village could participate in the invites those marginalized and underrepresented
in the past — the farm hands, the fisher folk,
party-list elections.
the urban poor, even thos'e in the underground
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes movement — to come out and participate, as
the position ofthe Office ofthe Solicitor General indeed many of them came out and participated
(OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks during the last elections. The State cannot now
to enable certain Filipino citizens — specifically disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
those belonging to marginalized and underrep desecrating this social justice vehicle.
resented sectors, organizations and parties — to
Because the marginalized and underrepre
be elected to the House of Representatives. The
sented had not been able to win in the congres
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system
sional district elections normally dominated
is not exclusive to the marginalized and under-
by traditional politicians and vested groups,
represented disregards the clear statutory policy.
percent ofthe seats in the House of Representa
Its claim that even the super-rich and overrep-
|y|^ tives were set aside for the party list system. In
resented can participate desecrates the spirit of arguing that even those sectors who normally
the party-list system. controlled SO percent of the seats in the House
Indeed, the law crafted to address the pe could participate in the party-list elections for
culiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sec between the congressional district elections and
i&J
tors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's the party-list elections.
position to treat them similarly defies reason and As earlier noted, the purpose ofthe party-list
common sense. In contrast, and with admirable provision was to open up the system, in order to
candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted enhance the chance of sectoral groups and orga
during the Oral Argument that a group of bank nizations to gain representation in the House of
ers, industrialists and sugar planters could not Representatives through the simplest scheme
join the party-list system as representatives of possible. Logic shows that the system has been
their respective sectors. opened to those who have never gotten a foothold
gal
&m
within it — those who cannot otherwise win in First, the political party, sector, organization
regular elections and who therefore need the or coalition must represent the marginalized and
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, underrepresented groups identified in Section
it would be illogical to open the system to those 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show —
who have long been within it — those privileged through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
sectors that have long dominated the congres by laws, history, platform of government and
ffi^
sional district elections. track record — that it represents and seeks to up
lift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
The import ofthe open party-list system may Verily, majority of its membership should belong
be more vividly understood when compared to to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
a student dormitory "open house," which by its it must demonstrate that in a conflict ofinterests,
nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of of such sectors.
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outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who
can enter the dormitory even without such spe Second, while even major political parties
cial privilege. In the same vein, the open party- are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Con
list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot stitution to participate in the party-list system,
tJMi
get elected through regular elections otherwise; they must comply with the declared statutory
it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepre- policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
sented who already fill the ranks of Congress. marginalized and underrepresented sectors ...
to be elected to the House of Representatives."
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and In other words, while they are not disqualified
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats merely on the ground that they are political
under the party-list system would not only dilute, parties, they must show, however, that they
iii^j
but also prejudice the chance ofthe marginalized represent the interests of the marginalized and
and underrepresented, contrary to the intention underrepresented. . .
ofthe law to enhance it. The party-list system is
jffi$) a tool for the benefit ofthe underprivileged; the Fourth, a party or an organization must not
law could not have given the same tool to others, be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
to the prejudice ofthe*intended beneficiaries. enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the
party-list system to be sullied and prostituted "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, or
by those who are neither marginalized nor ganization or association organized for religious
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of purposes;
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means
permeate every discussion ofthe qualification of to seek its goal;
political parties and other organizations under
<%> the party-list system. (3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
Guidelines for Screening Party-List organization, whether directly or through any
Participants of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to
&gj remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws,
to determine, after summary evidentiary hear rules or regulations relating to elections;
ings, whether the 154 parties and organizations (6) It declares untruthful statements in its
allowed to participate in the party-list elections petition;
comply with the requirements of the law. In (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay
year; or
down the following guidelines, culled from the
law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
in its work. preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
igj
^j
per centum (2%) ofthe votes cast under the party- attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
list system in the two (2) preceding election's for shall be allowed to continue in office until the
the constituency in which it has registered." expiration of his term.
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which Seventh, not only the candidate party or
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or organization must represent marginalized and
failure to comply with election laws and regula underrepresented sectors; so also must its nomi
tions. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, nees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
which states that the party-list system seeks to nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong
"eriable Filipino citizens belonging to marginal to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
ized and underrepresented sectors, organizations organizations and parties." Surely, the interests
and parties... to become members ofthe House of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
of Representatives." A party or an organization, retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
therefore, that does not comply with this policy the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
must be disqualified. otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
Fifth, the party or organization must not genuine representation to the marginalized and
be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an underrepresented.
entity funded or assisted by, the government. Eighth, as previously discussed, while lack
By the very nature of the party-list system, the ing a well-defined political constituency, the
iiliil) party or organization must be a group of citizens, nominee must likewise be able to contribute to
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. the formulation and enactment of appropriate
It must be independent of the government. The legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
participation of the government or its officials Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicam
iM
in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not eral committee proceedings that "the nominee
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also of a party, national or regional, is not going to
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable represent a particular district..."
MtA citizens belonging to marginalized and underrep
resented sectors and organizations to be elected
to the House of Representatives.
•iAt\
Sixth, the party must not only comply with C. Ang Bagong Bayam-OFW Labor Party,
the requirements of the law; its nominees must .et al. v. Comelec, et al.
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as
G.k No. 147589, June 25, 2003
follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
SECTION 9. Qualifications ofParty-List Before the Court are Motions for proclama
Nominees. — No person shall be nominated tion filed by various party-list participants. The
IssSj as party-list representative unless he is a ultimate question raised is this: Aside from
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a those already validly proclaimed pursuant to
registered voter; a resident of the Philip earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other
'Mi
pines for a period of not less than one (1) party-list candidates that should be proclaimed
year immediately preceding the day of the winners? The answer to this question is circum
election, able to read and write, a bonafide scribed by the eight-point guideline given in our
member of the party or organization which June 26, 2001 Decision in these consolidated
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) cases, as well as by the four unique parameters
days preceding the day ofthe election, and is of the Philippine party-list system:
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election. "First, the twenty percent allocation
— the combined number of all party-list
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he congressmen shall not exceed twenty per
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more cent of the total membership of the House
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the of Representatives, including those elected
election. Any youth sectoral representative who under the party-list.
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"Second, the two percent threshold —

only those parties garnering a minimum of
We... accept the OSG's position that indeed
?.M two percent of the total valid votes cast for
Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and
the party-list system are 'qualified' to have a
COCOFED. Therefore,' we now add these two
seat in the House of Representatives.
groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier
^J "Third, the three-seat limit—each quali mentioned and therebyaihcrease the total to 46.
fied party, regardless ofthe number of votes
We shall now take up the main question of
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
which parties/organizations won during the last
of three seats; that is, one 'qualifying' and
'ty&i party-list election.
two additional seats.
Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the
"Fourth, proportional representation —
"Total Votes Cast"
the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed 'in proportion The instant Motions for proclamation con
to their total number of votes'." tend that the, disqualification of many party-list
organizations has reduced the "total number of
votes cast for the party-list elections." Because
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark re
the OSG... added that "the proclamation by the quired by law has now been allegedly attained by
SJ
COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS movants. Hence, they now pray for their procla
and PM (as well as all other qualified parties and mation as winners in the last party-list elections.
organizations which received at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the same party-list election) as Recall that under Section 11(b) of RA 7941
winners in the said party-list is in order." (the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering
a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system are entitled to have a
M Preparatory to resolving the present Mo seat in the House of Representatives. The criti
tions and in observance of due process, the Court cal question now is this: To determine the "total
resolved on February 18, 2003 to require the votes cast for the party-list system," should the
parties, including the OSG, to submit their re votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be
spective Position Papers on the following issues: deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause
"total votes cast for the party-list system" include
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. only those ballots cast for qualified party-list
105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992 and Grego v. candidates?
Comelec, 340 Phil. 591, June 19, 1997 and re
lated cases should be deemed applicable to the To answer this question, there is a need to
determination of winners in party-list elections review related jurisprudence on the matter, es
pecially Labo v. Comelec and Grego v. Comelec,
2) Whether the votes cast for parties/orga which were mentioned in our February 18,2003
nizations that were subsequently disqualified for Resolution.
having failed to meet the eight-point guideline
^J contained in our June 26, 2001 Decision should Labo and Grego Not Applicable
be deducted from the "total votes cast for the
In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineli
party-list system" during the said elections gibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
The Court's Ruling does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared
At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot
the claims ofthe OSG that the initial recommen
be deemed elected to the office." In other words,
dation contained in Comelec's First Compliance the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified
Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding BUHAY candidate cannot be considered "stray."
and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that
L these two party-list groups should be deemed However, "this rule would be different if the
electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
qualified.
L
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candidate's disqualification so as to bring such posts, while the present controversy pertains
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would to the acquisition of a number of congressional
nonetheless cast their votes in favor ofthe ineli seats depending on the total election results —
gible candidate. In such case, the electorate may such that even those garnering second, third,
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed win
of their votes by notoriously misapplying their ners depending on their compliance with other
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which requirements.
case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected." RA 7941 is a special statute governing the
In short, the votes cast for a "notoriously disquali elections of party-list representatives and is the
i&l
fied" candidate may be considered "stray" and controlling law in matters pertaining thereto.
excluded from the canvass. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into
being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the
^| The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated latter is a qualification of the former ruling and
in Grego, which held that the exception men law. On the other hand, Grego and other related
tioned in Labo v. Comelec "is predicated on the cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941
concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the should be construed as inapplicable to the latter.
Ml
one who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware Subtracting the votes garnered by these dis
in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification qualified party-list groups from the total votes
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of cast under the party-list system will reduce the
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the two
in favor of the ineligible candidate." percent threshold can be more easily attained
by the qualified marginalized and under-repre
sal Note, however, that the foregoing pronounce sented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of
ments (1) referred to regular elections for local disqualified party-list participants will increase
offices and (2) involved the interpretation of and broaden the number of representatives from
Section 6 of RA 6646. They were not meant to these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and
cover party-list elections, which are specifically give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941,
governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this latter law which we reproduce thus:
clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a
sectoral organization or a coalition" "not entitled "SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The
to be voted for shall not be counted": State shall promote proportional representa
tion in the election of representation in the
"SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. — Every election of representatives to the House of
voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the Representatives through a party-list system
first vote is a vote for candidate for member of registered, national and sectoral parties
ship of the House of Representatives in his or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
\$i\l
legislative district, and the second, a vote for will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the party, organization, or coalition he wants marginalized and underrepresented sec
represented in the House of Representatives: tors, organizations and parties, and who
Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sec lack well-defined political constituencies
toral organization, or coalition not entitled to but who could contribute to the enactment
be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, of appropriate legislation that will benefit
finally, That the first election under the the nation as a whole, to become members of
party-list system shall be held in May 1998." the House of Representatives. Towards this
The language ofthe law is clear; hence, there end, the State shall develop and guarantee
is room, not for interpretation, but merely for a full, free and open party system in order to
application. Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic attain the broadest possible representation
aids is warranted when the language of the law of party, sectoral or group interests in the
is plain and unambiguous. House ofRepresentatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
(Ml
Another reason for not applying Labo and legislature, and shall provide the simplest
Gregois that these cases involve single elective scheme possible."
sj
Need for Patience and Perseverance We also take this opportunity to-emphasize
that the formulas devised in Veterans for comput
BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduc
ing the number of nominees that the party-list
tion of votes obtained by party-list candidates
winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by
disqualified after the holding of the party-list
the concerned agencies of government, especially
elections will result in the instability of the
the Commission on Elections. These formulas
system. The reason is that qualified party-list
ensure that the number of seats allocated to the
candidates would be encouraged to seek the dis winning party-list candidates conform to the
qualification ofthe other candidates for the sole principle of proportional representation man
purpose of attaining the needed percentage ofthe dated by the law.
votes cast. Although such scenario may be pos
sible, we believe that the perceived "instability" The Party-List Winners
can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by
elections, Comelec now has the herein qualified disqualified party-list candidates are not to be
and disqualified participants' list, which can be counted in determining the total votes cast for
used for future elections; and (2) in the light of the party-list system. In the present cases, the
au recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec votes they obtained should be deducted from the
will now be guided accordingly when accrediting canvass of the total number of votes cast during
new candidates for the next party-list elections the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, fol
tiivi
and will be able to set the period for accredita lowing Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and
tion in such time and manner as to enable it to ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now
determine their qualifications long before the in order, according to the percentage of votes they
elections are held. obtained as compared with the total valid votes
cast nationwide.
Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance
to have the marginalized and under-represented
sectors ably represented in Congress. The con
!i!A\ Epilogue
troversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001
party-list elections should further embolden, The determination ofthe winners in the last
not distract, the nation in the process of imple party-list elections has been neither easy nor
ii'J&l menting a genuine and sound Philippine-style simple. The novelty ofthe party-list system in our
party-list system. At this point, the Court needs country necessarily demanded careful study and
to stress what it said in Veterans: deliberation by the Court. Principles and prec
££zl
edents in other democracies of the world have
[T]he dismal result of the first election not been very helpful, because our party-list law
for party-list representatives should serve (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters,
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-
m organizations. It should stir them to. be style party-list system. Our difficulties have also
more active and vigilant in their campaign been aggravated by the less than firm actions of
for representation in the State's lawmaking the Commission on Elections referred to earlier,
body. It should also serve as a clarion call for which had to be reversed based on the OSG's
innovation and creativity in adopting this later submissions.
novel system of popular democracy.
To help all concerned, especially the Com
"With adequate information and dis mission on Elections, speed up the process of
semination to the public and more active determining the party-list winners in the future,
sectoral parties, we are confident our people we deem it wise to summarize the implementing
will be more responsive to future party-list processwe followed in this Resolution, as follows:
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance
and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, 1. After the promulgation of our Decision
in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to con
representation in Congress under the aegis duct a factual determination as to which of the
of the party-list system, Philippine style." various party-list candidates had passed the
ml
eight-point guideline we instituted in that Deci tiously, now that there are precedents to guide
sion. Although we gave Comelec only 30 days all concerned, especially the Commission on
to undertake the work, it was able to submit its Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has
Final Compliance Report only on September 27, the herein base list of 46 qualified parties. For
2001. another, given the lessons and experiences in
2. Ofthe various parties and organizations these proceedings, it can now more speedily,
39 which Comelec allowed to participate in the more carefully and more prudently pass upon the
2001 party-list elections, it recommended — in qualifications of new candidates. Such process
can even be done in advance under such rules
its three Compliance Reports to the Court — 42
to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were and regulations it may issue, consistent with the
law and with our Decisions and Resolutions here
added, for a total of 46.
and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants well
3. Next, we determined which of the 46 in advance of the elections.
qualified parties garnered at least two percent
of the total votes cast for the party-list system. In closing, the Court hopes that, with each
To do so, we subtracted the votes obtained by bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous
the disqualified candidates from the "total votes
journey they experienced in our one-of-a-kind
cast." Those parties, organizations and coalitions Philippine-style party-list system, the marginal
that had obtained at least two percent of this ized and under-represented sectors of our country
balance were declared winners.
will be accorded ever-widening opportunities to
participate in nation-building, so that they can
4. After identifying the winners, we de help develop—in peace and harmony—a society
termined, by using the formulas mandated in that is just, humane, progressive and free.
Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees, each
winning party was entitled to. WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having ob
tained at least two percent ofthe total valid votes
5. The foregoing process would have been cast in the last party-list elections, the following
finished long ago and the winners proclaimed qualified participants are DECLARED elected
before the end of the year 2002, had Comelec with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA,
been more resolute and exacting in the factual COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE!
determinations contained in its Compliance Re PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections
ports. to proclaim — upon finality of this Resolution —
6. In the interest of due process, the Court these winners and their respective nominees, we
required Position Papers on the issue of whether hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restrain
w)
the votes of disqualified candidates should be ing Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them
deducted from the "total votes cast" nationwide. only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest
that did not qualify and win.
7. The two rollos of these two consolidated
cases contain about 14,000 pages, because almost
all ofthe original party-list participants filed — D. Banat v. Comelec
some repeatedly — 'motions, pleas, position pa G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009
pers and so on, which all needed attention. Thus,
the Court had to devote an enormous amount of DECISION
time and effort poring over, understanding, and
ruling upon these submissions. CARPIO, J.:
8. In the interest of speedy justice, this The Case

matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay
was discussed, finalized and promulgated by the
Association for National Advancement and
Court within weeks after it had received the last
Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for cer
Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.
tiorari and mandamus, assails the Resolution
filfoii
r IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commis
winners can truly be made much more expedi sion on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-
L?j!|fiA
041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC 3. The proportional relationships under
No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation the First Party Rule are different from those
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head ofthe National required under RA 7941.
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Param
the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT
eters" of the.Philippine party-list system as
filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as
provided for under tne same case of Veterans
NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution. II. Presuming that the Commission on Elec
m
tions did not commit grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
Issues
it implemented the First-Party Rule in the alloca
§si
BANAT brought the following issues before tion of seats to qualified party-list organizations,
this Court: the same being merely in consonance with the
ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party- COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable
list representatives provided in Section 5(2), case as the issues involved herein are constitu
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it tional in nature, involving the correct interpreta
merely a ceiling? tion and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section transcendental importance to our nation.
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? Considering the allegations in the petitions
3. Is the two percent threshold and "quali and the comments ofthe parties in these cases,
gii
fier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) we defined the following issues in our advisory
of RA 7941 constitutional? for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
4. How shall the party-list representatives 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-
be allocated? list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the
other hand, raised the following issues in their 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of
petition: RA 7941 constitutional?
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, act 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed

ing as National Board of Canvassers, committed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or constitutional?
excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
4. How shall the party-list representative
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-
seats be allocated?
Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule: 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major
political parties from participating in the party-
A. Violates the constitutional principle
list elections? If not, can the major political par
iMl
of proportional representation.
ties be barred from participating in the party-list
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 elections?
particularly:
The Ruling ofthe Court
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First
Party Rule in allocating additional seats for The petitions have partial merit. We main
the "First Party" violates the principle of tain that a Philippine-style party-list election
•ifiiit
proportional representation under RA 7941. has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly
stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
2. The use of two formulas in the allo
cation of additional seats, one for the "First First, the twenty percent allocation
Party" and another for the qualifying parties, — the combined number of all party-list
violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941. congressmen shall not exceed twenty per-
i^j>
fa/
iiiiiaJ
cent of the total membership of the House provided by law, by selection or election from
of Representatives, including those elected the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
t^ under the party list; cultural communities, women, youth, and
Second, the two percent threshold — such other sectors as may be provided by
only those parties garnering a minimum of law, except the religious sector.
two percent of the total valid votes cast for The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A.
the party-list system are "qualified" to have NO. 7941 reads:.
a seat in the House of Representatives;
Section 11.Number ofParty-List Repre
^} Third,the three-seat limit—each quali sentatives. — The party-list representatives
fied party, regardless ofthe number of votes shall constitute twenty per centum (20%)
it actually obtained, is entitledto a maximum of the total number of the members of the
of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and House of Representatives including those
two additional seats; under the party-list.
Fourth, proportional representation — XXX
the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be.computed "in proportion Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution
to their total number of votes." states'that the "HouseofRepresentatives shall be
composedof not more than two hundred and fifty
However, because the formula in Veterans
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The
has flaws in its mathematical interpretation
of the term "proportional representation," this House of Representatives shall be composed of
Court is compelled to revisit the formula for district representatives and party-list represen
•ffilil) the allocation of additional seats to party-list tatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
organizations. modify the number ofthe members ofthe House
of Representatives.
Number of Party-List Representatives: Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
The Formula Mandated on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
by the Constitution representatives to the total number of repre
i
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution

sentatives. We compute the number of seats
provides: available to party-list representatives from the
number oflegislative districts. On this point, we
Section 5. (1) The House of Representa do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans,
'$$}
tives shall be composed of not more than thus:
two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among Number of seats ^ Number of seats
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan available to legisla available to party-list
Manila area in accordance with the number tive districts representatives
x.20 =
of their respective inhabitants, and on the !io
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be
This formula allows for the corresponding
elected through a party-list system of regis
increase in the number of seats available for
tered national, regional, and sectoral parties
party-list representatives whenever a legislative
or organizations.
district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress
(2) The party-list representatives shall of the Philippines has 220 district representar
constitute twenty per centum of the total tives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
h$$i
number of representatives including those representatives.
f under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Consti 220 55
x.20 =
^j tution, one-half of the seats allocated to .80
party-list representatives shall be filled, as
jjffilj
ijjjyl
Afterprescribing the ratio ofthe numberof Section 12. Procedurein Allocating Seats
party-list representatives to the total number for Party-List Representatives. —TheCOM
iiiiii of representatives, the Constitution left the ELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
manner of allocating the seats available to organizations, or coalitionson a nationwide
party-list representatives to the wisdom of basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list repre
the legislature.
sentatives proportionately according to the
Allocation of Seats for Party-List percentage of votes obtained by each party,
Representatives: organization, or coalition as against the
The Statutory Limits Presented total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
by the Two Percent Threshold system. (Emphasis supplied)
and the Three-Seat Cap In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two
a^) All partiesagree ontheformula to determine interpretations through three formulas to allo
the maximum number of seats reserved under cate party-list representative seats.
the Party-List System, as well as onthe formula The first interpretation allegedly harmo
to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list nizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
candidates garnering at least two-percent ofthe requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.
total party-list votes. However, there are numer BANAT described this procedure as follows:
ous interpretations ofthe provisions ofR.A. No.
7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" (a) The party-list representatives shall
underthe Party-List System. Veterans produced constitute twenty percent (20%) ofthe total
the First PartyRule, and JusticeVicente V. Men- Members of the House of Representatives
doza's dissent in-Veterans presented Germany's including those from the party-list groups
Niemeyer formula as an alternative. as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI ofthe
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA
The Constitution left to Congress the deter 7941and Comelec Resolution No.2847dated
mination of the manner of allocating the seats 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
for party-list representatives. Congress enacted Representatives in the 14thCongress, there
R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) ofSection shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
11 and Section 12 of which provide. seats shall have to be proclaimed.
Section 11. Number ofParty-List Repre (b) All party-list groups shall initially
sentatives. — x x x be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) ofthe total party-list votes they
at) In determining the allocation of seats obtained; provided, that noparty-listgroups
for the second vote, the following procedure shall have more than three (3) seats (Section
shall be observed: ' 11, RA 7941).
(a) The parties, organizations, and co (c) The remaining seats shall, after
alitions shall be ranked from the highest to deducting the seats obtained by the party-
the lowest based on the number ofvotes they list groups under the immediately preced
garnered during the elections. ing paragraph and after deducting from
(b) The parties, organizations, and co their total the votes corresponding to those
alitionsreceiving at least twopercent(2%) of seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
Sii«J the total votes cast for the party-list system proportionately to all the party-list groups
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, whichhave not secured the maximum three
That those garnering more than two (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, inac
percent (2%) of the votes shall be en cordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.
titled to additional seats in proportion Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be
to their total number of votes: Provided, awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitle'd to not more than
The second interpretation presented by
BANAT assumes that the 2% vote require-
three (3) seats.
ment is declared unconstitutional, and ap formulas do not factor in the total number of
portions the seats for party-list representa seats alloted for the entire Party-List System.
tives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
BANATstates that the COMELEC: three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. Af
(a) shall tally all the votes for the par ter determining the qualified parties, a second
i^ ties, organizations, or coalitions on a nation percentage is generated by dividing the votes of
wide basis; a qualified party by the total votes ofall qualified
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a
(b) rank them according to the ntfmber qualified party is computed by multiplying the
of votes received; and total party-list seats available with the second
(c) allocate party-list representatives percentage. There will be a first round of seat
proportionately according to the percentage allocation, limited to using the wholeintegers as
of votes obtained by each party, organization the equivalent of the number of seats allocated
or coalition as against the total nationwide to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified
votes cast for the party-list system, parties are given their seats, a second round of
seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
same results: one is based on' the proportional from highest to lowest and the remaining seats
percentage ofthe votes received by each party as on the basis of this ranking are allocated until
is*)
against the total nationwide party-list votes, and all the seats are filled up.
the other is "by makingi;he votes of a party-list
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes
with a median percentage of votes as the divisor
to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
in computing the allocation of seats." Thirty-
four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 "prescribes
BANATs second interpretation. the ranking of the participating parties from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of
•%)
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, votes they garnered during the elections.
and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula Table 1. Ranking of the participating par
for systematically preventing all the party-list ties from the highest to the lowest based on the
seats from being filled up. They claim that both number qf votes garnered during the elections.
pffit
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
ALAGAD 423,149 65 PBA 71,544
COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
^)
sal

ffij&l
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO * 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 ANWARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! * 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD t 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAYPARAK 42,282

23
ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

24
ALIF" 217,822 72 SB 34,835

25
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

27'.
VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

28
188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

29 ANAD
BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

30
ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

31
BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

32
ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

33
&&)
1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
34
162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

35 TUCP
155,920 83 SM 20,744
36 COCOFED
iii
146,032 84 AG 16,916
37 AGHAM
141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
38 ANAK
ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

39
119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

40 PM
110,769 88 ATS 14,161

41 AVE
}$fy) 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
42 SUARA
110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

43 ASSALAM
107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

44 DIWA
99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

45 ANC
97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

46 SANLAKAS
90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

47 ABC
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 2 below, weuse the first 20 party-hst candidates
^ 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and for illustration purposes. The percentage ofvotes
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) garnered by each partyis arrived at by dividing
of the total votes cast for the party-list system the number of votes garnered by eachparty by
^J
shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause 15,950,900, the totalnumber ofvotes cast for all
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table party-list candidates.
iaj
ifej
Table 2.. The first 20 party-list candidates two percent threshold for the distribution of th-
and their respective percentage ofvotes garnered additional seats as found in the second clause o
over the total votes for the party-list. Section 11(b) of R.A. No: 7941 is unconstitu
Votes Garnered over

Rank Party Votes Garnered Total Votes for Party- Guaranteed Seat
List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
iS)
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% i
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 ATEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN .466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS 385,810 1 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32%
|:pj
* 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 * 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 ANWARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89%
S^ttfl 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
i&) From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 tional. This Court finds that the two percent
party-list candidates received at least 2% from threshold makes it mathematically impossibleto
the total number of votes cast for party-list can achieve the maximum number of available party
jgfr didates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or list seats when the number of available party
the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guar the two percent threshold in the distribution of
anteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives shall consist of
The second clause of Section 11(b)of R.A. No. party-list representatives.
7941 provides that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) ofthe votes shall be entitled to To illustrate: There are 55 available party-
additional seats in proportion to their total list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
number of votes." This is where petitioners' for the 100 participants in the party-list elec
and intervenors' problem with the formula in tions. A party that has two percent of the votes
Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat.
proportion to their total number of votes" to be Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all
in proportion to the votes ofthe first party. get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
This interpretation is contrary to the express despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of
language of R.A. No. 7941. the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
We rule that, in computing the allocation of available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if
additional seats, the continued operation ofthe we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two In computing the additional seats, the guar
percent of the votes for every party, it is always anteed seats shall no longer be included because
impossible for the number of occupied party-list they have already been allocated, at one seat
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent each, to every tworpercenter. Thus, the remain
threshold is present. ing available seats for allocation as "additional
{ffij seats" are the-maximum seats reserved under
We therefore strike down the two percent
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
threshold only in relation to the distribution of
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
the additional seats as found in the second clause
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
rounding off of fractional seats.
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article In declaring the two percent threshold
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attain unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation
ment ofthe broadest possible representation of of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
party, sectoral or group interests in the House percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
of Representatives." each party-list candidate is arrived at by divid
ing the number of votes garnered by each party
In determining the allocation of seats for
by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
party-list representatives under Section 11 of
for party-list candidates. There are two steps
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
lifiiig
in the second round of seat allocation. First,
observed:
the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions available seats, 38, which is the difference be
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest tween the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
î based on the number of votes they garnered dur Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats
ing the elections. of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining
2. The parties, organizations, and coali
available seats corresponds to a party's share in
§^j tions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
one party-list seat to each of the parties next
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
in rank until all available seats are completely
I 3. Those garnering sufficient number of distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
shall be entitled to additional seats in propor Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
jjfflftJ
tion to their total number of votes until all the the number of seats each qualified party-list
additional seats are allocated. candidate is entitled. Thus:
4. Each party, organization, or coalition Table 3. Distribution ofAvailable Party-List

shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Seats
Votes (B) plus Applying

Guaranteed Additional
Garnered (C), in the three
Seat Seats
over whole seat cap
integers
Total Votes
Votes Gar
Rank Party for Party
nered
List, in %
(First Round) (Second
Round)!
(B) (C) (D) (E)

(A)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 RA.
imi
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1.1'J 2 NA. •
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1.1]I 2 RA.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1.0]L 2 NA.
9 COOP-NATC- 409,883 2.57% 2 N.A.
CO
Lj
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 2 NA
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 2 NA
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 2 NA
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 2 NA.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 2 NA.
!5 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 2 NA. ..
^1 16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 2 NA
17 ANWARAY 321,503 2.02% 2 NA
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 NA.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 NA
p$
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 RA
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% * 0 NA.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 NA
23 KABATAAR 228,637 1.43% 0 NA.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 NA.
25 ALIF 217,522 1.37% 0 NA.
26 SENIOR CITI 213,058 1.34% 0 NA.
^jjl
ZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 NA.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 NA.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 NA.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 NA.
3t ANGKASANG- 170,53.1 1.07% 0 NA.
GA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 NA.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% ' 0 NA.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 NA.
|$j 35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 NA.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 NA.
Total 17 55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as tions. The deliberations of the Constitutional
illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party- Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
$$\ list representatives from the 36 winning party-
list organizations. All 55 available party-list MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just
seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to
want to say that we suggested or proposed
the parties with sufficient number ofvotes for one
the party-list system because we wanted to
whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
open up the political system to a pluralistic
seats for each party, are shown in column (D). society through a multiparty system, x x x
We are for opening up the system, and
Participation ofMajor Political Parties we would like very much for the sectors
in Party-List Elections to be there. That is why one ofthe ways
to do that is to put a ceiling on the num
The Constitutional Commission adopted a ber of representatives from any single
multi-party system that allowed all political party that can sit within the 50 allocated
parties to participate in the party-list elec under the party-iist system, x x x.
lis*)
XXX pate in the party list election ifthey can

prove that they are also organized along
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the sectoral lines.
ip) candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited
to political parties. My question is this: Are MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner
we going to classify for example Christian is saying is that all political parties can par
Democrats and Social Democrats as political ticipate because it imprecisely the contention
parties? Can they run under the party-list of political parties that they represent the
concept or must they be under the district broad base of citizens and that all sectors
legislation side of it only? are represented in them. Would the Com
iî missioner agree?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that
query, I think these parties that the Com MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin,
missioner mentioned can field candidates for pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
the Senate as well as for the House of Repre political party, it will dominate the party
sentatives. Likewise, they can also field list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector.
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent
Lalamuriin mismo ng political parties ang
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
the seats that we are allocating under
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin
the party list system.
itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the parties.
Christian Democrats can field district can
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon
didates and can also participate in the party
kasi anybody can run there. But my question
iiii|W) list system? to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under
they come to the party list system, they this system, would UNIDO be banned from
ij^fr} will be fielding only sectoral candidates. running under the party list system?
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said,
that? Can UNIDO participate in the party UNIDO may field sectoral candidates.
list system? On that condition alone, UNIDO may
be allowed to register for the party list
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For system.
as long as they field candidates who
t&Sj come from the different marginalized MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Com
sectors that we shall designate in this missioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
Constitution. MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Ta- MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang
iiada wants to run under BAYAN group and UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
says that he represents the farmers, would
xxxx
he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tafiada MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this
would not qualify. will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek
&fl
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field common ground. For example, we have the
candidates under the party list system and PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would why they should not be able to make com
pass on whether he is a farmer or not? mon goals with mass organizations so that
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Mon- the very leadership of these parties can be
sod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political transformed through the participation of
%^ parties, particularly minority political mass organizations. And if this is true °£
parties, are not prohibited to partici the administration parties, this will betrue
Hgjj)
iiiiiiii
102 CONSTTTUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
fylffi
of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is Definition of Terms, (a) The party-list
now being formed. There is no question that system is a mechanisHLof proportional repre
they will be attractive to many mass orga sentation in the election ofrepresentatives to
nizations. In the opposition parties to which the House of Representatives from national,
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to regional and sectoral parties or organizations
contact mass organizations so that with their or coalitions thereofregistered with the Com
participation, the policies of such parties mission on Elections (COMELEC). Compo
can be radically transformed because this nent parties or organizations of a coalition
amendment will create conditions that will may participate independently provided the
challenge both the mass organizations and coalition of which they form part does not
the political parties to come together. And participate in the party-hst system.
the party list system is certainly available,
although it is open to all the parties. It is (b) A party means either a political party
ijjiiiJ
understood that the parties will enter in the or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
roll ofthe COMELEC the names of represen (c) A political party refers to an orga
tatives of mass organizations affiliated with nized group of citizens advocating an ideology
them. So that we may, in time, develop this or platform, principles and policies for the
excellent system that they have in Europe general conduct of government and which,
where labor organizations and cooperatives, as the most immediate means of securing
. for example, distribute themselves either in their adoption, regularly nominates and
the Social Democratic Party and the Chris supports certain of its leaders and members
tian Democratic Party in Germany, and their as candidates for public office.
very presence there has a transforming effect
upon the philosophies and the leadership of It is a national party when its constitu
those parties. ency is spread over the geographical terri
tory of at least a majority of the regions. It
It is also a fact well known to all that
is a regional party when its constituency is
in the United States, the AFL-CIO always spread over the geographical territory of at
vote with the Democratic Party. But the least a majority of the cities and provinces
businessmen, most of them, always vote comprising the region.
with the Republican Party, meaning that
M
there is no reason at all why political parties (d) A sectoral party refers to an orga
and mass organizations should not combine, nized group of citizens belonging to any of
reenforce, influence and interact with each the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
'•'ftSfl
other so that the very objectives that we set whose principal advocacy pertains to the
in this Constitution for sectoral representa special interests and concerns of their sector.
tion are achieved in a wider, more lasting,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a
and more institutionalized way. Therefore,
group of citizens or a coalition of groups
I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amend
of citizens who share similar physical at
ment. It installs sectoral representation as
tributes or characteristics, employment,
a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
interests or concerns.
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty
of being elected representatives later on (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation
through a party list system; and even be of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
yond that, to become actual political parties parties or organizations for political and/or
capable of contesting political power in the election purposes.
wider constitutional arena for major politi
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the
cal parties.
three-seat cap to prevent any party from domi
xxx (Emphasis supplied) nating the party-list elections.
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
iaij(ft concepts put forward by the Constitutional Com prohibits major political parties from participat
mission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: ing in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
'afi
M
framers ofthe Constitution clearly intended the In case of a nominee ofthe youth sector,
major political parties to participate in party-list he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
aiit elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the more than thirty (30) years of age on the
members ofthe Constitutional Commission voted day of the election. Any youth sectoral rep
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, arid resentative who attains the age of thirty (30)
in the alternative the reservation of the party- during his term sjiall be allowed to continue
list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a until the expiration of his term.
"party" that participates in party-list elections
as either "a political party or a sectoral party," Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not
mi
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major necessary that the party-list organization's
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and in
political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties firmity" as there is no financial status required
in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
I^J in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk,
ti'ml he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
judicially legislate the exclusion of major politi
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be
cal parties from the party-list elections in patent
a senior citizen.
violation of the Constitution and the law.
^> Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the de
liberations of the Constitutional Commission
mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allo
cation of party-list representatives found in the
state that major political parties are allowed
to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1,
Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination
organizations for electoral or political purposes.
of the number of the members of the House of
There should not be a problem if, for example,
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Rep
the Liberal Party participates in the party-list
resentatives shall be composed of not more than
election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-
other major political parties can thus organize,
list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-hst
or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors.
representatives cannot be more than 20% ofthe
To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party
members ofthe House of Representatives. How
can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in
ever, we cannot allow the continued existence
the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing
can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng of a provision in the law which will systemati
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for cally prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
the urban poor. party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
The qualifications of party-list nominees are seats that a qualified party-list organization may
prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941: occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-
fevî
Qualifications ofParty-List Nominees. —
list elections. Seats for party-hst representatives
No person shall be nominated as party-list
shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
representative unless he is a natural born
procedure used in Table 3 above.
citizen ofthe Philippines, a registered voter,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided
not less than one (1) year immediately pre to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
ceding the day of the elections, able to read major political parties from participating in the
:V(jii
and write, bona fide member of the party or party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
organization which he seeks to represent for who voted to continue disallowing major politi
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of cal parties from the party-list elections joined
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
years of age on the day of the election. opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list
104 CQNSTTTUTlbNAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OFGOVERNMENT
|*tfj
seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congres
this ponencia. sional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A.
FORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the peti No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675
tion. We SET ASIDE the Resolution ofthe COM
into law on February 9,1994.
ELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 Pursuant to the Local -Government Code of
in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional 1991,a plebiscite was held on April 10,1994. The
the two percent threshold in the distribution people ofMandaluyong were asked whether they
of additional party-hst seats. The allocation of approved of the conversion of the Municipahty
additional seats under the Party-List System of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
shall be in accordance with the procedure used provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the
in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties plebiscite was only 14.41% ofthe voting popula
areodisallowed from participating in party-list tion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
elections. This Decision is immediately execu 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A.
tory. No pronouncement as to costs. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
SO ORDERED. Petitioners now come before this Court, con

tending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article
3. Apportionment. VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for
being violative of three specific provisions ofthe
The underlying principle behind the rule Constitution.
for apportionment is the concept of equality
of representation which is a basic principle of Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675
republicanism. One man's vote should carry as provides:
much weight as the vote of every other man. As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Each province, irrespective of population, Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
is entitled to one representative; each city with district with the first representative to be
a population of at least 250,000 is entitled to at elected in the next national elections after
least one representative. the passage of this Act. The remainder of
the former legislative district of San Juan/
"Gerrymandering," which is the formation of Mandaluyong shall become the new legisla
one legislative district out of separate territories tive district of San Juan with its first repre
for the purpose offavoring a candidate or a party, sentative to be elected'at the same election.
t^j is not allowed. The Constitution says that each
district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory." provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes
ihe "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in
A. Tobias v. Abalos Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to
G.R. No. L-114783, December 8,1994 wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Con

BIDIN, J.: gress shall embrace only one subject which
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as shall be expressed in the title thereof.
residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the
assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
the Municipality ofMandaluyong into a Highly namely: (1) the conversion ofMandaluyong into a
Urbanized City to be known as the City ofMan highly urbanized city; and (2) the division ofthe
daluyong." congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
into two separate districts.
Prior to the enactment of the assailed stat
ute, the municipalities ofMandaluyong and San Petitioners contend that the second afor-
Juan belonged to only one legislative district. estated subject is not germane to the subject
iS}
matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains
of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly comphance with the "one city-one representative"
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the proviso in the Constitution:
law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a sub
ject distinct from that stated in the title of the ... Each city with a population of at least
law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been two hundredfifty thousand, oreach province,
complied with. shall have at least one representative" (Ar
ticle VI, Section 5[3], Constitution).
Petitioners' second and third objections
Hence, it is in compliance with the afores-
&Y&{
involve Article VI, Section 5(1) and (4) of the
tated constitutional mandate that the creation
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
of a separate congressional district for the City
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
iii
shall be composed of not more than two Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
hundred and fifty members, unless other
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the cre
wise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
ation of a separate congressional district for
legislative districts apportioned among the
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Ma
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
nila area in accordance with the number of
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logi
L their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
cal consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title oOLA. No. 7675.
who, as provided by law, shall be elected
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Manda
through a party list system of registered
luyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Manda
national, regional and sectoral parties or
luyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
organizations.
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding
the creation of a separate congressional district
SJ
for Mandaluyong.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one
shall make a reapportionment of legislative title-one subject" rule has been invariably ad
districts based on the standard provided in opted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
this section. legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73
Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
Petitioners argue that the division of San
&&j requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congres
sional districts under Section 49 of the assailed
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. It should be suf
law has resulted in an increase in the composi
tion ofthe House of Representatives beyond that ficient compliance with such requirement if the
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) ofthe Constitu title expresses the general subject and all the
tion. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said provisions are germane to that general subject."
division was not made pursuant to any census The liberal construction ofthe "one title-one .
showing that the subject municipalities have subject" rule had been further elucidated in Li-
attained the minimum population requirements. dasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit;
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has
the effect of preempting the right of Congress to "Of course, the Constitution does not
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. require Congress to employ in the title of
5(4) as aforecited. an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
The contentions are devoid of merit. contents and the minute details therein. It
Anent the first issue, we agree with the ob suffices if the title should serve the purpose
servation ofthe Solicitor General that the statu of the constitutional demand that it inform
tory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly the legislators, the persons interested in the
urbanized city with a population of not less than subject of the bill and the public, of the na-
MS
ture, scopeand consequences ofthe proposed Petitioners contend that the people of San
law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). Juan should have been made to participate in the
SJ
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved
Proceeding now to the other constitutional is a change in their legislative district. The conten
sues raised by petitioners to the effect that there tion is bereft of merit since the principal subject
is no mention in the assailed law of any census to involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 matter of separate district representation was
inhabitants to justify their separation into two only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to San Juan were properly excluded from the said
strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
said Actenjoysthe presumption ofhaving passed change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Saatl
through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Similarly, petitioners' additional argument
Congress of the minimum requirements for the that the subject law has resulted in "gerryman
establishment of separate legislative districts. At dering," which is the practice of creating legisla
Mt
any rate, it is not required that all laws emanat tive districts to favor a particular candidate or
ingfrom the legislature must containall relevant party", is not worthy of credence. As correctly
data considered by Congress in the enactment observed by the Solicitor General, it should be
of said laws. noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
the assailed law, is the incumbent representative
As to the contention that the assailed law
of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
violates the present limit on the number of rep
having consistently won in both localities. By
resentatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
constituency has in fact been diminished, which
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the pres
development could hardly be considered as favor
ent limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
able to him.
Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by MISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
law." The inescapable import ofthe latter clause
is that the present composition of Congress may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates B*. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the on Elections
iiiiJ
increase in congressional representation man G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
dated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
PUNO, J.:
Thus, in the absence ofproof that Mandaluy
ong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate At bench are two (2) petitions assailing
legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7859 as
R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A.
Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into
No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress a HighlyUrbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati."
to reapportion legislative districts, the said ar
gument borders on the absurd since petitioners G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for
overlookthe glaring fact that it was Congress it prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed
self which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Bautista, Teresita Abang, Valentina. Pitalvero,
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
right which pertains to itself. Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is
Aside from the constitutional objections to a resident of Makati. The others are residents
R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further argu of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing
ments against the validity thereof. as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the the Municipality ofMakati in Metropolitan
following grounds: Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction
"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not bounded onthe northeast byPasigRiver and
properly identify the land area or territorial beyond by the CityofMandaluyong and the
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by
with technical descriptions, in violation of the municipalities^ Pateros and Taguig; on
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in the southwest by the Cityof Pasay and the
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Municipality of Taguig; and the northwest,
Government Code; by the City of Manila.
2. Section 51 ofR.A. No. 7854attempts The.foregoing provision shall be without

to alter or restart the "three-consecutive prejudice to the resolution by the appropri
p&i
term" limit for local elective officials, in vio ate agency or forum of existing boundary
lation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, disputes or cases involving questions of
Article VI of the Constitution. territorial jurisdiction between the City of
Makati and the adjoining local government
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is uncon units. (Emphasis supplied)
stitutional for:
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that
(a), it increased the legislative dis this delineation violates Sections 7 and 450 ofthe
trict of Makati only by special law (the Local Government Codewhich require that the
Charter in violation ofthe constitutional area of a local government unit should be made
provision requiring a general reappor bymetesand bounds, withtechnical descriptions.
asafei tionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the re The importance of drawing with precise
turn of every census; strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The
jsjpl (b) the increase in legislative district boundaries must be clear for they define the
was not expressed in the title ofthe bill; limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
and government unit. It can legitimately exercise
(c) the addition of another legisla powers of government only within the limits of
tive district in Makati is not in accord its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits
with Section 5(3), as of the latest survey ofits acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
(1990 census), the population of Makati uncertainty in the boundaries of local govern
stands at only 450,000." ment units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil
iliij
John H. Osmefia as senator, taxpayer, and sought to be avoided by the local government unit
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails Section requiring that the land area of local government
52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds,
the same grounds as aforestated. with technical descriptions.
We find no merit in the petitions. Given the facts ofthe cases at bench, we can
not perceive how this evil can be brought about
I by the description made in Section 2 of R.A. No.
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 de 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
lineated the land area of the proposed city of delineation ofthe land area ofthe proposed City
Makati, thus: of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundar
ies. Wenote that said delineation did not change
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Mu even by an inch the land area previously covered
nicipality of Makati shall be converted into a by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not
i^lfyf
highly urbanized city tobe known as the City add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established
ofMak;ati, hereinafter referred toas the City, land area of Makati. In language that cannot be
which shall comprise the present territory of any cleared, Section 2 stated that the city's land
Sx&l
area "shall comprise the present territory of the nicipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
municipality." concluded that the legislative intent behind
the law has been sufficiently served.
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that
there is a legitimate reason why the land area of Certainly, Congress did not intend that
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by laws creating new cities must contain therein
•Ml
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. detailed technical descriptions similar to
At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, those appearing in Torrens titles, as petition
the territorial dispute between the municipalities ers seem to imply. To require such descrip
of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was tion in the law as a condition sine qua non
under court litigation. Out ofa becomingsense of for its validity would be to defeat the very
respect to a co-equal department ofgovernment, purpose which the Local Government Code
the legislations felt that the dispute shouldbeleft seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the
to the courts to decide. They did not want to fore Code is to empower local government units
closethe dispute by making a legislative finding and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
of fact which could decide the issue. This would to make local governments more responsive
have ensued if they denned the land area of the to the needs of their constituents while at
proposed cityby its exact metes and bounds, with the same time serving as a vital cog No. 7854
technical descriptions. We take judicial notice of on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
gjjifti the fact that Congress has also refrained from description was used in the law would serve
using the metes and bounds description ofland the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code.
It then becomes a case of a master serving
areas of other local government units with un
the slave, instead of the other way around.
settled boundary disputes.
This could not be the intendment of the law.
We hold that the existence of a boundary
Too well settled is the rule that laws
dispute does not per se present an unsurmount-
must be enforced when ascertained, although
able difficulty which will prevent Congress form
it may not be consistent with the strict let
defining with reasonable certitude the territorial ter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
jurisdiction of as local government unit. In the letter of the statute when to do so would
cases at bench, Congress maintained the exist depart from the true intent ofthe legislature
ml
ing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati or wjould otherwise yield conclusions incon
but as an act of fairness, made them subject to sistent with the general purpose of the act
the ultimate resolution by the courts. Consider (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141; Tafiada v.
ing these peculiar circumstances, we are not Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active in
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of strument of government which, for purposes
the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.: ofinterpretation, means that laws have ends
"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the to achieve, and statutes should be so con
Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil strued as not to defeat but to carry out such
that the requirement stated therein, viz: 'the ends and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or SCRA520).The same rule must indubitably
converted cities should be described by metes apply to the case at bar.
and bounds, with technical descriptions' was
sM
made in order to provide a means by which
Ill
the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement Finally, petitioners in two (2)cases at bench
i&&! on metes and bounds was meant merely as assail the constitutionality of Section 52, Article
tool in the establishment of local government X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long provides:
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to "Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its
common boundaries with neighboring mu conversion into a highly-urbanized city,
L
Makati shall thereafter have at least two cord with Section 5(3); Article VI ofthe Constitu
(2) legislative districts that shall initially tion for as ofthe latest survey (1990 census) the
correspond to the two (2) existing districts population ofMakati stands atonly four hundred
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act fifty thousand (450,000). Said Section provides
No. 7166 as implemented by the Commis inter aha, thatacity with apopulation ofat least
sion on Elections to commence at the next
national elections to be held after the ef-
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have
fectivity ofthis Act. Henceforth, barangays at least one representative. Even granting that
Magallanes, Dasmarinas, and Forbes shall
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
bewiththe first district, in lieuofBarangay stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000)
Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of its legislative district may still be increased'since
the second district." (underscoring supplied) ithas met the minimum population requirement
oftwo hundred fifty thousand (250,000). Infact
They, contend that the addition of another Section 3of the Ordinance appended to the Con
legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional stitution provides that a city whose population
for: (1) reapportionment cannot made bya special has increased to more than two hundred fifty
iMI
law;(2) the addition ofa legislativedistrict is not thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least
expressedin the title ofthe bill;and (3) Makati's one congressional representative.12
population, as perthe 1990 census, standsat only Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners'
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
contention that the creation of an additional
These issues have been laid to rest in the legislative district in Makati should have been
recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.11 In said case, expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
$$}
weruled that reapportionment oflegislative dis same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiter
tricts may be made through a special law, such ated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
clearly provides that Congress shall be com so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, the
Bi
posed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) Constitution does, not command that the title
members, unlessotherwise fixed by law. As thus of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Con completely catalogue all its details. Hence,'we
:Hii gress from increasing its membership bypassing ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if
a law,other than a general reapportionmentlaw. the title expresses the general subject andall the
This is exactly what was done by Congress in provisions are germane to such general subject."
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an in
una
crease in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
to hold that reapportionment can only be made DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
through a general apportionment law, with a
«a> review of all the legislative districts allotted to
each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitablesituation wherea newcity
or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. That intolerable situation will TOSec. 3. provides: "Any province that may hereafterbe
created, oranycitywhose population may hereafter increase
deprive the people of a new city or province a to morethan two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
particle oftheir sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot the immediately following election to at least one Member
admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
It mustbeforever whole orit is notsovereignty. basis ofthe number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph(3),Section 5 of Article VI of
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the
provinceout of which such new provincewas created or where
another legislative district in Makati is not in ac thecity, whose population hasso increased, isgeographically
located shallbe correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within
7,G.R. No. 114783, December8,1994. one hundred, and twenty days before the election."
M
C. Montejo v. Commission on Elections law, the Members thereof shall be elected

G.R. No. 118702, March 16,1995 • from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
PUNO.J.: Manila Area as follows:
'd$&l
More than political fortunes are at stake in XXX XXX XXX
the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Monte "SECTION 2. The Commission on Elec
jo,representing the First District ofLeyte, pleads tions is hereby empowered to make minor
for the anriulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. adjustments cf the reapportionment herein
2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain made.
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representa "SECTION 3. Any province that may
tion. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner hereafter he created, or any city whose popu
seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosafrom lation may hereafter increase to more than
his.district to the Second District of the province. two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the in the immediately following election to at
Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion least one Member or such number of Mem
of Tolosa in his district. We gave.due course to the bers as it may be entitled to on the basis of
petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the number of its inhabitants and according
liiiiij the validity of the unprecedented exerciseby the to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
COMELEC of the legislative power of redistrict Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ing and reapportionment. The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was
liiiijfl)
created or where the city, whose population
We find Section 1 ofResolution No. 2736 void. has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
While the petition at bench presents a Commission on Elections but such adjust
significant issue, our first inquiry will relate ment shall not be made within one hundred
to the constitutional power of the respondent and twenty days before the election." (Em
COMELEC to transfer municipalities from one phasis supplied)
legislativedistrict to another legislativedistrict
in the province of Leyte. The. basic powers of The Ordinance was made necessary because
respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and admin Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C.
^)
istrator of our election laws, are spelled out in Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution
black and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the
Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC Batasang Pambansa. She then exercised legisla
does not invoke this provision but relies on the tive powers under the Provisional Constitution.
iiiiii3
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution The Ordinance was the principal handiwork
as the source of its power of redistricting which of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
is traditionally regarded as part of the power to now a distinguished member of this Court. The
make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportion records reveal that the Constitutional Commis
ing the Seats of the House of Representatives of sion had to resolve several prejudicial issues be
the Congress of the Philippines to the Different fore authorizing the first congressional elections
g^
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital
the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive issues were: whether the members of the House
sections state: of Representatives would be elected by district
"SECTION 1. For purposes of the election or by province; who shall undertake the appor
&j|fri
of Members of the House ofRepresentatives tionment ofthe legislative districts; and, howthe
of the First Congress of the Philippines un apportionment should be made.73 Commissioner
der the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent "Record ofConstitutional Commission, October 9,1986
elections, and until otherwise provided by session, p. 686.
&fei
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ill
Davide, Jr., offered three (3)options for the Com "MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. PresidingOffi
mission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino cer. For instance, we may not have the data
to dothe apportionment by law; (2)empowerthe regarding a division ofa municipality by the
COMELEC tomakethe apportionment; or (3) let interim BatasangPambansa or the Regular
the Commission exercisethe powerby wayofan BatasangPambansaintotwo municipalities,
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The dif meaning, a mother municipality and the new
ferent dimensions of the options were discussed municipality, but still actually these are
by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino within the geographical district area.
and Bias F. Ople.74...
"MR. DE CASTRO. Sothe minoradjust
ment which the COMELEC cannot do is
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission that; if, for example, my municipality is in
denied to the COMELEC the major power ofleg the First District ofLaguna,they cannotput
islative apportionment as it itself exercised the that in any other district.
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empow "MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor
Iffi^
ered the COMELEC "tomake minor adjustments correction. It is a substantive one.
of the reapportionment herein made." The mean
ing ofthe phrase "minoradjustments"was again "MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
clarifiedin the debates ofthe Commission, viz.:75 Consistent with the limits of its power to
&mJ
make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Or
dinance did not also give the respondent COM
"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you. ELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district.
"I was about to ask the committee the The powergranted by Section3 to the respondent
meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be COMELEC is to adjust the number of members
possible that one municipality in a district (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province
be transferred to another district and call it out of which such new province was created ..."
a minor adjustment?
Prescinding from these premises, we hold
"MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, that respondent COMELEC committed grave
Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that abuse of discretion amounting to lack of juris
there should be no change in the allocations diction when it promulgated Section 1 of its
per district. However, it may happen that we Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipal
l^j
have forgotten a municipality in between, ity of Capoocan of the Second District and the
which is still in the territory of one assigned municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District
district, or there may be an error in the to the Third District of Leyte:
correct name of a particular municipality
because of changes made by the interim
Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Ba- D. Bagabuyo v. Comelec
tasang Pambansa. There were many batas G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
pambansa enacted by both the interim and
the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing The Plebiscite Requirement.
the names of municipalities.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371
"MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor ad converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro
justment may be made only if one of the as a local government unit, and does not merely
municipalities is not mentioned in the or provide for the City's legislative apportionment.
dinance appended to, and it will be up for This argument essentially proceeds from a mis
the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such understanding of the constitutional concepts of
municipality to a certain district. apportionment of legislative districts and divi
sion of local government units.
&&} "Ibid, pp. 692-694, 700.
"Records of Constitution Commission, Session of Octo Legislative apportionment is defined by
ber 13, 1986, pp. 950-951. Black's Law Dictionary as the determination
112 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
of the number of representatives which a State, The concern that leaps from the text of
&ffi\ county or other subdivision may send to a Article VI, Section 5 is political representation
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in and the means to make a legislative district
a legislative body in proportion to the popula sufficiently represented so that the people can
tion; the drawing of voting district lines so as to be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim
equalizepopulation and votingpower among the of legislative apportionment is "to equalize
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is population and voting power among districts."
the realignment orchange in legislative districts Hence, emphasis is given to the number of
brought about by changes in population and peoplerepresented; the uniform and progressive
mandated by the constitutional requirement of ratio to be observed among the representative
equality of representation. districts; and accessibility and commonality of
interests in terms of each district being, as far
as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent
Separately from the legislativedistricts that territory. In terms of the people represented,
legalapportionment or reapportionment speaks every citywith at least 250,000people and every
of, are the local government units (historically province (irrespective of population) is entitled
and generically referredto as "municipal corpora to one representative. In this sense, legislative
tions") that the Constitution itself classified into districts, on the one hand, and provinces and
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. cities, on the other, relate and interface with
In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has each other. To ensure continued adherence to
been defined as "a body politic and corporate con the required standards ofapportionment, Section
stituted bythe incorporation ofthe inhabitants of 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as
a cityor townforthe purposeoflocal government soon as the given standards are met.
thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition In contrast with the equal representation
or alteration of boundary of local government objective ofArticle VI, Section 5, Article X, Sec
units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, tion 10 expressly speaks of how local government
^)
and barangays, are covered by the Article on units may be "created, divided, merged, abol
Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this ished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its
Article provides: / concern is the commencement, the termination,
No province, city, municipality, or 6a- and the modification of local government units'
rangay may be created, divided, merged, corporateexistence and territorial coverage; and
abolished, or its boundary substantially al it speaks of two specific standards that must be
^ tered, except in accordance with the criteria observedin implementing this concern, namely,
established in the local government code the criteria established in the local government
and subject to approval by a majority of the code and the approval by a majority of the votes
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
$j<^
directly affected. affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income,
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article population and land area are specified as verifi
X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the'authority able indicators ofviability and capacity to provide
to act has been vested in the Legislature. The services. The division or merger of existing units
Legislature undertakes the apportionment and must comply with the same requirements (since
reapportionment of legislative districts, and a new local government unit will come into be
likewise acts on local government units by set ing), provided that a division shall not reduce
ting the standards for their creation, division, the income, population, or land area of the unit
merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries affected to less than the minimum requirement
and by actually creating, dividing, merging, prescribed in the Code.
abolishing local government units and altering
their boundaries through legislation. Other than A pronounced distinction between Article
this, not much commonality exists between the VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
jiij two provisions since they fire inherently differ requirement ofa plebiscite. The Constitutionand
entalthough they interface and relate with one the Local Government Code expressly require
another. a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
jil|r»
ftiflp
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a discussion.77 When these offices, however, were
local government unit. Incontrast, noplebiscite discussed, no distinction was made. Hence, even
requirement exists under the apportionment or citizens byelection who aredeemed tobe natural-
reapportionment provision. ...
born citizens satisfy thecitizenship qualification
SEC. 6. NO PERSON SHALL BE A for representatives-(as well as for Senators,
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE President, and Vice-President).78
SENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL- The age qualification is the same asthe age
BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES qualification for representatives under the 1935
AND,ONTHE DAY OFTHE ELECTION, IS Constitution andfor Batasanmembers under the
AT LEASTTWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, 1973 Constitution —twentyfive years.79
ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND EXCEPT
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES, A A representative must not only be a quali
iifti
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT fied elector, buthemust actually be "a registered
IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND voter."
A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD
OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMME As to the residence requirement, the mean
DIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ingofresidence as found in the election lawunder
ELECTION. the 1935 Constitution has been retained:
1. Qualifications of District Representa The term "residence" as used in the

tives. election lawis synonymous with "domicile,"
whichimports not onlyintention to reside in
A district representative must be a natural a fixed place but also personal presence in
born citizen ofthe Philippines, a registered voter that place coupled with conduct indicative
in the district in which he shall be elected, and ofsuch intention (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil.
a resident of that district for a period of not less 645). In ordertoacquire a domicile bychoice,
than one year immediately preceding the day there must concur (1) residence or bodily
V»i
of the election. Aparty-list representative must presence in the new locality, (2) an inten
possess the same qualifications except for the tion to remain there, and (3) an intention to
requirement of being a resident of a district for abandon the old domicile. In other words,
^) at leastone yearimmediately preceding the elec there must be an animus non revertendi and
tion. This is because a party-list representative an animus manendi. The purpose to remain
does not represent a district. in or at the domicile of choice must be for
ji^ "Natural-born citizens are those who are citi an indefinite period of time. The acts of the
zens ofthe Philippines from birth without having person must conform with this purpose .. .80
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Such residence, according to Faypon v.
Sj
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philip Quirino,61 is not necessarily lost even through
pine citizenship in accordance with paragraph prolonged absence:
(3), Section 1 [of Article IV] shall be deemed
natural-born citizens."76 When the second sen- '
.tence ofSection 4,Article IV, wasbeingdiscussed "I RECORD 355, 369.
bytheConstitutional Commission, one objection 78This expanded meaning ofnatural-born citizenship is
nota novel idea.The 1971 Constitutional Convention, which
to it was that it would allow citizensby election first formulated the definitionofa natural born citizenas one
to qualify for constitutional positions reserved who isa citizen from birthwithout having toperform anyact
for natural-born citizens. The new provision to acquire or perfect his citizenship, actingas the sole judge
wasnonetheless accepted on the understanding ofthe qualifications ofthe delegates to the Convention, voted
to consider Delegate Ernesto G. Ang a natural borncitizen
that, if desired, the distinction between different and therefore qualified to be a delegate in spite of the fact
igj
kinds of natural-born citizens could be made for that DelegateAng was a citizen by electionunder the 1935
Constitution.
purposes of qualifying for constitutional offices
79A reduction of the age qualification to twenty-one
when qualification for these offices come up for was approved on October 12, 1972, only to be raised later
to twenty-five.
^Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 455-6 (1941).
'"Article IV, Section 2. 8I96 Phil. 294, 299 (1954).
H)
A citizen may leave the place of his birth SECTION 9. Qualifications ofParty-List
to look for "greener pastures," as the saying Nominees. — No person shall be nominated
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course as party-list representative unless he is a
includes study in other places, practice ofhis natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
avocation, or engaging in business ... registered voter, a resident of the Philip
Sal pines for a period of not less than one (1)
The definition of residence given above, when year immediately preceding the day of the
written by the Court, had reference to residence election, able to read and write, a bonafide
as a requirement for suffrage. The same concept member of the party or organization which
was used for residence as a qualification for he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
representatives in the 1935 Constitutionand in days preceding the day of the election, and is
the 1973 Constitution. A proposal to make actual at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
physical residence a requirementwasrejected by day of the election.
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.82
In case of a nominee of the youth sector,
The qualifications must be possessed on the he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
day of the election.83 more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
Thequalifications ofa sectoral representative of the election. Any youth sectoral represen
were not explicitlydiscussed by the Commission. tative who attains the age of thirty (30) dur
L Since, however, sectoral representatives are,
for a limited period, meant to take the place of
ing his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.
party-list representatives and are a prelude to
fullimplementationofthe party-list system,they 3. Residence qualification: Cases.
should have the same qualifications as party-list A. Gallego v. Verra
representatives. G.R. No. L-48641, November 24, 1941
îij 2. Qualifications of Party-list Representa
OZAETA, J.:
tives.
This case is before us on petition for certiorari
In Bagong Bayani, supra, the majority also
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
ruled that party-list nominees ")riustrepresent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors." affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte,whichdeclaredillegal the petitioner's elec
This means that nominees who do not have this
tion to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog,
ideological quality (whichincidentallyis not eas
Leyte,in the general electionsofDecember,1940,
ilyproved or disproved), they are not qualified to
on the ground that, he did not have the residence
be members of the House of Representatives as
qualification ... Respondent Vicente Verra (pe
party-list representatives. But nosuchideologi titioner below) was the unsuccessful opponent of
calrequirementis found in Section 6 ofArticle VI
which enumerates the qualifications of a member
the petitioner Pedro Gallego, who was declared
of the House of Representatives. According to
electedby the municipal board ofcanvassers with
a majority of nearly 800 votes.
Section 6, the only difference in qualifications
between district representatives and party-list The undisputed facts as found by the trial
representatives is that a party-hstrepresentative court and the Court of Appeals may be briefly
does not represent a district and therefore need stated as follows:
m
not have resided in a single district for at least
Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog,
one year immediately preceding the election.
Leyte. After studying in the Catarman Ag
In fact, neither does R.A. No. 7941 prescribe an
ricultural School in the province of Samar,
ideological qualification:
he was employed as a school teacher in the
municipality of Catarman, Samar, as well
"Sessions of July 23, 1972 and October 12, 1972; II as in the municipalities of Burawon, Dulag,
RECORD 87 (1986). and Abuyog, province of Leyte, and school
^Compare with Espinosa v. Aquino, Jr., Senate Electoral
Tribunal, Electoral Case No. 9, January 15, 1969. teacher ofAbuyog, Leyte, and presented his
i^
taii
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT' • 115
candidacy for municipal mayor of his home of Appeals declared that the herein petitioner
town, but was defeated. After his defeat in Pedro Gallego hadacquired a residence ordomi
that election, finding himself in debt and un cile of origin inthe municipality of Malaybalay,
employed, he went to Mindanao in search of Bukidnon, and had lost his domicile oforigin in
a job. Hefirst wentto OrientalMisamis, but the municipality ofAbuyog, Leyte, at the time
findingno workthere he proceeded to the si- he was elected mayoriof the latter municipality,
tio ofKaato-an, municipality ofMalaybalay, and, that, therefore, his election wasvoid ...
Bukidnon, whereat he arrived on June 20,
1938, and immediately found employment In this Court the petitioner assigns the fol
as nurseryman in the chichona plantation lowing errors:
ofthe Bureau ofForestry. OnJuly 30ofthe 1. The Court of Appeals erred in hold
same year he returned to Abuyogbecause he ing that the petitioner Pedro Gallego was
had been offered an employmentas teacher a legal resident of Malaybalay, Bukidon,
in the public school of the barrio ofUnion, and not of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time of his
municipality of §ogod, Leyte; but as he did election as municipal mayor of the latter
not accept the offer he returned to Kaato-an municipality on December 10, 1940.
onAugust 23,1938, andresumed hisemploy
ment there as nurseryman of the Bureau of 2. The Court of Appeals erred in af
Forestry. He stayed in the chinchona plan firming the decision ofthe trial court holding
(Mi tation until he resigned in September 1940. the election of Pedro Gallego to the office of
But during the period ofhis stay, there, his municipal mayorofAbuyog, Leyte, null and
wife and children remained in Abuyog, and void and ordering the exclusion ofGallego
he visited themin the month ofAugust ofthe from the office to which he was elected.
years 1938, and 1940. Altho the Government The only question presented is .whether or
offered him a free house in the chinchona not Pedro Gallego had been resident ofAbuyog
plantation, he never took his family there. for at leastone year priorto December 10, 1940.
iii Neither, did he avail himself of the offer of That question may be approached from either of
the Government of a parcel of the hectares of two angles: Did he lose his domicile in Abuyog
land within the reservation of the chinchona by the mere fact that he worked in Malaybalay
^1
plantation. Heandhis wife own realproperty as a government employee, registered himself
in Abuyog, part ofwhich he acquired during as a voter and voted there in the election for
his stay in Malaybalay.
assemblymen in December, 1938, and secured
ijgg) Nevertheless, On October 1, 1938 he hisresidence certificate therefor theyear 1940;
registered himself as an elector in precinct and assuming that he did, had he reacquired
No. 14 of Lantapan, municipality of Ma his domicile oforigin at least one year prior to
laybalay, Bukidnon, and voted there in the his election as mayor of Abuyog on December
election for assemblymen held in December, 10, 1040?
1938. The trial court noted that in his voter's
affidavit (exhibit B) he did not fill the blank The term "residence" as used in the elec
%ffi) space corresponding to the length of time he tion law is synonymous with "domicile" which
had residedin Malaybalay. On January 20, imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
1940, he obtained and paid for his residence place but also personal presence in that place,
certificate from the municipal treasurer of coupled with conduct indicative of such inten
&&i
Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated tion (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). In order to
that he had resided in said municipality for acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur
one year and a half. (1) residence or bodily presence in the new local
iaJ ity, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
Based upon the facts stated in the next pre intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
ceding paragraph, namely, (1) registration as a words, there must be an animus non revertendi
voter, (2) his having actually voted in Malaybalay and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain
in the 1938 election for assemblymen, and (3) in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
his residence certificate for 1940, the trial Court indefinite period of time. The acts of the person
must conform with his purpose. The change of had any house in which he lived either alone
residence must be voluntary; the residence at or with his family in the municipality of Ba
the place chosen for the domicile mustbe actual; cong of said province. All that he has done
and to the fact of residence there must be added in the latter municipality was to register as
the animus manendi. (17 am. Jur., Section 16, elector in 1919, through an affidavit stating
pages 599-601.) that he was a resident of said municipality;
run for representative "for the second district
In the light of these principles, we are per of the province of Oriental Negros and vote
suaded that the facts of this case weigh heavily in said municipality in said year; run again
against the theory that the petitioner had lost for reelection in the year 1922; launch his
his residence or domicile in Abuyog. We believe, 0 candidacyfor member ofthe provincialboard
he did not reside in Malaybalay with the inten of said province 1925, stating under oath in
tion of remaining there indefinitely and of not all his certificates of candidacy that he was
returning to Abuyog. He is a native of Abuyog. a resident of said municipality of Bacong.
Notwithstanding his periodic absences from
thereprevious to 1937, whenhe was employed as The affidavit made by him upon register
ig*i teacher in Samar, Agusan, and other municipali ingas elector in the municipality ofBacong in
ties of Leyte, he always returned there. In the tjie year1919, statingthat hewas a resident
year 1937 he resigned as a school teacher and of said municipality; his two certificates of
presented his candidacy for the office of mayor candidacy for the office ofrepresentative for
of said municipality. His departure therefrom the second district of the Province of Oriental
after his defeat in that election was temporary Negros, which were filed, the former in the
and onlyfor purpose of looking for employment year 1919 and the latter in the year 1922.
MiaJ
to make up for the financial drawback he had and the certificate of candidacy for the office
suffered as*a result of his defeat at the polls. of member of the provincial board filed by
After he had found employment in Malaybalay, him in the year 1925 in every one of which
he did take his wife and children thereto. He he stated that he was a resident of the mu
bought the offer of a free house by the govern nicipality of Bacong, are at most a prima
ment. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and facie evidence of the fact of his residence in
did not avail himself of the offer of the Govern the municipality ofBacong, whichis required
ment often hectares of land within the chichona by law in order that the corresponding of
reservation in Malaybalay, where he worked as ficials could register him as an elector and
a nurseryman. During the short period ofabout candidate, and not conclusive, and may be
(0 two years he stayed in Malaybalay as a govern attacked in a corresponding judicial proceed
mentemployee, he visitedhis home town andhis ing. If, according to the ruling laid down in
family no lessthan threetimes notwithstanding the case of Vivero vs. Maurillo cited above,
the great distancebetween the two places. mereregistration in a municipality in order
jjp)
to be an elector therein does not make one
The facts of his case are more analogous a resident of said municipality; if, according
to those of Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36), to constant rulings the word "residence" is
'jjfl Yra vs. Aba'o (52 Phil., 380), and Vivero vs. synonymous with "home" or "domicile" and
Murillo (52 Phil., 694) than to those of Nu- denotes a permanentdwelling place, towhich
val vs. Guray (52 Phil., 645) and Tanseco vs. an absent person intends to return; if the
Arteche (57 Phil., 227) which were followed right to vote in a municipality requires the
herein by the Court ofAppeals. In the Teves concurrence of two things, the act of resid
case this Court, in reversing the judgment ing coupled with the intention to do so; and
of the trial court, among other things said: if the herein respondent-appellant, Pedro
In this case the respondent-appellant, Teves, has alwayslivedwith his familyin the
Pedro Teves, from the year 1904has had his municipality ofDumaguete and neverin that
own house in the municipality of Dumaguete, ofBacong, he has neverlost his residence in
Hei Oriental Negros, wherein he has constantly Dumaguete. The fact that his registration
been living with his family and he has never as elector in the municipality of Bacong was
jfjftjtyi
L ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ' • 117
cancelled only on April 5,1934, upon his peti we cannot disregard without doing violence to
tion, did not disqualify him to be a candidate the will of the people of said town.
î
for the office of municipal president of said
municipality of Dumaguete on the ground Wherefore, the judgment ofthe court ofap
that, as has been stated in the case of Yra vs. peals is reversed, with the costs of this instance
Aba'o cited above, registration in the list of against the respondent. So ordered.
voters is not one of the conditions prescribed
by Section 431 of the Election Law in order to B. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec
be an elector; neither doesfailure to register G.R. No. 119976, September 18,1995
&£J
as such constitute one of the disqualifications
prescribed in Section 432 of said law. (61 KAPUNAN,*/.:
Phil. 36, 39-41.)
L Applying the foregoing pronouncements to
the facts ofpresent case, wefind sufficientground Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed
forthe revocationofthe judgment appealedfrom. her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
]Mi&
Petitioneralsocontendsthat evenassumingthat Representative ofthe First DistrictofLeyte with
he had lost his residence or domicile in Abuyog,
the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in
he reacquired it more than one year prior to De item no. 8:
iavjjili cember 10, 1940. In support of that contention
he invokes his letter or note, exhibit 9, addressed RESIDENCEJN THE CONSTITUENCY
to "Varel" (Valeriano Tupa), vice-president of WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMME
the political faction to which petitioner belongs, DIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
in which note he announced his intention to Years and seven Months
launch his candidacy again for municipal mayor
of Abuyog as early as the month of May, 1939. On March 23, 19995, private respondent
But we do not deem it necessary to pass upon Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representa
said contention in view of the conclusion we tive ofthe First District of Leyte and a candidate
have reached that the petitioner did not lose his for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancel
domicile of origin. lation and Disqualification" with the Commission
^)
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
We might add that the manifest intent of the the constitutional requirement for residency.
law in fixing a residence qualification is to ex In his petition, private respondent contended
Lui clude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one
the conditions and needs ofa community and not year residency requirement for candidates to
identified with the latter, from an elective office the House of Representatives on the evidence of
to serve that community; and when the evidence declarations made by her in Voter Registration
on the alleged lack of residence qualification is Record 94-No. 3349772 and in her Certificate of
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued
in the instant case, that the purpose of the law declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
would not be thwarted by upholding the right the certificate of candidacy."
to the office, the will of the electorate should
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
be respected. Petitioner is a native of Abuyog,
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
had run for the same office of municipal mayor changing the entry "seven" months to "since
of said town in the election preceding the one childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certifi
in question, had only been absent therefrom cate. On the same day, the Provincial Election
L for about two years without losing contact with
his townspeople and without intention of re
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
maining and residing indefinitely in the place [TJhis office cannot receive or accept the
of his employment; and he was elected with an aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on
ka
overwhelming majority of nearly 800 votes in a the ground that it is filed out of time, the
third-class municipality. These considerations deadline for the filing of the same having
tSJ
already lapsed on March 20,1995. The Cor I. The Issue of Petitioner's Qualifications
rected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for
i§gi
should have been filed on or before the March election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
20,1995 deadline. for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
Consequently,petitioner filed the Amended/ 1995 elections.
Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intrarnuros, Ma
nila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private I. Petitioner's qualification
:Kpi respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same
day. In saidAnswer, petitioner averredthat the Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or
M
entry ofthe word "seven" in her original Certifi the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
cate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify is their place of habitual residence." In Ong v.
by adding the words "since childhood" in her Republic™ this court,tookthe concept ofdomicile
• siai
Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and to mean an individual's "permanent home," "a
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City place to which, whenever absent for business or
as her domicile or residence." ... for pleasure, oneintends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that
OnApril 24,1995, the Second Division ofthe
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
they disclose intent."85 Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact
of2to 1,cameup with a Resolution1)findingpri
vate respondentPetition'sforDisqualification in ofresiding or physical presence in a fixed place"
SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking petitioner's and animus manendi, or the intention of return
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy ing there permanently.
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original
Certificate Candidacy.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the on the residence qualification for certain elective
May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc positions have placedbeyond doubtthe principle
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration that when the Constitution speaks of "residence"
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her in election law, it actually means only "domicile"
not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. The Resolution In the light of the principles just discussed,
tersely stated: has petitioner Imelda RomualdezMarcos satis
fied the residency requirement mandated by
After deliberating on the Motion for Re Article VI, Sec. 6* of the 1987 Constitution? Of
consideration, the Commission RESOLVED what significance is the questioned entry in
to DENY it, no new substantial matters petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
having been raised therein to warrant re residence in the First Legislative District ofLeyte
examination of the resolution granting the as seven (7) months?
petition for disqualification.
It is the factofresidence, not a statement-ina
certificate ofcandidacy which ought to be decisive
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying in determining whether or not an individual has
petitioner from running for the congressional satisfied the constitution's residency qualifica
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public tion requirement. The said statement becomes
respondent's Resolution suspending her procla material only when there is or appears to be a
mation, petitionercomes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Origi M19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100
nal and Supplemental Petitions. The principal Phil 221 (1956).
issues may be classifiedinto two general areas: B/d at 969.
iliiilji
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
a fact which would otherwise render a candidate in its above-cited statements supporting its
rMl
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
candidate to deUberately and knowingly make for the position of Representative of the First
a statement in a certificate of candidacy which District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
would lead to his or her disqualification. referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not »
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner
only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence
merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
in election law and the deliberations of the con
down the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement.... stitutional commission but also the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).86
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's
domicile.
What is undeniable, however, are the fol
'Ml lowing set of facts which establish the fact of
In support of its asseveration that peti petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
tioner's domicile could not possibly be in the from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
First District of Leyte; the Second Division of the Resolution:
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,
1995 maintains that "except for the time when In or about 1938 when respondent was
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years a little over 8 years old, she established her
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continu domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
ously lived in Manila." The Resolution addition She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
ally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she gradu
that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place ated from high school. She pursued her col
where she lived in the last few decades except lege studies in St. Pauls College, now Divine
Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolu Word University in Tacloban, where she
tion, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
Metro Manila where she was also registered she taught in the Leyte Chinese Schqol, still
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her in Tacloban City. In 1952, she went to Manila
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived to work with her cousin, the late speaker
in San Miguel, Manila where she registered as Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a House ofRepresentatives. In 1954, she mar
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Gover ried ex-President Perdinand E. Marcos when
nor ofMetro Manila, "She could not, have served he was st^ll a congressman of Hocos Norte
these positions if she had not been a resident of and registered, there as a voter. When her
Metro Manila," the COMELECstressed. Here is husband was elected Senator of the Republic
where the confusion lies.
in 1959, she and her husband lived together
•Jiid
We have stated, many times in the past, that in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
an individual does not lose his domicile even if he voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
has lived and maintained residences in different President of the Republic of the Philippines,
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
factual relationship to a given place for various registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent MB.P. 881, Sec. 117 states:
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, XXX XXX XXX
"Any person who transfer residence to another city,

the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation;
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since profession; employment in private or public service; edu
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate cational activities; work in military or naval reservations;
of candidacy because she became a resident of service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or
national policeforce; or confinement or detention in govern
many places" flies in the face of settled juris ment institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed
prudence ... to have lost his original residence.
isii
fej
^jfji
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
she and her family were abducted and kid former place of residence and establishing a new
napped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November one; and
Bgiffj
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992,
respondent ran for election as President of 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
the Philippines and filed her Certificate of In the absence of clear and positive proof
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is based on these criteria, the residence of origin
a resident and registered voter of San Juan, should be deemed to continue.. ..
Metro Manila.
In this connection, it cannot be correctly
Applying the principles discussed to the facts argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that by operation of law as a result of her marriage to
petitioner held various residences for different the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
purposes during the past four decades. None of For there is a clearly established distinction
these purposes unequivocally point to an inten between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile"
tion to abandon her domicile of origin in Taclo and "residence."88 The presumption that the
ban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born wife automatically gains the husband's domicile
in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Taclo inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
ban, reached her adulthood there and eventually Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
established residence in different parts of the Code is one area where the two concepts are well
country for various reasons. Even during her delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos specific area explains:
Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences In the Civil Code, there is an obvious dif
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other ference between domicile and residence. Both
important personal milestones in her home prov terms imply relations between a person and
ince, instituting well-publicized projects for the a place; but in residence, the relation is one
benefit of her province and hometown, and estab of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridi
lishing a political power base where her siblings cal, independent of the necessity of physical
presence.
and close relatives held positions of power either
through the ballot or by appointment, always Article 110 of the Civil Code provide:
with either her influence or consent. These well-
publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part Article 110. The husband shall fix the
of the history and lore of the quarter century of residence of the family. But the court may
Marcos power in our country. Either they were exempt the wife from living with the husband
entirely ignored in the COMELEC's Resolutions, ' if he should live abroad unless in the service
or the majority of the COMELEC did not know of the Republic.
what the rest of the country always knew: the
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence
as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. of origin in favor of the husband's choice of resi
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one dence upon marriage.
must demonstrate:87
1. An actual removal or an actual change

of domicile;
"TOLENTINO, I COMMENTARIES & JURISPRU

8718 Am Jur 219-220. DENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).
In the light of all the principles relating to and unassailable is that his domicile oforigin of
residence and domicile enunciated by this court record up to the time of filing of his most recent
Mi up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
established by the parties weigh heavily in favor Concepcion, Tarlac.
of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District Petitioner's alleged connection with the Sec
of Leyte. ond District of Makati*City is an alleged lease
agreement ofa condominium unit in the area. As
the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
WHEREFORE, having determined that The intention not to establish a perma
petitioner possesses the necessary residence nent home in Makati City is evident in his
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of leasing a condominium unit instead ofbuying
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, one. While a lease contract may be indicative
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated of respondent's intention to reside in Makati
April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are City it does not engender the kind of per
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is manency required to prove abandonment of
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of one's original domicile especially since, by its
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as&the duly terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years,
elected Representative of the First District of and respondent Aquino himselftestified that
ijftfoi Leyte. his intention was really for only one (1) year,
SO ORDERED. because he has other "residences" in Manila
or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and should

C. Aquino v. Commission on Elections
never be an indicia of the right to vote or to
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
(Many footnotes omitted)
claims that he has other residences in Metro
Manila coupled with the short length of time he
KAPUNAN, J.: claims to be a resident of the condominium unit
ii
in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (peti
We agree with COMELEC's contention that tioner) in transferring his physical residence" is
in order that petitioner could qualify as a can not to acquire a new, residence or domicile "but
didate for Representative of the Second District only to qualify as a candidate for Representa
of Makati City the latter "must prove that he tive of the Second District of Makati City." The
has estabUshed not just residence but domicile absence of clear and positive proof showing a
of choice." successful abandonment of domicile under the
conditions stated above, the lack of identifica
tion — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with
As found by the COMELEC en banc peti the area, and the suspicious circumstances under
tioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May which the lease agreement was effected all belie
11,1992 elections, indicated not only that he was petitioner's claim of residency for the period re
a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in quired by the Constitution, in the Second District
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for of Makati. COMELEC en banc emphatically
52 years immediately preceding that election. At pointed out:
the time, his certificate indicated that he was also
L a registered voter of the same district. His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birth
[T]he lease agreement was executed
mainly to support the one year residence
place of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. requirement as a qualification for a candi
Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself date of Representative, by establishing a
to the COMELEC at various times during his commencement dated of his residence. If
political career, what stands consistently clear a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot,
by itself establish a domicile of choice, this What militates against respondent's clain
particular lease agreement cannot do better. that he has met the residency requirement for the
position sought is his own Voter's Registratior
Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [An
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would nex "B", Petition] and his address indicated as 2<
be legally impossible to impose the one year Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara. Quezor
residency requirement in newly created political City. This evidence, standing alone, negates al!
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new his protestations that he established residence al
political district is not created out of thin air. Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as earl)
It is carved out from part of a real and existing as January 1997. It is highly improbable, na>
geographic area, in this case the old Municipal incredible, for respondent who previously ran foi
ity of Makati. That people actually lived or were the same position in the 3rd Legislative District
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 tc
Second District cannot be denied. . . . unwittingly forget the residency requirement foi
the office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June
D. Domino v. Commission 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct
on Elections No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elec
G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999 tions on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks
the one (1) year residency requirement provided
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: for candidates for Member of the House of Rep
resentatives under Section 6, Article VI of the
Challenged in this case for certiorari with Constitution.
a prayer for preliminary injunction are the
Resolution of 6 May 1998 of the Second Divi All told, petitioner's .evidence conspire to
sion of the Commission on Elections (hereafter attest to respondent's lack of residence in the
COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino constituency where he seeks election and while
(hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate it may be conceded that he is a registered voter
for representative of the Lone Legislative District as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. No.
of the Province of Sarangani in the II May 1998 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the
elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998 of the position .of Congressman for the Lone District of
COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion the Province of Sarangani.
for reconsideration.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May
he had complied with the one-year residence 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en
requirement and that he has been residing in banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence,
Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
said contention, DOMINO presented before the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in
the main, that the COMELEC committed grave
COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
[EXHIBITS OMITTED] of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet
the One-year residence requirement.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division
promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of rep
Before us DOMINO raised the following is
resentative of the lone district of Sarangani for
sues for resolution, to wit:
lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certifi a. Whether or not the judgment of the
cate of candidacy, on the basis of the following Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
findings: declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani
and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive necessarily carries with it the power to inquire
and binding upon the whole world, including into and settle all matters essential to the exer
the Commission on Elections; cise of said authority. However, except for the
right to remain in the list of voters or for being
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has
excluded therefrom for the particular election in
resided in the subject congressional district relation to which the proceedings had been held,
for at least one (1) year immediately preced a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding,
ing the May 11, 1998 elections; and even if final and unappealable, does not acquire
c. Whether or not respondent COM the nature of res judicata. In this sense, it does
ELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a not operate as a bar to any future action that a
quo for the disqualification of petitioner. party may. take concerning the subject passed
upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an
iiiwi
The First Issue. exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive
The contention of DOMINO that the deci on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent
sion of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon proceedings on his right to be registered as a
City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him voter in any other election.
a resident of the Province ofSarangani and not
of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
The Second Issue.
COMELEC cannot be sustained.
•%>
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided
in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in
certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the his certificate of candidacy? -
said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of We hold in the negative.
the COMELEC to determine whether false rep
resentation as to material facts was made in the
certificate of candidacy, that will include, among Records show that petitioner's domicile of
others, the residence of the candidate. origin was Candon, IlocosSur and that sometime
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice
Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceed at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
ings as to the right of DOMINO to be included QuezonCity, as shown by his certificate ofcandi
or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct dacyforthe position ofrepresentative of the 3rd
within its territorial jurisdiction, does not pre District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
clude the COMELEC, in the determination of Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and
upon the issue of compliance with the residency has established a new "domicile" of choice at the
requirement. Province of Sarangani.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclu A person's "domicile" once established is
£Ml
sion of voters in the list of voters are summary considered to continue and will not be deemed
in character. Thus, the factual findings of the lost until a new one is established. To success
trial court and its resultant conclusions in the fully effect a change of domicile one must dem
exclusion proceedings on matters other than onstrate an actual removal or an actual change
the right to vote in the precinct within its ter of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
ritorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the the formerplace ofresidence and establishing a
COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or new one and definite acts which correspond with
exclusion proceedings may pass upon any ques the purpose. In other words, there must basi
tion necessary to decide the issue raised includ cally be animus manendi coupled with animus,
ing the questions ofcitizenship and residence of non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the challenged voter, the authority to order the the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters period of time; thechange of residence must be
iiiii)

•^J
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give
for the new domicile must be actual. rise to a strong presumption of residence espe
It is the contention of petitioner that his cially in this case where DOMINO registered
actual' physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani in his former barangay. Exercising the right of
since December 1996 was sufficiently established election franchise is a deliberate public asser
by the lease of a house and lot located therein in
tion of the fact of residence, and is said to have
January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifi decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon
cations under oath of the residents of that place the place the elector claims as, or believes to be,
that they have seen petitioner and his family his residence. The fact that a party continuously
residing in their locality. voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in
assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
While this may be so, actual and physical
is not in itself sufficient to show that from said
His claim that his registration in Quezon
date he had transferred his residence in that
City was erroneous arid was caused by events
over which he had no control cannot be sustained.
place. To establish a new domicile of choice,
The general registration of voters for purposes
personal presence in the place must be coupled
of the May 1998 ejections was scheduled for two
with conduct indicative of that intention. While
(2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21,
"residence" simply requires bodily presence in
and 22.
a given plaqe, "domicile" requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared While, Domino's intention to establish
and probable intent to make it one's fixed and residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the
permanent place of abode, one's home. fact that be bought the house he was renting on
November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation
As a general rule, the principal elements of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22
of domicile, physical presence in the locality October 1997, and that he. applied for transfer
involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani
must concur in order to establish a new domicile. by reason of change of residence on 30 August
No change of domicile will result if either of 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year
these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a residency requirement under the Constitution.
domicile without actual residence in the locality
does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does In showing compliance with the residency
the fact of physical presence without intention. requirement, both intent and actual presence in
the district one intends to represent must satisfy
The lease contract entered into sometime the length of time prescribed by the fundamen
in January 1997, does not adequately support tal law. Domino's failure to do so rendered him
a change of domicile. The lease contract may ineligible and his election to office null and void.
be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside
in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile. The mere absence of 3. Citizenship qualification: CASES.
individual from his permanent residence, no mat
A. Co v. House Electoral Tribunal
ter how long, without the intention to abandon
it does not result in loss or change of domicile. G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e.,
15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence The petitioners come to this Court asking
of other circumstances, as the reckoning period for the setting aside and reversal ofa decision of
of the one-year residence requirement. the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
Further, Domino's lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is further The HRET declared that respondent Jose
strengthened by his act of registering as voter Ong, Jr. is.a natural born Filipino citizen and a
in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
iiMl)
purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or The private respondent graduated from col
not, in making that determination, the HRET lege, and thereafter took and passed the CPA
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Board Examinations.
fljjtfJ
Since employment opportunities were bet-

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
o ter in Manila, the respondent looked for work
The records show that in the year 1895, here. He found a jolj in the Central Bank of the
the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te worked in the hardware business of his family
established his residence in the municipality of in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
iî)
Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
the fruits of hard work. Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to
which in drafting the Constitution removed the
obtain a certificate of residence from the then
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship
Spanish colonial administration.
on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
The father of the private respondent, Jose and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's
Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
... As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met
precisely amending the article on this subject.
a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao. The two
fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 The private respondent frequently went
according to Catholic faith and practice. home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and
^3 spent his childhood days.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom
is the private respondent who was born in 1948. In 1984, the private respondent married a
Filipina named Desiree Lim.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose
trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during
On May 15,1957, the Court of First Instance those elections.
of Samar issued an order declaring the decision
of April 28,1955 as final and executory and that The private respondent after being engaged
Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of for several years in the management of their
Allegiance. family business decided to be of greater service
to his province and ran for public office. Hence,
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan
when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the
took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
elections for representative in the second district
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
of Northern Samar.
At.the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath,
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the
the private respondent then a minor of nine
people of Northern Samar as their representative
years was finishing his elementary education in
in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two
the province of Samar. There is nothing in the
petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead
records to differentiate him from other Filipinos
the two by more than 7,000 votes.
jiiiajl)
insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned. The pertinent portions of the Constitution
found in Article IV read:
After completing his elementary education, "SECTION 1, the following are citizens
the private respondent, in search for better edu of the Philippines:
cation, went-to Manila in order to acquire his 1. Those who are citizens of the Phil
secondary and college education. ippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
i£)
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Pre
citizens of the Philippines; siding Officer?
3. Those born before January 17,1973, Fr. Bernas: yes."
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citi
XXX
zenship upon reaching the age of majority; XXX XXX
and "Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well

4. Those who are naturalized in accor that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well
dance with law. written book, he said that the decision was
designed merely to accommodate former del
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are egate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
those who are citizens of the Philippines natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now
from birth without having to perform any it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas
j§£i
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. is goingagainst this intention by supporting
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in the amendment?
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see,
there has been an evolution in my thinking.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
3 above as applying not only to those who elect Vol. 1, p. 189)
Philippine citizenship after February 2,1987 but
XXX XXX XXX
also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. "Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes
very important because his election of Phil
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended
to correct an unfair position which discriminates
ippine citizenship makes him not only a
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Com
citizen entitling him to run for Congress ...
£^l mission, viz.: Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware
of that and for that reason we will leave it
"Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provi to the body to approve that provision of Sec
sion of section 4, would this refer only to tion 4.
those who elect Philippine citizenship after
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis
would it also cover those who elected it under for the provision because it strikes me as
the 1973 Constitution? unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born
a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody Filipino citizen or a natural born citizen."
who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution Vol. 1, p. 231)"
whether the election was done before or after
January 17,1973." (Records of the Constitu XXX XXX XXX
E^J
tional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis "Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provi
supplied). sion is to remedy an inequitable situation.
XXX XXX XXX
Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino
mJ
"Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citi fathers but alien mothers were natural-born
zenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino
Obligations and Human Rights has more or mothers but alien fathers would have to elect
less decided to extend the interpretation of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
who is a natural-born Citizen as provided in ofmajority; and if they do elect, they become
Section4 ofthe 1973 Constitution by adding Filipino citizens but not natural-born Fili
that persons who have elected Philippine pino citizens." (Records of the Constitutional
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent those acts valid which would have been nil at the
of the framers. To make the provision prospective time had it not been for the curative provisions.
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow inter (See Development Bank of the Philippines v.
pretation resulting in an inequitable situation. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
It must also be retroactive.
There is no dispu'te that the respondent's
It should be noted that in construing the law, mother was a natural born Filipina at the time
the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and ofwhether or not the respondent elected or chose
intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, to be a Filipino citizen.
especially where adherence to the latter would
Election becomes material because Section 2
result in absurdity and injustice, (Casela v. Court
of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
liiiiii)
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
born status to children born of Filipino mothers
A Constitutional provision should be con before January 17,1973, if they elect citizenship
strued so as to give it effective operation and upon reaching the age of majority.
baai suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence,
it is the spirit of the provision which should pre To expect the respondent to have formally or
vail-over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, in writing elected citizenship when he came of
103 U.S. 580) age is tc ask for the unnatural and unnecessary.
The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen
The provision in question was enacted to but his father had been naturalized when the re
correct the anomalous situation where one born spondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not
of a Filipino father and an alien mother was have divined when he came of age that in 1973
automatically granted the status of a natural- and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother require him to have filed a sworn statement in
and an alien father would still have to elect 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of through a sworn statement would have been an
a natural-born. unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino moth We have jurisprudence that defines "election"
ers with an alien father were placed on equal as both a formal and an informal process.
footing. They were both considered as natural- In the case of In Re: Flqrencio Mallare (59
born citizens. SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exer
tti0}
Hence, the bestowment of the status of cise of the right of suffrage and the participation
"natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the in election exercises constitute a positive act of
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
citizens made up of essentially the same similarly pronouncement of the Court, we held:
situated members.
Esteban's exercise ofthe right of suffrage
It is for this reason that the amendments when he came of age, constitutes a positive
were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this act of election of Philippine citizenship." (p.
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally 52; emphasis supplied)
all those born before the 1973 Constitution and The private respondent did more than merely
who elected Philippine citizenship either before exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
or after the effectivity of that Constitution. his life here in the Philippines.
The Constitutional provision in question
is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment
was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd We repeat that any election of Philippine
situation which then prevailed, and thus, render citizenship on the part of the private respondent
£|J
would not only, have been superfluous but it to be a Filipino when he came ofage. At that time
would also have resulted in an absurdity. How and up to the present, both mother and father
$0 can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have
The respondent HRET has an interesting elected any other citizenship unless he first for
view as to how Mr. Ong 'elected citizenship. It mally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor
observed that "when protestee was only nine of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons
years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became faced with a problem of election, there was no
a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised foreign nationality-of his father which he could
fc> Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit possibly have chosen.
to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country. Concededly, it was the law itself that B. Bengzon v. Cruz
had already elected Philippine citizenship for G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied) KAPUNAN, J.:
The petitioners argue that the respondent's The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C.
father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen Cruzyisat issue in this case, in view of the con
because of his premature taking of the oath of stitutional requirement that "no person shall be
citizenship.
a Member of the House of Representatives unless
The Court cannot go into the collateral he is a natural-born citizen."
procedure of stripping Mr. Cng^ father of his
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen
citizenship after his death and at this very late
ofthe Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
date just so we can go after the son.
Tarlac, onApril 27,1960, ofFilipino parents. The
The petitioners question the citizenship of fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
the father through a collateral approach. This Constitution.
is) can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on
a person's citizenship may only be done through a On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
31 SCRA 52 [1970]). and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
To ask the Court to declare the grant of United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth
and void would run against the principle of due Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid losehis citizenship by, among others, "rendering
to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity service to or accepting commission in the armed
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. forces ofa foreign-country." ...
To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong Chuan's
lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not rise beyond On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reac
^•1 where his mortal remains now lie to defend
quired his Philippine citizenship through repa
himself were this matter to be made a central
triation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran
issue in this case."
for and was elected as the Representative of the
|g) The issue before us is not the nullification Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
Our function is to determine whether or not of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson
the HRET committed abuse of authority in the III, who was then running for re-election.
exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent
traces his natural born citizenship through his
mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The issue now before us is whether respon
'§&§}
The citizenship of the father is relevant only to dent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became
determine whether or not the respondent "chose" an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his rea~cquisition of monwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Philippine citizenship. Revised NaturaHzation Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an
no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he qualifications and none of the disqualifications
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Consti executory only after two (2) years from its prom
tution expressly states that natural-born citizens ulgation when the court is satisfied that during
are those who are citizens from birth without the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to
such citizenship. a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
Respondent on the other hand contends that convicted of any offense or violation of Govern
he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen ment promulgated rules; or (4) committed any
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.
birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a Filipino citizens who have lost their citizen
natural-born citizen. ship may however reacquire the same in the
j&£^ manner provided by law. CommonwealthAct No.
The petition is without merit.
63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
Filipino citizens as follows: by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Phil
ippines at the time of the adoption of this Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition
Constitution; and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode ofinitially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
citizens of the Philippines;
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
(3) Those born before January 17,1973 naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philip
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine pine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino
iiii and citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citi
zenship must possess certain qualifications and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accor none of the disqualifications mentioned in Sec
dance with law. tion 4 of CA. No. 473.
There are two ways ofacquiring citizenship: Repatriation, on the other hand, maybe had
(1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These under various statutes by those who lost their
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, forces; (2) servicein the armed forces ofthe allied
and the naturalized citizen. A person who at forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular Forces of the United States at any other time;
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. (4) marriage ofa Filipinowomanto an alien; and
As defined in the same Constitution, natural- (5) political and economic necessity.
born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines As distinguished from the lengthy process
iiiiiiiJ
from birth without having to perform any act to ofnaturalization, repatriation simplyconsists of
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." the takingofan oath ofallegiance tothe Republic
On the other hand, naturalized citizens of the Philippines and registering said oath in
are those who have become Filipino citizens the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
through naturalization, generally under Com person concernedresides or last resided.
*m>
iiggj
Ini4n.âro v. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 (1999), Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz
we held: is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had
mj to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
.... Parenthetically, under these stat
untenable. As correctly explained by the BET in
utes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine
first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
citizenship would not even be required to
Constitution as follows:
file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is
ic£ii}
Republic of the Philippines and to register one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
that fact with the civil registry in the place birth without having to perform any act to
of his residence or where he had last resided acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
in the Philippines.
Two requisites must concur for a person to
Moreover, repatriation results in the recov be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
ery of the original nationality. This means that a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
jtj^j)
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Philippine citizenship.
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was 7
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored were two categories of, Filipino citizens which
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. were not considered natural-born: (1) those
who were naturalized and (2) those born before
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Fili January 17,1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon
iiiiijij pino,citizenship when he rendered service in the reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship considered natural-born obviously because they
under RA. No. 2630, which provides: were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
Philippine citizenship by rendering service of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
iigj
to, or accepting commission in; the Armed 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
Forces of the United States, of after separa natural-born because they also had to perform
tion from the Armed Forces of the United an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
States, acquired United States citizenship, The present Constitution, however, now
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
considers those born of Filipino mothers before
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
of the Philippines and registering the same
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
with Local Civil Registry in the place where
majority age as natural-born. After defining who
he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
IV adds a sentence: 'Those who elect Philippine
i^l citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Having thus taken the required oath of al Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
legiance to the Republic and having registered citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Fili
tpi)
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, pinos are considered not natural-born citizens.
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have citizens under the present Constitution that
recovered his original status as a natural-born there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the who are natural-born and (2) those who are
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen,
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
return to, his original status before he lost his have to undergo the process of naturalization
Philippine citizenship. to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Fihpino. Noteworthy is the absence 0 SECTION 1. Any person who had
in said enumeration of a separate category for lost his Philippine citizenship be render
persons who, after losingPhilippinecitizenship, ing service to, or .accepting commission in
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is the Armed Forces of the United States, or
clear: as to such persons, they would either be after separation from the Armed Forces of
natural-born or naturalized depending on the the United States, acquired United States
^j)
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizen
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the ship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was Republic of the Philippines and registering
not required by law to go through naturalization the same with the Local Civil Registry in
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, the place.where he resides or last resided in
he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
pa
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to shall contain a renunciation of any other
be elected as member of the House of Represen citizenship."
tatives.
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts be
Afinal point. The HRET has been empowered fore he could again become a Filipino citizen. He
by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
contests relating to the election, returns, and of the Philippines and register his oath with the
qualificationsof the members of the House. The Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan.
L Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to He had to renounce his American citizenship
check "whether or not there has been a grave and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Philippine citizenship.
of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the
£M)
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born
Court to exercise its corrective power and annul citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpreta
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the tion and construction of a constitution is to give
^^) Court's judgment for that of the latter for the effect to the intention of the framers and of the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition people who adopted it. Words appearing in a
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of Constitution are used according to their plain,
the assailed decision. There is no such showing natural, and usual significance and import and
%j0
of grave abuse of discretion in this case. must be understood in the sense most obvious to
the common understanding of the people at the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS time of its adoption.
MISSED.
The provision on "natural-borncitizensof the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting: Philippines"is precise, clear and definite.Indeed,
neither HRET nor this Court can construe it
other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, not phrased in general language which may call
Article IV of the Constitution defines natural- for construction of what the words imply.
born citizens as "those who are citizens of the
tm Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine The definition of a natural-born citizen in
citizenship." the Constitution must be applied to this petition
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows: according to its natural sense.
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PRO Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the
VIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHIL "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through
iiiv/
IPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO anyofthese modes: (naturalization,repatriation
LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDER and legislationunder Section3, CA. No. 63) re
ING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COM sults in the restoration of previous status, either
ffiifi MISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a
THE UNITED STATES, provides: simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through natural Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Consti
ization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen tution, particularly in Section 2, Article F
concerned can not be considered natural-born. thereof, is meant to refer to those 'who ar
Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to citizens of the Philippines from birth withou
become a citizen. having to perform any act to acquire or per
As expressed in the Dissent ofJustice Jose C. feet their citizenship,' and to those 'who elec
Vitug in the instant case, concurred in by Justice Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, tin
Jose A.R. Melo [in the HRET decision]: Supreme Court has declared that where tin
law speaks in clear and categorical language
"Repatriation is the resumption or re there is no room for interpretation, vacilla
covery of the original nationality upon the tion or equivocation — there is only room foi
fulfillment of certain conditions. While an application. The phrase 'from birth' indicate*
applicant need not have to undergo the te that there is a starting point of his citizenshit
dious and time consuming process required and this citizenship should be continuous
by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, constant and without interruption."
as amended), he, nevertheless, would still
Thus, respondent is not eligible for electior
have to make an express and unequivocal
to Congress as the Constitution requires that a
act of formally rejecting his adopted state
member of the House of Representatives must
and reaffirming his total and exclusive al
be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
legiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be For sure, the framers of our Constitution
considered a natural-born citizen under the intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
first part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 requirement for higher elective offices, including
Constitution, one should not have to perform that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise,
any act at all or go through any process, the Constitution should have simply provided
judicial or administrative, to enable him to that a candidate for such position can be merely
tjgS) reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local
that a natural-born citizen is one who is able elective officers.
to claim citizenship without any prior decla
igjjj)
ration on his part of a desire? to obtain such
status. Under this view, the term 'natural WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT thepetition.
born' citizens could also cover those who have
been collectively deemed citizens by reason C. Valles v. Comelec
of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
of 1902 and those who have been accorded by
the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens PURISHMA, J.:
I'JgJ (those born in the Philippines of alien parents
who, before the adoption of the 1935 Con [The issue in this case is the citizenship of
stitution had been elected to public office.)" Rosalind Ybasco Lopez]
jg£> The two dissenting Justices correctly stated The Philippine law on citizenship adheres
that the "stringent requirement of the Constitu to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
tion is so placed as to insure that only Filipino child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
citizens with an absolute and permanent degree parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
^1
of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which de
membership in Congress, the branch of the gov termines nationality or citizenship on the basis
ernment directly involved and given the delicate of place of birth.
%l
task of legislation." Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
The dissenting opinion further states: was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
'The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez,
&iJ
an Australian. Historically, this was a year be Islands who are citizens of the United States,
fore the 1935 Constitution took into effect and or who could become citizens of the United
v^>
at that time, what served as the Constitution of States under the laws of the United States if
the Philippines were the principal organic acts residing therein, (underscoring ours)
by which the United States governed the country. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of
'•Hip\ These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, April 11,1899and resided therein including their
1916, also known as the Jones Law. children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
814 Amongothers, these laws defined who were Private respondent's father, Telesforo Ybasco,
deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. was born on January 5,1879 in Daet, Camarines
The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
ipj
citizens as: copyof an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philip Law,Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to bea Philip
pineIslandscontinuing to residetherein who pine citizen. Byvirtue of the same laws, which
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
ofApril, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent
and then resided in the Philippine Islands, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
and their children born subsequent thereto,
the Philippines.
^r)
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
PhilippineIslands and as such entitled to the The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
protection ofthe United States, except such Constitution has established the principle ofjus
^J as shall have elected to preserve their alle sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philip
giance to the Crown ofSpain in accordance pine citizenship...
with the provisions of the treaty of peace So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which
between the United States and Spain signed
confers citizenship by virtue of blood relation
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
ship, was subsequently retained under the 1973
and ninety-eight, (underscoring ours)
Constitution...
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
jpl Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosa
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Phil lind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having
ippine Islands whowere Spanish subjects on been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred beingborn in Australians not tantamount to her
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
Islands, and their children born subsequent follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citi private respondent can also claim Australian
zens of the Philippine Islands, except such citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
as shall have elected to preserve their alle citizenship.
giance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions ofthe treaty ofpeace be Petitioner also contends that even on the
^)
tween the United States and Spain, signed at assumption that the private respondent is a
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced
ninety-eight, and except such others as have herPhilippine citizenship. To buttress this con
since become citizens of some other country: tention, petitioner citedprivaterespondent's ap
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, plication for anAlien Certificate ofRegistration
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate ofResidence
provide by law for the acquisition of Phil (ICR), onSeptember 19,1988, andtheissuance to
ippine citizenship by those natives of the her of an Australian passport on March 3,1988.
Philippine Islands who cannot come within Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the citizenmaylosehis citizenship:
t&y
insular possessions ofthe United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine (1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
igi
s^
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship; against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
%>
to support the constitution or laws of a foreign citizenship, the same must be express. [Com
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age monwealth Act No. 63, Section 1.] As held by
or more;
this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
i&a application for an alien certificate of registration
(4) By accepting commission in the military, does not amount to an express renunciation or
naval or air service of a foreign country; repudiation of one's citizenship.oThe application
(5) By cancellation of the certificate, of of the herein private respondent for an alien
naturalization; certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado
(6) By having been declared by competent v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
sjja authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed Australian citizenship before she effectively
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and respondent had dual citizenship — she was an
k4 (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, Australian and a Filipino, as well.
to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force Moreover, under Commonwealth Act No.
in her husband's country, she acquires his na 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
tionality. born in another country has not been included as
In order that citizenship may be lost by re a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship.
nunciation, such renunciation must be express. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce
Petitioner's contention that the application of her Philippine citizenship, petitioner's claim
private respondent for an alien certificate of reg that respondent must go through the process of
istration, and her Australian passport, is bereft repatriation does not hold water.
of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case Petitioner also maintains that even on the
:&tfi
olAznar v. COMELEC [185 SCRA 703] and in assumption that the private respondent had
the more recent case of Mercado v. Manzano and dual citizenship, still, she is disquahfied to run
COMELEC [G.R. No. 135083, May 26,1999]. for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40
:>ift/L
In the case olAznar, the Court ruled that the of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the
mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
ofa certificate stating that he is an American did
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The fol
j0) not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that lowing persons are disqualified from running
an application for an alien certificate of registra for any elective local position:
tion was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. xxx. .xxx.
.xxx
And, in Mercado v. Manzano and COM
ELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent (d) Those with dual citizenship;
Manzano was registered as an American citizen xxx. .XXX.
in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation .XXX
and was holding an American passport on April
22,1997, only a year before he filed a certificate Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.
'•jjiA
of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the In the aforecited case of Mercado v. Manzano,
termination of his American citizenship. the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in
the Local Government Code and reconciled the
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Con
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Aus stitution on dual allegiance. ["Dual allegiance
tralian passport and had an alien certificate of of citizens is inimical to the national interest
registration are not acts constituting an effective and shall be dealt with by law."] Recognizing
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate situations in which a Filipino citizen may, with-
to
i'at

i^p
out performing any act, and as an involuntary

consequence of the conflicting laws of different
^t WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
countries, be also a citizen of another state,
MISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
July 17,1998 and January 15,1999, respectively,
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: »
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez

"xxx the phrase 'dual citizenship' in is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor
R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40(d) and in R.A. No. of Davao Oriental.
7854, xxx must be understood as referring
to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently, persons SEC. 7. THE MEMBERS OF THE
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
ijf> this disqualification." BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF THREE
Thus, the fact that the private respondent YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT
had dual citizenship did not automatically
NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE
disqualify her from running for a public office.
NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of REPRESENTATIVES SHALL SERVE FOR
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE
status as persons with dual citizenship. [Mercado TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION
v. Manzano, supra.] The filing of a certificate of OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF
ijffi* candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizen TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN
ship, effectively removing any disqualification INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF
as a dual citizen. [Ibid.] This is so because in the HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines 1. Term and tenure.
and will maintain true faith and allegiance
&S)
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, A. Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
teJ respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in
1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian
citizenship.
In theorizing that the provision under
consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Then, too, it is significant to note that on Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse
January 15 1992, private respondent executed "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly dis
a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian tinguished by the Solicitor General:
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department
tyi
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
'The term of office prescribed by the Con
on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
stitution may not be extended or shortened
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private re
by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period
•'^k
spondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
during which an officer actually holds the
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
office (tenure), may be affected by circum
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
stances within or beyond the power of said
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term
fcy.'i
settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
or it may not exist at all. These situations will
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation
not change the duration ofthe term ofoffice
was effective, petitioner's claim that private re
(see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12).'v
spondent must go through the whole process of Under the questioned provision, when an
repatriation holds no water. elective official covered thereby files a certificate
of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to a limitation on elective officials who run for an
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his office other than the one they are holding in a
term. The term remains and his successor, if any, permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
is allowed to serve its unexpired portion. facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the cer
tificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of
B. Farinas, et al. v. Executive Secretary the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced
G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003 in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
km CALLEJO, SR., J.: The petitioners also assert that Section 14
Before the Court are two Petitions under
of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protec
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seek tion clause of the Constitution because it repeals
ing to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes
insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
Pambansa 31g. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive
which provides:
office or position. — Any person holding a
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective public appointive office or position, includ
office. — Any elective official, whether na ing active members of the Armed Forces of
tional or local, running for any office other the Philippines, and officers and employees
than the one which he is holding in a per in government-owned or controlled corpora
manent capacity, except for President and tions, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
fcsa
Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto from his office upon the filing of his certificate
resigned from his office upon the filing of his of candidacy.
certificate of candidacy. They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in 9006 discriminates against appointive officials.
G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farinas,
By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official
who runs for office other than the one which
Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and
he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto
Agapito A. Aquino. . .
resigned/therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in,public
The petitioners now come to the Court al office even as they campaign for re-election or
election for another elective position. On the
leging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act
other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for
the limitation on appointive officials remains —
being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of they are still considered ipso facto resigned from
the Constitution, requiring every law to have their offices upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy.
only one subject which should be expressed in
its title. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not
Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilar and void. Even Section 16 of the law which pro
ity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, vides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus approval" is a violation of the due process clause
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence*
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
use of media for election propaganda and the
p^-%
elimination of unfair election practices, while Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
ij&)
hence, should not have been repealed. The peti national elections beings barely six months
tioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo away, reinforce our stand.
v.Mitra, Jr., [202 SCRA 779 (1991)]that Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the Every statute is presumed valid. The pre
constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of sumption is that the legislature intended to en
Public Officers": act a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. — effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
Public officers and employees must at all
mi times be accountable to the people, serve It is equally well-established, however, that
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, the courts,as guardians ofthe Constitution, have
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism the inherent authority to determine whether a
and justice, and lead modest lives. statute enacted by the legislature transcends
the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And
Consequently, the respondents Speaker where the acts of the other branches of govern
and Secretary General of the House of Repre ment run afoul of the Constitution, it is'the
sentatives acted with grave abuse of discretion judiciary's solemn and sacred duty to nullify
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for the same.
notjconsidering those members of the House who
ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, shall now resolve the substantial issues raised
by the petitions.
upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy. Section 14 of Pep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider
The Court's Ruling Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

provides:
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the SEC. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Con
petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus gress shall embrace only one subject which
Election Code, which this Court had declared in shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the con
stitutional provision on accountability of public The proscription is aimed against the evils of
officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legisla
of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching sig tion as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered
nificance" that justifies this Court's adoption ofa encroaches. The provision merely calls for all
parts of an act relating to its subject finding
liberal stance vis-a-vis the procedural matter on
expression in its title.
standing. Moreover, with the national elections
barely seven months away, it behooves the Court To determine whether there has been compli
to confront the issue now and resolve the same ance with the constitutional requirement that the
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title,
Court is quite apropos: the Court laid down the rule that —
c
. . . All await the decision of this Court Constitutional provisions relating to

on the constitutional question. Considering, the subject matter and titles of statutes
therefore, the importance which the instant should not be so narrowly construed as to
case has assumed and to prevent multiplic cripple or impede the power of legislation.
ity of suits, strong reasons of public policy The requirement that the subject of an act
demand that [its] constitutionality... be now shall be expressed in its title should receive a
resolved. It may likewise be added that the reasonable and not a technical construction.
exceptional character of the situation that It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
confronts us, the paramount public interest, enough reasonably to include the general
and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means for the method and means ofcarrying out the
necessary or convenient for the accomplish general subject.
ing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The title need not be an abstract
or index of the Act. The legislators considered Section 67 of the
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act
Omnibus Election Code as a.form of harassment
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, or discrimination that had to be done away with
Peaceful ancl Credible Elections through Fair
and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the
Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides
not only the declaration of principles but also the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For
objectives thereof:
sure, some sectors of society and in government
may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
tM) Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. — The pelicy as it would encourage political adventur
State shall, during the election period, super ism. But policy matters are not the concern
vise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the Court. Government policy is within the
of all franchises or permits for the operation exclusive dominion of the political branches
of media of communication or information to of the government. It is not for this Court to
guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
public service, including access to media time determination. Indeed, whether an enactment
and space, and the equitable right to reply, is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
for public information campaigns and fora economic theory, whether it is the best means to
among candidates and assure free, orderly, achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
honest, peaceful and credible elections. legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
should be exercised in a particular manner are
The State shall ensure that bona fide
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
candidates for any public office shall be free
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice
from any form of harassment and discrimi
to bring them within the range of judicial cogni
nation.
zance. Congress is not precluded from repealing
The Court is convinced that the title and the Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehen v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision
sive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of and by its' pronouncement in the same case
the Omnibus Election Code within its contempla that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
tion. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal
of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist the law on its belief that the election process is
that the title be a complete index of its content. thereby enhanced and the paramount objective
of election laws — the fair, honest and orderly
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 election of truly deserving members of Congress
of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes — is achieved.
a limitation on elective officials who run for
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the con
an office other than the one they are holding, stitutional directive that the subject of a bill
to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
use of media for election propaganda, does of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. law of matters which have not received the no
This Court has held that an act having a tice, action and study of the legislators and the
single general subject, indicated in the title, public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that
may contain any number of provisions, no the legislators were not apprised of the repeal
matter how diverse they may be, so long as of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the same was amply and comprehensively de
the general subject, and may be considered liberated upon by the members of the House. In
in furtherance of such subject by providing fact, the petitioners, as members of the House
"ofRepresentatives, expressed their reservations entitled to security of tenure while others serve
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. at the pleasure ofthe appointing authority.
Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the
existence of the provision repealing Section 67 Another substantial distinction between
of the Omnibus Election Code. the two sets ofofficials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Commission, BookV ofthe Administrative Code
Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
Constitution
officials, as officers and employees in the civil
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal service, are strictly prohibited from engagingin
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code per any partisan political activity or take part in any
taining to elective officials gives undue benefit election except tovote. Under the sameprovision,
to such officials as against the appointive ones elective officials, or officers or employees holding
and violates the equal protection clause of the political offices, are obviously expresslyallowed
constitution, is tenuous. to take part in political and electoral activities.
The equal protection of the law clause in ByrepealingSection67 but retaining Section
the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject 66 ofthe Omnibus Election Code,the legislators
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are 'deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
characterized by substantial distinctions that officials differently with respect to the effect on
make real differences, one class may be treated their tenure in the office of the filing of the cer
and regulated differently from the other. The tificates of candidacy for any position other than
Court has explained the nature of the equal those occupied by them. Again, it is not within
protection guarantee in this manner: the power of the Court to pass upon or look into
the wisdom of this classification.
The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class Since the classification justifying Section
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in material and significant distinctions and all the
the object to which it is directed or by territory persons belonging under the same classification
within which it is to operate. It does not demand are similarly treated, the equal protection clause
absolute equality among residents; it merely of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In
under like circumstances and conditions both as
this Case
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by Not content with their plea for the nullifi
legislation which applies only to those persons cation of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike petitioners insist that the entire law should be
to all persons within such class, and reasonable nullified. They contend that irregularities at
grounds exist for making a distinction between tended the passage of the said law particularly
those who fall within such class and those who in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
do not.
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicam
Substantial distinctions clearly exist be eral Conference Committee) members by the
tween elective officials and appointive officials. House during its session on February 5, 2001;
The former occupy their office by virtue of the b. No communication from the Senate for a
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to
conference on the compromise bill submitted by
an office for a definite term and may be removed
the BCC on November 29, 2000;
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd
officeby virtue of their designation thereto by an BCC was presented for approval on the floor
appointing authority. Some appointive officials without copies thereof being furnished the mem
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are bers;
Mi
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its facto resigned from his office upon the filing
proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was "of the certificate of candidacy.
&£j
not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to gc
as well as its senator-members at the time it
behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is
was presented to and rammed for approval by
not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine,'
jilij the House;
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
e. There was no meeting actually conducted and the Senate President and the certification o]
by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
•i&fll was instantly made and passed around for the was passed are conclusive of its due enactment
signature of the BCC members; A review of cases reveals the Court's consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reasor
f. The Senate has no record of the creation
to deviate from the salutary rule in this case
of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that con where the irregularities alleged by the petition
vened on November 23, 2000; ers mostly involved the internal rules of Con
g. The "Effectivity",clauses of SB No. 1741 gress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
and HB No. £000, as well as that of the compro Conference Committee by the House. This Court
mise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on is ndt the proper forum for the enforcement oJ
November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that these internal rules o£Congress, whether House
complywith the publication required by the Civil or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely proce
Code and jurisprudence, to wit: dural and with their observance the courts have
no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as tc
xxx xxx xxx
the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its
its final form as it appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
with the provision that "This Act shall take effect But the cases, both here and abroad, in vary
flfr&j
immediately upon its approval"; ing forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
h. The copy of the compromipe bill submit power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting
ted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the a law, a House of Congress failed.to comply with
members during its consideration on February its own rules, in the absence of showing that
7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it now ap there was a violation of a constitutional provision
pears in RA No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise or the rights of private individuals. In Osmefia v.
bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
objection thereto was made; declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the rules are merely procedural, and with their
changes in or amendments to the subject mea observance, the courts have no concern. They
sure"; and may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
amendment," which is Section 12 of the compro to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
mise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
the subject of the purported proposed amend requisite number of members have agreed to a
ment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as particular measure."'
stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision The Effectivity Clause Is Defective
states, thusly:
Finally, the ''Effectivity" clause (Section 16)
Sec. 12.Limitation on Elected Officials. ofRep.Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall
—Any elected officialwho runsibr president take effect immediately upon its approval." is
and vice-president shall be considered ipso defective. However, the same does not render
L
the entire law invalid. In Tanada v. Tuvera, this people cannotrepresent the people! Respondent
Court laid down the rule: Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino
. . . the clause "unless it is otherwise
M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14,
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th leg
not to the requirement of publication itself, islative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated
kail
which cannot in any event be omitted. This legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that
clause does not mean that the legislator may she should continue governing the people of
make the law effective immediately upon Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the
approval, or on any other date without its sovereign will of the people is not subject to the
previous publication. discretion of any official of the land.
Publication is indispensable in every case, This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo
but the legislature may in its discretion provide Warranto directed against respondents Speaker
that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto
or extended . . .
P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to
compel them to implement the decision of the
L Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and Commission on Elections en banc by (a) admin
the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, Rep. Act No. istering the oath of office to petitioner as the
9006, notwithstanding its express statement, duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative
kn took effect fifteen days after its publication in district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general the petitioner in the Roll ofMembers ofthe House
circulation. of Representatives, and against respondent Ma.
I In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of
the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into,
and unlawfully holding and exercising the said
r law is that the courts do not involve themselves public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
L statute. That is the exclusive -concern of the
legislative branch of the government. When the [The decision next details the steps leading
validity of a statute is challenged on constitu to the final proclamation of Codilla as the win
tional grounds, the sole function of the court is to ning candidate.]
determine whether it transcends constitutional These notwithstanding, and despite receipt
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No by the House of Representatives of a copy of the
such transgression has been shown in this case. COMELEC en baric resolution on September
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DIS 20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on
MISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner
sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-
[Footnotes Omitted] NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter addressed to
respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October
SEC. 8. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVID
25,2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto
ED BY LAW, THE REGULAR ELECTION
T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T.
ifci'i OF THE SENATORS AND THE MEMBERS
Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Ser
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
gio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of
SHALL BE HELD ON THE SECOND MON
Representatives to act decisively on the matter
DAY OF MAY.
l%i
in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever
1. Election. remedy is available should their action remain
unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
A. Codilla v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002 In response, SpeakerDeVenecia sent a letter
dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
PUNO, J.: "We recognize the finality of the COM
In a democracy, the first self-evident prin ELEC decision and we are inclined to sus
ciple is that he who has been rejected by the tain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially
L
ij&j
notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, Secretary-General shall likewise register the
inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members
September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly of the House of Representatives after he has
defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. taken his oath of office. This decision shall be
This ultimately means that implementing immediately executory.
the decision would result in the spectacle
of having two (2) legislators occupying the
SEC. 9. IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE
same congressional seat, a legal situation,
SENATE OR IN THE HOUSE OF REPRE
i-folii! the only consideration, that effectively deters
SENTATIVES, A SPECIAL ELECTION MAY
the HOUSE'S liberty to take action.
BE CALLED TO FILL SUCH VACANCY IN
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW,
the implementation of the COMELEC deci BUT THE SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE
sion is a matter that can be best, and with HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THUS
finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, ELECTED SHALL SERVE ONLY FOR THE
which, hopefully, shall act on it most expedi UNEXPIRED TERM.
tiously." (emphases supplied)
1. Special Election.
Hence, the present petition for mandamus
and quo warranto. A. Tolentino v. Comelec
In the case at bar, the administration of oath G.R. No. 148334, January 21. 2004
and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll
of Members of the House of Representatives CARPIO, J.:
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte Shortly after her succession to the Presidency
is no longer a matter of discretion on the part in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-
of the public respondents. The facts are settled Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guin-
and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 gona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President.
votes as against respondent Locsin. who only got Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President
'k&b COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the on 9 February 2001.
proclamation ofrespondent Locsin; on Motion for i
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside Following Senator Guingona's confirmation,
the order of its Second Division and ordered the the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolu
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of tion No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the
the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution
before this Court by respondent Locsin and said No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
tafliiE
Decision has become final and executory. through a special election to be held simultane
ously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Rep Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were
resentative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte due to be elected in that election. Resolution No.
has been finally settled by the COMELEC en 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candi
banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction date garnering the 13th highest number of votes
on the matter. The rule of law demands that its shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends
There is no alternative to the rule of law except on 30 June 2004.
the reign of chaos and confusion.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had can
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Man vassed the election results from all the provinces
damus is granted. Public Speaker of the House but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued
of Representatives shall administer the oath Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming
of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution
as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve
legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years
and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the the Senate. Petitioners point out that in those
unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teo elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the
Eaafr
fisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice- votes castfor the senatorial candidates running
President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") under the regular elections from the votes cast
and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th for the candidates running under the special
and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005. elections. COMELEC alsoseparatelyproclaimed
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolen- the winners in each of*those elections.
tino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters Petitioners sought the issuance ofa tempo
and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for pro rary restraining order during the pendency of
hibition, impleading only COMELEC as respon their petition.
dent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC
from proclaiming with finality the candidate for
itai Senator receiving the 13th highest number of The Issues
votes as the winner in the special election for a
single three-year term seat. Accordingly, peti The following are the issues presented for
resolution:
tioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution
No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation (1) Procedurally —
to such effect.
(a) whether the petition is in fact a peti
•sAi
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued tion for quo warranto over which the Senate
Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction be Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
cause: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as re (b) whether the petition is moot; and
quired under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (c) whether petitioners have standing
("R.A. No. 6645"); (2) it failed to require senato to litigate.
rial candidates to indicate in their certificates of
candidacy whether they seek election under the (2) On the merits, whether a special election
special or regular elections as allegedly required to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Big. 881; validly held on 14 May 2001.
and, consequently: (3) it failed to specify in the The Ruling of the Court
VotersInformation Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial The petition has no merit.
elections as purportedly required under Section On the Preliminary Matters: The Nature of
4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction
No. 6646"). Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes
Aquo warranto proceedingis, among others,
one to determine the right of a public officer in
iMib cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14May
the exercise of his office and to oust him from
2001 elections without distinction such that
its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded.
"there were no two separate Senate elections Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
held simultaneously but just a single electionfor the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the solejudge of
thirteen seats, irrespective of term." all contests relating to the qualifications of the
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if members of the Senate.
held simultaneously, a specialand a regular elec A perusal of the allegations contained in
tion must be distinguished in the documentation the instant petition shows, however, that what
as well as in the canvassing of their results. To petitioners are questioning is the validity of the
support their claim, petitioners cite the special special election on 14 May 2001 in which Hona
elections simultaneously held with the regular san was elected. Petitioners'various prayers are,
elections of November 1951 and November 1955 namely: (1) a "declaration" that no special elec
to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando tion was held simultaneously with the general
Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COM
became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in ELEC from declaring anyone as having won in •
the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose.
Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Reso The Senator or Member of the House ofRep
lutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the resentatives thus elected shall serve only for
special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers the unexpired term.
on COMELEC's alleged failure to comply with
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elec
certain requirements pertaining to the conduct
tions shall fix the date-of the special election,
of that special election. Clearly then, the petition
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45)
does not seek to determine Honasan's right in
days nor later than ninety (90) days from the
the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners'
date of such resolution or communication,
prayer for the annulment of Honasan's proclama stating among other things the office or of
tion and, ultimately, election is merely incidental fices to be voted for: Provided, however, That
to petitioners' cause of action. Consequently, the if within the said period a general election
Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the is scheduled to be held, the special election
instant petition. shall be held simultaneously with such gen
eral election. (Emphasis supplied)
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subse
Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly quently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
Held on 14 May 2001 follows:
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitu Postponement, Failure of Election and

tion, a special election may be called to fill any Special Elections. —.. ."In case a permanent
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Repre vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
sentatives "in the manner prescribed by law," Representatives at least one (1) year before
thus: the expiration of the term, the Commission
shall call and hold a special election to fill
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days
the House of Representatives, a.special elec nor longer than ninety (90) days after the
tion may be called to fill such vacancy in the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or of such vacancy in the Senate, the special
Member of the House of Representatives thus election shall be held simultaneously with
elected shall serve only for the unexpired the next succeeding regular election. (Em
term. (Emphasis supplied) phasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Consti Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at
tution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which least one year before the expiration of the term,
provides in pertinent parts: Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires
COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises the date of the special election, which shall not
in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than
or in the House of Representatives at least ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy
one (1) year before the next regular election but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
for Members of Congress, the Commission election shall be held simultaneously with the
on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
of the Senate or the House of Representa notice to the voters of, among other things, the
tives, as the case may be, certifying to the office or offices; to be voted for.
existence of such vacancy and calling for a
special election, shall hold a special election Did COMELEC, in conducting the special
to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, senatorial election simultaneously with the 14
an official communication on the existence of May 2001 regular elections, comply with the
the vacancy and call for a special election by requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
the President of the Senate or by the Speaker A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relat
of the House of Representatives, as the case ing to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections
L
reveals that they contain nothing which would Conversely, where the law does not fix the
amount to a compliance, either strict or sub time and place for holding a special election but
(sj
stantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of empowers some authority to fix the time and
R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in place after the happening of a condition prec
its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases edent, the statutory provision on the giving of
^&j did COMELEC state that it would holda special notice is considered mandatory; and failure to
election for a single three-year term Senate seat do sowill renderthe election a nullity.
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14
May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give'formal notice In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No.
that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial 6645 itselfprovides that in caseofvacancy in the
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy
votes in the special election. shall be held simultaneously with the next suc
Su)
The controversy thus turns on whether COM ceeding regular election. Accordingly, the special
ELEC's failure, assuming it did fail, to comply election to fill thevacancy in theSenate arising
with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-
^j
6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the President in February 2001 could not be held at
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and anyother time but mustbeheldsimultaneously
accordingly rendered Honasan's proclamation with the next succeeding regular elections on
as the winner in that special election void. More 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with
precisely, the question is whether the special knowledge of this statutory notice and COM
election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such ELEC's failure to give the additional notice did
election and for lack of notice as to the office to be not negate the calling of such special election,
filled and the manner by which the winner in the much less invalidate it.
special election is to be determined. For reasons
Our conclusion might be different had the
stated below,the Court answers in the negative. present case involved a special election to fill
ay
COMELEC's Failure to Give Notice of the a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In
Time ofthe Special Election Did Not Negate the such a case, the holding of the special election
Calling of such Election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
The calling of an election, that is^the giving vacancy should take place at least one year be
notice of the time and place of its occurrence, fore the expiration of the term. The time of the
whether made by the legislature directly or by election is left to the discretion of COMELEC
the body with the duty to give such call, is indis subject only to the limitation that it holds the
pensable to the election's validity. In a general special election withinthe range oftimeprovided
election, where the law fixes the date of the elec in Section 2 of R;A. No. 6645, as amended. This
tion, the election is valid without any call by the makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2
body charged to administer the election. of R.A. No. 6645, as amended; for COMELEC to
"call... a special election . . . not earlier than
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occur
is that a statute that expressly provides that an rence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call
general elections fixes the date at which the spe and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold
cial election is to be held and operates as the call a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it
for that election. Consequently, an election held will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the
at the time thus prescribed is not invalidatedby congressional district involved to know the time
the fact that the body charged by law with the and place of the special election and the office to
igi duty of calling ttie election failed to do so. This be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies.them.
is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call No Proof that COMELEC's Failure to Give
for the election by some authority and the law Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner
thus charges voters with knowledge of the time of Determining the Winner in the Special Elec
and place-of the election. tion Misled Voters
I'fMii
The test in determining the validity' of a right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of
special election in relation to the failure to give the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe
notice of the special election is whether the want to annul elections and will only do so when it is
of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient "impossible to distinguish what votes are law
number of voters as would change the result of ful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
the special election. If the lack of official notice certain result whatever, or that the great body
misled a substantial number of voters who of the voters have been prevented by violence,
wrongly believed that there was no special elec intimidation, and threats from exercising their
tion to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percent franchise."
age of voters would be void. 3
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to

The required notice to the voters in the respect the electorate's will and let the results
tffiijf)
14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers of the election stand, despite irregularities that
two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold may have attended the conduct of the elections.
a special election to fill a vacant single three- This is but to acknowledge the purpose and role
year term Senate seat simultaneously with the of elections in a democratic society such as ours,
regular elections scheduled on the same date. which is:
Second, that COMELEC will, proclaim as win
ner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th to give the voters a direct participation in the
highest number of votes in the special election. affairs of their government, either in deter
Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that mining who shall be their public officials or in
COMELEC's failure to give this required notice deciding some question of public interest; and
misled a sufficient number of voters as would for that purpose all of the legal voters should
change the result of the special senatorial elec be permitted, unhampered and unmolested,
tion or led them to believe that there was no such to cast their ballot. When that is done and
special election. no frauds have been committed, the ballots
^j) should be counted and the election should
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that not be declared null. Innocent voters should
since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no not be deprived of their participation in the
special election took place. This bare assertion affairs of their government for mere irregu
carries no value. Section 2 of R,A. No. 6645, as larities on the part of the election officers,
amended, charged those who Voted in the elec for which they are in no way responsible. A
tions of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the different rule would make the manner and
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guin- method of performing a public duty of greater
gona's appointment as Vice-President in Febru importance than the duty itself.
ary 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding
regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the Separate Documentation and Canvassing
absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
not preclude the possibility that the voters had
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim
actual notice of the special election, the office
that the manner by which COMELEC conducted
to be voted in that election, and the manner by
the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001
which COMELEC would determine the win
is a nullity because COMELEC failed to docu
ner. Such actual notice could come from many
ment separately the candidates and to canvass
sources, such as media reports of the enactment
separately the votes cast for the special election.
of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during
No such requirements exist in our election laws.
the campaign.
What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the elec
md
in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most tion," if necessary, and "state, among others,
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly,
cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Ho petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Big.
nasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their on Section 4(4) of R.A. No/6646 on the printing
tiijsJ
of election returns and tally sheets, to support Philippines in 1998 for a term which will
their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern expire on June 30, 2004;
ijsi elections in general and in no way require sepa
rate documentation of candidates or separate WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her
canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and Excellency President Gloria MacapagalAr
special elections. royo nominated Senator Guingona as Vicer
President of the Philippines;
Significantly, the method adopted by COM-
ELEO in conducting the special election on 14 WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator
May 2001 merely implemented the procedure Guingona has been confirmed by a majority
specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. vote of all the members of both House of
Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as Congress, voting separately;
introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator WHEREAS, Senator Guingona willtake
Tatad") made no mention of the manner by which his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the
the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona Philippines on February 9, 2001;
would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of
Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 pro
agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, vides that the election for twelve (12) Sena
as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate tors, all elective Members of the House of
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number Representatives, and all elective provincial
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term city and municipal officials shall be held on
of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." the second Monday and every three years
Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare thereafter;....
COMELEC and the candidates needless expendi
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is
tures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:
hereby resolved, tc certify, as it hereby certi
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I fies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate
move that we now consider Proposed Sen and calling the Commission on Elections
ate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through
Resolution No. 84], election to be held simultaneously with the
regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Is there any objec
Senator thus elected to serve only for the
tion? [Silence] There being none, the motion
unexpired term.
is approved.
Adopted,
Consideration of Proposed Senate Reso
lution No. 934 is now in order. With the (Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
permission of the Body, the Secretary will Senator
read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] SECRETARY]. Proposed Senate S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I
Resolution No. 934 entitled move for the adoption of this resolution.
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE SfENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). Mr. Presi

EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE dent.
SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COM T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Os-
MISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) mena is recognized.
TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH
ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANE S[ENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). Thank you,
OUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION Mr. President. Will the distinguished Major
ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR ity Leader, Chairman of the Committee on
THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a
THE UNEXPIRED TERM few questions?
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. SfENATOR] T[ATAD].With trepidation,
Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Mr. President. [Laughter]
L
S[ENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). What a way vacancy created, in this particular case, by
of flattery. [Laughter] the appointment of our colleague, Senator
jigl
Guingona, as Vice President.
Mr. President, I think I recall that some
time in 1951 or 1953, there was a special It can be managed in the Commission
election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As on Elections so that a slot for the particular
a matter of fact, the one who was elected in candidate to fill up would be that reserved
that special election was then Congressman, for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other
later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano. words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
iiM
In that election, Mr. President, the can xxx xxx xxx
didates contested the seat. In other words,

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth
JM senator — because at that time there were T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco
only eight — to elect a. member or rather, a is recognized.
candidate to that particular seat.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest,
Then I remember, Mr. President, that subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to
when we ran after the EDSA revolution, the effect that in the simultaneous elections,
twice there were 24 candidates and the first the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the
12 were elected to a six-year term and the special election for this purpose. So we just
next 12 were elected to a three-year term. nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues.
It is better for the candidates. It is also less
My question therefore is, how is this
going to be done in this election? Is the expensive because the ballot will be printed
candidate with the 13th largest number of and there will be less disfranchisement. _
votes going to be the one to take a three-year T[HE] PRESIDENT]. That is right.
term? Or is there going to be an election for
^)
a position of senator for the unexpired term S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Ifwe can just deem
of Sen. Teofisto Guingona? it therefore under this resolution to be such
a special election, maybe, we satisfy the re
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr,President,in quirement of the law.
this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics
to the Commission on Elections. But person T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Yes. In other
ally, I would like to suggest that probably, words, this shall be a guidance for the Com
the candidate obtaining the 13th largest elec.
number of votes be declared as elected to fill S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
up the unexpired term ofSenator Guingona.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. —to implement.
Hjj S[ENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). Is there a
law that would allow the Comelec to conduct S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec
such an election? Is it not the case that the •will not have the flexibility.
3&&I
vacancy is for a specific office?I am really at T[HE] PRESIDENT]. That is right.
a loss. I am rising here because I think it is
something that we should consider. I do not S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already
know if we can .. . No, this is not a Concur consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
rent Resolution. elections that will be held simultaneously
as a special election under this law as we
S[ENATOR]T[ATAD]. May we solicit the
understand it.
legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Yes. That will be
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. May I share this
a good compromise, Senator Roco.
information that under Republic Act No.
6645, what is needed is a resolution of this S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the spon
fe,
Chamber calling attention to the need for sor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
the holding of a special election to fill up the better, Mr. President.
StlJ
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT • 149'
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but
sponsor say? a legitimate exercise ofits discretion. Conversely,
•M
SfENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, this Court willnot interfere should COMELEC,
that is a most satisfactory proposal because in subsequent special senatorial elections, choose
I do not believe that there will be anyone to revert to the means it followed in the 13 No
running specifically — vember 1951.and 8 November 1955 elections.
tsj
That COMELEC adopts means that are novel
T[HE] PRESIDENT], Correct. or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it
liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. — to fill up this
earlier noted:
position for three years and campaigning
nationwide. The Commission on Elections is a constitu
tional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
(Ml T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Actually, I think
important part in our scheme of government.
what is going to happen is the 13th candidate
In the discharge of its functions, it should notf
will be running with specific groups.
be hampered with restrictions that would be
SfENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
gets No. 13. organization. The Commission may err, so may
this Court also. It should be allowed considerable
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. I think we can
latitude in devising means and methods that will
specifically define that as the intent of this
insure the accomplishment ofthe great objective
resolution.
for which it was created — free, orderly and
SfENATOR] TfATADj. Subject to style, honest elections. We may not agree fully with •
iga
we accept that amendment and if there will its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
be no other amendment, I move for the adop illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
tion of this resolution. court should not interfere.
xxx xxx xxx A Word to COMELEC
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934 The calling of a special election, if necessary,

and the giving of notice to the electorate of nec
If there are no other proposed amend essary information regarding a special election,
ments, I move that we adopt this resolution. are central to an informed exercise of the right
of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. There is a motion
î to the present case have led us to conclude that
to adopt this resolution. Is there any objec
COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice
tion? [Silence] There being none, the motion
did not invalidate the special senatorial election
is approved.
•âi held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its chances in future elections. We remind COME
discretion to use means and methods to conduct LEC to comply strictly with all the requirements
the special election within the confines of R.A. under applicable laws relative to the conduct of
î
No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's regular elections in general and special elections
proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. in particular.
This Court has consistently acknowledged and WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for
affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion lack of merit.
in adopting means to carry out its mandate of en
SO ORDERED.
suring free, orderly, and honest elections subject
only to the limitation that the means so adopted
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutier-
are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of rez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,
discretion. 38 COMELEC's decision to abandon
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
the means it employed in the 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt PUNO, J., dissented.
l£%f
liityll

iM\
SEC. 10. THE SALARIES OF SENA tution, in that under the 1935 Constitution tl
TORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF privilege was only from civil arrest. In no way d:
liiffit REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE DETER the 1935 Constitution protect a legislator fro
MINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID arrest for a criminal offense. Martinez v. Morj
COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT 44 SCRA 22 (1972). Under the new Constiti
UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE tion, however, as under the 1973 Constitutio:
jS)
FULL TERM OF ALL THE MEMBERS a legislator is privileged from arrest even for
OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF criminal offense provided that the offense w*
REPRESENTATIVES APPROVING SUCH not punishable by a penalty of more than s:
gg&) INCREASE. years imprisonment.
1. Salaries, emoluments, allowances. The privilege is available only "while tl

Congress is in session," whether regular or sp
as)
The purpose of delaying the effectivity of any cial and whether or not the legislator is actual,
increase in salary is to place a "legal bar to the attending a session. Hence, it is not availab
legislators' yielding to the natural temptation while Congress is on recess. Since the purpose •
to increase their salaries," Philconsa u. Mathay, the privilege is to protect the legislator again;
18 SCRA 300, 307 (1966). While the letter of harassment which will keep him away from lej
the present law prohibits immediate increase of isiative sessions, there is no point in extendir
"said compensation." that is. salaries, it is sub the privilege to the period when the Congress
mitted that one may legitimately appeal to the not in session.
spirit of the prohibition, expressed in Philconsa
v. Mathay, supra, and read the prohibition as 2. Case.
an absolute ban on any form of direct or indirect
increase of salary.
People v.-Jalosjos
Office and necessary travel allowances,
G.R Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
however, do not form part of the salary or com
pensation. Hence, increased allowances take
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
effect immediately: Nor is there a legal limit en
the amount that may be appropriated. The only The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjc
limit is moral, because, according to Section 20, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is no-
the books of Congress are audited by the Com confined at the national penitentiary while k
mission on Audit "which shall publish annually conviction for statutory rape on two counts an
p$\ an itemized list of amounts paid and expenses acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pendin
incurred for each Member." appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motio
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge th
SEC. 11. A SENATOR OR MEMBER duties of a Congressman, including attendanc
£0
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES at legislative sessions and committee meeting
SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE despite his having been convicted in the firs
BY NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS IM
instance of a non-bailable offense.
ipi PRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM
ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN The issue raised is one of first impression.
SESSION. NO MEMBER SHALL BE QUES
Does membership in Congress exempt a
TIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY
igj accused from statutes and rules which appl
OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR
DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN ANY
to validly incarcerated persons in general? I
COMMITTEE THEREOF.
answering the query, we are called upon t
balance relevant and conflicting factors in th
1. Immunity from Arrest. judicial interpretation of legislative privilege i
the context of penal law.
The 1987 privilege differs from the privilege
under the 1935 Constitution, and for that matter The accused-appellant's "Motion To B
from the privilege under the American Consti Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Membe
•0j
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT1 151
of House of Representatives" was filed on the been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
grounds that — Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an We start with the incontestable proposition
expression of popular will cannot be rendered that all top officials of Government — executive,
inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty
or interest — not even the police power of the of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression
State. in the public mind that election or appointment
to high government office, by itself, frees the of
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected ficial from the common restraints of general law.
representative amounts to taxation without rep Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred
resentation.
from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher
3. To bar accused-appellant from perform the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedi
Hi)
ing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal ence rather than exemption.
and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to The immunity from arrest or detention of
him by the people. Senators and members of the House of Repre
4. The electorate of the First District of sentatives, the latter customarily addressed
Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
heard. Constitution. The history of the provision shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed restrictive sense. The provision granting an ex
a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the emption as a special privilege cannot be extended
U.S. Congress. beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
i|fifo
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a not be extended by intendment, implication or

bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal equitable considerations.
branch of government to respect its mandate. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article
7. The concept of temporary detention VI on the Legislative Department:
does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused- SECTION 15. The Senators and Mem
appellant to discharge his mandate. bers of the House of Representatives shall in
8. Accused-appellant has always complied all cases except treason, felony, and breach
with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to of the peace be privileged from arrest during
leave jail. their attendance at the sessions of Congress,
^1
and in going to and returning from the same;
The primary argument of the movant is
the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Because of the broad coverage of felony and
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their repre breach of the peace, the exemption applied only
sentative in Congress. Having been re-elected to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamen
covenant with his constituents made possible
tary immunity from arrest. He was subject to
the same general laws governing all persons
by the intervention of the State. He adds that
still to be tried or whose convictions were pend
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
ing appeal.
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privi
True, election is the expression of the sov
lege of immunity as follows:
ereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
tp its benefits. However, in spite of its importance, punishable by not more than six years im
the privileges and rights arising from having prisonment, be privileged from arrest during
152 ''CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
his attendance at its sessions and in going to the people of their right to elect their officers.
and returning from the.same. . When a people have elected a man to office,
For offenses punishable by more than six
it must be assumed that they did this with
the knowledge of his life and character, and
years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
immunity and the intent to confine it within
not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
carefully defined parameters is illustrated
misconduct, to practically overrule the will
by the concluding portion of the provision,
of the people.
&J&&1
to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa
shall surrender the member involved to the will not extricate him from his predicament. It
custody of the law within twenty-four hours can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling
after its adjournment for a recess or for its that the Aguinaldo case involves the administra
&jjj
next session, otherwise such privilege shall tive removal of a public officer for acts done prior
cease upon its failure to do so. to his present term of office. It does not apply to
The present Constitution adheres to the imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
same restrictive rule minus the obligation of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman preventive suspension is not removal, confine
to the custody of the law. The requirement that ment pending appeal is not removal. He remains
he should be attending sessions or committee a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
meetings has also been removed. For relatively otherwise, disqualified.
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in One rationale behind confinement, whether
session. pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
The accused-appellant argues that a mem self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
ber of Congress' function to attend sessions is serves as an example and warning to others.
^)
underscored by Section 16(2), Article VI of the A person charged with crime is taken into
Constitution which states that — custody for purposes of the administration of jus
(2) A majority of each rjouse shall tice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 19 Phil.
constitute a quorum to do business, but a 208,212, it is the injury to the public which State
%tt
smaller number may adjourn from day to action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not
day and may compel the attendance of absent the injury to the complainant. After conviction
Members in such manner, and under such in the Regional Trial Court; the accused may be
penalties, as such House may provide. denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration
if there is risk of his absconding. (Cubillo v. City
However, the accused-appellant has not Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980]).
given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the The accused-appellant states that the plea of
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot the electorate which voted him into office cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The escape eventual punishment if permitted to
confinement of a Congressman charged with a perform congressional duties outside his regular
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than place of confinement.
six months is not merely authorized by law, it It will be recalled that when a warrant for
has constitutional foundations. accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues
in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, at 773 in the House of Representatives for him to attend
(1992), which states, inter alia, that — the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body
, The Court should never remove a public whose call he initially spurned which accused-
officer for acts done prior to his present term appellant is invoking to justify his present mo
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive tion. This can hot be countenanced because, to
i*jjj
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well- privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a aberrant situation not only elevates.accused-
mockery of the aims of the State's penal system. appellant's status to that of a special class, it
Accused-appellant argues that on several also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati correction system. ..
granted several motions to temporarily leave his The accused-appellant avers that his con
cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical stituents in the First District ofZamboanga del
reasons, to wit: Norte want their voices to be heard and that since
a) to attend hearings of the House Com he is treated as bona fide member of the House
mittee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/ branch of government to respect his mandate.
suspend him from the House of Representatives; He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention doesnot necessarily curtail his duty to
b) to undergo dental examination and treat discharge his mandate and that he has always
ment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City; complied with the conditions/restrictions when
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up he is allowed to leave jail.
at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City; We remain unpersuaded.
d) to register as a voter at his hometown No less than accused-appellant himself ad
in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant mits that like any other member of the House
commuted by chartered plane and private, ve of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
hicle.
WiJ
congressional office situated at Room N-214,
He also calls attention to various instances, North Wing Building, House of Representa
after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in tives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/ manned by a full complement of staff paid for
permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit: by Congress. Through [an] inter-department
coordination, he is also provided with an office
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work- at the Administration Building, New Bilibid
volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) estab Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his
lishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) plant constituents." Accused-appellant further admits
ing mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation.
that while under detention, he has filed several
For this purpose, he was assigned one guard bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has
ii0
and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in
been receiving his salaries and other monetary
going to and from the project area and his place
benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant
of confinement.
has been discharging his mandate as a member
b) to continue with his dental treatment at of the House of Representatives consistent with
the clinic of his dentist in Makati City. the restraints upon one who is presently under
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
Center in Makati City for his heart condition. should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to per
There is no showing that the aboveprivileges form these acts.
are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
When the voters of his district elected the
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. full awareness of the limitations on his freedom
:$$\ of action. They did so with the knowledge that
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an he could achieve only such legislative results
emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant which he could accomplish within the confines
to attend congressional sessions and commit of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
tee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week voters elect a person with full knowledge that
will virtually make him a free man with all the he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
154 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OP GOVERNMENT
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer It can be seen from the foregoing that inca]
serve his full term in office. ceration, by its nature, changes an individual
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us status in society. Prison officials have the difficu
boils down to a question of constitutional equal and oftenthankless jobofpreserving the securit
protection. in a potentially explosivesetting, as well as ofai
L The Constitution guarantees: "... nor shall
tempting to provide rehabilitation that prepare
inmates for re-entry into the social mainstrean
any person be denied the equal protection of Necessarily, both these demands require th
laws." This simply means that all persons simi
L larly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
curtailment and elimination of certain fights.
Premises considered, we are constrained t
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs
of government may not show any undue favorit rule against the accused-appellant's claim tha
ism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality re-election to public office gives priority to an;
nor prejudice shall be displayed. other right or interest, including the police powe
of the State.
Does being an elective official result in a
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereb-
substantial distinction that allows different
DENIED.
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substan 7
tial differentiation which reihoves the accused-

appellant as a prisoner from the same class as 3. Scope of the privilege of speech.
all persons validly confined under law? In the first place, the privilege is a protectioi
The performance of legitimate and even es only against forums other than the Congress it
sential duties by public officers has never been self. It doesnot protect the assemblyman agains
an excuse to free a person validly in prison... the disciplinary authority of the Congress but i
is an absolute protection against suits for libel
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960). Ir
isj The Court cannot validate badges ofinequal the second place, "speech or debate" include*
ity. The necessities imposed by public welfare utterances made in the performance of officia.
may justify exercise of government authority to functions, such asspeeches delivered, statements
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plau made, votes cast, as well as bills introduced anc
sibly assert that their interests are disregarded. other acts done in the performance of officia]
duties. Jimenez v.Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876
We, therefore, find that election to the posi (1966). To come under the privilege, it is not es
tion of Congressman is not a reasonable classifi sential that the Congress be in session when the
cation in criminal law enforcement....
utterance is made. What is essential is that the
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's utterance must constitute "legislative action",
personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a per that is, it must be part of the deliberative and
son to prevent the free exercise of his power of communicative process by which legislators par
locomotion. ticipate in committee or congressional proceed:
ings in the consideration of proposed legislation
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its gen or of other matters which the Constitution has
eral sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a placed within the jurisdiction of the Congress.
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court Gravel v. U.S., 90 LW 5053 (1972). See also An-
or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.
I The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his move
tonino v. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70 (May 27, 1974).
Like the privilege from arrest, the privilege
ments from place to place, or of his free action of speech is intended to leave the legislator un
according to his own pleasure and will. Imprison impeded in the performance of his duties and free
ment is the detention of another against his will from fear of harassment from outside. Moreover,
depriving him of his power of locomotion and it the privilege extends to agents of assemblymen,
"[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. provided that the "agency" consists precisely in
ma\
It includes the notion of restraint within limits assisting the legislator in the performance of
.defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 'legislative action." Gravel v. U.S., supra.
A. Jimenez v. Cabangbang functions as such, at the time of the performance

G.R No. L-15905, August 3, 1966 of the acts in question.
j&tfl
The publication involved in this case does

CONCEPCION, C.J.: not belong to this category. According to the
This is an ordinary civil action, originally complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
jjj^j
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, President of the Philippines, dated November
for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several in session, and defendant caused said letter to
Sj
sums of money, by way of damages for the publi be published in several newspapers of general
cation of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant circulation in the Philippines, on or about said
Bartolome Cabangbang.... date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
Jfifoi
communication to be so published, he was not
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to performing his official duty, either as a mem
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the ber of Congress or as officer or any Committee
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even thereof: Hence, contrary to the finding made by
if were, said letter is a privileged communication. His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication
The issues before us are: (1) whether the is not absolutely privileged.
publication in question is a privileged communi
cation; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
Theîrstissue stems:from the fact that, at the B. Antonrno^v. Valencia
time of said publication, defendant was a member G:R No. L-26526, May 27, 1974
of the House of Representatives and Chairman
of its Committee on National Defense, and that TEEHANKEE, Jr.
pursuant to the Constitution:
ifaftl
The Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall in all cases except The Court finds thafedefendant-appellant has
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be failed to discharge the burden of substantiating
privileged from arrest during their atten the errors of fact and of law allegedly committed
dance at the sessions of the Congress, and in by the trial court in its appealed decision and
going to and returning from the same; and therefore affirms in toto the appealed judgment
for any speech or debate therein, they shall holding that defendant caused and was liable
for the issuance and publication of the libelous
not be questioned in any other place. (Article
press release attacking the honor, integrity and
VI, Section 15 [1935])
reputation of plaintiff and rejecting defendant's
The determination of the first issue depends defense of qualified privilege and defensive libel
on whether or not the aforementioned pubHcation and accordingly sentencing defendant to pay
falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages
debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used with interest at the legal rate plus P5,000.00 as
in this provision. attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
Said expression refers to utterances made by This case arose as an aftermath of the No
Congressmen in the performance of their official vember 1963 local elections when the official can
tm
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements didate of the Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento)
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while for governor in Davao lost to the Nacionalista
the same is in session, as well as bills introduced Party standard bearer (Vicente Duterte), and
in Congress, whether the same is in session or plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino then a senator
not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, of the Republic and LP head in that province at
either in Congress or outside the premises hous tributed the loss of the LP candidate to the sup
ing its offices, in the official discharge of their port given by defendant BrigidoR. Valencia then
duties as members of Congress and of Congres Secretary ofPublic Works and Communications
sional Committees duly authorized to perform its to the independent LP candidate (Constancio
156 • CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Maglana) which divided the LP votes. In public abuse of power to threaten an American witl
statements widely quoted in the metropolitan deportation and make him cover from gettini
newspapers, plaintiff stated that had not defen a concession because you are a Senator of tin
dant "sabotaged" and "double-crossed"the LP, its Philippines and in the end you get the conces
official candidate would have won the election. sion yourself? and f) I cannot avoid unmaskinj
wi
The cordial relations between the two LP certain alleged high anomalous activities of th<
leaders which had begun since their student Senator as a memberofthe Monetary Board anc
days in the U.P. College of Engineering became as a member of the Philippine Senate.
iM strained. In the Taliba issue of December 21, Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 th<
1963, it was reported that plaintiff would file present civil action in the Manila court of firs!
unrevealed administrative charges against de instance for the recovery against defendant oJ
fendant with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Pi million as moral damages, P100,000 as ex
On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was emplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as
still convalescing in the hospital from a heart "litigationexpenses and attorney's fees.
attack on January 27, 1964 while attending a Defendant claimed in his answer that he did
Senate session, he filed a formal request with not issue or cause the publication of the press
the said Senate committee to investigate the ac release; that at any rate, they were made in
tions of defendant as Secretary of Public Works good faith and in self-defense and that they were
and Communications in connection with certain qualifiedly privileged in character. He sought
specifiedalleged anomalous acquisitions ofpublic by way of counterclaim from plaintiff the sum
works supplies and equipment, as follows: of Pl.25 million as moral damages, P100.000 as
Plaintiffs charges as filed with the Senate exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000
Blue Ribbon Committee together with defen as litigation expense and attorney's fees, which
plaintiff disclaimed in due course as without
dant's comments thereon that they wore "politi
basis.
t'JBi'l cally inspired" and had already been answered
in the past and that records of the transactions .... As per the Court's resolution of March
were open to public scrutiny were carried by the 3, 1969, the motion of Senator Magnolia W.
pre"ss, particularly in the Bulletin and Newsday Antonino as administratrix to substitute her
issues of March 5, 1964. deceased husband as plaintiff-appellee was
granted.'
On the same day, March 5, 1964, a two-
page press release was issued by the office of Defendant-appellant raises questions of fact
the Secretary of Public Works and Communica and of law in his brief.
tions, Exhibit A, and the contents thereof were On the question of fact, the Court finds that
published or reported on the front pages of the no error was committed by the trial court in
six metropolitan papers. findingthat the press release, Exhibit A, issued
Portions of the said published press release by the office of defendant as Secretary of Public
are quoted thus: "a) Since Senator Antonino has Works and Communications . ..
stubbornly continued telling lies about me, I have
no recourse but start telling the truth about him;
b) This is no play of words and in due time I will In his second and third assignments of er
file charges against the Senator before the Blue ror, defendant claims that the trial court erred
RibbonCommittee for reportedly anomalous acts in holding that the press release is libelous and
that can make him a disgrace to his Senate posi that it is not protected as a qualified privilege
tion; c)... for personal selfish reasons, Antonino communication.
had taken advantage of his position as a member There can be no serious question as to the de
ofthe Monetary Board and even as a Senator; d) famatory and libelous nature of the statements in
Antonino Tiad suspicious connections with no less defendant'spress release which depicted plaintiff
^J
than 22 corporations when he became a member as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high
of the Monetary Board'; e) Is it not the height of public offices as monetary board member and
liaii
senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and "double-crossing" could be held to be defama
and imputed to him the commission of certain tory or libelous, since "(A) review ofcontemporary-
serious offenses in violation of the Constitution politics in our country tends, to show that no
and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who
changes political parties. Neither is it unusual
As defendant's imputations against plaintiff,
for card-bearing party members to support can
were not made privately nor officially as to be didates belonging to the other political party. As
qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the a matter of fact, even way back during the time
Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held when the late President Quezon was the head
that by virtue of their defamatory and libelous of the Filipino participation in the Government
nature against the honor, integrity and reputa while the Philippines was still a dependency of
tion of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed. It the United States, he was quoted to have stated
yMJ
further correctly ruled that defendant had not that *Myloyalty to my party ends when my loy
overcome such presumption of malice, not having alty to my country begins.' Presumably, on the
shown the truth thereof, or that they were pub basis of this 'classical' utterance of that dynamic
lished with good intentions and with justifiable and beloved former President of the Philippines
motive or even from the most liberal standpoint that those who were elected as official standard
that they were made in the exercise of the right of bearers of one party, after election switched to
fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and affiliated with another political party, are
and sincerity of public officials. referred to as 'patriots."'
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is
hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
The trial court likewise properly rejected
defendant-appellant's claim of defensive libel NOTE: In a Senate privilege speech Senator
thus: "(S)tress had also been laid by the defen Santiago said the following:
dant on the argument that he had been libeled
by the plaintiff and accordingly the former was x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am
justified to hit back with another libel. The em foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
phasis laid had been misplaced and based upon
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
a wrong premise. The defendant was charged
up to be living my middle years in a country
with the commission of certain anomalous trans
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
actions in his capacity as Secretary of Public
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
Works and Communications and the same were
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
filed with the Investigation Committee (Blue no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots.
Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, the I would father be in another environment
s^j said charges, even assuming that they contain but not in the Supreme Court of idiots xxx.
defamatory imputation, would not be Ubelous
because the letter sent by the plaintiff was a Senator Santiago explained that "those
privileged communication." statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being
As to defendant's counterclaim, the Court part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
finds that the record amply supports the trial of her duty as member of Congress or its com
i%-i court's finding that there was no evidence, di mittee. The purpose of her speech, according to
rect or circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable her, was to bring out in the open controversial,
for the publication in the metropolitan press anomalies in governance with a view to future re
of his charges against defendant with the Blue medial legislation. She averred that she wanted
Ribbon Committee and the Commission on Ap to exposewhat she believed, 'to be an unjust act
pointments, which were at any rate qualifiedly of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],' which, after
privileged. Furthermore, the trial court had aptly sending out public invitations for nomination to
&I&J
observed that it was doubtful whether plaintiffs the soon-to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
charges against defendant of political "sabotage" would eventually inform applicants that only
&&l
U
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would

qualify for nomination.
The Issues
tad
The Court upheld her defense oh the ground
of parliamentary immunity but added that "the Petitioners raise the following issues:
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits 1. Whether the Philippine National Red
of decency and good professional conduct. It is Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned or
at once apparent that her statements in ques controlled corporation;
tion were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as state 2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of
ing that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief the Philippine Constitution applies to the
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts case of respondent who is Chairman of the
0 PNRC and at the same time a Member of
in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court
the Senate;
a "Supreme Court of idiots." Pobre v. Defensor
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009. 3. Whether respondent should be au
tomatically removed as a Senator pursuant
SEC. 12. ALL MEMBERS OF THE SEN to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
ATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN Constitution; and
r
TATIVES SHALL, UPON ASSUMPTION
OF OFFICE, MAKE A FULL DISCLOSURE 4. Whether petitioners may legally
OF THEIR FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS
institute this petition against respondent.
INTERESTS. THEY SHALL NOTIFY THE The substantial issue boils down to whether
HOUSE CONCERNED OF A POTENTIAL the officeof the PNRC Chairman is a government
CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT MAY office or an officein a government-owned or con
ARISE FROM THE FILING OF A PRO trolled corporation for purposes of the prohibition
POSED LEGISLATION OF WHICH THEY in Section 13, Article VI of-the Constitution.
ARE AUTHORS.
The Court's Ruling
SEC. 13. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER
We find the petition without merit.
MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR Petitioners Have No Standing to File this
EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT, Petition
OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR IN
STRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUD A careful reading of the petition reveals that
ING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CON it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule
î
TROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR

66 of the Rules of Court provides:
SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM Section 1.Action by Government against
WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT. NEI individuals. — An action for the usurpation
THER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY ofa public office, position or franchise may be
OFFICE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN CRE commenced by a verified petition brought in
ATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF the name of the Republic of the Philippines
INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR against:
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
A. Liban v. Gordon office, position or franchise;
G.R No. 175352, July 15, 2009
(b) A public officer who does or suffers
DECISION an act which by provision of law, constitutes
a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
CARPIO, J.
(c) An association which acts as a
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard corporation within the Philippines without
J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his being legally incorporated or without lawful
seat in the Senate. authority so to act.
THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVI

r
SION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY
THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOVERN
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing MENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPO
Public Functions RATION, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING
HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL NOT
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Rox-
INTERVENE IN A&Y MATTER BEFORE
as signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR
as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit,
HIS PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organi HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT ON
zation, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for
the most vulnerable without consideration of 1. Prohibitions.
Hi)
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status,
or political affiliation...
A. Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr.
113 SCRA 31 (1982)
The government does not control the PNRC.
Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. :
six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board
This suit for Certiorari and Prohibition with
of Governors are appointed by the President of
Preliminary Injunction is poised against the
the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or
Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of
four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are not appointed by the President....
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
aSî The PNRC is not government-owned but A question of novel import is in issue. ...
privately owned. The vast majority of the thou
sands of PNRC members are private individuals,
including students. Under the PNRC Charter, c) May 25-31,1979. The Puyat Group claims
those who contribute to the annual fund cam that at conferences of the parties with respon
paign of the PNRC are entitled to membership dent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the
6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
for one year upon contributing P35, PlOO, P300, appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to
P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, which the Puyat Group objected on Constitu
whether residents or not, can be members of the tional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the
PNRC.... 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that
no Assemblj'man could "appear as counsel before
See dissent, Nachura, J.
xxx any administrative body," and SEC was
SEC. 14. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER
an administrative body The cited Consti
tutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUN
SEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE respondent Acero.
OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBU d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was
NALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER called, it turned out that:
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER
SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, (i) On. May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Es
BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY tanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
iiftj CONTRACTWITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares ofstock
OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY ofIPI for P200.00 upon request ofrespondent
aji^l)

to
Acero to qualify him to run for election as a and one daybefore the scheduled hearing ofthe
Director. case before the SECon May31, 1979. Andwhat
i^J
* (ii) The deed of sale, howevet, was nota is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
rized only onMay 30, 1979 and was sought signified his intention to appear as counsel for
to be registered on said date. respondent EustaquioT.C. Acero, but which was
objected tobypetitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
(iii) On May 31,1979, the day following validity of tjie objection, he decided, instead, to
the notarization ofAssemblyman Fernandez' "intervene" on the ground oflegalinterest in the
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Mo matter under litigation. And it may be noted that
tion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
interest in the matter in litigation. defendant Excelsior, co-defendant ofrespondent
Acero therein.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave
to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' Under those facts and circumstances, we
ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Or are constrained to find that there has been an
der allowing intervention that precipitated the indirect "appearance as counsel before x x x an
instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition administrative body" and, in ouropinion, that isa
with Preliminary Injunction. circumvention ofthe Constitutional prohibition.
The"intervention" wasan afterthought toenable
lpt\ him toappear actively intheproceedings insome
The issue which will be resolved is whether othercapacity. To believe the avowed purpose,
or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stock that is, toenablehimeventually to vote and to be
holder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC Case elected as Director in the event ofan unfavorable
without violating Section 11, Article VHI of the outcomeofthe SEC Case would be pure naivete.
Constitution.. He would still appearas counsel indirectly.
What really has to be resolved is whether A ruling upholding the "intervention" would
&&J
or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assem make the constitutional provision ineffective...
blyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as
counsel, albeit indirectly, before an-administra
tive body in contravention of the Constitutional WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's
provision. Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for In leave tointervene in SEC Case No. 1747ishereby
reversed and set aside.
tervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be
said tobe appearingas counsel. Ostensibly, he is SEC. 15. THE CONGRESS SHALL
not appearing on behalf of another, although he CONVENE ONCE EVERY YEAR ON THE
is joining the cause of the private respondents. FOURTH MONDAY OF JULY FOR ITS
His appearance could theoretically be for the REGULAR SESSION, UNLESS A DIFFER
protection of his ownership often (10) shares of ENT DATEIS FIXED BYLAW, ANDSHALL
IPI in respect ofthe matter in litigation and not CONTINUE TO BE IN SESSION FOR SUCH
for the protection ofthe petitioners nor respon NUMBER OF DAYS AS IT MAY DETER
dents who have their respective capable and MINE UNTIL THIRTY DAYS BEFORE
respected counsel. THE OPENING OF ITS NEXT REGULAR
However, certain salient circumstances mili SESSION, EXCLUSIVE OF SATURDAYS,
tate against the intervention of Assemblyman SUNDAYS, AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS. THE
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a PRESIDENT MAY CALL A SPECIAL SES
mere P200.00 worth ofstock in IPI, representing SION AT ANY TIME.
ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. SEC. 16. (1) THE SENATE SHALL
He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on. ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE
May 30,1979, after the contested election of Di OF REPRESENTATIVES ITS SPEAKER,
rectors on May 14,1979, after the quo warranto BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RES
suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC PECTIVE MEMBERS.
$0
EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH In the session of the Senate of February 18,
OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NEC 1949,Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada requested that
ESSARY. his right to speak on the floor on the next session
(2) A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges
SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO against the then Senate President Jose Avelino
BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER be reserved. His request was approved.
MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND On February 21,1949, hours before the open
MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ing of the session Senator Tanada and Senator
ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of
AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH the Senate a resolution enumerating charges
HOUSE MAY PROVIDE. against ttie then Senate President and ordering
(3) EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE the investigation thereof.
THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUN Although a sufficient number of senators to
ISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BE constitute a quorum were at the Senate session
HAVIOR, AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the
OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, petitioner was already in his office, said peti
SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PEN tioner delayed his appearance at the session hall
ALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended
SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS.
the rostrum, he did not immediately open the
(4) EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A session, but instead requested from the Secretary
JOURNAL OF fTS PROCEEDINGS, AND a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators
FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH THE Tanada and Sanidad and in the presence of the
SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS MAY, public he read slowly and carefully said resolu
IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL tion, after which.he called and conferred with
SECURITY; AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ON his colleagues Senators Francisco and Tirona.
&&)
ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insis
OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE MEMBERS PRES
tent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco
ENT, BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.
that the session be opened, the petitioner finally
EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEP A called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto
RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS. who was confined in a hospital and Senator Con-
fesor who is in the United States, all the Senators
(5) NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE
were present.
SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL,
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTH Senator Sanidad, following a long estab
ER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE lished practice, moved that the roll call be dis
DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN pensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said
THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated
SHALL BE SITTING. plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use
Liiiiiiiiiii of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tanada
1. Officers. from delivering his privilege speech. The roll
was called.
A. Avelino v. Cuenco
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual
G.R No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 practice, to dispense with the reading of the
minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed
by Senators Tirona and David, evidently, again,
RESOLUTION
in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before
jjjj The Court believes the following essential and after the reading of the minutes, Senator
facts .have been established: Tanada repeatedly stood up to claim his right
ijj^
to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was
petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting
him; and when after the reading ofthe minutes, Secretary, because theAssistant Secretary, who
Senator Tanada insisted on being recognized was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
would order the arrest of any senator who would
speak without being previously recognized by Senator Tanada, after being recognized by
him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of the Chair, was then finally able to dehver his
his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continu privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad
ously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" read aloud the complete text of said Resolution
everytime the latter would ask for recognition of (No. 68), and submittedhis motion forapproval
Senator Tanada. thereofandthesame was unanimously approved.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz
broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre- again occupying the Chair, after the respondent
arrangement. At about this same time Senator had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad intro
Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's duced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution
followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he declaring vacant the position of the President
moved for adjournment of session, evidently, of the Senate and designating the Honorable
again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the
conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tanada. Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was
unanimously approved.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition
to the adjournment of the session and this op Senator Cuenco took the oath.
position was seconded by herein respondent Thenext daythe Presidentofthe Philippines
who moved that the motion of adjournment be recognized the respondent as acting president of
submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued. the Philippine Senate.
Senator David reiterated his motion for
Byhis petition in this quowarranto proceed
adjournment and herein respondent also reit
ing petitioner asks the Court to declare him the
erated his opposition to the adjournment and
rightful President of the Philippine Senate and
again moved that the motion of Senator David
\m oust respondent.
be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel The Court has examined allprincipal angles
of the controversy and believes that these are the
and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out crucial points:
of the session hall followed by Senators David,
Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalonaand Clarin, a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
while the rest of the senators remained. Where subject-matter?
upon Senator Melecio Arranz, Senate President
Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present b. If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67
validly approved?
took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
t&ii)
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that c. Should the petition be granted?
it be made of record — it was so made — that To the first question, the answer is in the
the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by negative, in viewofthe separation ofpowers,the
the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino
President Pro-tempore Arranz andthe remaining vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
members of the Senate to continue the session in Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1)
order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then sug power to elect its own president, which power
gested that respondent be designated to preside, should not be interfered with, nor taken over,
over the session, which suggestion was carried by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance
'$$} unanimously. The respondent thereupon took of the Vera case even if the rights of the elec
the Chair. tors of the suspended senators were allegedly
(gig)
affected without any immediate remedy. A for of the business of the Senate? Justices Paras,
tiori we should abstain in this case because the Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly
selection of the presiding officer affects only the because the minutes say so, secondly, because
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any at the beginning of such session there were at
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate least fourteen senators including Senators Pen-
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to datun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
petitioner to preside, his remedylies in the Sen Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority
ate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court. of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each
The Court will not sally into the legitimate
House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House"
domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal
does not mean "all" the members. Even a major
to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revo
ity of all the members constitute "the House."
lution. No state of things has been proved that
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p.
might change the temper of the Filipino people 239). There is a difference between a majority of
as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we
"all the members of the House" and a majority
should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into
of "the House," the latter requiring less number
a rash action inconsistent with the calm that
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12)
should characterize judicial deliberations.
of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo
It is furthermore believed that the recogni
believes furthermore that even if the twelve did
tion accorded by the Chief Executive to the re
not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered
spondent makes it adviseable, more than ever,
the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members;
to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated
if one had been so arrested, there would be no
by this Court in matters of similar nature.
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would
The second question depends upon these have been elected just the same inasmuch as
sub-questions. (1)Was the sessionofthe so-called there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against
rump Senate a continuation of the session val and one abstained.
idly assembled with twenty two Senators in the
morning of February 21,1949?; (2) Was there a In fine, all the four justices agree that the
quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor Court being confronted with the practical situa
and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the tion that of the twenty-three senators who may
present to pass on these questions onceit is held, participate in the Senate deliberations in the
as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over days immediately after this decision, twelve
the case. What follows is the opinion of the bther senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
four on those subquestions.
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, the rightful President of the Senate, that office
there is unanimity in the view that the session being essentially one that depends exclusively
under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the uponthe willofthe majorityofthe senators, the
morning session and that a minority often sena rule of the Senate about tenure of the President
tors may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the of that body being amendable at any time by
other twelve senators from passing a resolution that majority. And at any sessionhereafter held
that met with their unanimous endorsement. with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid
The answer might be different had the resolution all controversy arising from the divergence of
been approved only by ten or less. opinion here about quorum and for the benefit
If the rump session was not a continuation of all concerned, the said twelve senators who
of the morning session, was it validly consti approved the resolutions herein involved could
tuted? In other words, was there the majority ratify all their acts and thereby place them be
required by the Constitution for the transaction yond the shadow of a doubt.
liBj
As already stated, the six justices herein Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that,
above mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. with the agreement ofSenator Santiago, alleg
i$i) Without costs. edly the only other member of the minority, he
QUERY: Would the same conclusion be was assuming the position ofminority leader. He
reached ifthe case had happened under the 1987 explained that thos"e who had voted for Senator
Constitution? Fernan comprised the "majority," while only
those who had votedforhim,the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."
B. Santiago v. Guingona
G.R No. 134577, November 18, 1998
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader in
PANGANIBAN, J.: formed the body that he was in receiptof a let
ter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
The Facts senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John thereof, the Senate Presidentformally recognized
ffifi.l Henry R. Osmena as presiding officer,convened Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of Senate.
the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of
party affiliation, the composition of the Senate Thefollowing day,Senators Santiagoand Ta
was as follows: tad filed before this Court the subjectpetitionfor
quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino Guingona had beenusurping, unlawfully holding
(LAMP)
and exercising the position of Senate minority
7 members Lakas-National Union of Chris leader, a position that, according to them, right
tian fully belonged to Senator Tatad.
£££}
Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of Issues
the Philippi nes (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP) From the.parties'pleadings, the Courtformu
1 member Liberal Party (LP) lated the following issues for resolution:
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
petition?
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
2. Was there an actual violation of the
1 member Gabay Bayan Constitution?
2 members Independent 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader?
23 total number of senators 7 (The last six
members are all classified by petitioners as "in 4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave
dependent.") abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Nominated by Sen. Bias F. Ople to the The Court's Ruling
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo
B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also After a close perusal of the pleadings and a
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and
^
Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator con,the Court finds that no constitutional or legal
Fernan was declared the duly elected President. infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended
of the Senate. the recognition of and the assumption into office
byRespondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.
First Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction cernedwith issues dependentuponthe wisdom,

Petitioners principally invoke Aue/mo u. not [the] legality, of a particular measure."
m
Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949), in arguing that this The Court ruled that the validity ofthe selec
Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is tion of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit by the senators was not a political question. The
m that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" choice of these memBers did not depend on the
involve an interpretation of the Constitution, Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
specificallySection 16(1),Article VI thereof, stat subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.
ing that "[tjhe Senate shall elect its President Thus, the Courtheld that not onlywas it clearly
and the House of Representatives its Speaker, within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
by a majority vote of all its respective Members." of the selection proceedings, but it was also its
a§) Respondents and the solicitor general, in duty to consider and determine the issue.
their separate Comments, contend in common
that the issue of who is the lawful Senate mi
nority leader is an internal matter pertaining Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987
ie)
exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of
which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction judicial power. The present Constitution now
without transgressing the principle ofseparation fortifies the authority of the courts to determine
of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is in in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
volved, as the fundamental law does not provide of the political departments. It speaks ofjudicial
for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
The legislature alone has the full discretion to
"Judicial power includes the duty of the
provide for such office and, in that event, to de
court of justice to settle actual controversies
termine the procedure of selecting its occupant. involving rights which are legally demand-
»ta
Respondents also maintain that Avelino able and enforceable, and to determine
cannot apply, because there exists no question whether or not there has been a grave abuse
involving an interpretation or application of of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or in
aaj
the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circum strumentality of the Government."
stances" impelling the Court to assume jurisdic
tion over the petition. The solicitor general adds
that there is not even any legislative practice to In the instant controversy, the petitioners —
support the petitioner's theory that a senator one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
who votes for the winning Senate President is constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these
precluded from becoming the minority leader. jurisprudential parameters. They claim that
••iBi
Section 16(1), Article VI of the Constitution, has
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court
not been observed in the selection of the Senate
carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
important cases involving this very important
tig) "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether
and basic question, which it has ruled upon in
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
the past.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
L In Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1068
the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
(1957), this Court endeavored to define political Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdic
question. And we said that "it refers to 'those tion over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine,
questions which, under the Constitution, are however, that jurisdiction over the s.ubject mat
to be decided by the people in their sovereign ter-of a case is determined by the allegations of
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary the complaint or petition, regardless of whether
authority has been delegated to the legislative the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
or executive branch of the government.' It is con asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of
aj
166 • CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OPGOVERNMENT

M
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdic the senators. Notbyany construaldoes it thereb:
tion over the petition. It is well within the power delineatewhocomprise the "majority," muchles:
tsaj and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the "minority," in the said body.And there is n<
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a showing that the framers of our Constitutioi
violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse had in mind other than the usual meanings o
their discretion in exercise of their functions and these terms.
^j
prerogatives.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution that the President of the Senate must be electee
Having assumed jurisdiction over the peti by a number constituting more than one haL
tion, we now go to the next crucial question: In of all the members thereof, it does not provide
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate that the members who will not vote for him shaL"
minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could
•iî
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
the Constitution or the laws? or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically becomethe minority leader.
Petitioners answer the above question in the
affirmative. They contend that the constitutional The Comment of Respondent Guingona fur
provision requiring the election of the Senate nishes some relevant precedents, which were not
President "by majority vote of all its members" contested in petitioner's Reply. During the eighth
sSJ
carries with it a judicial duty to determine the Congress, which was the first to convene after the
concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomina
as who may elect a minority leader. They argue tion ofSen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President
^} that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional was seconded by a member of the minority, then
provision refers to that group of senators who (1) Sen.Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth rejgular
voted for the winning Senate President and (2) session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed
accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was
those who voted for the lossing nominee and ac reached to assign committee chairmanships to
all senators, including those belonging to the
cepted no such chairmanships comprise the mi
nority, to whom the right to determine the minor
minority. This practice continued during the
ity leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert,
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader
Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate was allowed to chair a committee. History would
minority leader, since he voted for Respondent also show that the "majority" in either house of
Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the Congress has referred to the political party to
jjS)
members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot

which the most number of lawmakers belonged,
choose the minority leader, because they did not while the "minority" normally referred to a party
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan with a lesser number of members.
and accepted committee chairmanships. Let us go back to the definitions of the terms
We believe, however, that the interpretation "majority" and "minority." Majority may also re
proposed by petitioners finds no clear support fer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger
jaj
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of number of votes," not necessarily more*than one
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality.
House. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or fac
tion with a smaller number of votes or adherents
The term "majority" has been judicially than the majority." Between two unequal parts
defined a number of times. When referring to or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it greater number would obviously be the majority,
simply "means the number greater than half while the lesser would be the minority. But where
or more than half of any total." The plain and there are more than two unequal groupings, it is
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional not as easy to say which is the minority entitled
clause simply mean that the Senate President to select the leader representing all the minori
must obtain the votes of more than one half of all ties. In a government with a multi-party system
such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by disregardedby the legislativebody at will, upon
petitioners themselves), there could be several the concurrence of a majority.
minority parties, one of which has to be identi
fied by the Comelec as the "dominant minority In view ofthe foregoing, Congressverily has
party" for purposes of the general elections. In the power and prerogative to provide for such of
the prevailing composition of the present Sen ficers as it may deem. And it is certainly within
ate, members either belong to different political its own jurisdiction %tnd discretion to prescribe
parties or are independent. No constitutional the parameters for the exercise of this preroga
or statutory provision prescribe which of the
tive. This Court has no authority to interfere
and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
many minority groups or the independents or a
realm, without running afoul of constitutional
combination thereof has the right to select the
minority leader.
principles'that it is boundto protectand uphold
— the very duty that justifies the Court's being.
While the Constitution is explicit on the Constitutional respect and a becomingregard for
manner of electing a Senate President and a the sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevents
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on this Court from prying into the internal workings
the manner of selecting the other officers in both of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be nei
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says ther a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other of steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
&ffi)
ficers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, majesty of the law.
the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
m
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by
this Court. one without color of title or who is not entitled
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is
house of Congress the power "to determine the the proper legal remedy to determine the right
rules of its proceedings." Pursuant thereto, the or title to the contested public office and to oust
Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to the holder from its enjoyment. . .
govern its internal affairs.. . The action may be brought by the solicitor
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not pro general or a public prosecutor or any person
vide for the positions of majority and minority claiming to be entitled to the public office or
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise
specifically for such offices and prescribing the by another. The action shall be brought against
manner of creating them or of choosing the hold the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into
ers thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the As discussed earlier, the specific norms or
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines standards that may be used in determining who
m
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
upon which to determine the legality of the acts not been laid down by the Constitution, the stat
of the Senate relative thereto... utes, or the Senate itself in which the power has
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
no way can it be said that illegality or irregular
permanence and obligatoriness during their ef-
ity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption
fectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation,
and exercise ofthe powers of the office of Senate
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of
body adopting them." Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern
his specific acts as minority leader.
to the. courts, for said rules may be waived or
i-jj-fol
168 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OPGOVERNMENT
C. Arroyo, e* a/, v. De Venecia never did. What happened thereafter is shown in

G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 the following transcript ofthe session on Novem
<<&*(i
ber 21,1996 ofthe HouseofRepresentatives, as
MENDOZA, J.: published by Congress in th,e newspaperissues
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibi of December 5 and 6, 1996:
ûj tion challenging the validity of Republic Act No.
MR,ALBANO. Mr*. Speaker, I movethat
8240, which amends certain provisions of the
we now approve and ratify the conference
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing committee report.
Saj
so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on
the manufacture and sale ofbeer and cigarettes. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
Any objection to the motion?
Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against MR.ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speak
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the er?
House ofRepresentatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Ex There being none, approved.
tail
ecutive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and
the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, charging ' (Gavel)
violation ofthe rules ofthe House which petition
L ers claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a min
ute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
what is the question that the Chair asked
Constitution.
the distinguished sponsor.
The law originated in the House ofRepresen THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
tatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved There was a motion by.the Majority Leader
on third reading on September 12, 1996 and for approval of the report, and the Chair
iM
transmitted on September 16,1996 to the Senate called for the motion.
which approved it with certain amendments on
third reading on November 17,1996. A bicameral MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so
conference committee was formed to reconcile the I wanted to object.
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
versions of the bill. The session is suspended for one minute.
The bicameral conference committee submit (It was 3:01 p.m.)
ted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on Novem
ber 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. (3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his spon The session is resumed.
sorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to
iiiiii
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco week.
objected to the motion and asked for a head count. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Wednesday, next week.
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his
motion was defeated when put to a vote. The in (It was 3:40 p.m.)
'i-tit terpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to Speaker of the House of Representatives and
interpellate. . . Rep. Arroyo announced that he the President of the Senate and certified by the
was -going to raise a question on the quorum, respective secretaries ofboth Houses of Congress
although until the end of his interpellation he as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November tion itself. They contend that the certification of
21,1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,1996. passed is false and spurious.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four More specifically, petitioners charge that (1)
different versions of the transcript of this portion in violation ofRuleVIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103
of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript oftherules oftheHouse, theChair, insubmitting
of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the conference committee reporttothe House, did
the session hall immediately after the session . not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, for its approval by motion in order to prevent
which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained petitioner Arroyo from questioningthe presence
from the operators of the sound system; (2) the of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112,
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's
3:40 p.m."of November 21, 1996, as certified by question, "What is that... Mr. Speaker?" and
the Chief of the Transcription Division on No- did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve
' vember 21,1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, the
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and in
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certi- stead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion
fied'by the Chief of the Transcription Division on and afterward declared the report approved; and
November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lag- (4) in violation ofRule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI,
man; and (4) the published version abovequoted. §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, the Chair suspended
According to petitioners, the four versions differ the sessionwithout first ruling on Rep.Arroyo's
oh three points, to wit: (1) in the audio sound question which, it is alleged, is a point of order
recording the word "approved," which appears or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon
heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November the resumption of the session on November 28,
'fiifoi 21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only 1996, because the parliamentary situation at
once, while in the other versions it is repeated the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for Petitioners also charge that the session was
a quorum because I will raise the question of the hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
quorum," which appears in the other versions. 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De
Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently de
•\l^ •formally challenging the existence of a quorum
nied by respondents. However, there is no need to
and asking for a reconsideration.
discuss this point as petitioners have announced
that, in order to expedite the resolution of this Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound
petition, they admit, without conceding, the by the certification of the Speaker of the House
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the that the law had been properly passed, consider
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes ing the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass
of this proceeding the word "approved" appears on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
in the transcripts. departments of the government, and they ask
for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Only the proceedings of the House of Repre Finance, which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
sentatives on the conference committee report enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership
on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' of the Court.
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null
and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House; that these rules embody After considering the arguments of the par
the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) ties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
that "each House may determine the rules of its Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
of the House rules is a violation of the Constitu dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
that what is alleged to have been violated in the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal other than members of the legislative body the
rules of procedure of the House rather than question presented is necessarily judicial in char
constitutional requirements for the enactment acter. Even its validity is open to question in a
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not case where private rights are involved.
claim that there was no quorum but only that,
In this case no rights of private individuals
by some maneuver allegedly, in violation of the
are involved but only those of a member who,
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
prevented from questioning the presence of a
to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no
quorum.
more power to look into the internal proceedings
of a House than members of that House have to
look over our shoulders, as long as no violation
But the cases, both here and abroad, in vary
of constitutional provisions is shown.
ing forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
apower to inquire into allegations that, in enacting Petitioners must realize that each of the
a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with three departments of our government has its
its own rules, in the absence of showing that separate sphere which the others may not invade
there was a violation of a constitutional provision without upsetting the delicate balance on which
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeha v. our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have working of our system ofgovernment,jnorethan
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
bodies are subject to revocation, modification enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting of the rules of the House. We must accordingly
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary decline the invitation to exercise our power.
rules are merely procedural, and with their
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chiei
observance, the courts have no concern. They
Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
Constitutional Commission, contend that under
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
Art. VIII. §1, "nothing involving abuse of discre
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
tion [by the other branches of the government]
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
requisite number of members have agreed to a
beyond judicial review." Implicit in this state
particular measure."'
ment of the former Chief Justice, however, is
an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this
Court is subject to the case and controversy re
We conclude this survey with the useful
quirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the
summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
requirement of a justiciable controversy before
Fernando, commenting on the power of each
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions
House of Congress to determine its rules of pro
such as those which arise in the field of foreign
ceedings. He wrote:
relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened
Rules are hardly permanent in character. the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally
The prevailing view is that they are subject to left to the political departments to decide, such
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure as those relating to national security, it has not
of the body adopting them as they are primarily altogether done away with political questions
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern such as those which arise in the field of foreign
with their observance. They may be waived relations. As we have already held, under Art.
or disregarded by the legislative body. Conse VIII, §1, this Court's function is merely [to]
quently, mere failure to conform to them does check whether or not the governmental branch
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
the requisite number of members have agreed limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has
to a particular measure. The above principle is a different view. In the absence of a showing...
[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of 7198 was approved was by no means a unique
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was
exercise its corrective power It has no power the way the conference committee report on the
to look into what it thinks is apparent error. bills which became the Local Government Code
If, then, the established rule is that courts of 1991 and the conference committee report on
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on the bills amending the.Tariff and CustomsCode
account merely of noncompliance with rules of were approved.
procedure made by itself, it follows that such In 1957, the practice was questioned as be
a case does not present a situation in which a ing contrary to the rules of the House. The point
branch of the government has "gone beyond the was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M.
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of
call for the exercise of our Art..VIII, §1 power. the Chair. Mr.Tolentino said:
k&\
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody
of the law in the House was "railroaded." They
objects means a unanimous action of the
claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Al
concerned, this has been a precedent since I
bano's motion approved.
came here-fceven years ago, and it has been
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's the procedure in this House that ifsomebody
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee objects, then a debate follows and after the
report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved debate, then the voting comes in.
for the approval and ratification of the confer
xxx xxx xxx
ence committee report. The Chair called out
for objections to the motion. Then the Chair Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised
declared: 'There being none, approved." At the by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder
fet
same time the Chair was saying this, however, what his attitude is now on his point of or
Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that. . . Mr. der. I should just like to state that I believe
Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talk that we have had a substantial compliance
ing simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's that refers to statutory or constitutional
motion, the approval of the conference committee requirement, and a substantial compliance,
report had by then already been declared by the to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with
Chair announces "The bill is approved on
the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for
second reading." If there was any doubt as
the approval of the conference committee report
to the vote, any motion to divide would have
should have been stated by the Chair and later
been proper. So, if that motion is not pre
the individual votes of the Members should have
sented, we assume that the House approves
been taken. They say that the method used in
the measure. So I believe there is substantial
this case is a legislator's nightmare because it
compliance here, and if anybody wants a di
suggests unanimity when the fact was that one
vision of the House he can always ask for it,
or some legislators opposed the report.
and the Chair can announce how many are
No rule of the House of Representatives in favor and how many are against.
has been cited which specifically requires that
in cases such as this involving approval of a Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method
conference committee report, the Chair must to say that some other way would be better, more
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or accurate and even more just. The advantages or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as the So disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method
licitor General has pointed out, the manner in do not present any matter for judicial consider
which the conference committee report on H. No. ation. ...
fe;.J
Nor does the Constitution require that the Given this fact, it is difficult to see how i1
yeas and the nays of the Members be taken can plausibly be contended that in signing the
every time a House has to vote, except only in bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent
the following instances: upon the last and third Speaker of the House acted with grave abuse oi
readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the his discretion.
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the
veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact
that in the approval of the original bill the votes Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine
of the Members by yeas and nays had already the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to House and the President of the Senate and the
repeat the process. certification by the secretaries of both Houses ol
Congress that it was passed on November 21.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much
from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result energy and learning is devoted in the separate
of the precipitate suspension and subsequent opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide.
adjournment of the session. It would appear, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is nc
however, that the session was suspended to allow claim either here or in the decision in the EVA1
the parties to settle the problem, because when it cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption.
not say anything anymore. While it is true that In one case, we "went behind" an enrolled bill
the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until and consulted the Journal to determine whether
4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. certain provisions of a statute had been approved
Arroyo could at least have objected if there was by the Senate.
anything he wanted to say. The fact, however,
is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, But, where as here there is no evidence to the
1996 of the House shows: contrary, this Court will respect the certification
of the presiding officers of both Houses that a
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this
Court has refused to determine claims that the
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed
no objection, the Chair declared the session amendment to the Constitution had not been
adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
of Wednesday, November 27, 1996. resolution imports absolute verity and is binding
iiiiiii on the courts." This Court quoted from Wigmore
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21,
on Evidence the following excerpt which embod
1996. (Emphasis added)
ies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
This Journal was approved on December
2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval 2. Internal discipline.
except Rep. Lagman.
A. Osmena v. Pendatun
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predica 109 Phil. 863(1960)
ment was largely of their own making. Instead
of submitting the proper motions for the House On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio
to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency Osmena, Jr., submitted to this Court a veri
of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the fied petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari
passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
was not, in form or substance, a point of order against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. fourteen other congressman in their capacity
And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. as members of the Special Committee created
Albano's motion to adjourn would have prece by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for an
r&ftl dence and would have put an end to any further nulment of such Resolution on the ground of
consideration of the question. infringement ofhis parliamentary immunity; he
also asked, principally, that said members of the the Philippines, made by Honorable Sergio
special committee be enjoined from proceeding Osmena, Jr., in his privilege speechofJune
in accordance with it, particularly the portion 23, I960, and for such purpose it is autho
authorizing them to require him to substantiate rized to summon Honorable SergioOsmena,
his charges against the President with the ad Jr., to appear before it to substantiate his
monition that if he failed to do so, he must show charges as well a$ to issue subpoena and/or
cause why the House should not punish him. subpoena duces tecum to require the atten
The petition attached a copyofHouse Resolu dance of witnesses and/or the production of
tion No. 59, the pertinent portion of which read pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable
&ffil
as follows: Sergio Osmena, Jr., fails to do so to require
him to show cause why he should not be
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, punished by the House. The special commit
^|J 1960, the Honorable Sergio Osmena, Jr., tee shall submit to the House a report of its
Member of the House of Representatives findings and recommendations before the
from the Second District of the province adjournment of the present special session
of Cebu, took the floor of this Chamber on of the Congress of the Philippines.
the one hour privilege to deliver a speech,
-entitled 'A Message to Garcia'; In support of his request, Congressman Os
mena alleged: first, the Resolution violated his
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity
the Congressman from the Second District for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
of Cebu states the following: words constituted no actionable conduct; and
xxxx
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech
and words, the House took up other business,
"The people, Mr. President, have been and Rule XVII, Sec. 7 of the Rules of the House
hearing of ugly reports that under your un provides that if other business had intervened
popular administration the free things they after the Member had uttered obnoxious words
used to get from the government are now for in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor
sale at premium prices. They say that even nor be subject to censure by the House.
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of
the gravity and seriousness of a criminal
case, the culprit can always be bailed out for There is no question that Congressman
ever from jail as long as he can come across Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before
with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an the House, made the serious imputations of
anomalous situation would reflect badly on bribery against the President which are quoted
the kind of justice that your administration in Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to
is dispensing, x x x" produce before the House Committee created
WHEREAS, the charge of the gentleman for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
from the Second District of Cebu, if niade imputations. There is also no question that for
maliciously or recklessly and without basis having made the imputations and for failing to
in truth and fact, would constitute a seri produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by
ous assault upon the dignity and prestige resolution of the House, suspended from office
of the Office of the President, which is the for a period of fifteen months, for serious disor
derly behavior.
one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the
Filipino people and would expose said office
to contempt, and disrepute: xxx
As previously stated Osmena contended in
Resolved by the House ofRepresentatives, his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him
that a special committee of fifteen members complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
to be appointed by the Speaker be and the words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
same hereby is, created to investigate the questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no
truth of the charges against the President of disorderly behavior for which he could be pun-
L>
ished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned floor ofthe House: "Amonstrosity, a measure the
and disciplined therefore, the House had lost most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
the power to do so because it had taken up other infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol.
business before approving House Resolution No. 2, pp. 789-799). Two other congressmen were
59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that censured for employing insulting words during
the House has no power, under the Constitution debate. (2 Hinds' Precedent, 799-801). In one
to suspend one of its members. case, a member of Congress was summoned to
testify on a statement made by him in debate
Section 15 of Article VI of our Constitution
but he invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
provides that "for any speech or debate" in Con
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Prec
gress, the Senators or Members of the House of
edents 123-124).
Representatives "shall not be questioned in any
other place." This section was taken or is a copy For unparliamentary conduct, members
of Sec. 6, Clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of Parliament or Congress have been, or_could
of the United States. In that country, the provi be censured, committed to prison, [Kilbourn v.
sion has always been understood to mean that Thompson, 103 U.S. 189; Hiss v. Barlett and
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions Gray, 468, 63 Am, Rec. 768, 770.] suspended,
for their words uttered in Congress, the members even 'expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in The appendix to this decision amply attests to
Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be the consensus of informed opinion regarding the
questioned in any other place" than Congress. practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or
Our Constitution enshrines parliamen expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension
tary immunity which is a fundamental privilege of a legislator in a foreign country.
cherished in every legislative assembly of the And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine
democratic world. As old as the English Parlia Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for
ment, its purpose is "to enable and encourage one year.
a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and.success" for "it Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine
is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy House ojF Representatives provide that the
the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should parliamentary practices of the Congress of the
be protected from the resentment of every one, United States shall apply in a supplementary
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that manner to its proceedings.
liberty may occasion offense." [Terry v. Brand- This brings up the third point of the petition
howe, 341 U.S. 367.] Such immunity has come er: the House may no longer take action against
to this country from the practices of Parliament me, he argues, because after my speech, and
as construed and applied by the Congress of the before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken
United States. Its extent and application remain up other business. Respondents answer that
no longer in doubt in so far as related to the Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved
question before us. It guarantees the legislator by the house, that such approval amounted to a
complete freedom of expression without fear of suspension of the House Rules, which according
being made responsible in criminal or civil ac to standard parliamentary practice may be.done
tions before the courts or any other forum outside by unanimous consent.
of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the
him from responsibility before the legislative body
House may suspend the operation of its Rules,
itself whenever his words and conduct are con
it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its
sidered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
right to take action which had already lapsed.
member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was The situation might thus be compared to
censured for using the following language on the laws [Rules of the House have not the force of
^jpt
feM
176 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
lamation, February 28 and that the appellant on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged
is charged with having violated the provisions fact may be established by extraneous evidence;
ofAct No. 2381, the vital question is the date of while, on the other hand, it is urged that the
adjournment ofthe Legislature, andthis reduces contents ofthe legislative journals are conclusive
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order
proved, whether by the legislative journals or to understand these opposing positions, it is nec
extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court essarytoconsider the nature and characterofthe
can take judicial notice of the journals. These evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood
questions will beconsidered in thereverse order. to be that which proves or disproves "any matter
in question or to influence the beliefrespecting
... On page 793 ofVolume 7 ofthe Commis it," and "conclusive evidence is that whichestab
sion Journal for the ordinary and special sessions lishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive
ofthe Third Philippine Legislature, the following presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol.
appears: 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in
order to establish his contention, must neces
"The Journal for Saturday, February
sarily depend upon the memory or recollection
28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine of witnesses, while the legislative journals are
die of the Commission as a Chamber of the the acts of the Government or sovereign itself.
Philippine Legislature. Thehourofmidnight Fromtheir very nature and objectthe records of
having arrived, on motion of Commissioner the Legislature are as important as those of the
Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber ofthe judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity ofthe
PhilippineLegislature, adjournedsinedie." journals ofthe Philippine Legislature, whenthey
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
While there are adjudicated cases in this organic laws by which the Philippine Govern
jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the ment was brought into existence, to invade a
$j&
courts may take judicial notice of the legislative coordinate and independent department of the
journals, it is well settled in the United States Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
that such journals may be noticed by the courts powers and functions of the Legislature. But
in determiningthe questionwhether a particular counsel in his argument says that the public
bill became a law or not. The result is that the knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped
law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so
to take judicial notice ofthe legislative journals until the determination of the discussion of all
of the special session of the Philippine Legisla pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands
ture of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous of the clock was stayed in order to enable the
or contradictory as to the aetual time ofadjourn Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently
ment. They show, with absolute certainty, that within the time fixedby the Governor's proclama
the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock tion for the expiration of the special session, in
midnight on February 28, 1914. direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
Passing over the question whether the 1902. If the clock, was in fact, stopped, as here
printed Act (No. 2381), published byauthority of suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight
as compared with that ofaltering the probative
law, is conclusive evidence as to the date whenit force and character of legislative records, and
was passed, we will inquire whether the courts making the proof of legislative action depend
l&afc,) may go behind the legislative journals for the upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
purpose ofdetermining the date ofadjournment death or absence* and so imperfect on account
when such journals are clear and explicit. From ofthe treachery ofmemory. Long, longcenturies
the foregoing it is clear that this investigation ago, these considerations of public policy led to
belongs entirely to the branch of legal science the adoption ofthe rule giving verity and unim
which embraces and illustrates the laws of evi peachability to legislative records.." (Capito vs.
dence. On the one hand, it is maintained that Topping, W. Vds., 22 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1089.)
the Legislature did not, as we have indicated,
adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but
... As the Constitution of the Philippine tions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
Government is modeled after those of the Fed conditions relating to temperature, acidity,
jffiij eral Government and the various states, we do and time of reaction. This produce when ap
not hesitate to follow the courts in that country plied in water solution and extended with
in the matter now before us. The journals say inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight cost adhesive fo* use in the manufacture of
on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, plywood."
and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a
fe) finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the
B. Casco Philippine Chemical synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde."
Co. v. Gimenez
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill ap
7 SCRA 347(1963) proved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and
"formaldehyde," and that the members of Con
CONCEPCION, J.: gress intended to exempt "urea" and "formalde
hyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
The only question for determination in this "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as finished
case is whether omot "urea" and "formaldehyde" product, citing in support of this view the state
are exempt by the law from the payment of the ments made on the floor of the Senate, during
jgg) aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of the consideration of the bill before said House,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads: by members thereof. But, said individual state
ments do not necessarily reflect the view of the
"The margin established by the Mon
etary Board pursuant to the provision of
Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon
the House of Representatives ... Furthermore,
it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which
the sale of foreign exchange for the importa
tion of the following:
uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon
xxxxx the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the passed by Congress and approved by the Presi
manufacture of plywood and hardboard dent. (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
when imported by and for the exclusive use Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
of end-users."
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14,
1961). If there has been any mistake in the print
Petitioners maintains that the term "urea ing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should of Congress and approved by the Executive— on
be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (italics which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
ours) and that respondent herein, the Auditor the principle of separation of powers and under
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, mining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
have erred in holding otherwise. In this connec system — the remedy is by amendment or cu
tion, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and rative legislation, not by judicial decree.
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials
in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the
National Institute of Science and Technology C. Astorga v. Villegas
has expressed, through its Commissioner, the 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
view that:
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
"Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical
solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as The present controversy revolves around
condensation product from definite propor the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which be-
came Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the pines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice Mayor of of approval of June 18,1964. The bill thereupon
the City of Manila, Further Amending for the became Republic Act No. 4065.
Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic The furor over the Act which ensued as a
Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
result of the public denunciation mounted by
iik Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction
City of Manila."
from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 is
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear sued a press statement that the enrolled copy
undisputed: of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the
President of the Philippines was a wrong version
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a
of the bill actually passed by the Senate because
bill of local application, was filed in the House it did not embody the amendments introduced
$i§) of Representatives. It was there passed on third
by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
reading without amendments on April 21,1964.
consequence the Senate President, through the
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate Com
Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated
mittee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
&^\
July 11,1964 to the President of the Philippines,
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas.
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill
The committee favorably recommended approval
with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses
$pa&\
Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the as well as by the presiding officers thereof was
President Pro tempore of the Municipal Board not the bill duly approved by Congress and that
who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the he considered his signature on the enrolled bill
latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter
dated July 21,1964 made the further clarification
When the bill was discussed on the floor of that the invalidation by the Senate President of
the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, his signature meant that the bill on which his
substantial amendments to Section l89 were signature appeared had never been approved by
introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the
amendments were approved in toto by the Sen Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the
ate. The amendment recommended by Senator bill a valid enactment.
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Sen
ate proceedings as having been acted upon. On July 31,1964 the President of the Philip
pines sent a message to the presiding officers of
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Sen both Houses of Congress informing them that
ate sent a letter to the House of Representatives in view of the circumstances he was officially
that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
L Attached to the letter was a certification of the
9266 (which had been returned to the Senate
the previous July 3), adding that "it would be
amendment, which was the one recommended untenable and against public policy to convert
by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amend into law what was not actually approved by the
ments which were the ones actually approved two Houses of Congress."
by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Ma
9266 as sent back to it, and copies were then cer nila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the
tified and attested by the Secretary of the House department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of government as well as to the owners, operators
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and/or managers of business establishments.in
and the Senate President. On June 16,1964 the Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
copies of the bill to the President of the Philip- Chief of Police to recall five members of the city
police force who had been assigned to the Vice-
89Amending Section 10 of R.A. No. 409 defining the pow
Mayor presumably under authority of Republic
ers and duties of the Vice-Mayor. Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor The issue in that case was whether or not a
Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. resolution ofboth Houses ofCongress proposing
Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on Sep an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
tember 7,1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/ appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called
or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and parity rights provision) had been passed by "a
Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Senate and of the House of Representatives"
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and ihe
Members of the municipal board to comply with The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro
the provisions of Republic Act 4065. Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V.
Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hon-
gg)
Respondents' position is that the so-called tiveros, held that the case involved a political
Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was question which was not within the province of
not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and the judiciary in view of the principle of separa
that the entries in the journal of that body and tion of powers in our government. The "enrolled
not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the
the resolution of the issue. ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reason
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respon ing being that "if a political question conclusively
L dent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution
official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule'
without bond, ''enjoining the petitioner Vice-
born of that respect."
Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any
of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate
conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla,
the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not other holding that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve
wise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any the question presented, and affirming categori
other law until further orders from this Court." cally that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and
the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
The original petitioner, HerminioA.Astorga, specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as
has since been succeeded by others as Vice-
amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the
Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil proce
and Antonio Reguiza, with previous leave of this
&y dure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis
Court, appeared as amid curiae, and have filed on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
extensive and highly enlightening memoranda
on the issues raised by the parties. The proceedings of the Philippine Com
mission, or of any legislative body that may
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or
citations of authorities, principally decisions of of Congress (may be proved) by the journals
United States Federal and State Courts, have of those bodies or of either house thereof,
been submitted on the question of whether the or by published statutes or resolutions, or
"enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" by copies certified by the clerk or secretary,
rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A printed by their order; provided, that in the
similar question came up before this Court and case of acts of the Philippine Commission or
elicited differing opinions in the caseofMabanag, the Philippine Legislature, when there is in
et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 existence a copy signed by the presiding of
Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court ficers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
it cannot be truly said that the question has acts and of the due enactment thereof.
been laid to rest and that the decision therein
jM
constitutes a binding precedent. Congress devised its own system of authen
ticating bills duly approved by both Houses,
&}
fifaftl
namely, by the signatures of their respective pre the judicial department "to accept, as having
siding officersand secretaries on the printed copy passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
of the approved bill.90 It has been held that this manner stated." Thus it has also been stated
procedureis merelya modeofauthentication,91 to in other cases that if the attestation is absent
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being and the same is not required for the validity of
presented to him has been duly approved by Con a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
gress and is ready for his approval or rejection.92 and other records of Congress for proof of its
The function of an attestation is therefore not of due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
approval, because a bill is considered approved reached in a number of decisions,98 although they
r&fc)
after it has passed both Houses. Even where are silent as to whether the journals may still
such attestation is provided for in the Constitu be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
tion authorities are divided as to whether or not officers is present.
•$0 the signatures are mandatory such that their The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what
absence would render the statute invalid.93 The shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill.
affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in It does not require the presiding officers to cer
effect giving the presiding officers the power tify to the same. But the said Constitution does
of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to contain the following provisions:
the contrary*94 There is less reason to make the
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill Sec. 10(4). "Each House shall keep a
where the Constitution does not even provide Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
that the presiding officers should sign the bill time publish the same, excepting such parts
before it is submitted to the President. as may in its judgment require secrecy; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
In one case in the United States, where the the request of one-fifth of the Members pres
(State) Constitution required the presiding offi ent, be entered in the Journal."
cers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill Sec. 21. (2). "No bill shall be passed by ei
was considered as conclusive proof of its due ther House unless it shall have been printed
enactment.95 Another case however, under the and copies thereofin its final form furnished
same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill its Members at least three calendar days
was not conclusive evidence.96 But in the case of '• prior to its passage, except when the Presi
Field vs. Clark,97 the U.S. Supreme Court held dent shall have certified to the necessity of
that the signatures of the presiding officers on a its immediate enactment. Upon the last read
i±gl
bill, although not required by the Constitution, is ing of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authori allowed, and the question upon its passage
ties in the United States are thus not unanimous
shall be taken immediately thereafter and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal."
on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is Petitioner's argument that the attestation of
set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark ... the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive
proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said,
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory by the respect due to a coequal department of the
is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal government,99 is neutralized in this case by the
and independent departments," which requires fact that the Senate President declared his sig
nature on the bill to be invalid and issued a sub
xSee Rules of the House of Representatives, Rules 11(d) sequent clarification that the invalidation of his
and WO) and the Rules of the Senate; Sections 3(e) and 6(h). signature meant that the bill he had signed had
9,Brown v. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160,164
92Taylor v. Wilson, 22 NW 119,120.
MSee Annotations in 95 ALR 273. "Gray v. Taylor, 113 P 558,591, affirmed in 227 U.S. 51,
wBrown v. Morris, supra, at pp. 164-165. 57, 57 L.ed. 413, 416; Pelt v. Payne, 30 SW 426,427.
â ^Hammond v. Lynch, 151 NW 81,88. "Field v. Clark, supra, at p. 303; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
"Lynch v. Hutchinson, 76 NE 370. 78 Phil. 1,13; Morales v. Subido, L-29658, Feb. 27,1969, 27
87143 U.S. 294, 303; 36 L.ed. 294. SCRA 131, 134.
gjiii
Msi
yt
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously tion requires it. While it is true that thejournal
this declaration should be accordedevengreater is not authenticated and is subject to the risks
Effi*l respect than the attestation it invalidated, which of misprinting and other errors, the point is ir
it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and relevantin this case. This courtis merely asked
undisputable in logic. to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
•$$ As far as Congress itself is concerned, there signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode specific facts and circumstances ofthis.case,this
of authentication. The law-making process in Courtcan do this and resort to the Senatejour
Congressends when the bill is approvedby both nal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
Houses, and the certification does not add to the substantial and lengthy amendments were intro
validity of the bill or cure any defect already duced on the floor and approved by the Senate
\^J but werenot incorporatedin the printed text sent
present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of to the President and signed by him. This court
the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the is not asked to incorporate such amendments
(1935) Constitution says that "[e]very billpassed into the alleged law, which admitted is a risky
by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, undertaking,101 but to declare that the bill was
be presented to the President."100 In Brown vs. not duly enacted and therefore did not become
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, law. This We do, as indeed both the President of
interpreting a similar provision in the State Con the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
stitution, said that the same "makes it clear that they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
the indispensable step is the final passage and face of the manifest error committed and subse
it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted quently rectified by the President of the Senate
as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
other proof that it has 'passed both houses' will perpetuate that error by disregarding such rec
i£jjjj) satisfy the constitutional requirement." tification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the and bring about mischievous consequences not
bill is not mandatory but argues that the dis intended by the law-making body.
claimerthereofbythe Senate President, granting
it to have been validly made, would only mean In view of the foregoing considerations, the
that there was no attestation at all, but would petition is denied and the so-called RepublicAct
not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
L It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OFREPUBLIC
its absence upon the vaHdity of the statute. The ACT NUMBERED FOURHUNDRED NINE,AS
inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such at AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
testation as result of the disclaimer, and conse REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MA
quently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, NILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted
what evidence is there to determine whether or and therefore didnot become law.The temporary
not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case restraining order dated April 28,1965 is hereby
the entries in the journal should be consulted. made permanent.
The journal of the proceedings ofeach House NOTE: The duty to keep a Journal has a dual
of Congressis no ordinary record. The Constitu purpose: (1) "to insure publicity to the proceed
ings of the legislature, and a correspondent
""ArticleVI, Section 20(1).The 1973 Constitution simi
frfo'J
larly provides inArticle VIII, Section 20(i) that"[E]very bill mSee, for example, the decision of this Court in Casco
passed by the National Assembly shall, before it-becomes a Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963, 7
law, be presented to the Prime Minister x x x." SCRA 347 and Morales v. Subido, supra.
ijjii
°^j
^ffii
responsibility of the members to their respective 1. The Electoral Tribunals.

constituents," and (2) to provide proof of what A. Angara v. -Electoral
actually transpired in the legislature. 1 Story Commission
Commentaries 840, quoted with approval in Field 63 Phil. 134(1936)
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892).
î The Constitution exempts from publication LAUREL, J.:
only such matters "as may, in [the Congress!
judgment, affect national security." This new
rule is an application of Section 7 of the Bill of Having disposed of the question of jurisdic
Rights which says: tion, we shall now proceed to pass upon the
second proposition and determine whether the
The right of the people to information Electoral Commission has acted without or in
on matters of public concern shall be recog excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution
nized. Access to official records, and to of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
.documents and papers pertaining to official cognizance of the protest filed against the elec
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as tion of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
to government research data used as basis previous confirmation thereofby the National As
for policy development, shall be afforded the sembly on December 3,1935. As able counsel for
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges
provided by law. on the interpretation of Section 4 of Article VI of
If the enrolled bill conflicts with the Journal the Constitution which provides:
i^>
on a matter required by the Constitution to be SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Com
entered in the Journal, which should prevail? The mission composed of three Justices of the Su
Supreme Court has explicitly left this matter an preme Court designated by the ChiefJustice,
open question in Moralesv. Subido,27 SCRA131 and of six Members chosen by the National
(1969). Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of
SEC. 17. THE SENATE AND THE votes, and three by the party having the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL second largest number of votes therein. The
EACH HAVE AN ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall
ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELEC be the sole judge of all contests relating to
TION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS the election, returns and qualifications of the
OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. members of the National Assembly.
EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE
COMPOSED OF NINE MEMBERS, THREE It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE the origin and history of this constitutional provi
SUPREME COURT TO BE DESIGNATED sion and inquire into the intention of its framers
BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE, AND THE RE and the people who adopted it so that we may
iiiiiiiJ
MAINING SIX SHALL BE MEMBERS OF properly appreciate its full meaning, import and
THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REP significance.
RESENTATIVES, AS THE CASE MAY BE, The original provision regarding this subject
WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (Sec. 7,
OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly
FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS qualifications of its members," was taken from
REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST clause 1 of Section 5, Article I of the Constitution
SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE of the United States providing that "Each House
SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE ELECTORAL shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN. Qualifications of its own Members,***." The Act
of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative
modified this provision by the insertion of the Power was also preparing its report. As submit
word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and ted to the Convention on September 24, 1934,
House of Representatives, respectively, shall subsection 5, Section 5, of the proposed Article
be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
qualifications of their elective members,***"
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive The elections* returns and qualifica
character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each tions of the members of either House and all
House of the Legislature over the particular cases cases contesting the election of any of their
therein specified. This court has had occasion to members shall be judged by an Electoral
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Commission, constituted, as to each House,
Senate and House of Representatives, respec by three members elected by the members of
tively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. the party having the largest number of votes
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], therein, three elected by the members of the
39 Phil. 886, 888.) party having the second largest number of
The first step towards the creation of an votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
independent tribunal for the purpose of decid the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
ing contested elections to the legislature was Justice.
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitu
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees tional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Convention, which sub as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
committee submitted a report on August 30, Guarantees which was probably inspired by
1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal the Spanish plan (Art. 121, Constitution of the
of Constitutional Security empowered to hear Spanish Republic of 1931); was soon abandoned
protests not only against the election of members in favor of the proposition of the Committee on
of the legislature but also against the election of Legislative Power to create a similar body with
executive officers for whose election the vote of reduced powers and with specific and limited
the whole nation is required, as well as to initi jurisdiction, to be designated as an Electoral
ate impeachment proceedings against specified Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modi
executive and judicial officers. For the purpose fied the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was
Power with respect to the composition of the
to be composed of three justice designated by the
Electoral Commission and made further changes
Supreme Court and six members of the house
&fl in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
of the legislature to which the contest corre
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature.
sponds, three members to be designated by the
The draft as finally submitted to the Convention
majority party and three by the minority, to be
on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the
Chief Justice is also a member in which case the
(6) The elections, returns and quali
latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was
fications of the Members of the National
submitted by the Committee on Constitutional
miiJ
Assembly and all cases contesting the elec
Guarantees to the Convention on September 15,
tion of any of its Members shall be judged
1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
by an Electoral Commission, composed of
reduction of the legislative representation to four
Mfo\ three members elected by the party having
members, that is, two senators to be designated
the largest number of votes in the National
one each from the two major parties in the Sen
ate and two representatives to be designated one
Assembly, three elected by the members of
each from the two major parties in the House of
the party having the second largest number
Representatives, and in awarding representa of votes, and three justices of the Supreme
tion to the executive department in the persons Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
of two representatives to be designated by the Commission to be presided over by one of
fi/iji
President. said justices.
jjijtfjj
During the discussion of the amendment "Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with
introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, regards to the municipal president who is
and others, proposing to strike out the whole elected? What happens with regards to the
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
in lieu thereof the following: "The National As confirm their election? The municipal council
sembly shall be the sole and exclusive judge of does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
the elections, returns, and qualifications of the — in this case the municipal council pro
Members," the following illuminating remarks claims who has been elected, and it ends
were made on the floor of the Convention in its there, unless there is contest. It is the same
j^js)
session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of case; there is no need on the part of the Elec
the said draft:
toral Commission unless there is a contest.
******** The first clause refers to the case referred
to by the gentleman from Cavite where one
"Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have
person tries to be elected in place of another
a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning
who was declared elected. For example, in
of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11
a case when the residence of the man who
E&i&l of the draft, reading: The elections, returns
has been elected is in question, or in case the
and qualifications of the Members of the Na
tional Assembly and all cases contesting the citizenship of the man who has been elected
election of any of its Members shall be judged is in question.
by an Electoral Commission, ***,' I should "However, if the assembly desires to an
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz nul the power of the commission, it may do
whether the election and qualification of the so by certain maneuvers upon its first meet
Member whose election is not contested shall ing when the returns are submitted to the
also be judged by the Electoral Commission. assembly. The purpose is to give to the Elec
"Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question toral Commission all the powers exercised
about the election of the members, there is by the assembly referring to the elections,
nothing to be judged; that is why the word returns and qualifications of the members.
'judge' is used to indicate a controversy. If When there is no contest, there is nothing
there is no question about the election of a to be judged.
member, there is nothing to be submitted to
"Mr. VENTURA, Then it should be
the Electoral Commission and there is noth
eliminated.
ing to be determined.
&&1
"Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different mat
"Mr. VENTURA. But does that, carry
ter, I think, Mr. Delegate.
the idea also that the Electoral Commission
shall confirm also the election of those whose "Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a
election is not contested? similar question as that propounded by the
"Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confir
gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose
mation. As the gentleman knows, the action a while ago. However, I want to ask more
of the House of Representatives confirming questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
the election of its members is just a matter of paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites
the rules of the assembly. It is not constitu cases contesting the election as separate from
tional. It is not necessary. After a man files the first part of the section which refers to
his credentials that he has been elected, that elections, returns and qualifications.
is sufficient, unless his election is contested. "Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake
tjijjfrl "Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elec
this is sufficient, as we have observed that tions are already included in the phrase 'the
for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of elections, returns and qualifications.' This
election of a member to a legislative body, phrase 'and contested elections'was inserted
because he will not authorize his pay. merely for the sake of clarity.
E&I-&4
"Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, "Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they
may not the Electoral Commission, at its havenopower, because they canonlyjudge."
own instance, refuse to confirm the election
of the members? > In the same session, the first clause of
the aforesaid draft reading 'The election,
"Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless returns and qualifications of the members of
there is a protest. the National Assembly and" was eliminated
"Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the by the Sponsoring Committee in response
gentleman yield? to an amendment introduced by Delegates
Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim
[m
'THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may Mumar and others. In explaining the differ
yield, if he so desires. ence between the original draft and the draft
"Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
as amended Delegate Roxas speaking for the
Sponsoring Committee said:
• "Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentle
*******
man from Capiz believe that unless this
power is granted to the assembly, the as
"Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, senor Presi-
sembly on its own motion does not have the dente, consiste solamente en obviarla objecion
right to contest the election and qualification apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de
of its members?
que la primera clausula del draft que dice:
"Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that "The elections, returns and qualifications
the gentleman is right. If this draft is re of the members of the National Assembly'
tained as it is, even if two-thirds of the as parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
sembly believe that a member has not the facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion
qualifications provided by law, they cannot de los miembros que no han sido protesta-
remove him for that reason. dos y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos
que la enmienda tiene razon en ese sentido,
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to si enmenlamos el draft, de tal modo que se
rempve shall only be retained by the Elec lea como sigue: 'Allcases contesting the elec
toral Commission. tion', de modo que losjueces de la Comision
p$)
"Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for mis Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos
conduct. en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador
"Mr. LABRADOR. 1 mean with respect was voted upon the following interpellation
to the qualifications of the members. also took place:
"Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can "El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la
question the eligibility, he must go to the enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del
Electoral Commission and make the question Subcomite de Siete.
before the Electoral Commission.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el
•*Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Comite?
Commission shall decide whether the election
"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
is contested or not contested.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir; that is thepurpose.
draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y
"Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Su-
like to be informed if the Electoral Commis prema, no creo Su Senoria que esto equivale
sion has power and authority to pass upon practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miem
the qualification of the members of the Na bros del Tribunal Supremo?
tional Assembly even though that question "El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si
has not been raised.
el tribunal o la Comision esta constituido en
I
^l
esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria SEC. 4.' There shall be an Electoral
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros Commission composed of three Justices of
a&ftl
de la Corte Surpema consideraran la cues- the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
tion sobre la base de us meritos, sabiendo Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar National Assembly, three of whom shall be
el triunfo. nominated by the party having the larg
est number of votes arid three by the party
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que
having the second largest number of votes
en un caso como ese, podriamos hancer que
therein. The senior Justice in the Commis
tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
sion shall be its chairman. The Electoral
prescindieran del partidismo?
Commission shall be the sole judge of the
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el election, returns, and qualifications of the
partidismo no les daria el triunfo." Members of the National Assembly."
********
When the foregoing draft was submitted for
approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Com
The amendment introduced by Delegates
mittee, through President Recto, to effectuate
Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore
the original intention of the Convention agreed
the power to decide contests relating to the elec
to insert the phrase "All contests relating to"
tion, returns and qualifications of members of
between the phrase "judge of and the words
the National Assembly to the National Assembly
"the election." which was accordingly accepted
itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
by the Convention.
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934,
Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft
The members of the Constitutional Conven
bj' reducing the representation of the minority
tion who framed our fundamental law were in
party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
their majority men mature in years and ex
Commission to two members each, so as to ac
perience. To be sure, many of them were familiar
cord more representation to the majority party.
with the history and political development of
The Convention rejected this amendment by a
other countries of the world. When, therefore,
vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46),
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Com
thus maintaining the non-partisan character of
mission as a constitutional organ and invested it
the commission.
with the exclusive function of passing upon and
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft determining the election, returns and qualifica
was made to read as follows: tions of the members of the National Assembly,
they must have done so not only in the light of
(6) All cases contesting the elections, their own experience but also having in view the
returns and qualifications of the Members experience of other enlightened peoples of the
of the National Assembly shall be judged world. The creation of the Electoral Commission
by an Electoral Commission, composed of
was designed to remedy certain evils of which
three members elected by the party having the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
the largest number of votes in the National Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
Assembly, three elected by the members of members of the Convention to its creation, the
the party having the second largest number
plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the can be said now is that upon the approval of the
Commission to be presided over by one of Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Com
' said justices.
mission is the expression of the wisdom and "ul
The Style Committee to which the draft was timate justice of the people." (Abraham Lincoln,
submitted revised it as follows: First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
B. Abbas, et al. v. Senate remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if

166 SCRA 651 (1988) not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with-
no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situ
GANCAYCO, J.:
ation created by the petition for disqualification,
this would, in .the context of the situation, leave
the resolution of the contest to the only three
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed
Members who would remain, all Justices of this
before the respondent Tribunal an election
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that
who were proclaimed senators-elect in the the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor
May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that
U/til
Commission on Elections. The respondent in fact the most fundamental objection to such
Tribunal was at the time composed of three proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
(3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Sec
Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro tion 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
L. Yap (Chairman), Associate Justices Andres ordains its composition and defines its jurisdic
R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and tion and powers.
Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales,
iilWl
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal
A.J. Tamano and Victor Ziga. It seems quite clear to us that in thus provid
ing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices
On November 17,1987, the petitioners, with
of the Supreme Court and Members of the Sen
the exception of Senator Estrada but including ate, the Constitution intended that both those
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been desig
"judicial" and "legislative" components com
nated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator
monly share the duty and authority of deciding
Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the
all contests relating to the election, returns and
Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribu
representative in the Tribunal) filed with the re
nal correctly stated one part of this proposition
spondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
•^j
when it held that said provision "x x x is clear
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case expression of an intent that all (such) contests x
No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
im interested parties to said case, as respondents their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are
therein....
represented." The other part, of course, is that
the constitutional provision just as clearly man
The petitioners, in essence, argue that con dates the participation in the same process of
siderations of public policy and the norms of decision of a representative or representatives
fair play and due process imperatively require of the Supreme Court.
the mass disqualification sought and that the
doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be Said intent is even more clearly signalled by
the foundation of the questioned Resolutions the fact that the proportion of Senators to Jus
does not rule out a solution both practicable and tices in the prescribed membership of the Senate
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an unmistakable
fa*i
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules indication that the "legislative component" can
of procedure so as to permit the contest being not be totally excluded from participation in
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal. the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's of the Constitution.
Rules (Section 24) — requiring the concurrence
of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions Where, as here, a situation is created which
of whatever nature — is a proviso that where precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the •in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
(Ml&i
the Senate without inviting the same objections which is composed of nine (9) members, thre<
to the substitute's competence, the proposed of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court anc
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, the remaining six are members of the House o:
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to Representatives chosen on the basis of propor
abandon a duty that no other court or body can tiqnal representation from the political parties
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge and the parties or organizations registered undei
if shorn of the participation of its entire member the party-list system represented therein (Sec
ship of Senators. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)...
To our mind, this is the overriding consid

eration — that the Tribunal be not prevented After the revision of the ballots, the presenta
from discharging a duty which it alone has the tion of evidence, and submission of memoranda.
power to perform, the performance of which is Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in
in the highest public interest as evidenced by July, 1989.
its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached
in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin
of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the
LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
C. Bondoc v. Pineda reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast
jffliffli G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991 in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least
four (4) months the finalization of the decision
in the case.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This case involves a question of power. May The re-examination and re-appreciation of
the House of Representatives, at the request of
the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead
the dominant political party therein, change that over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camas
ura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
party's representation in the House Electoral
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a deci
winner of the contest.
sion freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court Moved by candor and honesty, Congress
iMJ
review and annul that action of the House? man Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to
his "Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco,
Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final
In the local and congressional elections held tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted
on May 11,1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the La- for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice
ban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. and self-respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's
Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) agreement" among the members of the HRET
tiigj
were rival candidates for the position of Repre that they would "abide by the result of the ap
sentative for the Fourth District of the province preciation of the contested ballot Congressman
of Pampanga. Each received the following votes Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest
&wll
in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting
Canvassers of Pampanga: appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
majority in the Tribunal.
Marciano M. Pineda 31,700 votes On March 5,1991, the HRET issued a Notice
Emigdio A. Bondoc 28,400 votes of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991
at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of
Difference 3,300 votes the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed March 6, 1991.
winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed On March 13, 1991, the eve of the prom
a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of ulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (for short). Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by
letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto
Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, attached.
by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled
Thank you.
him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from
the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize For the Secretary-General
the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Dandihg" Co
juangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP (SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
members in Davao del Sur to join said political Officer-in-charge
party; and that as those acts are "not only in
imical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but Operations Department
also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano
March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associ
unanimously confirmed the expulsions. ate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of
this "distressing development" and asked to be
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco relieved from their assignments in the HRET.
notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the
ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and By the above action (of the House) the prom
asked the House of Representatives, through the ulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the
Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda"
ii^
where party membership is a prerequisite. (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for
14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See
At 9:45 in the morning of March 14, 1991, the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even
letter dated March 13,1991, from the Office of the if there were no legal impediment to its prom
Secretary General of the House of Representa ulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5
fasaaA tives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
the letter from the LDP, the House of Represen overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the
tatives, during its plenary session on March 13, party-litigant which would have been defeated.
1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready
rescind the election of Congressman Camasura,
as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23
Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter
votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because
reads as follows:
some members of the Tribunal requested re-ap
preciation of some ballots, the finalization of the
13 March 1991
decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
With the re-appreciation completed, the deci
Chairman sion, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz
liiiip Constitution Hills
and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen
Quezon City Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles,
is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera: Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A.
Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose
I have the honor to notify the House of Elec E. Calingasan, dissenting.
toral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 Congressman Casamura's votein the Bondoc
March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to v.Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote,
rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. for which he earned the respect pi the Tribunal
Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader
on the basis of an LDP communication which is of his party.
Eiifi
190 CONSTITUTIONALSTRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Under the above circumstances an untenable But political factors are blocking the accom
situation has come about. It is extremely difficult plishment of the constitutionally mandated task
to continue with membership in the Tribunal of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of
i&iiftj
and for the Tribunal to preserve it. Integrity the present congressional term.
and credibility as a constitutional body charged
with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the Under these circumstances, we are compelled
unseating of an incumbent member of Congress to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
is being prevented at all costs. We believe that membership in the Tribunal.
the Tribunal should not be hampered in the per XXX XXX XXX
formance of its constitutional function by factors At the open session of the HRET in the
which have nothing to do with the merits of the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued
cases before it.
Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulga
In this connection, our own experience tion of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The
teaches that the provision for proportional rep resolution reads:
resentation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be received at 9:45 this morning from the House of
amended to provide instead fbr a return to the Representatives that at its plenary session held
composition mandated in the*1935 Constitution, on March 13,1991, it had voted to withdraw the
that is: three (3) members chosen by the House nomination and rescind the election of Congress
or Senate upon nomination of the party having man Camasura to the House of Representatives
the largest number of votes and three (3) of the Electoral Tribunal, the Tribunal Resolved to
party having the second largest number of votes: cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc
and a judicial component consisting of three (3) vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this
justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
party or coalition of parties can dominate the Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concur
legislative component in the Tribunal. rence offive members as required by Section 24 of
î
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot
Tribunal could perhaps sit as the Sole judge of be validly promulgated.
all contests relating to the election, returns and The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Jus
qualifications of members of the, House of Rep tices-members of the Supreme Court, being of
resentatives. Similarly, the House of Represen the opinion that this development undermines
tatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole the independence of the Tribunal and derails the
judge of all such contests involving members of orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have
the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date,
chances of non-judicial elements playing a de for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
cisive role in the resolution of election contests.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congress
We suggest that there should also be a provi man Cerilles also manifested his intention to
sion in the Constitution that upon designation to resign as a member of the Tribunal.
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so
designated should divest themselves of affiliation The Tribunal further Noted that Congress
with their respective political parties, to insure men Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
their independence and objectivity as they sit in Calingasan also manifested a similar intention,
Tribunal deliberations.
(p. 37, Rollo.)
There are only three (3) remaining cases for On March 19,1991, this Court, after deliber
decision by the' Tribunal. Bondoc should have
ating on the request for relief ofJustices Herrera,
Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to
been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera
return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court
v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
observed that:
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v.
&i)
Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy ... in view of the sensitive constitutional
Week recess. functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the
t^J
iiiiijj)
'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
the election, returns and qualifications of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
]kM
the members of Congress, all members of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
these bodies are appropriately guided only 2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining
by purely legal considerations in the decision respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be des
of the cases before them and that in the con
ignated in place of respondent Camasura from
templation of the Constitution the members- assuming, occupying and discharging functions
legislators, thereof, upon assumption oftheir as a member of the House of Representatives
duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer Electoral Tribunal;
^)
as representatives of their respective politi
cal parties but as impartial judges. The view 3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering re
was also submitted that, to further bolster spondent Camasura to immediately reassume
i&J the independence of the Tribunals, the term and discharge his functions as a member of the
of office of every member thereof should be House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
considered co-extensive with the correspond
4. Grant such other relief as may be just
ing legislative term and may not be legally
and equitable.
terminated except only by death, resignation,
permanent disability, or removal for valid Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, with
cause, not including political disloyalty. out giving it due course, required the respondents
m) to comment on the petition within ten days from
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to
DECLINE the request ofjustices Herrera, Cruz, notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganiz
and Feliciano to be relieved from their member
ing and allowing participation in its proceedings
'^ ship in the House of Representatives Electoral of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever
Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume
is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G.
their duties therein; b) to EXPRESS its concern Camasura in said House of Representatives Elec
over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the toral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal
of the nomination and rescission of the election
proceedings of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions of said Congressman Camasura as member of
purely judicial in character despite the inclusion the HRET by the House of Representatives is
tiui) oflegislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered
the view that the term of all the members of the by the Court."
Electoral Tribunals, including those from the Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did
'M&
legislature, is co-extensive with the correspond not oppose the petition. >
ing legislative term and cannot be terminated
at will but only for valid legal cause, and to Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea
REQUIRE the Justices-members ofthe Tribunal for the dismissal of the petition is centered
to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the on Congress' being the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members.
first instance.
Upon recommendation by the political parties
therein, those who are to sit in the House of
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the
prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Commission on Appointments as well), hence,
Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of
Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, them whenever the ratio in the representation
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other repre of the political parties in the House or Senate
sentative who may be appointed Vice Represen is materially changed on account of death,
iiiiijljj tative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying political party; that a Tribunal member's term
of office is not co-extensive with his legislative
this Court to:
term, for if a member of the Tribunal who-
1. Annul the decision of the House of Rep changes his party affiliation is not removed
resentatives of March 13, 1991, "to withdraw from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision
i £4jjj)

lifltift
mandating representation based on political The use of the word "sole" in both Section
affiliation would be completely nullified; and that 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11M
tf&J the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive
the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 3 jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as
and the decision to rescind his membership in the judge ofcontests relating to the election, returns
House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative and qualifications of the members of the House of
of the House-of-Representatives, hence, it is a Representatives(Robles vs. HouseofRepresenta
purely political question beyond the reach of
tives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, Febru
judicial review.
ary 5,1990). The tribunal was created to function
as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
Now, is the House of Representatives em members are politicians. It is a non-politicalbody
powered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
;$$}
interfere with the disposition of an election con said about the Electoral Commission applies as
test in the House Electoral Tribunal through the well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the House of Representatives:
tribunal of the majority party?
The purpose of the constitutional conven
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitu tion creating the Electoral Commission was to
tion . . . re-echoes Section 11, Article VI of the provide an independent and impartial tribunal
1935 Constitution, except the provision on the for the determination of contests to legislative
representation of the main political parties in office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to
the tribunal which is now based on proportional transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously
representation from all the political parties, in exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
stead of equal representation of three members to contested elections of its members.
from each of the first and second largest political
aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 con The power granted to the electoral Commis
^J stitutional provision reads as follows: sion to judge contests relating to the election and
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of
qualification of members of the National Assem
Representatives shall have an Electoral bly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
^y Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of ail as if it had remained in the legislature.
contests relating to the election, returns, and The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and
qualifications of their respective Members. the House were created by the Constitution as
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed special tribunals to be the solejudge of all con
of nine Members, three of whom shall be tests relating to election returns and qualifica
Justices of the Supreme Court to be desig tions of members of the legislative houses, and,
nated by the Chief Justice, and the remain
as such, are independent bodies which must be
ing six shall be Members of the Senate or of
permitted to select their own employees, and to
the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House,
supervise and control them, without any legisla
three upon nomination of the party having tive interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant
the largest number of votes and three of the of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
party having the second largest member of To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction,
votes therein. The senior Justice in each the House Electoral Tribunal must be indepen
$$) Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 dent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congres
935 Constitution of the Philippines.) sional electioncontests is not to be shared by it
Under the above provision, the Justices with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
held the deciding votes, and it was impossible
The Electoral Commission is a body separate
for any political party to control the voting in
the tribunal.
from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an government, it is to all intents and purposes,
electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa. when acting within the limits ofits authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority may as well abandon all hope at'the threshold
of members of the legislature it is a body separate of the tribunal.
from and independent of the legislature.
Disloyalty to partyis not a valid cause
XXX XXX XXX
for termination of membership in the HRET.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional
As judges, the members of the tribunal must
organ created for the specific purpose of deter
be non-partisan. They must discharge their
mining contests relating to election returns and
functions with complete detachment, impartial
qualifications of members of the National Assem ity, and independence even independence from
bly may not be interfered with by the judiciary the political party to which they belong. Hence,
when and while acting within the limits of its au "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party disci
thority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction pline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of
\S$}
over the Electoral Commission for the purpose a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congress
of determining the character, scope and extent man Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
of the constitutional grant to the commission as conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
sole judge of all contests relating to the election on the result ofthe examination and appreciation
and qualifications of the members of the National of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 tribunal, the House of Representatives commit
Phil. 139.) ted a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and
TheJndependence of the electoral tribunal a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Con expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
ili stitution... therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura

The independence of the House Electoral violates his right to security of tenure.
Tribunal, so zealously guarded by the fram Another reason for the nullity of the expul
ers of our Constitution, would, however, be a sion resolution of the House of Representatives
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right
Representatives, or the majority party therein, to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as
may shuffle and manipulate the political (as "sole judge" of congressional election contests,
distinguished from the judicial) component of are entitled to security of tenure just as mem
the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of bers of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
the party in power. under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIH, 1987
The resolution of the House of Representa Constitution). Therefore, membership in the
tives removing Congressman Camasura from House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to except for a just cause, such as, the expiration
the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of of the member's congressional term of office, his
the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a death, permanent disability, resignation from
clear impairment of the constitutional preroga the political party he represents in the tribunal,
tive of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the
formal affiliation with another political party,
or removal for other valid cause. A member may
sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
To sanction such interference by the House formally affiliated with another political group.
of Representatives in the work of the House As the records of this case fail to show that Con
Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to gressman Camasura has become a registered
a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party memberofanother political party, his expulsion
in power (LDP) which the three justices of the from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security
be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate of tenure.
i££g)
There is nothing to the argument of respon the Constitution "even when the violator be the
dent Pineda that members of the House Electoral highest official of the land or the Government
<££j Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure itself' (Concurring opinion ofJ. AntonioBarredc
because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA183, 207).
Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the
end of the congressional term, namely: ChiefJus Since the expulsion of Congressman Cama
tice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to sura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the
the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Jus House of Representatives was not for a lawful
tice Florentino P. feliciano, and the latter, who and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with
was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It decision in his favor, the action of the House
Hi should be stressed, however, that those changes of Representatives is clearly violative of the
in the judicial composition to the HRET had no constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
political implications at all unlike the present Constitution) which created the House Electoral
attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, there
resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano fore, ^declare null and void the resolution dated
to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their March 13,1991 of the House of Representatives
own free will, for valid reasons, and with no co withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
vert design to derail the disposition of a pending election, of Congressman Camasura as a member
case in the HRET. of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner,
Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he
The case of Congressman Camasura is dif prays for in this case.
ferent. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP
to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari,
revealed to the Secretary-General of the party prohibition and mandamus is granted. The deci
how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose sion of the House of Representatives withdraw
of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was ing the nomination and rescinding the election
to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as
HRETs decision may not be promulgated, and a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
so that the way could be cleared for the LDP hereby declared null and void ab initio for being
to nominate a replacement for Congressman violative of the Constitution, and Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated
LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly to his position as a member of the House of
aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991,
HRET in the Bondoc case.
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs.
The judicial power of this Court has been Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Consid
invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights ering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
against the strong arm of the majority party in promulgation of that decision to the prejudice
the House of Representatives. The Court cannot of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the
be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
charge that the House of Representatives had and in the interest ofjustice, hereby declares the
acted with grave abuse of discretion in remov said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective
ing Congressman Camasura from the House upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be
§gj
Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against
guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its jur respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
dicial power and discharge its duty to protect his
SO ORDERED.
rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the
House. The Court must perform its duty under Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., disssented.
•ffiffi
D>. Guerrero v. Comelec We find pertinent for our resolution this

G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000 issue:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of

QUISUMBING, J.: discretion in holding that the determination of
the validity of the certificate of candidacy of re
spondent Farinas is already within the exclusive
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House
Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent of Representatives?
Farinas as a candidate for the position of Con
gressman. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been In its assailed resolution, the COMELEC
campaigning as a candidate for Congressman had noted that respondent Farinas had taken his
oath and assumed office as a Member of the 11th
in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to
?%i file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office... Congress and by express mandate of the Consti
tution, it had lost jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal
itfl
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or in
the COMELEC decided Case No. SPA 98-227, validity of the certificate of candidacy of Farinas
disposing as follows: amounted to grave abuse of discretion on its part.
He claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitu
ijfM
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the tional duty to uphold and enforce all laws relative
Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to to elections. . .
DISMISS the instant petition for utter lack of
merit.
t&iii
"SO ORDERED." In the present case, we find no grave abuse

of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when
it held that its jurisdiction over Case No. SPA
$$i
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office
through as scheduled. The post-election tally of of respondent Farinas as Representative for the
votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Farinas got a first district of Ilocos Norte. While the COM
'/§>l total of 56,369 votes representing the highest ELEC is vested with the power to declare valid
number of votes received in the first district. or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to
Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. exercise that power following the proclamation
and assumption of the position by Farinas is a
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries sepa
reconsideration, contending that Farinas could rating the COMELEC and the ElectoralTribunal
not validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farinas, of the Houseof Representatives (HRET). Under
^>
since the latter was not the official candidate Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the
of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
(LAMMP), but was an independent candidate. all contests relative to the election, returns, and
Another person cannot substitute for an inde qualifications ofmembers ofthe House ofRepre
&&\
pendent candidate. Thus, Farinas' certificate of sentatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
candidacy claiming to be the official candidate been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V. Farinas was office as a member of the House of Representa
igi fatally defective, according to Ruiz. tives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and
On June 3,1998, Farinas took his oath of of qualifications ends, and theHRETs own jurisdic
fice as a member of the House of Representatives. tion begins. Thus, the COMELEC's decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case
is justifiable, in deference to the HRET's own
Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the jurisdiction and functions.
following grounds: However, petitioner contends that thejuris
dictionofthe HRET as defined under ArticleVI,
'm
jjy
s»t

4w>
Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to view, must likewise be addressed to the sound
the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus
Section 6 of the Constitution. Consequently, he can we demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional
claims that any issue which does not involve provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each
these constitutional qualifications is beyond the House of Congress shall be the "solejudge of all
iîi
realm of the HRET. The filing of a certificate of contests relating to the election, returns, and
candidacy being a statutory qualification under qualifications of their respective members."
the Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale
of the HRET, according to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
MISSED for lack of merit. Costs against peti
This contention lacks cogency and is far from tioner.
persuasive. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitu
tion cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word QUERY: Is the issue here one of "qualifica
iij$J tion" or of "election"?
"qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the
term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc
nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in stat E. Garcia, et al. v. HRET
utory construction that where the law does not G.R. No. 134792, August 12,1999
distinguish, the courts, should not distinguish. r
There should be no distinction in the applica YNARES-SANTIAGO, Jr.

tion of a law where none is indicated. For firstly,
the drafters of the fundamental law, in making May a petition for quo warranto before the
no qualification in the use of a general word or House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
expression, must have intended no distinction at be summarily dismissed for failure to pay cash
all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish deposit, notwithstanding that petitioner rectified
payment thereof?
where there are facts or circumstances showing
that the lawgiver intended a distinction or quali On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten
Ijj fication. In such a case, the courts would merely (10) day period from respondent Harry Angping's
give effect to the lawgiver's intent. proclamation as duly elected Representative for
Petitioner further argues that the HRET the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly
sgj assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid proc registered voters in the district, filed a petition
lamation of the winning candidate. He contends for quo warranto before the House of Represen
that if a candidate fails to satisfy the statutory tatives ElectoralTribunal (HRET) against Con
requirements to qualify him as a candidate, gressman Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned
li)
his subsequent proclamation is void ab initio. the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
Where the proclamation is null and void, there office in the House of Representatives, claiming
that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of
is no proclamation at all and the mere assump
j^l tion of office by the proclaimed candidate does the Philippines, a constitutional requirement.
not deprive the COMELEC at all of its power to They prayed that Congressman Angping be
declare such nullity, according to petitioner. But declared ineligible to assume or hold office as
as we already held, in an electoral contest where member of the House of Representatives and for
%»)
the validity of the proclamation of a winning the candidate who received the highest number
candidate who has taken his oath of office and
of votes from among the qualified candidates to
assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that be proclaimed the winner.
issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason Upon filing of the their petition, petitioners
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids du duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.
plicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
Sjfi between constitutional bodies, with due regard On June 10,1998, however, the HRET issued
to the people's mandate. a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo
warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash
Whether respondent Farinas validly sub deposit required by its Rules. After receiving a
^J stituted Chevylle V. Farinas and whether re copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid
spondent became a legitimate candidate, in our the P5.000.00 cash deposit on June 26, 1998
and attached the corresponding receipt to the precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to know
Motion for Reconsideration they filed with the and are expected to properly comply with the pro
HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for cedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal
Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of without being formally ordered to do so. They
Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to
a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance
for quo warranto cases. of those requirements it decides to dismiss their
petition. Imperative justice requires the proper
Hence, the instant Petition, filed on August
observance of technicalities precisely designed to
j§&*fr 14, 1998,
ensure its proper and swift dispensation.
[The second issue is] whether or not the
HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
*Therefore, we find that the HRET did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its
'±gi\ in summarily dismissing the petition for quo war
Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for
ranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate
quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition
the same even after the payment of the required
for certiorari cannot prosper.
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET pro
vides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner Indeed, the function of this Court is merely
in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five to check whether grave abuse of discretion has
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with been committed by the HRET in the dismissal
the Tribunal. of the petition for quo warranto before it. A peti
tion for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
It is not disputed that petitioners did not
iiaiiisi
Court will prosper only if there is a showing of
initially pay the required cash deposit; but after
grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in
their petition was summarily dismissed by the
excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
HRET for such non-payment, petitioners rectified
tribunal. In the absence of such a shewing, there
their inadvertence and paid the Five Thousand
is no reason for this Court to annul the decision
Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash deposit, at the
of the respondent tribunal or to substitute it with
same time seeking a reconsideration of the dis
its own judgment, for the simple reason that it is
missal.
not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
the correctness of the assailed decision. In this
case, as we have stated above, we find that the
. . . . It was a judgment call of the HRET
HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion.
which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As
The instant petition must be dismissed.
long as the exercise of discretion is based on
well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement a--s
the Tribunal. to costs.
The petition for quo warranto attacks the

ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold F. Pimentel, et al v. HRET
office as a Member of the House of Representa G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002
tives, not being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. This is a serious charge, which, if CARPIO, Jr.
true, renders Congressman Angping disqualified
The Case
from such office. In view of the delicate nature
Îjfl
and importance of this charge, the observance Before this Court are two original petitions
of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e., writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail
the speedy and orderly determination of the true the composition of the House of Representa
will of the electorate. Correlatively, party liti tives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET" for brevity)
gants appearing before the HRET or, to be more and the Commission on Appointments ("CA"for
brevity). Petitioners pray that respondents be The Ruling of the Court

ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and
reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the is
the CA to include party-list representatives in sues raised in the petitions under review, citing
accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of
the following pronouncement in Guingona, Jr.
v. Gonzales:
the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. 'Where constitutional issues are prop
Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the erly raised in the context of the alleged facts,
CA be enjoined from exercising their functions procedural questions acquire a relatively
until they have been reorganized. minor significance, and the transcendental
importance to the public of the case demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely
The Issues brushing aside . . technicalities of proce
dure."
Petitioners raise the following issues:
Petitioners' reliance on Guingona, Jr. v.
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COM
&a Gonzales is misplaced. The "procedural ques
POSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL
tions" that petitioners want the Court to brush
TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITU aside are not mere technicalities but substantive
TIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPOR matters that are specifically provided for in the
TIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESEN
TATIVES IN THE HRET. The Constitution expressly grants to the
1M$
House of Representatives the prerogative, within
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEM constitutionally defined limits, to choose from
BERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COM among its district and party-list representatives
MISSION ON APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
jjî THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
OP' PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST on the Senate and on the House the authority to
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA. elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF
members in the Commission on Appointments.
THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECON
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitu
STITUTE THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE tion, each chamber of Congress exercises the
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES.CON power to choose, within constitutionally defined
STITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRE limits, who among, their members would occupy
TION. the allotted 6 seats of each chamber's respective
On the other hand, the Solicitor General ar electoral tribunal.
gues that the instant petitions are procedurally These constitutional provisions are reiter
defective and substantially lacking in merit for ated in Rules 3 and 4(a) of the 1998 Rules of the
having been filed prematurely, thus: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
to wit:
"It is a generally accepted principle that
the averments in the pleading determine the "Rule 3. Composition. — The Tribunal
existence of a cause of action. In the instant shall be composed of nine Members, three of
petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
or any one of them was elected by a party or to be designated by the ChiefJustice, and the
organization registered under the party-list remaining six shall be Members of the House
system as a Member of the HRET or CA to of Representatives who shall be chosen on the
represent said party or organization under basis of proportional representation from the
the party-list system of the House of Repre political parties and the parties or organiza
sentatives." tions registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Senior Justice in being subject to the mandatory 'constitutional
the Tribunal shall be its Chairman. rule on proportional representation. However,
\m under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Rule 4. Organization. — (a) Upon the
designation of the Justices of the Supreme * Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
Court and the election of the Members of the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty,
absent a clear violation of the Constitution or
House of Representatives who are to com
pose the House of Representatives Electoral grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine
Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal ôf separation of powers calls for each branch of
shall meet for its organization and adoption government to be left alone to discharge its du
of such resolutions as it may deem proper." ties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate
(Emphasis supplied) on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for member
Likewise, Section. 1 of the Rules of the Com ship in the HRET and the CA.
mission on Appointments provides:
The instant petitions are bereft of any alle
"Section 1. Composition of the Commis gation that respondents prevented the party-list
sion On Appointments. Within thirty (30) groups in the House from participating in the
"days after both Houses of Congress shall election of members of the HRET and the CA.
have organized themselves with the election Neither does it appear that after the May 11,
of the Senate President and the Speaker of 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
the House of Representatives, the Commis representatives from seeking membership in the
sion on Appointments shall be constituted. HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
ffip) It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators available facts that the party-list groups in the
and twelve (12) members of the House of House at that time simply refrained from par
Representatives, elected by each House on ticipating in the election process. The party-list
the basis of proportional representation from representatives did not designate their nominees
the political parties and parties or organiza even up" to the time they filed the instant peti
tions registered under the party-list system tions, with the predictable result that the House
represented herein. (Emphasis supplied) did not consider any party-list representative for
Thus, even assuming that party-list rep election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary
resentatives comprise a sufficient number and recourse of the party-list representatives lies
have agreed to designate common nominees to with the House of Representatives, the Court
the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse cannot resolve the issues presented by petition
clearly rests with the House of Representatives ers at this time.
and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and
18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list rep Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a
resentatives must first show to the House that constitutional question will not be heard and
they possess the required numerical strength to resolved by the courts unless the following re
be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only quirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there
if the House fails to comply with the directive of must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or
the Constitution on proportional representation party raising the constitutional issue must have
of political parties in the HRET and the CA can a personal and substantial interest in the resolu
the party-list representatives seek recourse to tion of the controversy; (3) the controversy must
this Court under its power of judicial review. be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity;
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue
recourse to the House is necessary before peti must be indispensable to the final determination
tioners may bring the instant case to the court. of the controversy.
Consequently, petitioners' direct recourse to this
The five party-list representatives who are
Court is premature.
petitioners in the instant case have not alleged
The discretion of the House to choose its that they are entitled to, and have been unlaw
members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, fully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA.
tsJ
Neither have they claimed that they have been that issue is best addressed to the HRET.
nominated by the party-list groups in the House The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for
iM to the HRET or the CA. As such, they do not it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash
possess the personal and substantial interest of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies,
required to confer them with locus standi. The with due regard to the people's mandate.
party raising the constitutional issue must have
"such personal stake in the outcome of the con Further, for the Court to take cognizance
troversy as to assure that concrete adverseness of petitioner Chato's election protest against
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon respondent Unico would be to usurp the con
which the court depends for illumination of dif stitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
ficult constitutional questions." Petitioner Chato's remedy would have been to
file an election protest before the said tribunal,
We likewise find no grave abuse in the ac not this petition for certiorari. The special civil
'«iii
tion or lack of action by the HRET and the CA action of certiorari is available only if there is
in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (1)
Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
sj 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
reconstitute themselves. discretion amounting to lack ofjurisdiction, and
(b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
G. Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007 to annul or modify the proceeding. There must
be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise
The Court has invariably held that once a of power for certiorari to prosper.
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of All told, the COMELEC en banc clearly did
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
•'<&&{
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his issued the assailed Resolution dated March 17,
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the 2006 holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon re
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Stated in an spondent Unico's proclamation and oath-taking
^] other manner, where the candidate has already as a Member of the House of Representatives.
been proclaimed winner in the congressional On the contrary, it demonstrated fealty to the
elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file constitutional fiat that the HRET shall be the
an electoral protest with the HRET. sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
•IM\
returns, and qualifications of its members.
In the present case, it is not disputed that
respondent Unico has already been proclaimed
and taken his oath of office as a Member of the H. Limkaichong v. Comelec
House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had
already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's DECISION
xM petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns PERALTA, J:
and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26,
proclamation. These are matters that are best 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
addressed to the sound judgment and discretion Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that of Representative of the First District of Negros
respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void Oriental.
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the her disqualification were instituted before the
validity of the proclamation of a winning can COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from
didate who has taken his oath of office and her locality. On April 4,2007, Napoleon Camero,
assumed his post as Congressman is raised, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Ori-
bin
ental, filed the petition for her disqualification directed to strike out the name JOCELYN SY-
on the ground that she lacked the citizenship LIMKAICHONG from the list ofeligible candi
requirement of a Member of the House of Rep dates for the said position, and the concerned
resentatives. Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold
In her separate Answers to the petitions, and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN
Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if
Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Fili any, until this decision has become final.
pino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, SO ORDERED.
Mi who had reacquired her status as such due to
her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of
of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) the COMELEC Second Division on the evening
days had already passed after her father took his ofMay 17, 2007, and accordinglysuspended the
•m
Oath of Allegiance on October 21,1959 and after proclamation of Limkaichong.
he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the
the same day. She contended that the COMELEC COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No.
should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
cause of action.... suspending the proclamation of winning
The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) candidates with pending disqualification
petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07- cases which shall be without prejudice to the
247 and 07-248, entitled IN THE MATTER OF continuation of the hearing and resolution of the
involved cases.
THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN
SY LIMKAICHONG FROM HER CANDIDACY
AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF
NEGROS ORIENTAL (herein referred to as the On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance
disqualification cases), which remainedpending with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, recon
on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local vened and proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly
Elections were conducted. elected Member of the House of Representatives
for the First District of Negros Oriental.
After the casting, countingand canvassingof
Mi
votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged
as the winner with 65,708 votesor by a margin The Court heard the parties in oral argu
of 7,746 votes over another congressional candi ment on August 26, 2008, during which the fol
S) date, Olivia Paras (Paras), who obtained 57,962. lowing issues were tackled:
On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the 1. Whether the proclamation of Limka
COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to ichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
Intervene and to Suspend the Proclamation of of Negros Oriental is valid;
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate
of the First District of Negros Oriental. 2. Whether said proclamation divested
the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction
In a Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007, to resolve the issue of Limkaichong's citizen
the COMELEC SecondDivisiongranted the pe ship;
titions in the disqualification cases, disqualified
Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative 3. Whether the House of Representa
of the First District of Negros Oriental, directed tives Electoral Tribunal shall assume juris
the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to diction, in lieu of the COMELEC, over the
strike out her name from the list ofeligible candi issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;
ift) dates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers 4. Whether the COMELEC Second Divi
(PBOC) to suspend her proclamation.... sion and the COMELEC En Banc correctly
ruled that Limkaichong is disqualified from
running as a Member of the House of Rep
The Provincial Supervisor of the Commis resentatives on the ground that she is not a
sion on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby natural-born citizen;
5. Whether the COMELEC disqualifica 25, 2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC
tion of Limkaichong is final and executory; of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her
and, qualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with
the HRET.
6. Whether the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; may be compelled to pro Biraogo, oh the other hand, believed other
hibit Limkaichong from assuming her duties wise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the
as a Member of the House of Representatives. issue concerning Limkaichong's disqualification
On same day, the Court required the parties is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when
to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days
their respective memoranda, after which the peti Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007,
tions shall be deemed submitted for resolution, the matter was still pending resolution before
with or without the memoranda. the COMELEC En Banc.
We do not agree. The Court has invariably

held that once, a winning candidate has been
Whether Limkaichong's proclamation proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
was valid. officey as a Member of the House of Represen
tatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid.
election contests relating to his election,
The COMELEC Second Division rendered its
returns, and qualifications ends, and the
Joint Resolution dated May 17,2007. On May 20,
2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COM HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows
ELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as then that the proclamation of a winning candi
well as for the lifting of the. incorporated direc date divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
tive suspending her proclamation. The filing of over matters pending before it at the time of the
the motion for reconsideration effectively proclamation. The party questioning his quali
suspended the execution ofthe May 17,2007 fication should now present his case in a proper
Ml
Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, mandated tribunal to hear and decide.a case
there was no impediment to the valid proclama involving a Member of the House of Representa
tion of Limkaichong as the winner. tives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualifications
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is
\m
Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy- the State, through its representatives designated
guideline. It is also an administrative inter by statute, that may question the illegally or
pretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987 invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
Constitution, namely: (i) Section 17, Article VI in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings.
:&fl
(ii); Section 2(2), Article IX-C; Section 6 of R.A.
It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
6646; and Sections 241 and 243, Article XX of
private persons in an election case involving the
the OEC
naturalized citizen's descendant.
Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the
COMELEC's constitutionally mandated power to
Ill
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to
Whether the COMELEC Second Division
the conduct of the elections.. ..
and the COMELEC En Banc correctly dis
II qualified Limkaichong on the ground that
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclama she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
tion, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, In resolving the disqualification cases, the
should assume jurisdiction over the
COMELEC Second Division relied on the entries
disqualification cases.
in the docket book of the OSG, the only remain
In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Lim ing record of the naturalization proceedings, and
kaichong argued that her proclamation on May ruled on the basis thereof that the naturaliza-
tion proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Limkaichong's Second Division Joint Resolution'dated May 17,
father, in Special Case No. 1043, were null and 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong from holding
void. The COMELEC Second Division adopted public office. He contended that the said Reso
Villando and Camero's arguments that the OSG lution q>ted June 29, 2007 is already final and
was deprived of its participation in the said case executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant
for it was not furnished copies of the following: to the principle of rets judicata.
(a) the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) granting the petition for natural
De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that
he should not be faulted for honoring the proc
ization; and (b) the September 21,1959 Order of
lamation of Limkaichong, because it had the
the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen.
hallmarks of regularity, and he had no power
Thus, when the latter took his oath of allegiance
to exclude any Member, of the House of Rep
on October 21,1959, it was exactly 30 days after
resentatives motu proprio. In their Comment
his declaration as a naturalized Filipino, or one
on the petition, respondents De Venecia, et al.,
day short of the reglementary period required un
contended that the enrollment of a Member in
der Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No.
the Roll of Members of the House of Representa
473. Such defects were fatal to the naturaliza
tives and his/her recognition as such becomes the
tion proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented
ministerial duty of the Secretary General and
the same from gaining finality. The COMELEC
the House of Representatives upon presenta
Second Division concluded that since Julio Ong
tion by such Member of a valid Certificate
Sy did not acquire Philippine citizenship through
of Proclamation and Oath of Office.
the said naturalization proceedings, it follows
that Limkaichong remains a-Chinese national Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's,
and is disqualified to run as candidate and be substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16,
elected as a Member of the House of Represen 2008 stating that under the circumstances, the
tatives. House of Representatives, and its officials, are
without recourse except to honor the validity of
We cannot resolve the matter of Limka
the proclamation of Limkaichong until the same
ichong's citizenship as the same should have
is canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue
been challenged in appropriate proceedings as
to recognize her as the duly elected Representa
earlier stated.
tive of the First District of Negros Oriental until
it is ordered by this Court, as it was in Codilla,
to recognize somebody else. He went on.to state
that after assumption by the Member-elect, or
Whether the Speaker ofthe House ofRep having acquired a presumptively valid title to
resentatives may be compelled to prohibit the office, the House of Representatives cannot,
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as motu proprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any rec
a Member of the House of Representatives. ognition given to a sitting Member or to "remove"
his name from its roll, as such would amount to
Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia[
a removal of such Member from his office with
should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's
out due process of law. Verily, it is only after a
name in the Roll of Members of the House of
determination by the appropriate tribunal (as
Representatives because he has no power to
in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final and
allow an alien to sit and continue to sit therein
executory order, that the Member does not have
as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of
a right to the office(i.e., not being a duly elected
his legal authority. Moreover, Biraogo opposes
Member), that the House of Representatives is
Limkaichong's assumption of office in the House
directed to exclude the said Member.
of Representatives since she is not qualified to
sit therein, being a Chinese citizen and, thus, Their contentions are meritorious. The un
disqualified by virtue of a final and executory seating ofa Member ofthe House ofRepresenta
judgment of the COMELEC En Banc. He relied tives should be exercised with great caution and
on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated after the proper proceedings for the ouster has
June 29, 2007, which affirmed the COMELEC been validly completed. For to arbitrarily unseat
JIM
someone, who obtained the highest number of ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BA
votes in the elections, and during the pendency SIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA
E&ftJ
of the proceedings determining one's qualifica TION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES
tion or disqualification, would amount to disen AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS
franchising the electorate in whom sovereignty REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST
resides.
SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION SHALL
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE.
petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL
and the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT
Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA WITHIN THIRTY SESSION DAYS OF THE
Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 is REVERSED and CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION.
^) SET ASIDE. All the other petitions (G.R. Nos. THE COMMISSION SHALL RULE BY A
179120, 179132-33, 179240-41) are hereby MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS.
DISMISSED.
1. Composition of the Commission on Ap
SO ORDERED.
pointments.
r
NOTE: The law.allowing Congress and Com-

A. Daza v. Singson
elec to entertain pre-proclaation cases is chal
180 SCRA 496 (1989) .
lenged on the argument that this undermines
the ndependence of the Tribunals. But Congress CRUZ, J:
and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon
iii)
the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There After the congressional elections of May 11,
is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of 1987, the House of Representatives proportion
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one ally apportioned its twelve seats in the Com
hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, mission on Appointments among the several
are exercised on different occasions and for dif political parties represented in that chamber,
ferent purposes. The PET is the sole judge of including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban,
all contests relating to the election, returns and the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL,
in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the
qualifications of the President or VicePresident.
Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among
The SET is the sole judge of all contests relat
those chosen and was listed as a representative
ing to the election, returns, and qualifications of
of the Liberal Party.
members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the
PET and the SET can only be invoked once the On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng De-
winning presidential, vice presidential or sena mokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, result
torial candidates have been proclaimed. On the ing in a political realignment in the House of
other hand, Congress and the COMELEC en banc Representatives. Twenty four members of the
shall determine only the authenticity and due Liberal Party formally resigned from that party
execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number
^jfAfr
and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former
power before the proclamation of the winning party to only 17 members.
presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial On the basis of this development, the House
candidates. Banat v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177508, of Representatives revised its representation in
August 7, 2009. (the Commission on Appointments by withdraw
ing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giv
iiiiii/
SEC. 18. THERE SHALL BE A COMMIS ing this to the newly-formed LDP. On December
SION ON APPOINTMENTS CONSISTING 1988, the chamber elected a new set of represen
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, tatives consisting of the original members except
AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, TWELVE the petitioner and including therein respondent
SENATORS AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF Luis C. Singson as the' additional member from
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, the LDP.
[&&£
to
ARTICLEVI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 205
iiiii
» Thepetitionercameto this CourtonJanuary

13,1989, to challenge his removal from the Com
mission on Appointments and the assumption
ofhis seat by the respondent. Actinginitially on In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
his petition for prohibition and injunction with objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary The reason is that, even if we were to assume
restraining order that same day to prevent both that the issue presented before us waspolitical
the petitioner and the respondent from serving in nature, we would still not be precludedfrom
in the Commission on Appointments. resolving it under the expandedjurisdiction con
Briefly stated, the contention of the peti ferred uponus that now covers, in propercases,
tioner is that he cannot be removed from the even the political question. Article VII, Section
Commission on Appointments because his elec 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
tion thereto is permanent under the doctrine an
nounced in Cunanan v. Tan.102 His claim is that
the reorganization of the House representation Judicial power includes the duty ofthe courts
in the said body is not based on a permanent ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving
political realignment because the LDP is not a rights which are legally demandable and enforce
duly registered political party and has not yet able, and to determine whether or not there has
$$fo attained political stability. been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
For his part, the respondent argues that the branch or instrumentality of the Government.
question raised by the petitioner is political in na
ture and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
He also maintains that he has been improperly Coming now to the more crucial question,
impleaded, the real party respondent being the the Court notes that both the petitioner and the
House of Representatives which changed its respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v.
representation in the Commission on Appoint Tan to support their respective positions. It is
ments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he best, therefore, to make a quick review of that
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it case for a proper disposition of this one.
required that the.political party be registered to
be entitled to proportional representation in the In the election for the House of Representa
Commission on Appointments. tives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Na-
cionalistaParty, 29by the Liberal Party and 1by
In addition to the pleadings filed by the par an independent. Accordingly, the representation
ties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor of the chamber in the Commission on Appoint
General as amicus curiaein compliance with an ments was apportioned to 8 members from the
order from the Court. Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party.
Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista
At the core of this controversy is Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution ...
Party, professing discontent over the House
leadership, made common cause with the Liberal
jfef)
Ruling first on the jurisdiction issue, we hold Party and formed what was called the Allied
that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize
Court has the competence to act on the matter at the chamber. Included in this reorganization was
bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not the House representation in the Commission on
a discretionary act of the House of Representa Appointments where three of the Nacionalista
tives that may not be reviewed by us because it congressmen originally chosen were displaced
is political in nature. What is involved here is by three of their party colleagues who had joined
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that the Allied Majority.
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim
Commission on Appointments. appointment as Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestation Administration was rejected by
,025 SCRA l. the Commission on Appointments as thus re-
'p0
organized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was fullyjustified his designation to the Commission
thereafter designatedin his pla"ce. Cunanan then on Appointments after the reduction of the LP
came to this Court, contending that the rejection representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
of his appointment was null and void because Upon the other hand, the constitutional
the Commission itself was invalidly constituted. provision to the effect that "there shall be a
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Commission on Appointments consisting of
Majority was a merely temporary combination twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members
as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffili of the House of Representatives elected by each
i£|^
ated from their party and permanently joined House, respectively, on the basis ofproportional
the newpoHtical group. Officially, they werestill REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL
members of the Nacionalista Party. Then reor PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the
ganization ofthe Commission onAppointments authority of each House of Congress to see to it
was invalid because it was not based on the pro that this requirement is dulycomplied with.As a
portional representation ofthe political parties consequence, it may take appropriate measures,
in the House of Representatives as required by not only upon- the initial organization of the
the Constitution. The Court held: Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If
by reason ofsuccessful electionprotests against
x x x In other words, a shifting of votes at members of a House, or of their expulsion from
a given time, even if dueto arrangements of the political party to which they belonged and/or
a more or less temporary nature, like the one of theiraffiHation with another political party,
that has led to the formation of the so-called the ratio in the representation of the political
"Allied Majority," does not suffice to autho parties in the House is materially changed, the
rize a reorganization of the membership of House is clothed with authority to declare vacant
the Commission for the said House. Other the necessary number of seats in the Commis
wise the Commission on Appointments may sion on Appointments held by members of said
have to be reorganized as often as votes shift House belonging to the political party adversely
from one side to another in the House. The affected bythe changeand then fill saidvacancies
framers of our Constitution could not have
in conformity with the Constitution.
intended to thus place a constitutional organ,
like the Commission on Appointments, at the In the course of the spirited debate on this
mercy of each House of Congress. matter between the petitioner and the respon
dent (who was supported by the Solicitor Gen
The petitioner vigorously argues that the eral)an important development has supervened
biBd
LDP is not the permanent political party con
to considerably simplify the present controversy.
templatedin the Constitution because it has not
beenregisteredin accordance withArticle IX-B, The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argu
Section 2(5), in relation to the otherprovisions of ment heavilyon the non-registration ofthe LDP
the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called which, he claims has not provided the permanent
party nasi not yet achieved stability and sug poHtical realignment to justify the questioned
gests it might benodifferent from several other reorganization...
political groups that have died aa-bornin\" like On November 23,1989, however, that argu
the UNA, or have subsequently floundered, like
ment boomeranged against the petitioner. On
the UNIDO.
that date, the Commission on Elections in an
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its
a different viewpoint. According to him, that First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting
caseexpresslyallows reorganizationat any time thepetition ofthe LDP forregistration as a poHti
to reflect changes in the political alignments in cal party.103 This has taken the wind out of the
Congress, provided only that such changes are sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must
permanent. Thecreation of.the LDP constituting now limp to shore as best he can.
the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which
no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had trans
ferred was a permanent change. That change wagpp No. 88-001 (SPC No. 88-839).
iiiiii)

&££)
The petitioner's contention that, even if the twelveseats ofthe House ofRepresentatives
registered, the party must stiU pass the test of in the Commission on Appointments and the six
£&&>
time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
Under this theory, a registered party obtaining
the majority of the seats in the House of Rep It is noteworthy that'when with 41 members
resentatives (or the Senate) would still not be the Liberal Party was allotted two of the seats
entitled to representation in the Commission on in the Commission oh Appointments, it did not
Appointments as long as it was organized only express any objection.105 Inconsistently, the pe
recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal titioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from
Party itself would fall in such a category. That it of one seat although its original number has
been cut by more than half.
partywascreated in December 1945 by. a faction
of the NacionaHsta Party that seceded therefrom As for the other condition suggested by the
jii^y
to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presi petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive
dency of the Philippines in the election held on in a general congressional election, the LDP
April 23,1946.104 The Liberal Party won. At that has doubtless also passed that test, if only vi
time it was only four months old. Yet no ques cariously. It may even be said that as it now
tion was raised as to its right to be represented commands the biggest foUowing in the House of
in the Commission on Appointments and in the Representatives, the party has not only survived
Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was
majority party in both chambers of the Congress. never laid down in Cunanan.
The LDP has been in existence for more To summarize, then, we hold,nn1view of the
than one year now. It now has 157 members in foregoing considerations, that the issue present
the House of Representatives and 6 members in ed to us is justiciable rather poHtical [sic[,involv
the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the ing as it does the legality and not the wisdom of
President of the Philippines and its President the act complained of, or the manner of fiUing
is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true by the Constitution. Even if the question were
that there have been, and there still are, some political in nature, it would still come within our
internal disagreements among its members, but powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
these are to be expected in any political organiza conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of
tion, especially if it is democratic in structure. In the Constitution, which includes the authority
fact, even the monoHthic Communist Party in a to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
number of socialist states has undergone similar amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely been committed by any branch or instrumental
cannot be considered still temporary because of ity of the government. As for the alleged technical
such discord. flaw in the designation of the party respondent,
assuming the existence of such a defect, tlje same
If the petitioner's argument were to be pur
may be brushed aside, conformably to existing
sued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House
doctrine, so that the important constitutional is
of Representatives would have to be denied rep
fci sue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve
resentation in the Commission on Appointments
that issue in favor of the authority of the House
and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
of Representatives to change its representation
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner
in the Commission on Appointments to reflect
says is now "history only," should also be written
at any time the changes that may transpire in
off.The independents also cannot be represented
the political alignments of its membership. It is
because they belong to no poHtical party. That
understood that such changes must be perma
would virtually leave the Liberal Party only —
nent and do not include the temporary aHiances
with all of its seventeen members — to claim all
or factional divisions not involving severance
104Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The Continu

ft^)
ing Past, 1978 edition, pp. 181-187 & 188; Manuel Buenafe, ,05The other seat was given to Rep. Lorna Verano-Yap,
Wartime. Philippines, 1950 edition, p. 284. who is now affiliated with the Liberal Party.
W
iffft*
of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio
permanent shifts ofallegiance from one political Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabo-
party to another. chan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo
N. Joson, Antonio H. CeriUes and Isacio Pelaez.
The Court would have preferred not to in
tervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by
the House ofRepresentatives or the Commission Petitioner Coseteng . . . alleged that she
on Appointmentsas the bodies directlyinvolved. is qualified to sit in the Commission on Ap
But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, pointments as a representative of the Minority
more importantly, because a constitutional because she has the support of nine (9) other
stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alter congressmen and congresswomenofthe Minority
native for us except to act, and to act decisively.
In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our
wiU upon the said agencies, or substituting our The indorsements ofthe nine (9) congressmen
discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's
sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the election to the Commission are inconsequential
ii) Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest because they are not members of her party and
we ourselves betray our oath. they sfgnedidentical indorsements in favorofher
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
The temporary restraining order dated January
13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the
respondenthas beenvalidlyelectedas a member
^^
of the Commission on Appointments and is en C. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales
titled to assume his seat in that body pursuant G.R. No. 106971, October 20,1992
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No
pronouncement as to costs. CAMPOS, JR., Jr.
SO ORDERED. This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit,

respondents Senators Alberto Romulo and Wig-
berto Tafiada from sitting and assuming the posi
B. Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. tion of members of the Commission on Appoint
187 SCRA 377 (1990) ments and to prohibit Senators NeptaHGonzales,
as ex-officio Chairman, of said Commission from
GRINO-AQUINO, J.: recognizing and allowing the respondent sena
tors to sit as members thereof.
The congressional elections of May 11; 1987
resulted in the election to the House of Repre As a result of the national elections held last
sentatives of the candidates of diverse political May 11,1992, the-Senate is composed ofthe fol
parties'such as the PDP-Laban,Lakas ng Bansa lowing members or Senators representing the
(LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido,Kilusan ng respective political affiliations:
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababai- 15 senators
LDP
han Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some
independents. Petitioner Anna DominiqueM.L. NPC 5 senators
Coseteng was the only candidate elected under LAKAS-NUCD 3 senators
the banner of KAIBA.
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 senator
Applying the mathematical formula agreed

On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng
to by the parties as follows:
wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra request
ing that as representative of KAIBA, she be No. of Senators of a Political Party x 12 seats
appointed as a member of the Commission on
ffijij^
Appointments and HouseElectoral TribunalHer
Total No. of senators elected.
request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen,
s=J
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATTVE DEPARTMENT • 209
the resulting composition of the senate based on (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance
the rule of proportional representation of each ofa writ ofprohibition to prohibitthe respondent
political party with elected representatives in Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio
the Senate, is as follows: Chairman ofthe Commission onAppointments,
from recognizing the membership of Senators
Political Party/ Proportional Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator electedby
Political Coalition Membership the LDP, and Wigberto L. Tanada, as the lone
Representatives member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in
LDP 15 7.5 members the Commission on Appointments, on the ground
NPC 5 2.5 members that the proposed compromise of Senator To
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members lentino was violative of the rule of proportional
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members.
representation, and that it is the right of the mi
At the organization meeting of the Senate nority political parties in the Senate, consistent
held on August 27, 1992, Senator Romulo in his with the Constitution, to combine their fractional
capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, representation in the Commission on Appoint
for and in behalf of the LDP. eight (8) senators ments to complete one seat therein, and to decide
for membership in the Commission on Appoint who, among the senators in their ranks, shall
ments, namely, Senators Angara, Herrera, be additionally nominated and elected thereto.
Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Ro Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution
mulo. The nomination of the eighth senator was of 1987 provides for the creation of a Commis
objected to by Petitioner, Senator Guingona, as sion on Appointments and the allocation of its
Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John Os- membership . . .
a^ mena, in representation of the NPC. To resolve
the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed Based on the mathematical computation
a compromise to the effect that the Senate elect of proportional representation of the various
political parties with elected senator in the Sen
^•1 ". . . 12 members to the Commission
ate, each of these political parties is entitled to
on Appointments, eight coming from LDP,
a fractional membership in the Commission on
two coming from NPC, one coming from the
Appointments as stated in the first paragraph
Liberal Party, with the understanding that
of this decision. Each political party has a claim
there are strong reservations against this
proportion or these numbers so that if later
to an extra hah0 seat, and the election of respon
dents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to the
on in an action in the Supreme Court, if any
ial party is found to have an excess in repre Commission on Appointments by the LDP ma
sentation, that the party will necessarily jority is precisely questioned by the petitioners
reduce its representation, and if any party because, according to them, it unduly increased
is found to have a deficiency in representa the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in
tion, that party will be entitled to nominate the Commission and reduced the membership of
and have elected by this body its additional the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC correspondingly.
representative." In view of the conflicting claims of each of the
ijjl political parties/coalition duly represented in the .
The proposed compromise above stated was Senate to a fractional membership in the Com
a temporary arrangement and, inspite of the mission on Appointments, the election ofrespon
objections of Senators Guingona and Osmena, dents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada has
jut
to enable the Commission on Appointments to become controversial and its validity question
be organized by the election of its members, it able. Hence, this petition. It has been established
was approved. The elected members consisted of that the legality of filling up the membership of
eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and the Commission on Appointments is a justifiable
one LAKAS-NUCD.
issue and not a political question.106
On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats ,06Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187 SCRA 377 (1990).
We deem it necessary to resolve the respon Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in electing
dents' argument as to the nature of the instant the respondent Senators?
petition. There is no doubt that the issues in 3) If there was grave abuse of discretion
volved herein are constitutional in nature and by respondent Senate, acting through the LDP
are of vital importance to our nation. They in majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining,
volve the interpretation of Section 18, Article VI prohibiting and restraining the respondent Sena
of the Constitution which creates a Commission tors from sitting as members ofand participating
on Appointments. Where constitutional issues in the proceedingsofthe Commission on Appoint
are properly raised in the context ofthe alleged ments be issued?
facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively
It is an established fact to which all the par
minor significance, and the "transcendentalim
portance to the public ofthe case demands that ties agree that the mathematical representation
theybesettledpromptly and definitely brushing ofeach ofthe political parties represented in the
Senate is as follows:
aside ... technicalities of procedure."107
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, LDP 7.5
the instant petition may be regarded as one of LP-PDP-LABAN .5

prohibition wherein the Senate is claimed to 2.5
NPC
have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
when it designated respondent Senator Romulo LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
as eighth member of the Commission on Ap It is also a fact accepted by all such parties
pointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and that each of them is entitled to a fractional mem
Si respondent Senator Tanada as LP nominee, not bership on the basis of the rule on proportional
withstanding, that in both instances, LDP and representation of each of the political parties. A
LP are each entitled only to "half a member." In literal interpretation of Se'ction 18 of Article VI
the alternative, the petition may be regarded as of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
one for mandamus, in which it is claimed that application than as above. The problem is what
the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in
or office to which each is entitled. Considering the Senate converted a fractional half member
the importanceofthe case at bar and in keeping ship into a whole membership of one senator by
with the Court's duty under the Constitution adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
jffff) to keep the other branches of the government Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
within the limits of the Constitution and the fractional membership was correspondingly
laws ofthe land, this Court has decided to brush reduced leaving the latter's representation in
aside legal technicalities of procedure and take the Commission on Appointments to less than
cognizance of this case. their proportional representation in the Senate.
This is dearly a violation of Section 18 because
The issues for determination by this Court it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
'$& may be stated as follows: that membership in the Commission be based
1) Whether the electionofSenators Alberto on the proportional representation of the politi
Romulo and Wigberto E. Tanada as members of cal parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
|î the Commission on Appointments is in accor more representation to the LDP and reduced the
dance with the provision of Section 18 ofArticle representation of one political party either the
VI of the 1987 Constitution. LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.
2) If said membership of the respondent On the claim of Senator Tanada that un

senators in the Commission is violative of the der the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo
Constitutional provision, did the respondent Tanada,108 and the case of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member
'$?&}
""Osmena v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 750

(1991). 108Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
t^
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. 211
of the Commission on Appointments because shall be elected on the basisôf proportional rep-"
of: (a) the physical impossibility of dividing a resentation of the political parties represented
person, so that the fractional membership must therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
be rounded up into one senator; (b) being the membership of the political parties in the Com
sole elected senator of his party, his party is mission on Appointments by adding together two
entitled to be represented in the Commission on halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
Appointments; (c) having been elected senator, proportional representation because it will give
rounding up into one full senator his fractional the LDP an added member in the Commission
membership is consistent with the provision and by utilizing the fractional membership of the
spirit of the Constitution and would be in full minority political party, who is deprived of half
accord, with the principle of republicanism that a representation.
emphasizes democracy.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional
The cases of the two former senators men representation is mandatory in character and
tioned cannot be invoked as a precedent in sup does not leave any discretion to the majority
port of incumbent Senator Tanada's claim to a party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the
membership in the present Commission on Ap
rule on proportional representation; otherwise,
pointments. In the time of his illustrious father,
the party with a majority representation in the
out of 24 elected senators in the upper chamber of
Senate or the House of Representatives can by
Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
sheer force of numbers impose its will on the
while Senator Lorenzo Tanada, who belonged
hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
to the Citizens' Party, was the lone opposition.
representation in the Commission on Appoint
By force of circumstance, he became a member
of the Commission on Appointments because ments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on
he alone represented the minority party. Had the majority party in the Senate and helps to
there been another senator belonging to a party maintain the balance of power. No party can
other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of claim more than what it is entitled to under such
who should sit as the sole representative of the rule. To allow it to elect more than its propor
opposition party would have arisen. In the case tional share of members is to confer upon such a
of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators party a greater share in the membership in the
elected from the opposition party, namely, he Commission on Appointments and more power
and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of pro to impose its will on the minority, who by the
portional representation mentioned earlier (see same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful
formula), the opposition was entitled to one full membership in the Commission.
iffift
member (not a fractional membership). Senator
Section 18 also assures representation in the
Enrile was thus legaUy nominated and elected
Commission on Appointments of any political
as the minority representative in the Senate. In
party who succeeds in electing members to the
the present case, if there were a poHtical party
Senate, provided that the number of senators so
other than the present four political parties is
the Senate and We follow Senator Tanada's
elected enables it to put a representative in the
claim that he is entitled to full membership as Commission on Appointments. Drawing from the
lone representative of his party. We would have ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.,109 a
the anomaly of having 13 senators, where the political party must have at least two senators
Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Com in the Senate to be able to have a representative
mission on Appointments. in the Commissionon Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such a party
We find the respondents' claim to member a membership in the Commission on Appoint
ship in the Commission on Appointments by ments. This applies to the respondent Senator*
nomination and election of the LDP majority in
Tanada.
the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore
violative of the same because it is not in compli
ance with the requirement that twelve senators 109187 SCRA 377 (1990).
lu
We lay down the following guidelines ac on Audit. They perform their functions so long as
cordingly: there is the required quorum, usually a majority
of its membership. The Commission on Appoint
liiiii)
1) In the Senate, a political party or coali ments may perform its functions and transact its
tion must have at least two duly elected senators business even if only ten (10) senators are elected
for every seat in the Commission on Appoint thereto as long as a quorum exists.
ments.
It may also be mentioned that while the
2) Where there are more than two political Constitution provides for equal membership from
parties represented in the Senate, a political the Senate and the House of Representatives in
party/coalition with a single senator in the Sen the Commission on Appointments, the senators
ate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the on the one hand, and the representatives, on the
Commission. other, do not vote separately but jointly, and usu
We do not agree with respondents' claim ally along party lines. Even if Senator Tanada
that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the would not be able to sit in the Commission on Ap
Commissionon Appointments. The Constitution pointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be
does not contemplate that the Commission on represented in the Commission by Congressman
Appointments must necessarily include twelve Ponce Enrile who has become a member of the
(12) senators and twelve (12) members of the LP. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop
Hoifce of Representatives. What the Constitu any of the political parties from forming a coali
tion requires is that there be at least a majority tion with another political party in order to fill
of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all . Assuming that the Constitution intended
the members and in Section 19, the Commission that there be always twelve (12) senators in the
shall meet only while Congress is in session, at Commission on Appointments, the instant situa
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its tion cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard
ipj
members "to discharge such powers and func of the rule on proportional representation. The
tions herein conferred upon it." Implementing election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada
the above provisions ofthe Constitution, Section as members ofthe Commission on Appointments
10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commissionon by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a
Appointments, provides as follows: violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
"Sec. 10. Place of Meeting and Quorim: The Constitution. Their nomination and election by
Commission shall meet at either the session hall the LDP majority by sheer forceof superiority in
of the Senate or the House of Representatives numbers during the Senate organization meeting
uponcallofthe Chairman or as the Commission of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of
may designate. The presence of at least thirteen discretion. Where power is exercised in a man
L (13) members is necessary to constitute a quo
rum. Provided, however, that at least four (4) of
ner inconsistent with the command of the Con
stitution, and by reason of numerical strength,
the members constituting the quorum should knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said
come from either house " exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted
by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
It is quite evident that the Constitution found to exist.
does not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members In the light of the foregoing and on the basis
of the House of Representatives in order that of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the
the Commission may function. Other instances matter before this Court, We declare the election
may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto
bodies which perform their functions even if not Tanada as members of the Commission on Ap
fully constituted and even if their compositionis pointments as nuUand voidforbeing in violation
expressly specified by the Constitution. Among of the rule on proportional representation under
aJ these are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Com Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
mission, Commission on Elections, Commission ofthe Philippines. Accordingly, a writ ofprohibi
ted
ARTICLEVJ: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 213
iiiii
tion is hereby issued ordering the said respon TION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY
dents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE.
desist from assuming, occupying and discharging THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING
the functions of members of the Commission on IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES
Appointments; and ordering the respondent Sen SHALL BE RESPECTED.
ate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity
as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on 1. Legislative investigations.
Appointments, to desist from recognizing the a
membership of the respondent Senators and from A. Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
allowing and permitting them from sitting and Committee
participating as members of said Commission. G.R. No. L-89914, November 20, 1991
SO ORDERED.
&i4 PADILLA, Jr.
NOTE: The Constitution gives to the two
Houses of Congress the primary "jurisdiction This is a petition for prohibition with prayer
over who should sit in the Commission on forthe issuance ofa temporary restraining order
Appointments. This includes determination of and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent
party affiliation and number of party members Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring
for the purpose of determining proportional the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at
representation. Drilon, et al. v. Speaker, G.R.
its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
No. 180055, July 31, 2009.
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group
in thirty-six (36)or thirty-nine (39)corporations.
ffi-M
SEC. 19. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philip
AND THE COMMISSION ON APPOINT pines, represented by the Presidential Commis
MENTS SHALL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN sion on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by
THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE SENATE AND the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandigan-
$fcJ
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES bayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35)
SHALL HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITH entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benja
THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND min 'Kokoy* Romualdez, et al", for reconveyance,
THE SPEAKER. THE COMMISSION ON AP reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
POINTMENTS SHALL MEET ONLYWHILE The complaint was amended several times
THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION, AT THE by impleading new defendants and or amplify
CALL OF ITS CHAIRMAN OR A MAJORITY ing the allegations therein. Under the Second
OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, TO DISCHARGE Amended Complaint, the herein petitioners were
SUCH POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AS ARE impleaded as party defendants.
HEREIN CONFERRED UPON IT.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein
SEC. 20. THE RECORDS AND BOOKS petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others
OF ACCOUNTS OF THE CONGRESS that:
SHALL BE PRESERVED AND BE OPEN
"14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Ro
TO THE PUBLIC IN ACCORDANCE WITH
mualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez,
LAW, AND SUCH BOOKS SHALL BE AU
acting by themselves and/or in unlawful
DITED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
L WHICH SHALL PUBLISH ANNUALLY AN
ITEMIZED LIST OF AMOUNTS PAID TO
concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Mar
cos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their relationship, influence
AND EXPENSES INCURRED FOR EACH and connection with the latter Defendant
MEMBER. spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
SEC. 21. THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves
OF REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CON people, among others:
DUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLA [Details omitted]
On 28 September 1988, petitioners (as defen other petitioners who are his co-defendants in
dants) filed their respective answers. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, there
disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez cor upon, suspended its inquiry and directed the
porations" were carried in various metropolitan petitioners to file their memorandum on the
newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued
the Romualdez firms had not been sequestered a resolution6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the
because of the opposition of certain PCGG offi petitioners' plea to be excused from testifying,
cials who "had worked previously as lawyers of and the Committee voted to pursue and continue
the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali
otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March Gonzales dissented.
1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986
j^ji revolution, the "Romualdez companies" were Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Com
sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to mittee is poised to subpoena them and require
a holding company controUed by Romualdez, and their attendance and testimony in proceedings
before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdic
that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-
tion and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant
law, had effectively taken over the firms, even
disregard of their constitutional rights, and to
pending negotiations for the purchase of the
their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice
corporations, for the same price of P5 million and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any
which was reportedly way below the fair value other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
of their assets.
ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority present petition for prohibition with a prayer
Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a for temporary restraining order and/or injunc
speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before tive relief.
the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil
Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose
Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo S. Sandejas, filed with the Court a motion for
Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into intervention, which the Court granted in the
the possible violation of the law in the case, par resolution of 21 December 1989, and required
ticularly with regard to Republic Act,No. 3019, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." to comment on the petition in intervention. In
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the compliance therewith, respondent Senate Blue
Mi
matter was referred by the Senate to the Com Ribbon Committee filed its comment thereon.
mittee on Accountabihty of Public Officers (Blue Before discussing the issues raised by peti
Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue tioners and intervenor, we will first tackle the
Ribbon Committee started its investigation on jurisdictional question raised by the respondent
the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were Committee.
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before
L it and testify on "what they know" regarding the
"sale of the thirty-six (36) corporations belonging
In its comment, respondent Committee
claims that this Court cannot properly inquire
into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting
to Benjamin 'Kokoy' Romualdez."
legislative investigations, much less can it enjoin
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo the Congress or any of its regular and special
Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his committees — like what petitioners seek from
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the
in.Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. doctrine of separation of powers, which obtains
Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused in our present system of government.
to testify invoking his constitutional right to due
The contention is untenable...
process, and averring that the publicity gener
ated by respondent Committee's inquiry could The "allocation of constitutional boundaries"
adversely affect his rights as well as those of the is a task that this Court must perform under
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
case,110 "(t)he political question doctrine neither circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
constitutional boundaries has been given to this accordance with its duly published rules ofproce
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation man dure" and that, "the rights of persons appearing in
dated by the 1987 Constitution, although said or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
provision by no means does away with the appli It follows then that the rights of persons under
cability of the principle in appropriate cases."111 the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
4&i}A the right to due process and the right not to be
The Court is thus of the considered view that
compelled tp testify against one's self.
it has jurisdiction over the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the scope and The power to conduct formal inquiries or
MS extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon investigations is specifically provided for in Sec.
Committee to conduct inquiries into private af 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing In
fairs in purported aid of legislation. quiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination
\M Coming to the specific issues raised in this
of any law or in connection with any proposed
case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue
legislation or the formulation of future legisla
Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legisla
tion. They may also extend to any and aU matters
a^4 tive purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legisla
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in
tion; (2) the sale or disposition of the Romualdez
the Senate alone.
corporations is a "purely private transaction"
which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Naza-
a&i)
Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the reno, et al.,nz the inquiry, to be within the juris
inquiry violates their right to due process. diction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes
it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate
the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
or to expel a member.
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides: Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules,
the Senate may refer to any committee or com
"The Senate or the House of Represen
mittees any speech or resolution filed by any
tatives or any of its respective committee
Senator which in its judgment requires an ap
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
fasii
propriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order
in accordance with its duly published rules
therefore to ascertain the character or nature of
of procedure. The rights of persons appear
an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
ing in or affected by such.inquiries shall be
resolution under which such an inquiry is pro
respected."
posed to be made.
The power of both houses of Congress to
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile re
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
veals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement
which was published in various newspapers on
. noNeptali A. Gonzales, et al. v. Hon. Catalino Macaraig,
Jr.. et al, G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby"
452, 463. Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of
"'Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution pro Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa
vides:
wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be estab 1988 categorically denying that he Had "taken
lished by law. over" the FMMC Group of Companies; that
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which categorically stated in a telecast interview by
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or.instrumentality of the Government." ll2No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29.
•M4
1988 that there has been no takeover by him possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, othr
(Lopa); and that these repeated allegations of erwise known as 'The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the
baseless as they are malicious. inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Rib
bon Committee was to find out whether or not the
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile,
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
during the session of the Senate on 13 September
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection
1988, to avail of the privilege hour, so that he
with the aUeged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
could respond to the said Lopa letter, and also
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the
Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim
intended legislation involved.
of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he
(Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Com
panies are "baseless" and "malicious." ...
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolu
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech tion No. 212 is to look into the charges against
in the following tenor: the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders
of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the
"Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of
the Senate to look into the possible violation
the Constitution.
of the law in the case particularly with regard
to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which
reads as follows and I quote:
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated
inquiry by respondent Committee is not really
'Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to
— It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress,
any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
within the third civil degree, of the President v/hether or not the relatives of the President or
of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, Act," a matter that appears more within the prov
to intervene directly or indirectly, in any ince of the courts rather than of the legislature.
business, transaction, contract or application Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that
with the Government: Provided, That this Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of
section shall not apply to any person who this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States,11*
prior to the assumption of office of any of it was held:
the above officials to whom he is related, has
been already dealing with the Government " .... The power of congress to conduct
along the same line of business, nor to any investigations is inherent in the legislative
transaction, contract or application filed by process. That power is broad. It encompasses
him for approval of which is not discretion inquiries concerning the administration of
ary on the part of the officials concerned but existing laws as well as proposed or possi
depends upon compliance with requisites bly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
provided by law, nor to any act lawfully defects in our social, economic, or poHtical
performed in an official capacity or in the system for the purpose of enabling Congress
exercise of a profession.' to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government
"Mr. President, I have done duty to this to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.
Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is
Body to make its own conclusion." not unhmited. There is no general authority
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile con to expose the private affairs of individuals
tained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a U3354 U.S. 178,1 L. ed. 2d 1273 (1957).
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATT7E DEPARTMENT 217
i&M
withoutjustification in terms ofthe functions not inquire into matters which are within
of congress. This was freely conceded by the the exclusive province of one of tlie other
Solicitor General in his argument in this case. branches of the government. Lacking the
Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial judicial power given to the Judiciary, it can
agency. These are functions of the executive not inquire into matters that are exclusively
and judicial departments ofgovernment. No the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related supplant the Executive in what exclusively
to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of belongs to the Executive "
Congress. Investigations conducted solely for
Now to another matter. It has been held that
the personal aggrandizement of the investi
"a congressional committee's right to inquire is
gators or to 'punish' those investigated are
'subject to\all relevant limitations placed by the
indefensible." (itaHcs supplied)
Constitution on governmental action,' including
It cannot be overlooked that when respon 'the relevant Hmitations of the Bill of Rights'."115
dent^Committee decided to conduct its investi
In another case
gation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the "... the mere semblance of legislative
Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint purpose would not justify an inquiry in the
shows that one of its principal causes of action face of the Bill of Rights. The critical ele
against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, ment is the existence of, and the weight to
is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since in demanding disclosures from an unwilling
the issues in said complaint had long been joined witness. We cannot simply assume, however,
by the filing of petitioners' respective answers that every congressional investigation is
thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by justified by a public need that over-balances
the respondent Committee is one over which any private rights affected. To do so would
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandigan be to abdicate the responsibility placed by
E£&J
bayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure
by that court. To allow the respondent Commit that the Congress does not unjustifiably en
tee to conduct its own investigation of an issue croach upon an individual's right to privacy
already before the Sandiganbayan would not nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, reli
only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments gion or assembly."116
between a legislative committee and a judicial
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were
Ijiî Constitution to an individual is the right against
to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
self-incrimination. This right construed as the
the possibility of its influence being made to bear
right to remain completely silent may be availed
on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan
of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may
cannot be discounted.
be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
In fine, for the respondent Committee to are asked of them.
probe and inquire into the same justiciable
This distinction was enunciated by the Court
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan,
in Romeo Chavez v. The Honorable Court of
would be an encroachment into the exclusive
Appeals, et al.117 thus —
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had .much
earlier set in. In Baremblatt v. United States,114 Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different
it was held that: tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled
"Broad as it is, the power is not, however,
to take the witness stand and claim the privilege
without Hmitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it can •"Maurice A. Hutcheson v. U.S., 369 US 599.
,16Watkins v. US, 354 USS 178 citing US v, Rumely,
345 US 41.
,H360 U.S. 109, 3 L ed. 2d 1115, 69 S CT 1081 (1959). ,,7G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968 24 SCRA 663.
^&j
as each question requiring an incriminating an hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners
swer is shot at liim, an accused may altogether and intervenor to testify before it and produce
refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to evidence at the said inquiry.
answer any and all questions.
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, this right of the accused is ex
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
s£ij tended to respondents in administrative investi
gations but only if they partake of the nature of I regret that I must express a strong dissent
a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal to the Court's opinion in this case.
proceeding. In Galman v. Pamaran,118 the Court
reiterated the doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan (6 The Court is asserting a power which I
SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses believe we do not possess. We are encroaching
to invoke the right against self-incrimination on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the
not only in criminal proceedings but also in all Senate from proceeding with a constitutionally
other types of suit. vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative
It was held that: prerogative investigations in aid of legislation.
SiB&l
"We did not therein state that since he is We do so because we somehow feel that the pur
not an accused and>the case is not a criminal ported aim is not the real purpose.
case. Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness The Court has no power to second guess the
stand and testify, and that he can invoke his motives behind an act of a House of Congress.
right against self-incrimination only when a Neither can we substitute our judgment for its
question which tends to elicit an answer that judgment on a matter specifically given to it by
will incriminate him is propounded to him.
the Constitution. The scope of the legislative
Clearly then, it is not the character of the
power is broad. It encompasses practically every
suit involved but the nature of the proceed
aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of
ings that controls. The privilege has consis
regulation. How can this Court say that unrav
tently been held to extend to all proceedings
eling the tangled and secret skeins behind the
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of
punishment is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not."
39 corporations under the past regime and their
sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we the new dispensation will not result in useful
presently rule that petitioners may not be com legislation?
pelled by the respondent Committee to appear,
testify and produce evidence before it, it is only
because we hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would B. Sabio v. Gordon
feai
be violative of the principle of separation of G.R. No. 174177, October 17, 2006
powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, ordained by the DECISION
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is
The Court holds that, under the facts, including
being questioned on the ground that it tramples
the circumstance that petitioners are presently
upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative
impleaded as defendants in a case before the
inquiry under Article.VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Sandiganbayan, which involves issues inti
Constitution, which reads:
mately related to the subject of contemplated
inquiry before the respondent Committee, the The Senate or the House of Representatives
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is or any of its respective committees may conduct
)m inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
118G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30,1985,138 SCRA 294. its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such in Gordon, sent another notice to Chairman Sabio
quiries shall be respected. requiring him to appear and testify on the same
subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The
&&A
The facts are undisputed.
notice was issued "under the same authority
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously
Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Sen served upon (him) last 16 August 2006."
ate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply
"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
with the notice. He sent a letter dated September
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
4, 2006 to Senator Gordon reiterating his reason
aaifr Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
for declining to appear in the public hearing.
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOM- This prompted Senator Gordon to issue
SAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the al an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring
leged improprieties in their operations by their Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede,
respective Board of Directors." Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they
should not be cited in contempt of the Senate.
On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Ino- Senate their Compliance and Explanation, which
cencio, under the authority of Senator Richard partly reads:
JJMi*
J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of
the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should
him to be one of the resource persons in the public not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on No member or staff of the Commission
Government Corporations and Public Enter shall be required to testify or produce evi
prises and Committee on PubHc Sendees. The dence in any judicial legislative or adminis
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate trative proceeding concerning matters within
on Senate Res. No. 455.
its official cognizance.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No.
the invitation because of prior commitment. At
1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legis
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
lative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of
No. 1 earlier quoted.
the need to provide protection to the PCGG in
On August 10,2006, Senator Gordon issued a order to ensure the unhampered performance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law,
President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Section 4(b) of which had not been amended,
Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, repealed or revised in any way.
Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario
ai'^
to appear in the public hearing scheduled on To say the least, it would require both Houses
August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or
relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. repeal the provision in controversy. Until then, it
S3> No. 455....
stands to be respected as part of the legal system
in this jurisdiction.
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear.
In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen.
&*a 2006, he reiterated his earHer position, invoking Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the anomalous transactions referred to in the
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Hold P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending
ings Corporation relied on the position paper cases before the regular courts, the Sandigan
they previously filed, which raised issues on the bayan and the Supreme Court....
propriety of legislative inquiry. In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commit
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. tee (203 SCRA 767, 784 [l991]), the Honorable
Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Supreme Court held:
iiiiiul
"... [T]he issues sought to be investi Perched on one arm of the scale of justice:
gated by the respondent Committee is one Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitutio
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by granting respondent Senate Committees tb
the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
been pre-empted by that court. To allow the The Senate or the House of Represei
plifiS
respondent Committee to conduct its own tatives or any of its. respective committee
investigation of an issue already before the may conduct inquiries in aid of legislatio
Sandigabayan would not only pose the pos in accordance with its duly pubHshed rule
sibility of conflicting judgments between a of procedure. The rights of persons appea:
:p{j$
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, ing in or affected by such inquiries shall h
but if the Committee's judgment were to be respected.
reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
the possibiHty of its influence being made to On the other arm of the scale is Section 40
bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandi of E.O. No. 1 Hmiting such power of legislativ
ganbayan cannot be discounted. inquiry by exempting all PCGG members c
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislativ
Unconvinced with the above Compliance or administrative proceeding, thus:
and Explanation, the Gommittee on Government
No member or staff of the Commissio
Corporations and Public Enterprises and the
shall be required to testify or produce ev
Committee on Public Services issued an Order
&&&
dence in any judicial, legislative or adminii
directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.),
trative proceeding concerning matters withi
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman
its official cognizance.
Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for
contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the To determine whether there exists a clea
approval of Senate President Villar and the ma and unequivocal repugnancy between the tw
jority of the Committees' members. quoted provisions that warrants a declaratio
that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 198
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 Constitution, a brief consideration of the Cor
a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chair gress' power of inquiry is imperative.
man Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82
EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippin
Senate premises where he was detained. Congress' power of inquiry, provisions oh sue.
power made their maiden appearance in Articl
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. The:
a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate came the 1987 Constitution incorporating th
Committee on Government Corporations and present Article VI, Section 12. What was there
PubHc Enterprises and Committee on Public Ser fore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, a
vices, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon influenced by American jurisprudence, becam
and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognize
the power of investigation, not just of Congress
Crucial to the resolution of the present but also of "any of its committee." This is sig
petitions is the fundamental issue of whether nificant because it constitutes a direct conferra
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the of investigatory power upon the committee
1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the and it means that the mechanisms which th
merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and Houses can take in order to effectively perforn
his Commissioners that their refusal to appear its investigative function are also available t
before respondent Senate Committees is justi the committees.
fied. With the resolution of this issue, all the It can be said that the Congress' power o
other issues raised by the parties have become inquiry has gained more solid existence an«
inconsequential. expansive construal. The Court's high regard t
such power is rendered more evident in Senate The petition seeks the issuance of a tem
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the porary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin re
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials spondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry
of the executive branch." Verily, the Court rein pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution
forced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are
§&
of government, being a legitimate subject for officers of petitioner jSCB-Philippines to at
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" tend and testify before any further hearing to
and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive be conducted by respondent, particularly that
with the power to legislate." set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any
ttf
Considering these jurisprudential instruc hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the
tions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant petitioners dh the Watch List. It also prays that
with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoe-
the PCGG members and stafffrom the Congress' nae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision from compelling petitioners to appear and testify
granting such exemption. The Congress' power in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S.
of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything Resolution No. 166.
that concerns the administration of existing laws
The facts are as follows:
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends "to government agencies created by On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan
Congress and officers whose positions are within Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respon
the power of Congress to regulate or even abol dent, delivered a privilege speech entitled
ish." PCGG belongs to this class. "Arrogance of Wealth" before the Senate
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, denouncing SCB-Philippines for seUing un
in the absence of any constitutional basis. registered foreign securities in violation of
the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsis 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately
tent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitu conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to
ia) tion stating that: "Public office is a public trust. prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudu
Public officers and employees must at all times lent activity in the future. Upon motion of
be accountable to the people, serve them with Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S.
lead modest lives." Resolution No. 166, . . . DIRECTING THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
C. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO
Committee CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEG
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007 ISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF
UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SE
DECISION CURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED
NACHURA, Jr. BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS
OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVEST
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With ING PUBLIC
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on
March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respon Acting on the referral, respondent, through
dent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set
Institutions and Currencies, as represented by
the initial hearing on February 28,2005 to inves
its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara (respondent).
tigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of
the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners, among oth the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such
ers, to attend the hearing, requesting them to investigation contained no suggestion ofany con
submit their written position paper. Petition templated legislation; it merely called upon the
ers, through counsel, submitted to respondent a Senate to look into possible violations of Section
letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held
position, particularly stressing that there were that the requested probe failed to comply with a
cases pending in court allegedly involving the fundamental requirement "of Section 21, Article
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, VI of the Constitution, which states:
thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent to continue with the inquiry. The Senate or the House of Represen
tatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
Petitioners argue that respondent has no in accordance with its duly published rules
jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its of procedure. The rights of persons appear
subject matter is the very same subject matter ing in or effected by such inquiries shall be
of [several cases already filed in court]. respected.
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue
Committee, the petitioners claim that since the Ribbcfn Committee from proceeding with the
issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines iHegally legislative investigation in that case.
sold unregistered foreign securities is already Unfortunately for the petitioners, this dis
preempted by the courts that took cognizance tinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not
of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this obtain in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No.
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the
powers vested solely in these courts. inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does the respondent Committee, as found in the last
not apply squarely to petitioners' case. three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared WHEREAS, existing laws including
that the issue to be investigated was one over the Securities Regulation Code seem to be
i-i-ittfi
which jurisdiction had already been acquired inadequate in preventing the sale of unreg
by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Sen istered securities and in effectively enforcing
ate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the the registration rules intended to protect the
matter would create the possibility ofconflicting investing public from fraudulent practices;
judgments; and that the inquiry into the same WHEREAS, the regulatory interven
justiciable controversy would be an encroach tion by the SEC and BSP likewise appears
ment on the exclusive domain ofjudicial jurisdic inadequate in preventing the conduct of
tion that had set-in much earlier. proscribed activities in a manner that would
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there protect the investing public;
are a number of cases already pending in various WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial
courts and administrative bodies involving the legislation to address the situation, having in
petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unreg mind the imposition of proportionate penal
istered foreign securities, there is a resemblance ties to offending entities and their directors,
between this case and Bengzon. However, the officers and representatives among other
similarity ends there. additional regulatory measures; (emphasis
Central to the Court's ruling in Bengzon supplied)
— that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was The unmistakable objective of the investiga
without any constitutional mooring to conduct tion, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes
the legislative investigation — was the Court's the error in petitioners' aUegation that the inqui
determination that the intended inquiry was ry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very
not in aid of legislation. The Court found that same Senator Enrile, was simply "to denounce
Ijjji*)
the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank ManuelBaviera,the latter a party to the pending
in selling unregistered foreign securities x x court cases cited by petitioners, were onlyseeking
x." This fallacy is made more glaring when we a friendly forum so that they could recover their
consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege investments from SCB-Philippines; and that
speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to im the respondent has allowed itself to be used as
]jpi mediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legisla the conveniently available vehicle to effect this
tion, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar purpose. « ♦
fraudulent activity in the future."

However, as correctly pointed out by respon
^s&fr Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an dent in its Comment on the petition, Atty. Bocobo
administrative complaint before a court or a did not fite a complaint before the Senate for the
quasi-judicial body should not automatically purpose of recovering his investment. On the con
bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Oth trary, and as confirmed during the initial hear
erwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert ing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint
any intended inquiry by Congress through the humbly requested the Senate to conduct an
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of
administrative, complaint. Surely, the exercise SCB-Phihppines, with the end view of preventing
of sovereign legislative authority, of which the the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent
power of legislative inquiry is an essential com activity by the banks in general. Baviera, on the
ponent, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal other hand, was not a "complainant" but merely
or an administrative investigation. a witness in the investigationt invited to testify
As succinctly stated in the landmark case on the alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign
Arnault v. Nazareno —
securities by SCB-Philippines, being one of the
lî
supposed victims thereof.
[T]he power of inquiry - with process
The Court further notes that when it denied
to enforce it - is an essential and appropri
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a TRO to
iii) ate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005, re
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
spondent proceeded with the investigation. On
effectively in the absence of information re
the said date, outraged by petitioners' imputation
specting the conditions which the legislation
that it was conducting the investigation "in aid of
is intended to affect or change; and where
collection," respondent held petitioners, together
the legislative body does not itself possess
with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo,
the requisite information - which is not
in contempt and ordered their detention for six
infrequently true - recourse must be had to
hours.
others who possess it.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Recon
Neither can the petitioners claim that they
sideration of this Court's Resolution dated March
were singled out by the respondent Committee.
14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the
The Court notes that among those invited as re
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
source persons were officials of the Securities and
preliminary injunction, alleging that their be
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko
ing held in contempt was without legal basis, as
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were
the phrase "in aid of coUection" partakes of an
subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the
absolutely privileged aUegation in the petition.
respondent relative to their separate findings
on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign secu We do not agree. The Court has already ex
rities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the pounded on the essence of the contempt power
objective of the investigation was the quest for of Congress and its committees in this wise -
L remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the
The principle that Congress or any of its
recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry witnesses is founded upon reason and poHcy.
conducted by respondent was, in fact, "in aid of Said power must be considered implied
collection." They claim that Atty. Bocobo and or incidental to the exercise of legislative
power. How could a legislative body obtain General Santos City, Branch 23, which denied
the knowledge and information on which to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's motion
base intended legislation if it cannot require to dismiss the petition for prohibition, injunc
and compelthe disclosure ofsuch knowledge tion with writ of preliminary injunction filed by
and information, if it is impotent to punish private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano; and
~kJ
a defiance of its power and authority? When (b) G.R. No. 138378, for review of the resolution
the fraimers of the Constitution adopted the dated April 15,1999 of respondent Judge Maja
principle of separation of powers, making ducon declaring petitioner Senator Aquilino Q.
each branch supreme within the realm ofits Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt of court.
iiijfli)
respective authority, it must have intended The antecedent facts are as follows:
each department's authority to be> full and
complete, independently of each other's au G.R. No. 136760:
thority or power.And how couldthe author On August 28, 1998, Senator Bias F. Ople
ity and power become complete if for every filed Senate Resolution No. 157 directing the
act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act Committee on National Defense and Security to
of contumacy against it, the legislative body conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
must resort to the judicial department for the charges ofthen Defense Secretary Orlando Mer-
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent cado that a group of active and retired military
by itself to punish or deal therewith, with officers were organizing a coup d'etat to prevent
affronts committed against its authority or the administration of then President Joseph Es
dignity. trada from probing alleged fund irregularities in
The exercise by Congress or by any of its the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
committees of the power to punish contempt is On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto
based on the principle ofself-preservation. As the III also filed Resolution No. 160, "directing the
branch ofthe government vested with the legisla appropriate senate committee to conduct an
tivepower, independentlyofthe judicial branch, inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged
it can assert its authority and punish contuma
mismanagement of the funds and investment
cious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and
as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).. .."
functions per se, but to the sovereign character
ofthe legislature as oneofthe three independent The Senate President referred the two reso
and coordinate branches of government. lutions to the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
In this case, petitioners' imputation that the
Committee) and the Committee on National
investigation was "in aid ofcoUection" is a direct
Defense and Security.
chaUenge against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the lat During the public hearings conducted by
ter. In this light, we find the contempt citation the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (hereafter
againstthe petitionersreasonable andjustified. called the Committee), it appeared that the AFP-
RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City,
designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for P10.500.00
D. Senate Blue Ribbon v. per square meter from private respondent Atty.
Judge Majaducon Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed
G.R. No. 136760, July 29, 2003 with the Register of Deeds indicated that the
purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Jr. square meter.
For resolution are two consoHdated petitions: The Committee thereafter caused the service
(a) G.R. No. 136760, for certiorari, prohibition, of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano,
mandamus and preliminary injunction, assailing directing him to appear and testify before it.
the resolution dated November 11,1998 of Judge Respondent refused to appear at the hearing.
Jose S. Majaduconofthe RegionalTrial Court of Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and
|^
fcty)
preHminary injunction with prayer for temporary AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FILED
restraining order with the Regional Trial Court BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT, ATTY. NILO J.
§&
of General Santos City, Branch 23, which was FLAVIANO, AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN
docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496. SP. CIVIL CASE NO. 496.
On October 21,1998, the trial court issued a II. ISSUED (1) A TEMPORARY RE
Temporary Restraining Order directing the Com STRAINING ORD&R EX-PARTE FOR A PE
mittee "to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding RIOD OF TWENTY (20) DAYS AGAINST THE
with the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in Gen PETITIONER ON OCTOBER 21, 1998, AND
eral Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or (2) A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling ON NOVEMBER 11, 1998 ENJOINING THE
and sale of Lot X, MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and PETITIONER FROM ENFORCING ITS SUB
"from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from Re POENAS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN
gion XI, particularly from General Santos City, REGION XI.
pending the hearing of the petition for prohibi
IH. APPLIED THERULING OF BENGZON
tion and injunction."
VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON IN GRANTING
On November 5,1998, the Committee filed a INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PRIVATE RESPON
motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of DENT.
(a) lack of jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a
m G.R. No. 138378:
valid cause of action. It further argued that the
issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order On January 13, 1999, the newspaper, The
was invalid for violating the rule against ex-parte Philippine Star published a news report on the
issuance thereof; and that the same was not filing by the Committee with this Court of the
enforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction petition for certiorari which was docketed as G.R.
of the trial court. No. 136760. The news report quoted portions
of the petition filed by the Committee, aUeging
iiiii On November 11,1998, the trial court denied that Regional Trial Court Judge Majaducon was
petitioner's motion to dismiss and granted the guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and proce
writ of preliminary injunction, thus: dures when he issued the temporary restraining
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSID order and the writ of preliminary injunction
ERED, the motion to dismiss is DENIED, because, under the principle of separation of
and the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNC
powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise
£ffil TION is hereby issued against respondent. It by the legislature of its authority to conduct in
vestigations in aid of legislation.
is enjoined from enforcing its subpoenas to
petitioner in Region XI to appear and testify Reacting to the.aforesaid news report,
before it in any of its inquiry or investigation respondent Judge Majaducon motu proprio
anywhere in the Philippines regarding the initiated a charge for indirect contempt of court
acquisition by the AFP-RSBS of Lot X, MR- against Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., news
1160-D, located in General Santos City. The reporter Perseus Echeminada, Philippine Star
,^J
bond of petitioner filed on October 21, 1998, pubHsher Maximo Soliven, editor-in-chiefRamon
for P500,000.00 for the TRO also serves as J. Farolan, and executive editor Bobby G. dela
his bond in this injunction. Cruz, which was docketed as Special Civil Case
No. 496.Judge Majaducon averred that the news
SO ORDERED.
report created in the minds of the reader the im
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari pressionthat he violated the separation ofpowers
which was docketed as G.R. No. 136760, aUeging clause of the Constitution and that he was guilty
SsJ
that respondent Judge Majaducon committed of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures.
grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without After the respondents submitted their re
or in excess of jurisdiction when he: spective answers, a decision was rendered on
I. DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION TO April 15,1999 finding petitionerPimentelguilty
DISMISS THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION of indirect contempt.
Hence, the instant petition based on the fol purchase thereof, which faUs squarely within th<
lowing grounds: ambit of Senate Resolutions Nos. 157 and 160.
§£
L THE EXPRESSION "GROSS IGNO On the other hand, respondent Flaviano con
RANCE OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE" tends that the trial court may properly intervent
OR "GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW' IN into investigations by Congress pursuant to th<
REFERENCE TO THE RESPONDENTS EX- power of judicial review vested in it by the Con
PARTE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF stitution. He avers that he has a vaHd cause o:
IS NOT PEJORATIVE AS TO CONSTITUTE A action to file the petition for prohibition consider
GROUND FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ing that the Committee's investigation will delvt
into the validity of the patenting and titling of L01
II. THIS HONORABLE COURT ITSELF X, MR-1160-D which, as admitted by petitioner
USES "GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW' falls within the competence of judicial courts
'&)
AND OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SIMILAR In fact, the validity of the purchase by AFP-
FORCEFUL IMPORT IN DESCRIBING GROSS RSBS of the subject lot is already the subject o:
AND PALPABLE ERRORS OF JUDGES. a pending action before the Regional Trial Courl
III. BY UPHOLDING HIS CONTEMPT of General Santos City and the Ombudsman oi
CHARGE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, THE Mindanao. Finally, he cites the case of Bengzon v
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS, IN EFFECT, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, [G.R. No. 89914
&£&) PREEMPTED THIS HONORABLE COURT IN 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA 767] and argues
RESOLVING THEISSUES RAISED AGAINST that preliminary injunction may issue in cases
HIM IN G.R. NO. 136760.
pending before administrative bodies such as the
Ombudsman or the Office of the Prosecutor as
a^j
IV. THE PUBLICATION BY PHILIPPINE long as the right to self-incrimination guaranteed
STAR OF THE BLUE RIBBON PETITION IN •by the Bill of Rights is in danger. Furthermore,
G.R. NO. 136760, OR EXCERPTS THEREOF an information against him has been filed with
WAS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF FREE the Sandiganbayan.
DOM OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS.
We find for petitioner. There is grave abuse
The two petitions, namely, G.R. No. 136760 of discretion when the respondent acts in a capri
tig,) and G.R. No. 138378, were ordered consolidated cious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
on December 11, 2000. in the exercise of his judgment, as when the
assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal
The issues for resolution in these joint peti
L tions are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge
Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discre
justification. In this case, the assailed resolu
tion of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued
without legal basis.
tion when he dismissed petitioner's motion to dis
miss the petition for prohibition and issued the The principle of separation of powers essen
M0
writ of preHminary injunction; and. (b) whether tially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
or not respondent Judge erred in convicting pe execution to the Executive, and settlement of
titioner Pimentel of indirect contempt of court. legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is pre
iig) vented from invading the domain of the others.
On the first issue, petitioner Committee con
When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served
tends that courts have no jurisdiction to restrain
subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
Congress from performing its constitutionally
testify before it in connection with its investiga
vested function to conduct investigations in aid
tion of the alleged misuse and mismanagement
of legislation, foUowing the principle of separa
of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its
tion of powers. Moreover, the petition filed by
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legisla
respondent Flaviano before the trial court failed
m*
tion. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section
to state a cause of action considering that the
21 of the Constitution, thus:
legislative inquiry did not deal with the issuance
of the patent and title to Lot X, MR-1160-D in The Senate or the House of Representatives
ijiiii
the name of AFP-RSBS, which is well within the or any of its respective committees may conduct
court's jurisdiction, but with the anomaly in the inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
fffffi]
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights In G.R. No. 138378, petitioner, Senator Aq-
of persons appearing in or affected by such in uilino Pimentel, Jr., contends that respondent
quiries shaU be respected. judge erred in finding him, as representative
of the Committee, guilty of indirect contempt
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General
of court under Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997
Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no
Rules of Civil Procedure. According to Pimentel,
authority to prohibit the Committee from requir
the phrase "gross ignorance of the rules of law
ing respondent to appear and testify before it.
and procedure," which the Committee used in
The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent, the petition, is not depreciatory, but merely a
does not apply in this case. We agree with peti description of normal usage in petitions where
tioner Committee that the factual circumstances the acts of lower courts are challenged before
therein are different from those in the case at higher judicial bodies. In fact, this Court often
bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was uses the phrase in its decisions to describe judges
involved and the subject matter of the inquiry who commit gross and palpable mistakes in
was more within the province of the courts rather their interpretation and application of the law.
than of the legislature. More specifically, the Petitioner further maintains that when the Com
investigation in the said case was an offshoot of mittee used the phrase, it did so without malice.
the privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who Rather, it was only to stress the unfamiliarity of
urged the Senate to look into a possible violation or disregard by the respondent Judge of a basic
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by rule of procedure, and to buttress its arguments
the relatives ofthen President Corazon Aquino, in support of its petition for certiorari.
particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, in connection Petitioner Pimentel also contends that he
iiiiii) with the alleged sale of 36 to 39 corporations had no participation in the publication in the
belonging to Benjamin Romualdez! On the other Philippine Star of excerpts from the Committee's
hand, there was in this case a clear legislative petition for certiorari. Even assuming arguendo
purpose, as stated in Senate Resolution No. 160, that it was within his control, he pointed out that
and the appropriate Senate Committee was di he could not have prevented the editors and writ
rected to look into the reported misuse and mis ers of the newspaper from publishing the same,
management of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the lest he violate their constitutional right of free
$0)
intention of enacting appropriate legislation to expression. Indeed, the report by the Philippine
protect the rights and interests of the officers and Star of the filing of the petition and the reproduc
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. tion of its contents was a legitimate exercise of
Further, in Bengzon, the vaHdity of the sale of press freedom.
Romualdez's corporations was pending with the
Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon Respondent Judge counters that Pimentel
Committee decided to conduct its investigation. was guilty of indirect contempt of court, first
In short, the issue had already been pre-empted for causing the publication of the Committee's
by the court.
petition in the Philippine Star notwithstanding
that the same was subjudice, second, for making
In the instant case, the complaint against derogatory remarks in the petition itself which
respondent Flaviano regarding the anomaly in affected the honor and integrity of the respondent
the sale of Lot X, MR-1160 was still pending judge and degraded the administration ofjustice;
before the Office of the Ombudsman when the and third, for making it appear that an admin
Committee served subpoena on him. In other istrative complaint was filed against respondent
words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the Judge for gross ignorance of the law. These, he
matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment said, constituted mahcious and false report which
by the legislature into the exclusive jurisdiction obstructed the administration of justice.
of another branch of the government. Clearly,
Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997 Rules of
there was no basis for the respondent Judge to
Civil Procedure provides:
apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of
petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for pro Section 3. Indirect contempt to bepunished
hibition amounted to grave abuse of discretion. after charge and hearing. — After a charge in
ijp)
|g£)
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given In this connection,it bears stressing that the
to the respondent to comment thereon within power to declare a person in contempt of court
such period as may be fixed by the court and to must be exercised on the preservative, not vin
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty dictive principle, and on the corrective and not
of any of the following acts may be punished for retaliatory idea of punishment. This was aptly
indirect contempt; expressed in the case ofNazareno v. Barnes [220
Phil. 452 (1985)]
xxx XXX xxx
d) Any improper conduct tending, di A judge, as a public servant, should not be

rectly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or of
degrade the administration of justice;.... fended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion
about him which may not altogether be flattering
After deliberating on the parties' arguments, to him. After aU, what matters is that a judge
we find that petitioner Pimentel is not guilty of performs his duties in accordance with the dic
improper conduct which obstructs or degrades tates of his conscience and the Hght that God has
the administration of justice. given him. A judge should never aUow himself to
Verily, it does not appear that Pimentel be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or petti
ness in the performance of his duties. He should
'caused the publication in the Philippine Star of
the fact of filing of the petition for certiorari by
always bear in mind that the power of the court to
punish for contempt should be exercised for pur
the Committee and the reproduction of excerpts
poses that are impersonal, because that power
thereof. He had no right to choose which news
is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
articles will see print in the newspaper. Rather,
persons but for the functions that they exercise.
it is the publisher thereof which decides which
news events will be reported in the broadsheet. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
In. doing so, it is allowed "the widest latitude of the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 136760 and
choice as to what items should see the light of day 138378 are GRANTED. The resolution of the Re
so long as they are relevant to a matter of public gional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch
interest," pursuant to its right of press freedom. 23, in Special Civil Case No. 496 dated November
11, 1998, which denied the Senate Blue Ribbon
Respondent Judge's allegation that peti Committee's motion to dismiss, is REVERSED
tioner made it appear that an administrative and SET ASIDE. The Writ ofPreHminary Injunc
complaint was filed against him is without tion issued by the trial court on November 11,
basis. From a careful perusal of the records, it 1998 is DISSOLVED. The resolution dated April
i&î
appears that while the Committee prayed for the 15, 1999, which declared Senator Aquilino Q.
imposition of administrative sanctions against Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt ofcourt,
respondent Judge Majaducon for gross ignorance is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
of the law, no formal administrative complaint indirect contempt is ordered DISMISSED.
was instituted separately from the petition for
certiorari. NOTE: When the Constitution says that
"The rights of persons appearing in or affected
FinaHy, the statement that respondent Judge by such inquiries shall be respected," it simply
was grossly ignorant of the rules of law and means that legislative investigations must be
procedure does not constitute improper conduct "subject to the Hmitations placed by the Consti
«m
that tends to impede, obstruct or degrade the tution on governmental action." And since all
administration of justice. As correctly argued governmental action must be exercised subject
by petitioner, the phrase "gross ignorance of the to constitutional limitations, principaUy found in
rules of law and procedure" is ordinarily found the Bill of Rights, this limitation really creates
lii
in administrative complaints and is a necessary no new constitutional right.
description to support a petition which seeks the
annulment of an order of a judge wherein basic In addition to the above express limitations
legal principles are disregarded. on the power of Congress is the impHcit limitation
that the legislature's power to commit a witness
for contempt terminates when the legislative
<$P
'#$&

tafel
body ceases to exist upon its final adjournment. use of the power as will constitute a denial of
"This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the due process. But the Senate is still subjectto the
power to impose such a penalty is the right which imperatives of quorum, voting, and pubHcation.
the legislature has to self-preservation, and The Senates /rules have been pubHshedand were
which right is enforceable during the existence of followed by the Senate. Dela Paz v. Senate, G.R.
the legislative body."Avancefia, C.J., concurring No. 184849, February 13, 2009.
in Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170,186 (1930). •>
NOTE: Need to publish Rules. SEC. 22. THE HEADS OF DEPART

MENTS MAY UPON THEIR OWN INITIA
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitu TIVE, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
tion explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the PRESIDENT, OR UPON THE REQUEST
House of Representatives, or any of its respec OF EITHER HOUSE, AS THE RULES OF
tive committees may conduct inquiries in aid of EACH HOUSE SHALL PROVIDE, APPEAR
legislation in accordance with its duly pubHshed BEFORE AND BE HEARD BY SUCH HOUSE
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication ON ANY MATTER PERTAINING TO THEIR
iM> of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic re DEPARTMENTS. WRITTEN QUESTIONS
quirements of due process. Publication is indeed SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESI
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice DENT OF THE SENATE OR THE SPEAKER
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
transgression of a law or rule of which he had AT LEAST THREE DAYS BEFORE THEIR
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive SCHEDULED APPEARANCE. INTERPEL
one. What constitutes publication is set forth in LATIONS SHALL NOT BE LIMITED TO
^) Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that V/RITTEN QUESTIONS, BUT MAY COVER
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following MATTERS RELATED THERETO. WHEN
the completion of their publication either in the THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OR THE
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general cir PUBLIC INTEREST SO REQUIRES AND
culation in the Philippines." The absence of any THE PRESIDENT SO STATES IN WRIT
amendment to the rules published some years ING, THE APPEARANCE SHALL BE CON
ago cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the DUCTED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION.
clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law 1. Executive privilege.
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its A. Senate v. Ermita
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of leg G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
islation only in accordance with duly published
rules of procedure, and does not make any dis DECISION
tinction whether or not these rules have under
gone amendments or revision. The constitutional CARPIO MORALES, Jr.
mandate to pubHsh the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate. Garcillqno v. House of Representatives, On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Commit
G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008. tee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department
However, Section 16(3), Article VI of the for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
Philippine Constitution states: "Each House resource speakers in a public hearing on the
shall determine the rules of its proceedings." railway project of the North Luzon Railways
This provision has been traditionaUy construed Corporation with the China National Machinery
as a grant of full discretionary authority to the and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption Project). The public hearing was sparked by a
and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
exercise of this power is generally exempt from urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
judicialsupervision and interference, excepton a overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
clear showing ofsuch arbitrary and improvident contract covering the North Rail Project.
EJSfel
The Senate Committee on National Defense the NorthRail project] to which various officials
and Security likewise issued invitationsdated of the Executive Department have been invited"
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of in order to "afford said officials ample time and
the AFP: the Commanding General of the Phil opportunity to study and prepare for the various
ippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; issues so that they may better enlighten the Sen
inspectorGeneralofthe AFP Vice AdmiralMateo ate Committee on its investigation."
M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Stafffor Intelligence Senate President Drilon, however, wrote Ex
of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief
ecutive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are
of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent
Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrange
of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) ments as well as notices to all resource persons
Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant were completed [the previous] week."
Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col.
Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as re Senate President Drilon likewise received on
source persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 a letter from the President
September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privi of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose
\M
lege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until
Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of a copy of the report of the UP Law Center dn the
Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the contract agreements relative to the project had
Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege been secured.
Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered On September 28, 2005, the President issued
^)
on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the E.O. 464, "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE
Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS,
Speech of Senator Rodolfo Blazon delivered on ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Dan PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS
ger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Sena OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEG
tor Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal - Resolution ISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLA
Directing the Committee on National Defense TION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND
foivt and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of FOR OTHER PURPOSES," which, pursuant to
Legislation, and in the NationaMnterest, on the Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The
Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed
i&i
by Senator Biazon - Resolution Directing the SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads ofDe
Committee on National Defense and Security to partments Before Congress. — In accordance
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitu
Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines. tion and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers be
Also invited to the above-said hearing sched tween co-equal branches of the government,
uled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief all heads of departments of the Executive
of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by Branch of the government shall secure the
letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for consent of the President prior to appearing
its postponement "due to a pressing operational ' before either House of Congress.
situation that demands [his] utmost personal
When the security of the State or the
attention" while "some of the invited AFP of
public interest so requires and the President
ficers are currently attending to other urgent
so states in writing, the appearance shall
operational matters."
only be conducted in executive session.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Cover
Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive
age of Executive Privilege. —
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[s] dated
^j
September 27, 2005 "respectfully requesting] (a) Nature and Scope. — The rule of con
for the postponement of the hearing [regarding fidentiality based on executive privilege is
L
fundamental to the operation of government officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
and rooted in the separation of powers under Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. Philippine National PoHce (PNP) officers
No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic with rank of chief superintendent or higher
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
and such other officers who in the judgment
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
n&j of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
Employees provides that Public Officials
executive privilege;
and Employees shall not use or divulge con
fidential or classified information officially Senior national security officials who in
im known to them by reason of their office and the judgment of the National Security Advis
not made available to the public to prejudice er arecovered bythe executive privilege; and
the public interest.
Such other officers as may be determined
aWl Executive privilege covers all confiden by the President.
tial or classified information between the
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Pub
President and the public officers covered by
this executive order, including:
lic Officials Before Congress. — All public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) hereof
Conversations and correspondence be shall secure prior consent of the President
tween the President and the public official prior to appearing before either House of
covered by this executive order (Almonte Congress to ensure the observance of the
v. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; principle of separation of powers, adherence
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. to the rule on executive privilege and respect
133250, 9 July 2002); for the rights of public officials appearing in
£&£)
Military, diplomatic and other national inquiries in aid oflegislation. (Emphasisand

security matters which in the interest of underscoring supplied)
national security should not be divulged
(Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 Also on September 28, 2005, Senate Presi
May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commis dent Drilon received from Executive Secretary
sion on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter
9 December 1998). informing him "that officials of the Executive
'iiiit
Department invited to appear at the meeting
Information between inter-government [regarding the NorthRail project] will notbe able
agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties to attend the same without the consent of the
^) and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presi President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said
dential Commission on Good Government, officials have not secured the required consent
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); from the President." On even date which was
L Discussion in close-door Cabinet meet also the scheduled date of the hearing on the
ings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission allegedwiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to
on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee
December 1998); on National Defense and Security, informing
Matters affecting national security and
him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo],
public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Au thru the Secretary of National Defense, no of
thority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). ficer ofthe [AFP] is authorized to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings without
(b) Who are covered. — The following are seeking a writtenapproval from the President"
covered by this executive order: and "that no approval has been granted by the
Senior officials of executive departments President to any AFP officer to appear before
whoin the judgment ofthe department heads the public hearing ofthe Senate Committee on
are covered by the executive privilege; National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
September 2005."
Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, dock This provision is worded exactly as Section
eted as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except
for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before that, in the latter, it vests the power ofinquiry in
this Court chaUenging the constitutionality of the unicameral legislature established therein—
E.O. 464. the Batasang Pambansa — and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno, a case decided in 1950 under that
et al., on the other hand, pray in their consoH-
:f&l
dated memorandum on March 13, 2006 for the
Constitution, the Court already recognized that
the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to
dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
legislate.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be re
solved as follows:
As discussed in Arnault, the power of in
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power
quiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded
of inquiry vested in Congress;
on the necessity of information in the legislative
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of process. If the information possessed by execu
the people to information on matters of pubHc tive officials on the operation of their offices is
concern; and necessary for wise legislation on that subject,
by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right
3. Whether respondents have committed to that information and the power to compel the
grave abuse of discretion when they implemented disclosure thereof.
tali!
E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation. As evidenced by the American experience
during the so-called "McCarthy era," however,
the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
Constitutionality ofE.O. 464 abuse than executive or judicial power. It may
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the ap thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
pearance of executive officials before Congress, the Court's certiorari powers under Section 1,
deprives Congress of the information in the Article VIII of the Constitution.
possession of these officials. To resolve the ques For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue
tion of whether such withholding of information Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might
violates the Constitution, consideration of the not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus
general power of Congress to obtain informa beyond the constitutional power of Congress.
tion, otherwise known-as the power of inquiry, Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
is in order. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress
to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is
The power of inquiry to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly .concerned, or to any person for that matter, the
recognized in Section 21 ofArticle VI of the Con possible needed statute which prompted the
stitution which reads: need for the inquiry. Given such statement in
its invitations, along with the usual indication
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of the subject of inquiry and the questions rela
of Representatives or any of its respective tive to and in furtherance thereof, there would
committees may conduct inquiries in aid be less room for speculation on the part of the
of legislation in accordance with its duly person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid
published rules of procedure. The rights of of legislation.
persons appearing in or affected by such
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring
crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative
supplied)
power of inquiry. The provision requires that the
i*l
inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate that while it is customary to employ the phrase
or House's duly published rules of procedure, "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity speak of executive privileges "since presidential
of an inquiry conducted without duly published refusals to furnish information mav be actuated
rules ofprocedure. Section 21 also mandates that bv anv of at least three distinct kinds of consid
iM?i the rights of persons appearing in or affected by erations, and may be asserted, with differing
such inquiries be respected, an imposition that degrees ofsuccess, in the context ofeither judicial
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees or legislative investigations."
in the Bill of Rights.
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains,
These abuses are, of course, remediable is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by . Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the
m\
the persons affected, even if they belong to the ground that the information is cf such nature
executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be that its disclosure would subvert crucial mili
exceptional circumstances, none appearing to tary or diplomatic objectives. Another variety
obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of
abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might the Government not to disclose the identity of
be established, resulting in palpable violations persons who furnish information of violations of
of tlie rights guaranteed to members of the ex law to officers charged with the enforcement of
£j&j ecutive department under the BiU of Rights. In that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal
such instances, depending on the particulars of deliberations has been said to attach to intra-
each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to governmental documents reflecting advisory
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial opinions, recommendations and deliberations
sanction. comprising part of a process by which govern
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legisla mental decisions and policies are formulated.
tion, there are still recognized exemptions to the Tribe's comment is supported by the ruling
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the in In re Sealed Case, thus:
rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it "Since the beginnings of our nation,
being mentioned in its provisions, its preambu- executive officials have claimed a variety of
lar clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of privileges to resist disclosure of information
executive privilege is crucial for determining the the confidentiality of which thev felt was
constitutionality of E.O. 464. crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibiHties of the executive branch of
Executive privilege
our government. Courts ruled early that the
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new executive had a right to withhold documents
in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to that might reveal military or state secrets.
the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being The courts have also granted the executive a
ofAmerican origin, it is best understood in light right to withhold the identity of government
î of how it has been defined and used in the legal informers in some circumstances and a quaH-
literature of the United States. fied right to withhold information related to
pending investigations, xxx" (Emphasis and
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the
underscoring supplied)
power of the Government to withhold informa
tion from the pubHc, the courts, and the Con The entry in Black's Law Dictionary on "ex
gress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right ecutive privilege" is similarly instructive regard
ofthe President and high-level executive branch ing the scope of the doctrine.
officers to withhold information from Congress,
This privilege, based on the constitution
the courts, and.ultimately the public."
al doctrine of separation of powers, exempts
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a the executive from disclosure requirements
clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed applicable to the ordinary citizen or organi
claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments zation where such exemption is necessary to
the discharge of highly important executive issue. However, the U.S. Court of Appeal
responsibilities involved in maintaining for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a cas
governmental operations, and extends not decided earlier in the same year as Nixor
only to military and diplomatic secrets but recognized the President's privilege over hi
also to documents integral to an appropriate conversations against a congressional sut
exercise of the executive' domestic decisional poena. Anticipating the balancing approac
and policy making functions, that is, those adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixor
documents reflecting the frank expression the Court of Appeals weighed the publi
necessary in intra-governmental advisory interest protected by the claim of privileg
and deHberative communications. (Emphasis against the interest that would be serve-
and underscoring supplied) by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling tha
the balance favored the President, the Cour
^J
That a type of information is recognized as
privileged does not, however, necessarily mean
declined to enforce the subpoena.
that it would be considered privileged in all in In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executiv
stances. For in determining the vaHdity of a claim privilege was recognized by this Court in Almont
of privilege, the question that must be asked is v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in referenc-
not only whether the requested information falls to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quotei
within one of the traditional privileges, but also the following portion of the Nixon decision whicl
whether that privilege should be honored in a explains the basis for the privilege:
given procedural setting.
'The expectation of a President to tht
The leading case on executive privilege in the confidentiality of his conversations and cor
United States is U.S. v. Nixon, decided in 1974. respondences, like the claim of confidential
In issue in that case was the validity of President ity of judicial deliberations, for example, ha:
Nixon's claim of executive privilege against a all the values to which v/e accord deferenci
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the for the privacy of all citizens and, added t<
production of certain tapes and documents relat those values, is the necessity for protection o
ing to the Watergate investigations. The claim the public interest in candid, objective, an(
of privilege was based on the President's general even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidentia
interest in the confidentiality of his conversations decision-making. A President and those wh(
and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that assist him must be free to explore alterna
while there is no expHcit reference to a privilege tives in the process of shaping policies anc
of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is making decisions and to do so in a way manj
constitutionally based to the extent that it relates would be unwilling to express except private
to the effective discharge of a President's powers. ly. These are the considerations justifying i
The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President's presumptive privilege for Presidential com
claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must munications. The privilege is fundamental tc
be balanced against the public interest in the fair the operation of government and inextricablj
administration of criminal justice. Notably, the rooted in the separation of powers under the
Court was careful to clarify that it was not there Constitution xxx" (Emphasis and underscor
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a ing supplied)
civil litigation or against congressional demands
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum
for information.
issued by the Ombudsman against the therein
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly
of executive privilege against Congress stated in the decision, the right of the people tc
are rare. Despite frequent assertion of the information. Nonetheless, the Court recognized
privilege to deny information to Congress, that there are certain types of information which
beginning with President Washington's re the government may withhold from the public,
fusal to turn over treaty negotiation records thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name,
to the House of Representatives, the U.S. that executive privilege may be claimed against
Supreme Court has never adjudicated the citizens' demands for information.
faa
In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself
this jurisdiction recognizes the common law has, through the challenged order, made the
holding that there is a "governmental privilege determination that they are. Further, unlike
against public disclosure with respect to state also Section 3, the coverage of department heads
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other under Section 1 is not made to depend on the
national security matters." The same case held department heads' possession of any information
that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a which might be covered by executive privilege. In
recognized limitation on the right to information. fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-a-vis Sec
tion 2, there is no reference to executive privilege
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Au
at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
thority, the Court ruled that the right to infor
Section 1 as grounded on Article VI, Section 22
mation does not extend to matters recognized as
of the Constitution on what has been referred to
"privileged information under the separation of
&J4fr as the question hour.
powers," by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions SECTION 22. The heads of departments
in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held may upon their own initiative, with the con
E&iA that information on military and diplomatic sent of the President, or upon the request
secrets and those affecting national security, of either House, as the rules of each House
and information on investigations of crimes by shall provide, appear before and be heard
law enforcement agencies before the prosecution by such House on any matter pertaining to
of the accused were exempted from the right to their departments. Written questions shall
information. be submitted to the President of the Senate or
From the above discussion on the meaning the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and scope of executive privilege, both in the at least three days before their scheduled
United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear appearance. Interpellations shall not be
principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether limited to written questions, but may cover
asserted against Congress, the courts, or the pub matters related thereto. When the security
lic, is recognized only in relation to certain types of the State or the public interest so requires
of information of a sensitive character. While
and the President so states in writing, the
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context Determining the validity of Section 1 thus
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any rec requires an examination of the meaning of Sec
ognition that executive officials are exempt from tion 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact for the question hour must be interpreted vis-a
of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordi vis Section 21 which provides for the power of
nary character of the exemptions indicates that either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries
the presumption inclines heavily against execu in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of
tive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. the deliberations of the Constitutional Commis
sion shows, the framers were aware.that these
Validity of Section 1 two provisions involved distinct functions of
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both Congress.
require the officials covered by them to secure MR. MAAMBONG. xxx When we
the consent of the President prior to appearing amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the
before Congress. There are significant differences Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that
between the two provisions, however, which con members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled
ivMjfr strain this Court to discuss the validity of these anymore to appear before the House of Rep
provisions separately. resentatives or before the Senate. I have a
Section 1 specifically applies to department particular problem in this regard, Madam
tiî
heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a President, because in our experience in
prior determination by any official whether they the Regular Batasang Pambansa - as the
iiliij
[%&
Gentleman himself has experienced in the MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his

interim Batasang Pambansa — one of the capacity as Chairman of the Committee on
most competent inputs that we can put in Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to
our committee dehberations, either in aid of the Article on Legislative and may I request
legislationor in congressional investigations, the chairperson of the Legislative Depart
is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We ment, Commissioner Davide, to give his
usually invite them, but if they do not come reaction.
and it is a congressional investigation, we THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
usuaUy issue subpoenas. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
I want to be clarified on a statement MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding
madeby Commissioner Suarez when he said Officer.I have only one reaction to the Ques
that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may tion Hour. I propose that instead of putting
refuse to come to the House of Representa? it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative
tives or the Senate [when requested under Inquiries.
Section22] doesnot mean that they need not
come when they are invited or subpoenaed THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does
by the committee of either House when it the committee say?
comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner
congressional investigation. According to Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Commissioner Suarez, that is aUowed and
their presence can be had under Section 21. MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we consid
Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam ered that previously when we sequenced this
but we reasoned that in Section 21, which
President?
is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam of Congress in terms ofits own lawmaking;
iii
President, because Section 20 refers only whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a
to what was originally the Question Hour, power in terms of its own lawmaking power
whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of
toinquiriesin aid oflegislation, under which legislation. And so we put Question Hour as
anybody for that matter, may be summoned Section 31.1 hope Commissioner Davide will
and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt consider this.
of the House. (Emphasis and underscoring
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is
supplied) closely related with the legislative power,
A distinction was thus made between inqui and it is precisely as a complement to or a
ries in aid of legislation and the question hour. supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
While attendance was meant to be discretion appearanceofthe membersofCabinet would
ary in the question hour, it was compulsory in be very,very essential not onlyin the applica
inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to tion of check and balance but also, in effect,
Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one in aid of legislation.
iS/fifi
ofthe proponents ofthe amendmentto makethe MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with
appearance ofdepartmentheadsdiscretionary in the committee, we find merit in the sugges
the question hour. tion of Commissioner Davide. In other words,
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to we are accepting that and so this Section 31
the members of the Commission that the Com would now become Section 22. Would it be,
mittee on Style, precisely in recognition of this Commissioner Davide?
distinction, later moved the provision on question MR. DAVIDE. Yes. (Emphasis and un
hour from its original position as Section 20 in derscoring supplied)
the original draft down to Section 31, far from
•i^ the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. Consistent with their statements earlier in
This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and
the deliberations: Maambong proceeded fromthe same assumption
that these provisions pertained to two different during the question hour in the present Consti
functions ofthe legislature. Both Commissioners tution so as toconform more fuUy toa system of
understood that the power to conduct inquiries separation ofpowers. To thatextent, thequestion
in aid of legislation is different from the power hour, as it is presently understood in this juris
to conduct inquiries during the question hour. diction, departs from the question period ofthe
» CommissionerDavide's onlyconcernwas that the parliamentary system. That department heads
two provisions onthese distinctpowers beplaced maynotberequiredto appearin a question hour
closely together, they being complementary to does not, however, mean that the legislature is °
each other. Neither Commissioner considered rendered powerless to elicit information from
them as identical functions of Congress. them inall circumstances. Inf^ct, inlight of the
The foregoing opinion was not the two absence ofa mandatory question period, the need
Commissioners' alone. From the above-quoted to enforce Congress' right to executive informa
exchange, Commissioner Maambong's committee tionin the performance ofits legislative function
- the Committee on Style - shared the view that becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:
the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Indeed, if the separation of powers has
Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other- anything to tell us on the subjectunder dis
hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman cussion, it is that the Congress has the right
ofthe Committee onthe Legislative Department. to obtaininformationfromany source—even
ll%jiJ
Hisviews maythus bepresumed as representing from officials ofdepartments and agencies in
that of his Committee. the executive branch. In the UnitedJStates
In the context of a parliamentary system of there is, unlike the situation which prevails
government, the "question hour" has a definite in a parliamentary system such as that
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated in Britain, a clear separation between the
by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and legislative and executive branches. It is this
the other ministers accountable for their acts very separation that makes the congressional
andthe operation ofthe government, correspond right to obtain information from the execu
ing to what is known in Britain as the question tive so essential, if the functions of the Con
period. There was a specific provision fora ques gress as the elected representatives of the
tion hour in the 1973 Constitution which made people are adequately to be carried out. The
the appearance of ministers mandatory. The absence ofclose rapport betweenthe legisla
same perfectly conformedto the parliamentary tive and executive branchesin this country,
system estabHshed by that Constitution, where comparable to those which exist under a
the ministers are alsomembers ofthe legislature parliamentary system, and the nonexistence
and are directly accountable to it. in the Congress of an institution such as the
British question period have perforce made
An essential feature of the parliamentary reliance by the Congress upon its right to
system of government is the immediate account obtain information from the executive essen
ability of the Prims Minister and the Cabinet to tial, if it is intelligently to perform its legis
the National Assembly. They shallberesponsible lative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses
tothe National Assembly forthe program ofgov the right to obtain executive information, its
ernment and shall determine the guidelines of powerofoversight ofadministration in a sys
nationalpolicy. Unlikein the presidential system tem such as ours becomes a power devoid of
where the tenure of office of all elected officials most ofits practical content, since it depends
cannotbe terminated before their term expired, for its effectiveness solely upon information
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in parceled out ex gratia by the executive. (Em
office onlyas longas they enjoythe confidence of phasis and underscoring suppHed)
the National Assembly. The moment this confi
dence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Sections 2i and 22, therefore, while closely
may be changed. related and complementary to each other, should
fojffi)
not be considered as pertaining to the same
The framers of the 1987 Constitution re power of Congress. One specificaUyrelates to the
moved the mandatorynature ofsuchappearance power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
iî
the aim of which is to elicit information that may in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
be used for legislation, while the other pertains to is exempt on the basis not only of separation of
the poWer to conduct a question hour, the objec powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
tive of which is to obtain information in pursuit constitutional independence of the judiciary.
of Congress' oversight function. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it dur
When Congress merely seeks to be informed
ing the oral argument upon interpellation of the
on how department heads are implementing the
Chief Justice.
statutes which it has issued, its right to such
iisii) information is not as imperative as that of the Having established the proper interpreta
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such tion of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution,
department heads must give a report oftheir per the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitu
iiii
formance as a matter of duty. In such instances, tionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of Section 1, in view of its specific reference to
powers, states that Congress may only request Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and
their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid
in which Congress requires their appearance of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the. application to appearances of department heads
appearance is mandatory for the same, reasons in the question hour contemplated in the provi
stated in Arnault. sion of said Section 22 ofArticle VI. The reading
In fine, the oversight function of Congress is dictated by the basic rule of construction that
may be facilitated by compulsory process only issuances must be interpreted, as much as pos
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of sible, in a way that will render it constitutional.
legislation. This is consistent with the intent The requirement then to* secure presidential
discerned from the deliberations of the Consti consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
î
tutional Commission. appearances in the question hour, is valid on-its
Ultimately, the power of Congress to com face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Con
pel the appearance of executive officials under stitution, the appearance of department heads in
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 the question hour is discretionary on their part.
find their basis in the principle of separation of Section 1 cannot, however, be appHed to ap
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal pearances of department heads in inquiries in
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to instances to respect the refusal of the depart
comply with its demands for information. ment head to appear in such inquiry: unless a
When Congress exercises its power of in valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
quiry, the only way for department heads to either by the President herself or by the Execu
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim tive Secretary.
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere Validity of Sections 2 and 3
m) fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires aH the public
power—the President on whom executive power officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress consent of the President prior to appearing before
except through the power of impeachment. It either house of Congress. The enumeration is
is based on her being the highest official of the broad. It covers all senior officials of executive
executive branch, and the due respect accorded departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
to a co-equal branch of government which is and aU senior national security officials who, in
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e., department heads, Chief
By the same token, members ofthe Supreme of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the
\$$h
Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. National Security Adviser), are "covered by the
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested executive privilege."
fei
The enumeration also includes such other authorized by the President, has determined that
officers as may be determined by the President. the requested information is privileged, arid that
Given the title of Section 2 — "Nature, Scope the President has not reversed such determina
and Coverage of Executive Privilege" — it is tion. Such declaration, however, even without
evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, mentioning the term "executive privilege,"
the determination by the President under this amounts to an implied claim that the informa
provision is intended to be based on a similar tion is being withheld by the executive branch,
finding of coverage under executive privilege. by authority of the President, on the basis of
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b)
executive privilege. Verily, there is an impHed
claim of privilege.
of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privi
lege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of The letter dated September 28, 2005 of re
the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed spondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific President Drilon illustrates the impHed nature
categories of information and not to categories of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464.
of persons. It reads:
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 In connection with the inquiry to be
which deals with the nature, scope and coverage conducted by the Committee of the Whole
of executive privilege, the reference to persons regarding the NorthRail Project of the North
being "covered by the executive privilege" may Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 Septem
be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the ber 2005 at 10:00 a.m.. please be informed
person is in possession of information which is, that officials of the Executive Department in
in the judgment of the head of office concerned, vited to appear at the meeting will not be able
fefty)
privileged as defined in Section. 2(a). The Court to attend the same without the consent of the
shall thus proceed on the assumption that this President, pursuant to Executive Order No.
is the intention of the challenged order. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance
Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers,
Upon a determination by the designated
Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privi
head of office or by the President that an official
lege And Respect For The Rights Of Public
is "covered by the executive privilege," such of
Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries
ficial is subjected to the requirement that he In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitu
first secure the consent of the President prior to tion, And For Other Purposes." Said officials
appearing before Congress. This requirement have not secured the required consent from
effectively bars the appearance of the official the President. (Underscoring supplied)
concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowing the President to The letter does not explicitly invoke execu
give its consent means nothing more than that tive privilege or that the matter on which these
the President may reverse a prohibition which officials are being requested to be resource per
already exists by virtue of E.O. 464. sons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
consent is the determination by a head of office, from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, attend the hearing.
or by the President herself, that such official is
^
in possession of information that is covered by Significant premises in this letter, however,
executive privilege. This determination then are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter
becomes the basis for the official's not showing assumes that the invited officials are covered by
up in the legislative investigation. E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a determination
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes has been made, by the designated head of office
E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such or the President, that the invited official pos
invocation must be construed as a declaration to sesses information that is covered by executive
Congress that the President, or. a head of office privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the
letter that such determination has been made, examining the ground invoked therefor and
the same must be deemed impHed. Respecting the particular circumstances surrounding
&tiflt the statement that the invited officials have it, there is, in an impHed claim of privilege,
not secured the consent of the President, it only a defect that renders it invaHd per se. By its
means that the President has not reversed the very nature, and as demonstrated by the let
standing prohibition against their appearance ter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted
before Congress. above, the implied claim authorized by Sec
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita's tion 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any
letter leads to the conclusion that the executive
' specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g.,
^J
whether the information demanded involves
branch, either through the President or the heads
of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
determination that the information required by Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a)
the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of enumerates the types of information-that
writing, there has been no contrary pronounce are covered by the privilege under the chal
ment from the President. In fine, an implied lenged order, Congress is left to speculate
claim ofprivilege has been made by the executive. as to which among them is being referred
to by the executive. The enumeration is not
While there is no PhiHppine case that di eVen intended to be comprehensive, but a
rectly addresses the issue of whether executive mere statement of what is included in the
iffifcl privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is phrase "confidential or classified information
gathered from Chavezv. PEA that certain infor between the President and the publicofficers
mation in the possession of the executive may covered by this executive order."
vaHdly be claimed as privileged even against
Jili£)
Congress. Thus, the case holds: Certainly, Congress has the right to know
why the executive considers the requested infor
There is no claim by PEA that the in mation privileged. It does"not suffice to merely
formation demanded by petitioner is privi declare that the President, or an authorized head
leged information rooted in the. separation of office, has determined that it is so, and that
of powers. The information does not cover the President has not overturned that determi
Presidential conversations, correspondences,
nation. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
jp> or discussions during closed-door Cabinet dark on how the requested information could
meetings which, like internal-deliberations
be classified as privileged. That the message is
of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
couched in terms that, on first impression, do
courts, of executive sessions of either house
fc&) not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it
of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
This kind ofinformation cannot be pried open
doubly blind to the question of why the executive
bv a co-equal branch of government. A frank
branch is not providing it with the information
j^jrf) exchange of exploratory ideas and assess
that it has requested.
ments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemp
protect the independence of decision-making tion from an obHgation to disclose information,
of those tasked to exercise Presidential, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v.
Legislative and Judicial power. This is not Reynolds teaches:
the situation in the instant case.
The privilege belongs to the government
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be
and must be asserted by it; it can neither
dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact be claimed nor waived by a private party.
that it sanctions claims of executive privilege.
It is not to be lightly invoked. There must
^| This Court must look further and assess the
be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the
claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
head of the department which has control
determine whether it is valid.
over the matter, after actual personal con
While the validity of claims of privilege sideration by that officer. The court itself
must be assessed on a case to case basis, must determine whether the circumstances
:mi
m
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT • 241e

iisaJ
are appropriate for the claim of privilege, vide 'precise andcertain' reasons for preserving
and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the confidentiahty ofrequested information."
the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect. (Underscoring supplied) Black v. Sheraton Corp. ofAmerica ampli
fies, thus:
Absent then a statement ofthe specific basis
ofa claim ofexecutive privilege, thereis no way A formal anjd proper claim ofexecutive
of determining whether it falls under one of the privilege requires a specific designation and
traditional privileges, or whether, given the description ofthe documents within its scope
circumstances in which it is made, it should be as well as precise and certain reasons for
respected. These, in substance, were the same preserving their confidentiality. Without this
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege as specificity, it is impossible for a court fri ana
serted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. lyze the claim short of disclosure of the very
Vasquez and, more in point, against a commit thing sought to be protected Asthe affidavit
tee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on . now stands, the Court has Httle more than its
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon. sua sponte speculation with which to weigh
the applicability ofthe claim. An improperly
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is asserted claim of privilege is no claim of
enlightening: privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
claim was made by the proper executive as
[T]he lack of specificity renders an Reynolds requires, the Court cannot recog
assessment of the potential harm result nize the claim in the instant case because it is
ing from disclosure impossible, thereby legally insufficient to allow the Court to make
preventing the Court from balancing such a just and reasonable determination as to its
harm against plaintiffs' needs to determine applicability.Torecognize such a broadclaim
whether to override any claims of privilege. in whichthe Defendant has givennoprecise
(Underscoring supplied) or compelling reasons to shield these docu
jiil)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug: ments from outside scrutiny, would make a
farce ofthe wholeprocedure. (Emphasis and
On the present state of the record, this underscoring supplied)
Court is not called upon to perform this bal Due respect for a co-equal branch ofgovern
ancing operation. In stating its objection to ment, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
claimant's interrogatories, government as privilege clearlystating the groundstherefor. Ap
serts, and nothing more, that the disclosures ropos is the foUowing ruling in McPhaul v. U.S.:
ityi
sought by claimant would inhibit the free
expression of opinion that non-disclosure is We think the Court's decision in United
designed to protect. The government has not States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724,
^) shown —nor even alleged —that those who is highly relevant to these questions. For it
evaluated claimant's product were involved is as true here as it was there, that 'if (pe
in internal policymaking, generally, or in titioner) had legitimate reasons for failing
aa
this particular instance. Privilege cannot be to produce the records of the association,.^
set up bv an unsupported claim. The facts decent respect for the House of Representa
upon which the privilege is based must be tives, bv whose authority the subpoenas
established. To find these interrogatories issued, would have required that (he) state
objectionably this Court would have to as. (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the
sume that the evaluation and classification of return of the writ. Such a statement would
claimant's products was a matter of internal havegiven the Subcommittee an opportunity
to policy formulation, an assumption in which to avoidthe blocking ofits inquiry by taking
this Court is unwilling to indulge suasponte. other appropriate steps to obtain the records.
(Emphasis and underscoring suppHed) 'To deny the Committee the opportunity to
consider the objection or remedy is in itself a
tfekl Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy contempt of its authority and an obstruction
similarly emphasizes that "anagency must pro- ofits processes. His failure to make any such
ifel
•$0
statement was "a patent evasion of the duty in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive
of one summoned to produce papers before privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on
a congressional committee[, and] cannot be the other branches of government. It may thus
condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring sup be construed as a mere expression of opinion by
plied; citations omitted) the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Upon the other hand, Congress must not
require the executive to state the reasons for Petitioners, however, assert as another
the claim with such particularity as to compel ground for invalidating the challenged order the
disclosure of the information which the privilege alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the
is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determin heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate
ing the requisite degree ofparticularity wouldbe of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, the United States where, so it claims, only the
Hoffman v. U.S. declares: President can assert executive privilege to with
"The witness is not exonerated from hold information from Congress.
answering merely because he declares that Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually
in so doing he would incriminate himself provides that, once the head of office determines
— his say-so does not of itself establish the that ascertain information is privileged, such de
hazard of incrimination. It is for the court termination is presumed to bear the President's
to say whether his silence is justified, and to authority and has the effect of prohibiting the
require him to answer if 'it clearly appears official from appearing before Congress, subject
to the court that he is mistaken.' However, if only to the express pronouncement of the Presi
the witness, upon interposing his claim, were dent that it is allowing the appearance of such
foftffl required to prove the hazard in the sense official. These provisions thus allow the President
in which a claim is usually required to be to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
established in court, he would be compelled
to surrender the very protection which the Such presumptive authorization, however, is
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain contrary to the exceptional nature of the privi
the privilege, it need only be evident from the lege. Executive privilege, as already discussed,
implications of the question, in the setting in is recognized with respect to information the
iW which it is asked, that a responsive answer confidential nature of which is crucial to the
to the question or an explanation of whv it fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities
cannot be answered might be dangerous of the executive branch, or in those instances
because injurious disclosure could result." where exemption from disclosure is necessary to
<j&l
xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) the discharge of highly important executive re
sponsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. is thus premised on the fact that certain infor
I»
464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per mation must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
of providing precise and certain reasons for the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with the obligation to disclose information, in this
an announcement that the President has not case to Congress, the necessity must be of such
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for high degree as to outweigh the public interest
Congress to determine whether the withholding in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
^ of information is justified under the circum
stances of each case. It severely frustrates the In light of this highly exceptional nature of
power of inquiry of Congress. the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit
to the President the power to invoke the privi
ty^j In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 lege. She may of course authorize the Executive
uiust be invalidated.
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf,
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to in which case the Executive Secretary must state
Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, that the authority is "By order of the President,"
binding only on the heads of office mentioned which means that he personally consulted with
iiiiiii
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, claiming, however, that what is involved in the
it must be wielded only by the highest official present controversy is not merely the legislative
|ffl
in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the power of inquiry, but the right of the people to
President may not authorize her subordinates to information.
exercise such power. There is even less reason
to uphold such authorization in the instant case There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions
where the authorization is not explicit but by between the right of Cjpngress to information
mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section
which underlies the power of inquiry and the
2(b), is further invalid on this score.
right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen
It follows, therefore, that when an official is for the production of documents pursuant to
being summoned by Congress on a matter which, his right to information does not have the same
in his own judgment, might be covered by execu obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued
tive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable by Congress. Neither does the right to informa
time to. inform the President or the Executive tion grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the from government officials. These powers belong
privilege. This is necessary in order to provide only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
the President or the Executive Secretary with Thus, while Congress is composed of rep
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter resentatives elected by the people, it does not
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people
the President nor the. Executive Secretary in are exercising-their right to information.
vokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound
to respect the failure of the official to appear To the extent that investigations in aid of
legislation are generally conducted in public,
before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
however, any executive issuance tending to
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
unduly limit disclosures of information in such
The Court notes that one of the expressed investigations necessarily deprives the people
purposes for requiring officials to secure the of information which, being presumed to be in
consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of
464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public public concern. The citizens are thereby denied
;%0
officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legisla access to information which they can use in
tion." That such rights must indeed be respected formulating their own opinions on the matter
by Congress is an echo from Article VI, Section before Congress — opinions which they can then
'hfl
21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he communicate to their representatives and other
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such government officials through the various legal
inquiries shall be respected." means allowed by their freedom of expression.
Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
In light of the above discussion of Section 3,
it is clear that it is essentially an authorization It is in the interest of the State that the
for implied claims of executive privilege, for channels for free political discussion be main
which reason it must be invalidated. That such tained to the end that the government may
authorization is partly motivated by the need to perceive and be responsive to the people's
ensure respect for such officials does not change will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effec
tive only to the extent that the citizenry is
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
informed and thus able to formulate its will
Right to Information intelligently. Only when the participants in
the discussion are aware of the issues and •
E.O. 464 is concerned only with the demands
have access to information relating thereto
of Congress for the appearance of executive of
can such bear fruit. (Emphasis and under
ficials in the hearings conducted by it, and not
scoring supplied)
with the demands of citizens for information
pursuant to their right to information on matters The impairment of the right of the people
of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
'ij0
Si
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as clearly asserting a right to do so and/or profferir
direct as its violation of the legislature's power its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient«
of inquiry. invoking said provisions, the power of Congre*
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is fru
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its trated. That is impermissible. For —
publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officialsof the [w]hat republican theory did accon
executive branch, it does not follow that the same plish...was to reverse the old presumptic
is exempt from the need for publication. On the in favor of secrecy, based on the divine rigl
need for publishing even those statutes that do of kings, and nobles, and replace it with
not directly apply to people in general, Tanada presumption in favor of publicity, based c
the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Unde
v. Tuvera states:
scoring supplied)
tai
The term "laws" should refer to all laws
-Resort to any means then by which officia
and not only to those of general application, of the executive branch could refuse to divulge h
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the formation cannot be presumed vaHd. Otherwis
people in general albeit there are some that we shall not have merely nullified the power <
do not apply to them directly. An example is our legislature to inquire into the operations «
a law granting citizenship to a particular in
government, but we shaU have given up som«
dividual, like a relative of President Marcos
thing of much greater value - our right as
. who was decreed instant naturalization. It
people, to take part in government.
surely cannot be saidi;hat such a law does
not affect the public although it unquestion WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTL
^foij ably does not apply directly to aUthe people. GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Jlxecuti\
The subject of such law is a matter of public Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "ENSURIN
interest which any member of the body poHtic OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE O
may question in the political forums or. if he SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENC
is a proper partv. even in courts of justice. TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEG
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLI
OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIV
Although the above statement was made in INQUIRIES IN Alt) OF LEGISLATION W
reference to statutes, logic dictates that the chal DERTHE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHE
lenged order must be covered by the publication PURPOSES," are declared VOID. Sections 1 an
requirement. Asexplained above, E.O. 464has a 2(a) are, however, VALID.
^J
direct effect on the right of the people to informa
tion on matters of public concern. It is, therefore,
B. Neri v. Senate Committee
a matter of public interest which members of
the body poHtic may question before this Court. G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Dueprocessthus requires that the people should
have been apprised ofthis issuance before it was
implemented. Assailed in this motion for reconsider*
Conclusion tion is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (th
"Decision"), granting the petition for certiora:
Congress undoubtedly has a right to infor filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against th
mation from the executive branch whenever it respondent Senate CommitteesonAccountabiHt
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive of Public Officers and Investigations,Trade an
branch withholds such information on the ground Commerce, and National Defense and Securit
L that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state
the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
(collectively the "respondent Committees").
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however,
allow the executive branch to evade congres On September 26,2007, petitioner appeare
sional requests for information without need of before respondent Committees and testified fc
about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning by executive privilege. He also manifested his
the National Broadband Project (the "NBNProj willingness toappear andtestify should there be
fe> ect"), a project awarded by the Department of new matters to be taken up. Hejust requested
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") that he befurnished "inadvance as towhatelse"
to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment he "needs to clarify."
fciHit
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Com
mission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 MiUion in On the same date, petitioner moved for the
exchange for his approval ofthe NBN Project. reconsideration of the above Order. He insisted
He further narrated that he informedPresident that hehadnotshown "any contemptible conduct
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of worthy ofcontempt and arrest." Heemphasized
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him his willingness to testify on new matters, but
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed respondent Committees did not respond to his
further onPresidentArroyo and petitioner's dis request foi*advance notice of questions. He also
cussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner mentioned the petition for certiorari he previ
refused toanswer, invoking "executive privilege." ously filed withthis CourtonDecember 7,2007.
l&&i
To bespecific, petitioner refused toanswer ques According tohim, thisshould restrain respondent
tions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo Committees from enforcing the orderdatedJanu
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not ary30, 2008 which declared him incontempt and
she directedhim to prioritizeit, and (c) whether directed Ijis arrest and detention.
or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in know
ingpetitioner's answers to thesethreequestions Thecore issuesthat arisefrom the foregoing
byrequiring himtoappearand testify once more respective contentions of the opposing parties
on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, are as follows:
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote
to respondent Committees and requested them (1) whetheror not there is a recognized pre
to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the sumptive presidential communications privilege
in our legal system;
ground of executive privilege....
The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita (2) whether or not there is factual or legal
pertinently stated [in part]: basis tohold that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by executive
lî Considering that Sec. Neri has been privilege;
lengthily interrogated on the subject in an (3) whether or not respondent Committees
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he have shown that the communications elicited by
has answered all questions propounded to the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise
iaj
him except the foregoing questions involving of their functions; and
executiveprivilege,wetherefore request that
his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the (4) whether or not respondent Committees
ZTE/NBN project be dispensed with. committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the contempt order.
OnNovember 20,2007, petitioner did notap
pear before respondentCommittees uponorders We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
ofthePresident invoking executive privilege. On
November 22,2007, the respondent Committees
issued the show-cause letter requiring him to There Is a Recognized Presumptive
explain whyhe should not becitedin contempt. Presidential Communications Privilege
On November 29, 2007, in petitioner's reply to
respondent Committees, he manifested that it Respondent Committees ardently argue
was not his intention to ignore the Senate hear that the Court's declaration that presidential
w> •
ing and that he thought the only remaining communications are presumptively privileged
questions were those he claimed to be covered reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate
246 • CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
ttpi
v. Ermita that "inclinesheavily against executive the United States and in this jurisprudence,
secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent a clear principle emerges. Executive privi
Committees then claim that the Court erred in lege, whether asserted against Congress,
relying on the doctrine in Nixon. the courts, or the pubHc, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information
Respondent Committees argue as if this of a sensitive character. While executive
Ifeaft
were the first time the presumption in favor of privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
the presidential communications privilege is thereofmaybe validor not depending onthe
mentioned and adoptedin our legalsystem.That groundinvoked to justify it and the context
iiiiii is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier in which it is made. Noticeably absent is
case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the any recognition that executive officials are
presidential communications privilege is fun exemptfrom the duty to disclose information
damental to the operation of government and hv the mere fact of being executive officials.
j-feaj
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers Indeed,-the extraordinary character of th€
under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, exemptions indicates that the presumption
the caserelied upon by respondent Committees, inclines heavily against executive secrecy
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumer and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and
ated the cases in which the claim of executive underscoring supplied)
privilege was recognized, among them Almonte
v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission Obviously, the last sentence of the above-
on Good Gdvernment (PCGG), and Chavez v. quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers tc
PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that the "exemption" being claimed by the executive
"there are certain types of information which officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No
thegovernment may withhold from the public," 464, solely byvirtueoftheir positions in the Ex
that there is a "governmental privilege against ecutive Branch. This means that when an execu
public disclosure with respect to state secrets tive official, who is one of those mentioned in tht
regarding, military, diplomatic and other national said Sec. 2(b) ofE.O. No.464, claims to be exempi
PAJ
security matters"; andthat "therighttoinforma from disclosure, there can be no presumption o:
tion does not extend to matters recognized as authorization to invoke executive privilege giver
'privileged information' under the separation of by the President to said executive official, sucr
powers, by which the Court meant Presidential that the presumption in this situation incline*
conversations, correspondences, and discussions heavily against executive secrecy and in favoi
in closed-door Cabinet meetings." of disclosure.
£tij
Respondent Committees' observation that
this Court's Decision reversed the "presumption The constitutional infirmity found in the
that inclines heavily against executive secrecy blanket authorization to invoke executive privi
L and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piece
meal interpretation of the said Decision. The
lege granted by the President to executive offi
cialsin Sec. 2(b) ofE.O. No. 464does not obtaii
Court has repeatedly heldthat in ordertoarrive
in this case.
at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
specific portion thereof should be isolated and In this case, it was the President hersetf
resorted to, but the decision must be considered through Executive Secretary Ermita, who in
in its entirety. • voked executive privilege on a specific matte:
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made
involving an executive agreement between thi
Philippines and China, which wasthe subject o
in the context of the circumstances obtaining in
Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections
the three(3) questions propounded to petitione:
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees
2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, investigation. Thus, the factual setting of thi
Seriesof2005. The pertinent portionofthe deci
case markedly differs from that passed upon ii
sion in the said case reads:
Senate v. Ermita.
From the above discussion on the mean
ingandscope ofexecutive privilege, both in
L
aj
II tion to temper the official acts o£each of these

ThereAre Factual and Legal Bases to three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the certain legislative acts require action from the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered byExecutive President for their vaHdity does not render such
Privilege acts less legislative in nature. A good exampleis
the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of
Respondent Committees claim that the com the Constitution mandates thatevery biU passed
munications elicited by the three (3) questions by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
are not covered by executive privilege because presented to the President who shaU approve
the elements o£the presidential communications or veto the same. The fact that the approval or
privilege are not present. vetoing of $he bill is lodged with the President
does not render the power to pass law executive
A. The power to enter into an executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law
^J
agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable is generally/a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power." power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the
First, respondent Committees contend that executive power to enter or not to enter into a
the power to secure a foreign loan does not contract to secure foreign loans does not become
relate to a "quintessential and rion-delegable less executive in nature because of conditions laid
presidential power," because the Constitution down in the Constitution. The final decision in
iiiiil does not vest it in the President alone, but also the exercise of the said executive power is stiU
in the Monetary Board which is required to give lodged in the Office of the President.
its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity"
This argument is unpersuasive. was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communicationsprivilege but, in any
The fact that a power is subject to the con
case, it is not conclusive.
currence of another entity does not make such
iJafri
power less executive. "Quintessential" is defined Second, respondent Committees also seek
as the most perfect embodiment of something, reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine
the concentrated essence of substance. On the of operational proximity' for the reason that 'It
jfrfli other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the
or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even presidential communications privilege to commu
if delegated, the responsibility remains with the nications between those who are 'operationally
obligor. The power to enter into an executive proximate' to the President but who may have
agreement is in essence an executive power. This "no direct communications with her."
authority.of the President to enter into execu
It must be stressed that the doctrine of
tive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionaUy been recognized in "operational proximity" was laid down in In re:
Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the Sealed Case precisely to Hmit the scope of the
President has to secure the prior concurrence presidential communications privilege. The U.S.
of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to court was aware of the dangers that a limitless
Congress a complete report of its decision before extension of the privilege risks and, therefore,
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining
not diminish the executive nature of the power. it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the
agencies, and then only to White House staffthat
The inviolate doctrine of separation of pow has "operational proximity" to direct presidential
ers among the legislative, executive and judicial decision-making, thus:
branches of government by no means prescribes
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each We are aware that such an extension,
branch ofthat part ofthe governmental power as unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish
signed to it by the sovereign people. There is the the purposes of the privilege, could pose a
corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which significant risk of expanding to a large swath
has been carefully calibrated by the Constitu of the executive branch a privilege that is
bottomed on a recognition of the unique role C. ThePresident'sclaim of executiveprivilege

of the President. In order to limit this risk, is not merelybased on a generalized interest;and
the presidential communications privilege in balancing respondent Committees' and the
should be construed as narrowly as is con President's clashing interests, the Court did hot
sistent with ensuring that the confidentiaHty disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
of the President's decision-making process government transparency, accountability and
is adequately protected. Not every person disclosure of information. •
who plays a role in the.development of Third, respondent Committees claim that
presidential advice, no matter how remote the Court erred in upholding the President's
ii£j and removed from the President, can qualify, invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of
for the privilege. In particular, the privilege executive privilege because (a) between respon
should not extend to staff outside the White dent Committees' specificand demonstrated need
iiffit House in executive branch agencies. Instead, and the President's generalized interest in con
the privilegeshould apply only to communi fidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance
cations authored or solicited and received by in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of
those members of an immediate White House interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of
pJ
advisor's staffwho have broad and significant the 1987 PhiHppine Constitution on government
responsibiHtyfor investigation and formulat transparency, accountability and disclosure of
ing the advice to be given the President on information, specificaUy, Article III, Section 7;
Mi the particular matter to whichthe communi Article II, Section 28; Article XI, Section 1; Ar
cations relate. Only communications at that ticle XVI,Section 10; Article VII, Section 20' and
level are close enough to the President to be Article XII, Sections 9, 21, and 22.
&&1"
revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a It must be stressed that the President's claim
risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, ofexecutiveprivilegeis not merely founded on her
997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational proximity" generalized interest in confidentiaHty. The Letter
to the President that matters in determining dated November 15,2007 of Executive Secretary
lM whether "[t]he President's confidentiaHty in Ermita specified presidential communications
terests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied) privilegein relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as the
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
the privilege "to a large swath of the executive
branch" (a fear apparently entertained by re The context in which executive privilege
spondents) is absentbecause the official involved is being invoked is that the information
jsii here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly sought to be disclosedmight impair our dip
lomatic as weU as economic relations with
within the term "advisor" of the Presidentjin fact,
her alter egoand a member ofher officialfamily. the People's RepubHc of China. Given the
confidential nature in which this information
Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the of
were conveyed to the President, he cannot
ficial involved is far too remote, this Court also
provide the Committee any further details
mentioned in the Decision the organizational test
of these conversations, without disclosing
laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department
the very thing the privilege is designed to
ofJustice. This goes to showthat the operational protect, (emphasis supplied)
proximity test used in the Decision is not con
sidered conclusive in every case. In determining Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held
which test to use, the main consideration is to that Congress must not require the Execu
limit the availabihty of executive privilege only tive to state the reasons for the claim with
to officialswho stand proximate to the President, such particularity as to compeldisclosure of
not only by reason of their function, but also the information which the privilege is meant
by reason of their positions in the Executive's to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
organizational structure. Thus, respondent Com coordinate and co-equal department.
mittees' fear that the scope of the privilege would It is easy to discern the danger that
be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the goes with the disclosure of the President's
operational proximity test is unfounded. communication with her advisor. The NBN
k&J
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Project involves a foreign country as a party unchecked legislative incursion into the core of
to the agreement. It was actually a product the President's decision-making process, which
of the meeting of minds between officials inevitably would involve her conversations with
of the Philippines and China. Whatever a member of her Cabinet.
the President says about the agreement —
particularly while official negotiations are With respect to respondent Committees' in
ongoing — are matters which China will vocation ofconstitutional prescriptions regarding
surely view with particular interest. There the right of the people to information and public
is danger in such kind of exposure. It could accountability and transparency, the Courtfinds
adversely affect our diplomatic as well as nothing in these arguments to support respon
economic relationswith the People's Republic dent Committees' case.
of China. ...
There is no debate as to the importance of
the constitutional right of the people to infor
mation and the constitutional policies on public
Privileged character of diplomatic negotia accountability and transparency. These are the
tions twin postulates vital to the effective functioning
The privileged character of diplomatic ne of a democratic government. The citizenry can
gotiations has been recognized in this jurisdic become prey to the whims and capricesof those
tion. In discussing valid limitations on the right towhom the power has beendelegated iftheyare
to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG denied access to information. And the policies on
held that "information on inter-government ex public accountabilityand democratic government
changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and would certainly be mere empty words if access
executive agreements may be subject to reason to such information of public concern is denied.
able safeguards for'the sake of national interest." In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding
Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in executive privilege with respect to three (3)
People's Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) specific questions, did not in any way curb the
v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the public's right to information or diminish the
reasons for the privilege in more precise terms. importance of public accountability and trans
parency.
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court

adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curiiss-Wright Indeed, the constitutional provisions citedby
Export Corp. that the Presidentis the sole organ respondent Committees do not espouse an abso
of the nation in its negotiations with foreign lute right to information. By their wording, the
countries . . .
intention of the Framers to subject such
Considering that the information sought For clarity, it must be emphasized that the
through the three (3) questions subject of this assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Com
Petition involves the President's dealings with mittees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All
a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court that is expected from them is to respect matters
is wary of approving the view that Congress that are covered by executive privilege.
may peremptorily inquire into not only official,
documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her III.
close advisors onthe pretext that saidquestions Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
serve some vague legislative need. Regardless
the Communications Elicited by the Three
of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their
unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief
Functions
Executive to unrestricted congressional inqui
ries done with increased frequency and great
publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge In the Decision, the majority held that "there
constitutional functions in the face of intense and is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the Hmitation of the privilege and be lightly applied to the instant case, which un
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere like Arnault involves a conflict between two (2)
by an appropriate investigating authority." In the separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Commit the Government.
tees argue that the information elicited by the
Whatever test we may apply, the starting
three (3)questions are necessary in the discharge
pojnt in resolving the conflicting claims between
of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to
the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the
consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and
recognized existence of the presumptive presi
(b) to curb graft and corruption.
dential communications privilege....
We remain unpersuaded by respondents' The presumption in favor of Presidential
assertions. communications puts the burden on the re
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that spondent Senate Committees to overturn the
executive privilege is subjectto balancing against presumption by demonstrating their specific
other interests and it is necessary to resolve the need for the information to be elicited by the
competing interests in a manner that would answers to the three (3) questions subject of this
\m
preserve the essential functions of each branch. case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here,
There, the Court weighed between presidential there^ is simply a generalized assertion that, the
privilege and the legitimate claims of the judicial information is pertinent to the exercise of the'
process. In giving more weight to the latter, the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific
Court ruled that the President's generalized reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear
assertion of privilege must yield to the demon what matters relating to these bills could not be
determined without the said information sought
strated, specific need for evidence in a pending
by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed
criminal trial.
out by the Honorable Justice Dante 0. Tinga in
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and his Separate Concurring Opinion:
unqualified privilege would stand in the way of
...If respondents are operating under
the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial
the premise that the president and/or her
Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions
executive officials have committed wrongdo
ings that need to be corrected or prevented
from recurring by remedial legislation, the
In the case at bar, we are not confronted
answer to those three questions will not nec
with a court's need for facts in order to adjudge
essarily bolster or inhibit respondents from
HabiHty in a criminal case but rather with the
proceeding with such legislation. They could
Senate's need for information in relation to its
easily presume the worst of the president in
legislative functions. This leads us to consider
enacting such legislation.
once again just how critical is the subject in
formation in the discharge of respondent Com For sure, a factual basis for situations
mittees' functions. The burden to show this is covered by bills is not critically needed before
on the respondent Committees, since they seek legislatives bodies can come up with relevant
to intrude into the sphere of competence of the legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases
President in order to gather information which, by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral
according to said respondents, would "aid" them Argument before this Court, the counsel for re
in crafting legislation. spondent Committees impliedly admitted that
the Senate could stiU come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three (3)
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting questions. In other words, the information being
legislation cannot be equated with the compeUing eHcited is not so critical after all....
or demonstratively critical and specific need for
facts which is so essential to the judicial power
Mrt to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare The general thrust and the tenor of the three
standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the
iiiijj
OfficeOf the President. While it may be a worthy An unconstrained congressional investiga

endeavor to investigate the potential culpabil tive power, like an unchecked Executive, gener
ity of high government officials, including the ates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that
President, in a given government transaction, the investigative power of Congress has been
it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. abused (or has the potential for abuse) have
The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to been raised many £imes. Constant exposure
determine anyone's guilt of a crime or wrongdo to congressional subpoena takes its toU on the
ing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the ability of the Executive to function effectively.
Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita
cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature are modest mechanisms that would not unduly
adjudicate or prosecute. limit Congress' power. The legislative inquiry
must be confined to permissible areas and thus,
si prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in
Legislative inquiries., unlike court proceed the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson. Likewise,
ings, are not subject to the exacting standards of witnesses have their constitutional right to due
evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual process. They should be adequately informed
findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section what matters are to be covered by the inquiry.
10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent
Inquiries irl Aid of Legislation provides that information and documents. To our mind, these
"technical rules of evidence applicable to judi requirements concede too little political costs or
cial proceedings which do not affect substantive burdens on the part of Congress when viewed
rights need not be observed by the Committee." vis-a-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry..-..
Court rules which prohibit leading, hypotheti
cal, or repetitive questions or questions calling
for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not ap Clearly, petitioner's request to be furnished
ply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from an advance copy of questions is a reasonable
&M* the highest public official to the most ordinary demand that should have been granted by re
citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent spondent Committees.
until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a
competent court or body. Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testifican
dum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific
IV reference to any pending Senate biU. It did not
also inform petitioner of the questions to be
iigi)
Respondent Committees Committed Grave asked. As it were, the subpoena merely com
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt manded him to "testify on what he knows relative
Order to the subject matter under inquiry."
iiiii) The legitimacy of the claim of executive privi Anent the third argument, respondent Com
lege having been fully discussed in the preceding mittees contend that their Rules of Procedure
pages, we see no reason to discuss it once again. Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the
Respondent Committees' second argument "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court.
While it is true that this Court must refrain from
rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v.
Ermita, requiring invitations or subpoenas reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as
to contain the "possible needed statute which
a co-equal branch of government, however, when
prompted the need for the inquiry" along with a constitutional requirement exists, the Court
has the duty to look into Congress' compliance
the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry
therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to pos
and the questions relative to and in furtherance
sible violations of the Constitution simply out
thereof is not provided for by the Constitution
of courtesy....
and is merely an obiter dictum.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale
and necessity of compliance with these require The language of Section 21, Article VI of
ments. the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published SEC. 23. (1) THE CONGRESS, BY A
rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS OF BOTH HOUSES
upon the Senate to publish the rules for its leg IN JOINT SESSION ASSEMBLED, VOTING
islative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise SEPARATELY, SHALL HAVE THE SOLE
make the published rules clearly state that the POWER TO DECLARE THE EXISTENCE
same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses OF A STATE OF WAR.
or until they are amended or repealed to suffi
ciently put public on notice. (2) IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER NA
TIONAL EMERGENCY, THE CONGRESS
If it was the intention of the Senate for its MAY BY LAW AUTHORIZE THE PRESI
present rules on legislative inquiries to be ef DENT, FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUB
fective even in the next Congress, it could have JECT TO SUCH RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY
easily adopted the same language it had used in PRESCRIBE, TO EXERCISE POWERS NEC
its main rules regarding effectivity. ESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT A
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY. UNLESS
likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or SOONER WITHDRAWN BY RESOLUTION
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject OF THE CONGRESS, SUCH POWER SHALL
Rules are null and void. Only those that result CEASE UPON THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT
in violation of the rights of witnesses should be THEREOF.
considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the 1. War powers.
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, The 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such viola
gave to Congress "the sole power to declare war;"
m tion, orders and proceedings are considered valid the present provision, as also the 1973 provision,
and effective.
gives to Congress "the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war." The difference be
NOTE: Military officers.
tween the two phraseologies is not substantial
The President has constitutional authority, but merely in emphasis. The two phrases are
by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, to interchangeable, even under the 1935 Constitu
prevent a military officer from appearing in an tion; but the second phrase emphasizes more the
investigation. This is distinct from the power of fact that the Philippines, according to Article II,
the President over department secretaries. An Section2, renounces aggressive war as an instru
officer who defies such injunction is liable under ment of national policy. •
f^\
military justice.
While the Constitution gives to the legisla
At the same time, any chamber of Congress ture the power to declare the existence of a state
which seeks to appear before it a military officer of war and to enact aU measures to support the
against the consent of the President has adequate war, the actual power to makewar is lodged else
remedies under law to compel such attendance. where, that is, in the executive power which holds
Any military official whom Congress summons to the sword of the nation. The executive power,
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the when necessary, may make war even in the ab
President. If the President is not so inclined, the sence of a declaration of war. In the words of the
President may be commanded by judicial order American Supreme Court, war being a question
to compel the attendance of the military officer. of actualities, "the President was bound to meet
Final judicial orders have the force of the law it in the shape it presented itself, without wait
of the land which the President has the duty to ing for Congress to baptize it with a name; and
faithfully execute. no name given to it by him or them could change
When General Gudani appeared before the the fact." See Prize Cases, 2 Bl. 635 (U.S. 1863).
Senate disobeying EO 464, he was stripped of
his responsibility and subjected to Court mar 2. Emergency powers.
tial. Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, April Under the present provision, Congress may
15, 2006. authorize the President "to exercise powers nee-
i£j||£j
essary and proper to carry out a declared national amendments were thoroughly discussed in To
policy." Note that the nature of the delegable lentino v. Secretary of Finance119 involving R.A.
power is not specified. It is submitted that, on No. 7716, the Value Added Tax (VAT)law. After
the basis of this provision, the President may be the House version of the bill was sent to the
given emergency legislative powers if Congress Senate, the Senate introduced a substitute biU
so desires. This is confirmed by the explanation which apparently it had prepared in anticipation
made on the floor of the 1971 Convention, which of the House bill. Later the President certified
is the source of this provision, that emergency to the urgency of passing the Senate version of
powers can include the power to rule by "execu the bill. After the two versions had gone through
tive fiat." A resolution of Congress withdrawing a-Conference Committee, the House approved
the emergency powers does not need presidential the Conference Committee report which for all
approval. practical purposes was the Senate bill. Was there
a violation of the rule on origination?
SEC. 24. ALL APPROPRIATION, REV The constitutional rule is that revenue biUs
ENUE OR TARIFF BILLS, BILLS AU must "originate exclusively" from the House
$gS THORIZING INCREASE OF THE PUBLIC of Representatives. The Court said that the
DEBT, BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION, exclusivity of the prerogative of the House of
AND PRIVATE BILLS SHALL ORIGINATE Representatives means simply that the House
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF REP alone can initiate the passage of a revenue bill,
RESENTATIVES, BUT THE SENATE MAY such that, if the House does not initiate one, no
PROPOSE OR CONCUR WITH AMEND revenue law will be passed. But once the House
MENTS. has approved a revenue bill and passed it on to
e
the Senate, the Senate can completely overhaul
1. The Origination clause. it, by amendment of parts or by amendment by
substitution, and come out with one completely
An appropriation biU is one whose purpose is
to set aside a sum of money for pubHc use. Only
different from what the House approved. It does
not matter whether the Senate already antici
appropriation bills in the strict sense of the word
pated a bill from the House and formulated one
are comprehended by the provision; bills for other
to take the place of whatever the House might
purposes which incidentally set aside money for
send. The Court rejected the idea that the Sen
that purpose are not included.
ate is bound to retain the essence of what the
Similarly revenue or tariff bills are those other House approved. Textually, it is the "bill"
ffifft
which are strictly for the raising of revenues; which must exclusively originate from the House;
biUs for other purposes which incidentaUy create but the "law" itself which is the product of the
revenue are not comprehended. total bicameral legislative process originates not
Bills of local application are those whose just from the House but from both Senate and
\m House.120
reach is limited to specific localities, such for
instance as the creation of a town. Private bills
are those, which affect private persons, such for SEC. 25. (1) THE CONGRESS MAY
instance as a biU granting citizenship to a specific NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS
foreigner. RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT
The theory behind the rule requiring that FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERN
(i$\
these originate in the House of Representatives MENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET.
is that district Representatives are closer to the THE FORM, CONTENT, AND MANNER OF
pulse of the people than senators are and are PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL
therefore in a better position to determine both BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
PJ
the extent of the legal burden they are capable

of bearing and the benefits that they need.
::9235 SCRA 630 (1994), affirmed on reconsideration
The meaning of origination from the House G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6,1995.
and the scope of the Senate's power to introduce ™Id. at 661-662.
iaiijij
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!&&$

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(2) NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT PRIATIONS LAW FQR THE PRECEDING

SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED RE
APPROPRIATIONS BILL UNLESS IT RE ENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE
LATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PAR AND EFFECT UNTIL THE GENERAL AP
TICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. PROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BY THE
ANY SUCH PROVISION OR ENACTMENT CONGRESS.
il^l
SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION
TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT 1. Riders. *
RELATES.
(3) THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING A. Garcia v. Mata

APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS 65 SCRA 517 (1975)
SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PRO
CEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIA CASTRO, J.:
TIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND This is a petition for certiorari to review
AGENCIES.
the decision of the Court of First Instance of
(4) A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS Quezon City, Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466,
BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus
FORWHlfcH IT IS INTENDED, ANDSHALL Hon. Ernesto Mata (Juan Ponce Enrile), et al.,
BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the
AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NA "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
TIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED Philippines" of Republic Act No. 1600121 uncon
BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PRO stitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative.
POSAL THEREIN.
We affirm the judgment a quo.
(5) NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED AU
THORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPRO
PRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT, The petitioner consequently argues that his
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE reversion to inactive status on November 15,
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN 1960 was in violation of the above-quoted provi
i|Wl TATIVES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE sion which prohibits the reversion to inactive
SUPREME COURT, AND THE HEADS OF status of reserve officers on active duty with at
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY, least ten years of accumulated active commis
BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT sioned service.
ss>
ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIA On the other hand, the respondents contend
TIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE that the said provision has no relevance or per
OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER tinence whatsoever to the budget in question or
ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPRO to any appropriation item contained therein, and
PRIATIONS. is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par.
(6) DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPRO 2122 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines,
Si) which reads:
PRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS
SHALL BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUB No provision or enactment shall be
LIC PURPOSES TO BE SUPPORTED BY embraced in the general appropriation bill
APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUB unless it relates specifically to some par
JECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE ticular appropriation therein; and any such
PRESCRIBED BY LAW. provision or enactment shall be limited in its
(7) IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL operation to such appropriation.
YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE
FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL AP "'Otherwise known as the Appropriation Act for the
PROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING Fiscal Year 1956-1957.
mArt. VIII, Sec. 16, par. 2 of the 1973 Constitution of
FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPRO the Philippines.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. parties with general interest common to all the
tea
No. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation people ofthe Philippines, and as taxpayerswhose
to any appropriation item therein, or to the Ap vital interests maybe affected by the outcome of
propriation Act as a whole. From the very first the reliefs prayed for listed the grounds relied
clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads, upon in this petition as follows:
»
After the approval of this Act, and when A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET
there is no emergency, no reserve officer of REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be TTPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
titfi
called to a tour of active duty for more than AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER
two years during any period of five consecu OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
tive years:
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evi DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO
dent. While R.A. No. 1600 appropriated money THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO
for the operation of the Government for the fiscal
SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PUR
,a*j year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to
POSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED
the fundamental governmental policy matters
TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
of the calling to active duty and the reversion to
inactive status ofreserve officers in the AFP. The C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
ijjjai
incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESI
the entire paragraph. DENTTO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS,
FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED
In the language of the respondents-appellees,
"it was a non-appropriation item inserted in BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against 'riders' to the D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DE
general appropriation act." It was indeed a new CREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DEL
and completely unrelated provision attached to EGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO
the Appropriation Act. THE EXECUTIVE.
'•&!•}
E. THE THREATENED AND CON
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is TINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY
denied, and the decision of the lower court dis THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMEN
' i«sl missing the complaint is hereby affirmed. No TATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET
pronouncement as to costs. MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR
2. Transfer of funds. IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION.
A. Demetria v. Alba
148 SCRA 208 (1987)
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
FERNAN, J:
16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is
lifil Assailed in this petition for prohibition with readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
prayer for a writ of preHminary injunction is the thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
constitutionahty of the first paragraph of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise The President shall have the authority
JJJ
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as agencies of the Executive Department, which
concerned citizens of this country, as members are included in the General Appropriations
of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa Act, to any program, project or activity of any
representing their millions of constituents, as department, bureau, or office included in the
256 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
General Appropriations Act or approved after the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutiona
its enactment. infirmities render the provision in question nul
and void.
On the other hand, the constitutional provi
sion under consideration reads as follows: "For the love of money is the root of al!
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed autho evil: xxx "and money belonging to no one ir
rizing any transfer of appropriations, how particular, i.e., public funds, provide an ever
ever, the President, the Prime Minister, the greater temptation for misappropriation and
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in
the minds pf the framers of the constitution in
Court, and the heads of constitutional com
missions may by law be authorized to aug meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds ac
ment any item in the general appropriations
embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII
law for their respective offices from savings
of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions
in other items of their respective appropria
on the release of money from the treasury [Sec.
tions.
18(1)];the restrictions on the use of public funds
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)];the prohibition to
for one item to another was explicit and cat transfer an appropriation for an item to another
egorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, [Sec.16(5)] and the requirement of specifications
to afford the heads of the different branches of [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards
the government and those of the constitutional designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of publicrfunds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts
of public funds and resources, the constitution all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited
transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting authority bestowed upon the President, "xxx
an item from savings in another item in the Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgatesfor the
appropriation of the government branch or con enactment of unfunded appropriations, results
stitutional body concerned. The leeway granted in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for accountability for budgetary performance and
which funds may be transferred were specified, entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling
i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose of party may well expand [sic] public money not on
augmenting an item and such transfer may be the basis of development priorities but on politi
made only if there are savings from another item cal and personal expediency." The contention of
in the appropriation of the government branch public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section
or constitutional body. 44 of P.D. No. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Sec
tion 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 must perforce fall flat on its face.
iiiiii unduly overextends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one depart WHEREFORE, the instant petition is grant
ment, bureau, office or agency of the Executive ed. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Department to any program, project or activity Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void
of any department, bureau or office included in for being unconstitutional.
the General Appropriations Act or approved after
tal its enactment, without regard as to whether or SO ORDERED.
not the funds to be transferred are actually sav
ings in the item from which the same are to be SEC. 26. (1) EVERY BILL PASSED BY
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the THE CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY
purpose of augmenting the item to which said ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EX
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely PRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF.
disregard the standards set in the fundamental (2) NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER
mi
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation HOUSE SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS
of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS ON
$ffL*
SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COP and a tremendous drop in the collection of
IES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORM HAVE sales, contractor's specific, amusement and
BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial
THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EX losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
CEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES government revenues;
TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE
ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAM 2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establish
ITY OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE LAST ments collectively earn around P600 Million
READING OF A BILL, NO AMENDMENT per annum from rentals, sales and disposi
THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND THE tion of videograms, and such earnings have
VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMME
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving
DIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS
the Government of approximately Pi80 Mil
lion in taxes each year;
^ AND NAYS ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activi
1. Subject and title of bills. ties of videogram establishments have "also
affected the viability of the movie industry,
itaftl
A. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board particularly the more than 1,200 movie
151 SCRA 208 (1987) houses and theaters throughout the country,
and occasioned industry-wide displacement
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: and unemployment due to the shutdown of
numerous moviehouses and theaters;
This petition .. . assails the constitutional
ity of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An 4. WHEREAS, in order to ensure
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" national economic recovery, it is imperative
with broad powers to regulate and supervise the for the Government to create an environment
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred conducive to growth and development
to as the BOARD)... of all business industries, including the
movie industry which has an accumulated
On November 5, 1985, a month after the investment of about P3 Billion;
promulgation of the abovementioned decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the Na 5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the
tional Internal Revenue Code providing, inter activities of videogram establishments will
alia: not only alleviate the dire financial condi
tion of the movie industry upon which more
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers
be collected on each processed video-tape depend for their livelihood, but also provide
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of an additional source of revenue for the Gov
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, ernment, and at the same time rationalize
That locally manufactured or imported blank the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregu
lated showing of obscene videogram features
The rationale behind the enactment of the
constitutes a clear and present danger to the
DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses moral and spiritual well-being of the youth,
as follows: and impairs the mandate of the Constitution
"1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and for the State to support the rearing of the
unregulated circulation of videograms in youth for civic efficiency and the develop
cluding, among others, videotapes, discs, ment of moral character and promote their
cassettes or any technical improvement or physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced 7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and
the operations of moviehouses and theaters, groups have called for remedial measures to
and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical curb these blatant malpractices which have
attendance by at least forty percent (40%) flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
i£i£>
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's
emergencies corroding the moral values of contention that the tax provision of the DECREE •
jj&i the people and betraying the national eco is a rider is without merit. That section reads,
nomic recovery program, bold emergency inter alia:
measures must be adopted with dispatch;
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposi
.x x x" (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
tion of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality provision of law to the contrary, the province
of the DECREE rests on the following grounds: shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the may be, for every sale, lease or disposition
local government is a RIDER and the same of a videogram containing a reproduction of
is not germane to the subject matter thereof; any motion picture or audiovisual program.
iU
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and
We shall consider the foregoing objections the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to
in seriatim.
the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila,
1. The Constitutional requirement that the tax shall be shared equally by the City/
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
shall be expressed in the title thereof'123 is suf Commission.
ficiently complied with if the title be comprehen
sive enough to include the general purpose which xxx
a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary The foregoing provision is allied and ger
that the title express each and every end that mane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
the statute wishes to accomplish. The require accomplishment of,, the general object of the
ment is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
related, and are germane to the subject matter industry through the Videogram Regulatory
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision
inconsistent with or foreign to the general sub is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that gen
ject and title.124 An act having a single general eral subject and title. As a tool for regulation'2"
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any it is simply one of the regulatory and control
number of provisions, no matter how diverse mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE.
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent The express purpose of the DECREE to include
with or foreign to the general subject, and may
taxation of the video industry in order to regu
be considered in furtherance of such subject by
late and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled
providing for the method and means of carrying
distribution of videograms is evident from Pre
siisii out the general object."125 The rule also is that
ambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain
the constitutional requirement as to the title of
the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the
cripple or impede the power of legislation.126 It
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
should be given a practical rather than technical
comprehensive enough to include the purposes
construction.127
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers
'"Section 19(1), Article VIII, 1973 Constitution; Section
all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
26(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution. those objectives in the title or that the latter be
•"Sumulong v. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10, an index to the body of the DECREE.129
1941, 73 Phil. 288; Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al,
L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 418.
1MPublic Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 111. 314, 8 A.
L. R. 466, 470.
"Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corpo
ration, No. 44257, November 22,1938,66 Phil. 483; Cordero ,28United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44,1950, cited
v. Cabatuando, et al, supra. in Bernas, Philippines Constitutional Law, p. 594.
,27Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, supra. I29People v. Carlos, L-239, June 30,1947, 78 Phil. 535.
B. Phil. Judges Ass'h v. Prado every statute is supposed to have first been care
G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993 fully studied and determined to be constitutional
m before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is
CRUZ, Jr. clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed,
the attack against its validity must be rejected
The basic issue raised in this petition is the
and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by
the petitioners that this hallmark of republican I
ism is impaired by the statute and circular they
are here challenging. The Supreme Court is We consider first the objection based on Ar
itself affected by these measures and is thus an ticle VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing
interested party that should ordinarily not also that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall em
be a judge at the same time. Under our system brace only one subject which shall be expressed
of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself in the title thereof."
and must rule upon the challenge, because no The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent
other office has the authority to do so. We shall hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
iiM
therefore act upon this matter not with officious- prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
ness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty by means of provisions in bills of which the title
and,.as always, with detachment and fairness. gives no intimation, and which might therefore
The main target of this petition is Section 35 be overlooked and carelessly and unintention
W&l
of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philip ally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people,
pine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. through such publication of legislative proceed
9228. These measures withdraw the franking ings as is usually made, of the subject of legisla
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of tion that is being considered, in order that they
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metro may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by
politan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.130
and the Land Registration Commission and its It is the submission of the petitioners that
Register of Deeds, along with certain other gov Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
ernment offices. franking privilege from the Judiciary is not ex
The petitioners are members of the lower pressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect
courts who feel that their official functions as its purposes.
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating
measures. The National Land Registration the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Authority has taken common cause with them Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Provid
insofar as its own activities, such as the sending ing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect Purposes Connected Therewith."
Ui&j judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene. The objectives of the law are enumerated in
Section 3, which provides:
The petition assails the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title The State shall pursue the following ob
embraces more than one subject and does not jectives of a nationwide postal system:
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the re a) to enable the economical and speedy
quired readings in both Houses of Congress and transfer of mail and other postal matters,
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not from sender to addressee, with full recogni
distributed among the members before its pas tion of their privacy or confidentiality;
sage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary. b) to promoteinternational interchange,
cooperation and understanding through the
We approach these issues with one important
principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
,30COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th
gfj
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as Ed., pp. 295-296; State v. Dolan, 14 L.R.A. 1259; State v.
the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.
unhampered flow or exchange of postal Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
matters between nations; not included in the original version of Senat€
ijimi
c) to cause or effect a wide range of Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this
postal services to cater to different users and paragraph appeared only in the Conference Com
changing needs, including but not limited to, mittee Report, its addition violates .Article VI.
philately, transfer of monies and valuables, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
and the like; (2) No bill passed by either House shall be
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues come a law unless it has passed three readings
are generated by and within the industry on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
to finance the overall cost of providing the its final form have been distributed to its Mem
varied range of postal delivery and messen- bers three days before its passage, except when
gerial services as well as the expansion and the President certifies to the necessity of its
itel
continuous upgrading of service standards immediate enactment to meet a public calamity

by the same. or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
Sec. 35 of R.A. No, 7354, which is the princi vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereaf
pal target of the petition, reads as follows: ter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, de The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the
crees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent that amendment to any bill when the House and
with the provisions of this Act are repealed or the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
modified accordingly. settled by a conference committee of both cham
iiavl
All franking privileges authorized by law bers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject
are hereby repealed, except those provided for of any disagreement between both Houses and so
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts the second paragraph could not have been validly
vj^t
Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The added as an amendment.
Corporation may continue the franking privilege These arguments are unacceptable.
under Circular No. 35 dated October 24,1977 and
that of the Vice President, under such arrange While it is true that a conference committee
ments and conditions as may obviate abuse or is the mechanism for compromising differences
unauthorized use thereof. between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We broader function is described thus:
do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution. A conference committee may deal gen
erally with the subject matter or it may be
The title of the bill is not required to be an
limited to resolving the precise differences
index to the body of the act, or to be as com
between the two houses. Even where the
prehensive as to cover every single detail of
conference committee is not by rule limited
the measure. It has been held that if the title
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
fairly indicates the general subject, and reason
limits the freedom with which new subject
ably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
matter can be inserted into the conference
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
bill. But occasionally a conference committee
people, there is sufficient compliance with the
produces unexpected results, results beyond
constitutional requirement.
its mandate. These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is
II
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
The petitioners maintain that the second conference committee (Davies, Legislative
aj paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
franking privilege from the petitioners and this p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference IV

Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate In sum, we sustain R.A. No.7354against the
and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, attack that its subject is not expressed in its title
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Sen and that it was not passed in accordance with the
L ate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives
prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section
35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
as having been duly passed by both Houses of the Constitution providing that no person shall
Congress. It was then presented to and approved "be deprived of the equal protection of the laws."
by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3,1992. We arrive at these conclusions with a full
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, awarenesaofthe criticism it is certain to provoke.
the Court may not inquire beyond the certifica While ruling against the discrimination in this
case, we may ourselves be accused of similar dis
tion of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical crimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criti
Co. v. Gimenez131 laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary cism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is
(except in matters that have to be entered in the
a fact of life in the political system that we are
journals like the yeas and nays on the final read prepared to accept. As judges, we cannot even
ing of the bill).132 The journals are themselves debate with our detractors. We can only decide
also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held the cases before us as the law imposes on us the
in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,133
duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us
the light to be right.
where we explained the reason thus:
jjjj&J
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially
GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III
The third and most serious challenge of

the petitioners is based on the equal protection C. Farinas, et al. v. Executive Secretary
clause.
G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003
See supra, under Section 7.

We are unable to agree with the respondents
that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a D. Tan v. Del Rosario
valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature un G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994
der the police power. On the contrary, we find its
tsi
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision VITUG, J.:
that denies the Judiciary the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things These two consolidated special civil actions
similarly situated. The distinction made by the for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also
commonly known as the Simplified Net Income
distinctions that make real differences between
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
provisions of the National Internal Revenue
privilege.
Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public
This is not a question of wisdom or power respondents pursuant to said law.
into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the
affected by the continued implementation of the
duty and power to correct. amendatory legislation.
In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the
,S17 SCRA 347.
l32Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1. enactment of Republic Act No. 7496.violates the
,3834 Phil. 729. following provisions of the Constitution:
"Article VI, Section 26(1). Every bill proprietorships and professionals differently
passed by the Congress shall embrace only from the manner it imposes the tax on corpora
one subject which shall be expressed in the tions and partnerships. The contention clearly
title thereof." forgets, however, that such a system of income
"Article VI, Section 28(1). The rule of the , taxation has long been the prevailing rule even
taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Congress shall evolve a progressive system Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred con
of taxation." cept of equal protection, merely requires that all
"Article III, Section 1. No person shall be subjects or objectsoftaxation, similarly situated,
deprived of... property without due process are to be treated alike both in privileges and li
of law, nor shall any person be denied the abilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento,
equal protection of the laws." 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classifi
cation as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2)the
G.R. No. 109289 categorization is germane to achieve the legisla
tive purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being
Petitioner contends that the title of House equal, to both present and future conditions, and
Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No. (4) the classification applies equally well to all
7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola s.
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco v. PAGCOR,
Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and 197 SCRA 771).
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289).
The full text of the title actually reads: Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea
of petitioner to have the law declared unconsti
"An Act Adopting the Simplified Net tutional for being violative of due process must
Income Taxation Scheme For The Self- perforce fail.
Employed and Professionals Engaged In
The Practice of Their Profession, Amending
Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as Amended." E. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
li£wfl
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitu MENDOZA, Jr.

tion has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent
log-rolling legislation intended to unite the The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the
members of the legislature who favor any one of sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
unrelated subjects in the support of the whole as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It
act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
through such publications of its proceedings as bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. from the sale or exchange of services. Republic
The above objectives of the fundamental law ap Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
pear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything existing VAT system and enhance its admin
else would be to require a virtual compendium istration by amending the National Internal
of the law which could not have been the intend Revenue Code.
ment of the constitutional mandate.
These are various suits for certiorari and
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of
7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds sum
that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" marized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this
in that the law would now attempt to tax single Court, as follows:
U
I. Procedural Issues: thepublic debt, bills oflocal application, and

A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate private bills shall originate exclusively inthe
Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution? House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the
Constitution? Id., §. 26(2): JSfo bill passed by either
House shall become a law unless it has
C. What is the extent of the power of passed three readings on separate days, and
the Bicameral Conference Committee? printed copies thereof in its final form have
II. Substantive Issues: been distributed to its Members three days
before jts passage, except when the Presi
A. Does the law violate the following dent certifies to the necessity of its immedi
provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)? ate enactment to meet a public calamity or
1. §1 emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
2. §4
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
3. §5 thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.
4. §10
It appears that on various dates between
B. Does the law violate the following July 22,1992 and August 31,1993, several bills134
other provisions of the Constitution?
were introduced in the House of Representa
1. Art. VI, § 28(1) tives seeking to amend certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code relative to the
2. Art. VI, § 28(3)
value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred
These questions will be dealt in the order to the House Ways and Means Committee which
they are stated above. As will presently be ex recommended for approval a substitute measure,
plained not all of these questions are judicially H. No. 11197, entitled
cognizable, because not all provisions of the
Constitution are self executing and, therefore, AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
judicially enforceable. The other departments VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT; SYSTEM TO
of the government are equally charged with the WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE
enforcement of the Constitution, especially the ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
provisions relating to them. THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
102,103,104,105,106,107,108 AND 110 OF
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V,
AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE LX, AND
The contention of petitioners is that in en
REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF
acting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded
TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTER
Valued-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the
NAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED.
Constitution because, although H. No. 11197
had originated in the House of Representatives, The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on
it was not passed by the Senate but was simply second reading starting November 6, 1993 and,
consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the
tlijjj 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce House of Representatives after third and final
the bill which the President signed into law. The reading.
following provisions of the Constitution are cited
It was sent to the Senate on November 23,
in support of the proposition that because Repub
lic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it 1993 and later referred by that body to its Com
did not originate in the House ofRepresentatives mittee on Ways and Means.
and it has not thereby become a law:
134H. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030,9210, 9297,
Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue 10012and 10100. (Respondents' Consolidated Memorandum,
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of Annexes 3-12).
I
Sift I
On February 7,1994, the Senate Committee newspapers of general circulation and, on May
submitted its report recommending approval of 28,1994, it took effect, although its implementa
S. No. 1630, entitled tion was suspended until June 30,1994 toallow
time for the registration of business entities. It
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO
ifftM its enforcement was stopped because the Court,
WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE
by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a
ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
temporary restraining order on June 30,1994.
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF ° First. Petitioners' contention is that Repub
TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, lic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively"
AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING in the House of Representatives as required by
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in
V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND bills, H. No.. 11197 and SI No. 1630. In this con
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. nection, petitioners point out that although Art.
VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal
It was stated that the bill was being sub
Constitution,135 it is notable in two respects: the
mitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129,
taking into consideration P. S. Res. No. 734 and verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philip
S5A
rL B. No. 11197." pine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and
the phrase "as on other bills" in the American
On February 8,1994, the Senate began con version is omitted. This means, according to
sideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished them, that to be considered as having originated
debates on the bill and approved it on second in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain
reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, the essence of H. No. 11197.
it approved the bill on third reading by the af
firmative votes of 13 of its members, with one This argument will not bear analysis. To
abstention. begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill
which is required by the Constitution to "origi
H. No. 1197 and its Senate version (S. No. nate exclusively" in the House of Representa
1630) were then referred to a conference com tives. It is important to emphasize this, because
mittee which, after meeting four times '(April 13, a bill originating in the House may undergo such
19, 21 and 25,1994), recommended that "House extensive changes in the Senate that the result
i'jji&fr
Bill No. 1197, in consolidation with Senate Bill may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility
No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the at of a third version by the conference committee
tached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved will be discussed later. At this point, what is im
by the conferees." portant to note is that, as a result of the Senate
IfifffiJ
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist
ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX initiated the legislative process culminating in
BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRA the enactment of the law must substantially be
TION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMEND the same as the House bill would be to deny the
ING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT Senate's power not only to "concur with amend
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL ments" but also to "propose amendments." It
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR would be to violate the coequality of legislative
OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
by the House of Representatives on April 27, make the House superior to the Senate.
1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The
enrolled bill was then presented to the President
of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed ,MU.S. CONST., Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 1: "AU bills for raising
it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on
1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two other bills."
liijiifi
iliffiijj
The contention that the constitutional de It is insisted, however,that S. No. 1630was

sign is to limit the Senate's power in respect passed not in substitution of H. No. 1197but of
of revenue bills in order to compensate for the another Senate bill (S. No.1129)earlier filedand
grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power that what the Senate did was merely to "take
and thereby equalize its powers and those of the [H. No. 1197] into consideration" in enacting S.
House overlooks the fact that the powers being No. 1630. There is really no difference between
compared are different. Weare dealing here with the Senate preserving H. No. 1197 up to the en
the legislative power, which under the Constitu acting clause and then writing its own version
tion is vested not in any particular chamber but following the enacting clause (which, it would
in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by
"a Senate and a House of Representatives." The substitution), and, on the otherhand, separately
exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a matter. In either case the result are two bills on
check on the executive power. There is, therefore, the same subject.
no justification for comparing the legislative pow
ers of the House and of the Senate on the basis Indeed, what the Constitution simply means
liiSiiA
of the possession of such non-legislative power is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff,
by the Senate. The possession of a similar power or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of as public debt, private bills and bills oflocalapplica
giving it more legislative powers than the House tion must come from the House of Representa
of Representatives. tives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be
In the United States, the validity of a provi
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
sion (Sec. 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based
and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate
who are elected at large, are expected to approach
had inserted in the TariffAct of 1909, was upheld
against the claim that the provision was a rev
the same problems from the national perspec
ii£? tive. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enue bill which originated in the Senate in con
enactment of such laws.
travention of Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution.136
Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing
provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as ofits receipt ofthe bill from the House, solongas
changing the whole of bills following the enact action by the Senate, as a body is withheld pend
ing clause and substituting its own versions. In ing receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot,
1883, for example, it struck out everything after therefore, understand the alarm expressed over
the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
its place its own measure, and the House sub before the House passed H. No. 1197, S. No. 1129
sequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. had been filed in the Senate. After all it does
Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what not appear that the Senate ever considered it.
later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of It was only after the Senate had received H. No.
1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act 1197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill, legislation in respect of it began with the referral
in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of
of 1992.137 Given, then, the power of the Senate H. No. 1197 and the submission by the Commit
to propose amendments, the Senate can propose tee on February 7,1994 of S. No. 1630. For that
its own version even with respect to bills which matter, if the question were simply the priority
are required by the Constitution to originate in in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was
the House. in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the
VAT law was first filed on July 22,1992. Several
136Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 309, 58 L. Ed. 117 other bills had been filed in the House before
(1914).
^j*)
mF.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, INTRODUCTION TO S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No.
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 309, n. 2 (1945). 1197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.
ts>
266 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFX30VERNMENT
Second. Enough has been said to show that the necessityof printing and distributing copies
it was within the power of the Senate to propose of the bill three days before the third reading
i]jn
S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument would insure speedy enactment of a law in the
of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three face of an emergency requiring the calling of a
readings on separate days as required by the special election for President and Vice-President.
Constitution138 because the second and third Under the Constitution such a law is required to
readings were done on the same day, March 24, be made within seven days of the convening of
1994. But this was because on February 24,1994 Congress in emergency session.139
and again on March 22,1994, the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential That upon the certification of a bill by the
certification dispensed with the requirement not President the requirement of three readings on
only of printing but also that of reading the bill separate days and of printing and distribution
jisi) on separate days. The phrase "except when the can be dispensed with is supported by the weight
President certifies to the necessity of its immedi of legislative practice. For example, the bill defin
ate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified ing the certiorarijurisdiction of this Court which,
the two stated conditions before a bill can become in consolidation with the Senate version, became
a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on RepublicAct No. 5440, was passed on second and
separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its third readings in the House of Representatives
final form and distributed three days before it is on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill
finally approved. had been certified by the President as urgent.140
In other words, the "unless" clause must be There is, therefore, no merit in the conten
read in relation to the "except" clause, because tion that presidential certification dispenses only
%(j(i
the two are really coordinate clauses of the same with the requirement for the printing of the bill
sentence. To construe the "except" clause as sim and its distribution three days before its passage
ply dispensing with the second requirement in but not with the requirement of three readings
the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution on separate days, also.
three days before final approval) would not only It is nonetheless urged that the certification
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate of the bill in this case was invalid because there
the very premise of the "except" clause: the neces was no emergency, the condition stated in the
sity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill certification of a "growing budget deficit" not be
which is certified in order to meet a public calam ing an unusual condition in this country.
ity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that
is dispensed with by presidential certification, It is noteworthy that no member of the Sen
the time saved would be so negligible as to be ate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual
of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It
,MArt. VII, Sec. 10 provides: "The Congress shall, at ten
aa
may well be doubted whether doing away with o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in
the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, con
vene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
'"Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly re within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to
quire that bills must pass three readings in each House, this elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier
was clearly implied from its Art. VI, sec. 21(2) so that the two than forty-five days not later than sixty days from the time
Houses by their rules prescribed three readings for the pas of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be
sage of bills. Later the requirement was expressly provided deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of
in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI, sec. 26(2) was this Constitution and shall becomelaw upon its approval on
taken. Art. VIII, Sec. 19(2) of the 1973 document provided: third reading by the Congress.Appropriations for the special
No bill shall become a law unless it has passed election shall bechargedagainst any current appropriations
three readings on separate days, and printed copies and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of
m> Members three days before its passage, except when the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election
the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its im postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
mediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emer occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
gency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment presidential election."
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be H0JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays TIVES, SIXTH CONGRESS, FOURTH SESSION 398-399
entered in the Journal. (1968).
basis of the certification. To the contrary, by take the suggestion ofa cabal orsinister motive
passing S. No. 1630 on second and third read attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of
ingsonMarch 24, J994, the Senateaccepted the their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25,1994,
President's certification. Should such certifica nor read anything into the incomplete remarks
tion be now reviewed by this Court, especially of the members, marked in the transcript of
•'tiia'i
when no evidence has been shownthat, because stenographic notes bji ellipses. The incomplete
S, No. 1630 was taken up on second and third sentences are probably dueto the stenographer's
readings on the same day, the members of the own limitations or to the incoherence that some
Senate were deprived of the time needed for the times characterize conversations.William Safire
i&fft
study of a vital piece of legislation? noted some such lapses in recorded talks even
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the by recent past Presidents of the United States.
suspension of the writ of habeascorpus or decla In any event, in the United States conference
•fig)
ration ofmartial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the committees had been customarily heldin execu
existence ofa national emergency justifying the tive sessions with only the conferees and their
.delegation ofextraordinary powersto the Presi staffs in attendance.141 Only in November 1975
ant dent under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subjectto judicial was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions.
review because basic rights ofindividuals may Even then a majority of either chamber's confer
be at hazard. But the factual basis of presiden ees may vote in public to close the meetings.142
tial certification of bills, which involves doing
away with procedural requirements designed to As to the possibility of an entirely new bill
insure that bills are duly consideredby members emergency out of a Conference Committee, it has
of Congress, certainly should elicit a different been explained:
standard of review.
Under congressional rules ofprocedure,
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact conference committees are not expected to
that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not make any material change in the measure at
H. No. 1197. That is because S. No. 1630 was issue, either by deleting provisions'to which
what the Senate was considering.Whenthe mat both houses have already agreed or by in
ter was before the House, the President likewise serting new provisions. But this is a difficult
certified H. No. 9210 then pending in the House. provisionto enforce. Note the problemwhen
one house amends a proposal originating in
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill
either house by striking out everything fol
which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill lowing the enactingclause and substituting
which the Conference Committee prepared by provisions whichmakeit an entirelynewbill.
consolidating H. No. 1197 and S. No. 1630. It is
claimed that the Conference Committee report
The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft
included provisions not found in either the House essentially a new bill.. ,143
bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions
were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference The result is a third version, which is con
Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the sidered an "amendment in the nature of a sub
last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, stitute," the only requirement for which being
1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. that the third versionbe germane to the subject
We are not told, however, whetherthe provisions of the House and Senate bills.144
were not the result of the give and take that often
mark the proceedings of conference committees.
M1Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ
Nor is there anything unusual or extraor 864-865 (1952).
dinary about the fact that the Conference Com H2CONG. QUARTERLY 65 (1983); M. JEWELL, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 169
mittee metin executive sessions. Often the only (1986); LEES AND SHAW, COMMITTEES IN LEGISLA-
way to reach agreement on conflictingprovisions TURES 163 (1979).
is to meet behind closed doors, with only the ,43W. KEEFE AND M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEG
conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise ISLATIVE PROCESS 149 (1985).
U4W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES
is likely to be made. The Court is not about to AND POLICY PROCESS 214 (1984).
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is Nonetheless, it is argued that under th<
within the power of a conference committee to respective Rules of the Senate and the House o
Ijfifl
include in its report an entirely new provision Representatives a conference committee can onl;
that is not found either in the House bill or in act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill am
the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules th-
amendment consisting of one or two provisions, Conference Committee inserted provisions no
there is no reason why it cannot propose several found in the bills submitted to it. The followin;
provisions, collectively considered as an "amend provisions are cited in support of this contention
ment in the nature of a substitute," so long as Rules of the Senate
such amendment is germane to the subject ofthe
Rule XII:
bills before the committee. After all, its report
was not final but needed the approval of both § Sec. 26. In the event that the Senat
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of does not agree with the House of Represen
the legislative department. The charge that in tatives on the provision of any bill or join
this case the Conference Committee acted as a resolution,, the differences shall be settlet
third legislative chamber is thus without any by a conference committee of both House
basis.145 which shall meet within ten days after thei
composition.
The President shall designate th
HSThe charge is an old one. In the United States, the members of the conference committee ii
same change, including claims that important provisions accordance with subparagraph (c), Sectioi
were being "surreptitiously added" in the committee, was
iigjjjj made in the 1940s. But no satisfactory alternative to the 3 of Rule III.
conference committee has been devised. And today, given
the bicameral nature of the U.S. Congress, the charge is no
Each Conference Committee. Report sha't
longer heard. Compare the following from a 1945comment: contain a detailed and sufficiently explici
"Asa devise for oiling the machinery of legislation, commit statement of the changes in or amendment
tees of conference are, under American conditions, useful, if to the subject measure, and shall be signet
not indispensable. Nevertheless, they have shortcomings.
Without exception, they work behind closeddoors, hold no by the conferees.
hearings, and give their proceedings nopublicity. Doubtless The consideration of such report shal
^
it would be difficult for them to make headway if they did
otherwise. Nevertheless, in view of the power which they not be in order unless the report has beei
wield, strong objection can be, and is, raised. For, while the filed with the Secretary of the Senate an*
committeesare supposed to deal onlywith actual differences copies thereof have been distributed to th-
iliji]) between the houses and to stay well within the bounds set
Members.
bythe extreme positions which the houses havetaken,they
often work into measures, as reported, provisions of their (Emphasis added)
owndevising, even goingso far as to rewrite whole sections
with the sole purpose of incorporating the views which the Rules of the House of Representatives
majority members happen to hold In practice, thisoften
results in the adoptionofimportant provisions, moreor less Rule XIV:
surreptitiously added, without consideration byeitherhouse
in other words, legislation nominally by Congress but actu § Sec. 85. Conference Committee Reporti
ally byconference committee. Any remedy found will prob In the event that the House does not agre-
ably take the form ofreducing the needforusingconference
committees at all; and the principal suggestion to that end is with the Senate on the amendments to an;
that bills and resolutions be referred, not, as now, to separate bill or joint resolution, the differences ma:
committees ofthe two houses, but to joint committees, which be settled by conference committees of boti
not only would hold single setsofhearings, butmight delib Chambers.
erate and report backbills to the twohousesin such agreed
form that further significantdifferences would notbe likelyto The consideration of conference commit
develop. Arrangements ofthis nature yield excellent results
in thelegislature ofMassachusetts. Butthereareobstacles to tee reports shall always be in order, excep
adoption ofthe planforCongress, nottheleastofthem being whenthe journal is beingread, whilethe rol
a natural aversion of House members to joint committees in is beingcalled or the Houseis dividingon an;
which senators seem likely to dominate; and, as indicated question. Each of the pages of such report
below, theoutlook forthe reform is problematical.'' F.A. OGG
AND P.O. RAY, supra note 7 at 310-311.
shall be signed by the conferees. Eachrepor
sat
L ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 269
s/iaM contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit Conference Committee Report because the Re
statement of the changes in or amendments port did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently
ffiffi)
to the subject measure. explicit statement ofchanges in, or amendments
The consideration of such report shall to, the subject measure." The Report used brack
ets and capital letters to indicate the changes.
not be in order unless copies thereof are dis
fa&l
tributed to the Members: Provided, That in
This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We
the last fifteen days of each session period it cannot say that in using these marks and sym
bols the Committee violated the Rules of the
shall be deemed sufficient that three copiesof
the report, signed as above provided, are de Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court
liiiiii)
posited in the office of the Secretary General.

is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
(Emphasis added) already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely
&foi) procedural and with their observance the courts
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a have no concern."146 Our concern is with the pro
conference committee to a consideration of con cedural requirements of the Constitution for the
^
flicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements
Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If are concerned, we are satisfied that they have
there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the been faithfully observed in these cases.
precedents of the Legislative Department of the
Nor is there any reason for requiring that
Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supple
the Committee's Report in these cases must
ment of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's
have undergone three readings in each ofthe two
Manual." The following is then quoted from the
Jefferson's Manual:
houses. If that be the case, there would be no end
jjkifr
to negotiation since each house may seek modifi
The managers of a conference must con cations of the compromise bill. The nature ofthe
fine themselves to the differences committed bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by
ft&J to them... and may not include subjects not each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with
within disagreements, even though germane the only alternative that if it is not approved by
to a question in issue. both houses, another conference committee must
be appointed. But then again the result would
^*J Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in
still be a compromise measure that may not be
case there is no specific rule applicable, resort
wholly satisfying to both houses.
must be to the legislative practice. The Jeffer
iiijiiJ
son's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed
It is common place in Congress that conference as referring only to bills introduced for the first
committee reports include new matters which, time in either house of Congress, not to the con
though germane, have not been committed to ference committee report. For if the purpose of
the committee. This practice was admitted by requiring three readings is to give members of
Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gain
115543, during the oral argument in these cases. said that H. No. 1197 was passed in the House
Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jeffer after three readings; that in the Senate it was
son's Manual must be considered to have been considered on first reading and then referred
modified by the legislative practice. If a change to a committee of that body; that although the
is desired in the practice it must be sought in Senate committee did not report out the House
Congress since this question is not covered by" bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which
any constitutional provision but is only an in it had prepared by "taking into consideration"
ternal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) the House bill; that for its part the Conference
of the Constitution provides that "Each House Committee consblidated the two bills and pre
may determine the rules of its proceedings...." pareda compromise version; that the Conference
Committee Report was thereafter approved by
This observation applies to the other conten the House and the Senate, presumably after ap-
^)
tion that the Rules of the two chambers were
likewise disregarded in the preparation of the ,460smenav. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871 (1960).
Jfoffl
tiî
propriate study by their members. We cannot say gress shall embrace only one subject which shall
that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended
were not fully informed of the provisions of the that neither H. No. 1197 nor S. No. 1630 provided
bill. The allegation that the Conference Commit for removal of exemption of PAL transactions
tee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, from the payment of the VAT and that this was
in our view, without warrant in fact and in law. made only in the Conference Committee bill
which became Republic Act No. 7716 without
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to
reflecting this fact in its title.
the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must
*^
be resolved in its favor. Our cases147 manifest firm The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but'
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)SYSTEM, WID
igi) also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a
ENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING
proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
because the requisite votes for its approval had
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEAL
not been obtained or that certain provisions of
:piii ING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
behind the proceedings of a coequal branch ofthe PURPOSES.
•a0 government. There is no reason now to depart
from this rule. Among the provisions of the NIRC amended
is Sec. 103, which originally read:
No claim is here made that the "enrolled
ijgj
bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case143 we § Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. The
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the following shall be exempt from the value-
Journal to determine whether certain provisions added tax:
of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fact that the President of the Sen
ate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, (q) Transactions which are exempt un
admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, der special laws or international agreements
so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled to which the Philippines is a signatory.
bill to consider.
Among the transactions exempted from the
But where allegations that the constitutional VAT were those of PAL because it was exempted
^)
procedures for the passage of bills have not been under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the pay
observed have no more basis than another allega ment of all "other taxes ; . . now or in the near
tion that the Conference Committee "surrepti future," in consideration of the payment by it
tiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise
had prepared, we should decline the invitation tax of 2%.
to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To As a result of its amendment by Republic
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:
would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government. § 103. Exempt transactions. The follow
ing shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. (q) Transactions which are exempt un
11582, namely, that it violates Art. IV, § 26(1) der special laws, except those granted under
which provides that "Every bill passed by Con- Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972,1491,
1590....
ulE.g., Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Casco The effect of the amendment is to remove the
(Phil.)Inc.y. Gimenez, 7 SCRA347 (1963); Morales v. Subido,
27 SCRA 131 (1969).
exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is
,48Astorgav. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974). concerned. .
!&jjj)
IftlM
The question is whether this -amendment of special law, in view of Sec. 24 of P.D. No. 1590
§ 103 of the NtRC is fairly embraced in the title which provides:
^> of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention
is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those This franchise, as amended, or any sec
which the statute amends. We think it is, since tion or provisionhereof may onlybe modified,
the title states that the purpose of the statute is amended, or repealed expressly by a special
lisj
to expand the VATsystem, and one way of doing law or decree that?shall specifically modify,
this is to widen its base by withdrawing some amend, or repeal this franchise or any section
of the exemptions granted before. To insist that or provision thereof.
P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the This provision is evidently intended to pre
law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which vent the amendment of the franchise by mere
it is specifically referred to, would be to insist implication resulting from the enactment of a
ilftl
that the title of a bill should be a complete index later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the
of its content.
fact that a franchise is a contract which can be
The constitutional requirement that every altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in
bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, it was held that
subject which shall be expressed in its title is an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for
intended to prevent surprise upon the members the payment of tax on certain goods and articles
of Congress and to inform the people of pending imported into the Philippines, did not amend the
legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be franchise ofplaintiff, which exempted it fromall
heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, peti taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It
tioner did not know before that its exemption had was held that a special law cannot be amended
%1 been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in by a general law.
the title but perhaps for the same reason other In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act
statutes, although published, pass unnoticed No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise
ggj
until some event somehow calls attention to (P.p. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from
their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's
No. 7716 is not any more general than the title exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within
of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and the powerofCongressto do under Art. XII.§11of
taj
yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The the Constitution, which provides that the grant
title of P.D. No. 1590 is: of a franchise for the operation of a public utility
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRAN is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
CHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. Congress when the common good so requires.
TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAIN
TAIN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the con
uSJ stitutional requirement in such a manner that B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due
courts do not unduly interfere with the enact Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment of
ment of necessary legislation and to consider it Contracts
&&) sufficientifthe title expresses the general subject There is basis for passing upon claims that
of the statute and all its provisions are germane on its face the statute violates the guarantees of
to the general subject thus expressed.149 freedom of speech, press and religion. The pos
It is further contended that amendment sible "chilling effect" which it may have on the
of petitioner's franchise may only be made by essential freedom of the mind and conscience and
the need to assure that the channels of commu
M9See, e.g., Alalayan v. National PowerCorp., 24 SCRA
nication are open and operating importunately
pi
172 (1968); Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962); demand the exercise of this Court's power of
Sumulongv. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941). review.
s^>
kiS
272. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

w
There is, however, no justification for passing reduced, while basic commodities, which before
upon the claims that the law also violates the were taxed at rates ranging from 3%'to 5%, are
fc&i rule that taxation must be progressive and that now taxed at a higher rate.
it denies petitioners' right to due process and
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the
the equal protection of the laws. The reason for
law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed
this different treatment has been cogently stated
iiijiJ
by respondents that in fact-it distributes the tax
by an eminent authority on constitutional law
burden to as many goods and services as possible
thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled particularly to those which are within the reach
by law, it is freedom that commands a moment of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts
^1
of respect; when property is imperiled it is the basic goods and services. It is thus equitable.
lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the those used or consumed by higher-income groups.
presumption of constitutionahty in civil liberties These include real properties held primarily for
cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
values within the due process clause."150 course of business, the right or privilege to use
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
harm makes the need for judicial intervention hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist
less evident and underscores the essential nature buses, and the like. On the other hand, small
of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds business establishments, with annual gross
of regressivity, denial of due process and equal sales of less than P500.000, are exempted. This,
protection and impairment of contracts as a mere according to respondents, removes from the cov
academic discussion of the merits of the law. For erage of the law some 30,000 business establish
i^j}
the fact is that there have even been no notices ments. On the other hand, an occasional paper
of the Center for Research and Communication
of assessments issued to petitioners and no de
terminations at the administrative levels of their cites a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal
claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of impact on inflation and income distribution and
the law and enable us to reach sound judgment
that while additional expenditure for the lowest
income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that
regarding so fundamental questions as those
for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is
raised in these suits.
P8.340 or 2.2%.
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT
Lacking empirical data on which to base
is that it is regressive and that it violates the re
any conclusion regarding these arguments, any
quirement that "The rule of taxation shall be uni
discussion whether the VAT is regressive in
form and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve
the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-
a progressive system of taxation." Petitioners income group in society harder than it will the
in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philip
"VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, pines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely
Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the an academic exercise. On the other hand, the
International Monetary Fund, that "VAT pay CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of
[ffliA
ment by low-income households will be a higher exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing
proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while
than payments by higher-income households. maintaining that granted to electric coopera
That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petition tives, not only goes against the constitutional
ers contend that as a result of the uniform 10% policy to promote cooperatives as instruments
VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies
are in the higher-income bracket, which before such cooperatives the equal protection of the law
lay were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been is actually a policy argument. The legislature is
not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none"
IMP.A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SU in choosing the subject of taxation.
PREME COURT 11 (1950), quoted in Ermita, Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449, Nor is the contention of the Chamber of
459 (1967). Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA),
jgjj
petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will ing the obligation of contracts shall be passed/'
reduce the mark up of its members by as much It is enough tosay that theparties toa contract
$ifti as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere cannot, through theexercise ofprophetic discern
allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the ment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of
Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. the State. For not only are existing laws read
No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its into contracts in order to fix obligations as be
members out ofcirculation because their profits tween parties, but the reservation of essential
from advertisements will notbeenough topayfor attributes of sovereign power is also read into
their tax liability, while purporting to be based contracts as a basic postulateofthe legal order.
H$<± onthe financial statements ofthe newspapers in The policy ofprotecting contracts against impair
question, still falls short of the establishment of ment presupposes the maintenance ofa govern
facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating ment which retains adequate authority to secure
the question whether the tax is oppressive and thepeace and good order ofsociety.
confiscatory.
In truth, the ContractClause has neverbeen
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative stan thought as a limitation on the exercise of the
iii dard for courts to enforce. What Congress is State's power oftaxation save only where a tax
required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve exemption has been granted for a valid consid
a progressive system of taxation." This is a di eration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No.
I =KMt
rective to Congress, just like the directive to it 115852, and wedonot Understandit to make this
to give priority to the enactment of laws for the claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above,
enhancement of human dignity and the reduc is that the removal ofits tax exemption cannot
tion ofsocial, economic and political inequalities be made by a general, butonly by a specific, law.
(Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion ofthe right
The substantive issues raised in someofthe
to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1). These
cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical
provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
form because of the lack of a concrete record.
incentivestolegislation,not as judicially enforce We accept that this Court does, not only ad
able rights.
judicate private cases; that public actions by
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapati- "non-Hohfeldian"162 or ideological plaintiffs are
ranl&1 should have laid to rest the question now now cognizable provided they meet the stand
raised againstthe VAT. There similar arguments ing requirement ofthe Constitution; that under
made against the original VAT Law (Executive Art. VIII, § 1, par. 2 the Court has a "special
Order No. 273) were heldtobehypothetical, with function" of vindicating constitutional rights.
no more basis than newspaper articles which Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that
this Court found to be "hearsay and [without] we do not have before us in these cases a fully
evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 developed factual record that alone can impart
merelyexpands the base ofthe VAT systemand to ouradjudication the impact ofactuality163 to
itscoverage asprovided intheoriginal VAT Law,
further debateon the desirabilityand wisdom of I62The term is Professor Jaffe's (JUDICIAL CONTROL
jg&) the lawshould have shifted to Congress. OFADMJNISTRATIVEACTION [1965]) adopted byJustice
Harlan in his dissent in Fiast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless 120, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 973 (1968) todistinguish between the
personal and proprietary interest oftraditional plaintiffs and
hypothetical is the contention ofCREBA that the thepublic interest ofa citizen suing in a public action. The
|»wi
impositionofthe VAT on the sales and leases of term was mentioned by some members of this Court in the
real estate by virtue of contracts entered into Lotto case (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375,
May 5, 1994).
prior to the effectivity of the law would violate '"Compare Justice Laurel: "Even then, this power of
j&jjj) theconstitutional provision that"No law impair- judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity ofargument by the par
ties, andlimited further totheconstitutional question raised
16,P.A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SU or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
^0)
PREME COURT 11 (1950), quoted in Ermita, Malate Hotel could only leadto dialectics and barrenlegal questions and
and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449 to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities." Angara v.
459 (1967).
Electoral Commission, 63Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
ftffii
m
274 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
insure that decision-makingis informed and well This conception of the judicial power has
grounded. Needless to say,wedonot havepower been affirmed in several cases155 of this Court
iia
to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction following Angara.
over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke
we are being asked to do what the Conference this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention
Committee is preciselyaccused ofhaving donein in what is essentially a case that at best is not
these cases to sit as a third legislative chamber ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be
to review legislation. performed in the context of a concrete case or
We are told, however, that the power of ju controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines
dicial review is not so much power as it is duty our justificationin terms of"cases," and nothing
but "cases." That the other departments of the
imposed on this Court by the Constitution and governmentmay have committed a grave abuse
that we would be remiss in the performance of
IftjSl
of discretion is not an independent ground for
that dutyifwedecline to look behindthe barriers exercising our power. Disregard of the essen
set bythe principle ofseparation ofpowers. Art. tial limits imposed by the case and controversy
VIII, § 1, par. 2 is citedin supportofthis view: requirement can in the long run only result in
Judicial powerincludesthe duty ofthe courts undermining our authority as a court oflaw. For,
ofjustice tosettleactualcontroversies involving as judges, what we are called upon to render is
rights which arelegally demandable andenforce judgment according to what may appear to be
able, and to determine whether or not there has the opinion of the day.
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to ******
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any

^) branch or instrumentality of the Government. In the preceeding pages we have endeavored
to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic
Toview the judicial powerofreview as a duty Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive as
is nothing new. ChiefJustice Marshall said so pects as this has been raised in the various cases
in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power in before us. To sum up, we hold:
Marbury v. Madison:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the
It is emphatically the province and duty Constitution have been complied with by Con
of the judicial department to say what the gress in the enactment of the statute;
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must of necessity expound and inter
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal
pret that rule. If two lawsconflict with each requirements for the enactment of statutes be
im
yond those prescribedby the Constitutionhave
other, the courts must decide on the opera
been observed is precluded by the principle oi
tion of each.154
separation of powers;
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in (3) That the law does not abridge freedom
1936in Angara v. Electoral Commission: of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere
And when the judiciary mediates to with the free exercise of religion, nor deny tc
%> allocate constitutional boundaries, it does any ofthe parties the right to an education; and
not assert any superiority over the other (4) That, in view of the absence of a factual
departments; it does not in reality nullifyor foundation of record, claims that the law is re
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only gressive, oppressive and confiscatory and thai
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation as it violates vested rights protected under the
signedto it by the Constitutionto determine Contract Clause are prematurely raised and dc
conflicting claimsofauthority under the Con notjustify the grant ofprospective reliefby writ
stitution and to establish for the parties in of prohibition.
an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
'"People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94 (1937); Tanada v
Cuenco, 103 Phil.1051,1061-2 (1957); Macias v.COMELEC
1M1 Cranch 137. 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 3 SCRA 1, 7-8 (1961).
L
L
UM
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases 1. Legislation.

are DISMISSED.
ig£ Two steps are required before a bill finally
NOTE: A bill of local application, such as becomes a law. First,it mustbeapproved byCon
one asking for the conversion of a municipality gress. The legislativeactionrequired ofCongress
into a city, is deemed to have originated from the is a positiveact; there is no enactment oflawby
House provided that the bill of the House was legislative inaction. Miller v. Mardo, 2SCRA 398,
filed prior to the filing of the bill in the Senate 908-9 (1961). Second, it must be approved bythe
even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own President. Approval by the President maybe by
version. The VAT case is reiterated. Alvarez v. positive act or by inaction. "The President shall
Guingona, G.R. No. 118303,January 31, 1996. communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the
F. Tobias v. Abalos date ofreceipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become
(See supra under Art. VI, Sec. 5) a law as if he had signed it."
SEC. 27. (1) EVERY BILL'PASSED BY Publication of a bill in every case is indis
THE CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT pensable for its effectivity. However, the legis
BECOMES A LAW, BE PRESENTED TO lature has discretion to determine the manner
THE PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES THE and duration of'publication before effectivity.
SAME, HE SHALL SIGN IT; OTHERWISE, Total omission of publication would be a denial
i'isi
HE SHALL VETO IT AND RETURN THE of due process in that the people would not know
SAME WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE • what laws to obey. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446 (1986).
HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH
SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT
2. Item veto.
LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED
TO RECONSIDER IT. IF, AFTER SUCH
A. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE
Court of Tax Appeals
SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT 185 SCRA 329 (1990)
SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE
OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER HOUSE BY MEDL\LDEA, J:
WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECON In Commissionerof Internal Revenue v. Ma
SIDERED, AND IF APPROVED BY TWO- nila Hotel Corporation; et al., G.R. No. 83250,
THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT September 26, 1989, We overruled a decision
HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN of the Court of Tax Appeals which declared the
ALL SUCH CASES, THE VOTES OF EACH collection of caterer's tax under Section 191-A
HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY of Republic Act No. 6110 illegal because Sec. 42
YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE of House Bill No. 17839, which carries that pro
MEMBERS VOTING FOR OR AGAINST viso, was vetoed by then President Ferdinand E.
SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS JOURNAL. Marcos when the bill was presented to him and
THE PRESIDENT SHALL COMMUNICATE Congress had not taken any step to override the
HIS VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE presidential veto. We held thus:
WHERE IT ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY
The power of the State to impose the
L DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF RECEIPT
THEREOF; OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BE 3% caterer's tax is not debatable. The Court
COME A LAW AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT. of Tax Appeals erred, however, in holding
that the tax was abolished as a result of the
(2) THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE presidential veto of August 4, 1969. It failed
POWER TO VETO ANY PARTICULAR ITEM to examine .the law then, and up to now,
OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION, REV existing on the subject which has always
ENUE, OR TARIFF BILL, BUT THE VETO imposed a 3% caterer's tax on operators of
SHALL NOT AFFECT THE ITEM OR ITEMS restaurants. Since the Manila Hotel oper
TO WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT. ates restaurants in its premises, it is liable
Eiiil
to pay the tax provided in paragraph (1), wines served, the originals of the invoices
Section 206 of the Tax Code. (Commissioner or receipts to be issued to the purchaser or
*ofInternal Revenue v. Manila Hotel Corpora customer.
tion and the Court of Tax Appeals, G. R. No. (3) On proprietors or operators of restau
83250, September 26, 1989) rants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and
The petition now before Us presents an other eating places which are maintained
identical question: whether the presidential veto within the premises or compound of a hotel,
referred to the entire section or merely to the motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai,
lai imposition of 20%tax on gross receipts of opera cabaret, night or day club by means of a con
tors or proprietors of restaurants, refreshments necting door or passage twenty per cent of
parlors, bars and other eating places which are their gross receipts.
maintained within the premises or compound Where the establishments arc operated
of a hotel, motel or resthouses. Reference to the or maintained by clubs ofany kind or nature
Manila Hotel case, therefore, might have been (irrespective of the disposition of their net in
sufficient to dispose ofthis petition were it not for comeand whether or not they cater exclusively
the position ofthe CTAthat a chiefexecutivehas to membersor their guests) the keepersof the
no power to veto part of an item in a bill; either establishments shall pay the corresponding
he vetoes an entire section or approves it but not tax at the rate fixed qpove. (Italics ours)
a fraction thereof.
iSi*)
Republic Act No. 6110 took effect on Septem
Herein private respondent, Manila Golf & ber 1, 1969. By this virtue, petitioners assessed
Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock corporation. the club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and
True, it maintains a golf course and operates a restaurants, and also percentage tax (caterer's
clubhouse with a lounge, bar and dining room, tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/
but these facilities are for the exclusive use of its wines for the period covering September 1969
members and accompanied guests, and it charges to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96.
on cost-plus-expense basis. As such, it claims it The club protested claiming the assessment to be
should have been exempt from payment of privi without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by
lege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of then President Marcos. The veto message reads:
s&j Section 191-A of R. A. No. 6110, otherwise known
as the "Omnibus Tax Law." Section 191-A reads:
"MALACAriANG
Sec. 191-A. Caterer. — A caterer's tax is Manila
fc&4
hereby imposed as follows: August 4, 1969
(1) On proprietors or operators of restau Gentlemen of the House

rants, refreshment parlors and other eating of Representatives:
places, including clubs, and caterers, three I have the honor to inform you that I have
per cent of their gross receipts. this day signed H.B. No. 17839, entitled:
(2) On proprietors or operators ofrestau
'AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN PRO
rants, bars, cafes and other eating places,
VISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL-
including clubs, where distilled spirits, fer
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED'
mented liquors, or wines are served, three
per cent of their gross receipts from sale Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20-(3),
of food or refreshments and seven per cent Article VI, of the Constitution, however, I have
of their gross receipts from sale of distilled vetoedthe following items in this bill:
spirits, fermented liquors or wines. Two sets
xxx xxx xxx
of commercial invoices or receipts serially
numbered in duplicate shall be separately pp. 44, SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section
prepared and issued, one for sale of refresh 191-A which imposes a caterer's tax of three
ments served, and another for each sale percent of the gross receipts of proprietors
of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or or operators of restaurants, refreshment
parlors and other eating places; three percent so essential to the tourist industry, may be
ofgrossreceipts fromsale offood or refresh restrained. These reasons have been taken
ment and seven percent on gross receipts together in the interpretations of the veto
from the sale of distilled spirits, fermented message and the delegations of such en
liquors orwines, on proprietors oroperators terprises as are connected with the tourist
of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eat industryhas therefore beenrecommended.
ing places, including clubs, where distilled
spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are To interpret the veto message otherwise
served; and twenty percent ofgross receipts would result in the exemption ofentities al
tjffifii on proprietor or operators of restaurants, • ready subject of tax. This would be absurd.
refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other Where the Congress wanted toexempt, itwas
eating places maintained within the prem so provided in the bill. While the President
iajijj
ises orcompound ofa hotel, motel, resthouso, mayvetoany item or items in a revenue bill,
cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or theconstitution does not give him the power
dayclub, orwhich are accessible topatrons of to repeal an existing tax. (2nd Indorsement
said establishments by means ofaconnecting dated December 9,1969, Chairman on Ways
door or passage. andMeans, Sixth Congress ofthe Republic
ofthePhil.) (Exhs. 14, p.85, B.I.R. rec). (pp.
The burden of taxation will be shifted to 20-21, Rollo)
the consuming public.
It wasbyreasonofthis interpretationofthe
The development of hotels, essential to Committee that R. A. No. 6110 was published in
our tourist industry, may be restrained con Volume 66, No. 18,p. 4531 ofthe Official Gazette
sidering that a big portion ofhotel earnings (May 4,1970)in such a way that Section 191-A
comes from food sale, x x x"
was included in the text save for the words "ho
This bill, H. B. No. 17839, has become Re tels, motels, resthouses."
public Act No. 6110.
As already mentioned, theCourt ofTax Ap-
Respectfully, peals^ upon petition by the club, sustained the
latter's position reasoning thatthe veto message
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS" was clear and unqualified, as in fact it was con
&jjfl
The protestation ofthe club was denied by firmed three years later, after much controversy,
the petitioner who maintains that Section 42 by the Office ofthe President, thus:
was not entirely vetoed but merely the words
ta "Mr. Antero M. Sison, Jr.
'•hotels, motels, resthouses" ontheground that it
might restrain the development of hotels which San Martin Building, 1564,
A. Mabini, P.O. Box 2288
is essential to the tourism industry. This in fact
Manila, Philippines
was the position of the House Ways and Means
Committee whichreported, to wit: Dear Sir:
When Congress decided to split Section With reference to yourletter dated July 14,
•itiftil
191into twoparts, one dealing with contrac
1972, we wish to inform you that Section 42
tors, and the other dealing with those who
(which contains Sec. 191-A) of House Bill No.
serve food and drinks, the intention was to
17839, now R.A. 6110 was one of the Sections
classify andtoimprove. While theCongress vetoed bythePresident in hisveto message dated
expanded the coverage of both 191 and 191-
August 4, 1969, vetoing certain sections of the
A, it also provided for certain exemptions. said revenue bill.
The veto message seems to object to certain
additions to 191-A. What additions are ob- Very Truly Yours,
jectionablescan be gleaned from the reasons
(SGD.) IRINEO T. AGUIRRE, JR.
given: a general reason that this sort of tax
Presidential Staff Assistant"
kfoi is passed on to the consuming public, and a
particular reason that hotel developments, (p. 49, R0u0)
IS&i
As mentioned earHer, We have already ruled B. Gonzales v. Macaraig

that the presidential veto referred merely to the G.R. No. 87636, November 19,1990
î inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the
20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole DECISION
section. But, as mentioned earlier also, the CTA MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
opined that the President could not veto words
or phrases in a billbut onlyan entire item.Obvi This constitutional controversy between the
ously, what the CTAmeant by "item" was an en legislative and executive departments ofgovern
tire section. We do not agree. But even assuming ment stemmed from Senate Resolution No. 381,
it to be so, it would also be to petitioner's favor. adopted on 2 February 1989:
The ineffectual veto by the President rendered Authorizing and Directing the Commit
the whole Section 191-A as not having been ve tee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
toed at all and it, therefore, became law as an Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit
unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever. with the Supreme Court of the Philippines
(See Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valeria, No. contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto
L-20740,-June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). by the President of Special and General
However, We agree with then Solicitor Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the
General Estelito Mendoza and his associates General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No.
that inclusion of hotels, motels, and resthouses 19186) and For Other Purposes.
in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in Petitioners are thus before us as members
themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art. and ex-officio members of the Committee on
&MI
VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, Finance of the Senate and as "substantial tax
the President has the power to veto. An "item" payers whose vital interests may be affected by
in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire this case."
section imposing a particular kind of tax, but
Respondents are members of the Cabinet
rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate.
tasked with the implementation of the General
In the portion of a revenue bill which actually Appropriations Act of 1989 and 1990, some of
imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and them incumbents, while others have already
enumerates the persons liable therefor with the been replaced, and include the National Treasur
corresponding tax rate. To construe the word er and the Commission on Audit Chairman, all of
"item" as referring to the whole section would whom are being sued in their official capacities.
tie the President's hand in choosing either to
approvethe wholesection at the expenseofalso Tne Background Facts
approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the On 16 December 1988, Congress passed
expense of foregoing the collection of the kind House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropria
of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to tions Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it
be prevented in giving the President the power eliminated or decreased certain items included in
to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be the proposed budget submitted by the President.
perpetrated rendering that power inutile (See Pursuant to the constitutional provision
Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. on the passage of bills, Congress presented the
161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]). said Bill to the President for consideration and
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED approval.
and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in On 29 December 1988, the President signed
CTA Case No. 2630 is set aside. Section 191-A of the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
RA No. 6110 is valid and enforceable and, hence, become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven
the Manila Golf & Country Club Inc. is liable for (7) Special Provisions and Section55,a "General
the amount assessed against it. Provision," were vetoed.
SO ORDERED. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same
L
Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, President, but also that of the President
further expressed: of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
&&I
WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is here Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
by Resolved, That the Senate express its Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional
sense that the veto by the President of Sec Commissions, to augment any item in the
tion 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of general appropriations law for their respec
the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H. B. tive offices from savings in other items of
No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, their respective appropriations. A careful
void and without any force and effect; hence, review of the legislative action on the budget
K&&I
the aforesaid Section 55 remains; as submitted shows that in almost all cases,
the budgets of agencies as recommended by
xxx xxx xxx the President, as well as those of the Senate,
Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Peti the House of Representatives, and the Con
tion for Prohibition/Mandamus was filed, with a stitutional Commissions, have been reduced.
prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary An unwanted consequence of tlfis provision
Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing is the inability of the President, the Presi
mainly the constitutionality or legality of the dent of the Senate, Speaker of the House
Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitu
enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act
No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by tional Commissions to augment any item of
the Court.
appropriation of their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective
appropriations even in cases of calamity or
in the event of urgent need to accelerate the
The Vetoed Provisions and Reasons Therefor
implementation of essential public services
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 and infrastructure projects.
(Section 55 [FY '89] hereinafter), which was ve
toed by the President, reads:
Furthermore, this provision is inconsis
tent with Section 12 and other similar pro
SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Resto visions of this General Appropriations Act.
ration or Increase of Recommended Appro A substantially similar provision as the ve
priations Disapproved and/or Reduced by toed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations
Congress: No item of appropriation recom Act of 1990, this time crafted as follows:
mended by the President in the Budget
submitted to Congress pursuant to Article B. GENERAL PROVISIONS
VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has
been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall Sec. 16. Use of Savings. — The Presi
be restored or increased by the use of appro dent of the Philippines, the President of the
priations authorized for other purposes by Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre
augmentation. An item of appropriation for sentatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
u) any purpose recommended by the President Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commis
in the Budget shall be deemed to have been sions under Article IX of the Constitution
disapproved by Congress if no correspond and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
ing appropriation for the specific purpose is to augment any item in this Act for their
provided in this Act. respective offices from savings in other items
of their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT
We quote below the reason for the Presiden
NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION RECOM
tial veto:
MENDED" BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE
The provision violates Section 25(5) of BUDGET SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION
this Section would nullify not only the con 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS
stitutional and statutory authority of the BEEN DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY
CONGRESS SHALL BE RESTORED OR of the Supreme Court, and heads of Consi

INCREASED BY THE USE OF APPRO tutional Commissions to augment any ite
PRIATIONS AUTHORIZED FOR OTHER of appropriation of their respective offic
PURPOSES IN THIS ACT BY AUGMENTA from savings in other items of their respe
TION. AN ITEM OF APPROPRIATION FOR tive appropriations even in cases of nation
ANYPURPOSE RECOMMENDED BYTHE^ emergency or in the. event of urgent need
PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SHALL BE accelerate the implementation of essenti
DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPROVED public services and infrastructure projects
BY CONGRESS IF NO CORRESPONDING
&H£
APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIFIC The fundamental issue raised is whether i
PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT. not the veto by the President of Section 55 of tl
1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY '89), ar
iliiii)
It should be noted that in the 1989 Appro subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of tr
priations Act, the "Use of Savings" appears in 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90),
Section 12, separate and apart from Section 55; unconstitutional and without effect.
whereas in the 1990 Appropriations Act, the
"Use of Savings" and the vetoed provision have The Contending Views
been commingled in Section 16 only, with the
vetoed provision made to appear as a condition In essence, petitioners' cause is anchore
or restriction. on the following grounds: (1) the President
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills:
Essentially the same reason was given for limited to item/s and does not cover provision/.
the veto of Section 16 (FY '90), thus: therefore, she exceeded her authority when sh
I am vetoing this provision for the reason vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (F
that it violates Section 25(5) of Article VI of '90) which are provisions; (2) when the Presides
the Constitution in relation to Sections 44 objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, sh
and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. cannot exercise the item-veto power but shoul
No. 6670 which authorizes the President veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power doe
to use savings to augment any item of ap not carry with it the power to strike out cond:
propriations in the Executive Branch of the tions or restrictions for that would be legislatior
1^
Government. in violation of the doctrine of separation of pow
ers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Articl
Parenthetically, there is a case pending VI, Section 25[5] of the 1987 Constitution, has t
in the Supreme Court relative to the validity be provided for by law and, therefore, Congres
&y>
of the President's veto on Section 55 of the is also vested with the prerogative to impos
General Provisions of Republic Act No. 6688 restrictions on the exercise of that power.
upon which' the amendment on this Section
was based. Inclusion, therefore, of the pro The Solicitor General, as counsel for publi
viso in the last sentence of this section might respondents, counters that the issue at bar is j
prejudice the Executive Branch's position in political question beyond the power ofthis Cour
the case. to determine; that petitioners had a politica
remedy, which was to override the veto; tha
Moreover, if allowed, this Section would Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to
nullify not only the constitutional and statu the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits th<
tory authority of the President, but also that President's veto; that the power of the Presiden
of the officials enumerated under Section to augment items in the appropriations for th<
25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution, to executive branches had already been providec
augment any item in the general appropria for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44
tions law for their respective appropriations.. and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended b)
An unwanted consequence of this provi Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the
sion would be the inability of the President, President is empowered by the Constitution tc
the President of the Senate, Speaker of the veto provisions or other "distinct and severable
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
iki&b
The Extent of the President's Item-veto Power all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other
The focal issue for resolution is whether or words, the power given the executive to disap
not the President exceeded the item-veto power prove any item or items in an Appropriations
accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part
has the President the power to veto "provisions" ofan item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.
ijfkl of an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY '89) Originally, item veto exclusively referred to
and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions and not veto of items of appropriation bills and first came.
items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the into being in the former Organic Act, the Act of
item-veto power of the President. Congressof29 August 1916.This was followed by
the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar
The veto power of the President is expressed provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except
in Article VT,Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that the veto power was made more expansive
reading, in full, as follows: by the inclusion of this sentence:
Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the xxx When a provision of an appropria
jflfiift
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be tion bill affects one or more items of the same,
presented to the President. Ifhe approves the the President cannot veto the provision with
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto out at the same time vetoing the particular
it and return the same with his objections to item or items to which it relates xxx.
the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal The 1935 Constitution further broadened the
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such re President's veto power to include the veto of item
^J
consideration, two-thirds of all the Members or items of revenue and tariff bills.
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it With the advent of the 1973 Constitution,
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the section took a more simple and compact
iiiiiiii) the other House by which it shall likewise be form, thus:
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall Section 20(2). The Prime Minister shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of have the power to veto any particular item or
each House shall be determined by yeas or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
nays, and the names of the Members voting bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
for or against shall be entered in its Journal. items to which he does not object.
The President shall communicate his veto
of any bill to the House where it originated It is to be noted that the counterpart provi
within thirty days after the date of receipt sion in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Sec
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as tion 27[2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction
if he had signed it. except for the public official concerned. In other
words, also eliminated has been any reference
(2) The President shall have the power to the veto of a provision. The vital question is:
to veto any particular item or items in an should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but a disallowance of the power to veto a provision,
the veto shall not affect the item or items to as petitioners urge?
which he does not object.
The terms item and provision in budgetary
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto legislation and practice are concededly differ
power of the President and if exercised would ent. An item in a bill refers to the particulars,
result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general the details, the distinct and severable parts x
rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the x x of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an
item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated
the exercise of the veto over a particular item or purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d
^
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United
As specified, the President may not veto less than States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v.
te^
Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S. Ct But in exercising that authority he may no
252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an item of an be confined to rules of strict constructioi
gii> appropriation bill obviously means an item which or hampered by the unwise interference o
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not the judiciary. The courts will indulge ever
some general provision of law, which happens to intendment in favor of the constitutional
be put into an appropriation bill." ity of a veto the same as they will presum<
It is our considered opinion that, notwith the constitutionality "of an act as originalh
standing the elimination in Article VI, section passed by the Legislature (Commonwealtl
27(2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L. R. A.
im)
to the veto of a provision the extent of the Presi 882; People v. Board of Councilmen [1892]
dent's veto power as previously defined by the 20 N. Y. S., 52; Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 10<
1935 Constitution has not changed. This is be Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State [1927], 53 A. L
R., 258 [at 9171).
cause the eliminated proviso merely pronounces
the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate Inappropriateness of the so-called ^Provisions"
veto. (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., But even assuming arguendo thatproviswni3
912, 916 [1926]; 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J, The are beyond the executive power to veto, we are ol
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the opinion that Section 55 (FY '89) and Sectior
1st ed.? 154-155 [1988]). 16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary
The restrictive interpretation urged by sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25(2) of the
petitioners that the President may not veto a 1987 Constitution provides:
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
Sec. 25(2) No provision or enactment
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
shall be embraced in the general appropria
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
tions bill unless it relates specifically to some
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitu
particular appropriation therein. Any such
tional mandate that any provision in the general
provision or enactment shall be limited in
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to
its operation to the appropriation to which
some particular appropriation therein and that
it relates.
any such provision shall be limited in its opera
tion to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Explicit is the requirement that a provision
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25[2]). In other in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifi
words, in the true sense of the term, a provision cally to some "particular appropriation" therein.
in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its opera The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
tion to some particular appropriation to which requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do
it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. not relate to any particular or distinctive ap
propriation. They apply generally to all items
Petitioners' further submission that, since
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Ap
the exercise of the veto power by the President
propriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
partakes of the nature of legislative powers it
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face
should be strictly construed, is negatived by the
following dictum in Bengzon, supra, reading: of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to
be made to the original recommendations made
The Constitution is a limitation upon by the President and to the source indicated
the power of the legislative department of by petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative
the government, but in this respect it is a Budget Research and Monitoring Office"(Annex
grant of power to the executive department. B-l and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sec
The Legislature has the affirmative power tions are more of an expression of Congressional
^0
to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the policy in respect of augmentation from savings
negative power by the constitutional exercise rather* than a budgetary appropriation. Conse
of which he may defeat the will of the Leg quently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY
islature. It follows that the Chief Executive '90) although labeled as "provisions," are actually
must find his authority in the Constitution. inappropriate provisions that should be treated
as items for the purpose of the President's veto Inappropriateness of the so-called "Conditions/
power (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, Restrictions"
to 157-158).
Petitioners maintain, however, that Con
Just as the President may not use his gress is free to impose conditions in an Appro
item-veto to'usurp constitutional powers priations Bill and where conditions are attached,
conferred on the legislature, neither can the veto power does not carry with it the power to
the legislature deprive the Governor of the strike them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson
constitutional powers conferred on him as (11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics
chief executive officer of the state including Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30,
in a general appropriation bill matters more 1964,11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory
properly enacted in separate legislation. The is that Section 55 (FY'89) and Section 16 (FY'90)
Governor's constitutional power to veto bills are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond
of general legislation ... cannot be abridged the veto power.
by the careful placement of such measures in
a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing There can be no denying that inherent in the
the Governor to choose between approving power of appropriation is the power to specify
how money shall be spent; and that in addition to
unacceptable substantive legislation or ve
toing 'items' of expenditure essential to the distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature
may include in Appropriation Bills qualifica
operation of government. The legislature
tions, conditions, hmitations or restrictions on
cannot by location of a bill give it immunity
expenditure offunds. Settled also is the rule that
from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent
the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition
the Governors veto power over substantive
or proviso of an appropriation, while allowing
legislation by artfully drafting general law
the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v.
measures so that they appear to be true
Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling
conditions or limitations on an item- of ap
in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a
propriation. Otherwise, the legislature would
condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not
be permitted to impair the constitutional
include a veto of the items to which the condition
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
related was deemed invalid and without effect
branch of government in contravention of
whatsoever.
the separation of powers doctrine . . . We
are no more willing to allow the legislature However, for the rule to apply, restrictions
to use its appropriation power to infringe on should be such in the real sense of the term, not
the Governor's constitutional right to veto some matters which are more properly dealt with
matters of substantive legislation than we in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La,
are to allow the Governor to encroach on 346, So 2d 153). Restrictions or conditions in an
the constitutional powers of the legislature. Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection
In order to avoid this result, we hold that, with money items in a budgetary sense in the
when the legislature inserts inappropriate schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is ap
provisions in a general appropriation bill, propriateness.
such provisions must be treated as 'items'for
It is not enough that a provision be re
purposes of the Governor's item veto power
lated to the institution or agency to which
over general appropriation bills.
funds are appropriated. Conditions and
xxx xxx xxx limitations properly included in an appro
priation bill must exhibit such a connexity
xxx Legislative control cannot be exer
with money items of appropriation that they
cised in such a manner as to encumber the
logicallybelong in a schedule of expenditures
general appropriation bill with veto-proof
... the ultimate test is one of appropriateness
'logrolling measure,' special interest provi (Henry v. Edwards, supra, at 158).
sions which could not succeed if separately
enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY '89)
legislation incorporated in a bill to insure and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to be
passage without veto, xxx (Italics supplied) inappropriate "conditions." While they, particu-
jjijjp
larly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been "artfully as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25(5) of the
drafted" to appear as true conditions or limita Constitution. Said provision reads:
tions, they are actually general law measures
more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed au
separate legislation. thorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the
Further, neither of them shows the neces Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre
sary connection with a schedule of expenditures. sentatives, the ChiefJustice of the Supreme
The reason, as explained earlier, is that items Court, and the heads of Constitutional Com-
reduced or disapproved by Congress would not cmissions may, by law, be authorized to aug
appear on the face of the enrolled bill or Appro ment any item in the general appropriations
priations Act itself. They can only be detected law for their respective offices from savings
when compared with the original budgetary sub in other items of their respective appropria
mittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY tions (Italics ours).
'89) and 16 (FY '90) themselves provide that an
item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to aug- «
ment from savings lies dormant until authorized
by Congress if no corresponding appropriation by law.
for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."
This Court upheld the validity of the power
Considering that the vetoed provisions are
of augmentation from savings in Demetria v.
not, in the budgetary sense of the term, condi
^) Alba, which ruled:
tions or restrictions, the case of Bolinao Electron
ics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by x x x to afford the heads of the different
petitioners, becomes inapplicable. In that case, branches of the government and those of
a public works bill contained an item appropri the constitutional, commissions consider
ating a certain sum for assistance to television able flexibility in the use of public funds
stations, subject to the condition that the amount and resources, the constitution allowed the
would not be available to places where there were enactment of a law authorizing the transfer
commercial television stations. Then President of funds for the purpose of augmenting an
Macapagal approved the appropriation but ve item from savings in another item in the
toed the condition. When challenged before this appropriation of the government branch or
Court, it was held that the veto,was ineffectual constitutional body concerned. The leeway
and that the approval of the item carried with it granted was thus limited. The purpose and
the approval of the condition attached to it. In conditions for which funds may be trans
contrast with the case at bar, there is no condi ferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be
tion, in the budgetary sense ofthe term, attached allowed for the purpose of augmenting an
to an appropriation or item in the appropriation item and such transfer may be made only if
bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sec there are savings from another item in the
tions 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) partake more appropriation of the government branch
of a curtailment on the power to augment from or constitutional body (G.R. No. 71977, 27
savings; in other words, "a general provision of February 1987, 148 SCRA 214).
api law, which happens to be put in an appropriation The 1973 Constitution contained an identical
bill" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra). authority to augment from savings in its Article
VIII, Section 16(5), except for mention of the
The Power ofAugmentation and The Validity Prime Minister among the officials vested with
of the Veto that power.166
The President promptly vetoed Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they ,56Sec. 16(5) — No law shall be passed authorizing any
nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime
the heads of different branches of government to Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
augment any item in the General Appropriations Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may
by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
Law for their respective offices from savings in appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
other items of their respective appropriations, in other items of their respective appropriations.
In 1977, the statutory authority ofthe Presi And once given, the heads of the different
dent to augment any appropriation ofthe execu branches of the Government and those of the
tive department in the General Appropriations Constitutional Commissionsare afforded consid
Actfrom savings was specifically provided forin erable flexibility in the use of public funds and
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, as resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra).The doctrine
Ml amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwise ofseparation ofpowers is in no way endangered
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." because the transfer is made within a depart
It reads:
ment (or branch of government) and not fromone
fortl
Sec. 44. x x x department (branch) toanother (CRUZ, Isagani
A, Philippine Political Law [1989], p. 155).
The President shall, likewise, have the
authority to augment any appropriation of » When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90),
igj
the Executive Department in the General therefore, prohibit the restoration orincrease by
Appropriations Act, from savings in the ap- - augmentation of appropriations disapproved or
propriations of another department, bureau, reduced by Congress, they impair the constitu
office or agencywithin the Executive Branch, tional and statutory authority of the President
pursuant to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. and other key officials to augment any item or
.16(5) of the Constitution (now Sec. 25[5], any appropriation from savings in the interest of
Art. VI) (Emphasis ours). (N.B.: The first expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such
paragraph declared void in Demetria v.Alba, authority in respect of disapproved or reduced
supra, has been deleted). items by no means vests in the Executive the
power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners
Similarly,the use by the President ofsavings contend, the leeway granted being delimited to
to cover deficits'is specifically authorized in the transfers within the department or branch con
same Decree. Thus: cerned, the sourcing to comeonly from savings.
Sec. 45. Authority to Use Savings in More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for
Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except such a special power as that of augmentation
as otherwise provided in the General Ap fromsavings, the same is merelyincorporated in
propriations Act, any savings in the regular the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropria
appropriations authorized in the General tions Bill is "one the primary and specific aim of
Appropriations Act for programs and projects which is to make appropriation of moneyfrom the
of any department, office or agency, may, public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary ofJustice,
with the approval of the President be used to 292 U.S., 410, 57 S. Ct. 252). It is a legislative
cover a deficit in any other item of the regular authorization of receipts and expenditures. The
appropriations: xxx • power ofaugmentation from savings, on the other
A more recent grant is found in Section 12 hand, can by no means be considered a specific
of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation
text of which is repeated in the first paragraph item inserted in an appropriation measure.
of Section 16 (FY '90). Section 12 reads: The same thing must be said of Section
Sec. 12. Use ofSavings.—The President, 55 (FY '89), taken in conjunction with Section
the President of the Senate, the Speaker 12, and Section 16 (FY '90), which prohibit the
of the House of Representatives, the Chief restoration or increase by augmentation of ap
Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of propriations disapproved and or reduced by
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Congress. They are non-appropriation items,
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to aug an appropriation being a setting apart by law
ment any item in this Act for their respective of a certain sum from the public revenue for a
offices from savings in other items of their specified purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of Jus
respective appropriations. tice, 62 Phil. 912, 916 [1936]). It bears repeating
that they are more of a substantive expression
There should be no question, therefore, that of a legislative objective to restrict the power of
statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. augmentation granted to the President and other
Sjjl
key officials.They are actually matters ofgeneral SO ORDERED.

law and more properly the subject of a separate,
iii) legislation that will embody, define and delimit Cruz, J., see dissent.
the scope of the special power of augmentation Gutierrez, J., see dissent.
from savings instead of being inappropriately
Padilla, J., see dissent.
$$}
incorporated annually in the Appropriation Act.
To sanction this practice would be to give the
Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold
the power from the Executive and other officials, C. Philconsa v. Enriquez
m*
and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
that power.
If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section QUIASON, Jr.
55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90), Congress, as
Onceagain this Court is called upon the rule
petitioners argue, intended to amend or repeal
on the conflictingclaims ofauthority between the
Pres. Decree No. 1177, with all the more reason
Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the
should it have so provided in a separate enact
powers ofthe purse and the sword. Providing the
ment, it being basic that implied repeals are not
focus for the contest between the President and
favored. For the same reason, we cannot sub
the Congress over control of the national budget
scribe to petitioners' allegation that Pres. Decree are the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention
No. 1177 has been revoked by the 1987 Constitu is being sought by a group of concerned taxpay
tion. The 1987 Constitution itselfprovides for the ers on the claim that Congress and the President
continuance of laws, decrees, executive orders, have impermissibly exceed their respective au
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other thorities, and by several Senators on the claim
executive issuances not inconsistent with the that the President has committed grave abuse
Constitution until amended, repealed, or revoked of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the
(1987 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3). exercise of his veto power.
If, indeed, the legislature believed that the
exercise of the veto powers by the executive were I
'$&$ unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropria
Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto tion Bill of 1994 (GABof 1994), was passed and
may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of approved by both houses of Congress on Decem
I^J
members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article ber 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no and limitations on certain items of appropria
attempt to override the Presidential veto. Peti- * tions in the proposed budget previously submit
tioners' argument that the veto is ineffectual so ted by the President. It also authorized members
that there is "nothing to override" (citing Bolinao) of Congress to propose and identify projects in
has lost force and effect with the executive veto the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to reahgn
having been herein upheld. their respective operating budgets.
As we see it, there need be no future conflict Pursuant to the procedure on the passage
if the legislative and executive branches of gov and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Con
ernment adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, stitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
each exercising its respective powers with due President for consideration and approval.
deference to the constitutional responsibilities
and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate
On December 30,1993, the President signed
the bill into law, and declared the same to have
equilibrium of governmental powers remains on
^>
even keel.
become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR of Budget and Management, the National Trea
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the surer, and the COA.
$ity
same day, the President delivered his Presiden
tial Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the Petitioners Tanada and Romulo sued as
bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain members of the Philippine Senate and taxpay
conditions.
ers, while petitioner Freedom from Debt Coali
VfAl
tion sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the
No step was taken in either House of Con constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the
gress to override the vetoes. special provision in the appropriations for debt
'jiiill
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Con service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefor.
stitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and
Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Tanada and
writ ofprohibition to declare as unconstitutional Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide prohibition and mandamus against the same
Development Fund, the special provision in respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this peti
Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for tion, petitioners contest the constitutionality of:
ijpl
Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the (1) the veto on four special provisions added to
Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of
(^ of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2)
of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the the conditions imposed by the President in the
veto of the President of the Special Provision implementation of certain appropriations for the
of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing
88-90. 104-105). Authority (NHA).
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of Petitioners also-sought the issuance of tem
the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo J. porary restraining orders to enjoin respondents
'Hgji
Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chair Secretary of Budget and Management, National
man of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Treasurer and COA from enforcing the ques
Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of tioned provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Court declined to grant said provisional reliefs
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the on the time-honored principle of according the
Department of Budget and Management, and presumption of validity to statutes and the pre
the National Treasurer. sumption of regularity to official acts.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpay In view of the importance and novelty of
ers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality most of the issues raised in the four petitions,
of the conditions imposed by the President in the the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene
Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Om Cortes to submit their respective memoranda as
budsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, Amicus Curiae, which they graciously did.
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and II
Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of
lajij the veto of the special provision in the appropria
tion for debt service. III
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. G.R. No. 113105

*iy Romulo and Wigberto Tanada (a co-petitioner
1. Countrywide Development Fund.
in G.R. No. 113174), together with the Free
dom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Coun
corporation, sought the issuance of the writs of trywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00
prohibition and mandamus against the Execu to "be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambu
tive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department lances and computers and other priority projects
^
and activities and credit facilities to qualified tion of a law. They argue that the proposal and
beneficiaries." Said Article provides: identification of the projects do not involve the
making of laws or the repeal and amendment
"COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND thereof, the only function given to the Congress
by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78-86).
For Fund requirements of countrywide de
^) velopment projects P2,977,000,000 Under the Constitution, the spending power
called by James Madison as "the power of the
purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to
Special Provisions the veto power of the President. The President
may propose the budget, but still the final say
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount
on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the
herein appropriated shall be used for infrastruc
Congress.
ture, purchase of ambulances and computers and
other priority projects and activities, and credit The power of appropriation carries with it
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed the power to specify the project or activity to be
and identified by officials concerned according funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
to the following allocations: Representatives, detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each;
The Countrywide Development Fund is
Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That,
explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure,
the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a
revolving fund to be administered by a govern purchase of ambulances and computers and
other priority projects and activities and credit
ment financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund
for lending operations. Prior years releases to facilities to qualified beneficiaries. . . ." It was
local government units and national government Congress itself that determined the purposes for
agencies for this purpose shall be turned over the appropriation.
to the government financial institution which Executive function under the Countrywide
shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities Development Fund involves implementation of
released from this fund. the priority projects specified in the law.
The fund shall be automatically released The authority given to the members of Con
^^
quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and gress is only to propose and identify projects to be
Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned implemented by the President. Under Article XLI
implementing agency not later than five (5) days of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce
after the beginning of each quarter upon submis examine whether the proposals submitted by
sion of the list of projects and activities by the the members of Congress fall within the specific
officials concerned. items of expenditures for which the Fund was set
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The up, and if qualified, he next determines whether
Department of Budget and Management shall they are in line with other projects planned for
submit within thirty (30) days after the end of the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects
each quarter a report to the Senate Commit qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the
tee on Finance and the House Committee on President who shall implement them. In short,
Appropriations on the releases made from this the proposals and identifications made by the
Fund. The report shall include the listing of the members of Congress are merely recommenda
$~i projects, locations, implementing agencies and tory.
the endorsing officials" (GAA of 1994, p. 1245). The procedure of proposing and identifying
Petitioners claim that the power given to the by members of Congress of particular projects or
members of Congress to propose and identify the activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994
projects and activities to be funded by the Coun is imaginative as it is innovative.
trywide Development Fund is an encroachment The Constitution is a framework of a work
jjflffi
by the legislature on executive power, since said able government and its interpretation must
power in an appropriation act is in implementa take into account the complexities, realities
is)
and politics attendant to the operation of the Petitioners assail the special provision al
poUtical branches of government. Prior to the lowing a member of Congress to realign his
GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of allocation for operational expenses to any other
appropriations for the constituents of the mem expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that
bers of Congress, with the members close to the this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article
§fe>
Congressional leadership or who hold cards for VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
"horse-trading," getting more than their less fa
"No law shall be passed authorizing any
vored colleagues. The members of Congress also
transfer of appropriations: however, the
had to reckon with an unsympathetic President,
President, the President of the Senate, the
iilii)
who could exercise his veto power to cancel from
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
the appropriation bill a pet project of a Repre
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
sentative or Senator.
heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
The Countrywide Development Fund at by law, be authorized to augment any item
tempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a in the general appropriations law for their
recognition that individual members ofCongress, respective offices from savings in other items
^) far more than the President and their congres of their respective appropriations."
sional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable The proviso of said Article of the Constitu
about the needs of their respective constituents
tion grants the President of the Senate and the
and the priority to be given each project.
Speaker of the House of Representatives the
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
power to augment items in an appropriation act
for their respective offices from savings in other
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation items of their appropriations, whenever there is
î
for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which a law authorizing such augmentation.
P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for current
The special provision on realignment of the
operating expenditures, while the appro
priation for the House of Representatives is operating expenses of members of Congress is
Pl,171,924,000.00 of which Pl,165,297,000.00 is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provi
sions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
appropriated for current operating expenditures
(GAA of 1994, pp. 2,4, 9, 12). "Expenditure Components. Except by
act of the Congress of the Philippines, no
change or modification shall be made in the
The Special Provision Applicable to the Con expenditure items authorized in this Act and
*0 gress of the Philippines provides: other appropriation laws unless in cases of
augmentations from savings in appropria
"4. Realignment of Allocation for Op tions as authorized under Section 25(5) of
erating Expenses. A member of Congress Article VI of the Constitution." (GAA of 1994,
may realign his allocation for operational p. 1273).
. expenses to any other expense category
provided the total of said allocation is not Petitioners argue that the Senate President
exceeded." (GAA of 1994, p. 14). and the Speaker ofthe House ofRepresentatives,
but not the individual members of Congress are
The appropriation for operating expenditures the ones authorized to realign the savings as
for each House is further divided into expendi appropriated.
tures for salaries, personal services, other com
pensation benefits, maintenance expenses and Under the Special Provisions applicable to
other operating expenses. In turn, each member the Congress of the Philippines, the members
of Congress is allotted for his own operating ex of Congress only determine the necessity ofthe
penditure a proportionate share ofthe appropria realignment ofthe savings in the allotments for
tion for the House to which he belongs. Ifhe does their operating expenses. They are in the best
not spend for one item of expense, the provision position to do so because they are the ones who
in question allows him to transfer his allocation know whether there are deficiencies in other
in said item to another item of expense. items oftheir operating expenses that need aug-
mentation. However, it is the Senate President As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
as the case may be, who shall approve the re and improve the facility of the public school
alignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, system. The compensation of teachers has been
these two officials will have to see to it that: doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
(1) The funds to be realigned or trans aside for the Department of Education, Culture
ferred are actually savings in the items of and Sports under the General Appropriations
expenditures from which the same are to be Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
taken; and allocation among all. department budgets. This
tsi
is a clear compliance with the aforesaid consti
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the tutional mandate according highest priority to
purpose of augmenting the items of expen education.
sgj
diture to which said transfer or realignment
is to be made.
Having faithfully complied therewith,
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
While Congress appropriated enormous debt, the greater portion of which was
P86,323,428,000.00 for debt service (Article inheiited from the previous administration. It
XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Educa credit standing of the country. More especially,
tion, Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that the very survival of our economy is at slake.
Congress cannot give debt service the highest Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) an amount for debt service bigger than the share
because under the Constitution it should be allocated to education, the Court finds and so
education that is entitled to the highest funding. holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, assailed as unconstitutional."
which provides:
G.R. NO. 113105
"(5) The State shall assign the highest
G.R. NO. 113174
budgetary priority to education and ensure
•iyi>
that teaching will attract and retain its right Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
ful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of The Congress added a Special Provision to
EM job satisfaction and fulfillment." Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service)
of the GAA of 1994 which provides:
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v.
Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)j where this court "Special Provisions.
held that Section 5(5), Article XTV of the Consti 1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation
tution, is merely directory, thus: authorized herein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foreign and domestic
"While it is true that under Section 5(5),
indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in
Article XTV of the Constitution, Congress is
excess of the amount herein appropriated shall
mandated to 'assign the highest budgetary
priority to education' in order to 'insure that be subject to the approval of the President of the
teaching will attract and retain its rightful Philippines with the concurrence of the congress
juf'V
share of the best available talents through of the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
adequate remuneration and other means of
in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
job satisfaction and fulfillment,' it does not liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquida
tors.
thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power 2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko
to respond to the imperatives of the national Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department of Fi
interest and for the attainment of other state nance shall submit a quarterly report of actual
policies or objectives. foreign and domestic debt service payments to
iMt
the House Committee on Appropriations and the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Senate Finance Committee within one (1) month Liquidators'" (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
after each quarter" (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot
The President vetoed the first Special Pro veto the Special Provision on the appropria
vision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 tion for debt service without vetoing the entire
appropriation for debt service in said Article. amount of P86,323,4<J8.00 for said purpose
According to the President's Veto Message: (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General
"IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT counterposed that the Special Provision did not
SERVICE
relate to the item of appropriation for debt service
I would like to emphasize that I concur and could therefore be the subject of an item veto
flffii fully with the desire of Congress to reduce (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60;<JRollo, G.R.No.
the debt burden by decreasing the appropria 113174, pp. 72-82).
tion for debt service as well as the inclusion
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put
of the Special Provision quoted below. Nev to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA
ertheless, I believe that this debt reduction 452 (1990). In that case, the issue was stated by
scheme cannot be validly done through the the Court, thus:
1994 GAA. This must be addressed by revis
ing our debt policy by way of innovative and 'The fundamental issue raised is wheth
comprehensive debt reduction programs con er or not the veto by the President of Section
ceptualized within the ambit of the Medium- 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
Term Philippine Development Plan. FY '89, and subsequently of its counterpart
:Mt
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
Appropriations for payment of public debt,
(Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and
whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
without effect."
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing
Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated The Court re-stated the issue, just so there
under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. would not be any misunderstanding about it,
292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish thus:
Wfil to emphasize that the constitutionality of such
automatic provisions on debt servicing has been 'The focal issue for resolution is whether
upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Teo- or not the President exceeded the item-veto
fisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, power accorded by the Constitution. Or dif
Jr. v. Hon. GuillermoN Carague, in his capacity ferently put, has the President the power to
as Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.,' veto '[provisions' of an Appropriations Bill?"
G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22, 1991. The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which
I am, therefore vetoing the following special are similar to those invoked in the present case,
provision for the reason that the GAA is not the are stated as follows:
appropriate legislative measure to amend the "In essence, petitioners' cause is an
ajfefl provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. chored on the following grounds: (1) the
No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292: President's line-veto power as regards ap
'Use of the Fund. The appropriation propriation bills is limited to item/s and does
îl
authorized herein shall be used for pay not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded
ment of principal and interest of foreign her authority when she vetoed Section 55
and domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED, (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are
That any payment in excess of the amount provision; (2) when the President objects to
herein appropriated shall be subject to the a provision of an appropriation bill, she can
approval of the President of the Philippines not exercise the item-veto power but should
with the concurrence of the Congress of the veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power
Philippines; PROVIDED FURTHER, That does not carry with it the power to strike
in no case shall this fund be used to pay for out conditions or restrictions for that would
f${\
- be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and
separation of powers; and (4) the power of to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by
&&i augmentation in Article VT, Section 25(5) of the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for should be done in a separate law, not in the ap
by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested propriations law.
with the prerogative to impose restrictions
on the exercise of that power. The Court will indulge every intendment in
favor of the constitutionahty of a veto, the same
The restrictive interpretation urged by as it will presume the constitutionality of an act
petitioners that the President may not veto of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31
a provision without vetoing the entire bill Ariz. 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may The veto power, while exercisable by the
ha
be the subject of a separate veto but also President, is actually a part of the legislative
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as
any provision in the general appropriations Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found hi
bill shall relate specifically to some particu Article VI on the Legislative Department rather
lar appropriation therein and that any such than in ArticleVII on the Executive Department
provision shall be limited in its operation to in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound
the appropriation to which it relates (1987 basis to indulge in the presumption of validity
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25[2]). In of a veto. The burden shifts on those question
other words, in the true sense of the term, a ing the validity thereof to show that its use is a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited violation of the Constitution.
in its operation to some particular appropria
Under his general veto power* the President
tion to which it relates, and does not relate
has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts
to the entire bill."
thereof (1987 Constitution, Aft. VI, Sec. 27[1]).
The Court went one step further and rules The exception to the general veto power is the
that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" power given to the President to veto any par
are beyond the executive power to veto, and ticular item or items in a general appropriations
Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[21). In so
not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the doing, the President must veto the entire item.
term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that
should be treated as "items" for the purpose of A general appropriations bill is a special
the President's veto power. type of legislation, whose content is limited to
specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The
346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 Temple
include in a general appropriations bill matters Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropri The item veto was first introduced by the
ate provisions inserted by it must be treated as Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S.
"item," which can be vetoed by the President in Congress on August 29, 1916. The concept was
the exercise of his item-veto power. adopted from some State Constitutions.
It is readily apparent that the Special Pro Cognizant of the legislative practice of insert
u
vision applicable to the appropriation for debt ing provisions, including conditions, restrictions
service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of and limitations, to items in appropriations bills,
the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "in the Constitutional Convention added the follow
appropriate" provision referring to funds other ing sentence to Section 20(2), Article VT of the
than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the 1935 Constitution:
General Appropriations Act of 1991.
"... When a provision of an appropriation
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an bill affects one or more items of the same, the
attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 President cannot veto the provision without
at the same time vetoing the particular item conferred on the legislature, neither can the
or items to which it relates " legislature deprive the Governor of the con
• In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the stitutional powersconferred on him as chief
President was empbwered to veto separately executive officer ofthe state byincluding in
not only items in an appropriations bill but also a general appropriation bill matters more
|&s) "provisions." properlyenacted in separate legislation.The
Governor's constitutional power to veto bills
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain ofgeneral legislation ... cannot beabridged
the aforementioned sentence added to Section by the careful placement of such measures
11(2) of Article VI.of the 1935 Constitution, it in a general appropriation bill, therebyforc
included the following provision: ing the Governor to choose between approv
"No provision or enactment shall be em ing unacceptable substantive legislation or
\mi
braced in the general appropriations bill unless it vetoing 'items' of expenditures essential to
relates specifically to someparticular appropria the operation ofgovernment. The legislature
tion therein. Any such provision or enactment cannot bylocation of a bill give it immunity
shall be limited in its operationto the appropria from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent
tion to which it relates3 (Art.VI, Sec. 25[2]). the Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omis measures so that they appear to be true
in) sion of that sentence of Section 16(2) ofthe 1935 conditions or limitations on an item of ap
Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not propriation. Otherwise, the legislature would
be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the be permitted to impair the constitutional
power of the President to veto a "provision." responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
As the Constitution is explicit that the responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
provision which Congress can include in an branch of government in contravention of
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to the separation of powers doctrine . . . We
some particular appropriation therein" and "be are no more willing to allow the legislature
limited in its operation to the appropriation to to use its appropriation power to infringe on
which it relates," it follows that any provision the Governor's constitutional right to veto
&y
which does not relate to any particular item, or matters of substantive legislation than we
which extends in its operation beyond an item are to allow the Governor to encroach on
ofappropriation, is considered "aninappropriate the constitutional powers of the legislature.
provision" which can be vetoed separately from In order to avoid this result, we hold that,
an item. Also to be included in the category of when the legislature inserts inappropriate
"inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions in a general appropriation bill,
provisions and provisions which are intended to suchprovisions mustbetreated as Items'for
amend other laws, because clearly these kind purposes of the Governor's item veto power
of laws have no place in anappropriations bill. over general appropriation bills.
These *are matters of general legislation more xxx xxx xxx
iiîi appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
FormerJustice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, ". . . Legislative control cannot be exer
commented that Congress cannot by law estab cised in such a manner as to encumber the
lish conditions for and regulate the exercise of general appropriation bill with veto-proof
powers ofthe President given by the Constitution 'log-rollingmeasures,' special interest provi
for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion sions which could not succeed if separately
into executiveprerogative. enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of leg
islation incorporated in a bill to insure pas
The doctrine of"inappropriate provision" was sage without veto " (Emphasis supplied).
well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra, thus:
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo
"Just as the President may not use his that the veto of the Special Provision on the
item-veto to usurp constitutional powers ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President
^1
cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt "(H.7) West Visayas State University
payment without complying with the conditions
. for automatic appropriation under the provisions 'Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned
OfR.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and
by the University subject to Section 13 of
the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by
the special provisions applicable to all State
the Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No.
Universities and Colleges shall be equally
•fjjrl
1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
shared by the University and the University
hospital' (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the Presi XXX xxx xxx
dent will not faithfully execute the laws. The
writ ofprohibition will not issue on the fear that (J. 3) Leyte State College
official actions will be done in contravention of
'Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC
the laws.
Ml
House and Human Resources Development
The President vetoed the entire paragraph Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State
one of the Special Provision of the item on debt College derived from the operation of its
service, including the provisos that the appro LSC House and HRDC shall be constituted
priation authorized in said item "shall be used for into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an
payment of the principal and interest of foreign authorized government depository bank for
and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case the operational expenses of these projects/
shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of services. The net income of the Revolving
the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These Fund at the end of the year shall be remitted
provisos are germane to and have a direct con to the National Treasury and shall accrue
nection with the item on debt service. Inherent to the General Fund. The implementing
in the power of appropriation is the power to guidelines shall be issued by the Depart
specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. ment of Budget and Management" (GAA of
Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said pro 1994, p. 415).
visos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to
vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said all SUC's are the following:
provisions is void.
"12.Use of Income from Extension Ser
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misun vices. State Universities and Colleges are
derstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of authorized to use their income from their
the Special Provision of the item on debt service extension services. Subject to the approval of
only with respect to the proviso therein requir the Board of Regents and the approval of a
ing that "any payment in excess of the amount special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter
herein, appropriated shall be subject to the ap 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, such income shall
proval of the President of the Philippines with be utilized solely for faculty development,
the concurrence of the Congress of the Philip instructional materials and work study pro
pines ..." gram" (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
G.R. No. 113174 xxx xxx xxx
G,R. No. 113766 "13.Tncome of State Universities and

G.R. No. 113888 Colleges. The income of State Universities
1. Veto ofprovisions for revolving funds of and Colleges derived from tuition fees and
SUCs. other sources as may be imposed by gov
erning boards other than those accruing to
In the appropriation for State Universities revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872
and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed spe and 1026 and those authorized to be recorded
cial provisions which authorize the use of income as trust receipts pursuant to Section 40,
and the creation, operation and maintenance of Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be
revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed deposited with the National Treasury and
are the following: recorded as a Special Account in the General
Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No. law, I have noted the proliferation ofspecial
1437 for the use of the institution, subject provisions authorizing the use of agency in
afotl
to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. come as well as the creation, operation and
No. 292: PROVIDED, That disbursements maintenance of revolving funds.
from the Special Account shall not exceed
the amount actually earned and deposited: I would like to underscore the fact that
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash ad such income were1 already considered as
vance on such income may be allowed State integral part of the revenue and financing
Universities and Colleges representing up to sources ofthe National Expenditure Program
one-half of income actually realized during which I previously submitted to Congress.
the preceding, year and this cash advance Hence, the grant of new special provisions
shall be charged against income actually authorizing the use of agency income and the
earned during the budget year: AND PRO establishment of revolving funds over and
VIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall above the agency appropriations authorized
such funds be used to create positions, nor in this Act shall effectively reduce the financ
for payment of salaries, wages or allowances, ing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same
except as may be specifically approved by the time, increase the level of expenditures of
Department of Budget and Management for some agencies beyond the well-coordinated,
income-producing activities, or to purchase rationalized levels for such agencies. This
equipment or books, without the prior ap corresponding increases the overall deficit
proval of the President of the Philippines of the National Government" (Veto Message,
pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. p. 3).
29. Petitioners claim that the President acted
All collections of the State Universities and with grave abuse of discretion when he disal
Colleges for fees, charges and receipts intended lowed by his veto the "use of income" and the
for private recipient units, including private creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Vi-
foundations affiliated with these institutions sayas State University and Leyte State Colleges
shall be dully acknowledged with official receipts when he allowed other government offices, like
and deposited as a trust receipt before said in the National Stud Farm, to use their income for
come shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292" (GAA of 1994, p. 490). pp. 15-16).
The President gave his reasons for the veto There was no undue discrimination when
thus: the President vetoed said special provisions
while allowing similar provisions in other gov
"Pursuant to Section 65 of the Govern ernment agencies. If some government agencies
ment Auditing Code of the Philippines, were allowed to use their income and maintain
Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because
292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article VII of these agencies have been enjoying such privilege
the Constitution, all income earned by all before by virtue of the special laws authorizing
Government offices and agencies shall accrue such practices as exceptions to the "one-fund
to the General Fund of the Government in policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National
line with the One Fund Policy enunciated Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities .
by Section 29(1), Article VI and Section 22, and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for
ai&frl
Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise, the Department of Budget and Management's
the creation and establishment of revolving Procurement Service).
funds shall be authorized by substantive law
pursuant to Section 66 of the Government 2. Veto of provision on 70% (administra
Auditing Code of the Phihppines and Section tive)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
45, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
In the appropriation for the Department
Notwithstanding the aforementioned of Public Works and Highways, the President
provisions of the Constitution and existing vetoed the second paragraph of Special Provi-
sion No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ratio to ensure their successful implementation
of works to be contracted for the maintenance of and therefore risk their completion. Fur
national roads and bridges. The said paragraph thermore, not only could the restrictions
reads as follows: and limitations derail and impede program
implementation but they may also result in
"2. Release and Use of Road Mainte
a breach of contractual obligations.
nance Funds. Funds allotted for the mainte
nance and repair of roads which are provided D.l.a. A study conducted by the Infra
in this Act for the Department of Public structure Agencies show that for practical
Works and Highways shall be released to intent and purposes, maintenance by con
the respective Engineering District, subject tract could be undertaken to an optimum
to such rules and regulations as may be of seventy percent (70%) and the remaining
prescribed by the Department of Budget and thirty percent (30%) by force account. More
Management. Maintenance funds for roads over, the policy of maximizing implemen
and bridges shall be exempt from budgetary tation through contract maintenance is a
reserve. covenant of the Road and Road Transport
Program Loan from the Asian Develop
Of the amount herein appropriated
ment Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990)
for the maintenance of national roads and
and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
bridges, a maximum of thirty percent (30%)
(OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is
shall be contracted out in accordance with
a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD)
guidelines to be issued by the Department Loan for the Highway Management Project
of Public Works and Highways. The bal (IBRD Loan No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
ance shall be used for maintenance by force
account. In the light of the foregoing and consider
ing the policy of the government to encourage
Five percent (5%) of the total road and maximize private sector participation
maintenance fund appropriated herein to be in the regular repair and maintenance of
applied across the board to the allocation of infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing
each region shall be set aside for the main the underlined second paragraph of Special
tenance of roads which may be converted to Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public
or taken over as national roads during the Works and Highways" (Veto Message, p. 11).
current year and the same shall be released
to the central office of the said department The second paragraph of Special Provision
for eventual sub-allotment to the concern No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of
region and district: PROVIDED, That any Congress and the President. While Congress
balance of the said five percent (5%) shall be expressly laid down the condition that only 30%
restored to the regions on apro-rata basis for of the total appropriation for road maintenance
the maintenance of existing national roads' should be contracted out, the President, on the
basis of a comprehensive study, believed that
No retention or deduction as reserves contracting out road maintenance projects at an
or overhead expenses shall be made, except option of 70% would be more efficient, economical
as authorized by law or upon direction of and practical.
the President" (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786;
Emphasis supplied). The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject
The President gave the following reason for of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for
the veto: road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
#"While I am cognizant of the well- specifies how the said item shall be expended 70%
intended desire of Congress to impose cer by administrative and 30% by contract.
tain restrictions contained in some special The 1987 Constitution allows the addition
provisions, I am equally aware that many by Congress of special provisions, conditions to
programs, projects and activities of agen items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be.
cies would require some degree of flexibility vetoed separately from the items to which they
Mi
relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the cannot justify his veto of the provision on the
budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]). purchase of medicines by the AFP.
TheSolicitor Generalwashard put injustify Being directly related to and inseparable
ing the veto of this special provision. He merely from the appropriationitem onpurchasesofmed
argued that the provision is a completeturnabout icines by the AFP, the,special provision cannot
iiii)
from an entrenched practice of the government be vetoed by the President without also vetoing
to maximize contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation
No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
veto a provision separate from the item to which
it refers. o
4.. Veto, of provision on prior approval of
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Congress for purchase of military equipment.
Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is In the appropriation for the modernization
therefore unconstitutional. of the AFP, the President vetoed the underlined
proviso of the Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use
iMsi
3. Vetg of provision on purchase of medi of Fund," which requires the prior approval of
cines by AFP.
theCongress for the release ofthe corresponding
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the Provision No. 3 on the "SpecificProhibition":
special provision on the purchase by the AFP of "2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount
medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs herein appropriated, priority shall be given
Law (RA. No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads: for the acquisition ofAFP assets necessary
"12.Purchase ofMedicines. The purchase for protecting marine, mineral, forest and
of medicines by all Armed Forces of the other resources within Philippine territorial
Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall borders and its economic zone, detection,
prevention or deterrence of air or surface
strictly comply with the formulary embodied
in the National Drug Policy of the Depart intrusions and to support diplomatic moves
ment of Health" (GAAof 1994, p. 748). aimed at preserving national dignity, sov
ereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, That
According to the President, while it is desir the said modernization fund shall not be
able to subject the purchase of medicines to a released until a Table of Organization and
standard formulary, "it is believedmoreprudent Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to
to provide for a transition period for its adoption and approved by Congress.
and smooth implementation in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12). 3. Specific Prohibition. The said Mod
&$&
ernization Fund shall not be used for pay
The Special Provision which requires that ment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
all purchases of medicines by the AFP should planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in armored personnel carriers" (GAA of 1994,
iiiiiJ
the National Drug Policy of the Department of p. 747).
Healthis an "appropriate" provision. It is a mere
advertence by Congress to the fact that there is As reason for the veto, the President stated
an existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that that the said condition and prohibition violate
requires"the extensiveuse ofdrugs with generic the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment
names through a rational system ofprocurement of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall
and distribution." The President believes that it effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
ismore prudent toprovide for a transition period Modernization Fund to cover all military equip
forthe smooth implementation ofthe law in the ment deemed necessary to modernize the Armed
case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the Forcesofthe Philippines" (VetoMessage, p. 12).
Philippines, asimplied by Section 11 (Education Petitioners claim that Special Provision No.
Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special Provision No.
3 are conditions or limitations related to the item The veto of said special provision is therefore
on the AFP modernization plan. valid.
arfift
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to
on the "use of Fund" for the AFP modernization
augment AFP pension funds.
program that the President must submit all pur
chases of military equipment to Congress for its In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the
legislative veto." By way of definition, a congres new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
sional veto is a means whereby the legislature use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
can block or modify administrative action taken gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads:
under a statute. It is a form of legislative control "2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff,
in the implementation of particular executive AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of
actions. The form may be either negative, that the Secretary of National Defense, to use sav
is requiring disapproval of the executive action, ings in the appropriations provided herein to
or affirmative, requiring approval of the execu augment the pension fund being managed by
tive action. This device represents a significant the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
attempt by Congress to move from oversight of System as provided under Sections 2(a) and
the executive to shared administration (Dixon, 3 of P.D. No. 361" (GAA of 1994, p. 746).
The Congressional Veto and Separation of Pow
ers: The Executive on a Leash, 56 North Carolina According to the President, the grant of
Law Review, 423 [1978]). retirement and separation benefits should be
covered by direct appropriations specifically ap
A congressional veto is subject to serious proved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1)
questions involving the principle of separation of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
of powers. stated that the authority to use savings is lodged
However the case at bench is not the proper in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message,
of the legislative veto as provided in Special pp. 7-8).
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 becau.se the issues at
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision
hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condi
provision blocking an administrative action in tion or limitation which is so intertwined with
implementing a law or requiring legislative ap the item of appropriation that it could not be
%A
proval of executive acts must be incorporated in separated therefrom.
a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being
"inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions The Special Provision, which allows the Chief
Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly
VI of the Constitution.
by attaching conditions to the exercise of that
power (of the President as Commander-in-Chief) Under Section 25(5) no law shall be passed
through provisions in the appropriation law." authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and
under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, pro
hibiting the use of the Modernization fund for of the Treasury except in pursuance of an ap
payment of the trainer planes and armored propriation made by law. While Section 25(5)
personnel carriers, which have been contracted allows as an exception the realignment of savings
for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional to augment items in the general appropriations
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the law for the executive branch, such right must and
obligation of contracts (Art. Ill, Sec. 10), more so, can be exercised only by the President pursuant
contracts entered into by the Government itself. to a specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the President, however, directed that the deactiva
CAFGU's. tion should be done in accordance to his time
table, taking into consideration the peace and
Congress appropriated compensation for
order situation in the affected localities.
the CAFGU's including the payment of separa
tion benefits but it added the following Special Petitioners complain that the directive of the
Provision: President was tantamdunt to an administrative
embargo of the congressional will to implement
"1. CAFGU Compensation and Separa
the Constitution's command to dissolve the
tion Benefit. The appropriation authorized
CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, p. 14; G.R.
herein shall be used for the compensation
No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the
of CAFGU's including the payment of their
President cannot impair or withhold expendi
separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year
tures authorized and appropriated by Congress
subsistence allowance for the 11,000 mem
when neither the Appropriations Act nor other
bers who will be deactivated in 1994. The
legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo,
Chief of Staff, AFP, shall subject to the ap
G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
proval of the Secretary of National Defense,
promulgate policies and procedures for the The Solicitor General contends that it is the
payment of separation benefit" (GAA of 1994, President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
p. 740). Forces of the Philippines, who should determine
when the services of the CAFCU's are no longer
The President declared in his Veto Message
needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 92-95).
that the implementation of this Special Provision
to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to This is the first case before this Court where
prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. the power of the President to impound is put in
1597 and R.A. No. 6758. He gave the following issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the
reasons for imposing the condition: President, for whatever reason, to spend funds
iiiiwii}
"I am well cognizant of the laudable made available by Congress. It is the failure to
intention of Congress in proposing the spend or obligate budget authority of any type
amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the (Notes: Impoundment ofFunds, 86 Harvard Law
fttafiJ CAFGU. However, it is premature at this Review 1505 [1973]).
point in time of our peace process to earmark Those who deny to the President the power
and declare through special provision the to impound argue that once Congress has set
i?Mi
actual number of CAFGU members to be aside the fund for a specific purpose in an ap
deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that propriations act, it becomes mandatory on the
the number to be deactivated would largely part of the President to implement the project
depend on the result or degree of success and to spend the money appropriated therefor
&&) of the on-going peace initiatives which are the President has no discretion on the matter,
not yet precisely determinable today. I have for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to
desisted, therefore, to directly veto said pro faithfully execute the laws.
visions because this would mean the loss of
the entire special provision to the prejudice In refusing or deferring the implementation
of its beneficent provisions. I therefore de of an appropriation item, the President in ef
clare that the actual implementation of this fect exercises a veto power that is not expressly
special provision shall be subject to prior granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact,
Presidential approval pursuant to the pro the Constitution does not say anything about im
visions of P.D. No. 1597 and R,A. No. 6758" pounding. The source of the Executive authority
(Veto Message, P. 13). must be found elsewhere.
Petitioners claim that the Congress has Proponents ofimpoundmenthave invoked at

required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when least three principalsources ofthe authority of
it appropriated the money for payment of the the President. Foremost is the authority to im
separation pay of the members of thereof. The pound given tohim either expressly orimpliedly
gjiiftl
by Congress. Second is the executive power for (a) printing of decisions and publication
drawn from the President's role as Commander- of 'Philippine Reports'; (b) commutable ter
in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause minal leaves of Justices and other person
which ironically is the same provisions invoked nel of the Supreme Court and payment of
by petitioners herein. adjusted pension rates to retired Justices
entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative
The proponents insist that a faithful execu Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair, main
tion of the laws requires that the President desist tenance, improvement and other operating
from implementing the law if doing so would expenses of the courts' libraries, including
prejudice public interest. An example given is purchase of books and periodicals; (d) pur
when through efficient and prudent manage chase, maintenance and improvement ol
ment of a project, substantial savings are made. printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses
In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the for the employment of temporary employ
President to spend the entire amount budgeted ees, contractual and casual employees, for
in the law (Notes: Presidential Impoundmenti judicial administration; (f) maintenance
Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, and improvement of the Court's Electronic
61 GeorgetownLaw Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes: Data Processing System; (g) extraordinary
Protecting theFisc:Executive Impoundment and expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance
Congressional Power, 82 YaleLaw Journal 1686 in international conferences and conduct of
[1973]). training programs; (h) commutable trans-
We do not find anything in the language portation.and representation allowances and
used in the challenged Special Provision that fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court,
would imply that Congress intended to deny to Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and
the President the right to defer or reduce the other Court personnel in accordance with the
spending,much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU rates prescribed by law; and (i)compensation
members all at one in 1994. But even if such is of attorney-de-o//?cio; PROVIDED, That as
the intention, the appropriation law is not the mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention salary and allowances shall be subject to the
must be embodied and manifested in another usual procedures and policiesas providedfor
law considering that it abrades the powers ofthe under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws"
Commander-in-Chiefand there are existing laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. xxx xxx xxx
Again we state: a provisionin an appropriations
Lfo&l
act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, Commission on Audit
in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. xxx xxx xxx
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the "5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the
Supreme Court, etc. Commission on Audit is hereby authorized,
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme subject to appropriate accounting and audit
Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Con ing rules and regulations, to use savings for
^j
gress added the following provisions: the payment of fringe benefits as may be
authorized by law for officials and personnel
The Judiciary of the Commission" (GAA of 1994, p. 1161;
xxx xxx xxx
Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
"1. Augmentation of any Item in the Office of the Ombudsman
Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the xxx xxx xxx
appropriations for the Supreme Court and
the Lower Courts may be utilized by the "6. Augmentation of Items in the Appro
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to aug priation ofthe Office ofthe Ombudsman. The
ment any item of the Court's appropriations Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to
i%if
appropriate accounting and auditing rules Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional
and regulations to augment items of ap which states that 'no elective or appointive
ii»l propriation in the Office of the Ombudsman public officer or employee shall receive ad
from savings in other items of appropriation ditional, double, or indirect compensation
actually released, for: (a) printing and/or unless specificallyauthorized by law.' I am,
publication of decisions, resolutions, training therefore, confident that the heads of the
and information materials; (b) repair, main said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law
tenance and improvement of OMB Central and faithfully adhere to the well-established
and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of principle on compensation standardization
liB) books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (Veto Message, p. 10).
(d) payment of commutable representation
and transportation allowances of officials Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed
and employees who by reason of their posi by the President violated the independence and
aiii)
tions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Om
as may be authorized specifically by law for budsman, the COA and the CHR.
officials and personnel of OMB pursuant to
In the first place, the conditions questioned
Section 8 of Article LX-Bof the Constitution;
by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Con
and (e) for other official purposes subject to
gress itself, not by the President. The .Veto
accounting and auditing rules and regula
tions" (GAAof 1994, p. 1178, Emphasis sup Message merely highlighted the Constitutional
plied). mandate that additional or indirect compensa
tion can only be given pursuant to law.
xxx xxx xxx
In the second place, such statements are
\m Commission on Human Rights mere reminders that the disbursements of ap
xxx xxx xxx
propriations must be made in accordance with
law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated
"1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of as superfluities.
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate (b) In the appropriation for the COA, the
accounting and auditing rules and regula President imposed the condition that the imple
is) tions, to augment any item of appropriation mentation of the budget of the COA be subject
in the office of the CHR from savings in other to "the guidelines to be issued by the President."
items of appropriations actually released, for: The provisions subject to said condition
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions, reads:
resolutions, training materials and educa
tional publications; (b) repair, maintenance xxx xxx xxx
and improvement of Commission's central "3. Revolving Fund. The income of the
and regional facilities; (c) purchase of books,
Commission on Audit derived from sources
journals, periodicals and equipment, (d)
authorized by the Government Auditing
payment of commutable representation and
Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not
transportation allowances of officials and
aij
employees who by reason of their positions
exceeding Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000)
are entitled thereto and fringe benefits, as shall be constituted into a revolving fund
may be authorized by law for officials and which shall be used for maintenance, operat
personnel of CHR, subject to accounting ing and other incidental expenses to enhance
and auditing rules and regulations" (GAA audit services and audit-related activities.
of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied). The fund shall be deposited in an authorized
t^j
government depository ban, and withdrawals
In his Veto Message, the President expressed therefrom shall be made in accordance with
his approval of the conditions included in the the procedure prescribed by law and imple
GAA of 1994. He noted that:
menting rules and regulations: PROVIDED,
"The said condition is consistent with the That any interests earned on such deposit
Constitutional injunction prescribed under shall be remitted at the end of each quarter to
the National Treasury and shall accrueto the administrative overhead, detailed engineer
General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That ing and construction supervision, testing and
the Commission on Audit shall submit to the quality control, and the like, thus insuring
Department of Budget and Management a that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of
quarterly report of income and expenditures the released fund is available for direct
j^'ii of said revolving fund" (GAA of 1994, pp. implementation of the project. PROVIDED,
1160-1161). HOWEVER, That for school buildings, health
The President cited the "imperative need to centers, daycare centers and barangay halls,
the deductible amount shall not exceed three
rationalize" the implementation, applicability
percent (3%).
and operation of use of income and revolving
funds. The Veto Message stated: Violation of, or non-compliance with, this
"... I have observed that there are old
provision shall subject the government official or
and long existing special provisions autho employee concerned to administrative, civil and/
or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80,
rizing the use of income and the creation of
revolving funds. As a rule, such authoriza Book VI of E.O. No. 292" (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
;&&)
tions should be discouraged. However, I take (d) In the appropriation for the National
it that these authorizations have legal/statu Housing Authority (NHA), the President im
tory basis aside from being already a vested posed the condition that allocations for spe
right to the agencies concerned which should cific projects shall be released and disbursed
not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. "in accordance with the housing program of
There is, however, imperative need to ratio the government, subject to prior Executive
nalize their implementation, applicability approval."
m
and operation, thus, in order to substantive
the purpose and intention of said provisions, The provision subject to the said condition
I hereby declare that the operationalization reads:
ijjp of the following provisions during budget "3. Allocations for Specific Projects. The
implementation shall be subject to the guide following allocations for the specified projects
lines to be issued by the President pursuant shall be set aside for corollary works and used
to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VT of E.O. No. exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and
292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks,
in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General drainage, waterworks systems, facilities and
Provisions of this Act" (Veto Message, p. 6; amenities, in the area: PROVIDED, That
jjtf> Emphasis supplied). any road to be constructed or rehabilitated
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, shall conform with the specifications and
the President imposed the condition that in standards set by the Department of PubHc
the implementation of DPWH projects, the - Works and Highways for such kind of road:
administrative and engineering overhead of PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings that
5% and 3% "shall be subject to the necessary may be available in the future shall be used
administrative guidelines to be formulated for road repair, rehabilitation and construc
by the Executive pursuant to existing laws." tion:
The condition was imposed because the pro (1) Maharlika Village Road Not less
vision "needs further study" according to the than P5,000,000.
President.
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig)
The following provision was made subject to Not less than P3,000,000.
said condition:
(3) BagongLipunan Condominium Proj
"9. Engineering and Administrative ect (Taguig) Not less tjian P2,000,000.
Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%)
of the amount for infrastructure project 4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount
released by the Department of Budget and appropriated for the implementation of various
Management shall be deducted by DPWHfor projects in resettlement areas, Seven Million
Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P7,500,000) Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Ex
shall be allocated to the Dasmarinas Bagong ecution Clause, the President has the power to
Bayanresettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
(P18,000,000) to the CarmOna Relocation Center execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional
Area (Gen. Marinao Alvarez) and Three Million Law, p. 147[1977]). These steps are the ones to
Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and be embodied in the guidelines.
Services, all ofwhich will be for the cementing
of roads in accordance with DPWH standards. IV
|£gi 5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An alloca Petitioners chose to avail ofthe special civil
tionofEight Million Pesos(P8,000,000) shall be actions but those remedies canbeused only when
set aside for the asphalting ofseven (7) kilometer respondents have acted "without or in excess" of
jiii)
mainroad ofSapangPalay,San JoseDelMonte, jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse ofdiscretion,"
Bulacan" (GAA of 1994, p. 1216). (Revised Rules ofCourt, Rule 65, Section 2). How
The President imposed the conditions: (a) can we begrudge the President for vetoing the
that the "operationalization" of the special pro Special Provision on the appropriation for debt
vision on revolving fund of the COA "shall be payment when he merely followed our decision
subjectto guidelinesto be issued by the President in Gonzales? How can wesay that Congress has
pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of abused its discretion when it appropriated a
E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 bigger sum for debt payment than the amount
in relation to Sections _2and 3 of the General appropriated for education, when it merely fol
Provisions ofthis Act" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, lowed our dictum in Guingona?
pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation ofSpecial Article 8 ofthe Civil Code ofthe Philippines,
Provision No. 9 ofthe DPWH on the mandatory provides:
retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released
bysaid Department "besubjectto the necessary "Judicial decisionsapplying or interpret
^1
administrative guidelines to be formulated by ing the laws or the constitution shall form a
the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo, part of the legal system of the Philippines."
G.R. No. 113888; p. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the The Court's interpretation ofthe law is part
appropriations authorized for the NHA can be of that law as of the date of its enactment since
released only "in accordance with the housing the court's interpretation merely establishes the
program of the government subject to prior Ex contemporary legislative intent that the con
ecutive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. strued law purports to carry into effect (People
10-11; 14-16). . v. Licera, 65 SCRA270 [1975]). Decisionsof the
The conditions objected to by petitioners are Supreme Court assume the same authority as
mere reminders that the implementation of the statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation,
itemsonwhichthe said conditions wereimposed, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
should bedone in accordance withexisting laws, Even if Guingona, and Gonzales are consid
regulationsor policies. Theydid not add anything ered hard cases that make bad laws and should
fy$ to what was already in place at the time of the be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior
approval of the GAA of 1994. acts done in reliance thereof.
There is less basis to complain when the WHEREFORE, the petitions are DIS
President said that the expenditures shall be MISSED, except with respect with respect to
subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the (1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined they pray for the annulment of the veto of the
whether they are proper or inappropriate. The special provision on debt service specifying that
issuance of administrative guidelines on the use the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for
ofpublic funds authorized byCongress is simply payment of the principal and interest of foreign
an exercise by the President ofhis constitutional and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use
''iiij<i
dutyto see that the laws are faithfullyexecuted of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the
(1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Central Bank Board of Liquidators," and (2)G.R.
L
No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the an which imposed a ten peso capital contribution for
nulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph the sale of each bag of fertilizer "until adequate
of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appro capital is raised to make PPI viable." PPI was a
priation for the Department of Public Works private corporation. Clearly, therefore, the impo
and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and sition was for private benefit and not for a public
tm (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of purpose and therefore invalid. The Court also
medicines by the Armed Forces ofthe Phihppines found that, even if seen as an exercise of police
(GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED. power, the imposition would still be invalid for
not being for a public purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, although the power to tax is leg:
D. Arroyo v. De Venecia islative in nature, Section 28(2) itself authorizes
j^j) See supra under Secion 16. Congress to delegate it to the President. But
the President is bound by the conditions set by
SEC. 28. (1) THE RULE OF TAXATION Congress.168 This is one exception to the rule of
SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. non-delegability of legislative power.
THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROG The obvious, primary, and specific purpose
RESSIVE SYiSTEM OF TAXATION. 6 of the power to tax is to raise revenue. However,
(2) THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, from the earliest days of the history of the power
m)
AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO FIX
of taxation, the power to tax has been recognized
as an instrument of national economic and social
WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND SUB
policy. It has, for instance, been used as an in
JECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RE
m* strument for the extermination of undesirable ac
STRICTIONS AS IT MAY IMPOSE, TARIFF
tivities and enterprises. In the celebrated words
RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS,
of Justice Marshall, the power to tax involves
TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND
the power to destroy. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
iî OTHER DUTIES OR ikPOSTS WITHIN
Wheat, 316, 431 (U.S. 1819)..
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE GOV The power to tax has also been used as a
ERNMENT. tool for regulation. For the purpose of regulat
(3) CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, ing property, the State can choose to exercise
its police power or its power to tax. "It is beyond
CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES OR
CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO,
serious question that a tax does not cease to be
valid merely because it regulates, discourages,
MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES,
or even definitely deters the activities taxed...
AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IM
The principle applies even though the revenue
PROVEMENTS ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY,
obtained is obviously negligible,... or the rev
AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELI
enue purpose.of the tax may be secondary . . ."
GIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42,44 (1950).
PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
'$& TAXATION. Another aspect of the power to tax is what the
United States Supreme Court has characterized
(4) NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EX
as "the power "to keep alive." This is the founda
EMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT
tion for the imposition of tariffs designed for the
THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF
encouragement and protection of locally pro
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
duced goods against competition from imports.
'The enactment and enforcement of a number
1. The power to tax.
of customs revenue laws drawn with a motive
In Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) v. Fertiphil of maintaining a system of protection, since the
Corp.167 the Court had occasion to review the revenue law of 1789, are matters of history ...
sgj
validity of LOI 1465, a martial rule product,
""Southern Cross v. Philippine Cement, G.R. No.
I57G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008. 158540, July 8, 2004. . •
ARTICLE VLAEGISLATTVE DEPARTMENT • 305
whatever we may thinkofthewisdom ofa protec A.Gerochi v. Department of Energy

tion policy." Hampton and Co. v. United States, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
lm 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928).
The power to tax exists for the general wel DECISION
fare. Hence implicit in the power is the limita
tion that it should beexercised only for a public NACHURA, Jr. »
purpose. In the words of Loan Association v.
Topeka, 20 Wall, 655, 664 (U.S. 1875), "To lay, Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng
withone hand, the power ofthe government on Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers
the property ofthe citizen, and with the other to Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before
bestow it upon favored individuals toaidprivate this Court in this original action praying that
enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none Section 34ofRepublic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise
^>
the less a robbery because it is done under the known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform
forms of law and. is called taxation." Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
Charge, and Rule 18 oftheRules and Regulations
The concept of uniformity of taxation is (IRR) which seeks toimplement thesaid imposi
derived from Article I, Section 8, of the United tion, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners
States Constitution which prescribes that "all also pray that the Universal Charge imposed
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the Unites States." It will thus
upon theconsumers berefunded andthat a pre
be seen that whereas the American provision liminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
whence the Philippine rule derived has refer order (TRO)i>edssued directing the respondents
ence to "duties, imposts, and excises," that is, torefrainfrom implementing, charging, and col
to indirect taxes, the Philippine requirement lecting the said charge. The assailed provision
of law reads:
of uniformity applies to taxation in general.
Philippine jurisprudence, however, from its SECTION 34. Universal Charge. —.
earliest days has interpreted "uniformity" in Within one (1) year from the effectivity of
the Philippine Constitution in the same way as
"uniformity" in the American Constitution. In thisAct, a universal charge tobedetermined,
the words of Churchill v. Concepcion, 34 Phil. fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be
969, 976-7 (1916), "uniformity" in the Constitu imposed on all electricity end-users for the
tion does "notsignify an intrinsic, but simply a following purposes:
geographical uniformity ... A tax is uniform, (a) Payment for the stranded debts in
within the Constitutional requirement, when it excessofthe amount assumed by the Nation
operates with the same force and effect in every al Government and stranded contract costs
place where the subject of it is found." of NPC and as well as qualified stranded
Moreover, the requirement of "uniformity" contract costs of distribution utilities result
hasbeen interpreted byPhilippine jurisprudence ingfrom the restructuring ofthe industry;
as equivalent to the requirement of valid classi (b) Missionary electrification;
ga>
fication under the equal protection clause, Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. v. City ofButuan, 24 SCRA 789, (c) The equalization of the taxes and
795-96 (1968). royalties applied to indigenous or renewable
sources of energy vis-a-vis imported energy
The word "equitable" seems to add nothing fuels;
except by way of emphasis.
A tax system is progressive when the rate (d)An environmental charge equivalent
increases as the tax base increases. The explicit to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-
i»i
mention of progressive taxation in the Constitu hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to
tion reflects the wish of the Commission that the an environmental fund to be used solely for
legislature should use the power oftaxation as watershed rehabilitation and management. .
an instrument for a more equitable distribution Said fund shall be managed by NPC under
of wealth. existing arrangements; and
jjijvii)
(e) A charge to account for all forms of representation as the consumers were not
cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding given a chance to be heard and represented.
three (3) years. Petitioners contend that the Universal
The universal charge shall be a non-by- Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
passable charge which shall be passed on and collected to fund the operations of the NPC.
collected from all end-users on a monthly basis They argue that the cases invoked by the re
by the distribution utilities. Collections by the spondents clearly show the regulatory purpose
distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any of the charges imposed therein, which is not so
SijjJ
given month shall be remitted to the PSALM in the case at bench. In said cases, the respec
Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the , tive funds were created in order to balance and
succeeding month, net of any amount due to stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act
ti§\ the distribution utility. Any end-user or self- as buffer to counteract the changes and adjust
generating entitynotconnected to a distribution ments in prices, peso devaluation, and other
utility shall remit its corresponding universal variables which cannot be adequately and timely
charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a
Corp., as administrator ofthe fund, shall create need to delegate powers to administrative bod
a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed ies. Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge
is imposed not for a similar purpose.
onlyforthe purposesspecified hereinin an open
and transparent manner. All amount collected
The Issues
for the universal charge shall be distributed to
the respectivebeneficiaries within a reasonable The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
period to be provided by the ERC." 1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge
imposed under Sec.34 ofthe EPIRAis a tax; and
Petitioners submit that the assailed provi To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to
fal
sion of law and its IRR which sought to imple distinguish the State's power of taxation from
ment the same are unconstitutional on the fol the police power.
lowing grounds: The powerto tax is an incident ofsovereignty
tm
1) The universal charge provided for and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in
under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to its very nature no limits, so that security against
be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of its abuse is to be found only in the responsibil
the IRR of the said law is a tax which is ity of the legislature which imposes the tax on
to be collected from all electric end-users the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on
and self-generating entities. The power to the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the
tax is strictly a legislative function and as government, and their promptandcertainavail
pi
such, the delegation of said power to any ability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory
executive or administrative agency.like the behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates
ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same from necessity; without taxes, government can
unlimited authority. The assailed provision not fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
clearly provides that the Universal Charge welfare and well-being of the people.
is to be determined, fixed and approved by On the other hand, police power is the
the ERC,hence leaving to the latter complete power ofthe state to promote public welfare by
discretionary legislative authority. restraining and regulating the use of liberty
2)The ERCis also empowered to approve and property. It is the most pervasive, the least
and determine where the funds collected
limitable, and the most demanding of the three
fundamental powers of the State. The justifica
should be used.
tion is found in the Latin maxims salus populi
3) The imposition of the Universal est suprema lex (the welfare ofthe people is the
Charge on all end-users is oppressive and supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
confiscatory and amounts to taxation without laedas (so use your propertyas not to injure the
property of others). As an inherent attribute of (f) To protect the public interest as it is

sovereigntywhich virtually extends to all public affected by the rates and services ofelectric
iiiiili) needs, police power grants a wide panoply of utilities and other providers ofelectric power;
instruments through which the State, asparens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory (g) To assure socially and environmen
powers. We have held that the power to "regu tally compatible energy sources and infra
fc&J
structure; *
late"meansthe power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the (h) To promote the utilization of in
interests, first and foremost, of the public, then digenous and new and renewable energy
^J
of the utility and of its patrons. resources in power generation in order to
The conservative and pivotal distinction reduce dependence on imported energy;
between these two powers rests in the purpose (i) To provide for an orderly and trans
&i>
for which the charge is made. If generation of parent privatization of the assets and li
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation abilities of the National Power Corporation
is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but (NPC);
if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
(j) To establish a strong and purely in
imposition a tax. °
dependent regulatory body and system to
ensure consumer protection and enhance
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge the competitive operation of the electricity
through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police market; and
power, particularly its regulatory dimension,
(k) To encourage the efficient use of
$®{l is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34
energy and other modalities of demand side
which enumerates the purposes for which the management.
Universal Charge is imposed and which can be
amply discerned as regulatory in character. The From the aforementioned purposes, it can be
EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus: gleanedthat the assailed TJniversal Chargeis not
a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
is hereby declared the policy of the State:
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total that the taxing power may be used as an imple
electrification of the country; ment of police power. In Valmonte v. Energy
jjlî (b) To ensure the quality, reliability, Regulatory Board, etal. and in Gaston v. Repub
security and affordability of the supply of lic Planters Bank, this Court held that the Oil
electric power; Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made
JjJA'u 1
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine
prices of electricity in a regime offree and fair was reiterated in Osmena v. Orbos with respect'
competition and full public accountability to to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners
achieve greater operational and economic that the instant case is different from the afore
efficiency and enhance the competitiveness mentioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a
of Philippine products in the global market; Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under
the administration of PSALM. The STF has some
(d) To enhance the inflow of private
notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and
capital and broaden the ownership base of the SSF, viz.:
the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors; 1) In the implementation of stranded cost
recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory determine whether there is under-recovery
treatment of public and private sector enti or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level
ties in the process of restructuring the elec of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case
tric power industry; of an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure
iijjjj
that any excess amount shall be remitted to the 1935 Constitution: 'Cemeteries, churches,
the STF. A separate account shall be created and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
forthese amountswhichshall beheldin trust and all lands, buildings, and improvementsused
for any future claims ofdistribution utilities exclusively for religious, charitable, or educa
for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the tional purposes shall be exempt from taxation.'
stranded cost recovery period, any remain The presentConstitution has added: 'charitable
ing amount in this account shall be used to institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries'
reducethe electricityrates to the end-users. and required that for the exemption of 'lands,
2) Withrespectto the assailedUniversal
buildings, and improvements,' they should not
fî only be'exclusively' but also 'actually* and'direct
Charge, if the total amount collected for the ly' used for religious, charitable, or educational
same is greater than the actual availments purposes . . . There must be proof therefore of
against it, the PSALM shall retain the bal the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings,
ancewithin the STF to payforperiods where andimprovements for religious orcharitable [or
a shortfall occurs.
educational] purposes tobeexempt from taxation
3) Upon expiration of the term of . . ." Province ofAbra v. Hernando and Roman
PSALM, the administration ofthe STFshall Catholic Bishop, 107 SCRA 104,108-9 (L-49336,
be transferred to the DOFor any ofthe DOF August 31, 1981).
attached agencies as'designated bytheDOF
^
Secretary. 3. Cases
The OSG is in point when it asseverates: A. Garcia v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992
Evidently, the establishment and main
la
tenance of the Special Trust Fund under
the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. FELICIANO, Jr.
9136, is well within the pervasive and non- On27 November 1990*, the Presidentissued
waivable power and responsibility ofthe gov Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in ad
ernment to securethe physicaland economic dition to any other duties, taxes and charges
survival and well-being of the community, imposed by law on all articles imported into the
jfjyt
that comprehensive sovereign authority we Philippines, an additional duty of five percent
designate as the police power of the State. (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was im
This feature ofthe Universal Charge further posed across the board on allimported articles,
boosts the position that the same is an exaction
including crude oil and other oil products im
sal
imposed primarily in pursuit ofthe State's po
ported into the Philippines. This additional duty
was subsequently increased from five percent
lice objectives. The STF reasonably serves and (5%) advalorem tonine percent (9%) advalorem
assures the attainment and perpetuity of the by thepromulgation ofExecutive Order No. 443:
tmj
purposes for which the Universal Charge is im dated 3 January 1991.
posed, i.e., toensure theviability ofthe country's
electric power industry. On24July 1991, the DepartmentofFinance
ffi^
requested the Tariff Commission to initiate th€
2. Exemptions. process required by the Tariffand Customs Code
for the imposition ofa specific levy on crude oi
Under the conditions laid down in Section and other petroleum products, covered by H£
28, exemptions from taxation may be provided Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Sectior
by law. 104 ofthe Tariffand Customs Code as amended
Section 28(3), andArticle XIV, Section 4(3 & Accordingly, the TariffCommission, following th<
4) areconstitutionally provided exemptions. Un procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tarif
der Section3, the exemptionis only for taxes as and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearinj
sessed as property taxes,as contradistinguished to give interested parties an opportunity to b<
from excise taxes. Lladoc v. Commissioner ofIn heard and to present evidence insupport ofthei
ternal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292,295 (1965). "Under respective positions.
ae>
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was is the Congress of the Phihppines. Section 26(2)of
sued by the President on 15 August 1991 reduc Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
&pt
ing the rate of additional duty on all imported
articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize
c
(5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such hmitations and restric
iiii oil and other oil products which continued to be
tions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
subject to the additional duty of nine percent
(9%) ad valorem.
and export quotas^ tonnage and wharfage
dues, arid other duties or imposts within
Upon completion of the public hearings, the the framework of the national development
Tariff Commission submitted to the President program of the Government." (Underscoring
a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil supplied)
Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consider
^4
There is thus explicit constitutional permis
ation and appropriate action. Seven (7) days sion1 to Congress to authorize the President
later, the President issued Executive Order No. "subject to such hmitations and restrictions as
478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addi [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific
tion to the aforementioned additional duty ofnine limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or im
percent (9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad posts ....-'
valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter
or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and The relevant congressional statute is the
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provi
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Pro sions thereof. These are the provisions which
hibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the the President explicitly invoked in promulgat
validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. ing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section
He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the relevant part:
1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
"Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters,
"Section 24. All appropriation, revenue headings and subheadings and the rates
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of of import duty under Section 104 of Presi
the public debt, bills of local application, and dential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent
private bills shall originate exclusively in the amendments issued under Executive Orders
House of Representatives, but the Senate and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted
may propose or concur with amendments." and form part of this Code."
He contends that since the Constitution vests There shall be levied, collected, and paid
the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, uponall importedarticles the rates ofdutyindi
the President may not assume such power of issu cated in the Section under this section except as
ing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are otherwise specifically provided for in this Code:
in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not ex
ceed one hundred percent ad valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subse
Turning first to the question of constitution quently fixed pursuant toSection Four Hundred
ality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Consti One of this Code shall be subjectto periodic in
tution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue vestigation by the Tariff Commission and may
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, be revised by the President upon recommenda
within the province of the Legislative rather than tion of the National Economic and Development
the Executive Department. It does not follow, Authority.
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. xxx xxx xxx
475 and 478, assuming they may be character
ized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the Section 401 of the same Code needs to be
President, that they must be enacted instead by quoted in full:
ftfifct
"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. valorem or specific equivalents of the dul

with respect to imports from the princip;
a. In the interest of national economy,
competing foreign country for the most recei
general welfare and/or national security, and representative period shall be used as base
subject to the limitations herein prescribed,
the President, upon recommendation of the d. The Commissioner of Customs sha
National Economic and Development Au regularly furnish the Commission a cor,
thority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), of all customs import entries as filed in tl
is hereby empowered: (1)to increase, reduce Bureau of Customs. The Commission or r
or remove existing protective rates ofimport duly authorized representatives shall ha"\
duty (including any necessary change in access to, and the right to copyoall liquidate
classification). The existing rates may be customs import entries and other documen
increased or decreased but in no case shall appended thereto as finally filed in the Con
the reduced rate of import duty be lower than mission on Audit.
the basic rate often (10) percent ad valorem,
nor shall the increased rate of import duty be e. The NEDA shall promulgate rul<
higher than a maximum ofonehundred (100) and regulations necessary to carry out tl:
percent ad valorem; (2) to establish import provisions of this section.
quota or to ban imports ofany commodity, as f. Any Order issued by the President pu
may be necessary; and (3) to impose an ad suant to the provisions of this section shs
ditional duty on all imports not exceedingten take effect thirty (30) days after promulg;
(10)per cent ad valorem whenever necessary; tion, except in the imposition of addition,
Provided, That upon periodic investigations duty not exceeding ten (10) percent ad v;
by the Tariff Commission and recommenda lorem which shall take effect at the discretic
tion of the NEDA, the President may cause of the President." (Underscoring supplied)
a gradual reduction of protection levels
granted in Section One hundred and four Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thru
\m
of this Code, including those subsequently of the delegated authorizations found in Sectioi
granted pursuant to this section. 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, I
contending that the President is authorized
b. Before any recommendation is submit^ act under the Tariff and Customs Code only "
ted to the President by the NEDA pursuant protect localindustries and products for the sal
to the provisions of this section, except in of the national economy, general welfare an
the imposition of an additional duty not or national security." He goes on to claim that
'$&$
exceeding ten (10) percent ad valorem, the
Commission shall conduct an investigation "E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having not]
in the course of which they shall hold public ing to do whatsoever with the protection
fefeil hearings wherein interested parties shall local industries and products for the sal
be afforded reasonable opportunity to be of national economy, general welfare an
present, produce evidence and to be heard. or national security. On the contrary, the
The Commission shall also hear the views work in reverse, especially as to crude o:
and recommendations of any government an essential product which we do not ha*
office, agency or instrumentality concerned. to protect, since we produce only minim
The Commission shall submit their findings quantities and have to import the rest
and recommendations to the NEDA within what we need.
thirty (30) days after the terminationofthe These Executive Orders are avowed
public hearings. solely to enable the government to fail
M c. The power ofthe President to increase government finances, contrary to Sections S
or decrease rates of import duty within the and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitutio
limits fixed in subsection 'a' shall include the as well as to Section 401 of the Tariff ar
authority to modify the form ofduty.In modi Customs Code." (Underscoring in the orig
fying the form ofduty, the corresponding ad nal).
&afti \
ijjftj
The Court is not persuaded. In the first place,. which, in a particular instance, is the dominant
there is nothing in the language of either Section or principal objective. In the instant case, since
m\
104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen
suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here,
authority. The entire contention of petitioner is the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
anchored on just two (2) words, one foundin Sec special duty on imported crude oil and imported
tion 401(a)(1): "existing protective rates of import oil products may be seen to have some "protec
duty," and the second in the proviso found at the tive" impact upon indigenous oil production. For
end of Section 401(a):" protection levels granted the effective price of imported crude oil and oil
in Section 104 of this Code . . . ." We believe products is increased. At the same time, it can
that the words "protective" and "protection" are not be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the
simply not enough to support the very broad and government are raised by the imposition of such
encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks increased tariff rates or special duty.
to rest on those two (2) words.
In the,fourth place, petitioner's concept
In the second place, petitioner's singular which he urges us to build into our constitu
theory collides with a very practical fact of tional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow
which this Court may take judicial notice that one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
the Bureau of Customs which administers the Code establishes general standards with which
Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) the exercise of the authority delegated by that
principal traditional generators or producers provision to the President must be consistent:
of governmental revenue, the other being the that authority must be exercised in "the inter
Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third est of national economy, general welfare and/or
agency, non-traditional in character, that gener national security." Petitioner, however, insists
ates lower but still comparable levels of revenue that the "protection of local industries" is the
for the government The Philippine Amusement only permissible objective that can be secured
and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].) by the exercise of that delegated authority, and
In the third place, customs duties which are that therefore "protection of local industries"
assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of
much like taxes which are frequently imposed "the national economy, general welfare and/or
for both revenue-raising and for regulatory national security." We find it extremely difficult
purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs to take seriously such a confined and closed view
i&irt duties" is "the name given to taxes on the impor of the legislative standards and policies summed
tation and exportation of commodities, the tariff up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that
or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, the protection of consumers, who after all consti
or exported to, a foreign country." The levying tute the very great bulk of our population, is at
^J
of customs duties on imported goods may have the very least as important a dimension of "the
in some measure the effect of protecting local national economy, general welfare and national
industries where such local industries actually security" as the protection of local industries.
exist and are producing comparable goods. Si And so customs duties may be reduced or even
multaneously, however, the very same customs removed precisely for the purpose of protecting
duties inevitably have the effect of producing consumers from the high prices and shoddy qual
governmental revenues. Customs duties like ity and inefficient service that tariff-protected
internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, de and subsidized local manufacturers may other
signed to achieve one policy objective only. Most wise impose upon the community.
commonly, customs duties, which constitute It seems also important to note that tariff
taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of rates are commonly established and the cor
which become public funds have either or both responding customs duties levied and collected
the generation of revenue and the regulation of upon articles and goods which are not found at all
economic or social activity as their moving pur and not produced in the Phihppines. The Tariff
poses and frequently, it is very difficult to say and Customs Code is replete with such articles
ia
jp;i
and commodities: among the more interesting being used actually, directly and exclusively for
examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); casto- educational purposes pursuant to Article VI,
reum or musk taken from the beaver (Chapter Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution and other
5, 5.14); olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or applicable provisions of the Local Government
European fungi growing under the soil on tree Code.
roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8,8.01); On February 5,1998, respondent city govern
figs (Chapter 8,8.03); caviar (Chapter 16,16.01); ment, on recommendation of respondent Atty.
aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.01); special diagnostic Nestor Francisco, City Legal Officer, deniecl the
instruments and apparatus for human medicine request on the ground that the subject parcels
and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray genera of land were owned by Consolidated Assembly
tors; X-ray tubes; X-ray screens, etc. (Chapter 90, and Pair Management which derived income
90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties maybe therefrom in the form of rentals and other local
&iai
seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes taxes assumed by the petitioner. Hence, from
purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage the land owners' standpoint, the same were not
any importation of the items involved. In either actually, directly and exclusively used for edu
iiai case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and cational purposes.
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there
are any competing local industries to protect. On February 15,1999, the petitioner, on the
one hand, and the Consolidated Assembly and
^j Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Pair Management, on the other, entered into
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may separate agreements which.in effect novated
be conceded to be substantially moved by the their existing contracts of lease on the subject
desire to generate additional public revenues, parcels of land and converted them to donations
H&t
are not, for that reason alone, either constitu of the beneficial use thereof.
tionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner On February 19, 1999," the petitioner wrote
has not successfully overcome the presumptions respondent. City Assessor informing the latter
of constitutionality and legality to which those of the new agreements and seeking a reconsid
Executive Orders are entitled.
eration of respondent's earlier denial of the ap
plication for tax exemption. In this connection,
a duly notarized certification jointly issued by
Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management to
B. Systems Plus Computer College v. the effect that they no longer received income by
Caloocan City way of rentals from the subject properties, accom
G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003. panied by the corresponding board resolutions,
were submitted by the petitioner. Nevertheless,
on July 21, 1999, respondent city government
Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is
again denied the application for tax exemption,
a non-stock and non-profit educational institu
reasoning out as follows:
tion organized and established in 1997 with busi
ness address at 141-143 10th Avenue, Caloocan Firstly, it may be reasonably implied
City. As such, it enjoys property tax exemption from the above facts that SYSTEMS COM
from the local government on its buildings but PUTER COLLEGE is an agency for its sister
not on the parcels of land which petitioner is rent corporations, particularly, PAIR MANAGE
s&j ing for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies, MENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Consolidated Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated As and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, INC. to
sembly) and Pair Management and Development evade payment of Real Property Taxes.
Corporation (Pair Management). It bears stressing that immediately after
On January 8, 1998, petitioner requested the denial by this Office of the first request of
respondent city government ofCaloocan,through SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE for
respondent Mamerto Manahan, City Assessor Real Property Tax Exemption of the properties
and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to then leased to it by its sister companies; PAIR
the parcels of land claiming that the same were MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATION and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to

INC.j the latter corporations donated the ben enforce, through the petition for mandamus, a
eficial use of the subject properties to SYSTEMS clear legal right under the Constitution and the
PLU&COMPUTER COLLEGE, if only to evade pertinent provisions of the Local Government
payment of Real Property Taxes. Code granting tax exemptionon propertiesactu
The revenue officers, in proper cases, may ally, directly and exclusivelyused foreducational
disregard the separate corporate entity where it purposes. But petitioner is taking an unwar
serves as a shield for tax evasion.... ranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously
presumes the existence of the fact which it must
Secondly, the grant of exemption from taxa first prove by competent and sufficient evidence
tion rests upon the theory that an exemption before the Gity Assessor. It must be stressed
will benefit the body of people, and not upon that the authority to receive evidence, as basis
any idea of lessening the burden of individual for classification of properties for taxation, is
or corporate owners.
legally vested on the respondent City Assessor
Thirdly, while the beneficial use of the whose action is appealable to the Local Board of
properties being sought to be exempt from Real Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of
Property Taxes were donated to SYSTEMS PLUS Assessment Appeals, if necessary.
COMPUTER COLLEGE, there is no showing The petitioner cannot bypass the authority
that the same are "actually, directly and exclu of the concerned administrative agencies and
sively" used either for religious, charitable, or directly seek redress from the courts even on the
educational purposes. pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of
Igi
Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition for law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion
mandamus with the respondent Regional Trial of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, which, how provides for remedies against the action of an
ever, dismissed it for being premature. Its timely administrative board, body, or officer, as in the
^1
motion for reconsideration having been denied, case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention
the trial court when it ruled: (1) that mandamus of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner
does not he against the public respondents and should first avail of all the means affordedby the
(2) that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative processes.
administrative remedies.
s»i
Besides, mandamus does not lie against the
Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding respondent City Assessor in the exercise of his
a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the function of assessing properties for taxation pur
act required to be done when it or he unlawfully poses. While its duty to conduct assessments is a
neglects the performance of an act which the law ministerial function, the actual exercise thereof
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes rule that mandamus may not be availed of to
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
officeor which such other is entitled, there being particular way, or to retract or reverse an action
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in already taken in the exercise of either.
the ordinary course of law. Where administrative
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for cer
remedies are available, a petition for mandamus
tiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
does not lie.
Under Section 226 of RA 7160, the remedy of C. Central Mindanao University v.

appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals Department of Agrarian Reform
is available from an adverse ruling or action of G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992
the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the
NOTE: This case is added simply because
assessment of property...
of its interpretation of the-meaning of "directly,
actually and exclusively."
CAMPOS, JR., Jr. dinary reader a classroom meaning of the phras

"is actually directly and exclusively," but in s
&&A This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
doing they missed the true meaning of Sectio
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify
10, R.A. No. 6657, as to what lands are exempte
the proceedings and decision of the Department
or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB
for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set The pertinent provisions of R.A. }io. 6651
aside the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agraria:
August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the Reform Law of 1988, are as follows:.
DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400
hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous Sec. 4. SCOPE. The Comprehensiv
portions of the Central Mindanao University Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall covei
(CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in regardless of tenurial arrangement an-
mi
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program commodity produced, all public and privat
agricultural lands as provided in Proclama
(CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified
tion No. 131 and Executive Order No. 22'
beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
including other lands of the public domaii
This case originated in a complaint filed by suitable for agriculture.
complainants calling themselves as the Bukid-
More specifically, the following lands ar
non Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reforn
Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the
Program:
leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso
against the CMU, before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as
Sec. 10. EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLV
Tenants, under the CARP.
SIONS. Lands actually, directly and exclu
From the records, the following facts are sively used and found to be necessary fo
evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricul parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation
tural education institution owned and run by the fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, wa
estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon tersheds and mangroves, national defense
province school sites and campuses including experi
mental farm stations operated by public o
private schools for educational purposes
The questioned decision of the Adju seeds and seedlings research and pilot pro
dication Board, affirmed in toto by the Court of duction centers, church sites and convent:
Appeals, segregating 400 hectares from the CMU appurtenant thereto, mosque sites an<
land is primarily based on the alleged fact that Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, com
<iUti the land subject hereof is "not directly, actually munal burial grounds and cemeteries, pena
and exclusively used for school sites, because the colonies and penal farms actually workec
same was leased to Philippine Packing Corpora by the inmates, government and private
&*
tion (now Del Monte Philippines)." In support of research and quarantine centers and al
this view, the Board held that the "respondent lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope anc
University failed to show that it is using actually, over, except those already developed shal
really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to be exempt from the coverage of this Act
the exclusion of others, nor did it show that the [Emphasis added.]
same is directly used without any intervening
agency or person," and "there is no definite and The construction given by the DARAB tc
concrete showing that the use of said lands are Section 10 restricts the land area of the CML
tJMH
essentially indispensable for educational pur to its present needs or to a land area presently
poses." The reliance by the respondents Board actively exploited and utilized by the university
and Appellate Tribunal on the technical or literal in carrying out its present education prograir
definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Diction with its present student population and academic
ary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the or facility overlooking the very significant factor ol
growth of the university in the years to come.

By the nature of the CMU, which is a school
established to promote agriculture and indus (4) It is exempt from coverage under
try, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 because the
for future programs of expansion is obvious. At lands are actually, directly and exclusively
the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same
used and found jto be necessary for school
manner as land grant colleges in America, a type site and campus, including experimental
of educational institution which blazed the trail farm stations for educational purposes, and
for the development of vast tracts of unexplored for establishing seed and seedling research
and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid- and pilot production centers.
West. What we now know as Michigan State
University, Penn State University and Illinois D. Commissioner of BIR v.
State University, started as small land grant Court of Appeals
colleges, with meager funding to support their G.R. No. 124043, October 14,1998
ever increasing educational programs. They were
given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest PANGANIBAN, J.:
lands to be developed to support their numerous
expanding activities in the fields of agricultural Is the income derived from rentals of real
technology and scientific research. Funds for property owaed by the Young Men's Christian
the support of the educational programs of land Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA)
grant colleges came from government appro — established as "a welfare, educational and
priation, tuition and other student fees, private charitable non-profit corporation" — subject to
endowments and gifts, and earnings from mis income tax under the National Internal Revenue
cellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit Code (NIRC) and the Constitution?
that President Garcia issued Proclamation No.
476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and
JiHi
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College The Facts
(forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of The facts are undisputed. Private Respon
3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set dent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution,
up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, which conducts various programs and activities
in order that it can have enough resources and that are beneficial to the public, especially the
wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural edu young people, pursuant to its religious, educa
cational institution, to develop and train future tional and charitable objectives.
farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to
that part of the country. In 1980, private respondent earned, among
others, an income of P676,829.80 from leasing
iM
out a portion of its premises to small shop own
As to the determination of when and what ers, like restaurants and canteen operators, and
lands are found to be necessary for use by the P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-
CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve members. On July 2, 1984, the commissioner of
and answer the question and pass upon the internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment
problem of its needs in relation to its avowed to private respondent, in the total amount of
objectives for which the land was given to it by P415,615.01 includingsurcharge and interest, for
the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded with
Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment holding taxes on rentals and professional fees
or discretion on this matter, unless the eviden and deficiency withholding tax on wages.Private
tiary facts are so manifest as to- show that the respondent formally protested the assessment
CMU has no real need for the land. and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a
letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares or denied the claims of YMCA.
dered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August Contesting the denial of its protest, the
20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because: YMCA filed a petition for review at the Courtof
iftifjJ
(£4jij
Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due ratifying the Charter. Such intent must be ef
course, the CTA issued this ruling in favor of fectuated.
the YMCA:
Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
a former constitutional commissioner, who is
This Court's Ruling: The petition is meri now a member of this Court, stressed during
torious.
the Concom debates that"... what is exempted
is not the institution itself. . .; those exempted
Second Issue: Is the Rental Income of the from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and
YMCA Taxable? improvements actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational pur
poses." Father Joaquin G. Bernas, an eminent
Constitutional Provisions on Taxation authority on the Constitution and also a member
of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the
Invoking not only the NIRC but also the exemption created by said provision pertained
fundamental law, private respondent submits only to property taxes.
that Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987
Constitution, exempts'"charitable institutions" In his treatise on taxation, Mr. Justice
from the payment not only of property taxes but Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating that "[t]he tax
also of income tax from any source. In support of exemption covers property taxes only." Indeed,
its novel theory, it compares"the use of the words the income tax exemption claimed by private
"charitable institutions," "actually" and "directly" respondent finds no basis in Article VT, Section
in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, on the 28, par. 3 of the Constitution.
$$
one hand; and in Article VI, Section 22, par. 3 of Private respondent also invokes Article XTV,
the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand. Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter, 36 claiming
Private respondent enunciates three points. that the YMCA "is a non-stock, non-profit edu
First, the present provision is divisible into two cational institution whose revenues and assets
categories: (1) "[c]haritable institutions, churches are used actually, directly and exclusively for
and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes
mosques and non-profit cemeteries," the in on its properties and income." We reiterate that
comes of which are, from whatever source, all private respondent is exempt from the payment
tax-exempt; and (2) "[a]U lands, buildings and of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals
improvements actually and directly used for from its property. The bare allegation alone that
religious, charitable or educational purposes," it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institu
which are exempt only from property taxes. Sec tion is insufficient to justify its exemption from
ond, Lladoc v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, the payment of income tax.
hiii
14 SCRA 292, June 16, 1965, which limited the As previously discussed, laws allowing
exemption only to the payment of property taxes, tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris.
referred to the provision of the 1935 Constitution Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemp
kfflil
and not to its counterparts in the 1973 and the tion it claims under the aforecited provision, it
1987 Constitutions. Third, the phrase "actu must prove with substantial evidence that (1)
ally, directly and exclusively used for religious, it falls under the classification non-stock., non
m charitable or educational purposes" refers not profit educational institution; and (2) the income
only to "all lands, buildings and improvements," it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used
but also to the above-quoted first category which actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
includes charitable institutions like the private purposes. However, the Court notes that not a
respondent. scintilla of evidence was submitted by private re
spondent to prove that it met the said requisites.
The Court is not persuaded. The debates,
interpellations and expressions of opinion ofthe Is the YMCA an educational institution
framers of the Constitution reveal their intent within the purview ofArticle XTV, Section 4, par.
which, in turn, may have guided the people in 3 of the Constitution? We nuethat it isnot. The
ajVo£
term "educational institution" or "institution of signified that "[t]he net income derived from
learning" has acquired a well-known technical the rentals of the commercial buildings shall be
meaning, of which the members of the Consti- apportioned to the Federation and Member As
tutionaT Commission are deemed cognizant. sociations as the National Board may decide."
Under the Education Act of 1982, such term In sum, we find no basis for granting the YMCA
refers to schools. The school system is synony exemption from income* tax under the constitu
mous with formal education, which "refers to the tional provision invoked.
hierarchically structured and chronologically
isj graded learnings organized and provided by the
formal school system and for which certification WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
is required in order for the learner to progress The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
through the grades or move to the higher levels." September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 are
^)
The Court has examined the "Amended Articles hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deci
of Incorporation" and "By-Laws" of the YMCA, sion of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
but found nothing in them that even hints that 1995 is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that
it is a school or an educational institution. the income derived by petitioner from rentals
of its real property is subject to income tax. No
Furthermore, under the Education Act of
pronouncement as to costs.
1982, even non-formal education is understood
to be school-based and "private auspices such as SO ORDERED.
foundations and civic-spirited organizations" are
ruled out. It is settled that the term "educational
E. Commissioner of Internal
institution," when used in laws granting tax ex Revenue v. Santos
emptions, refers to a "... school seminary, college G.R. No. 119252, August 18, 1997
or educational establishment..." Therefore, the
private respondent cannot be deemed one of the HERMOSISIMA, JR., Jr.
educational institutions covered by the constitu
tional provision under consideration. Of grave concern to this Court is the judicial
pronouncement of the court a quo that certain
Is)
". . . Words used in the Constitution provisions of the Tariff & Customs Code and
are to be taken in their ordinary accepta the National Internal Revenue Code are uncon
tion. While in its broadest and best sense stitutional. This provokes the issue: Can the
education embraces all forms and phases of Regional Trial Courts declare a law inoperative
'Mi instruction, improvement and development and without force and effect or otherwise uncon
of mind and body, and as well of religious stitutional? Ifit can, under what circumstances?
and moral sentiments, yet in the common
In this petition, the Commissioner of Inter
understanding and application it means a nal Revenue and the Commissioner of Customs
place where systematic instruction in any or jointly seek the reversal of the Decision, dated
all of the useful branches of learning is given February 16,1995, of herein public respondent,
by methods common to schools and institu Hon. Apolinario B. Santos, Presiding Judge of
lm
tions of learning. That we conceive to be the Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
true intent and scope of the term [educational City.
institutions,] as used in the Constitution."
Moreover, without conceding that Private
Respondent YMCA is an educational institu The public respondent, in addressing the
tion, the Court also notes that the former did
third issue, ruled that the laws in question are
not submit proof of the proportionate amount
confiscatory and oppressive. Again, virtually
of the subject income that was actually, directly
adopting verbatim the reasons presented by the
private respondents in their position paper, the
and exclusively used for educational purposes.
lower court stated:
&M)
Article XIII, Section 5 of the YMCA by-laws,
which formed part of the evidence submitted, "The Court finds that indeed government
is patently insufficient, since the same merely taxation policy treats (jewelry as non-essen-
kai

sai
tial luxury item and therefore, taxed heavily. taxed as it is in this country, and these reasons
Aside from the ten percent (10%) value added deliberated upon by our legislature, are beyonc
tax (VAT), local jewelry manufacturers con the reach of judicial questioning...
tend with the (manufacturing) excise tax of
What we see here is a debate on the WIS
twenty percent (20%) (to be applied in stages)
DOM of the laws in question. This is a mattei
customs duties on imported raw materials,
on which the RTC is not competent to rule...
the highest in the Asia-Pacific region. In con
trast, imported gemstones and other precious
metals are dutyfree in Hongkong, Thailand,
The respondents presented an exhaustive
Malaysia and Singapore.
study on the tax rates on jewelry levied by differ
The Court elaborates further on the experi ent Asian countries. This is meant to convince us
ences of other countries in their treatment of the that compared to other countries, the tax rates
jewelry sector. imposed on said industry in the Phihppines is op
pressive and confiscatory. This Court, however,
cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates
M) We rule in favor of the petitioners. of other countries should be used as a yardstick
in determining what may be the proper subjects
It is interesting to note that public respon
of taxation in our own country...
dent, in the dispositive portion of his decision,
. perhaps keeping in mind his limitations under
the law as a trial judge, did not go so far as to F. John Hay Peoples Alternative
declare the laws in question to be unconstitu Coalition v. Victor Lim
tional. However, therein he declared the laws G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003
to be inoperative and without force and effect
insofar as the private respondents are concerned. CARPIO-MORALES, Jr. •
But, respondent judge, in the body of his decision,
gsa By the present petition for prohibition, man
unequivocally but wrongly declared the said pro
damus and declaratory relief with prayer for a
visions of law to be violative of Section 1, Article
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
III of the Constitution...
of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in
^>
the main, the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, "CREAT
We find it incongruous, in the face of the ING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE
sweeping pronouncements made by Judge San
tea AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP
tos in his decision, that private respondents can
JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL
still persist in their argument that the former
ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC
did not overreach the restrictions dictated upon
ACT NO. 7227."
him by law. There is no doubt in the Court's
mind, despite protestations to the contrary, Republic Act No. 7227, AN ACT ACCEL
that respondent judge encroached upon matters ERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY
properly falling within the province of legislative RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE
functions. In citing as basis for his decision un- USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION
proven comparative data pertaining to differenc AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYFORTHIS
es between tax rates of various Asian countries, PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
and concluding that the jewelry industry in the AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise
Philippines suffers as a result, the respondent known as the "Bases Conversion and Develop
.ju*dge took it upon himself to supplant legislative ment Act of 1992," which was enacted on March
policy regarding jewelry taxation. In advocating 13,1992, set out the policy of the government to
the abolition of local tax and duty on jewelry sim accelerate the sound and balanced conversion
ply because other countries have adopted such into alternative productive uses of the former
policies, the respondent judge overlooked the fact military bases under the 1947 Philippines-Unit
that such matters are not for him to decide. There ed States of America Military Bases Agreement,
are reasons why jewelry, a non-essential item, is namely, the Clark and Subic military reserva-
to
tions as well as their extensions including the The Baguio City government, meanwhile
John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) passed a number of resolutions in response to the
in the City of Baguio. actions taken by BCDA as owner and administra
As-rioted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created tor of Camp John Hay.
public respondent Bases Conversion and De By Resolution of September 29, 1993, the
velopment Authority (BCDA), vesting it with Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (the
powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of sanggunian) officially asked BCDA to exclude
carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing all the barangays partly or totally located within
the base areas in accordance with the declared Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of
government policy. any plan or program for its development.
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic By a subsequent Resolution dated January
iffijj
Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic 19,1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an
SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership
delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the over the home lots being occupied by residents
President of the Philippines. of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military
R.A. No. 7227 grantedthe Subic SEZ incen reservation.
tives-ranging from tax and duty-free importa Still by another resolution passed on Feb
tions, exemption of businesses therein from ruary 21, 1994, the sanggunian adopted and
iii)
local and national.taxes, to other hallmarks of a submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the
liberalized financial and business climate.
development of Camp John Hay. The sanggu-
And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority nian's vision expressed, among other things, a
Hj&
to the President to create through executive proc kind of development that affords protection to
lamation, subject to the concurrence of the local the environment, the making of a family-oriented
government units directly affected, other Special type of tourist destination, priority in employ
Economic Zones (SEZ)*in the areas covered re ment opportunities for Baguio residents and free
spectively by the Clark military reservation, the access to the base area, guaranteed participation
Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, of the city government in the management and
and Camp John Hay. operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a
named nine barangays from the area for develop
Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agree ment, and liability for local taxes of businesses
to be established within the camp'.
Ity®) ment with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.)
Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internatio BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed
nale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corpo to some, but rejected or modified the other pro
rations registered under the laws of the British posals of the sanggunian. They stressed the need
Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition
joint venture for the development of Poro Point precedent to its full development in accordance
in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.
tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four
months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA,
On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a
TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a-Joint
resolution requesting the Mayor to order the de
Venture Agreement whereby they bound them termination of realty taxes which may otherwise
'§$}
selves to put up a joint venture company known be collected from real properties of Camp John
as the Baguio International Development and Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently
guide the sanggunian in determining its position
L Management Corporation which would lease
areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ,
the purpose of turning such places into principal it (the sanggunian) being of the view that such
tourist and recreation spots, as originally envi declaration would exempt the camp's property
sioned by the parties under their Memorandum and the economic activity therein from local or
of Agreement. national taxation.
ii->
a&)
More than a month later, however, the -and-

sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255, (Series
of 1994), seeking and supporting, subject to its Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lc
pfoi)
concurrence, the issuance by then President Ra 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16, Lc
mos of a presidential proclamation declaring an 17, and Lot 18 of Psd-131102-002639 bein
area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 8*:
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227. With a combined area of TWO HUN
Together with this resolution was submitted a DRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTI
draft of the proposed proclamation for consider HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided,Tha
ation by the President. the area consisting of approximately Six an
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos is two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less, pres
sued Proclamation No. 420, the title of which ently occupied by the VOA and the resident
was earlier indicated, which established a SEZ of the Ambassador of the United States, shal
on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads be considered as part of the SEZ only upoi
as follows: turnover of the properties to the governmen
of the Republic of the Phihppines.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hai
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the Special Economic Zone. —.Pursuant to Sec
law and the resolution of concurrence by the tion 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the Base:
t^jfr) City Council of Baguio, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, Conversion and Development Authority is
President of the Phihppines, do hereby create hereby established as the governing body o
and designate a portion of the area covered by the John Hay Special Economic Zone and
the former John Hay reservation as embraced, as such, authorized to determine the utiliza
covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases tion and disposition of the lands comprising
Agreement between the Philippines and the it, subject to private-rights, if any, and ir
United States of America, as amended, as the consultation and coordination with the Cit3
John Hay Special Economic Zone, and accord Government of Baguio after consultatior
ingly order:
with its inhabitants, and to promulgate the
SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay necessary policies, rules, and regulations tc
Special Economic Zone. — The John Hay govern and regulate the zone thru the John
Special Economic Zone shall cover the area Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
consisting of Two Hundred Eighty Eight and which is its implementing arm for its eco
one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of nomic development and optimum utilization.
the total of Six Hundred Seventy-Seven (677)
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay
hectares of the John Hay Reservation, more
Special Economic Zone. — Pursuant to Sec
or less, which have been surveyed and veri
fied by the Department of Environment and
tion 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No.
Natural Resources (DENR) as defined by the
7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development
following technical description: Corporation shall implement all necessary
policies, rules, and regulations governing
WiJ
A parcel of land, situated in the City of the zone, including investment incentives,
Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of Luzon, in consultation with pertinent government
and particularly described in survey plans departments. Among others, the zone shall
Psd-131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030 have all the applicable incentives of the
as approved on 16 August 1993 and 26 Au Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of
gust 1993, respectively, by the Department Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable
of Environment and Natural Resources, in incentives granted in the Export Processing
i$$
detail containing: Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of
Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of and new investment laws that may herein
Ccs-131102-000030 after be enacted.
^£>
jSjjsj
i^l
ajjjj)
Sec. 4. ifoZe 0/ Departments, Bureaus, IE. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION

Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities. NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS UNCONSTI
&a
— All Heads of departments, bureaus, of TUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE
fices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the RULE THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE
government are hereby directed to give full UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
support to Bases Conversion and Develop
ment Authority and/or its implementing IV. THE MEMCtftANDUM OF AGREE
subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate the MENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BE
necessary approvals to expedite the imple TWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RE
mentation of various projects of the conver SPONDENTS BASES CONVERSION
W
sion program. DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING
BEEN ENTERED INTO ONLY BY DIRECT
Sec. 5. Local Authority. — Except as
NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.
$ai herein provided, the affected local govern
ment units shall retain their basic autonomy V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
and identity. OF THE.MEMORANDUM OF AGREE
Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. — All orders, MENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BE
rules, and regulations, or parts thereof, TWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPON
which are inconsistent with the provisions DENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOP
of this Proclamation, are hereby repealed, MENT AUTHORITY IS [sic] ILLEGAL.
amended, or modified accordingly.
VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOP
Sec. 7. Effectivity.—This proclamation MENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS NOT
shall take effect immediately. HAVING UNDERGONE ENVIRONMEN
'H0
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of TAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING
July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A
and ninety-four. VALID ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AS
jjMjl SESSMENT.
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420
spawned the present petition for prohibition,
mandamus and declaratory reliefwhich was filed .. The issues boil down to:
J^jj) on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its
constitutionality or validity as well as the legal
ity of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint
(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is consti
Venture Agreement between public respondent
isyl
tutional by providing for national and local tax
BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and
exemption within and granting other economic
ASIAWORLD.
incentives to the John Hay Special Economic
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allow Zone; and
ance of the petition the following:
(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is consti
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
tutional for limiting or interfering with the local
NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic) IN SO FAR autonomy of Baguio City;
AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS IS
INVALID AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UN It is settled that when questions of consti
CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE tutional significance are raised, the court can
Lai) PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED exercise its power of judicial review only if the
ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE. following requisites are present: (1) the existence
II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT LIMITS THE and substantial interest of the party raising the
POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE constitutional question; (3) the exercise ofjudicial
AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS reviewis pleaded at the earhest opportunity; and
INVALID, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITU (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
TIONAL. the case.
iiijji)
An actual case or controversy refers to an contravenes Article VI, Section 28(4) of the Con
existing case or controversy that is appropriate stitution which provides that "No law granting,
liiiiii)
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or an any tax exemption shall be passed without the
ticipatory. The controversy needs to be definite concurrence of a majority of all the members of
and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations Congress."
of parties who are pitted against each other due Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the chal
to their adverse legal interests. There is in the lenged provision, reads:
present case a real clash of interests and rights
between petitioners and respondents arising Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay
•§±) from the issuance of a presidential proclamation Special Economic Zone. — Pursuant to Sec
that converts a portion of the area covered by tion 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No.
Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development
that such proclamation contains unconstitutional Corporation shall implement all necessary
provisions, the latter claiming otherwise. policies, rules, and regulations governing
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concur the zone, including investment incentives,
rence of the affected local government units to in consultation with pertinent government
the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in departments. Among others, the zone shall
the country. The grant by the law on local gov have all the applicable incentives of the
ernment units of the right of concurrence on the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of
bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable
standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition incentives granted in the Export Processing
of the real interests that communities nearby Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of
or surrounding a particular base area have in 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, and new investment laws that may here
being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the inafter be enacted. (Emphasis and italics
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal supplied)
and substantial such that they have sustained Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No.
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
7227 provides:
government act being challenged. Theirs is a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by w v ' wv ^cy^c
the proclamation and not merely an interest in (a) Within the framework and subject
the question involved or an incidental interest, to the mandate and limitations of the Con
for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc
stitution and the pertinent provisions of the
lamation No. 420 is the very economic and social
Local Government Code, the Subic Special
existence of the people of Baguio City.
Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-
sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial
and investment center to generate employ
Having cleared the way for judicial review,
ment opportunities in and around the zone
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420,
and to attract and promote productive foreign
as framed in the second and third issues above,
investments;
must now be addressed squarely.
The second issue refers to petitioners' objec (b) The Subic Special Economic Zone
tionagainstthe creationby Proclamation No. 420 shall be operated and managed as a sepa
ofa regime oftax exemption within the John Hay rate customs territory ensuring free flow
SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R.A. No. or movement of goods and capital within,
7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs into and exported out of the Subic Special
yet to be established in base areas, unlike the Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives
grant underSection 12thereof oftax exemption such as tax and duty free importations ofraw
and investment incentives to the therein estab materials, capital and equipment. However,
lished Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to exportation or removal ofgoods fromthe ter
the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus ritory ofthe Subic Special Economic Zone to
sgj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT* 323
the other parts of the Philippine territory resident status within the Subic Special
shall be subject to customs duties and taxes Economic Zone. They shall have freedom
m
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other of ingress and egress to and from the Subic
relevant tax laws of the Philippines; Special Economic Zone without any need of
special authorization from the Bureau of
(c) The provisions of existing laws,
Immigration and Deportation. The Subic
rules and regulations to the contrary not
Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in
withstanding, no taxes, local and national,
Section 13 of this Act may also issue work
shall be imposed within the Subic Special
ing visas renewable every two (2) years to
Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three
foreign executives and other aliens possess
percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all
ing highly-technical skills which no Filipino
businesses and enterprises within the Subic
within the Subic Special Economic Zone
Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to
possesses, as certified by the Department of
the National Government, one percent (1%)
Labor and Employment. The names of aliens
each to the local government units affected
granted permanent residence status and
by the declaration of the zone in proportion
working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan
to their population area, and other factors.
Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of
In addition, there is hereby established a
Immigration and Deportation within thirty
development fund of one percent (1%) of the (30) days after issuance thereof;
gross income earned by all businesses and en
terprises within the Subic Special Economic xxx xxx xxx
Zone to be utilized for" the Municipality of It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No.
Subic, and other municipalities contiguous 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted
to be base areas. In case of conflict between by Congress with tax exemption, investment
national and local laws with respect to tax incentives and the like. There is no express ex
exemption privileges in the Subic Special tension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs
Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved still to be created at the time via presidential
in favor of the latter; proclamation.
(d) No exchange control policy shall The deliberations of the Senate confirm the
be applied and free markets for foreign ex exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and invest
change, gold, securities and futures shall be ment privileges accorded it under the law ...
allowed and maintained in the Subic Special
Economic Zone; As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section
:$$* 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given to Subic
(e) The Central Bank, through the Mon SEZ consist principally of exemption from tariff
etary Board, shall supervise and regulate the or customs duties, national and local taxes of
operations of banks and other financial in business entities therein (paragraphs [b] and
stitutions within the Subic Special Economic [c]), free market and trade of specified goods or
Zone; properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking and
(f) Banking and Finance shall be lib
finance (paragraph f), and relaxed immigration
rules for foreign investors (paragraph g). Yet,
eralized with the establishment of foreign
apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also
currency depository units of local commercial
makes available to the John Hay SEZ benefits
banks and offshore banking units of foreign
existing in other laws such as the privilege of
banks with minimum Central Bank regula
export processing zone-based businesses of im
tion;
portingcapital equipment and raw materials free
(g) Any investor within the Subic Spe from taxes, duties and other restrictions;] tax
cial Economic Zone whose continuing invest and dutyexemptions, tax holiday, tax credit,and
ment shall not be less than Two hundred fifty other incentives under the Omnibus Investments
thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse Code of1987;] and the applicability to the subject
^j and dependent children under twenty-one zone of rules governing foreign investments in
(21) years of age, shall be granted permanent the Philippines.
'iMii
324 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOFGOVERNMENT

&$£
While the grant of economic incentives may This Court then declares that the grant by
be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, Proclamation No. 420 oftaxexemption andother
ia&l
free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof privileges to the John HaySEZ is void for being
to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The violative of the Constitution. This renders it
incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive unnecessary to still dwell on petitioners' claim
only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of that the same grant violatesthe equal protection
the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support guarantee.
therein. Neither doesthe same grant ofprivileges
to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other Withrespectto the final issueraisedbypeti
laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation tioners — that Proclamation No. 420 is unconsti
No. 420, which laws were already extant before tutional for beingin derogation ofBaguio City's
the issuance of the proclamation or the enact
local autonomy, objection is specifically mounted
against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA is set
ment of R.A. No. 7227.
up as the governing body of the John Hay SEZ.
More importantly, the nature of most of the
Petitioners argue that there is no authority
assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It of the President to subject the John Hay SEZ to
is the legislature, unless limited by a provision the governance of BCDA which has just over
of the state constitution, that has full power to sight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to
exempt any person or corporation or class of prop diminish the city government's power over an
erty from taxation, its power to exempt being as area within its jurisdiction, hence, Proclamation
broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, No. 420 unlawfully gives the President power of
the Constitution may itself provide for specific control over the local government instead ofjust
tax exemptions, or local governments may pass mere supervision.
ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.
The challenged grant of tax exemption would Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is entrusted
circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a with, amongother things, the following purpose:
law granting any tax exemption must have the
xxx xxx xxx
concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. In the same vein, the other kinds of (a) To own, hold and/or administer the mili
'$#£) privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are tary reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wal
by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate lace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station,
upon. San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt.
Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those
i i;:fifo) Contrary to public respondents' suggestions, portions of Metro Manila Camps which may be
the claimed statutory exemption of the John transferred to it by the President;
Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and
unmistakable from the language of the law on xxx xxx xxx
which it is based; it must be expressly granted With such broad rights of ownership and
in a statute stated in a language too clear to administration vested in BCDA over Camp John
be mistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it, subject
as it must be categorically and unmistakably to certain limitations provided for by law. By
expressed. designating BCDA as the governing agency of
If it were the intent of the legislature to grant the John Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes
iiiiiijj
to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption or reiterates the statutory role or functions it
and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would has been granted.
have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227. The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy immunity and financial incentives as contained
of the political departments of the government in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclama
on either of two grounds-infringement of the tion No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed
Ifoiati
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. proclamation cannot be declared unconstitution
al, the other parts thereof not being repugnant
tai
to law or the Constitution. The delineation and 1. Expenditure of public funds.

declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the Congess has control of the expenditure of
ftfiiJ
powers of the President to do so by means of a public funds. "No money shall be paid out of the
proclamation. The requisite prior concurrence by treasury except in pursuance ofan appropriation
made by law."
the Baguio City government to such proclama
tion appears to have been given in the form of a »
duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The A. Guingona, Jr. v. Carague

other provisions of the proclamation had been G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary GANCAYCO, Jr.
to the Constitution, while another part is valid, This is a case of first impression whereby
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, petitioner question the constitutionality of the
may stand and be enforced. This Court finds that automatic appropriation for debt service in the
' the other provisions in Proclamation No. 420 1990 budget.
converting a delineated portion of Camp John
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as
Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from
follows:
the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof,
hence they stand. The 1990 budget consist of P98.4 Bil
lion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
SEC. 29. (1) NO MONEY SHALL BE Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION otherwise known as the General Appropria
MADE BY LAW. tions Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while
the appropriations for the Department of
(2) NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY Education, Culture and Sports amount to
j^J
SHALL BE APPROPRIATED, APPLIED, P27,017,813,000.00.
PAID, OR EMPLOYED, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, The said automatic appropriation for debt
OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITU
"Amending Certain Provisions.of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
TION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR ANY
as amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by
PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR OTH
P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Pro
ER RELIGIOUS TEACHER OR DIGNITARY
cess in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
AS SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH PRIEST,
Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No.
PREACHER, MINISTER, OR DIGNITARY 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guar
IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES, antee and Payment Positions of the Republic
OR TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION, OR of the Phihppines on Its Contingent Liabilities
GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR LEPRO Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
SARIUM. Appropriating Funds For The Purpose."
(3) ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY There can be no question that petitioners
TAX LEVIED FOR A SPECLAL PURPOSE as Senators of the Republic of the Phihppines
SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL FUND may bring this unit where a constitutional is
AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE sue is raised. [Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., G.R.
ONJUY. IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A No. 87656, November 19, 1990.] Indeed, even a
SPECIAL FUND WAS CREATED HAS BEEN taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful
FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BAL expenditure of public funds. [Municipality of
ANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969) and
TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOV Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. vs.
ERNMENT. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966).]
The petition seeks the declaration of the 'He pointed to the high expectations gen
unconstitutionahty of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of erated by the February Revolution, especially
P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The position keen among public schoolteachers, which
also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt at present exacerbate these long frustrated
service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said hopes.
decrees.
'Mr. Ople stated that despite thesincer-
ity of all administrations that tried vainly
The questions raised in the instant petition to respond to the needs of the teachers, the
are —
central problem that always defeated their
pious intentions was really the one budget
"I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P ary priority in the sense that any proposed
86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990 increase for public schoolteachers had to be
U BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ^multiplied many times by the number of
ARTICLE XTV OF THE CONSTITUTION? government employees in general and their
n.AREPDNo.81,PDNo. 1177 AND PD
equitable claims to any pay standardization
g&j No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
such that the pay rate of teachers is hope
CONSTITUTION?
lessly pegged to the rate of government work
ers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SEC the prospect of a significant pay increase for
TION 29(1), ARTICLE VI OF THE CON teachers.
STITUTION?"
'Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised by the Constitution of the highest priority for
ai
in the petition which this Court may properly public schoolteachers, and by implication, for
take cognizance of. all teachers, would ensure that the President
and Congress would be strongly urged by a
Of the first issue, the petitioners aver-
L "According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the
constitutional mandate togrant to them such
a level of remuneration and other incentives
Constitution: that would take teaching competitive again
and attractive to the best available talents
'(5) The state shall assign the highest
in the nation.
budgetary priority to education arid ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its right 'Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before
ful share of the best available talents through World War II, teaching competed most suc
adequate remuneration and other means of cessfully against all other career choices for
job satisfaction and fulfillment.' the best and the brightest of the younger
generation. It is for this reason, he stated,
L "The reason "behind the said provisions is
stated, thus:
that his proposed amendment if approved
would ensure that teaching would be restored
'In explaining his proposed amendment, to its lost glory as the career of choice for
?m\ Mr. Ople stated that all the great and sincere the most talented and most public-spirited
piety professed by every President and every of the younger generation in the sense that
Congress of the Philippines since the end of it would become the countervailing measure
World War II for the economic welfare of the against the continued decline of teaching
public schoolteachers always ended up in and the wholesale desertion of this noble
failure and this failure, he stated, had caused profession presently taking place. He further
mass defection of the best and brightest stated that this would ensure that the future
teachers to other careers, including menial and the quality of the population would be
jobs in overseas employment and concerted asserted as a toppriority against many clam
actions by them to project their grievances, orous and importunate but less important
mainly over low pay and abject working claims of the present.' (Journal claims of the
conditions. Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
fa" i
"However, as against this constitutional Petitioners argue that the said .automatic
intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of
i»\
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated then President Marcos became functus oficio
for the Department of Education in the 1990 when he was ousted in February, 1986; that
budget. It is plain, therefore, that the said upon the expiration of the one-man legislature
appropriation for debt service is inconsistent in the person of President Marcos, the legislative
with the Constitution, hence, void (Art. 7, power was restored to Cbngress on February 2,
New Civil Code)." 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the
people; that there is a need for a new legislation
While it is true that under Section 5(5),
by Congress providing for automatic appropria
Article XVI of the Constitution Congress is man tion, but Congress, up to the present, has not
dated to "assign the highest budgetary priority approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8
to education" in order to "insure that teaching Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990
•fAi will attract and retain its rightful share of the budget is an administrative act that rests on no
best available talents through adequate remu law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
neration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and
it the power to respond to the imperatives of the P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of
national interest and for the attainment of other President Marcos„after the adoption of the 1987
state policies or objectives. Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative
under Section 3, Article XVTH which provides -
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985,
the budget for education has tripled to upgrade "Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, ex
and improve the facility of the public school ecutive orders, proclamations, letters of
system. The compensation of teachers has been instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
aside for the Department of Education, Culture remain operative until amended, repealed,
or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
and Sports under the General Appropriations
Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary They then point out that since the said de
allocation among all department budgets. This crees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI
is a clear compliance with the aforesaid consti of the Constitution, i.e.,
tutional mandate according highest priority to
"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or
education.
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
Having faithfully complied therewith, public debt, bills of local application, and
Congress is certainly not without any power, private bills shall originate exclusively in
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an the House ofRepresentatives, but the Senate
appropriation, that can reasonably service our may propose or concur with amendments."
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was (Emphasis supplied.)
inherited from the previous administration. It
whereby bills have to be approved by the Presi
is not only a matter of honor and to protect the dent, [Section 27, Article VI, Constitution.] then
credit standing of the country. More especially, a law must be passed by Congress to authorize
the very survival of our economy is at stake. said automatic appropriation. Further, petition
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated ers state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of
to!
an amount for debt service bigger than the share Article VI of the Constitution which provides
allocated to education, the Court finds and so are follows -
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional. "Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
Now to the second issue. The petitioners appropriation made by law."
made the following observations:
They assert that there must be definiteness,
certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
L
[Citing State vs. Eggers, 16 L.R.A. N.S. 630; burden — debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-
State vs. La Grane, 41 Pac. 1075; 1 Tanada and to-debt or/other such schemes. Second, the
iffiftl
Carreon, Political Law, 1961 ed., p. 253; State automatic appropriation obviates the serious
vs. Moore, 69 N.W. 3735, pages 15 to 20, Rollo.] difficulties in debt servicing arising from any
Otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative deviation from what has been previously pro
power to the President who determines in grammed. The annual debt service estimates,
JffiJ advance the amount appropriated for the debt which are usually made one year in advance,
service. [Citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) are based on a mathematical set or matrix
and Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), 1 or, in layman's parlance, 'basket' of foreign
&j&i
Taiiada and Carreon, supra, pages 421 to 4422; exchange and interest rate assumptions
Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 10th ed., page which may significantly differ from actual
220.] rates not even in proportion to changes on
The Court is not persuaded. the basis of the assumptions. Absent an au
tomatic appropriation clause, the Philippine
Section 3, Article XVHI of the Constitution Government has to await and depend upon
recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, execu- Congressional action, which by the time this
' tive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions comes, may no longer be responsive to the
and other executive issuances not inconsistent intended conditions which in the meantime
with the Constitution shall remain operative may have already drastically changed. In
until amended, repealed or revoked." the meantime, also, delayed payments and
This transitory provision of the Constitution arrearages may have supervened, only to
has precisely been adopted by its framers to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure
preserve the social order so that legislation by ration in the budget due to penalties and/or
the then President Marcos may be recognized. demand for immediate-payment even before
Such laws are to remain in force and effect un due dates.
less they are inconsistent with the Constitution Clearly, the claim that payment of the
or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon
An examination of the aforecited presidential the continuance of the person of President
decrees show the clear intent that the amounts Marcos and his legislative power goes against
needed to cover the payment of the principal the intent and purpose of the law. The pur
and interest on all foreign loans, including those pose is foreseen to subsist with or without
guaranteed by the national government, should the person of Marcos."
be made available when they shall become due
'dM\
The argument of petitioners that the said
precisely without the necessity of periodic en
presidential decrees did not meet the require
actments of separate laws appropriating funds
ment and are therefore inconsistent with Sec
therefor, since both the periods and necessities
mi tions 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitu
are incapable of determination in advance.
tion which requires, among others, that "all
The automatic appropriation provides the appropriations, xxx bills authorizing increase
flexibility for the effective execution of debt of public debt" must be passed by Congress and
\m
management policies. approved by the President is untenable. Cer
Its political wisdom has been convincing tainly, the framers of the Constitution did not
discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues — contemplate that existing laws in the statute
books including existing presidential decrees
"x x x First, for example, it enables the appropriating public money are reduced to mere
Government to take advantage of a favorable "bills" that must again go through the legislative
turn of market conditions by redeeming high- mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said
interest securities and borrowing at lower provisions of the Constitution which refer to
rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures
Mi
instruments, or too enter into arrangements still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of
that could lighten our outstanding debt the framers thereof were otherwise they should
ik&l
have expressed their decision in a more direct or "The Government budgeting process
express manner. consists of four major phases:
Well-knownis the rule that repeal or amend 1. Budget preparation. The first step
ment by-implication is frowned upon. Equally is essentially tasked upon the Executive
fundamental is the principle that construction Branch and covers the estimation of gov
of the Constitution and law is generally applied ernment revenues,* the determination of
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is budgetary priorities and activities within the
so clearly stated. ' ' constraints imposed by available revenues
and by borrowing limits, and the transla
tion of desired priorities and activities into
The Court finds that in this'case the ques expenditure levels.
tioned laws are complete in all their essential
Budget preparation starts with the bud
terms and conditions and sufficient standards
are indicated therein.
get call issued by the Department of Budget
and Management. Each agency is required to
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as submit agency budget estimates in line with
amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. the requirements consistent with the general
No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be ceilings set by the Development Budget Co
automatically set aside in order to enable the ordinating Council (DBCC).
L, Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges staff, based on the macroeconomic projec
on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred tions of interest rates (e.g., LIBOR rate) and
as guaranteed by it when they shall become due estimated sources of domestic and foreign
without the need to enact a separate law appro financing, estimates debt call, then Bureau
priating funds therefor as the need arises. The of Treasury computers for the interest and
purpose of these laws is to enable the government principal payments for the year for all direct
^
to make prompt payment and/or advances for all national government borrowings and other
loans to protect and maintain the credit standing liabilities assumed by the same.
of the country.
2. Legislative authorization. At this
Although the subject presidential decrees stage, Congress enters the picture and de
do not state specific amounts to be paid, neces liberates or acts on the budget proposals of
sitated by the very nature of the problem being the President, and Congress.in the exercise
addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made of its own judgment and wisdom formulates
certain by the legislative parameters provided an appropriation act precisely following the
in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited process established by the Constitution,
discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for which specifies that no money may be paid
debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the from the Treasury except in accordance with
principal, interest, taxes and other normal bank an appropriation made by law.
ingcharges onthe loans,credits or indebtedness,
or on the bonds, debentures or security or other Debt service is not included in the Gen
evidences of indebtedness sold in international eral Appropriations Act, since authorization
markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and therefor already exists under R.A. No. 4860
when they shall become due. No uncertainty and 245, as amended and P.D. No. 1967.
arises in executive implementation as the limit Precisely in the light of this subsisting au
will be the exact amounts as shown by the books thorization as embodiedin said RepublicActs
of the Treasury. and PD for debt services, Congress does not
î
concern itself with details for implementa
The Government budgetary process has tion by the Executive, but largely with an
been graphically described to consist of four nual levels and approval thereof upon due
major phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor deliberations as part of the whole obligation
General: program for the year. Upon such approval,
Congress has spoken and..cannot be said to 'Section 29(1). No money shall be paid
have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, out of the treasury except in.pursuance of
on whose part lies the implementation or an appropriation made by law.'
execution of the legislative wisdom. More significantly, there is no provi
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Ex sion in our Constitution that provides or
ecutive, the third phase of the budget process prescribes any particular form of words or
covers the various operational aspects of religious recitals in which an authorization
budgeting. The establishment of obligation or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
authority eeilings, the evaluation of work except that it be 'made by law,' such as pre
and financial plans for individual activities, cisely the authorization or appropriation
the continuing review of government fiscal under the questioned presidential decrees. In
position, the regulation of fund releases, the other words, in terms of time horizons, an ap
implementation of cash payment schedules, propriation may be impliedly (as by past but
and other related activities comprise this subsisting legislations) as well as" expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment
phase of the budget cycle.
of laws by the present Congress), just as said
Release from the debt service fund is appropriation may be made in general as
triggered by a request of the Bureau of the well as in specific terms. The Congressional
Treasury for allotments from the Depart authorization may be embodied in annual
ment of Budget and Management, one laws, such as a general appropriations act
quarter in advance of payment schedule, or in special provisions of laws of general or
to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of special application which appropriate public
Treasury, upon receiving officialbillings from funds for specific public purposes, such as
the creditors, remits payments to creditors the questioned decrees. An appropriation
through the Central Bank or to the Sinking measure is sufficient if the legislative inten
Fund established for government security tion clearly and certainly appears from the
issues (Annex F). language employed (In re Continuing Ap
propriations, 32 p. 272), whether in the past
4. Budget accountability. The fourth or in the present."
phase refers to the evaluation-of actual
performance and initially approved work Thus, in accordance with Section 22,-Article
targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon
and work accomplished are compared with C. Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of
the targets set at time the agency budgets Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the
were approved. Fiscal Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure
program covering the estimated obligation that
There being no undue delegation of legisla will be incurred by the national government
tive power as clearly above shown, petitioners during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion.
insist nevertheless that subject presidential Of the proposed budget, P86.8 is aside for debt
decrees constitute undue delegation of legisla servicing as follows:
tive power to the executive on the alleged ground
that the appropriations therein are not exact,
certain or definite, invoking in support therefor as authorized under P.D. No. 1967 and R.A. No.
the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution 4860 and 245, as amended.
under which the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No.
974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitu P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
tion does not require a definite, certain, exact or authorizations or appropriations, unless they
'specific appropriation made by law.' Section 29, are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress.
Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of The Executive was thus merely complying with
these words and simply states: . the duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patrio of the Rules of Court, upon the following posited
tism and good motive of petitioners in filing this grounds, viz.:
petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail
. 1) the invalidity of the "TRUST AC
on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As
COUNT" in the books of account of the
to whether or not the country should honor its
international debt, more especially the enormous Ministry of Energy (now the Office of Energy
amount that had been incurred by the past ad Affairs) created pursuant to § 8, paragraph 1,
ministration, which appears to be the ultimate of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation
objective of the petition, is not an issue that is of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29
presented or proposed to be addressed by the (3) Article VI of the Constitution;"
aj
Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for 2) the unconstitutionality of § 8, para
Congress and the Executive to determine in the graph 1(c) of P.D. No. 1956 as amended by
exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion. Executive Order No. 137 for "being an undue
WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED, and invalid delegation of legislative power to
without pronouncement as to costs. ' the Energy Regulatory Board;"
3) the illegality of the reimbursements
2. Public purpose. to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price.
The specific limits on the power of Congress Stabilization Fund, because it contravenes
are those found in Section 29(2). Aside from the § 8 paragraph 2(2) of P.D. 1956 as amended;
explicit limitations, there is also the all impor and
tant implicit limitation that public money can 4) the consequent nullity of the Order
be appropriated only for a public purpose.. This dated December 10,1990 and the necessity of
iSs>
limitation arises from the relation between the a rollback of the pump prices and petroleum
power to spend and the power to tax. "The right products to the levels prevailing prior to the
of the legislature to appropriate public funds is said Order.
correlative with its right to tax, and, under the
constitutional provisions against taxation except It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984
for public purposes ... no appropriation of state President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956
funds can be made for other than a public pur creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
^ pose." 81 CJS p. 1147. designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse
Where the sum of 85,000 pesos was appro
oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
priated by Congress for a feeder road running
imported petroleum products resulting from ex
tej through a private subdivision owned by a private
change rate adjustments and from increases in
individual, the appropriation was not considered
the world market prices of crude oil.
to be for a public purpose even if the feeder road
was later donated to the government. The sub Subsequently the OPSF was reclassified into
^ft
sequent donation of the road did not validate the a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O 1024,
law because the validity of a statute depends and ordered released from the National Treasury
upon the powers of Congress at the time of its to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive
approval, and not upon events occurring or acts Order also authorized the investment ofthe fund
performed subsequently. Pascual v. Secretary of in government securities, with the earnings from
Public Works, 110 Phil. 331-346 (I960). such placements accruing to the fund.
aJ
3. Special fund. President Corazon C. Aquino amended P.D.
1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137
A. Osmena v. Orbos on February 27,1987 expanding the grounds for
G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993 reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
î
under recovery incurred as a result of the reduc

NARVASA, C.J.: tion of domestic prices of petroleum products
The petitioner seeks the corrective, prohibi the amount of the under recovery being left for
tive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 determination by the Ministry of Finance.
$M
Now, the petition alleges that the status of dues, and other duties or imposts within
the OPSF as of March 31 1991 showed a "Ter the framework of the national development
minal Fund Balance deficit" of some P12.877 program of the Government";
billion; that to abatethe worsening deficit; "the and inasmuch as the delegation relates to the
Energy Regulatory Board issued an Order on exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
December 10, 1990, approving the increase in limitations and restrictions, must be quantitative,
M
pump prices of petroleum products," and at the that is, the law must not only specify how to tax,
rate ofrecoupment the OPSF deficit shouldhave who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but
been fully covered in a span of six (6) months, also impose a specific limit on how much to tax."
but this notwithstanding, the respondents Oscar
Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; The petitioner does not suggest that a "trust
Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of account" is illegal per se, but maintains that the
Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as monies collected, which form part of-the OPSF
Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman should be maintained in a special account of the
Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory general fund for the reason that the Constitution
Board "are poised to accept process and pay so provides, and because they are, supposedly,
'41A
claims not authorized under P.D. 1956." taxes levied for a special purpose. He assumes
that the Fund is formed from a tax undoubt
The petition further avers that the creation edly because a portion thereof is taken from
of the trust fund violates § 29(3), Article VI of collections of ad valorem taxes and the increases
im
the Constitution, reading as follows: thereon.
"(3)All money collected on any tax levied It thus appears that the challenge posed by
altii
for a special purpose shall be treated as a the petitioner is premised primarily on the view
special fund and paid out for such purposes that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
only. If the purpose for which a special fund 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, taxation powerofthe State. The SolicitorGeneral
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the observes that the "argument rests on the assump
general funds of the Government." tion that the OPSF is a form of revenue measure
The petitioner argues that "the monies col drawing from a special tax to be expended for a
]mi lected pursuant to P.D. 1956 as amended, must special purpose." The petitioner's perceptions
be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not' as a 'trust are, in the Court's view, not quite correct.
account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a' special To address this critical misgiving in the
tax is collected for a specific purpose the revenue position of the petitioner on these issues, the
generatedtherefrom shall Tje treated as a special Court recalls its holding in Valmonte v. Energy
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, Regulatory Boara\ et al.159
and not channeled to another government objec
tive." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'The foregoing arguments suggest the
'specialfund' consistsofmoniescollected through presence of misconceptions about the nature
the taxing power ofa State, such amounts belong and functions of the OPSF. The OPSF is a
to the State, although the use thereof is limited 'Trust Account' which was established 'for
to the special purpose/objective for which it was the purpose ofminimizing the frequent price
created." changes brought about by exchange rate
adjustment and/or changes in world market
mj He also contends that the delegation of prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
"legislative authority" to the ERB violates § 28 products." Under P.D. No. 1956,as amended
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, viz.: by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 Febru-
\iM
"(2)The Congress may, by law, authorize
the President to fix, within specified limits, ,S9G.R. Nos. L-79601-03 [23 June 1988] 162 SCRA 521;
and subject to such limitations and restric Decided jointly with Citizen's Alliance for Consumer Protec
tionv.EnergyRegulatory Board,etal., G.R. Nos.L-78888-90,
tions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and Kilusang Mayo UnoLaborCenterv. EnergyRegulatory,
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage Boardetal., G.R. Nos.L-79690-92; emphasis supplied.
IfcE
i'lfiA

iM
ary 1987, this Trust Account may be funded that such frequentooil price adjustments may
from any of the following sources: have upon the economy: Thus, the OPSF serves
ogj
"a) Any increase in the taxcollectionfrom as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of
adjmlorem taxor customs duty imposed on the purchaseprice ofoilandpetroleum products
petroleum products subject to tax under this paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues
a*i
Decree arising from exchange rate adjust are inputted and from which amounts are drawn
ment, as may be determined by the Minister from time to time to reimburse oil companies,
of Finance in consultation with the Board of when appropriate situations arise, for increases
Energy; in, as well as under recovery of, costs ofcrude im
portation. TheOPSF is thus a buffer mechanism
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a through which the domestic consumer prices of
result of the lifting of taxexemptions ofgov oilandpetroleum products are stabilized, instead
ernment corporations, as may be determined offluctuating every so often, and oil companies
iiil
by the Minister of Finance in consultation areallowed torecover thoseportions oftheir costs
"with the Board of Energy; which they would not otherwise recovergiven the
c) Any additional amount tobe imposed level ofdomesticprices existing atanygiven time.
on petroleum products to augment the re To the extent that some taxrevenues are also put
sources of the Fund through an appropriate into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through
Order that may be issued by the Board of which thedomestic pricesofpetroleum products
fell Energy requiring payment ofpersons or com aresubsidized inpart.It appears to theCourt that
panies engagedin the business ofimporting, theestablishment and maintenance of theOPSF
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum is well within that pervasive and non-waivable
&*f4
products; power and responsibility of the government to
secure, the physical and economic survival and
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials vjell-being ofthecommunity, that comprehensive
in case the actual peso costs paid by oil com sovereign authority we designate as the police
^J
panies in the importation of crude oil and power oftheState. The stabilization, and subsidy
petroleum products is less than the peso of domesticprices ofpetroleum products and fuel
costs computed using the reference foreign oil clearly critical in importance considering,
exchange rate as fixed by the Board of En among other things, the continuing high level of
ergy."
dependence of the country on imported crude oil
xxx •virv
AAO. xxx are appropriately regarded as public purposes."
tot The fact that the world market prices of oil, Alsoofrelevance is this Court's ruling in re
measured by the spot market in Rotterdam, vary lation to the sugar stabihzation fund the nature
from dayto dayis ofjudicialnotice. Freight rates of which is not far different from the OPSF. In
for hauling crude oil and petroleum products Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank160 this Court
from sources of supply to the Phihppines may upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees
alsovaryfrom time to time.The exchange rate of and explained their nature and character, viz.:
the peso vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and other con
"The stabilization fees collected are in
yi vertible foreign currencies alsochanges from day the nature ofa tax, whichis within the power
today. Thesefluctuations in world market prices of the State to impose for the promotion of
and in tanker rates and foreign exchange rates the sugar industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil.
wouldin a completely free market translate into
ty»i 148). The tax collected is not in a pure exer
corresponding adjustments in domestic prices cise of the taxing power. It is levied with a
ofoil andpetroleum products withsympathetic regulatory purpose, to provide a means for
frequency. Butdomestic prices which varyfrom the stabilization of the sugar industry. The
^J dayto dayor evenonlyfrom weekto weekwould levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
result in a chaotic market with unpredictable power of the State (Lutz v. Araneta, supra).
effects upon the country's economy in general.
ay The OPSF was established precisely to protect
local consumers from the adverse consequences ,60158 SCRA 626.
jjffjfl
%}
XXX xxx xxx the authority must be exercised. In addition to

the general policy of the law to protect the local
'The stabilization fees in question are
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
levied by the State upon sugar millers, plant pump rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly autho
ers and producers for a special purpose that rizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
of'financing the growth and development of augment the resources of the Fund.
the sugar industry and all its components,
stabilization of the domestic market includ
ing the foreign market.' The fact that the In relation to the third question respecting
jjjafcj State has taken possession of moneys pur the illegality of the reimbursements to oil com
suant to law is sufficient to constitute them
panies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization
state funds, even though they are held for a Fund, because allegedly in contravention of §
special purpose (Lawrencev. AmericanSure 8, paragraph 2(2) of P.D. 1956, as amended the
ty Co., 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in Court finds for the petitioner.
42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied
for a special purpose, the revenues collected
are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in
the language of the statute, 'administered SEC. 30. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED
in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURIS
purpose has been fulfilledor abandoned, the DICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS
balance if any, is to be transferred to the PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION
general funds ofthe Government. That is the WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCUR
essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Con RENCE.
stitution, Article VI, Sec. 29[3]), lifted from
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23[1]). A. Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
The character of the Stabilization Fund as
a special kind of fund is emphasized by the fact
that the funds are deposited in the Philippine Na REGALADO, Jr.
tional Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari
MJ moneys from which may be paid out only in pur under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
suance of an appropriation made by law (1987) "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on
Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from June 18,1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1)"." which granted the motion for reconsideration of
'>$jtl
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds and absolved private respondent from adminis
collected may be referred to as taxes, they are trative charges for inter aha grave misconduct
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the committed by him as then Assistant Regional
i^j
State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public
is plain from the special treatment given it by Works and Highways (DPWH).
E.O. No. 137. It is segregated from the general
I
fund; and while it is placed in what the law
refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund It appears from the statement and counter-
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and statement of facts of the parties that petitioner
'iMi
review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder
these measures comply with the constitutional and president of PROMATConstruction Develop
description of a "special fund." Indeed, the prac ment Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged
tice is not without precedent.
L With regard to the alleged undue delega
in the construction business. Private respondent
Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
tion of legislative power, the Court finds that Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
the provisionconferring the authority upon the District (FMED) when he allegedly committed
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum the offenses for which he was administratively
productsprovides a sufficient standard by which charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
i^J
&wl
PROMAT participated in the bidding for II
L government construction projects including those

under the FMED, and private respondent,report In thepresentappeal, petitioner argues that
edlytaking advantage ofhis official position, in Section 27ofRepublic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
veigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Act of 1989)pertinently provides that —
L Their affair lasted for some time, in the course In all administrative disciplinary cases, or
of which private respondent gifted PROMAT ders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
with public works contracts and interceded for Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
^J
it in problems concerning the same in his office. Court by filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
incidents developed between the parties and order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
when petitioner tried to terminate their relation-. for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
ship, private respondent refused and resisted her the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
attempts to do so to the extent of employingacts
of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
However, she points out that under Section
j&iJ
eventually filed the aforementioned administra 7,RuleIH ofAdministrative Order No. 07(Rules
tive case against him in a letter-complaint dated of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman),
July 24, 1995. when a respondent is absolved of the charges
in an administrative proceeding the decision
The said complaint sought the dismissal of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable.
of private respondent for. violation of Section She accordingly submits that the Office of the
19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of Ombudsman has no authority under the law to
^j 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid
807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic
prayer for his preventive suspension. For pur Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of
poses of this case, the charges referred to may this Court. Because of the aforecited provision
be subsumed under the category of oppression, in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that
misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
she found it "necessary to take an alternative
sM
On January 31, 1996. Graft Investigator recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.,
Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding becauseofthe doubtit creates on the availabihty
private respondent guilty of grave misconduct of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
and ordering his dismissal from the service
Ui&l with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His Respondents filed their respective comments
resolution bore the approval ofDirector Napoleon and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman
Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo is empowered by the Constitution and the law to
Aportadera of their office. promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section
%i
13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution pro
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order vides, among others, that the Office of the Om
dated February 26,1996, approved the aforesaid budsman can "(promulgate its rules ofprocedure
ajJ
resolution with modifications, by finding private and exercise such other powers or perform such
respondent guilty of misconduct and meting but functions or duties as may be provided by law."
the penalty of suspension without pay for one
year. After private respondent moved for recon Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the
sideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered Constitutional mandate with these relevant
that the former's new counsel had been his "class provisions:
mate and close associate" hence, he inhibited Sec. 14. Restrictions. —:... No court shall
*%.> himself. The case was transferred to respondent hear any appeal or application for remedy
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, against the decision or findings of the Om
in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, budsman except the Supreme Court on pure
^J
1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of questions of law.
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private
respondent from the administrative charges. xxx XXX XXX
iiyt
Sec. 18. ifa/es of Procedure. — (1) The respect to the availability or non-availability ol
sitl
Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate appeal in administrative cases, such as Section
its own rules of procedure for the effective 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
exercise or performance of its powers, func
tions, and duties.
m
xxx xxx xxx
After respondents' separate comments had

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Ad
been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact,
ministrative investigations by the Office of
which does not appear to have been seriously
the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with
considered before, that the administrative li
its rules of procedure and consistent with due
ability of a public official could fall under the
process... • .
jurisdiction ofboth the Civil Service Commission
xxx xxx xxx and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the
offenses imputed to herein private respondent
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Deci
were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act
sions. —All provisionary orders at the Office
No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree
of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Sec
and executory.
tion 9, Batas Pambansa Big. 129 by Republic Act
A motion for reconsideration of any or No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service
der, directive or decision of the Office of the Commission in administrative disciplinary cases
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) were made appealable to the Court of Appeals
Kal days after receipt of written notice and shall effective March 18,1995, while those ofthe Office
be entertained only on any of the following of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
grounds: It could thus be possible that in the same
&&J
xxx xxx xxx
administrative case involving two respondents,
the proceedings against one could eventually
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombuds have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while
man when supported by substantial evidence the other may have found its way to the Ombuds
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision man from which it is sought to be brought to this
imposing the penalty of public censure or repri Court. Yet systematic and efficient case manage
mand, suspension of not more than one month ment would dictate the consolidation of those
salary shall be final and unappealable. cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency
and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, or
ders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Then there is the consideration that Section
M Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the ap
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as pro
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the vided in this Constitution without its advice and
^t
motion for reconsideration in accordance with consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. challenged Section 27, took effect on November
17,1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional
The above rules may be amended or modified prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is
by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest that a challenge on constitutional grounds must
of justice may require. be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom
Respondents consequently contend that, did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible
on the foregoing constitutional and statutory rule, as we shall explain.
authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity Since the constitution is intended for the ob
taJ
of the rules of procedure formulated by the Of servance of the judiciary and other departments
fice of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of of the government and the judges are sworn
proceedingsbefore it, including those rules with to support its provisions, the courts are nOt at
Mi ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 337
libertyto overlook or disregard its commands or Ombudsman issued its Rules ofProcedure, Sec
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear tion 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
that a statute transgresses the authority vested proceeding. It willberecalledthat R.A. No. 6770
in a legislative body, it is the duty ofthe courtsto was enacted on November17,1989, with Section
declare that the constitution, andnotthestatute, 27 thereof pertinentlyproviding that all admin
ijM
governsin a case before them for judgment. istrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass decisions ofthe Office ofthe Ombudsman may be
upon constitutional questions which are not appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule
raised in the pleadings, the rule has been rec 45 of the Rules of Court.
ognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does ?he Court notes, however, that neither the
not precludea court from inquiring into its own. petition nor the two comments thereon tooAk
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment into account or discussed the validity of the
thatit lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute, aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in-light"
on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding of the provisions of Section 30, ArticleVI of the
'<M
depends is unconstitutional, the court has no 1987 Constitution that "(n)o lawshallbepassed
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Su
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it preme Court as provided in this Constitution
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the without its advice and consent."
constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the
regular and orderly procedure in the trial are In view of the fact that the appellate juris
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the diction of the Court is invoked and involved in
court below or that of the appellate court is in this case, and the foregoing legal considerations
volved in which caseit mayberaised at anytime appear to impugnthe constitutionahty and valid
or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero ity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to
motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction it, the Courtdeemsit necessarythat the parties
at any point in the case where that fact is devel be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved
oped. Thecourt has a clearlyrecognized right to before conducting further proceedings in this
determine its own jurisdiction in anyproceeding. appellate review.
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to

the Court believedthat the parties hereto should require the parties to SUBMIT their position
befurther heard onthis constitutional question. and arguments on the matter subject of this
Correspondingly, the following resolution was resolution byfiling their corresponding pleadings
issuedonMay14,1998, the material parts stat within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
iii^j
ing as follows:
IV
The Court observes that the present peti
tion, from the very allegations thereof, is "an The records do not show that the Office of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules the Solicitor General has complied with such
of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for requirement, hence the Court dispenses with
Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. any submission it should have presented. On the
Ml 0-95-0411, entitled'TeresitaG. Fabianvs. Engr. other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that
Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Re the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No.
gion IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
the latter from the administrative charges for this Court of the aforementioned adjudications
s&flfl
of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative
grave misconduct, among others."
of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She
It is further averred therein that the present claims that what is proscribed is the passage of
^wj appeal to this Court is allowed under Section a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of
27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. this Court "as provided in this Constitution,"
6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all
Mt
&j
338 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
cases in which only an error or question of law THE SUBMISSION THAT BECAUSE
is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of THIS COURT HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE
the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, OF CASES INVOLVING SECTION 27 OF
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770, THAT FACT MAY
certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders BE VIEWED AS "ACQUIESCENCE" OR "AC
"as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," CEPTANCE" BY IT OF THE APPELLATE
said Section 27 does not increase this Court's ap JURISDICTION CONTEMPLATED IN
pellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the SAID SECTION 27, IS UNFORTUNATELY
mode ofappeal shall be by petition for certiorari TOO TENUOUS. THE JURISDICTION OF A
under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein COURT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ACQUI
are only questions of law of which this Court ESCENCE AS A MATTER OF FACT BUT AN
already has jurisdiction. ISSUE OF CONFERMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW. BESIDES, WE HAVE ALREADY
We are not impressed by this discourse. DISCUSSED THE CASES REFERRED TO,
It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential INCLUDING THE INACCURACIES OF
developments over the years, this Court has al SOME STATEMENTS THEREIN, AND WE
lowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a HAVE POINTED OUT THE INSTANCES
substantial number of cases and instances even WHEN RULE 45 IS INVOLVED, HENCE
if questions of fact are directly involved and COVERED BY SECTION 27 OF REPUBLIC
have to be resolved by the appellate court. Also, ACT NO. 6770 NOW UNDER DISCUSSION,
the very prevision cited by petitioner specifies AND WHEN THAT PROVISION WOULD
that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court con NOT APPLY IF IT IS A JUDICIAL REVIEW
templated therein is to be exercised over "final UNDER RULE 65.
judgments and orders of lower courts," that is,
the courts composing the integrated judicial SEC. 31. NO LAW GRANTING A TITLE
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial OF ROYALTY OR NOBILITY SHALL BE
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legis ENACTED.
lature intends that the decisions or resolutions SEC. 32. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AS
of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PROVIDE FOR A
by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFEREN
a specific provision to that effect is included in DUM, AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERE
the law creating that quasi-judicialagencyand, FROM, WHEREBY THE PEOPLE CAN
for that matter, any special statutory court. No DIRECTLY PROPOSE AND ENACT LAWS
suchprovision onappellate procedure is required OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR
for the regular courts of the integrated judicial LAW OR PART THEREOF PASSED BY
system because they arewhatarereferred toand THE CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLA
already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of TIVE BODY AFTER THE REGISTRATION
the Constitution. OF A PETITION THEREFOR SIGNED BY
AT LEAST TEN PER CENTUM OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOT
ERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PER CENTUM OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF.
lifo-yfc
Article VII
*
The Executive Department

\m
SECTION 1. THE EXECUTIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT OF

THE PHILIPPINES.
iiiiJ
1. Executive power. v '
A. Marcos v. Manglapus, et al.

177 SCRA 668 (1989)
Resolution
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is acontroversy ofgrave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision inthis case would undeniably have aprofound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
j$j
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop
E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via bloody challenges to the government. OnAugust
the non-violent "people power" revolution and 28,1987,Col. Gregorio Hohasan, oneofthe major
forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino players in the February Revolution, led a failed
was declared President of the Republic under coup that left scores of people, both combatants
a revolutionary government. Her ascension and civilians, dead. There were several other
to and consolidation of power have not been armed sorties of lesser significance, but the
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup message they conveyed was the same — a split
in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, in the ranks of the military establishment that
the takeover of television station Channel 7 by threatened civilian supremacy over the mili
rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support tary and brought to the fore the realization that
of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot civilian government could be at the mercy of a
ofthe Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return fractious military.
from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft
chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila But the armed threats to the Government
Bulletin, January 30,1987]awakened the nation were not only found in misguided elements in
to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouhle the military establishment and among rabid
even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the com
loyalty of their followers in the country. The munist insurgency and the secessionist move
ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined ment in Mindanao which gained ground during
the victory of "people power" and also clearly the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the
reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. communists have set up a parallel government
s*i)
339
fed
oftheir own in the areas they effectively control Executive Power

while the separatists are virtually free to move The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the
about in armed bands. There has been no let up separation ofpowers ofthe three greatbranches
in these groups' determination to wrest power of government. To recall the words of Justice
from the government. Not only through resort Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63
to arms but also through the use of propaganda Phil.139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked
have they been successful in creating chaos and but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment
destabilizing the country. of power to the executive, the legislative and
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely the judicial departments of the government."
political. The accumulated foreign debt and the [At 157.] Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly
plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be
^$J and his cronies left the economy devastated. The vested in the Congress of the Philippines" [Art.
efforts.at economic recovery, three years after VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shallbevested
Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show iii the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII,
concrete results in alleviating the poverty of Sec. 1], and"[t]he judicial power shall bevested
the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive. as may beestablished bylaw" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.]
These provisions not only establisha separation
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has sig of powers by actual division [Angara v. Elec
nified his wish to return to the Philippines to toral Commission, supra] but alsoconfer plenary
die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire con legislative, executive andjudicialpowerssubject
sequences to the nation ofhis return at a time only ito limitations provided in the Constitution.
when the stability of government is threatened For as the SupremeCourtin Ocampo v. Cabangis
from various directions and the economy is just [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant ofthe
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood legislative power means a grant ofalllegislative
firmly on the decision to bar the return ofMr. power; and a grant of the judicial power means
Marcos and his family. a grant of all the judicial power which may be
exercised under the government." [At 631-632.]
The Petition If this can be said of the legislative power which
This case is unique. It should not create a
is exercised by two chambers with a combined
precedent, for thecase ofa dictator forced outof membership ofmore than twohundredmembers
office and into exile after causing twenty years
and of the judicial power which is vested in a
of political, economic and social havoc in the hierarchy ofcourts, it can equally be said ofthe
country andwho within the shortspace ofthree executive power which is vested in one official
— the President.
years seeks to return, is in a class byitself.
As stated above, the Constitution provides
This petition for mandamus and prohibi
tion asks the Court to order the respondents to that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec.
immediate members of his family and to enjoin 1.] However, it does not define whatis meantby
the implementation of the President's decision "executive power" although in the same article
it touches on the' exercise of certain powers by
to bar their return to the Philippines.
the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments,bureaus and offices, the
The Issue
power to execute the laws, the appointing power,
liiij
The issue is basically one of power: whether the powers underthe commander-in-chiefclause,
or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
the Constitution, the President may prohibit pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. concurrence of Congress, the power to contract oi
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter intc
treaties or international agreements, the p.owei
ARTICLE VTI: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 341
Us*!
to submit the budget to congress, and the power ticular moment depends in important measure
to address Congress. [Art. VII, Sees. 14-23.] on who is President." [At 30.]
TJje inevitable question then arises: by enu This view is shared by Schlesinger, who
merating certain powers .of the President did wrote in TheImperial Presidency:
the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers For the American Presidency was a pe
and no other ? Are these enumerated powers the culiarly personal institution. It remained,
breadth and scope of"executive power?"Petition of course, an agency of government subject
ers advance the view that the President's powers to unvarying demands and duties no mat
are limited to those specifically enumerated in ter who was President. But, more than
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The most agencies of government, it changed
President- has enumerated powers, and what is shape, intensity and ethos according to the
man in charge. Each President's distinctive
not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclu-
temperament and character, his values,
sio unius est exclusio alterius." [Memorandum for
standards, style, his habits, expectations,
Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo, p. 233.] This argument
idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast
brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presi
the White House and pervaded the entire
dency after which ours is legally patterned.1
government. The executive branch, said
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the Clark Cliffors, was a chameleon, taking its
President of the United States grappled with the color from the character and personality of
same problem. He said: the President. The thrust of the office, its
impact on the constitutional order, therefore
Article II is the most loosely drawn chap altered from President to President. Above
ter of the Constitution. To those who think all, the way each President understood it as
that a constitution ought to settle everything his personal obligation to inform and involve
beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence
same token, to those who think that consti ofthe electorate and to render an accounting
tution makers ought to leave considerable to the nation and posterity determined
leeway for the future play of political forces, whether he strengthened or weakened the
it should be a vision realized. constitutional order. [At 212-213.]
- We encounter this characteristic of Ar We do not say that the presidency is what
ticle II in its opening words: 'The executive Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but,
power shall be vested in a President of the rather, that the consideration oftradition and the
United States of America." x x x. [The Presi development of presidential power under the dif
dent: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, pp. 3-4.] ferent constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. Presi
to the President's powers under the 1987 Consti
dent were exercised by the different persons who
tution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong
held the office from Washington to the early President with explicitly broader powers than the
1900's, and the swing from the presidency by U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted
commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he con to modify the system of government into the par
cluded that "what the presidencyis at any parliamentary type, with the President as the mere
figurehead, but through numerous amendments,
lThe Philippine presidency under the 1935 Constitu the President became even more powerful, to the
tion was patterned in large measure after the American point that he was also the de facto Legislature.
presidency. But at the outset, it must be pointedout that the
Philippine government established under the Constitutions The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back
of1935,1973 and 1987 is a unitarygovernment with general the presidential system of government and re
powers unlike that of the United States which is a federal stored the separation of legislative, executive
government with limited and enumerated powers. Even so,
L the powers ofthepresident oftheUnited States have through
theyears grown, developed andtaken shape asstudents of
and judicial powers by their actual distribution
among the three distinct branches ofgovernment
that presidency have demonstrated. with provision for checks and balances.
fei
It would not be accurate, however, to state which the powers ofgovernment are dividec
that "executive power" is the power to enforce the . ~.. [At 202-203; italics supplied.]
i!i|
laws, for the President is head of state as well as
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes
head of government and whatever powers inhere strong dissent. But in his enduring words o:
in such positions pertain to the office unless the dissent we find reinforcement for the view thai
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore,
it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers
the Constitution itself provides that the execu
of a branch of government to embrace only whai
tion of the laws is only one of the powers of the are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any The great ordinances of the Constitu
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's tion do not establish and divide fields o:
foreign relations. black and white. Even the more specific o:
them are found to terminate in a penumbra
On these.premises, we hold the view that shading gradually from one extreme to the
although the 1987 Constitution imposes limita other, xxx.
tions on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is tradition XXX
ally considered as within the scope of "executive It does not seem to need argument tc
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President show that however we may disguise it by
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific veiling words we do not and cannot carrj
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other out the distinction between legislative anc"
words, executive power is more than the sum of executive action with mathematical precisior
specific powers so enumerated. and divide the branches into watertight com
It has been advanced that whatever power partments, were it ever so desirable to do so.
inherent in the government that is neither leg which I am far from believing that it is, oi
islative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in that the Constitution requires. [At 210-211.]
the landmark decision of Springer v. Government
The Power Involved
of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on
the issue of who between the Governor-General The Constitution declares among the guiding
of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Govern
the shares of stock held by the Government to ment is to serve and protect the people" and
elect directors in the National Coal Company and that [t]he maintenance of peace and order, the
the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
Court, in upholding the power of the Governor- promotion ofthe general welfare are essential for
General to do so said: the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings
of democracy." [Art. II, Sees. 4 and 5.]
... Here the members of the legislature
who constitute a majority of the "board" and Admittedly, service and protection of the
"committee" respectively, are not charged people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
with the performance of any legislative func protection of life, liberty and property, and. the
tions or with the doing of anything which is promotion of the general welfare are essential
in aid of performance of any such functions ideals to guide governmental action. But such
by the legislature. Putting aside for the does not mean that they are empty words.
moment the question whether the duties Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions,
developed upon these members are vested by in drawing a plan of government, and in direct
the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it ing implementing action for these plans, or from
is clear that they are not legislative in char another point of view, in making any decision as
acter, and still more clear that they are not President of the Republic, the President has to
judicial. Thefact that they do not fall within consider these principles, among other things,
the authority ofeither of these two constitutes and adhere to them.
logical ground for concluding that they do Faced with the problem of whether or not
fall within that of the remaining one among the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return
L
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 343
to the Philippines, the President is, under the avoidablein any government and is best lodged
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic in the President].
principles in arriving at a decision. More than
that, hajang sworn.to defend and uphold the Con More particularly, this case calls for the exer
stitution, the President has the obligation under cise ofthe President's powers as protectorofthe
the Constitution to protect the people, promote peace. [Rossiter, TheAmericanPresidency.] The
ftifoi
their welfare and advance the national interest.
power of the President to keep the peace is not
It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, limited merely to exercising the commander-in-
aside from being an allocation of power is also
chief powers in times of emergency or to leading
the State against external and internal threats
a social contract whereby the people have sur
to its existence. The President is not only clothed
rendered their sovereign powers to the State for
the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
with extraordinary powers in timesofemergency,
but is also-tasked with attending to the day-to
Government exercising the powers delegated by
day problems of maintaining peace and order and
the people forget and the servants of the people
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
become rulers, the Constitution reminds every foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discre
one that "[sovereignty resides in the people and tion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presi
all government authority emanates from them." dential duties in times of peace is not in any way
[Art. II, Sec. 1.]
diminished by the relative want of an emergency
The resolution of the problem is made dif specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
ficult because the persons who seek to return For in making the President commander-in-chief
to the country are the deposed dictator and his the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
family at whose door the travails of the country be said to exclude the President's exercising as
are laid and from whom billions of dollars be Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling
lieved to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege
recovered. The constitutional guarantees they of the writ of habeas corpusor declaring martial
invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech public order and security.
and of expression, although couched in absolute That the President has the power under the
terms, admits .of limits and must be adjusted to Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning
the requirements of equally important public has been recognized by members of the Legisla
interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. ture, and is manifested by the Resolution pro
79690-707, October 7, 1988]. posed in the House of Representatives and signed
To the President, the problem is one of by 103 of its members urging the President to
balancing the general welfare and the common allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines
good against the exercise of rights of certain in "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
dividuals. The power involved is the President's reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our
residual power to protect the general welfare of collective adherence to uncompromising respect
the people. It is founded on the duty of the Presi for human rights under the Constitution and our
dent, as steward of the people. To paraphrase laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.]
Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of The Resolution does not question the President's
the President but also his duty to do anything not power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's
needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, sense of compassion to allow a man to come home
to die in his country.
at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's
duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. What we are saying in effect is that the re
It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the quest or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed
President's duty to take care that the laws are to return to the Philippines cannot be considered
faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
President, where the author advances the view guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
that an allowance of discretionary power is un travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case
law which clearly never contemplated situations mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
even remotely similar to the present one. It must execution of the law, could walk defiantly
L be treated as a matter that is appropriately ad abroad, destroying rights of person and ol
dressed to those residual unstated powers of the property, wholly free from interference of
President which are implicit in and correlative courts or legislatures. This does not mean,
L to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
either, that a person injured by the executive
authority by an act unjustifiable under the
context, such request or demand should submit law has no remedy, but must submit in si
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part lence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that
of the President to determine whether it must be the Governor-General, like the judges of the
granted or denied. courts and the members of the legislature,
may not be personally mulcted in civil dam
ages for the consequences of an act executed
in the performance of his official duties. The
2. Executive immunity.
judiciary has full power to, and will, when
L A. Estrada v. Desierto
the matter is properly presented to it and
the occasion justly warrants it, declare an
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
act of the Governor-General illegal and void
and place as nearly as possible in status quo
any person who has been deprived his liberty
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immu
or his property by such act. This remedy is
nity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity,
assured to every person, however humble or
the extent of the immunity
of whatever country, when his personal or
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: property rights have been invaded, even by
first, the cases filed against him before the re the highest authority of the state. The thing
spondent Ombudsman should be prohibited be which the judiciary can not do is mulct the
cause he has not been convicted in the impeach Governor-General personally in damages
ment proceedings against him; and second, he which result from the performance of his of
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether ficial duty, any more than it can a member of
criminal or civil. the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a
revisit of our legal history on executive immunity Neither does this principle of non-liabil
will be most enlightening. The doctrine of execu ity mean that the chief executive may not
tive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a be personally sued at all in relation to acts
case law. In the 1910 case ofForbes, etc. v. Chuoco which he claims to perform as such official.
Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534 (1910),the re On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
spondent Tiaco,a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner discussion heretofore had, particularly that
W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the portion which touched the liability of judges
Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R. Trow and drew an analogy between such liability
bridge,. Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret and that of the Governor-General, that the
Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for latter is liable when he acts in a case so plain
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him ly outside of his power and authority that he
to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this can not be said to have exercised discretion in
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held: determining whether or not he had the right
to act. What is held here is that he will be pro
"The principle of non-liability, as herein tected from personal liability for damages not
enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary only when he acts within his authority, but
has no authority to touch the acts of the also when he is without authority, provided
Governor-General; that he may, under cover he actually used discretion and judgment,
of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
unrestrained. Such a construction.would whether he had authority to act or not. In
L
i "*i
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 345
other words, he is entitled to protection in ing and fortifying the absolute immunity
determining the question of his authority. concept. First, we extended it to shield the
If he decide wrongly, he is still protected President not only from civil claims but also
provided the question of his authority was from criminal cases and other claims. Second,
one over which two men, reasonably qualified we enlarged its scope so that it would cover
for that position, might honestly differ; but even acts of the President outside the scope
he is not protected if the lack of authority to of official duties. Aid third, we broadened
act is so plain that two such men could not its coverage so as to include not only the
honestly differ over its determination. In President but also other persons, be they
such case, he acts, not as Gpvernor-General government officials or private individuals,
but as a private individual, and, as such, who acted upon orders of the President. It
must answer for the consequences of his act." can be said that at that point most ofus were
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the conse
suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity
quences if the Chief Executive was not granted defense syndrome)." •.
immunity from suit, viz:"... Action upon impor The Opposition in the then Batasang Pam-
tant matters of state delayed; the time and sub bansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian
stance of the chief executive spent in wrangling concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Con
litigation; disrespect engendered for the person stitution: The move was led by then Member of
of one of the highest officials of the State and for Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto
the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency
disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to immunity granted to President Marcos violated
the integrity of government itself." the principle that a public office is a public trust.
L Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did
not contain any specific provision on executive
He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism "the king can do no wrong." The
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial effort failed.
law years under the late President Ferdinand The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when
E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. President Marcos was ousted from office by the
In 1981, it was amended and one of the amend People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987
ments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
Article VII stated: reenact the executive immunity provision of the
"The President shall be immune from 1973 Constitution. The following explanation
suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz.:
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done
by him or by others pursuant to his specific "Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
orders during his tenure. The last question is with reference to the
The immunities herein provided shall Committee's omitting in the draft proposal
apply to the incumbent President referred to the immunity provision for the President. I
in Article XVII of this Constitution." agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this
&&)
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional second sentence, at the very least, of the
Chair Lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity original provision on immunity from suit
And All The King's Men: The Law Of Privilege under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
As A Defense To Actions For Damages," peti Committee members not agree to a restora
tioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP tion of at least the first sentence that the
College of Law, Atty. PacificoAgabin, brightlined President shall be immune from suit during
the modifications effected by this constitutional his tenure, considering that if we do not pro
amendment on the existing law on executive vide him that kind of an immunity, he might
privilege. To quote his disquisition: be spending all his time facing litigations, as
"In the Philippines, though, we sought the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing
to do the Americans one better by enlarg litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. 'The reason for the omission tion has been rendered by the impeachmenl
is that we consider it understood in present court or by the body, how does it affect the
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is impeachment proceeding? Will it be neces
immune from suit. sarily dropped?
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose ol
it here. impeachment to remove one from office, ther
his resignation would render the case moot
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that
and academic. However, as the provisior
way before. The only innovation made by the says, the criminal and civil aspects of it maj
1973 Constitution was to make that explicit
continue in the ordinary courts."
and to add ether things.
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I
Saturnino Bcrmudez, 345 SCRA160 (1986), that
will not press for any more query, Madam "incumbent Presidents are immune from suit oi
President.
from being brought to court during the period ol
I thank the Commissioner for the clari their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.
fication." Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has
We shall now rule oh the contentions
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presi
of petitioner in the light of this history. We dency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
reject his argument that he cannot be pros conditionsine qua nonto his criminal prosecution
ecuted for the reason that he must first be
before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in
convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada
the case oiLecaroz v. Sandiganbayan„12S SCRA
was aborted by the walkout of the prosecu
324 (1984) and related cases are inapropos for
tors and by the events that led to his loss of
they have a different factual milieu.
$M&
the presidency. Indeed, on February 7,2001,
the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 We now come to the scope of immunity that
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment President. The cases filed against petitioner
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
for petitioner to demand that he should first plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
be impeached and then convicted before he stretch of the imagination can these crimes, es
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would pecially plunder which carries the death penalty,
put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of
Such a submission has nothing to commend a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite
itself for it will place him in a better situa any decision of this Court licensing the President
tion than a non-sitting President who has to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
not been subjected to impeachment proceed post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
ings and yet can be the object of a criminal anomalous to hold that immunity is an inocula
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the tion from liability for unlawful acts and omis
Constitutional Commission make it clear sions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
that when impeachment proceedings have officials are not acts of the State and the officer
become moot due to the resignation of the who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
taffij
President, the proper criminal and civil cases in the same footing as any other trespasser.
may already be filed against him, viz:
Indeed, a critical reading of current litera
xxx XXX xxx
ture on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an disinclination to expand the privilege especially
impeachment proceeding has been filed when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
against the President, for example, and the the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of
President resigns before judgment of convic US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a
am
sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce among which is to "(investigate on its own, or
certain recordings and documents relating to on complaint by any person, any act or omission
his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven of any public official, employee, office or agency,
advisees of President Nixon's associates were when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice unjust, improper, of inefficient." The Office of
and other offenses which were committed in a the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.
burglary of the Democratic National Headquar These constitutional policies will be devalued if
ters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting
1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal
himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. acts committed during his incumbency.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground, among others, that the President was
not subject to judicial process and that he should B. Soliven.v. Makasiar
first be impeached and removed from officebefore 167 SCRA 393 (.1988)
he could be made amenable to judicial proceed
ings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Resolution
Court. It concluded that "when the ground for PER CURIAM:
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only [President Corazon Aquino sued Beltran for
on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it libel for having written that the President hid
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands under the bed during an attempted coup.]
of due process of law in the fair administration In these consolidated cases, three principal
of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. issues were raised: ... (3) whether or not the
Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held President of the Philippines, under the Constitu
that the immunity of the President from civil tion, may initiate criminal proceedings against
damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate
affidavit.
this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where
it held that the US President's immunity from
suits for money damages arising out of their of
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran
ficial acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
argues that "the reasons which necessitate
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic presidential immunity from suit impose a cor
to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immu relative disability to file suit." He contends that
nity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she
a public trust. It declared as a state policy that may subsequently have to be a witness for the
"(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
in the public service and take positive and effec jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in
tive measures against graft and corruption." It an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
ordained that "(p)ublic officers and employees from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,
must at all times be accountable to the people, she would be exposing herself to possible con
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, tempt of court or perjury.
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
The rationale for the grant to the President
justice, and lead modest lives." It set the rule that
of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
"(t)he right of the State to recover properties un
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
lawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
from them or from their nominees or transferees,
free from any hindrance or distraction, consider
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or es
ing that being the Chief Executive of the Gov
toppel." It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an
ernment is a jobthat, aside from requiring all of
the office-holder's time, also demands undivided
anti-graft court. It created the office of the Om
attention.
budsman and endowed it with enormous powers,
But this privilege of immunity from suit, 464 (1939) the President is "the Executive of the
pertains to the President by virtue of the office Government of the Philippines, and no other.
. and may be invoked only by the holder of the of The heads of the executive departments occupy
fice; not by any other person in the President's political positions and hold office in an advi
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in sory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas
which the President is complainant cannot raise Jefferson 'should be of the President's bosom
the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent confidence,' and, in the language of Attorney
the case from proceeding against such accused. General Cushing, 'are subject to the direction of
the President.'"
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the
5. The Cabinet.
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may
shed the protection afforded by the privilege and Although the Constitution mentions the
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of Cabinet a number of times, e.g., Article VII,
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it Sections 3, 11, and 13, the Cabinet itself as an
is solely the President's prerogative. It is a deci institution is extra-constitutionally created. It
sion that cannot be assumed and imposed by any essentially consists of the heads of departments
other person. who through usage have formed a body of
presidential advisers who meet regularly with
3. Head of State. the President. Although they are the principal
officers through whom the President execute the
What Clinton Rossiter said about the Ameri
law, the President, through his power of control
can President in The American Presidency can
over them and his power to remove them at will,
be said about the Philippine President as head
remains the chief of administration.
of state:
He remains today, as he has always been, 6. Executive privilege. *

iiij
the ceremonial head of the government of the It is a by-product of separation of powers and
United States, and he must Lake part with of the co-equality of the three departments which
real or apparent enthusiasm in a range of require of them respect for each other. Presidents
activities that would keep him running and usually invoke the privilege when they wish to
posing from sunrise to bedtime if he were hide things behind a shroud of secrecy.
not protected by a cold-blooded staff. Some
of these activities are solemn or even priestly There are at least three kinds of executive
in nature; others, through no fault of his privilege. The first is the privilege to keep state
own, are flirtations with vulgarity. The long secrets. As early as George Washington, this
catalogue of public duties that the Queen dis privilege was already invoked in order to pre
charges in England, the President of the Re vent disclosure of information that could subvert
public in France, and the Governor-General military or diplomatic objectives.
in Canada, is the President's responsibility The law of evidence also recognizes a second
in this, country, and the catalogue is even form of privilege: the "privilege to withhold from
longer because he is not a king, or even the disclosure the identity of persons who furnish in
agent of one. and is therefore expected to go formation of violations of law to officers charged
through some rather undignified paces by a with enforcement of that law."
Efcfti)
people who think of him as a combination
of scoutmaster, Delphic oracle, hero of the Finally, there is the privilege that attaches
silver screen, and father of the multitudes. to opinions, recommendations, and deliberations
which comprise the process of arriving at presi
4. Chief Executive. dential decisions.
The President is the "Chief Executive" or The privilege is given for very good reason.
head of government. This means that he is the It encourages candid policy discussions and it
executive and no one else is. In the language honors the expectation of privacy on the part of
of Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, those who participate in executive discussions.
ARTICLE VH: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 349
As the United States Supreme Court said in 1974 of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
in United States v. Nixon, "Human experience Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the
iiliii
teaches that thosecwho expect public dissemina main contenders for the presidency, a natural-
tion of iSieir remarks may well temper candor born Filipino or is he not?
with a concern for appearances and for their own
interests to the detriment of the decision-making The moment of introspection takes us face to
MJ
process." face with Spanish and American colonial roots
and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
The fact, however, that the privilege is as and common law traditions, the fusion resulting
serted does not put an end to the issue. The final in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could
arbiter as to whether the privilege should be be no less than distinctly Filipino.
honored is not the President. Neither, however,
is it Congress or any of its committees. The final Antecedent Case Settings
arbiter is the Supreme Court. On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald
And even if the subject falls under one of Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
the above categories, the Court will still have Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
to decide whether in the particular instance the candidacy for the position of President of the
privilege should be honored. And even ifthe privi- Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
, lege is judicially recognized, the President might ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
still voluntarily make the requested disclosure. forthcoming national elections. In his certificate
of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
Note: See Senate v. Ermita, infra, under natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
Section 21 and 22.
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and
SEC. 2. NO PERSON MAY BE ELECTED
his place of birth to be Manila.
PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-
BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, Victorino X. Former, petitioner in G.R. No.
A REGISTERED VOTER, ABLE TO READ 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Former, Petitioner,
AND WRITE, AT LEAST FORTY YEARS versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ron
OF AGE ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION. ald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
AND A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January
FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IMMEDIATE 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before
LY PRECEDING SUCH ELECTION. the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny duecourse or to can
1. Citizenship qualification. cel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
A. Tecson v. Comelec
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004 his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, ac
VITUG,J.- cording to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
fejfo) Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish na
those whom the state believes are deserving of tional, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
as an inestimable acquisition," that cannot be Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could
taken lightly by anyone — either by those who not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
enjoy it or by those who dispute it. FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
Before the Court are three consolidated cas alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of
es, all ofwhich raise a single question ofprofound the illegitimate birth of respondent on two as
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship sertions — first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
!s brought up to challenge the qualificationsofa marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, evenif nq
theland.Our people are waiting for thejudgment such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
is)
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dis
of respondent. missed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
las) days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed
In the hearing before the Third Division of
his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner,
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC
in support of his claim, presented several docu
en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner as
i&j mentary exhibits — 1) a copy of the certificate
sailed the decision of the COMELEC before this
of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to
affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824, likewise
bigamy and concubinage against the father of
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
that would stay the finality and/or execution of
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4)
the COMELEC resolutions.
a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Di The other petitions, later consolidated with
rector of the Records Management and Archives G. R. No. 161824, would include G.R. No. 161434,
Office, attesting to the fact that there was no entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Desiderio, Jr., v. The Commission on Elections,
:&'\ Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Phil Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. 'Fernando Poe,
ippines before 1907, and G) a certification from Jr.'), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Anto
of the National Archives to the effect that no nio G. Velez, v. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
available information could be found in the files Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the juris
of the National Archives regarding the birth of diction' of the COMELEC and asserting that,
Allan F. Poe. under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
mJ 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
basic issue on the case.
significant ones being — a) a certification issued
ia
by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives, Division Jurisdiction of the Court
of the National Archives that there appeared to
In G.R. No. 161824
be no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Car In seeking the disqualification of the candi
los, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the dacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the course or to cancel FPJ's certificate of candidacy
National Archives that no available information for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact
about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Sec
of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of tion 78 of the Omnibus Election Code —
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
"Section 78. Petition to deny, due course
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A
Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
verified petition seeking to deny due course
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death filed by any person exclusively on the ground
of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported mar that any material representation contained
riage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie therein as required under Section 74 hereof
Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City is false" —
Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office in consonance with the general powers of COM
l&y during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 ELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
were totally destroyed during World War II. Election Code —
"Section 52. Powers and functions of informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
the Commission on Elections. In addition to could or should be elected to occupy the highest
the powers and functions conferred upon it government post in the land.
byJbbe Constitution, the Commission shall
In G.R. No. 161434 and G.R. No. 161634
have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434,
the conduct of elections for the purpose of and Velez, in G.R. No. f 61634, invokethe provi
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" sions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Elec
the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA
tion Code which would authorize "any interested
No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
party" to file a verified petition to deny or can
instead take on the petitions they directly in
cel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
stituted before it. The Constitutional provision
candidate.
cited reads:
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualifica
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
tion cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under
to the election, returns, and qualifications
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
of the President or Vice-President, and may
Section 7, Article LX, of the 1987 Constitution
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
also reads —
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
"Each Commission shall decide by a
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
majority vote of all its Members any case or
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to
matter brought before it within sixty days
be the sole judge of presidential and vice-pres
from the date of its submission for decision
idential contests, has constrained this Court to
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
declare, in Lopez v. Roxas, as "not (being) justicia
submitted for decision or resolution upon the
ble" controversies or disputes involving contests
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memoran
on the elections, returns and qualifications ofthe
dum, required by the rules ofthe Commission
President or Vice-President. The constitutional
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
provided by this Constitution or by law, any
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Consti
decision, order, or ruling of each Commis
tuting an Independent Presidential Electoral
sion may be brought to the Supreme Court
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Con
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
testing the Election of the President-Elect and
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIH, of the Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
same Constitution provides that judicial power Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
lower courts as may be established by law which to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
power "includes*the duty of the courts of justice subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
to settle actual controversies involving rights government under the 1973 Constitution might
which are legally demandable and enforceable, have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
and to determine whether or not there has been the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now
sg) a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
or instrumentality of the Government."
Ordinary usage would characterize a "con
It is sufficiently clear that the petition test" in reference to a post-election scenario.
brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated Election contests consist of either an election
to, and could well be taken cognizance of, by this protest or a quo warranto which, although two
lisi Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to distinct remedies, would have one objective in
our people of their fundamental right to be fully view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
eel
'/al
office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Ma
Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presi ria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., v. Commission on
dential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Elections, et al." and G.R. No. 161634, entitled
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would "Zoilo Antonio Velez v. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
support this premise — a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dis
missed for want of jurisdiction.
2&J ."Rule 12. Jurisdiction. — The Tribunal
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating The Citizenship Issue
to the election, returns, and qualifications Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful
of the President or Vice-President of the to first give a brief historical background on the
iiijlj
Philippines. concept of citizenship.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. — An election Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citi
contest is initiated by the filing of an election zenship was that given by Aristotle, who, some
protest or a petition for quo warranto against time in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to
the President or Vice-President. An election refer to a man who shared in the administration
protest shall not include a petition for quo of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall tle saw its significance if only to determine the
not include an election protest. constituency of the "State," which he described
"Rule 14. Election Protest. — Only the
as being composed of such persons who would be
iffifti adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
registered candidate for President or forVice-
existence. The concept grew to include one who
President of the Philippines who received the
would both govern and be governed, for which
second or third highest number of votes may
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
fe> contest the election of the President or the
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presi hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the
dential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in
days after the proclamation of the winner." public life and fundamentally willing to submit
The rules categorically speak of the juris his private interests to the general interest of
diction of the tribunal over contests relating to society.
the election, returns and qualifications of the The concept of citizenship had undergone
"President" or "Vice-President," of the Philip changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
pines, and not of "candidates" for President or the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citi
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is zenship, which established the rights necessary
generally denned as being an action against a for individual freedom, such as rights to property,
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully personal liberty and justice. Its meaning ex
holds or exercises a public office. In such context, panded during the 19th century to include politi
the election contest can only contemplate a post cal citizenship, which encompassed the right to
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered participate in the exercise of political power. The
candidate who would have received either the 20th century saw the next stage of the develop
second or third highest number of votes couldfile ment of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
an election protest. This rule again presupposes on the right of the citizen to economic well-being
a post-election scenario. and social security. The idea of citizenship has
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction gained expression in the modern welfare state as
of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would and final stage of development, in keeping with
^tfj
not include cases directly brought before it, the rapidly shrinking global village, might well
be the internationalization of citizenship.
questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the The Local Setting — from Spanish Time to
elections are held. the Present.
ARTICLE VII: THEEXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 353
There was no such term as "Philippine citi sole colony in the East to an upooming world
zens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of power, the United States. An acceptedprinciple
Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, of international law dictated that a change in
the natives were called 'indios,' denoting a low re sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of
gard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Span all political laws then in force, would have no
ish laws on citizenship became highly codified effect on civil laws, Wjhich would remain virtu
during the 19th century but their sheer number ally intact.
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain
S£) however, were made to apply to the Philippine December 1898 between Spain and the United
Islands except for those explicitly extended by States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
Royal Decrees. rights and political status of the native inhabit
ants of the territories ceded to the United States
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced would be determined by its Congress —
back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated
in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the "Spanish subjects, natives of the Pen
law was extended to the Philippmes remained to insula, residing in the territory over which
be the subject of differing views among experts; Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or
however, three royal decrees were undisputably cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines territory or may remove therefrom, retaining
— the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 184 in either event all their rights of property,
the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically including the right to sell or dispose of such
defining the political status of children born in property or of its proceeds; and they shall
the Philippine Islands, and finally, the Ley Ex- also have the right to carry on their industry,
tranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was commerce, and professions, being subject in
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by respect thereof to such laws as are applicable
the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. to foreigners. In case they remain in the
:î
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never territory they may preserve their allegiance
extended to the Philippine Islands because of to the Crown of Spain by making, before a
the express mandate of its Article 89, according court of record, within a year from the date of
to which the provisions of the Ultramar among the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
which this country was included, would be gov declaration of their decision to preserve such
erned by special laws. allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made
have adopted the nationality of the territory
effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
in which they reside.
1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. — Thus —
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory, "The civil rights and political status
of the native inhabitants of the territories
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or
mother, even if they were born outside of hereby ceded to the United States shall be
Spain, determined by the Congress."
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained natu Upon the ratification of the treaty, and
ralization papers, pending legislation by the United States Con
gress on the subject, the native inhabitants of
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
%jjfi have become domiciled inhabitants of any Although they did not become American citizens,
town of the Monarchy." they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under
The year 1898 was another turning point in American laws and were thus issued passports
Philippine history. Already in the state ofdecline describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her entitled to the protection of the United States.
t'm
L
The term "citizens ofthe Philippine Islands" residing in the Philippine Islands who would
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill become citizens of the United States, under
of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philip the laws of the United States, if residing
pine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive therein."
legislation of the Congress of the United States
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of
on the Philippines —
1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for
"... that all inhabitants ofthe Philippine the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino"
Islands continuing to reside therein, who was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of Governor General in the Philippines when he
April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
and their children born subsequent thereto, Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Phil
shall be deemed and held to be citizens ofthe ippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones
jjfc&J Law restated virtually the provisions of the
. Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
as shall have elected to preserve their alle of Congress in 1912 —
giance to the Crown of Spain in accordance 'That all inhabitants of the Philippine
with the provisions of the treaty of peace
Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
between the United States and Spain, signed
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and ninety eight." and their children born subsequently thereto,
Under the organic act, a "citizen ofthe Phil shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
ippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the the Philippine Islands, except such as shall °
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th have elected to preserve their allegiance to
day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
taken to include: 1) a native-born inhabitant; 2) provisions of the treaty of peace between
ffijfJ an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular the United States and Spain, signed at
Spain; and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Span Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ish papers on or before 11 April 1899. ninety-eight and except such others as have
since become citizens of some other country;
Controversy, arose on to the status of children Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 herein provided for, is hereby authorized
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
i&iii
was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given citizenship by those natives ofthe Philippine
to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writ Islands who do not come within the forego
ing at the time, that the common law principle ing provisions, the natives of the insular
ofjus soli, otherwise also known as the principle possessions of the United States, and such
Sail)
of territoriality, operative in the United States other persons residing in the Philippine Is
and England, governed those born in the Philip lands who are citizens of the United States,
i
pine Archipelago within that period. More about or who could become citizens of the United
this later. States under the laws of the United States,
if residing therein."
In 23 March 1912, the Congress ofthe United
States made the following amendment to the Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabit
•^j
Philippine Bill of 1902 — ant ofthe Philippines was deemed to be a citizen
of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legisla
1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899,2) residing
ture is hereby authorized to provide by law
îi in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
date, not a citizen of some other country.
by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provi While there was, at one brief time, divergent
sions, the natives of other insular possession views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
ofthe United States, and such other persons acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
L
iiii
brought to an end to any such link with common "(3) Those who elect Philippine citizen
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis ship pursuant to the provisions of the Con
or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino stitution ofnineteen hundred and thirty-five;
citizenship —
"(4) Those who are naturalized in ac
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitu cordance with law."
tion. The following are citizens ofthe Philip *
pines — For good measure, Section 2 of the same

article also further provided that —
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Phil
ippine Islands at the time of the adoption of "A female citizen of the Philippines who
this Constitution.
marries an alien retains her Philippine citi
zenship, unless by her act or omission she
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Is is deemed, under the law to have renounced
lands of foreign parents who, before the adop her citizenship."
tion of this Constitution, had been elected to
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
public office in the Philippine Islands.
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
"(3) Those whose fathers or mothers are subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
citizens ofthe Philippines. irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and upon reaching the age of Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. now provides:
"(5) Those who are naturalized in ac 'The following are citizens of the Philip
cordance with law." pines:
Subsection (4), Article III, ofthe 1935 Con "(1) Those who are citizens of the Phil
stitution, taken together with existing civil law ippines at the time of the adoption of this
provisions at the time, which provided that Constitution.
women would automatically lose their Filipino "(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign citizens of the Philippines.
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from "(3) Those born before January 17, 1973
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
legitimate children and required illegitimate
and
children of Filipino m6thers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. "(4) Those who are naturalized in accor
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully dance with law."
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
The Case of FPJ
women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitu
new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such tion expresses:
concerns —
"No person may be elected President un
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitu less he is a natural-born citizen of the Phil
mi
tion — The following are citizens of the ippines, a registered voter, able to read and
Philippines: write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident ofthe Philippines
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Phil for at least ten years immediately preceding
ippines at the time of the adoption of this such election."
Constitution;
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are to include "those who are citizens of the Philip
citizens of the Philippines; pines from birth without having to performany
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizen 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe
ship." and Bessie Kelley;
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ ap 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
peared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were mar
of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
ried to each other on 16 September, 1940;
four modes of acquiring citizenship — natural
ization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo
— had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and Poe; and
jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
5. At the time of his death on 11 September
"natural-born" citizen ofthe Philippines. Jus soli,
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
per Roa v. Collector of Customs (1912), did not
last long. With the adoption ofthe 1935 Consti Would the above facts be sufficient or insuf
tution and the reyersal of Roa in Tan Chong v. ficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-
Secretaryof Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of
relationship would now become the primary basis Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certifi
of citizenship by birth. cate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou are documents of public record in the custody
Documentary evidence adduced by peti of a public officer. The documents have been
tioner would tend to indicate that the earliest submitted in evidence by both contending parties
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While The birth certificate of FPJ was marked
the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for re
presented in evidence, his death certificate, how spondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
ever, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21"
of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo
L the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submit
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to ted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
an Espafiol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
i'ji^j
Espanol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage
petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a sup certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
posed certificate ofthe alleged marriage of Allan Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death cer
tificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on
F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan,
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized
on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, those material statements in his argument. All
three documents were certified true copies of
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years
old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie the originals.
?jfot
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states
and an American citizen. The birth certificate of that —
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 Au
gust 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four "Original document must be produced;
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence
citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
shall be admissible other than the original
Considering the reservations made by the document itself, except in the following cases:
parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
XXX" XXX xxx
the birth certificate of respondent and the mar
riage certificate of his parents, the only conclu "(d) When the original is a public record
sions that could be drawn with some degree of in the custody of a public office or is recorded
certainty from the documents would be that — in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate (relationship or civil status of the father to the
of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan child)' ofan illegitimate child, FPJ evidently be
F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate ing an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
Iv&lt
of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their the mandatory rules under civil law must be
contents! Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of used.
Court provides:
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in
"Entries in official records. Entries in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889
official records made in the performance of up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when
, his duty by a public officer ofthe Philippines, the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
jiiii or by a person in the performance of a duty acknowledgment was required to establish fili
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie ation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
evidence of the facts therein stated." judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
fl&4 compulsory acknowledgment was possible only
The trustworthiness of public documents
if done during the lifetime ofthe putative parent;
and the value given to the entries made therein
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty
a record of birth, a will, or a public document.
in the preparation ofthe statement made, 2) the
Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin 5 thereof, that —
of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior expo "In case of an illegitimate child, the
sure of such errors as might have occurred. birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents ofthe infant or only by
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would
the mother if the father refuses. In the latter
indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at
case, it shall not be 'permissible to state or
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
reveal in the document the name ofthe father
It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to
born sometime in the year 1870 when the Phil
give therein any information by which such
ippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner father could be identified."
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 In order that the birth certificate could then
to 1902 considering that there was no existing be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment
record about such fact in the Records Manage of filiation or paternity, the certificate was re
ment and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, quired to be signed or sworn to by the father. The
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at failure of such requirement rendered the same
any other place during the same period. In his useless as being an authoritative document of
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou recognition. In Mendoza v. Mella, 17 SCRA 788,
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the the Court ruled —
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after
be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the registry law was enacted, the question
L the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death.
here really is whether or not his birth certifi
cate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified
It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office would have had copy of the registry record, may be relied
complete records of all residents of the Philip upon as sufficient proof of his having been
pines from 1898 to 1902.
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in
our judgment, may be placed upon it. While
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil it contains the names of both parents, there
Law. is no showingthat they signed the original,
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in es let alone swore to its contents as required
tablishing filiation (relationship or civil status of in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity might have happened, it was not even they
or either of them who furnished the data to so as to be an authentic writing for purposes o
be entered in the civil register. Petitioners voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuim
say that in any event the birth certificate is or indubitable writing of the father. The tern
in the nature of a public document wherein would include a public instrument (one dul?
voluntary recognition of a natural child may acknowledged before a notary public or othe:
also be made, according to the same Article competent official) or a private writing admitte(
131. True enough, but in such a case, there by the father to be his.
must be a clear statement in the document
that the parent recognizes the child as his The Family Code has further liberalized th<
or her own."
rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 17E
&&t
provide:
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ,
presented by both parties, nowhere in the docu "Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate childrer
ment was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. is established by any of the following:
There being no will apparently executed, or at "(1) The record of birth appearing in the
least shown to have been executed, by decedent civil register or a final judgment; or
$Ml
Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public "(2) An admission of legitimate filiation
document." In Pareja v. Pareja, 95 Phil 167, in a public document or a private handwrit
this Court defined what could constitute such a ten instrument and signed by the parent
document as proofof voluntary acknowledgment: concerned.
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there "In the absence ofthe foregoing evidence,
are two classes of public documents, those the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
executed by private individuals which must "(1) The open and continuous possession
be authenticated by notaries, and those is of the status of a legitimate child; or
sued by competent public officials by reason
of their office. The public document pointed "(2) Any other means allowed by the
out in Article 131 as one of the means by Rules of Court and special laws.
which recognition may be made belongs to "Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy
the first class.".
may be brought by the child during his or
Let us leave it at that for the moment. her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowl
or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
edgment or recognition of illegitimate children
heirs shall have a period of five years within
into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
which to institute the action.
recognition was required to be expressedly made
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a "The action already commenced by the
court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal child shall survive notwithstanding the
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood death of either or both the parties.
brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who
xxx xxx xxx
•&•$)
was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could he demanded "Art. 175. Illegitimate children may es
generally in cases when the child had in his favor tablish their illegitimate filiation in the same
any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action way and on the same evidence as legitimate
to claim legitimacy which would last during the children.
lifetime of the child, and might pass exception
"The action must be brought within the
ally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
same period specified in Article 173, except
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
when the action is based on the second para
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
graph ofArticle 172, in which case the action
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, may be brought during the lifetime of the
during the oral argument, "authentic writing," alleged parent."
ARTICLEVH: THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT • 359
t!M
The provisions of the Family Code are rights and duties, or to the status, condition
retroactively applied; Article 256 ofthe code and legal capacity of persons, govern Span
reads: iards although they reside in a foreign coun
try; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a
Ârt. 256. This Code shall have retroac
civil nature, such as those dealing with the
tive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
validity-or nullity ofthe matrimonial bond,
or impair vested or acquired rights in ac
the domicile of the nusband and wife, their
cordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
support, as between them, the separation of
Thus, in Vda. De SyQuia v. Court ofAppeals, their properties, the rules governing prop
125 SCRA 835, the Court has ruled: erty, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property,
"We hold that whether Jose was a vol
legal causes for divorce, the extent ofthe lat
untarily recognized natural child should be
ter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon
of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code
the persons and properties of the spouses,
provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a
are questions that are governed exclusively
natural child shall take place according to
fattl by the national law ofthe husband and wife."
this Code, even if the child was born before
the effectivity of this body of laws' or before The relevance of "citizenship" or "national
August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be ity" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15
given retroactive effect." of the Civil Code, stating that —
It should be apparent that the growing trend "Laws relating to family rights and du
to liberalize the acknowledgment of recognition of ties, or to the status, condition and legal
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away capacity of persons are binding upon citi
from the traditional idea of keeping well apart le zens of the Philippines, even though living
gitimate and non-legitimate relationships within abroad"—
the family in favor of the greater interest and that explains the need to incorporate in the code
welfare ofthe child. The provisions are intended a reiteration ofthe Constitutional provisions on
to merely govern the private and personal affairs citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate civil relationships found in different parts ofthe
that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status Civil Code, successional rights and family rela
of the individual would also affect his political
tions. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. would be considered the child of his adoptive
While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could parents and accorded the same rights as their
be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended
be taken in the context or private relations, the only to define his rights under civil law and not
domain of civil law; particularly —
his political status.
"Civil Law is that branch of law which
Civil law provisions point to an obvious
has for its double purpose the organization bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
ofthe family and the regulation of property. attitude may be traced to the Spanish family
It has thus [been] defined as the mass of and property laws, which, while defining pro
precepts which determine and regulate the prietary and successional rights of members of
relations of assistance, authority and obedi the family, provided distinctions in the rights
ence among member of a family, and those of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
which exist among members of a society for monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
the protection of private interests." [Antillon and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
v. Barcelon, 37 Phil 148.] according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
i&ij
in Yahez de Barnuevo v. Fuster, 29 Phil. 606, these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreignblood

the Court has held: was paramount.
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil These distinctions between legitimacy, and
Code of Spain,... the laws relating to family illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
\m
«3
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived with FPJ, i.e., living together with Bessie Kelly
when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary and his children (including respondent FPJ) in
source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, one house, and as one family —
however, remains and should remain only in
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or "I, Ruby Kelly Mangahas, of legal age
impinge on the domain of political law. and sound mind, presently residing in Stock
ton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in
The proofof filiation or paternity for purposes
accordance with law do hereby declare that:
of determining his citizenship status should thus
be deemed independent from and not inextricably "1. I am the sister of the late Bessie
tied up with that prescribed for civil law purpos Kelly Poe.
es. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of
proof of filiation or paternity, although good law,
Fernando Poe, Sr.
do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
to personal and family relations. The ordinary "3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son
rules on evidence could well and should govern. by the name ofRonald Allan Poe, more popu
For instance, the matter about pedigree is not larly known in the Philippines as 'Fernando
necessarily precluded form being applicable by Poe, Jr., or FPJ.'
the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe 'FPJ' was born
Section 39j Rule 130, of the Rules of Court on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
provides — Magdalena Street, Manila.
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The xxx xxx xxx
act or declaration of a person deceased, or

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bes
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree
sie, met and became engaged while they were
of another person related to him by birth or
students at the University ofthe Philippines
marriage, may be received in evidence where in 1936.1 was also introduced to Fernando
it occurred before the controversy, and the
Poe Sr., by my sister that same year.
relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or "8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister
declaration. The word 'pedigree' includes Bessie had their first child in 1938.
relationship, family genealogy, birth, mar
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie
riage, death, the dates when and the places
and their first three children, Elizabeth,
where these facts occurred, and the names of
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
lived together with our mother at our family's
history intimately connected with pedigree."
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
For the above rule to apply, it would be neces Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945,
sary that: (a) the declarant is already dead or un except for some months between 1943-1944.
able to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must
"lO.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister,
be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative
Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more chil
of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) dren after Ronald Allan Poe.
declaration must be made before the controversy
has occurred, and (e) the relationship between xxx xxx xxx
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in "18.1 am executing this Declaration to
question must be shown by evidence other than attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
such act or declaration. Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe,
Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Sr.
Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COME "Done in City of Stockton, California,
LEC, might be accepted to prove the facts of Allan U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship
ARTICLE VTI: THEEXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 361
îiii)
Ruby Kelly Mangahas and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The

Declarant veracity ofthe supposed certificate ofmarriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could
DNA Testing be most doubtful at best. But the documentary
In case proof of filiation or paternity would evidence introduced by no less than respondent
be unlikely to satisfactory establish or would be himself, consisting ofajbirthcertificate ofrespon
difficultto obtain, DNAtesting, which examines dent and a marriage certificate of his parents
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the il showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939
legitimate child and any physical residue of the to Filipino father and an American mother who
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive were married to each other a year later, or on
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 17, this would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner
Court has acknowledged the strong weight of contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
DNA testing — followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, basing his stand'on
"Parentage will still be resolved us the ruling of this Court in Morano v. Vivo, 20
ing conventional methods unless we adopt SCRA 562, Paa v. Chan, 21 SCRA 753, citing
the modern and scientific ways available. Chiongbianv. de Leon, 82 Phil. 771, and Serra
Fortunately, we have now the facility and J v. Republic. 91 Phil. 914, unreported.
iiiij expertise in using DNA test for identifica
tion and parentage testing. The University On the above score, the disqualification made
ofthe Philippines Natural Science Research by amicus curiaeJoaquin G. Bernas, S.J., is most
convincing; he states —
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Labora
tory has now the capability to conduct DNA "We must analyze these cases and ask
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact pronouncement of the Court on jus sangui
§£
that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) nis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
copies, one copy from the mother and the would be a decision constituting doctrine
other from the father. The DNA from the under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
mother, the alleged father and the child are pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, mota, the pronouncement would not be a
being a novel scientific technique, the use of decision but a mere obiter dictum which did
DNA test as evidence is still open to chal not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the
lenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case Court to look closely into these cases.
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on "First, Morano v. Vivio. The case was
the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
said, that courts should apply the results father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino,
of science when completely obtained in aid a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
of situations presented, since to reject said mother and a Chinese father. The issue was
result is to deny progress." whether the stepson followed the natural
Petitioner's Argument For Jurisprudential ization ofthe stepfather. Nothing about jus
Conclusiveness sanguinis there. The stepson did not have
blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan
"Second, Chiongbian v. de Leon. This
F. Poe. were a Filipino citizen, he couldnot have
case was not about the illegitimate son of
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ,
a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate
the latter being an illegitimate child. According son of a father who had become Filipino
to petitioner, prior to his marriage to BessieKel by election to public office before the 1935
ly, Allan F. Poe, onJuly 5,1936,contractedmar Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section
riage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelly bigamous illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra v. Republic. The case was by People v. Cayat. I would grant that the
not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino distinction between legitimate children and
rM father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a illegitimate children rests on real differences.
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The . .. But real differences alone do not justify
issue was whether one who was already a invidious distinction. Real differences may
Filipino because ofhis mother still needed to justify distinction for one purpose but not
ggj
be naturalized. There is nothing there about for another purpose.
invidious jus sanguinis.
".. . What is the relevance of legitimacy
"Finally; Paa v. Chan. This is a more to elective public service? What possible
complicated case. The case was about the state interest can there be for disqualifying
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son an illegitimate child from becoming a public
of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that officer. It was not the fault of the child that
his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. the child ofthe fullness of political rights for
Quintin therefore argued that he got his no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegiti
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But mate child from holding an important public
the Supreme Court said that there was no office is to punish him for the indiscretion
valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of his parents. There is neither justice nor
of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore rationality in that. And if there is neither
l§ii}
concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If justice nor rationality in the distinction,
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son then the distinction transgresses the equal
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not protection clause and must be reprobated."
a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino. The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente
Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Profes
"The Court should have stopped there. sor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona,
^& But instead it followed with an obiter dictum.
at bottom, have expressed similar views. The
The Court said orbiter that even if Leoncio, thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely
Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin on pure obiter dicta, should.indeed fail.
would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about1Quintin, Where jurisprudence regarded an illegiti
based on a contrary to fact assumption, was mate child as taking after the citizenship of its
absolutely unnecessary for the case. ... It mother, it did so for the benefit of the child. It
was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the il
repeating the obiter dictum in Morano v. legitimate child of an alien father in line with
Vivo. the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the
xxx xxx xxx
duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to
"Aside from the fact that such a pro help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
nouncement would have no textual founda against him.
tion in the Constitution, it would also violate
The fact of the matter — perhaps the most
the equal protection clause of the Consti
significant consideration — is that the 1935
tution not once but twice. First, it would
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing
make an illegitimate distinction between a
legitimate child and an illegitimate child, on the day, month and year of birth of respon
and second, it would make an illegitimate dent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is.
distinction between the illegitimate child of Providing neither conditions nor distinctions,
lte>
a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of the Constitution states that among the citizens
a Filipino mother. of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no
"The doctrine on constitutionality allow cogent justification to prescribe conditions or dis
able distinctions was established long ago tinctions where there are clearly none provided.
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • .363
In Sum —
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
(1) The Court, in the exercise ofits power of confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the are Filipino citizens regardless ofwhether such
petitioner! G.R. No. 161824, filed under Rule children are legitimateor illegitimate.
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules (4) But w.hile the totality of the evidence
of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the may not establish conclusively that respondent
resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave FPJis a natural-born citizen ofthe Philippines,
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of the evidence onhand still would preponderate in
merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
prayed for the disqualification of respondent guilty of having made a material misrepresen
FPJ from running for the position of President tation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
gijS
contention that FPJ has committed material Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly
representation in his certificate of candidacy by failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen notwithstanding the. ample opportunity given
of the Philippines. to the parties to present their position and evi
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack ofjuris dence, and to prove whether or not there has been
diction and prematurity, the petitions in G.R. No. material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
161434 and No. 161634both having been directly in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA
elevated to this Court in the latter's capacity as 300 (1995), must not only be material, but also
the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and deliberate and willful.
vice-presidential election contest under the Con WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to
stitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of DISMISS —
the Court can directly be invoked only after, not
before, the elections are held. 1. G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jea-
nette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Peti
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, tioners, versus Commissionon Elections, Ronald
whether grave abuse of discretion has been com Allan KelleyPoe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
mitted by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G.R. No.
on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ 161634, entitled "ZoiloAntonio Velez, Petitioner,
is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depend versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
ed on whether or not the father of respondent, Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
Allan F. Poe, would have himselfbeen a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the 2. G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn grave abuse of discretion on the part of respon
from the presumption that having died in 1954
dent Commission en Electionsin dismissingthe
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870,when the Philippines No Costs.
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, SO ORDERED.
Pangasinan, his place ofresidence uponhis death
in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, Puno,«/., on leave but was allowed to vote;
could have well been his place of residence be see separate opinion.
fore death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to
the Philippine bill had effected in 1902. That vote but did not send his vote.
citizenship (ofLorenzo Pou), if acquired, would Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices
therebyextendto his son, AllanF. Poe, father of Tinga and Morales; case should have been RE
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during MANDED.
i£i4
frfc)
Ynares-Santiago, J., concur and also with J. TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS
Puno's separate opinion. AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY
Sandovai-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see OF THE SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERIM
separate opinion. FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
Carpio, J., see separate opinion. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED B^
fffii|> Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see LAW, THE REGULAR ELECTIONS FOB
separate opinion. PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of SHALL BE HELD ON THE SECOND MON
^ Justice Morales. DAY OF MAY.
Carpio Morales, J., see dissenting opinion. THE RETURNS OF EVERY ELECTION
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion. FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
j$£ Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion. DULY CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF
Tinga, J., dissents as per his separate opin CANVASSERS OF EACH PROVINCE OR
ion. CITY, SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE
CONGRESS, DIRECTED TO THE PRESI
Separate Opinions
DENT OF THE SENATE. UPON RECEIPT
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: OF THE CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE SHAUL
SEC. 3. THERE SHALL BE A VICE- NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER
PHESnJENT WHO SHALL HAVE THE THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, OPEN ALL
SAME QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF THE CERTIFICATES IN THE PRESENCE
OFFICE AND BE ELECTED WITH AND IN OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
THE SAME MANNER AS THE PRESIDENT. REPRESENTATIVES IN JOINT PUBLIC
HE MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE IN SESSION, AND THE CONGRESS, UPON
THE SAME MANNER AS THE PRESIDENT. DETERMINATION OF THE AUTHENTIC
ITY AND DUE EXECUTION THEREOF IN
THE VICE-PRESIDENT MAY BE AP
THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW, CAN
POINTED AS A MEMBER OF THE CABI VASS THE VOTES.
NET. SUCH APPOINTMENT REQUIRES
NO CONFIRMATION. THE PERSON HAVING THE HIGHEST
NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL BE PRO
SEC. 4. THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CLAIMED ELECTED, BUT IN CASE TWO
^•fi) VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED
OR MORE SHALL HAVE AN EQUAL AND
BY DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR
HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, ONE OF
A TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL
THEM SHALL FORTHWITH BE CHOSEN
BEGIN AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH
BY THE VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL
DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THE
THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF
DAY OF THE ELECTION AND SHALL END
THE CONGRESS, VOTING SEPARATELY.
AT NOON OF THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS
THEREAFTER. THE PRESIDENT SHALL THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMUL
NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELEC GATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASSING
TION. NO PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED OF THE CERTIFICATES.
AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS
THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING
SUCH FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS
EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE
SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO
OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE
THE SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME.
ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICA
NO VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE TIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-
FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS
TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.
OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF
1. Election and Canvass. Indeed, the phrase, proclamation ofwinning

candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
iiiii
A. Macalintal v. Comelec far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the
£.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 proclamation of the winning candidates for the
presidency and the vice-presidency.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
i&i£) Section 18.5 of R.A.*No. 9189 appears to be
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Con
and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a stitution onlyinsofar as said Section totally dis
ki\
member ofthe Philippine Bar, seeking a declara regarded the authority given to Congress by the
tion that certain provisions of Republic Act No. Constitutionto proclaimthe winningcandidates
9189 (TheOverseasAbsenteeVoting Actof2003) forthe positions ofpresident and vice-president.
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming
Ml that he has actual and material legal interest in In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4
the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that of the law, to wit:
public funds are properly and lawfully used and 18.4. . . . Immediately upon the com
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition pletion of the canvass, the chairman of the
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit
The petitioner raises three principal ques via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other
tions: means of transmission equally safe and re
liable the Certificates of Canvass and the
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law em Statements of Votes to the Commission,...
powering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning [Emphasis supplied.]
candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4,Article VII of
Vice-President violate the constitutional man the Constitution which provides that the returns
date under Section 4, Article VII ofthe Constitu of every election for President and Vice-President
is3) tion that the winning candidates for President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to
and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as Congress.
winners by Congress?
Congress could not have allowed the COM
ELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to
Petitioner claims that the provision of
encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
the votes for president and vice-president and
COMELEC to orderthe proclamation ofwinning
the power to proclaim the winners for the said
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
positions." The provisions ofthe Constitution as
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
the fundamental law of the land should be read
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
becauseit violates. . . paragraph 4, Section 4 of as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
Article VII of the Constitution . . . which gives 2003 and hence, the canvassing ofthe votes and
to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
•J^\ proclaim the winning candidates for president president and vice-president for the entire nation
and vice-president. must remain in the hands of Congress.
The Solicitor General asserts that this pro NOTE: After Fidel Ramos was declared
Igil vision must.be harmonized with paragraph 4, elected President, defeated candidate Miriam
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and Defensor Santiago filed an election protest with
should be taken to mean that COMELEC can the Supreme Court. Subsequently, however,
only proclaim the winning Senators and party- while the case was pending, she ran for the office
ti&j
list representatives but not the President and ofSenator and, having been declared elected, as
Vice-President. sumed office as Senator. The Court ruled that by
her election and assumption of officeas Senator
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on she was deemed to have abandoned her protest.
the matter. A Senator's term is six years. It is a public trust.
L
She made a pact with the people that she would deprived petition and the other members of Con
serve for six years. Defensor-Santiago v. Fidel gress oftheir congressional prerogative, because
'•nf i Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13,1996. under the very Rules under attack, the decisions
See dissent. and final report of the said Committee shall be
subject to the approval of the joint session of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately (See
B. Congressman Lopez v. SENATE AND Sections 19, 23, 24 and 27 of the Rules).
HOUSE
G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
No costs.
frjfll
RESOLUTION
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition (As above-worded, the foregoing Resolu
ffifift and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, tion was approved unanimously, 14 to 0, by the
Rule VIII ofthe Rules ofthe Joint Public Session Court. In addition, individual opinions, copies of
ofCongress, dated May28,2004,creatinga Joint which are attached hereto, were written by Chief
Committee which shall preliminary canvass the Justice Hilario G; Davide, Jr.; Justice Reynato
votes of the candidates for President and Vice- S. Puno, joined by Justices Angelina Sandovai-
President during the May 10, 2004 elections. Gutierrez, Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., who
At the outset, the Court stresses that it has concurs in a Separate Opinion, and Adolfo S.
jurisdiction over the subject matter ofthis con Azcuna; Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing; Jus
troversy, because the herein Petition contains tice Conchita Carpio Morales; Justice Romeo J.
sufficient allegations claiming violations of the Callejo, Sr., and Justice Dante O. Tinga.)
Constitution. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction (INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS OMITTED)
is determined by the allegations ofthe initiatory
pleading, like the complaint or petition.
C. Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing
However* after careful deliberation on the Committee
merits ofthe Petition and the Comments filed by June 22, 2004
Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker
Jose C. De Venecia and the Office ofthe Solicitor RESOLUTION
General, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
the Petition on the ground that it failed to show Bythe present Petition for Prohibition, peti
that Congress gravely abused its discretion in tioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a
creating such Joint Committee. judgment declaring null and void the continued
existence of the Joint Committee of Congress
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity
expressly empowers Congress "to promulgate and due execution of the certificates of canvas
its rules for the canvassing of the certificates."
and preliminarycanvass the votescast for Presi
In Arroyo v. De Venecia (277 SCRA 268, August dential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the
14,1997), the Court ruled that it had no power to
May 10, 2004 elections following the adjourn
review the internal proceedings of Congress, un
less there is a clear violation ofthe Constitution.
ment of Congresssine die on June 11, 2004. The
Likewise,Santiagov. Guingona, (298SCRA 756,
petition coroDarily prays for the issuance of a
writ ofprohibitiondirecting the Joint Committee
L November 18,1998) held that the Court - under
the doctrine of separation of powers - has "no to cease and desist from conducting any further
authority to interfere" in the "exclusive realm" proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint
of a co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment
to restrict or limit the exercise of congressional sine dieon June 11,2004 by the Twelfth Congress
prerogative granted by the Constitution. ofits last regularsession, [its] term... terminated
The creation ofthe Joint Committee does not and expired onthe said dayand the said Twelfth
constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed
(gj
out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner May 25,1992. OnJune 16,1992, the Joint Com
goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings mittee finished tallying the votes for President
terminate upon the expiration of... Congress." andVice-President. Thereafter, onJune22,1992,
To advance this view, he relies on "legislative the Eight Congress convened in jointpublic ses
procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] sion as the National Board of Canvassers, and
by the rules of both Houses of Congress." on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and
Given the importance of the constitutional Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-
issue raised and to put to rest all questions re President, respectively.
£|ji garding the regularity, validity or constitutional Upon the other hand, during the 1998
ity of the canvassing of votes for President and Presidential, elections, both Houses ofCongress
VicePresident in the recently concluded national adjourned sine die on May 25, 1998. The Joint
elections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over Committee completed the counting of the votes
WJ
the instant petition pursuant to its power and for President and Vice-President on May 27,
duty "to determine whether or not there has been
1998. TheTenth Congressthen convened in joint
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or public session on May 29, 1998 as the National
excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any branch or Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph
instrumentality of the Government" under Sec
Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Maca-
tion 1 of Article VIII ofthe Constitution and its
pagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-President,
original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition respectively.
under Section 5 of the same Article.
As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]
After a considered and judicious examina
xistence and [proceedings [o]f the Joint Com
tion of the arguments raised by petitioner as
well as those presented in the Comments filed
mittee of Congress [a]re [i]nvalid, [i]llegal and
[unconstitutional [fallowing the [adjournment
by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint
Committee, this Court finds that the petition has [s]ine [djie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f[t]
absolutely no basis under the Constitution and
heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he
must, therefore, be dismissed.
cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of
the Constitutional which reads:
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are
buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once
or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both every year on the fourth Monday of July for
Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by its regular session, unless a different date
Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. session for such number of days as it may"
This section clearly provides that the Senate determine until thirty days before the open
shall convene in joint session during any ing of its next regular session, exclusive of
voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
the votes for President and Vice-President The President may call a special session at
not later than thirty days after the day of the any time.
electionin accordance with Section 4, ArticleVn Contrary to petitioner's argument, however,
ofthe Constitution.
the term of the present Twelfth Congress did
Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment not terminate and expire upon the adjournment
filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint sine die ofthe regular session of both Houses of
Committee and that of the Office of the Solici June 11, 2004.
tor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
1998 Presidential Elections do not support the cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term
move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint
of Congress, but to its regular annual legisla
Committee, they citingthe observations offormer tive sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess
Senate President Jovito Salonga. before the opening of its next regular session
Thus, during the 1992Presidential elections, (subject to the power of the President to call a
both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on special session at any time).
!Wi
iiil
Section 4 of Article VI also ofthe Constitution gress, whichmay reconvene without need ofcall
•j!0
clearly provides that "[t]he term ofoffice ofthe by the President to a special session.
Senators shall be six years and shall commence, WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the DISMISSED. .
thirtieth, day of June next following their elec
tion." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article
provides that "[t]he Members of the House of D. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-
Representatives shall be elected for a term of Arroyo
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise RET CASE No. 002, March 29, 2005
provided by law, at noon on the thirtiethday of
RESOLUTION
June next following their election." Consequent
ly, there being nolawtothe contrary, untilJune QUISUMBING, J:
30,2004, the presentTwelfth Congress to which
the present legislators belong cannot be saidto [FACTS: Before the election protest of
have"passedout oflegal existence." FernandoPoe, Jr. could be decided, he died.
•*fej\ Mrs. FPJclaims that because ofthe untimely
The legislative functions of the Twelfth demise ofherhusbandand in representation
Congress may have come to a close upon the not only of her deceased husband but more
final adjournment of its regular sessions on so because of the paramount interest of the
June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non- Filipino people, there is an urgent need for
legislative functions, such as that ofbeing the her to continue and substitute for her late
National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint husband in the election protest initiated by
public session of both Houses of Congress con him to ascertain the true and genuine will oj
vened by express directive- of Section 4, Article the electorate in the 2004 elections.]
VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for
andtoproclaim the newly elected President and
Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow
dieuntil it has accomplished its constitutionally substitute/intervene for the protestant who died
mandated tasks. For only when a board of can during the pendency ofthe latter's protestcase?
vassershas completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio. Its membership may change, but The fundamental rule applicable in a presi
-
it retains its authority as a board until it has ac dential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
complished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission Rules. It provides:
on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374,1385 [1968], citing
Bautistav. Fugoso, 60Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, registered candidate forPresidentorfor Vice-
L January 29,1968.)
President ofthe Philippines whoreceivedthe
secondor third highest number ofvotes may
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet contest the election of the President or the
completed its non-legislative duty to canvass
L the votes and proclaim the duly elected Presi
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing
a verified petition withthe Clerkofthe Presi
dent and Vice-President, its existence as the dential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)
National Board of Canvassers, as well as that days after the proclamation ofthe winner.
L ofthe Joint Committee to which it referred the
preliminary tasks ofauthenticating and canvass Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, th€
ing the certificates ofcanvass, have not become 2ndand3rdplacers, may contest the election. By
functus officio. thisexpress enumeration, the rule makers havt
in effect determined the real parties in interest
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of
Congress, there is no legal impediment to the concerning anon-going election contest. It envi
Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned sioned a scenario where, if the declared winnei
toit and transmitting its report for the approval had not been truly voteduponby the electorate
ofthe joint public session ofboth Houses of Con the candidate who received.that 2nd or the 3rc
ARTICLE VTI: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 36g
highest number ofvotes wouldbe the legitimate we permitted substitution by the' vice-mayor
beneficiary in a successful election contest. since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest
This Tribunal, however, does not have any considering that if the protest succeeds and the
rule onsubstitution nor intervention but it does protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds
. allow for the analogous and suppletory applica to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant
tion of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Su if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In
preme Court, and the decisions of the electoral contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ,
tribunals. herself denies any claim to the august office of
te»t
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitu case, we can conclude that protestant's widow is
tion in the Rules of Court. This rule allows not a real party in interest to this electionprotest.
substitution by a legal representative. It can
iM/<l be gleaned from the citation of this rule that We are not unaware that a contest before
movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is
Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute in pursuit of one's right to a public office, and
ofthe late protestant prescribed by said Section second, it is imbued with public interest.
liial
16. However, in our application of this rule to an Indeed the personal aspect of the case is
election contest, we have every time ruled that a inextricably linked with the public interest. For
public officeis personal to the public officer and an election protest involves not merely conflict
not a property transmissible to the heirs upon ing private aspirations but is imbued with public
death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitu interest which raises it into a plane ovet and
tion by the widow or the heirs in election contests above ordinary civil actions. But herein mov
tei
where the protestant dies during the pendency ant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed
of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, that it is with the "paramount public interest"
we recognized substitution upon the death ofthe in mind that she desires "to pursue the process"
protestee but denied substitution by the widow or commenced by her late husband. She avers that
heirs since they are not the real parties in inter she is "pursuing the process" to determine who
est. Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino
v. Commission on Elections, we struck down people. We laud her noble intention and her in
fiat the claim of the surviving spouse and children terest to find out the true will of the electorate.
of the protestee to the contested office for the However, nobility of intention is not the point of
same reason. Even in analogous cases before reference in determining whether a person may
i^>
other electoral tribunals, involving substitution intervene in an election protest....
by the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases
where the widow is not a real party in interest, Conformably then with the law, the rules and
we denied substitution by the wife or heirs. prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no
justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for
This is not to say that death of the protes intervention and substitution.
tant necessarily abates the pending action. We
have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) SEC. 5. BEFORE THEY ENTER ON
that while the right to a public office is personal THE EXECUTION OF THEIR OFFICE, THE
and exclusive to the public officer, an election PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, OR
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to THE ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL TAKE
lis) the protestant or to the protestee such that the THE FOLLOWING OATH OR AFFIRMA
death of either would oust the court of all author TION:
ity to continue the protest proceedings. Hence,
we have allowed substitution and intervention "I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR
but only by a real party in interest. A real party AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY
in interest is the party who would be benefited AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY FULFILL
or injured by the judgment, and the party who MY DUTIES AS PRESIDENT (OR VICE-
is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de • PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT)
De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESERVE
AND DEFEND ITS CONSTITUTION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL

EXECUTE ITS LAWS, DO JUSTICE ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT
TO EVERY MAN, AND CONSECRATE OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE
MYSELF TO THE SERVICE OF THE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.
NATION. SO HELP ME GOD." (IN CASE THE CONGRESS SHALL, BY LAW, PRO
OF AFFIRMATION, LAST SENTENCE VIDE FOR THE MANNER D£WHICH ONE
WILL BE OMITTED.) WHO IS TO'ACT AS PRESIDENT SHALL
SEC. 6. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BE SELECTED UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR
AN OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. THE SALA A VICE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALI
RIES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE- FIED, IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT
PRESIDENT SHALL BE DETERMINED BY DISABILITY, OR INABILITY OF THE OF
LAW AND SHALL NOT BE DECREASED FICIALS MENTIONED IN THE NEXT PRE
CEDING PARAGRAPH.
DURING THEIR TENURE. NO INCREASE
IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE
EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRA
1. Vacancy situations at the beginning of
the term.
TION OF THE TERM OF THE INCUMBENT
DURING WHICH SUCH INCREASE WAS In general, Section 7 dealswith vacancy situ
APPROVED. THEY SHALL NOT RECEIVE ations which exist at the beginning of the term
liiii) DURING THEIR TENURE ANY OTHER of the presidency.
EMOLUMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT The first two situations are: (1) when a
OR ANY OTHER SOURCE. President has been chosen but he fails to qualify
SEC. 7. THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND at the beginning of his term, and (2) when no
THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL President has yet been chosen at the time he
ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF is supposed to assume office. In both cases the
Vice-President becomes acting-President until a
pj THEIR TERMS.
President qualifies.
IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO
QUALIFY, THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT The third situation is (3) when the President
SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE electdiesoris permanently incapacitatedbefore
PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE QUALI the beginning ofhis term. In this case, the Vice-
President-elect becomes President.
FIED.
The fourth and fifth situations are (4) when
IF A PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE both the President and Vice-President have not
BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICE-PRESIDENT yet been chosen or have failed to qualify, and
ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL (5) when both shall have died or become perma
A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHO nently incapacitated at the start of their term.
SEN AND QUALIFIED. In such situation, the Senate President or the
IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM Speaker - inthat order - acts as President until
OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT a President or Vice-President qualifies.
ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL The sixth situation is (6) when the officials
HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY DIS mentioned in situations (4) and (5) shall have
ABLED, THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT died, or shall have become permanently inca
SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT. pacitated, orareunable to assume office. Insuch
WHERE NO PRESIDENT AND VICE- situation, Congress will decide by law who will
PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN act as President until a President or Vice-Presi
OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR WHERE dent shall have been elected and qualified.
BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED OR BECOME
PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE PRESI SEC. 8. IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMA
NENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OF
DENT Otf THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF
HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE FICE, OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESI-
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT •' 371
DENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL 2. Cases.

BECOME THE PRESIDENT TO SERVE
La THE UNEXPIRED TERM. IN CASE OF
A. Estrada v. Desierto
DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RE G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
MOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION
OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PUNO, J.: *
SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, On the line in the cases at bar is the office of
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP the President. PetitionerJoseph Ejercito Estrada
RESENTATIVES, SHALL THEN ACT AS alleges that he is the President on leave while
PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims
VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN she is the President. The warring personalities
ELECTED AND QUALIFIED. are important enough but more transcendental
are the constitutional issues embedded on the
THE CONGRESS SHALL, BY LAW,
parties' dispute. While the significant issues are
PROVIDE WHO SHALL SERVE AS PRESI
many, the jugular issue involvesthe relationship
DENT IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT betweenthe ruler and the ruled in a democracy,
DISABILITY, OR RESIGNATION OF THE Philippine style.
ACTING PRESIDENT. HE SHALL SERVE
UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE- First, we take a view of the panorama of
PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECT events that precipitated the crisis in the office
ED AND QUALIFIED, AND BE SUBJECT of the President.
TO THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POW In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner
ERS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS AS THE Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
ACTING PRESIDENT. while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice- President. Some ten (10) million
1. Vacancy situations during the term. Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he
The vacancy situations described here occur
would rescue them from life's adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a
after the office has been initially filled.
six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
The first situation is: (1) when the incumbent
From the beginning of his term, however,
President dies, or is permanently disabled, is petitioner was plagued by a plethora ofproblems
removed, or resigns. The vacancy created is thus, that slowlybut surely eroded his popularity. His
permanent. In this situation the Vice-President sharp descent from power started on October 4,
becomes President. 2000. Hocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson,
The second situation is: (2) when both the a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air
President and the Vice President die, or are and accused the petitioner, his family and friends
permanently disabled, are removed, or resign. In of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
such case, the Senate President or the Speaker The expose immediately ignited reactions
iait
— in that order — shall act as President until of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
a President or Vice-President shall have been Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minor
elected and qualified. ity Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused
The third situation is (3) when the Acting
the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
Presidentdies, or is permanently incapacitated, in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
is removed, or resigns. For such situation, Con November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged
gress will determine by law who will act as Presi that the petitioner took from Governor Singson
dent until a new President or Vice-President 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended
shall have qualified. for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred
by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator
fc*v
Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseatec
(then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for by Representative Fuentebella. On Novembei
joint investigation. 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachmenl
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators
The House of Representatives did no less.
took their oath as judges with Supreme Courl
L The House Committee on Public Order and Secu
rity, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez,
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
decided to investigate the expose of Governor The political temperature rose despite the
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives cold December. On December 7, the impeach
Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael ment trial started. The battle royale was foughl
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the by some ofthe marquee names in the legal profes
petitioner. sion. Standing as prosecutors were then House
Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte anc*
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner
Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tanada
filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime
Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno
Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in be Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodri
half of the Presbyteral Council bf the Archdiocese guez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura
of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from They were assisted by a battery of private pros
the presidency as he had lost the moral authority ecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernandc
to govern. Two days later or on October 13, the Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines Serving as defense counsel were former ChieJ
joined the cry for the resignation ofthe petitioner. Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor Genera
Four days later, or on October 17, former Presi and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza.
dent Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano
petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of former Deputy Speaker ofthe House Raul Daza
resignation. Former President Fidel Ramos also Atty. Siegfried Fortun andhis brother, Atty. Ray-
joined the chorus. Early .on, or on October 12, mund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by
respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest
Department of Social Welfare and Services and viewing rating. Its high and low points were the
later asked for petitioner's resignation. However, constant conversational piece of the chattering
petitioner strenuously held on to his office and classes. The dramatic point of the Decembei
refused to resign. hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank.
senior economic advisers, members ofthe Council She testified that she was one foot away from
of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P50C
Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente million investment agreement with their bank
Paterno and Washington Sycip. On November on February 4, 2000.
2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeach
the Department of Trade and Industry. On ment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christ
November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, mas. When it resumed on January 2,2001, more
and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with bombshells were exploded by the prosecution.
some47 representatives defectedfrom the ruling On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu whe
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino. served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took
The month of November ended with a big the witness stand. He alleged that the petitionei
bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with
L HouseSpeaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or
Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insidei
trading. Then came the fateful day of January
more than 1/3 of all the members ofthe House of 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges
Representatives to the Senate. This causedpoliti ruled against the opening ofthe second envelope
L cal convulsions in both houses of Congress. Sena whichallegedlycontained evidenceshowingthat
tor Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret banjk ac-
L
count under the name "Jose Velarde." The public ment." A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
and private prosecutors walked out in protest Panfilo Lacson and the major service command
of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel re ers gave a similar stunning announcement. Some
signed as*Senate President. The ruling made at Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned
of anger that hit the streets of the metropoHs. from their posts. Rallies for the resignation of
By midnight, thousands had assembled at the the petitioner exploded in various parts of the
EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner an
delivered against the petitioner and the eleven nounced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to
(11) senators. the opening of the highly controversial second
On January 17, the public prosecutors sub envelope. There was no turning back the tide.
mitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering The tide had become a tsunami.
asai
their collective resignation. They also filed their January 20 turned to be the day of surrender.
Manifestation of Withdrawal ofAppearance with At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations
the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
quickly moved for the indefinite postponement started at Malacanang's Mabini Hall, Office
ofthe impeachment proceedings until the House of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo
of Representatives shall have resolved the issue Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito
Justice Davide granted the motion.
Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and
January 18 saw the high velocity intensi Atty. Macel Fernandez, head ofthe Presidential
atl fication of the call for petitioner's resignation. Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Ex
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy ecutive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary
Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary
City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's of Justice Hernando Perez. Outside the palace,
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between
Students and teachers walked out of their classes pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted
in Metro Manila to show their concordance. in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries.
Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA The negotiations consumed all morning until the
Shrine, all masters ofthe physics of persuasion, ,news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
attracted more and more people. administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high
On January 19, the fall from power of the noon at the EDSA Shrine.
petitioner appeared inevitable. Xt 1:20p.m.,the At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m.,
Staffof the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, had petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malaca-
defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the fiang Palace. 29 He issued the following press
holding of a snap election for President where statement:
he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse
the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of "20 January 2001
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed EJERCITO ESTRADA
services went to the EDSA Shrine. In the pres
ence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice Presi
dent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstra President ofthe Republicofthe Philippines. While
tors, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of along with many other legal minds of our country,
your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members I have strong and serious doubts about the legal
of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that ity and constitutionality of her proclamation as
we are withdrawing our support to this govern President, I do not wish to be a factor that will
Lilii

'•&&i
prevent the restoration of unity and order in our treated as an administrative matter, the court
civil society. Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
It is for this reason that I now leave Malaca-
then present to the Chief Justice on January
nang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice
country, for the sake of peace and in order to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
begin the healing process of our nation. I leave ofthe Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the op
portunities given to me for service to our people. I This resolution is without prejudice to the
- will not shirk from any future challenges that may disposition of any justiciable case that may be
come ahead in the same service of our country. filed by a proper p'arty."
I call on all my supporters and followers to Respondent Arroyo appointed members of
join me in the promotion ofa constructive national
her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and spe
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
cial envoys. Recognition of respondent Arroyo's
May the Almighty bless our country and government by foreign governments swiftly fol
beloved people. lowed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d"
i'î i MABUHAY! honneur at Malacanang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco,
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
more than a hundred foreign diplomats recog
nized the government of respondent Arroyo. US
It also appears that on the same day, Janu President George W. Bush gave the respondent
ary 20, 2001. he signed the following letter: a telephone call from the White House conveying
US recognition of her government.
"Sir:
On January 24, Representative Feliciano
By virtue ofthe provisions of Section 11, Ar
Belmonte was elected new Speaker ofthe House
ticle VQ of the Constitution, I am hereby transmit
ting this declaration that I am unable to exercise of Representatives. The House then passed Reso
the powers and duties of my office. By operation lution No. 175 "expressing the full support ofthe
of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President House of Representatives to the administration
shall be the Acting President. of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines." It also approved
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support ofthe
House of Representatives to the assumption into
A copy of the letter was sent to former;
office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January
as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
20. Another copy was transmitted to Senate
extending its congratulations and expressing its
President Pimentel on the same day although it
support for her administration as a partner in
was received only at 9:00 p.m.
the attainment of the nation's goals under the
On January 22, the Monday after taking her Constitution."
oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
On January 26, the respondent signed into
the powers and duties of the Presidency. On
law the Solid Waste Management Act. A few
the same day, this Court issued the following
days later, she also signed into law the Political
Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-
Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act.
05 SC, to wit:
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nomi
"AM. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of nated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Vice President. The next day, February 7, the
her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
the Philippines before the ChiefJustice—Acting nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr., Senators
on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations,
taji
the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the citing as reason therefor the pending challenge
Court, dated January 20,2001, which request was on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presi-
dency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa public funds, illegal use of public funds and prop
Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent. erty, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-^1757
The House of Representatives also approved filed by Leonard de Vera, et al, on November
iîiiii)
Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
No. 178. Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA
Vice President two (2) days later. 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by
Ernesto B. Francisco^ Jr. on December 4, 2000
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution
for plunder, graft and corruption.
No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is
functus officio and has been terminated. Sena A special panel of investigators was forth
tor Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the with created by the respondent Ombudsman to
record" that she voted against the closure ofthe investigate the charges against the petitioner.
impeachment court on the grounds that the Sen It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
ate had failed to decide on the impeachment case Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
and that the resolution left open the question of members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,.Pros-
whether Estrada was still qualified to run for ecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
another elective post. Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the
panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse
file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rat
witnesses as well as other supporting documents
ing jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to
in answer to the aforementioned complaints
38% on January 26, 2001. In another survey
against him.
conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from Febru
ary 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set.
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court
as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with
also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the bal sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
m>
ance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% from "conducting any further proceedings in Case
in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,1755,1756,1757 and
Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that
social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper may be filed in his office, until after the term of
classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% petitioner as President is over and only if legally
among the E's or very poor class. warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo warran
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the
to. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner
petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. to be the lawful and incumbent President ofthe
Several cases previously filed against him in the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
to discharge the duties of his office, and declar
These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed ing respondent to have taken her oath as and to
by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for be holding the Office ofthe President, only in an
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case acting capacity pursuant to the provisions ofthe
No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15,the
Crime and Corruption on November 17,2000 for Court, on the same day, February 6, required
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, the respondents "to comment thereon within a
perjury, serious misconduct, violation ofthe Code non-extendible period expiring on 12 February
of Conduct for Government Employees, etc.; (3) 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the
OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No.
Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 146738 and the filing of the respondents' com
2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, ments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et On February 15,the consolidatedcases were
al, on'November 28, 2000 for malversation of orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
•V
hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr. and Associate II. Assuming that the petitions present a
JusticeArtemio Panganiban recused themselves justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Es
on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator trada is a President on leave while respondent
Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of Arroyo is an Acting President.
counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised
themselves by indicating that they have thrown
III. Whether conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is a condition precedent for the
their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhib
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the
ited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were
negative and on the assumption that petitioner
given the short period of five (5) days to file their
is still President, whether he is immune from
memoranda and two (2) days to submit their
criminal prosecution.
simultaneous replies.
IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on
Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
'4& the urgent motion for copies of resolution and
prejudicial publicity.
press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
I
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court
did not issue a resolution on January 20, Whether or not the cases at bar involve a
lla-t
2001 declaring the Office of the President political question.
vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice
Private respondents raise the threshold
issue a press statement justifying the alleged issue that the cases at bar pose a political ques
resolution; tion, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of
(2) to order the parties and especially this Court to decide. They contend that shorn
their counsel who are officers of the Court of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the
under pain of being cited for contempt to "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They
refrain from making any comment or discuss stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the
ing in public the merits of the cases at bar presidency through people power; that she has
while they are still pending decision by the already taken her oath as the 14th President of
&fj Court; and the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of
the presidency and that she has been recognized
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order ef by foreign governments. They submit that these
fective immediately enjoining the respondent realities on ground constitute the political thicket
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the which the Court cannot enter.
criminal cases pending investigation in his
office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada We reject private respondents' submission.
and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried
from news reports that the respondent Om to lift the shroud on political question but its
budsman may immediately resolve the cases exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds.
against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the
(7) days after the hearing held on February political question doctrine which rests on the
15, 2001, which action will make the cases principle of separation of powers and on pruden
at bar moot and academic." tial considerations, continue to be refined in the
mills of constitutional law. In the United States,
The parties filed their replies on February the most authoritative guidelines to determine
24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed whether a question is political were spelled out
submitted for decision. by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case ofBaker
The bedrock issues for resolution of this v. Carr, 369 US 186,82 S. Ct. 691,7 L. ed 2d 663,
Court are: 686 (1962), viz:
I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable "... Prominent on the surface of any case held
controversy. to involve a political question is found a textually
tei>
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section

issue to a coordinate political department or a 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable limpid languageto "... review, in an appropriate
standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination
proceedingfiledby any citizen, the sufficiency of
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent law or the suspension qfthe privilegeofthe writ
resolution without expressing lack ofthe respect (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof...."
due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers
political decision already made; or the potentiality League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver
of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce A. Lozano v. President Corazon C.Aquino, et al.
ments by various departments on question. Unless and related cases to support their thesis that
one of these formulations is inextricable from the since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of
case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they
justiciability on the ground of a political question's present a political question. A more cerebral
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of reading ofthe cited cases will show that they are
political questions,' not of 'political cases'." inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the
In the Philippine setting, this Court has government of former President Aquino was the
been continuously confronted with cases calling result ofa successful revolution by the sovereign
for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the
perimeters of a political question. Our leading Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino
case is Tahada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1068 government was installed through a direct
(1957), where this Court, through former Chief exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitu
questions refer "to those questions which, under tion, as amended." It is familiar learning that the
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people legitimacy of a government sired by a successful
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which revolution by people power is beyond judicial
full discretionary authority has been delegated to scrutiny for that government automatically or
the legislative or executive branch ofthe govern bits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered
ment. It is concerned with issues dependent upon contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." is not revolutionary in character. The oath that
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has nar she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under
rowed the reach ofthe political question doctrine the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categori
when it expanded the power of judicial review of cally swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Con
this court not only to settle actual controversies stitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is
involving rights which are legally demandable discharging the powers of the presidency under
and enforceable but also to determine whether
the authority ofthe 1987 Constitution.
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion In fine, the legal' distinction between EDSA
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the People Power I and EDSA People Power II is
part of any branch or instrumentality of govern clear. EDSA I involves the exercise ofthe people
ment. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on power of revolution which overthrew the whole
the "thou shalt not's" ofthe Constitution directed government. EDSA II is an exercise of people
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With power of freedom of speech and freedom of as
the new provision, however, courts are given a sembly to petition the government for redress
greater prerogative to determine what it can do of grievances which only affected the office of
to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any and the legitimacy of the new government that
branch or instrumentality of government. Clear resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial
ly, the new provision did hot just grant the Court review, but EDSAII is intra constitutional and
power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry the resignation of the sitting President that it
w with this intent are other provisions ofthe 1987 caused and the succession of the Vice President
Constitution trimming the so-called political as President are subject tojudicialreview. EDSA
I presented a political question; EDSA II involves it is an essentialprocess foradvancing knowledge

legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition provide for participation in decision-making by
the government for redress of grievance which all members of society; and fourth, it is a method
are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more
not inappropriate. stable community of maintaining the precarious
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly balancebetweenhealthy cleavageand necessary
are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights consensus." In this sense, freedom ofspeech and
was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution of assembly provides a framework in which the
against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, "conflict necessary to the progress of a society
raised the clarion call for the recognition of free can take place without destroying the society."
dom of the press of the Filipinos and included In Hague v. Committee forIndustrialOrganiza
it as among "the reforms sine quibus non." The tion, this function of free speech and assembly
Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the was echoed in the amicus curiae brieffiled by the
revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived Association which emphasized that "the basis of
(1) of the right to freely express his ideas or the right of assembly is the substitution of the
opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of expression of opinion and belief by talk rather
the press or other similar means; (2) ofthe right than force; and this means talk for all and by
of association for purposes of human life and all." In the relatively recent case of Subayco v.
which are not contrary to public means; and (3) Sandiganbayan, this Court similarly stressed
that "... it should be clear even to those with
of the right to send petitions to the authorities,
individually or collectively. These fundamental
intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
rights were preserved when the United States
people assemble to petition for redress of griev
ances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is
acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the
the people who count; those who are deaf to then-
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission
grievances are ciphers."
of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley,
it is specifically provided "that no law shall be Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal
passed abridging the freedom of speech or ofthe and not political questions. The principal issues
%) press or of the rights of the people to peaceably for resolution require the proper interpretation
assemble and petition the Government for re of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
dress of grievances." The guaranty was carried notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of
over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of powers under section 11 ofArticle VII. The issues
Congress of August 29, 1966. likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presi
dential immunity from suit. They also involve
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
our 1935 Constitution, and the 1973 Constitu
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the
tion. These rights are now safely ensconced in
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine
section 4, Article III ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:
has been laid down that "it is emphatically the
"SECTION 4. No law shall be passed province and duty of the judicial department
abridging the freedom of speech, of expres to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's
sion, or ofthe press, or the right ofthe people invocation of the doctrine of political question is
peaceably to assemble and petition the gov but a foray in the dark.
ernment for redress of grievances."
II
The indispensability of the people's freedom
of speech and of assembly to democracy is now Whether or not the petitioner resigned as
President.
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emer
son: first, freedom of expression is essential as a We now slide to the second issue. None ofthe
means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, . parties considered this issue as posing a politi-
iPJ
cal question. Indeed, it involves a legal question Using this totality test, we hold that peti
whose factual ingredient is determinable from tioner resigned as President.
the records of the case and by resort to judicial
The Court then goes on to relate the mount
notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President
ing pressure on Estrada arising from the defec
or that "Ee suffers from a permanent disability. tion of his principal executive officers resulting in
Hence, he submits that the office of the President
his gradual isolation, and the reverberating call
is&J
was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her of people for his resignation. Quotations from the
oath as President.
Angara Diary are used to illustrate the desperate
The issue brings under the microscope the character of the situation. Meanwhile negotia
W
meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitu tions for a peaceful transition were also going on
tion which provides: even as Estrada's supporters encourage him to
make a graceful exit. The Angara Diary quotes
'in)
"SECTION 8. In case of death, perma him as saying: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko
nent disability, removal from office or resig na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
nation of the President, the Vice President tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (lam very tired. I don't
shall become the President to serve the want any more ofthis — it's too painful. I'm tired
unexpired term. In case of death, permanent of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I
disability, removal from office, or resignation just want to clear my name, then I will go." And
of both the President and Vice President, also "Ayokona masyado nang masakit. "By noon
the President of the Senate or, in case of his time is ready to leave Malacanang. Before he
inability, the Speaker of the House of Repre leaves he reads the following message:
sentatives, shall then act as President until At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice Presi
the President or Vice President shall have
dent .Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
been elected and qualified. as President of the Republic of the Philip
xxx XXX xxx. pines. While along with many other legal
minds of our country, I have strong and
The issue then is whether the petitioner serious doubts about the legality and consti
resigned as President or should be considered tutionality of her proclamation as President,
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respon I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent
dent took her oath as the 14th President of the the restoration ofunity and order in our civil
Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal ab society.
straction. It is a factual question and its elements
are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to It is for this reason that I now leave
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of Malacanang Palace, the seat of the presi
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is dency of this country, for the sake of peace
not governed by any formal requirement as to
and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. I leave the Palace of our people
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
with gratitude for the opportunities given to
express. It can be implied. As long as the resigna
me for service to our people. I will not shirk
tion is clear, it must be given legal effect.
from any future challenges that may come
In the cases at bar, the facts show that pe ahead in the same service of our country.
titioner did not write any formal letter of resig
I call on all my supporters and followers
nation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace to join me in the promotion of a constructive
X)l{$ in .the.afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the national spirit of reconciliation and solidar
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
ity.
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, May the Almighty bless our country and
during and after January 20,2001 or by the total our beloved people. MABUHAY!
ity of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts In sum, we hold that the resignation of the
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmedby
relevance on the issue. his leaving Malacanang. In the press release con-
taining his final statement, (1) he acknowledged as strange that the letter, despite its legal value,
the oath-taking of the respondent as President was never referred to by the petitioner during
. of the Republic albeit with reservation about its the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the the slightest hint of its existence when he issued
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of his final press release. It was all too easy for him
peace and in order to begin the healing process to tell the Filipino people in his press release
M}
of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the that he was temporarily unable to govern and
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he that he was leaving the reins of government to
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any
lii^J as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
his gratitude to the people for the opportunity cannot negate the resignation of.the petitioner.
to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring If it was prepared before the press release of the
to the past opportunity given him to serve the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from
people as President; (4) he assured that he will the presidency, then the resignation must prevail
not shirk from any future challenge that may as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after
come ahead in the same service of our country. the press release, still, it commands scant legal
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge significance. Petitioner's resignation from the
after occupying the office of the president which presidency cannot be the subject of a changing
he has given up, and (5) he called on this support caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
ers to join him in the promotion of a constructive resignation is the result ofhis repudiation by the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. people. There is another reason why this Court
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation cannot give any legal significance to petitioner's
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not letter and this shall be discussed in issue number
give up the presidency. The press release was III of this Decision.
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell.
His presidency is now in the past tense. After petitioner contended that as a matter
of fact he did not resign, he also argues tlât he
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on
not resign but only took a temporary leave of section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as
absence due to his inability to govern. In support the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
of this thesis, the letter dated January 20,2001 of allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer "SECTION 12. No public officer shall be
to the said letter, viz: allowed to resign retire pending an investi
gation, criminal or administrative, pending
"Sir. a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this Act under the provisions of the
By virtue of the provisions of Section II,
Revised Penal Code on bribery."
Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am un A reading of the legislative history of RA
able to exercise the powers and duties of my No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
office. By operation of law and the Constitu petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate
tion, the Vice President shall be the Acting Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when
President. it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain
a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech.
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill,
in mystery. The pleadings filed by the peti "reserved to propose during the period of amend
tioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay ments the inclusion of a provision to the effect
even intimate, the circumstances that led to its that no public official who is under prosecution
preparation. Neither did the counsel of the pe for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
titioner reveal to the Court these circumstances administrative investigation, shall be allowed to
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court voluntarily resign or retire." During the period
ai
s^
of amendments, the following provision was the records show that when petitioner resigned
inserted as section 15: on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him
before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos.
. "SECTION 15. Termination of office — 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and
rô public official shall be allowed to resign 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed,
or retire pending an investigation, criminal the respondent Ombudsman refrained from
or administrative, or pending a prosecution conducting the preliminary investigation of
against him, for any offense under the Act the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal President then, petitioner was immune from suit.
Code on bribery. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
The separation or cessation of a public as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdic
official from office shall not be a bar to his tion to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019
prosecution under this Act for an offense cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for
committed during his incumbency." it contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable
The bill was vetoed by then President Car legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
los P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the sitting President.
second paragraph of the provision and insisted
Petitioner contends that the impeachment
that the President's immunity should extend
proceeding is an administrative investigation
even after his tenure.
that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature
similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But
passed. Section 15 above became section 13 even assuming arguendo that it is an administra
under the new bill, but the deliberations on tive proceeding, it can not be considered pending
this particular provision mainly focused on at the time petitioner resigned because the pro
the immunity of the President which was one cess already broke down when a majority of the
of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. senator-judges voted against the opening of the
There was hardly any debate on the prohibition second envelope, the public and private prosecu
against the resignation or retirement of a public tors walked out1, the public prosecutors filed their
%il official with pending criminal and administrative Manifestation of Withdrawal™ Appearance, and
cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent the proceedings were postponed indefinitely.
of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent There was, in effect, no impeachment case pend
the act of resignation or retirement from being ing against petitioner when he resigned.
used by a public official as a protective shield to
stop the investigation of a pending criminal or in
administrative case against him and to prevent Whether or not the petitioner is only tempo
his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or rarily unable to act as President.
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to We shall now tackle the contention of the
render service for that would be a violation of his petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
constitutional right A public official has the right perform the powers and duties of the presidency,
not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated,
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, the inability claim is contained in the January
a public official is facing administrative or crimi 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same
nal investigation or prosecution, such resignation day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker
or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the Fuentebella.
criminal or administrative proceedings against Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo
him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
to avoid prosecution. inability of the petitioner to discharge the pow
There is another reason why petitioner's ers and duties ofthe presidency. His significant
contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine the President shall continue exercising the
whether the President is incapable of perform powers and duties of his office."
ing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of Article VII." This contention is the That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a (1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent
President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only the above letter claiming inability to the Senate
lm an Acting President. President and Speaker of the House;
An examination of section 11, Article VH is (2) Unaware ofthe letter, respondent Arroyo
in order. It provides: took her oath of office as President on January
"SECTION 11. Whenever the President 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
transmits to the President of the Senate and (3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House
the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001
his written declaration that he is unable to House Resolution No. 175;
discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written On the same date, the House of the Rep
declaration to the contrary, such powers resentatives passed House Resolution No. 176
£Njj)
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice- which states:

President as Acting President.
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE
Whenever a majority of all the Members SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE
of the Cabinet transmit to the President of SENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
of Representatives their written declaration GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
that the President is unable to discharge the PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
powers and duties ofhis office, the Vice-Pres PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CON
ident shall immediately assume the powers GRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
and duties of the office as Acting President. SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION
AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT
Thereafter, when the President trans
OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
mits to the President of the Senate and to the
CONSTITUTION
Speaker of the-House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, WHEREAS, as a consequence of the
he shall reassume the powers and duties of people's loss of confidence on the ability of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
the Members of the Cabinet transmit within effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the
five days to the President of the Senate and to Philippines, the Philippine National Police
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn
their written declaration that the President support from him;
is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Congress shall decide the WHEREAS, upon authority of an en
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice
convene, if it is not in session, within forty- President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
eight hours, in accordance with its rules and sworn in as President of the Philippines on
without need of call. 20 January 2001 before ChiefJustice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr.;
If the Congress, within ten days after
receipt of the last written declaration, or, if WHEREAS, immediately thereafter,
not in session, within twelve days after it is members of the international community had
required to assemble, determines by a two- extended their recognition to Her Excellency,
thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
that the President is unable to discharge Republic of the Philippines;
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice- WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President
President shall act as President; otherwise, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a
L
ARTICLEVII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 383
iiiiii
policy of national healing and reconciliation On February 7, 2001, the House of the Rep
with justice for the purpose of national unity resentatives passed House Resolution No. 178
and development; which states:
"WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESI

obligations of the government cannot be DENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO
the constitutional duty of the House of Rep T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT
resentatives as an institution and that of OFTHEREPUBLJC OF THE PHILIPPINES
the individual members, thereof of fealty to
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the
the supreme will of the people, the House of Office of the Vice President due to the as
Representatives must ensure to the people a sumption to the Presidency ofVice President
stable, continuing government and therefore Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
î
must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Ar
ticle VII of the Constitution, the President in
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty the event of such vacancy shall nominate a
Hi)
of the House of Representatives to exert Vice President from among the members of
all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate the Senate and the House of Representatives
fractious tension, to heal social and political who shall assume office upon confirmation by
wounds, and to be an instrument of national a majority vote of all members ofboth Houses
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct voting separately;
representative of the various segments of the
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President
whole nation;
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
WHEREAS, without surrendering its Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona
independence, it is vital for the attainment of Jr., to the position of Vice President of the
all the foregoing, for the House of Represen Republic of the Philippines;
lasJ
tatives to extend its support and collabora WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guin
tion to the administration of Her Excellency, gona Jr., is a public servant endowed with
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to integrity, competence and courage; who has
be a constructive partner in nation-building, served the Filipino people with dedicated
the national interest demanding no less: responsibility and patriotism;
Now, therefore, be it.
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guin
Â Resolved by the House of Representa gona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
tives, to express its support to the assump statesmanship, having served the govern
tion into office by Vice President Gloria ment in various capacities, among others,
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the as Delegate to the Constitutional Conven
Republic of the Philippines, to extend its tion, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
congratulations and to express its support Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
for her administration as a partner in the Senator of the Philippines — qualities which
L attainment of the Nation's goals under the merit his nomination, to the position of Vice
Constitution. President of the Republic: Now, therefore,
be it.
Adopted,
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. HouseofRepresentatives, That the House of
Speaker Representatives confirms the nomination of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice
%j
This Resolution was adopted by the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
House of Representatives on January 24,
2001.
Adopted,
«y
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
Secretary General"
|ffii
This Resolution was adopted by the WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President

House of Representatives on February 7, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
2001. Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guin
gona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO the Republic of the Philippines;
Secretary General" WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. is a public servant endowed with in
(4) Also, despite receipt ofpetitioner's letter tegrity, competence, and courage; who has
claiming inability, some twelve (12) membersof served the Filipino people with dedicated
fcpi the Senate signed the following: responsibility and patriotism;
"RESOLUTION WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. possesses sterling qualities oftrue states
%j WHEREAS, the recent transition in gov manship, having served the government in
ernment offers the nation an opportunity for various capacities, among others, as Delegate
meaningful change and challenge; to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman
ay WHEREAS, to attain desired changes of the Commission on Audit, Executive Sec
and overcome awesome challenges the nation retary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of the
needs unity ofpurpose and resolute cohesive land — which qualities merit his nomina
resolute (sic) wili; tion to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it.
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philip
pines has been the forum for vital legisla Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That
ftgi tive measures in unity despite diversities in the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen,
perspectives; Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President
of the Republic of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express
support to the new government ofPresident Adopted,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to dis (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
charge our duties to attain desired changes
and overcome the nation's challenges." President of the Senate
On February 7, the Senate also passed Sen This Resolution was adopted by the Sen
ate Resolution No. 82 which states: ate on February 7, 2001.
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESI (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

DENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S Secretary of the Senate"
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. ASVICE PRESIDENTOF On the same date, February 7, the Senate
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES likewise passedSenate Resolution No. 83which
states:
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the
Office of the Vice-President due to the as "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT
sumption tothe Presidency ofVice President THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNC
TUS OFFICIO.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That.
Article VII of the Constitution, the President the Senate recognize that the Impeachment
in the event of such vacancy shall nominate Courtis functus officio and has been termi
nated.
a Vice President from among the members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives Resolved, further, That the Journals of
whoshall assume office upon confirmationby the Impeachment Court ofMonday, January
a majority voteofall members ofbothHouses 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday,
voting separately; January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
isati
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT *• 385

liii
Resolved, further, That the records of the decision ofboth Houses ofCongress recognizing
Impeachment Court including the 'second respondent Arroyo as President of the Philip
envelope' be transferred to the Archives of pines. Following Taftada v. Cuenco, wehold that
the Senate for proper safekeeping and pres this Courtcannot "exercise its judicialpower for
ervation in accordance with the Rules of the this is an issue "in regard to which full discretion
Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof ary authority has been delegated to the Legisla
shall be made only upon written approval of tive ... branch of the government." Or to use the
the Senate President. language in Baker v. Carr, there is a "textually
Resolved, finally. That all parties con demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
cerned be furnished copiesof$hisResolution. issue to a coordinate political department or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
Adopted, standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability
to discharge the powers and duties of the presi
President of the Senate dency. The question is political in nature and
This Resolution was adopted by the Sen addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
ate on February 7, 2001. fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided
bythis Court without transgressing the principle
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO of separation of powers.
Secretary of the Senate" In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that
he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed claim that he is a President on leave on the
Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of ground that he is merely unable to govern tem
a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COM- porarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Con
ELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to gress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is
be held simultaneously with the regular election the dejure President made by a co-equal branch
:&#J
on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number IV
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term
of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immu
nity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity,
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending the extent of the immunity.
bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo
as President. (See supra under Section 1)
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still
without any functioning Cabinet, without any V
recognition from any sector of government, and
without any support from the Armed Forces Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Estrada should.be enjoined due to prejudicial
Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his publicity.
inability to govern is only momentary. Petitioner also contends that the respondent
What leaps to the eye from these irrefut Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
able facts is that both houses of Congress have the investigation of the cases filed against him
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the prem guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombuds
ise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no man has developed bias and is all set to file the
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected criminal cases in violation of his right to due
petitioner's claim of inability. process.
The question is whether this Court has juris

diction to review the claim of temporary inability This is not the first time the issue of trial by
of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the publicityhas been raised in this Court'to stop the
Y%&\
trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal judge due to the barrage of publicity that
cases. In People v. Teehankee, Jr., later reiterated characterized the investigation and trial of
t&£\ in the case of Larranaga v. Court ofAppeals, et the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et
al., we laid down the doctrine that: al., we rejected this standard of possibility
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim
of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a find
that he was denied the right to impartial
ing of prejudicial publicity, there must be
trial due to prejudicial publicity: It is true
allegation and proof that the judges have
that the print and broadcast media gave the
been unduly influenced, not simply that they
case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
high profile and high stake criminal trials.
case at bar, the records do not show that
Then and now, we rule that the right of an
the trial judge developed actual bias against
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
appellant as a consequence of the extensive
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for,
his case. The totality of circumstances of
as well pointed out, a responsible press has
the case does not prove that the trial judge
always been regarded as the handmaiden of
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of preju
effective judicial administration, especially dicial publicity which is incapable of change
in the criminal field .... The press does not
even by evidence presented during the trial.
simply publish information about trials but
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
guards against the miscarriage of justice by bias and he has not discharged the burden."
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judi
cial processes to extensive public scrutiny We expounded further on this doctrine in
and criticism. the subsequent case of Webb v. Hon. Raul de
Leon, etc....
Pervasive publicity is not per se preju
dicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was Applying the above ruling, we hold that there
given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
does not by itself prove that the publicity enjoin the preliminary investigation of the peti
so permeated the mind of the trial judge tioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner
and impaired his impartiality. For;one, it is needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
impossible to seal the minds of members of discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show
the bench from pre-trial and other off-court more weighty social science evidence to suc
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The cessfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge
L
state of the art of our communication system to render a bias free decision. Well to note, the
brings news as they happen straight to our cases against the petitioner are still undergoing
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. preliminary investigation by a special panel of
These news form part of our everyday menu prosecutors in the office of the respondent Om
of the facts and fiction of life. For another, budsman. No allegation whatsoever has been
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not made by the petitioner that the minds of the
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the members of this special panel have already been
world. We have not installed the jury system infected by bias because of the pervasive preju
whose members are overly protected from dicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. panel has yet to come out with its findings and
. . Our judges are learned in the law and the Court cannot second guess whether its recom
trained to disregard off-court evidence and mendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
on-camera performances of parties to a liti
gation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally VI
infect their impartiality. Epilogue
At best, appellant can only conjure pos A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The
sibility of prejudice on the part of the trial cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
•JMJ
ARTICLEVII:THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 387
different dimension and then move to a new stage Ynares-Santiago, J., I concur in, the result. I
— the Officeof the Ombudsman. Predictably, the reserve the filing of separate opinion.
call from the majority for instant justice will hit a Sando'val-Gutierrez, J., I concur in the result
higherJficibel while the gnashing of teeth of the and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred
Separate -Opinions
duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance
the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and VITUG, J., concurring:
the right of an accused to a fair investigation and
trial which has been categorized as the "most fun The pressing issue must now catapult to its
L damental of all freedoms." To be sure, the duty end.
of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to Resignation is an act of giving up or the act
prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the of an officer by which he renounces his office
preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall indefinitely. In order to constitute a complete
have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide and operative act of resignation, the officer or
the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the employee must show a clear intention to relin
impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in quish or surrender his position accompanied by
a democracy are not decided by the mob whose an act of relinquishment. Resignation implies
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. an expression of an incumbent in some form,
Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of renounce, relinquish the office.
the majority is not and should never be the defini
Mr. Estrada importsi;hat he did not resign
tion of the rule of law. If democracy has proved
from the Presidency because the word "resigna
L to be the best form of government, it is because
it has respected the right of the minority to con
tion" has not once been embodied in his letters
or said in his statements. I am unable to oblige.
vince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of The contemporary acts of Estrada during those
multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they
L may be, is the key to man's progress from the
four critical days of January are evident of his
intention to relinquish his office. Scarcity of
cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that words may not easily cloak reality and hide true
key just to pander to some people's prejudice. intentions. .. .
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th Abandonment of office is a species of res
President of the Republic are DISMISSED. ignation, and it connotes the giving up of the
office although not attended by the formalities
SO ORDERED. normally observed in resignation. Abandonment,
may be effected by a positive act or can be the
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga- result of an omission, whether deliberate or not.
Reyes and De Leon, Jr., J., concur.
Buena, J., concurs in the result.
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
Davide, Jr., C.J., took no part in view of
reasons given in open court and in the Extended
Explanation.
L Kapunan, J., I concur in the result. I reserve
This brings me to the main issue, whether
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's ascension
the filing of a separate opinions. to the Presidency was in accordance with the
Panganiban,«/., no part per Letter of Inhibi Constitution. Art. VII, §8 provides in pertinent
tion dated Feb. 15, 2001 mentioned in footnote parts:
51 ofponencia. To recall these events is to note the moral
Pardo, J., concurs in the result. I believe that framework in which petitioner's fall from power
petitioner was constrained to resign. Reserve my took place. Petitioner's counsel claimed peti
vote in immunity from suit. tioner was forced out of Malacanang Palace,
fa&I
seat of the Presidency, because petitioner was Arroyo. It belies petitioner's claim that he was
"threatened with mayhem." What, the President not permanently disabled but only temporarily
ofthe Philippines, who under the Constitution is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, his office and therefore can onlybe temporarily
threatened with mayhem? This can only happen replaced by respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
because he had lost his moral authority as the under Art. VII, §11.
elected President.
Indeed, the people power movement did

not just happen at the call of some ambitious
But who is to declare the President's perma
nent disability, petitioner asks? The answer was
politicians, military men, businessmen and/
given by petitioner himself when he said that he
or prelates. It came about because the people,
was already tired and wanted no more of popular
rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of
demonstrations and rallies against him; when
graft and corruption made by Luis "Chavit" Sing-
he and his advisers negotiated with respondent
son, Emma Lim, Edgardo Espiritu, and other
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's advisers for a transi
witnesses against petitioner. Their testimonies
tion of powers from him to her; when petitioner's
during the impeachment trial were all televised
own Executive Secretary declared that petitioner
and heard by millions of people throughout the
was not only in a corner but was down.
length and breadth of this archipelago. As a
result, petitioner found himself on January 19,
2001 deserted as most of his cabinet members
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
resigned, members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police I FULLY CONCUR with the opinion writ
withdrew- their support of the President, while ten for the majority by Mr. Justice Puno in the
civil, society announced its loss of trust and usual penetrating and scholarly flourish of his
confidence in him. Public office is a public trust. pen, characteristically his. Allow me nonetheless
Petitioner lost the public's trust and as a conse to express my views on whether a vacancy oc
quence remained President only in name. Having curred in the Office ofthe President to justify and
lost the command of the armed forces and the validate Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's ascen
national police, he found himself vulnerable to dancy to the Presidency, if only to emphasize and
threats of mayhem. reinforce what he advocates in his ponencia. I
shall confine myself to this issue upon which the
This is the confession of one who is beaten.
legitimacy ofthe present dispensation hinges and
After all, the permanent disability referred to
to which all others moor their bearings.
in the Constitution can be physical, mental, or
moral, rendering the President unable to exercise
the powers and functions of his office. As his close
It is admitted that the term permanent dis
adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours of
ability used in Sec. 8, Art. VII, is a fair example of
petitioner's presidency:
words which have one meaning that is commonly
The President says: "Pagod na pagod na accepted, and a materially different or modified
ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod one in its legal sense. It is axiomatic that the
na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am primary task in constitutional construction is
very tired. I don't want any more of this — it's to ascertain and assure the realization of the
too painful. I'm tired ofthe red tape, the bureau purpose of the framers, hence of the people in
cracy, the intrigue.) adopting the Constitution. The language of the
Charter should perforce be construed in a man
ner that promotes its objectives more effectively.
«2J
This is the clearest proof that petitioner was A strained construction which impairs its own
totally and permanently disabled at least as of meaning and efficiency to meet the responsibili
11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the ties brought about by the changing times and
negotiations for the transfer of power to the conditions of society should not be adopted.
respondent Vice-President Gloria Macapagal- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
EMi
vagaries of contemporary events but should be Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the 14th de jure
interpreted to coyer even future and unknown President ofthe Republic? So he was; hence, the
circumstances. It must withstand the assaults assumption of respondent as President.
ofbigot&and infidels at the same time bend with
the refreshing winds of change necessitated by I view petitioner's permanent disability from
unfolding events. As it is oft repeated, constitu two (2) different perspectives: objectively and
tional provisions are inteipreted by the spirit subjectively. From the*objective approach, the
which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth. following circumstances rendered inutile peti
tioner's administration and powers as Chief Ex
siid
Thus, under the pertinent constitutional ecutive: (a) the refusal of a huge sector of civil so
provision governing the rules of succession by the ciety to accept and obey him as President; (b) the
Vice-President in the event of permanent disabil mass resignation of key cabinet officials thereby
ity ofthe President, the term must be reasonably incapacitating him from performing his duties
construed, and as so construed means all kinds to execute the laws of the land and promote the
of incapacities which render the President per general welfare; (c) the withdrawal of support of
petually powerless to discharge the functions and the entire armed forces and the national police
prerogatives of the office. This is what appears thus permanently paralyzing him from discharg
to have been in the minds of the framers of the ing his task of defending the Constitution, main
1987 Constitution. As borne by the deliberations taining peace and order and protecting the whole
of the Constitutional Commission — Filipino people; (d) the spontaneous acknowledg
ment by both Houses of Congress — the Senate
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you Madam Presi
represented by the Senate President, and the
dent. In the proposed draft for Section 5 of
the Honorable de los Reyes, he employed
House of Representatives by the Speaker — of
the phrase "BECOMES PERMANENTLY Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the constitu
DISABLED," I suppose this would refer to tional successor to the Presidency; and, (e) the
a physical disability, or does it also include manifestation of support by the Papal Nuncio,
mental disability? doyen of the diplomatic corps, and the recogni
tion and acceptance by world governments ofthe
MR. DE LOS REYES. It includes all Presidency of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. By
kinds of disabilities which will disable or virtue hereof, petitioner has lost all moral and
incapacitate the President or Vice-President legal authority to lead. Without the people, an
from the performance of his duties (emphasis effectively functioning cabinet, the military and
supplied). the police, with no recognition from Congress
Clearly, permanent disability in the sense and the international community, petitioner
it is conceptualized in the Constitution cannot had absolutely no support from and control of
realistically be given a restrictive and impracti the bureaucracy from within and from without.
cal interpretation as referring only to physical or In fact he had no more functioning government
mental incapacity, but must likewise cover other to speak of. It is in this context that petitioner
forms of incapacities of a permanent nature, e.g., was deemed to be absolutely unable to exercise
functional disability. Indeed, the end sought to or discharge the powers, duties and prerogatives
be achieved in inserting Sec. 8 of Art. VII in the of the Presidency.
Constitution must not be rendered illusory by
a strained interpretation fraught with consti
tutionally calamitous or absurd consequences. I vote to dismiss the petitions.
The present scenario confronting the Republic KAPUNAN, J.:
had been wisely foreseen and anticipated by the
framers, for after all, the 1987 Constitution was The core issue presented to the Court is
sired by People Power I. whether respondent Gloria.Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed the Presidency within the parameters
It may be asked: Was petitioner rendered of the Constitution.
permanently disabled as President by the cir
cumstances obtaining at the height of People The modes by which the Vice President suc
Power II as to justify the ascension of Mme. ceeds the President are set forth in Article VII,
Section 8 of the Constitution: (1) death, (2) per stepped down from the presidency. More impor
manent disability, (3) removal from office, and tantly, people power is not one ofthe modes pre
(4) resignation of the President. scribed by the Constitution to create a vacancy
in the office of the President.
Petitioner did not die. He did not suffer from o
permanent disability He was not removed from The Constitution prescribes that the sover
office because the impeachment proceedings eign power of the people is to be expressed prin
against him were aborted through no fault of his. cipally in the processes of election, referendum
and plebiscite. Thus, specifically, the provisions
Did petitioner resign as President? The po-
in Article XVII of the Constitution on Amend
nencia conceded that petitioner did not write any
ments or Revisions have been described as the
formal letter of resignation before he left Malaca
"constitution of sovereignty" because they define
nang Palace in the afternoon of January 20,2001,
the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty ofthe
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo How
people." As explained by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
ever, the ponencia held that petitioner resigned
from the Presidency as "determined from his acts a well-respected constitutionalist and member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior contemporary What is this "sovereign structure" on
and posterior facts and circumstances bearing which the new would be built? It is the amen
a material relevance on the issue." Among the datory and revision process originally sealed
"facts and circumstances" pointed to were the with the approval of the sovereign people.
so-called "people power" referring to the crowd The process prescribed in a constitution
that gathered at EDSA and Makati City, the is called the "constitution of sovereignty,"
withdrawal of support by the military and police distinguishing it from the "constitution of
forces from petitioner, the resignation of some of liberty" (the Bill of Rights). The amenda
ficials of the government, the incidents revealed tory and revision provisions are called the
in the diary of Executive Secretary Edgardo An
"constitution of sovereignty" because it is
gara, serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
through these provisions that the sovereign
and the press statement issued by petitioner at
people have allowed the expression of their
2:30 p.m. of January 20, 2001 before he and his
sovereign will through this constitution to be
family left Malacanang Palace.
canalized. And through this provision new
None of the foregoing "facts and circum changes are linked to the original expression
stances" clearly and unmistakably indicate that ofthe will ofthe founders ofthe Constitution.
petitioner resigned as President.
In other words, the amendatory provisions
To constitute a complete operative resigna are called a "constitution of sovereignty" because
tion of a public official, there must be: (1) the they define the constitutional meaning of "sov
intention to relinquish part ofthe term and (2) an ereignty of the people." Popular sovereignty, as
act of relinquishment. Intent connotes voluntari embodied in the Philippine Constitution, is not
ness and freedom ofchoice. With the impassioned extreme popular sovereignty.
crowd marching towards Malacanang Palace and
with the military and police no longer obeying When the people overwhelmingly ratified
petitioner, he was reduced to abject powerless- the Constitution on February 2,1987, they com
ness. In this sense, he was virtually forced out of mitted themselves to abide by its provisions. In
the Presidency. If intention to resign is a require effect, the Filipino people agreed to express their
ment sine qua non for a valid resignation, then sovereignty within the parameters defined by the
forced resignation or involuntary resignation, or Constitution. As an American professor on legal
^j resignation under duress, is no resignation at all. philosophy put it: "By ratifying the constitution
that included an explicit amendment process,
The use of "people power" and the with the sovereign people committed themselves to
drawal of military support mainly brought about following the rule of law, even when they wished
<M petitioner's ouster from power. This completely to make changes in the basic system of govern
negates any pretentions that he voluntarily ment." This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits I vote to DISMISS the petitions'.

on both our political institutions and ourselves,
hoping that democracies, historically always PARDO, J.:
turbulent, chaotic, and even despotic, might now I concur in the result. In the above cases,
become restrained, principled, thoughtful and the Court decided to dismiss the petitions. Con
tiiiiiiii
just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that sequently, the Court effectively declared that on
we made and promised to keep. And though a January 20, 2001, petitioner has resigned the
government of laws did not displace governance office ofthe president. Thus, then Vice President
by men, it did mean that now men, democratic GloriaMacapagal-Arroyosucceeded to the presi
men, would try to live by their word. dency in a manner prescribed in the Constitution.
She is a dejure president. I only wish to add that
petitioner was "constrained to resign" the office.
However, I share my colleagues' opinion It has been held that "resignation is defined as
that respondent Arroyo is now the recognized the act of giving up or the act of»an officer by
legitimate President. It is an irreversible fact. which he declines his office and renounces the
She has taken her oath as President before the further right to use it. To constitute a complete
Chief Justice on 20 January 2001. Since then and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relin
Ms. Arroyo has continuously discharged the
quish or surrender his position accompanied by
functions ofthe President. Her assumption into
the act of relinquishment." Petitioner's act of
power and subsequent exercise ofthe powers and
"resignation," however, was done in light of the
performance of the duties attaching to the said reality that he could no longer exercise the pow
position have been acquiesced in by the Legisla ers and duties ofthe presidency and lefi "the seat
tive Branch of government. of the presidency of this county, for the sake of
The Senate President and the Speaker ofthe peace and in order to begin the healing process
House of Representatives executed a Joint State of our nation."
iiiiiiiii ment of Support and Recognition of respondent Hence, the succession to the presidency of
Arroyo as petitioner's constitutional successor. then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
The Senate and the House of Representatives on January 20, 2001, was in accordance with
passed their respective Resolutions expressing the Constitutional prescription. She was the
support to the Arroyo administration. Congress Vice-President of the Philippines elected in the
confirmed the nomination of Senator Teofisto May 11, 1998 elections, proclaimed by Congress
Guingona, Jr. as the new Vice-President, thus ac on the basis of the certificates of canvass duly
knowledging respondent Arroyo's assumption to certified by the Board of Canvassers of each prov
the presidency in a permanent capacity. The Im ince, city and district showing that she garnered
peachment Court has resolved that its existence 12,667,252 million votes.
has ceased by becoming functus officio in view of
petitioner's relinquishment of the presidency.
I also join Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his
As President, Ms. Arroyo has gained control separate concurring opinion.
over all the executive departments, bureaus and
officers and is the acknowledged Commander-
in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philip
pines. Her administration has, likewise, been
The Philippines is a democratic and republi
recognized by numerous members of the inter
can State. Sovereignty resides in the people and
national community of nations, including Japan, all government authority emanates from them.
Australia, Canada, Spain, the United States, the
ASEAN countries, as well as 90 major political However, I am constrained to write this sepa
parties in Europe, North America, Asia and Af rate concurring opinion to express my concern
rica. More importantly, a substantial number of and disquietude regarding the use of "people
Filipinos have already acquiesced in her leader power" to create a vacancy in the presidency.
ship. The Court can do no less.
It cannot be overlooked that this Court's SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

legitimation through sufferance ofthe changeof I concur in the result of the Decision of the
jjjjAjJ
administration may have the effect of encourag Court.
ingPeople Power Three, People Power Four, and
People Power ad infinitum. It will promote the
use of force and mob coercion by activist groups I am, therefore, constrained to write this
expertin propagandawarfare to intimidate gov separate opinion to express my views on the
ernment officials to resolve national problems basic issue of whether or not petitioner Estrada
fiffiii
only in the way the group wants them to be resigned as President ofthe Philippines.
settled. Even now, this Court is threatened with
the use of mob action if it does not immediately
proclaim respondent Arroyo as a permanent It is a cardinal principle in Public Officers
m> and dejure President, brought to power through Law that a resignation must be voluntary and
constitutionally validmethods and constitutional willingly. It must also be express and definite.A
succession. Totallybaseless charges ofbribery in resignationevenifclear and unequivocal, if made
incredibly fantastic amounts are being spread under duress, is voidable and may be repudiated.
by malicious and irresponsible rumormongers.
People power to pressure Cabinet members,
Congress, government officials and even this However, the legality or illegality of peti
Court is becoming a habit. It should not be tioner's so called resignation has been laid to rest
stamped with legitimacy by this Court. by the results that have takenplacerRespondent
Arroyo immediately took her oath as President
j^:î of the Republic of the Philippines before Chief
I wish to emphasize that nothing that has Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. On January 24,
been said in these proceedingscan be construed 2001,the HouseofRepresentatives issued House
as a declaration that people power may validly Resolution No. 175 expressing its full support to
interrupt and lawfully abort on-going impeach her administration. Likewise, twelve members of
ment proceedings. There is nothing in the Con the Senate signed a Resolution recognizing and
stitution to legitimizethe ouster ofan incumbent expressing support to the new governmentand
President through means that are unconstitu
tional or extra-constitutional. The constitutional
ofPresident Arroyo. Moreover, the international
principle that sovereignty resides in the people community has likewise recognized the legiti
refers to the exercise of sovereign power within macy of her government.
the bounds ofthat same Constitution, not outside Under the circumstances, this Court has to
or against it. declare as a fact what in fact exists. Respondent
GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo is the dejurePresident
While I am against the resort to mob rule as a of the Republic of the Philippines. •
means ofintroducing change in government, the
peculiar circumstances in the case at bar compel B. Estrada v. Arroyo
me to agree that respondent Arroyo rightfully G.R. No. 146738, April 3, 2001
assumed the presidency as the constitutionally
anointed successor to the office vacated by peti RECONSIDERATION
tioner. There was at that time an urgent need
for the immediate exercise of presidential func PUNO, J.:
tions, powers and prerogatives. The vacancy in
the highest office was created when petitioner,
succumbing to the overwhelming tumult in the II
streets as well as the rapidly successive deser Evidentiary Issues
tions and defections ofhis cabinet secretaries and
military officers, leftMalacanang Palace "for the Petitioner devotes a large part of his argu
sake ofpeace and in order to begin the healing ments onthe allegedimproperuse by this Court
process of our nation." ofthe Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of
L
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT * 393
the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed
of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation even if they are based on hearsay erroneously
violates the rule against the admission of hearsay admitted, or admitted because no objection
evidence^- was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the
452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985). (hearsay evi
Angara Diary is not an out of court statement.
dence alone can support a verdict). Although
volumes have been written suggesting ways
The Angara Diary is part ofthe pleadings in the
to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates
cases of bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was
a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence.
not furnished a copy ofthe Angara Diary. Nor can
Indeed, the decided historical trend has been
he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said
to exclude categories of highly probative
Diary was frequently referred to by the parties
statements from the definition of hearsay
in their pleadings. The three parts of the Diary
(sections 2 and:3, infra), and to develop more
published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001
class exceptions to the hearsay rale (sections
were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of
4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have
the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo
added to their rules the residual, or catch
sga
T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001.
all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal
The second and third parts of the Diary were
Rules which authorize the admission of hear
earlier- also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of
say that does not satisfy a class exception,
the Comment of private respondents Capulong,
provided it is adequately trustworthy and
et al., dated February 12,2001. In fact, petitioner
probative (section 12, infra).
even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply
Memorandum both the second part ofthe diary, Moreover, some commentators believe that
t^yj published on February 5, 2001, and the third the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether
part, published on February 6, 2001. It was instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The
also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules,
Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980)
petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the (footnotes omitted):
use ofthe Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara that '[ajlthough relevant, evidence may be
Diary was an out of court statement, still its use excluded if its probative value is substan
is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is tially outweighed by the danger of unfair
called hearsay when its probative force depends, prejudice.' Under this structure, exclusion
in whole or in part, on the competency and cred is justified by fears of how the jury will be
ibility of some persons other than the witness influenced by the evidence. However, it is not
by whom it is sought to produce it. There are traditional to think of hearsay as merely a
three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: subdivision of this structure, and the Fed
SO
(1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of eral Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that
demeanor evidence; and (3) absence ofthe oath. manner. Prejudice refers to the jury's use of
Not all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmis evidence for inferences other than those for
sible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body which the evidence is legally relevant; by
of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts contract, the rule against hearsay questions
due to their relevance, trustworthiness and ne the jury's ability to evaluate the strength of
cessity. The emergence of these exceptions and a legitimate inference to be drawn from the
their wide spread acceptance is well-explained evidence. For example, were a judge to ex
by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as clude testimony because a witness was par
follows: ticularly smooth or convincing, there would
be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jury's
xxx xxx xxx
function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized
On the other hand, we all make decisions by the evidence rules, such as those stem
in our everyday lives on the basis of other ming from racial or religious biases or from
persons' accounts of what happened, and the introduction ofphotographs of a victim's
fca)
final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the ary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130
basis of misperception strikes at the root of provides that "the act, declaration or omission
the jury's function, by usurping its power to of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
process quite ordinary evidence, the type of evidence against him." It has long been settled
information routinely encountered by jurors that these admissions are admissible even if they
in their everyday lives. are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the
Court of Appeals cites the various authorities
xxx xxx xxx
who explain why admissions are not covered by
Since virtually all criteria seeking to the hearsay rule .. .
distinguish between good and bad hearsay
are either incoherent, inconsistent, or inde
terminate, the only alternative to a general The Angara Diary contains direct state
sa) rule of admission would be an absolute rule ments of petitioner wnich can be categorized as
of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap
important, the assumptions necessary to presidential election where he would not be a
justify a rule against hearsay... seem insup candidate; his statement that he only wanted the
portable and, in any event, are inconsistent five-dayperiod promised by Chief of StaffAngelo
with accepted notions of the function of the Reyes; his statements that he would leave by
jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be Monday if the second envelope would be opened
abolished, by Monday and "Pagodna pagod na ako. Ayoko
na, masyado^nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
Some support for this view can be found red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired.
in the limited empirical research now avail I don't want any more of this — it's too painful.
able — which is, however, derived from I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
simulations — that suggests that admitting intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I
hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes will go." We noted that days before, petitioner
sit)
because jurors discount the value of hearsay has repeatedly declared that he would not resign
evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Research despite the growing clamor for his resignation.
ing the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, The reason for the meltdown is obvious — his
General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 will not to resign has wilted.
Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Bor- It is, however, argued that the Angara Di
gidas, Jury DecisionMaking and the Evalu ary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
ation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. non-binding on him. The argument overlooks
683 (1992); Kovera, Park & Penrod, Jurors' the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive
Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evi admission is a party's reaction to a statement or
dence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman action by another person when it is reasonable
& Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Em to treat the party's reaction as an admission of
pirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition something stated or implied by the other person.
of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 ... In the Angara Diary, the options of the peti
Law & Psychol.Rev. 65 (1991). tioner started to dwindle when the armed forces
Others, even if they concede that restrictions withdrew its support from him as President and
commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary
on hearsay have some utility, question whether
Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
the benefits outweigh the cost...
advise petitioner to consider the option of"digni
fied exit or resignation." Petitioner did not object
to the suggested option but simply said he could
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem
SiJ never leave the country. Petitioner's silence on
requires that wefurther determine whether the
this and other related suggestions can be taken
hearsay evidenceis one exempted from the rules
as an admission by him.
of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of
laj our rules of exclusion will show that they do not Petitioner further contends that the use of
cover admissions of a party and the Angara Di the Angara Diary against him violated the rule
ARTICLE Vn: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 395
on res inter a/ios acta. The rule is expressed in ofthe Senate is the political question which this
section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: Court cannot review.
'The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, except We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest
petitioner forgets, he himself made the submis
as hereinafter provided." .
sion in G.R. No. 146738 that "Congress has the
ss*
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The ultimate authority urfder the Constitution to
res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. determine whether the President is incapable of
One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule performing his functions in the manner provided
130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner for in section 11 of Article VH." We sustained
or agent. this submission and held that by its many acts,
Congress has already determined and dismissed
Executive Secretary Angara as such was
the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern
ia) an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the peti
aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its
tioner to act for him in the critical hours and days
power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress
before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. Thus,
mi from Congress itself. The power is conceded by
according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged
told Secretary Angara: "Mula umpisapa long ng erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na longpinakikinggan ko. Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as
At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa Yin."... our de jure president made by Congress is un
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of questionably a political judgment. It is significant
an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases
principal (petitioner).. . . of its judgment such factors as the " people's loss
of confidence on the ability of former President
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern"
i£$i
not cover independently relevant statements. and the "members of the international commu
These are statements which are relevant inde nity had extended their recognition of Her Ex
pendently of whether they are true or not. They cellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements of the Republic of the Philippines" and it has a
which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those constitutional duty "of fealty to the supreme will
statements which are circumstantial evidence of ofthe people..." This political judgment may be
the facts in issue.... right or wrong but Congress is answerable only
to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to
be debated before the tribunal of the people and
III not before a court of justice. Needless to state,
the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an
Temporary Inability insuperable bar against this Court's interposition
Petitioner argues that the Court misinter of its power of judicial review to review the judg
preted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of ment of Congress rejecting petitioner's claim that
the Constitution in that Congress can only decide he is still the President, albeit on leave and that
the issue of inability when there is a variance respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet Petitioner attempts to extricate himselffrom
%#) and the President. The situation presents itself his submission that Congress has the ultimate
when majority of the Cabinet determines that authority to determine his inability to govern,
the President is unable to govern; later, the and whose determination is a political question
Presidentinforms Congress that his inabilityhas by now arguing that whether one is a dejure or de
ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the facto President is a judicial question. Petitioner's
members ofthe Cabinet. It is also urged that the change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at
President's judgment that heis unable to govern all impress. The cases at bar do not present the
iiiiiiJ temporarily which is thereafter communicated general issue ofwhether the respondent Arroyo
to the Speaker of the House and the President is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific
V
iigl
issues were raised to the Court for resolution "Joint Statement of Support and Rec
and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the ognition from the Senate President and the
issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII Speaker of the House of Representatives
of the Constitution, we held that the issue is le We, the elected leaders ofthe Senate and
gal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from the House of Representatives, are calledupon
office before respondent Arroyo took her oath to address the constitutional crisis affecting
as President. On the issue of inability to govern the authority of the President to effectively
under section 11, Article VII ofthe Constitution, govern our distressed nation. We under
we held that Congress has the ultimate author stand that the Supreme Court at that time
te> ity to determine the question as opined by the is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing
petitioner himself and that the determination this political reality. While we may differ on
of Congress is a political judgment which this the means to effect a change of leadership,
^£) Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur we however, cannot be indifferent and must
these specific rulings by the generalization that act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn
whether one is a dejure or de facto President is duty to represent our peopleand in pursuit of
a judicial question. our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we,
Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for the Senate President and the Speaker ofthe
House of Representatives, hereby declare our
its various acts expressed thru resolutions which
support and recognition to the constitutional
brushed offhis temporary inability to govern and
successor to the Presidency. We similarly call
President-on-leave argument. He asserts that
on all sectors to close ranks despite our politi
these acts of Congress should not be accorded any-
cal differences. May God Bless our nation in
legalsignificance because: (1) they are post facto this period of new beginnings.
and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity
cannot be implied. Mabuhay ang Pilipinas at ang mama-
mayang Pilipino.
Wedisagree. There is nothing in section11of
Article VII ofthe Constitution which states that (Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.
the declaration by Congress of the President's Senate President
inability must always be a priori or before the
Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the (Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
cases at bar, special consideration should be Speaker ofthe House ofRepresentatives"
givento the fact that the events which ledto the
resignation ofthe petitioner happened at express This a priori recognition by the President
speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
was then not in session and had no reasonable Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the
opportunity to act a priori on petitioner's letter "constitutional successor to the presidency" was
claiminginability to govern. Tobe sure, however, followed post facto by various resolutions of the
the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this
President ofthe Senate, the Honorable Aquilino recognition....
Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker ofthe House
lg£)
of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P.
Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as VI
the "constitutional successor to the presidency" Recusation
postfacto. Petitioner himselfstates that hisletter
alleging his inability to govern wasdeceivedby Finally, petitioner prays that "the members
the Officeofthe Speaker on January 20, 2001 at of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put
8:30 A.M. and the Officeofthe Senate at 9 P.M. of on record who they were and consider recusing
the same day." Respondenttookher oath ofoffice orinhibitingthemselves, particularly those who
a few minutes past 12 o'clock in the afternoon had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pres
of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate sure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in
(g>
President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for
had prepared a Joint Statement which states: the cold neutrality of impartial judges."
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS, VOTING
is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members SEPARATELY.
ofthe Court who merely accepted the invitation
ofthe respondent Arroyo to attend her oath tak SEC. 10. THE CONGRESS SHALL,
ing. As mere spectators of a historic even, said AT TEN O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING OF
members ofthe Court did not prejudge" the legal THE THIRD DAY AfTER THE VACANCY
basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the IN THE OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT
presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, AND VICE-PRESIDENT OCCURS, CON
the Court in its en banc resolution on January VENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES
•flfoi
22, 2001, the first working day after respondent WITHOUTNEED OF A CALL ANDWITHIN
Arroyo took her oath as President, held in Ad
SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING
FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION TO ELECT A
ministrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:
iliiiJ PRESIDENT AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN FORTY-
for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo FIVE DAYS NOR LATER THAN SIXTY
to Take her Oath of Office as President ofthe DAYS FROM THE TIME OF SUCH CALL.
Republic ofthe Philippines before the Chief THE BILL CALLING SUCH SPECIAL
Justice — Acting on the urgent request of ELECTION SHALL BE DEEMED CERTI
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to FIED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SECTION
be sworn in as President of the Republic of 26, ARTICLE VI OF THIS CONSTITUTION
the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Jus AND SHALL BECOME LAW UPON ITS
tice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, APPROVAL ON THIRD READING BY THE
dated January 20, 2001, which request was CONGRESS. APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE
treated as an administrative matter, the SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CHARGED
court Resolved unanimously to confirm the AGAINST ANY CURRENT APPROPRIA
authority given by the twelve (12) members TIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
ofthe Court then present to the Chief Justice THE REQUIREMENTS OF PARAGRAPH 4,
on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath SECTION 25, ARTICLE VI OF THIS CON
of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal- STITUTION. THE CONVENING OF THE
CONGRESS CANNOT BE SUSPENDED
Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at
NOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION POST
noon of January 20, 2001.
PONED. NO SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL
This resolution is without prejudice to BE CALLED IF THE VACANCY OCCURS
the disposition of any justiciable case that WITHIN EIGHTEEN MONTHS BEFORE
may be filed by a proper party." THE DATE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION.
£&1
SEC. 11. WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT
IN VIEW WHEREOF, PETITIONER'S TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF
G.R. NOS. 146710-15 AND HIS OMNIBUS THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS
fea MOTION IN G.R. NO. 146738 ARE DENIED WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE IS
FOR LACK OF MERIT. UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS
SEC. 9. WHENEVER THERE IS A VA
AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL
HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN
CANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-
DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY,
PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR
SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, THE PRESI
DISCHARGED BY THE VICE-PRESIDENT
i^j DENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE-PRESI
AS ACTING PRESIDENT.
DENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF ALL THE
RESENTATIVES WHO SHALL ASSUME MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT
tSJ
OFFICE UPON CONFIRMATION BY A MA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
JORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
L
OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN OF HIS HEALTH. THE MEMBERS OF THE

^pj
DiECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT CABINET IN CHARGE OF NATIONAL SE
IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POW CURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
ERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL IMMEDIATELY FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SHALL
ASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF NOT BE DENIED ACCESS TO THE PRESI
THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT. DENT DURING SUCH ILLNESS.
THEREAFTER, WHEN THE PRESI SEC. 13. THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRES
DENT TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT IDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET,
OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL NOT, UNLESS OTHERWISE PRO
HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT NO VIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD
$0
INABILITY EXISTS, HE SHALL REAS- ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT
SUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS DURING SAID TENURE. THEY SHALL
OFFICE. MEANWHILE, SHOULD A MA NOT, DURING THEIR TENURE, DIRECTLY
JORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE OR INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER
CABINET TRANSMIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN ANY
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE BUSINESS, OR BE FINANCIALLY INTER
AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE ESTED IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN
OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN ANY FRANCHISE, OR SPECIAL PRIVI
DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT LEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POW OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR
fijj&fl ERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUD
CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. ING ANY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CON
FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS TROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR
i£j
SHALL CONVENE, IF IT IS N&T IN SES SUBSIDIARIES. THEY SHALL STRICTLY
SION, WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, AVOID CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES AND
CONDUCT OF THEIR OFFICE.
WITHOUT NEED OF CALL.
THE SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY
IF THE CONGRESS, WITHIN TEN DAYS
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY WITHIN
AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST WRITTEN
THE FOURTH CIVIL DEGREE OF THE
DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT IN SESSION,
PRESIDENT SHALL NOT DURING HIS
WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER IT IS RE
QUIRED TO ASSEMBLE, DETERMINESBY TENURE BE APPOINTED AS MEMBERS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMIS
A TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES,
VOTING SEPARATELY, THAT THE PRESI SIONS, OR THE OFFICE OF THE OM
DENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE BUDSMAN, OR AS SECRETARIES, UNDER
POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, SECRETARIES, CHAIRMEN OR HEADS
THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS OF BUREAUS OR OFFICES, INCLUD
PRESIDENT; OTHERWISE, THE PRESI ING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CON
DENT SHALL CONTINUE EXERCISING TROLLED CORPORATIONS AND THEIR
THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OF SUBSIDIARIES.
FICE.
1. Prohibitions.
1. Temporary diability.
A. Doromal v. Sandiganbayan
A. Estrada v. Desierto 177 SCRA 354 (1989)
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
(See supra, under Sec. 8) GRINO-AQUINO, J.: •
SEC. 12. IN CASE OF SERIOUS ILL

NESS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PUBLIC Complying with that Memorandum, a new
SHALL BE INFORMED OF THE STATE information, duly approved by the Ombudsman,
was filed in the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case the prohibition inthe Civil Service Law (PD No
No. 12893), alleging that:
807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that"pursuit of private
"x x x, the above-named accused [Do business xxx without the permission required
romal], a public officer, being then a Com by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be
missioner of the Presidential Commission ground for disciplinary action against any officer
on Good Government, did then and there or employee in the civil^service.
willfully and unlawfully, participate in a
businessthrough the Doromal International
Trading Corporation, a family corporation of
which he is the President, and which com B. Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
pany participated in the biddings conducted Secretary
by the Department of Education, Culture G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
and Sports and the National Manpower &
Youth Council, which actorparticipation is FERNAN, C.J.:
prohibited by law and the constitution." (p.
68, Rollo; italics supplied.) These two (2) petitions were consolidated per
resolution dated August 9, 1988 and are being
resolved jointlyas both seek a declaration ofthe
There is no merit in petitioner's insistence unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
that the information should bequashed because issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July
the Special Prosecutor admitted inthe Sandigan 25,1987. The pertinent provisions ofthe assailed
Executive Order are:
bayan that he does not possess any document
signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or
petitioner after he became PCGG Commissioner by the ordinary functions of his position, a
(p. 49, Rollo). Thatadmission allegedly belies the member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
averment in the information that the petitioner assistant secretary or other appointive of
"participated" in the business of the DITC in ficials ofthe Executive Department may, in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or addition* to his primary position, hold not
by law from having any interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA more than two positions in the government
\m No. 3019).
and government corporations and receive
The Sandiganbayan it its order of August the corresponding compensation therefor;
19, 1988 correctly observed that "the presence Provided, that thislimitation shall notapply
of a signed document bearing the signature of to ad hodbodies or committees, or to boards,
accused Doromal as part of the application to councils or bodies of which the President is
bid x x x x is not a sine qua non" (Annex 0, p. the Chairman.
^j 179, Rollo), for, the Ombudsman indicated in his SECTION 2. If a memberofthe cabinet,
Memorandum/Clearance to the Special Prosecu undersecretary or assistant secretary or
tor, that the petitioner"canrightfully becharged other appointive official of the Executive
xxx with having participated in a business Department holds more positions than what
which act is absolutelyprohibited by Section 13 is allowed in Section1hereof, they (sic) must
of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the relinquish the excess position in favor of
DITC remained a family corporation in which the subordinate official who is next in rank,
Doromal has at least an indirect interest." (pp. but in no case shall any official hold more
107-108, Rollo). than two positions other than his primary
position.
Section 13, Article VII ofthe 1987 Constitu
tion provides that "the President, Vice-President, SECTION 3. In order to fully protect
the members ofthe Cabinetand their deputiesor the interest of the government in govern
assistants shall not xxx during (their) tenure, x ment-owned or controlled corporations, at
x x directly or indirectly xxx participate in any least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
business." The constitutional ban is similar to boards of such corporation should either be
a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant VII or the Secretary of Justice being designate!

secretary. an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Ba:
Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8(1). Publi.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive
respondents, on the other hand, maintain tha
Order which, in effect, allows members of the
the phrase "unless otherwise provided in th«
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes
secretaries to hold other government offices or
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B inso
positions in addition to their primary positions,
far as the appointive officials mentioned thereii
albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed,
are concerned.
runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, The threshold question therefore is: doe.1
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of th<
.1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive their deputies or assistants are concerned ad
Order No. 284 is being challenged by petition mit ofthe broad exceptions made for appointiv<
ers on the principal submission that it adds officials in general under Section 7, par. (2)
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than Article LX-B which, for easy reference is quotec
those provided in the Constitution. According to anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by lav
petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless oth or by the primary functions of his position, n<
erwise provided in this Constitution," the only appointive official shall hold any other office oi
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivi
employment in Government are those providedin sion, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President government-owned or controlled corporation oi
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet their subsidiaries."
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and We rule in the negative.
(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio mem
ber of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of A foolproof yardstick in constitutional con
Section 8 (1), Article VIII. struction is the intention underlying the provi
sion under consideration. Thus, it has been helc
Petitioners further argue that the exception that the Court in construing a Constitutior
to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article should bear in mind the object sought to be ac
LX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies complished by its adoption, and the evils, if any.
to officers and employees of the Civil Service in sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
general and that said exceptions do not apply provision will be examined in the light of the
and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article history of the times, and the condition and cir
VII which applies specifically to the President, cumstances under which the Constitution was
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
their deputies or assistants. which induced the framers ofthe Constitution tc
There is no dispute that the prohibition enact the particular provision and the purpose
against the President, Vice-President, the mem sought to be accomplished thereby, in order tc
construe the whole as to make the words conso
bers of the Cabinet and their deputies or assis
nant to that reason and calculated to effect that
tants from holding dual or multiple positions in
the Government admits of certain exceptions. purpose.2
The disagreement between petitioners and pub The practice of designating members of the
lic respondents lies on the constitutional basis Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as mem
of the exception. Petitioners insist that because bers ofthe governing bodies or boards ofvarious
ofthe phrase "unless otherwise provided in this government agencies and instrumentalities,
Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, including government-owned and controlled
the exception must be expresslyprovided in the corporations, became prevalent during the time
Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President
§j&i
beingallowed tobecome a Member ofthe Cabinet 2Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L.
under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article Ed. 597.
sij
legislative powers in this country were exer with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite
cised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos inevitable and in consonance with the over
£f?l
pursuant to his martial law authority. There whelmingsentiment ofthe peoplethat the 1986
was a-proliferation of newly-created agencies, Constitutional Commission, convened as it was
instrumentalities and government-owned and after the people successfully unseated former
controlled corporations created by presidential President Marcos, should draft into its proposed
decrees and other modes of presidential issu Constitution the provisions under consideration
ances wh,ere Cabinet members, their deputies which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct,
or assistants were designated to head or sit as the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
members of the board with the corresponding governmental offices and employment. In fact, as
salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
and other perquisites of office. Most of these during the deliberations in these cases, one of
im instrumentalities have remained up to the pres the strongest selling points ofthe 1987 Constitu
ent time. tion during the campaign for its ratification was
the assurance given by its proponents that the
This practice of holding multiple offices or
scandalous practice ofCabinetmembers holding
•'ml positions in the government soon ledtoabuses by multiple positions in the government and col
unscrupulous publicofficials whotookadvantage lecting unconscionably excessive compensation
of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. therefrom would be discontinued.
,»j In fact, the holdingofmultiple offices in govern
ment was strongly denounced on the floor of the But what is indeed significant is the fact that
Batasang Pambansa.3 This condemnation came although Section 7,Article TX^B already contains
in reaction to the published report of the Com a blanket prohibitionagainst the holdingofmul
mission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary An tiple offices or employment in the government
nual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and subsuming both elective and appointive public
Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards officials, the Constitutional Commission should
\M and Commissions" which carried as its Figure see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
No. 4 a "Roster of Membership in Governing ArticleVII,specifically prohibiting the President,
Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,their
Corporations as of December 31. 1983." deputies and assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure, unless
Particularly odious and revolting to the otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
people'ssense of propriety and morality in gov
ernment service were the data contained therein Evidently, from this move as well as in the
that Roberto V.Ongpinwas a memberofthe gov different phraseologies ofthe constitutional pro
erning boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental visions in question, the intent of the framers of
agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibi
Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E. tion on the President and his official familyin so
far as holding other offices or employment in the
A.Virata oftwenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr.
government or elsewhere is concerned.
offifteen (15);Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z.
m Velasco, offourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea Moreover, such intent is underscored by
of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with
Rono of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gil- other provisions of the Constitution on the.
berto 0. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of disqualifications of certain public officials
eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro or employees from holding other offices or
Q. Pena often (10) each.4 employment. Under Section 13, Article VI,
"(N)o Senator or Member of the House of
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved Representative may hold any other office or
into one of the serious causes of discontent employment in the Government . . ." Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the
armed forces in the active service shall, at
*R. B. No. 95, Monday, March 11, 1985, Record of the
Batasan,Volume IV,pp. 835-836. any time, be appointed in any capacity to a
4pp. 11-14. civilian position in the Government, including
Sail
government-owned or controlled corporations patedreportonthe Executive Department. Com

or anyoftheir subsidiaries." Even Section 7(2), missioner Foz commented, "We actually have to
Article IX-B, relied uponbyrespondentsprovides be stricter with the President and the members
"(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the of the Cabinet because they exercise more pow
primary functions ofhis position, noappointive ers and, therefore, more checks and restraints
officialshall hold any other officeor employment on them are called for because there is more
in the Government." possibility of abuse in their case."6
It is quite notable that in all these provi Thus, while all other appointive officials in
sions on disqualifications to hold other office the civil service are allowed to hold other office
or employment, the prohibition pertains to an or employment in the government during their
office or employment in the government and tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
government-owned or controlled corporations primary functions of their positions, members
or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
wording ofSection 13, Article VII which states may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
that "(T)he President, Vice-President, theMem Article IX-B is meantto lay down the general rule
bers ofthe Cabinet, and their deputies or assis applicable to "all e&ê-^njrapjpedntive public
tants shall not, unless otherwise providedin this" officials and employees, while Section13,Article
Constitution, hold any other office or employment VII is meant to be the exception applicable only
during their tenure." In thelatter provision, the to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
disqualification isabsolute, notbeing qualified by the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
thephrase "in theGovernment." The prohibition
imposed on the President and hisofficial family This being the case, the qualifying phrase
is therefore all-embracing and covers both public "unlessotherwise providedin this Constitution"
and private office or employment. in Section 13,Article VII cannot possiblyrefer to
the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Going furtherintoSection 13, Article VII, the Article LX-B ofthe 1987 Constitution. To construe
second sentenceprovides: "They shallnot,during said qualifying phrase as respondents would
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any have us do, would render nugatory and mean
other profession, participatein anybusiness, or ingless the manifest intent and purpose of the
be financially interested in any contract with, framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
by the Government or any subdivision, agency Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
or instrumentality thereof, including govern assistants with respect to holding other offices
fcjfrl ment-owned or controlled corporations or their or employment in the government during their
subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing tenure. Respondents' interpretationthat Section
prohibitions imposed on the President and his of 13 ofArticle VII admits ofthe exceptions found in
ficial family, which prohibitions arenot similarly Section 7,par. (2) ofArticleIX-B would obliterate
imposed on other public officials or employees the distinction so carefully set by the framers of
such as the Members of Congress, members of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking of
the civil service in general and members of the ficials ofthe ExecutiveBranch fromthe President
armed forces, are proofofthe intent ofthe 1987 to Assistant Secretary, on the onehand, and the
Constitution to treat the President and his of generality ofcivil servants from therankimme
ficial family as a class by itself and to impose diately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on
uponsaid class stricter prohibitions. the other, may hold any other office or position
in the government during their tenure.
Such intent ofthe 1986 Constitutional Com
missionto be stricter with the President and his Moreover, respondents'readingofthe provi
official family was also succinctly articulated by sions in question would render certain parts of
Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner the Constitution inoperative. This observation
Regalado Maambong noted during the floor delib applies particularly to the Vice-President who,
erations and'debate that there was no symmetry
between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally 6Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol.
found in the General Provisions and the antici I, p. 553.
&&1
L
ARTICLE VTI: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 403
under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold Since the. evident purpose of the framers
other office or employment when so authorized of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
by the Constitution, but whoas an electivepublic prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
officia^.under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B is members of the Cabinet, their deputies and as
absolutelyineligible"forappointment or designa sistants with respect to holding multiple offices
tion in any capacity to any public office or position or employment in thet government during their
during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase tenure, the exception to this prohibition must
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" be read with equal severity. On its face, the lan
found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to guageofSection 13,ArticleVII is prohibitory so
Section 7. par. (1) of Article IX-B would render
that it must be understood as intended to be a
meaningless the specific provisions of the Consti
positive and unequivocal negationofthe privilege
tution authorizing the Vice-President to become
ofholding multiple government offices or employ
a member ofthe Cabinet6 and to act as President
ment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood
the President shall not have chosen or fails to
qualify.7 Such absurd consequence can be avoided as intended to be a positive and unequivocal ne
only by interpreting the two provisions under gation.12 The phrase "unless otherwise provided
consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of in this Constitution" must be given a literal
Article IX-B providing the general rule and the interpretation to refer only to those particular
other, i.e., Section 13,Article VII as constituting instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
the exception thereto. In the same manner must the Vice-President being appointed as a member
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article
vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII. VII; or actmg as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),Article
It is a well-established rule in constitutional VII; and, the Secretary ofJustice being ex-officio
construction that no one provision ofthe Consti member ofthe Judicial and Bar Council byvirtue
tution is to be separated from all the others, to of Section 8(1), Article VIII.
|g«i be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be The prohibition against holding dual or
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to multiple offices or employment under Section
effectuate the great purposes ofthe instrument.8 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not,
Sections bearing on a particular, subject should however, be construed as applying to posts oc
be considered and interpreted together as to ef cupied by the Executive officials specified therein
fectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution9 without additional compensation in an ex-officio
and one section is not to be allowed to defeat capacity as provided by law and as required13
another, if by any reasonable construction, the by the primary functions of said officials' office.
two can be made to stand together.10 The reason is that these posts do not comprise
In other words, the court must harmonize "any other office" within the contemplation of
them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a the constitutional prohibition but are properly
construction which will render every word opera an imposition of additional duties and functions
tive, rather than one which may make the words on said officials.14 To characterize these posts
idle and nugatory.11 otherwise would lead to absurd consequences,
among which are: The President of the Philip
pines cannot chair the National Security Council
6Sec. 3, Ibid.
7Sec. 7, Article VII.
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (De-
"Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S.
8, 51 L Ed 345, 27 S Ct 236; Wallace v. Payne, 197 Cal 539,
241 P. 879. 12Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky 596; 6 S. W. 457; Hunt v.
9Grantz v. Grauman (Ky) 320 SW 2d 364; Runyon v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3 S. W. 233.
Smith, 308 Ky 73, 212 SW 2d 521. l3As opposed to the term "allowed" used in Section 7,
"People v. Wright, 6 Col. 92. par. (2),Article IX-Bofthe Constitution, which is permissive.
"Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional "Required" suggests an imposition,and therefore, obligatory
Limitations, Vol.I, p. 128,citing Attorney-General v. Detroit in nature.
and Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 114; People v. Burns, 5 "Martin v. Smith, 140 A. L. R. 1073; Ashmore v. Greater
Mich. 114; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa 262. Greenville Sewer District, 173 A. L. R. 407.
cember24,1986). Neither can'the Vice-President, authority than that conferred by the office."18
the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
'$$4
National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employ member by virtue of his title to a certain office,
ment and Local Government sit in this Council, and without further warrant or appointment.19
which would then have no reason to exist for lack To illustrate, by express provision of law, the
of a chairperson and members. The respective Secretary of Transportation and Communica
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries would tions is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of
also be prohibited. the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light
Rail Transit Authority.20
The Secretary of Labor and Employment can
not chair the Board of Trustees of the National The Court had occasion to explain the
Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administra Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspec
tion (POEA), both of which are attached to his tion Board,21 thus: "An examination of section
department forpolicy coordinationand guidance. 2 of the questioned statute (R. A. 3137) reveals
Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant that for the chairman and members ofthe Board
tftiij
Secretaries chair these agencies. to qualify they need only be designated by the
respective department heads. With the exception
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget can of the representative from tlie private sector,
not sit in the Monetary Board.15 Neither can they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they
their respective undersecretaries and assistant must already be holding positions in the offices
secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one
then be assisted by lower ranking employees in who does not hold a previous appointment in the
providing policydirection in the areas of money, Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be
banking and credit.16 designated a representative from that office. The
same is true with respect to the representatives
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could
from the other offices. No new appointments are
l'm\ not have intended such absurd consequences. A
necessary. This i3 as it should be, because the
Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative
representatives so designated merely perform
charter of government, is not to be interpreted as duties in the Board in addition to those already
demanding the impossible or the impracticable: performed under theiroriginal appointments.'"2
and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if
possible, should be avoided.17 The term "primary" used to describe "func
tions" refers to the order of importance and thus
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section means chiefor principal function. The term is not
13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as cover restricted to the singular but may refer to the
ing positions held without additional compensa plural.23 The additional duties must not only be
tion in ex-officio capacities as provided by law closely related to, but must be required by the
iiiflj
and as required by the primary functions of the official's primary functions. Examples of designa
concerned official's office. The term ex-officio tions to positions by virtue ofone's primary func
means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers tions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget
to an "authority derived from official character sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and
merely, not expressly conferred upon the indi the Secretary ofTransportation and Communica
vidual character, but rather annexed to the of tion acting as Chairman ofthe Maritime Industry
ficial position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act Authority24 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
done in an official character, or as a consequence
of office, and without any other appointment or "Black's Law Dictionary, p. 516; 15A Words and
Phrases, p. 392.
"Executive Order No. 16, May 9, 1986, 82 0. G, 2117. ,915A Words and Phrases, p. 392.
l6Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. êc. 1, E.O. 210.
,7Hirabayash'i v.United States, 320 U. S. 81, 87L. Ed. 2,21 SCRA 336 (1967).
1774, 63S. Ct. 1375; OppCottonMills, Inc.v.Administrator 22Italics supplied.
ofWage and Hour Div., 312 U. S. 126, 85 L. Ed. 624, 61 S. M33A Wordsand Phrases, p. 210,citing CollectorofRev
Ct. 524; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal 2d 794, 174P 2d 287, cited enue v. LouisianaReady Mix Co.,La. app., 197S. 2d 141,145.
in 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 100, 464. 24Sec. 7, P. D. No. 474.
fad!)
ARTICLE VU: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 405
Ifthefunctions required tobeperformed are who is toperform the same in an ex-officio capac
merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, ity as provided by law, without receiving any
incompatible, orotherwise alien to the primary additional compensation therefor.
function of a cabinet official, such additional
functions would fall under the purview of "any The ex oficio position being actually and in
other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An legal contemplation partofthe principal office, it
example would be the Press Undersecretary follows that the official concerned has no right to
sitting as a member of the Board of the Philip receive additional compensation for his services
pine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The in the said position. True reason is that these
same rule applies to such positions which confer services arealready paid for and covered by the
on the cabinet official management functions compensation attached to his principaloffice. It
and/or monetary compensation, such as but not should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
limited to chairmanships or directorships in Finance attends ameetingofthe Monetary Board
government-owned or controlled corporations asanex oficio member thereof, heis actually and
and their subsidiaries. in legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining policy
Mandating additional duties and functions in monetary and banking matters, which come
to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Mem under the jurisdiction of his department. For
bers, their deputies or assistants which are not such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
inconsistent with those already prescribed by collect any extra compensation, whetherit be in
their offices or appointments by virtue of their the form of a per diem or.an-honorarium or an
special knowledge, expertise and skill in their allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
respective executive offices is a practice long- whatever name it is designated, such additional
recognized in manyjurisdictions. It is a practice compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
justified by the demands ofefficiency, policy di
rection, continuity and coordination among the It is interestingto notethat duringthe floor
different offices in the Executive Branch in the deliberations on the proposal of Commissioner
discharge ofits multifarious tasks ofexecuting Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2),
and implementing laws affecting national in Article LX-B, originally found as Section 3 ofthe
terest and general welfare and delivering basic General Provisions, the exception "unless re
services to the people. It is consistent with the quired bythefunctions ofhisposition,"26 express
power vestedonthe President and his alter egos, reference to certain high-ranking appointive
the Cabinet members, to have control of all the • public officialslike members ofthe Cabinet were
executive departments, bureaus and offices and made.27 Respondingto a query of Commissioner
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.25 Bias Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out
Without these additional duties and functions that there are instances when although not
being assigned to the President and his official requiredby current law, membership ofcertain
family to sit in the governing bodies or boards high-ranking executive officials in other offices
of governmental agencies or instrumentalities and corporations is necessary by reason ofsaid
in an ex-offickt capacity as provided bylaw and officials' primary functions. The example given
as required by their primary functions, they by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of
would be deprived ofthe means for control and Trade and Industry.28
supervision, thereby resulting in an unwieldy While this exchange between Commission
and confused bureaucracy. ers Monsod and Ople may be used as authority
It bears repeating though that in order that for saying that additional functions and duties
such additional duties or functions may not flowing from the primary functions ofthe official
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such 26The phrase that appears in the Constitution is not "Un
additional duties orfunctions must be required less required by the primary functions" but "Unless otherwise
by theprimary functions ofthe official concerned, allowed by law or by the primary functions ..."
27Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol.
V, pp. 165-166.
"Section 17, Article VII. 28Italics supplied, Ibid., p. 165.
&sfrj
fe>
may be imposed upon him without offending the quired," asopposed to"allowed," by the primary
constitutional prohibition under consideration, it functions may be considered as notconstituting
&ii!i) cannot, however, be taken asauthority for saying "any other office."
that this exception is byvirtue ofSection 7, par. While it is permissible in this jurisdictior
(2) ofArticle LX-B. This colloquy between the two to consult the debates and proceedings of the
Commissioners took place in the plenarysession constitutional convention in order to arrive ai
ofSeptember 27,1986. Under consideration then the reason andpurpose oftheresulting Constitu
was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531, tion, resort thereto may be hadonly when othei
which was the proposed article on General Pro guides fail32 as said proceedings are powerless
iifofrl
visions.2® At that time, the article on the Civil to vary the terms ofthe Constitution when th<
Service Commission hadbeen approved on third meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutionao
reading on July 22, 198630 while the article on convention"are ofvalue as showing the views o
iil«i the Executive Department, containingthe more the individual members, and as indicating th«
specific prohibition inSection 13, had also been reasonsfortheir votes, but they give us no ligh
earlier approved on thirdreading on August 26, as to the viewsofthe large majority whodid no
1986.31 it was onlyefter the draft Constitution talk, much less ofthe mass ofourfellow citizen
had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the whose votes at the polls gave that instrumen
Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the the force offundamental law. We think it safe
to construe the constitution from what appear
General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) upon itsface."33 The proper interpretation there
ofArticle IX-B and reworded "Unless otherwise fore depends more on how it was understoo-
allowed by law or by the primary functions of by the people adopting it than in the framen
his position ..." understanding thereof.34
What was clearly being discussedthen were It being clear, as it was in fact one ofits bes
general principles which would serve as con selling points, thatthe 1987 Constitution seeks t
stitutional guidelines in the absence of specific prohibit the President, Vice-President, member
constitutional provisions on the matter. What ofthe Cabinet, their deputies or assistants fror
was primarily at issue and approved on that holding during their tenure multiple offices c
occasion was the adoption ofthe qualified and employment in thegovernment, except inthos
delimited phrase "primary functions" asthe basis cases specified in the Constitution itself and a
of an exception to the general rule'covering all above clarified withrespecttopostsheld withoi
appointive public officials. Had the Constitu additional compensation in an ex-officio capai
tional Commission intended todilute thespecific ity as provided by law and as required by tb
prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it primary functions of their office, the citation <
could have re-worded saidSection 13toconform Cabinetmembers (then calledMinisters) as e:
tothewider exceptions provided in then Section amples during the debate and deliberation on tt
3ofthe proposed General Provisions, later placed general rule laid down for all appointive officia
asSection 7, par. (2) ofArticle IX-B on the Civil should be considered as mere personal opinior
Service Commission. which cannot override theconstitution's manife;
intent andthe people's understanding thereof
Thatthis exception would in thefinal analy
sis apply also to the President and his official In the light of the construction given '•
family is by reason of the legal principles gov Section 13, Article VII inflation to Section
erning additional functions and duties of public par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitutio
officials rather thanbyvirtue ofSection 7, par. 2, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 19?
Article IX-B. Atanyrate, we have made it clear is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting tl
that only the additional functions and duties "re number of positions that Cabinet member
3216 Corpus Juris Secumdum 2.31, p. 105.
''Commonwealth v.Ralph, 111 Pa.365, 3Atl 220
*>Ibid., Vol. V., pp. 80-81. "Household Finance Corporation v.Shaffner, 203 S.
Îbid., Vol. II, P- 94. 2d 734, 356 Mo. 808.
slJbiU, Vol.IH, p. 710.
pa
ARTICLE VH: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 407
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may spondents Secretary of Environment and Natural

hold in addition to their primary position to not Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of
more than two (2) positions in the government Local Government35 Luis Santos, Secretary of
and government corporations, Executive Order National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of
No. 28? actually allows them to hold multiple Health Alfredo R. A. Bengzon and Secretary of
offices or employment in direct contravention of *the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII relinquish their other offices or employment, as
ofthe 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from herein defined, in the government, including
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 government-owned or controlled corporations
Constitution itself. and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other
The Court is alerted by respondents to the named respondents, the petitioners have become
impractical consequences that will result from moot and academic as they are no longer occupy
a strict application of the prohibition mandated ing the positions complained of.
under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of During their tenure in the questioned posi
the Government, considering that Cabinet mem tions, respondents may be considered de facto
bers would be stripped of their offices held in an officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary po actual services rendered.36 It has been held
sitions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clari that "in cases where there is no de jure officer,
fied in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had
executive official concerned without additional possession of the office and has discharged the
compensation as provided by law and as required duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
by the primary functions of his office do not fall the emoluments of the office, and may in an
under the definition of "any other office" within appropriate action recover the salary, fees and
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibi other compensations attached to the office." This
tion. With respect to other offices or employment doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
held by virtue of legislation, including chairman grounds since it seems unjust that the public
ships or directorships in government-owned or should benefit by the services of an officer de
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, facto and then be freed from all liability to pay
suffice it to say that the feared impractical con any one for such services.37 Any per diem, al
sequences are more apparent than real. Being lowances or other emoluments received by the
head of an executive department is no mean respondents by virtue of actual services rendered
job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring in the questioned positions may therefore be
full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and retained by them.
expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head's ability and expertise, WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification
he should be allowed to attend to his duties and above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Ex
responsibilities without the distraction of other ecutive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null
governmental offices or employment. He should and void and is accordingly set aside.
be precluded from dissipating his efforts, atten SO ORDERED.
tion and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazard- C. Bitonio, Jr. v. COA
ness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004
be derived from this concentration of attention,
knowledge and expertise, particularly at this CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
stage of our national and economic development,
far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be The instant petition filed under Rule 64 ofthe
Revised Rules of Court seeks the annulment of
gained from a department head spreading him
self too thin and taking in more than what he
can handle.
35Now Department of Interior and Local Governments.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be con 36Castillo v. Arrieta, G.R. No. L-31444, November 13,
1974, 61 SCRA 55.
stitutionally infirm, the Court hereby orders re 37Patterson v. Benson, 112Pac. 801,32 L. R.A.(NS)949/
gg)
L
the Decision ofthe Commission on Audit (COA) Members of the Board shall receive a per
datedJanuary 30, 2001 denying the petitioner's diem of not less than the amount equivalent
motion for the reconsideration of the COA No to the representation and transportation al
tices of Disallowance Nos. 98-008-101 (95) and lowances of the members of the Board and/
98-017-101 (97) dated July 31,1998 and October or as may be determined by the Department
9, 1998, respectively, involving the per diems of Budget and Management: Provided, how
the petitioner received from the Philippine Eco ever, That the per diem collected per month
nomic Zone Authority (PEZA). In order to avoid does not exceed the equivalent of four (4)
multiplicity ofsuits, an Amended Petition dated meetings.
August 16, 2002 was later filed to include in the
resolution ofthe instant petition Notice of Disal As representative of the Secretary of Labor
lowance No. 98-003-101 (96) dated July 31,1998 to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per
%D which was belatedly received by the petitioner diemfor every board meeting he attended during
on August 13, 2002. the years 1995 to 1997.
The antecedent facts are as follows: After a post audit of the PEZA's disburse
ment transactions, the COA disallowed the
In 1994,petitioner BenedictoErnesto R. paymentofper diemsto the petitioner and thus
Bitonio,Jr. was appointed Director IV ofthe issued the following:
Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department
of Labor and Employment. (a) Notice of Disallowance No. 98-008-101
(95) dated July 31, 1998 for the total sum of
In a Letter dated May 11,1995 addressed to P24.500 covering the period of July-December
Honorable Rizalino S. Navarro, then Secretary 1995;
ofthe DepartmentofTrade and Industry, Acting
Secretary JoseS.Brilliantes oftheDepartment of (b) Notice of Disallowance No. 98-003-101
Laborand Employment designatedthe petitioner (96) also dated July 31, 1998 for a total amount
to be the DOLE representative to the Board of ofP100,000coveringthe period ofJanuary 1996
Directors of PEZA. Such designation was in pur to January 1997;
suance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, (c) Notice of Disallowance No. 98-017-101
otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone (97) dated October 9, 1998 for the total amount
liijij
Act of 1995, which provides: ofP210.000 coveringthe period ofFebruary 1997
Section 11. The Philippine Economic to January 1998.
Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. — There is The uniform reason for the disallowance was
herebycreated a body corporate to be known stated in the Notices, as follows:
as the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA) ... Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants holding other offices in addition to
xxx xxx xxx
their primary office and to receivecompensa
The Board shall be composed of the tion therefore was declared unconstitutional
Director General as ex oficio chairman with bythe Supreme Courtin the Civil Liberties
eight (8) members as follows: theSecretaries Union v. Executive Secretary. Disallowanceis
ortheir representatives ofthe Department of in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-
Trade and Industry, the Department of Fi 038dated September 19,1997implementing
nance, the Department ofLabor andEmploy Senate Committee Report No. 509.
ment, the Department of [the] Interior and On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed
Local Government, the National Economic
andDevelopment Authority, andthe Bangko his motionfor reconsideration to the COA on the
Sentral ng Pilipinas, one (1) representative following grounds:
from the labor sector, and one (1) representa 1. The Supreme Court in its Resolu
tive from the investor/business sector in the tiondatedAugust 2, 1991 on the motion for
ECOZONE. clarification filed by the Solicitor General
xxx xxx xxx modified its earlier ruling in the CivilLiber-
$01$)
ties Union case which limits the prohibition interested in any other contract with, or in
to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries anyfranchise, or special privilege granted by
and their Assistants. Officials giventhe rank the Government or any subdivision, agency
equivalentto a Secretary,Undersecretary or or instrumentality thereof, including any
Assistant Secretary and other appointiveof government-owned or controlled corporations
ficials below the rank ofAssistant Secretary or their subsidiaries They shall strictly avoid
are not covered by the prohibition. conflict of interest in the conduct of their of
fice.
2. Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916provides
$f) the legal basis for the movant to receive per The spouse and relatives byconsanguin
diem. Said law was enacted in 1995, four ity or affinitywithin the fourth civildegree of
years after the Civil Liberties Union case the President shall not, during his tenure, be
became final. In expressly authorizing per appointed as members ofthe Constitutional
diems, Congress should be conclusively pre Commissions, or the Office of the Ombuds
sumed to have been aware ofthe parameters man, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
of the constitutional prohibition as inter Chairmen, or heads of bureaus or offices,
preted in the Civil Liberties Union case. including government-owned or controlled
On January 30, 2001, the COArendered the corporations and subsidiaries.
assaileddecision denyingpetitioner'smotion for Pursuant to the Court's ruling in this case
reconsideration. and the Senate Committee Report on the Ac
Hence, this petition. countability ofPublic Officersand Investigations
(Blue Ribbon), the COA issued Memorandum No.
The issue in this case is whether or not the 97-038 which authorized the issuance ofthe No
COAcorrectly disallowed the per diems received tices of Disallowances for the per diems received
by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA by the petitioner. It states:
Board of Directors' meetings as representative
of the Secretary of Labor. The Commission received a copy of Sen
ate Committee Report No. 509 urging "the
We rule in the affirmative. Commission on Audit to immediately cause
the disallowance of any payment of any form
The COA anchors the disallowance of per
of additional compensation or remuneration
diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v.
to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and as
Executive Secretary where the Court declared
sistants, or their representatives in violation
Executive Order No. 284 allowing government of the rule on multiple positions and to effect
officialsto hold multiple positions in government, the refund of any and all such additional
unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, compensation given to and received by the
Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretar officials concerned, or their representatives,
ies, are prohibited to hold other government from the time of the finality of the Supreme
offices or positions in addition to their primary Court ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Ex
positions and to receive compensation therefor, ecutive Secretary to the present." In the Civil
isiiiii)
except in cases where the Constitution expressly Liberties Union case, the Supreme Court
provides. The Court's ruling was in conformity ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their depu
with Section 13, Article VII ofthe 1987 Constitu ties and assistants may not hold any other
tion which reads: office or employment. It declared Executive
Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it
Sec. 13.The President, Vice-President,
allows Cabinet members, their deputies and
the Members ofthe Cabinet, and their depu
assistants to hold other offices in addition to
ties or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
their primary office and to receive compensa
provided in this Constitution, hold any other
tion therefor. The said decision became final
office or employment during their tenure.
and executory on August 19, 1991.
They shall not, during their tenure, directly
or indirectly, practice any other profession, In view thereof, all unit heads/auditors/
participate in any business or be financially team leaders of the national government
agencies and government-owned or con The petitioner's case stands on all fours with
trolled corporations which have effected the case of Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit,
payment of subject allowances are directed 371 SCRA 157 (2001). Here, the Court upheld
to implement the recommendation contained the COAin disallowing the payment ofhonoraria
in the subject Senate Committee Report by and per diems to the officers concerned who sat
undertaking the following audit action:. .. as members ofthe Board of Directors ofthe Na
tional Housing Authority. The officersconcerned
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled sat as alternates of their superiors in an ex oficio
to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 capacity. Citing also the Civil Liberties Union
specifically and categorically provides for the case, the Court explained thus:
paymentof a per diem for the attendance ofthe
members ofthe Board of Directors at board meet "The ex-oficio position being actually and
ings ofPEZA. The petitioner contends that this in legal contemplation part of the principal
lawis presumed to be valid; unless and until the office, it follows that the official concerned
law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in
has no right to receive additional compen
sation for his services in the said position.
effect and binding for all intents and purposes.
The reason is that these services are already
•î Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the
paid for and covered by the compensation
basis of a mere memorandum circular — COA
attached to his principal office. It should be
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA.
obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance
The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a attends a meeting ofthe Monetary Board as
statute more superior than an administrative an ex-oficio member thereof, he is actually
directive and the former cannot just be repealed and in legal contemplation performing the
or amended by the latter. primary function of his principal office in
The petitioner also posits that R.A. No. 7916 defining policy in monetary banking matters,
was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil which come under the jurisdiction of his de
Liberties Unionwas promulgated. It is, therefore, partment. For such attendance, therefore, he
assumed that the legislature, before enacting a is not entitled to collect any extra compensa
law, was aware ofthe prior holdings ofthe courts. tion, whether it be in the form of a per diern
Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
No. 7916 was never challenged, the provision other such euphemism. By whatever name it
on the payment of per diems remains in force is designated, such additional compensation
notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. is prohibited by the Constitution."
Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director xxx xxx xxx
IV is not included in the enumeration of officials

prohibited to receive additional compensation Since the Executive Department Sec
as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated
retaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA
Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra
August1,1991;thus, he is still entitled to receive
(additional) compensation, whether it be in
the per diems.
the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
The petitioner's contentions are untenable. allowance, or some other such euphemism,"
it follows that petitioners who sit as their
It must be noted that the petitioner's pres
alternates cannot likewise be entitled to
ence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by
receive such compensation. A contrary rule
virtue of his capacity as representative of the would give petitioners a "better right than
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself their principals.
admitted, there was no separate or special ap
pointment for such position. Since the Secretary Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow
of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensa the petitioner who sat as representative of the
tion for his additional office or employment, such Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a
prohibitionlikewise applies to the petitioner who better right than his principal. As the representa
sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary tive of the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat
of Labor. in the Board in the same capacity as his princi-
iMilt

iiiai
pal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the the fundamental law from which the Leg
Board is covered, so is the representative; and islature draws its power and with which
^t
whatever prohibitions or restrictions the mem the resulting legislation or statute must
ber is subjected, the representative is, likewise, conform. When the Court sets aside legisla
not exempted. Thus, his position as Director IV tion for being violative of the Constitution,
of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not it is not thereby substituting its wisdom for
covered by the constitutional prohibition set by that of the Legislature or encroaching upon
the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. the latter's prerogative, but again simply
The petitioner attended the board meetings by discharging its sacred task of safeguarding
aj the authority given to him by the Secretary of and upholding the paramount law.
Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have real
for such designation, the petitioner would not
have been in the Board at all. .
ized the flaw in the law which is the reason why
^j the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to
There is also no merit in the allegation that cure such defect. In particular, Section 11 of R.A.
the legislature was certainly aware of the pa No. 7916 was amended to read:
rameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A.
No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality ofthe SECTION 11. The Philippine Economic
Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of per Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. — There is
diems was clearly an express grant in favor of hereby created a body corporate to be known
the members ofthe Board of Directors which the as the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
petitioner is entitled to receive. (PEZA) attached to the Department of Trade
and Industry. The Board shall have a direc
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enact tor general with the rank of department
ment must not be repugnant to the highest law undersecretary who shall be appointed by
of the land which is the Constitution. No law the President. The director general shall be
can render nugatory the Constitution because at least forty (40) years of age, of proven pro
is) the Constitution is more superior to a statute. bity and integrity, and a degree holder in any
If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the of the following fields: economics, business,
fundamental law, courts of justice may step in public administration, law, management or
to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the their equivalent, and with at least ten (10)
Court to see to it that the law must conform to years relevant working experience prefer
the Constitution. In the clarificatory resolution ably in the field of management or public
issued by the Court in the Civil Liberties Union administration.
case on August 1,1991, the Court addressed the
issue as to the extent ofthe exercise of legislative The director general shall be assisted
prerogative, to wit: by three (3) deputy directors general each
for policy and planning, administration and
The Solicitor General next asks: . . . operations, who shall be appointed by the
may the Decision then control or otherwise FEZA Board, upon the recommendation of
encroach on the exclusive competence of the director general. The deputy directors
i^j the legislature tp provide funds for a pub general shall be at least thirty-five (35) years
lic purpose, in terms of compensation or old, with proven probity and integrity and a
honoraria under existing laws, where in the degree holder in any of the following fields:
absence of such provision said laws would economics, business, public administration,
otherwise meet the terms of the "exception law, management or their equivalent.
by law?" Again, the question is anchored on
a misperception. It must be stressed that The Board shall be composed of thirteen
the so-called "exclusive competence of the (13) members as follows: the Secretary ofthe
legislature to provide funds for a public pur Department of Trade and Industry as Chair
pose" or to enact all types of laws, for that man, the Director General of the Philippine
matter, is not unlimited. Such competence Economic Zone Authority as Vice-chairman,
must be exercised within the framework of the undersecretaries of the Department of
\jnii
412 CONSTTTUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
iijjffii
Finance, the Department of Labor and Em under the prohibition against multiple offices
ployment, the Department of [the] Interior imposed by Section 13, Article VII and Section
jj%$
and Local Government, the Department of 7, par. 2, Article IX-B ofthe 1987 Constitution,
Environment and Natural Resources, the De which provide that:
partment ofAgriculture, the Department of
Art. VII.
Public Works and Highways, the Department
of Science and Technology, the Department Section 13. The President, Vice-Presi
of Energy, the Deputy Director General of dent, the Membersofthe Cabinet, and their
the National Economic and DevelopmentAu deputies or assistants shallnot, unless oth
thority, one (1) representative from thelabor erwise provided in this Constitution, hold
sector, and one (1> representative from the any other office or employment during their
investors/business sector in the ECOZONE. tenure, xxx
In case ofthe unavailability ofthe Secretary
Art. IX-B.
ofthe Department ofTrade and Industry to
attend a particularboardmeeting, the Direc Section 7. No elective official shall be
tor General of PEZA shall act as Chairman. eligible for appointment or designation in
As can be gleaned from above, the members any capacity to any public office or position
of the Board of Directors was increased from 8 during his tenure.
\(0\ to 13, specifying therein that it is the under Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
secretaries of the different Departments who the primary functionsofhis position, no ap
should sit as board members of the PEZA. The pointive official shallhold anyotheroffice or
igjj
option of designating his representative to the employment in the Government or any sub
Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was division, agency or instrumentalitythereof,
deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the including governmentrowned or controlled
payment of per diems to the members of the corporations or their subsidiaries.
m* Board ofDirectors was also deleted, considering
that such stipulation wasclearly in conflict with To harmonize these two provisions, this
the proscription set by the Constitution. Court, in the case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, construed the prohibition
Prescinding from the above, the petitioner is, against multiple offices contained in Section 7,
indeed, not entitled to receive a per diem for his Article LX-B and Section 13, Article VII in this
attendance at board meetings during his tenure manner:
as member of the Board of Director ofthe PEZA.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the peti
[T]hus, while all other appointive of
ficials in the civil service are allowed to hold
tion is DISMISSED.The assailed decisionofthe
other office or employmentin the government
COA is AFFIRMED.
t^ during their tenure when such is allowed by
law orbytheprimary functions oftheirposi
D. Public Interest Center v. Elma tions, members ofthe Cabinet, theirdeputies
G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006 andassistantsmaydosoonly whenexpressly
This action seeks to declare as null and void authorized bythe Constitution itself. In other
the concurrentappointments ofrespondentMag- words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to
dangal B. Elma as Chairman ofthe Presidential lay down the general rule applicable to all
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and elective and appointive public officials and
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and meant to be the exception applicable only to
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Con the President, the Vice-President, Members
stitution. ... ofthe Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B
m>
The issue in this case is whether the position of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive
ofthe PCGG Chairman or that ofthe CPLC falls official to hold more than.one office only if
[iiiiJ
"allowed by law or by the primary functions of his tiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situa
position." In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this tion that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the
Court ruled that, "[t]here is no legal objection to prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
a government official occupying two government
offices and performing the functions of both
SEC. 14. APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED
as long as there is no incompatibility."
BY AN ACTING I*RESIDENT SHALL RE
The crucial test in determining whether
MAIN EFFECTIVE, UNLESS REVOKED
incompatibility exists between two offices was
BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN
laid out in People v. Green —whether one office
NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION
is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
OR REASSUMPTION OF OFFICE.
Ea» office has the right to interfere with the other.
SEC. 15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATE
(TJncompatibility between two offices, is
LY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
an inconsistency in the functions of the two;
ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF
xxx Where one office, is not subordinate to
the other, nor the relations of the one to the
HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING
PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINT
other such as are inconsistent and repug
MENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINT
nant, there is not that incompatibility from
MENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN
• which the law declares that the acceptance
CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL
of the one is the vacation of the other. The
PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR EN
force of the word, in its application to this
DANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.
matter is, that from the nature and relations
to each other, of the two places, they ought
not to be held by the same person, from the 1. Prohibited appointments.
contrariety and antagonism which would
result in the attempt by one person to faith A. In Re Appointments of Valenzuela
and Vallarta
fully and impartially discharge the duties of
one, toward the incumbent ofthe other, xxx AM No: 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998
The offices must subordinate, one [over] the
other, and they must, per se, have the right NARVASA, C.c/.:
to interfere, one with the other, before they The question presented for resolution in the
are incompatible at common law. xxx administrative matter at bar is whether, during
In this case, an incompatibility exists be the period of the ban on appointments imposed
tween the positions of the PCGG Chairman and by Section 15, Article VII ofthe Constitution, the
the CPLC. The duties ofthe CPLC include giving President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies
independent and impartial legal advice on the in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of
actions ofthe heads of various executive depart Article VIII. A corollary question is whether he
ments and agencies and to review investigations can make appointments to the judiciary during
involving heads of executive departments and the period of the ban in the interest of public
agencies, as well as other Presidential appoin service.
tees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency
under the Executive Department. Thus, the ac
tions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the III. The Relevant Constitutional
review of the CPLC.... Provisions
The provisions of the Constitution material

As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to the inquiry at bar read as follows:
to give his legal opinion on his own actions as Section 15, Article VII:
PCGG Chairman and review any investigation
conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Com "Two months immediately before the
mission, which may involve himself as PCGG next presidential elections and up to the end
w Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impar of his term, a President or Acting President
'.jff>
shall not make appointments, except tem was not initially adopted. Persisting however in
porary appointments to executive positions his desire to make certain that the size "of the
when continued vacancies therein prejudice Court would not be decreased for any substantial
public service or endanger public safety." period as a result of vacancies, Lerum proposed
the insertion in the provision (anent the Court's
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
membership) of the same mandate that "IN
"The Supreme Court shall be composed CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL
of a ChiefJustice and fourteen Associate Jus BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM
tices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, OCCURRENCE THEREOF." He later agreed
^t
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. to suggestions to make the period three, instead
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal
days from the occurrence thereof." was approved. As it turned out, however, the
Section 9, Article VIII: Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-
members Court. Thus it was that the section
"The Members ofthe Supreme Court and fixing the composition of the Supreme Court
judges in lower courts shall be appointed by came to include a command to fill up any vacancy
the President from a list of at least three therein within 90 days from its occurrence.
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
* Council for every vacancy. Such appoint In this connection, it maybe pointed out
ments need no confirmation. that that instruction that any "vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence
Forirhe lower courts, the President shall of Section 4[1] of Article VIII) contrasts with the
issue the appointments within ninety days from prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is
^) the submission of the list." couched in stronger negative language — that
"a President or Acting President shall not make
IV. The Court's View appointments..."
The Court's view is that during the period The Commission later approved a proposal
stated in Section 15, Article VII ofthe Constitu of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a
tion — "(t)wo months immediately before the Member of this Court) to add to what is now Sec
^j
next presidential elections and up to the end of tion 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph:
his terms" — the President is neither required "WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURT, THE
to make appointments to the courts nor allowed PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINT
to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article
MENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE
VIII simply mean that the President is required
SUBMISSION OF THE LIST" (of nominees by
to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
the Judicial and Bar Council to the President).
frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Davide stated that his purpose was to provide a
Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that
"uniform rule" for lower courts. According to him,
the prohibition on appointments comes into effect
the 90-day period should be counted from submis
only once every six years.
sion of the list of nominees to the President in
view of the possibility that the President might
V. Intent of the Constitutional Commission
reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus
The journal of the commission which drew need more time to submit a new one.
up the present Constitution discloses that the
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII —
original proposal was to have an eleven-member
Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum which is effect deprives the President of his ap
wanted to increase the number of Justices to
pointing power "two months immediately before
fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that the next presidential elections up to the end of
number would not be reduced for any appreciable his term" — was approved without discussion.
length of time (even only temporarily), and to this
VI. Analysis of Provisions
end proposed that any vacancy "must be filled
mi
within two months from the date that the vacancy Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII
occurs." His proposal to have a 15-member Court is directed against two types of appointments: (1)
tsi
those made for buying votes and (2) those made reelection, became no more than a "caretaker"
for partisan considerations. The first refers to administrator whose duty was to "prepare for
those appointments made within the two months the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
preceding a Presidential election and are similar President." Said the Court:
to those which are declared election offenses in
the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
"The filling up of vacancies in important
î
positions,' if few, and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The fol
lowing shall be guilty of an election offense: careful consideration ofthe need for the ap
pointment and the appointee's qualifications
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issu
Any person who gives, offers or promises ance of 350 appointments in one night and
money or anything of value, gives or prom the planned induction of almost all of them
ises any office or employment, franchise or a few hours before the inauguration of the
grant, public or private, or makes or offers to new President may, with some reason, be
make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presi
or cause an expenditure to be made to any dential prerogatives, the steps taken being
person, association, corporation, entity, or apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
community in order to induce anyone or the vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
public in general to vote for or against any other conditions, and thereby to deprive the
candidate or withhold his vote in the elec new administration of an opportunity to
tion, or to vote for or against any aspirant make the corresponding appointments."
for the nomination or choice of a candidate
As indicated, the Court recognized that there
in a convention or similar selection process
may well be appointments to important positions
of a political party.
which have to be made even after the proclama
xxx xxx xxx tion ofthe new President. Such appointments, so
(g) Appointment of new employees, long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford
creation of new position, promotion, or giv some assurance of deliberate action and careful
ing salary increases. — During the period of consideration of the need for the appointment
forty-five days before a regular election and and the appointee's qualifications," can be made
thirty days before a special election, (1) any by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several
head, official or appointing officer of a gov appointments made by President Garcia, which
ernment office, agency or instrumentality, were shown to have been well considered, were
lm
whether national or local, including govern upheld.
ment-owned or controlled corporations, who Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope
appoints or hires any new employee, whether than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably
provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" ap
and fills any new position, except upon prior pointments — those made obviously for partisan
authority of the Commission. The Commis reasons as shown by their number and the time of
sion shall not grant the. authority sought their making—but also appointments presumed
unless, it is satisfied that the position to be made for the purpose of influencing the outcome
filled is essential to the proper functioning of of the Presidential election.
the office or agency concerned, and that the
position shall not be filled in a manner that On the other hand, the exception in the
may influence the election. same Section 15 of Article VII — allowing ap
pointments to be made during the period of the
The second type of appointments prohibited ban therein provided — is much narrower than
by Section 15, Article VII consists ofthe so-called that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows
"midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo,it only the making of temporary appointments to
was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado executive positions when continued vacancies
Macapagal as duly elected President, President will prejudice public service or endanger public
Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts
&&t
the appointing power of the President during appointees 'Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme
the period of the ban. Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court -of the
Supreme court, in the Chief Justice's behalf,
Considering the respective reasons for the who thereafter advises the individual appointees
time frames for filling vacancies in the courts of their appointments and also of the date of
and the restriction on the President's power of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation
appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judi
generalproposition, in case ofconflict, the former cial Academy for new Judges. The rationale of
should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention this procedure is salutary and readily perceived.
of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the The procedure ensure the authenticity of the
need for avoiding delays in filling up of court appointments, enables the Court, particularly
vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Tem the Office of the Court Administrator, to enter
porary vacanciescan abide the periodofthe ban in the appropriate records all appointments to
which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, the Judiciary as well as other relevant data such
comesto exist only once in every six years. More as the dates of qualification, the completion by
over, those occurring in the lower courts can be the appointees of their pre-requisite orientation0
M filledtemporarily by designation. But prohibited seminars, their assumption of duty, etc.
appointments are long-lasting and permanent in
their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, The procedure also precludes the possibility,
in fact influence the results of elections and, for however remote, of Judges acting on spurious or
that reason, their making is considered an elec otherwise defective appointments. It is obviously
tion offense. not advisable, to say the least, for a Judge to take
his oath of office and enter upon the performance
To the contention that may perhaps be as of his duties on the basis alone of a document
serted, that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII purporting to be a copy of his appointment com
should prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, ing from Malacanang, the authenticity of which
becausethey may be consideredlater expressions has not been verified from the latter or the Of
of the people when they adopted the Constitu fice of the Court Administrator; or otherwise to
tion, it sufficesto point out that the Constitution begin performing his duties as Judge without the
must be construed in its entirety as one, single Court Administrator knowing of that fact. The
instrument. undesirability of such a situation is illustrated
To be sure, instances may be conceived of by the case of Judge Valenzuela who acted, with
the imperative need for an appointment, during no little impatience or rashness, on a mere copy
the period of the ban, not only in the executive of his supposed appointment without having
but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the received any formal notice from this Court, and
case should the membership of the Court be so without verifying the authenticity of the ap
reduced that it will have no quorum, or should pointment or the propriety of taking oath on the
the voting on a particularly important question basis thereof. Had he bothered to inquire about
requiring expeditious resolution be evenly di his appointment from the Court Administrator's
vided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Office,he would have been informed ofthe ques
Section 15 ofthe Article VII nor Sections 4(1) and tion concerning it and the Court's injunction.
9 of Article VIII.
VIII. Conclusion
VII. A Last Word The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela
A final word, concerning Valenzuela's oath- and Vallarta on March 30,1998 (transmitted to
taking and "reporting for duty" as Presiding the office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998)
Judge of RTC Branch 62, Bago City, on May 14, were unquestionably made during the period
1998. Standing practice is for the originals of of the ban. Consequently, they come within the
all appointments to the Judiciary — from the operation of the first prohibition relating to ap
highest to the lowest courts — to be sent by the pointments which are considered to be for the
Office of the President to the Office of the Chief purpose of buying votes or influencing the elec
Justice, the appointments being addressed to the tion. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTWE DEPARTMENT • 417
is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no will prejudice public service or endanger
showing in this case of any compelling reason public safety, (emphasis supplied)
to justify the making of the appointments dur
ing the period of the ban. On the other hand, as
alreadylliscussed, here is a strong publicpolicy The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the
for the prohibition against appointments made constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight
within the period of the ban. appointments," specifically those made within
two (2) months immediately prior to the next
In view of the foregoing considerations, the presidential elections, applies only to the Presi
&&1
Court Resolved to DECLARED VOID the ap dent or Acting President.
pointments signed by His Excellency the Presi
dent under date ofMarch 30,1998 of Hon. Mateo
A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as MENDQZA, J., dissenting:
\M
Judges ofthe Regional Trial Court of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, By its decision in this case today, the major
respectively, and to order them, forthwith on ity sanctions the making of "midnight appoint
ments" by local executives on the simplistic
being served with notice of this decision, to forth
reasoning that Art. VII, §15 of the Constitution
with CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the
applies only to Presidents and Acting Presidents.
office of Judge of the Courts to which they were
What the majority overlooks is that Art. VII, §15
respectively appointed on March 30,1998. This,
is simply an application of a broader principle
without prejudice to their being considered anew that after the appointing authority has lost the
by the Judicial and Bar Council for re-nomination elections, his is the duty of a prudent caretaker of
to the same positions. the office, and, therefore, he should not fill posi
IT IS SO ORDERED. tions in the government unless required by the
imperatives of public service. This rule binds all,
including mayors, who are vested with the power
B. De La Rama v. Court of Appeals of appointment, and it flows from the principle
G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001 that a public office is a public trust. In Aytona v.
Castillo, 4 SCRA1 (1962), this Court did not need
iii&i
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: a specific constitutional or statutory provision to
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor rule that the making of 350 appointments after
of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de the proclamation of a new President and during
Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the the last hours of the outgoing Chief Executive
Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the
could not be upheld consistent with "good faith,
morality, and propriety." So why should the ma
recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) mu
jority in this case demand a specific rule before
nicipal employees,...
iiiiJ it puts its foot down on this pernicious practice
of making "midnight" or last-hour appointments
by local executives?
Petitioner de Rama justified his recall re
quest on the allegation that the appointments For such indeed are the 14 appointments
of the said employees were "midnight" appoint made in this case to various positions in the
ments ofthe former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, municipal government of Pagbilao, Quezon.
done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 ofthe They were made by Mayor Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja
1987 Constitution, which provides: after she had lost her bid for re-election. Despite
the fact that the results of the election were
SECTION 15. Two months immediately proclaimed on May 11, 1995, she made several
before the next presidential elections and up appointments within the space of 27 days, from
to the end of his term, a President or Acting June 1, 1995 to June 27, 1995, just three days
President shall not make appointments, before she bowed out of the service. Even when
except temporary appointments to executive there was no urgent need to do so, she went
positions when continued vacancies therein ahead and filled the vacancies in the municipal
government a few days before the new mayor, ' The exact question of where the power of
herein petitioner Conrado L. de Rama, took office appointment to office is lodged has never'here-
. on June 30, 1995. tofore arisen in this jurisdiction. But a decision
of this court and a decision of the United States
SEC. 16. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOM Supreme Court are in point.
INATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
In Concepcion v. Paredes, supra, this court
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, AP had before it a law which attempted to require a
POINT THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE
drawing of lots for judicial positions in derogation
DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER of executive power. The case was exhaustively
PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR argued and after prolonged consideration, the
OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES questioned portion ofthe law was held invalid as
FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NA in violation ofthe provisions ofthe Organic Act.
VAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS Following the lead of Kentucky, it was announced
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN that "Appointment to office is intrinsically an
HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. HE SHALL executive act involving the exercise of discretion."
ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS
OFTHE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINT
MENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED NOTE: Since appointment to office is an
fefoi
FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY executive function, the clear implication is that
BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT. the legislature may not usurp such function. The
THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE legislature may create an office and prescribe
APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS the qualifications of the person who may hold
LOWER IN" RANK IN THE PRESIDENT the office, but it may neither specify who shall
ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE be appointed to such office nor actually appoint
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, him. The "appointing power is the exclusive
COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS. prerogative of the [President], upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress, except
THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE
those resulting . . . from the limited exercise of
POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS
power to prescribe the qualifications to a given
DURING THE RECESS OF THE CON
appointive office." Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94
GRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COM
Phil. 903, 911 (1954).
PULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS
SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL Moreover, the power to appoint includes the
DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON power to decide who among various choices is the
APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT best qualified, provided that the person chosen
ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS. has the qualifications provided by law. In this
matterj the President can even override the Civil
1. Power of appointment. Service Commission. Oliveros-Torre v. Bayot, 58
SCRA 272 (July 31, 1974).
A. Government v. Springer The appointing authority of the President,
50 Phil. 259(1927) however, should not be confused with the
authority ofthe legislature to impose additional
duties on existing offices. Thus, under the 1935
Possibly, the situation may better be visual Constitution, while it was clearly the preroga
ized by approaching the question by a process tive ofthe President to appoint the members of
of elimination. Is the power of appointment the Supreme Court, Roxas v. Lopez, 17 SCRA
judicial? No one so contends. Is the power of ap 756 (1966) upheld the authority of Congress to
pointment legislative? Not so if the intention of create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal consist
the Organic Law be carried out and ifthe Legisla ing of the Chief Justice and the Justices of the
ture be confined to its law-making function. Is Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that
the power of appointment executive? It is. the act did not create a new office nor specify
^,
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT •. 419
who should hold the office but merely imposed Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his ap
additional duties and powers upon the Supreme pointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath
||j[gj
Court and consequently upon whoever may be. of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of
the incumbent Chief Justice and Associate Jus the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac,
tices. Id. at 770. Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed of
fice and immediately informed the President,
Also of essence ofthe appointing power is the
as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil
power to decide who among the various qualified
Service Commission, of that assumption. Ber
choices is the best qualified. Oliveros-Torre v.
mudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial
Bayot, 58 SCRA 272 (1974). Moreover, when a
Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of
statute does not specify how an officer is to be
Quiaoit's appointment had not yet been released
appointed, the appointment must be made by
by the Secretary ofJustice. Quiaoit, nonetheless,
the President because Section 10 says that he
performed the functions and duties of the Office
appoints "all other officers of the government
of the Provincial Prosecutor by issuing office
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
orders and memoranda, signing resolutions on
for." Nieve v. Court of First Instance, 54 SCRA
preliminary investigations, and filing several
165, 170-171 (1973).
•>
informations before the courts. Quiaoit had since
been regularly receiving the salary, RATA and
B. Bermudez v. Executive Secretary other emoluments of the office.
G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999
On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and
Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by Justice
VITUG,J.:
Secretary Guingona. The three met at the De
The validity and legality of the appointment partment of Justice and, following the confer
of respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the post of ence, Bermudez was ordered to wind up his
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President cases until 15 October 1997 and to turn-over the
Fidel V. Ramos is assailed in this petition for contested office to Quiaoit the next day.
review on certiorari on a pure question of law
which prays for the reversal of the Order, dated
20 October 1997, of the Regional Trial Court In the meantime, on 10 October 1997, Ber
(Branch 63) of Tarlac, Tarlac, dismissing the mudez together with his co-petitioners Arturo
petition for prohibition and/or injunction and Llobrera and Claudio Dayaon, the Second Assis
mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a tant Provincial Prosecutor and the Fourth Assis
writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, tant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac, respectively,
instituted by herein petitioners. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a
The occurrence of a vacancy in the Office of petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and
the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac. impelled the mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a
main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar writ of injunction/temporary restraining order,
Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, against herein respondents, challenging the ap
to take contrasting views on the proper inter pointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground
pretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised that the appointment lacks the recommenda
Administrative Code. Bermudez, the First tion ofthe Secretary of Justice prescribed under
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After
Officer-In-Charge ofthe Office ofthe Provincial hearing, the trial court considered the petition
Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Justice submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position its now assailed order dismissing the petition.
of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other The subsequent move by petitioners to have the
hand, would appear to have had the support order reconsidered met with a denial.
of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second Hence, the instant recourse.
Legislative District of Tarlac. On 30 June 1997,
Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was ap The core issue for consideration is whether
pointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. or not the absence of a recommendation of the
r
^
Secretary of Justice to the President can be held in the final analysis, is firmed up and addressee
fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado on a case-to-case basis. The nature, structure
Quiaoit. This question would, in turn, pivot on and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in
the proper understanding of the provision of looking at the legislative intent. Generally, it is
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Book said that if no consequential rights or liabilities
IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect depend on it and no injury can result from ignor
that — ing it, and that the purpose of the legislature
can be accomplished in a manner other than
"All provincial and city prosecutors and
their assistants shall be appointed by the
that prescribed when substantially the same
jjjii^
results can be obtained, then the statute should
President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary."
be regarded merely as directory, rather than as
mandatory, in character.
Petitioners contend that an appointment of
a provincial prosecutor mandatorily requires a
An "appointment" to a public office is the
unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one
prior recommendation ofthe Secretary of Justice
endorsing the intended appointment citing, by
having the authority therefor of an individual to
discharge and perform the duties and functions
analogy, the case of San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA
of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed
69, where the Court held:
complete once the last act required of the ap
"... The DBM may appoint only from the pointing authority has been complied with and its
list of qualified recommendees nominated by acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to
the Governor. If none is qualified, he must renderit effective. Appointment necessarily calls
return the list of nominees to the Governor for an exercise of discretion on the part of- the
explaining why no one meets the legal re appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lung-
quirements and ask for new recommendees sod ngMaynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
who have the necessary eligibilities and 140 SCRA 22, reiterated in Flores v. Drilon, 223
qualifications. SCRA 568, this Court has held:
The Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) is "The power to appoint is, in essence,
expected to synchronize his work with DBM." discretionary. The appointing power has the
Insisting on the application of San Juan, pe right of choice which he may exercise freely
titioners call attention to the tenor of Executive according to his judgment, deciding for him
Order No. 112 — self who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and eligi
"SECTION 1. All budget officers of prov bilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing
inces, cities and municipalities shall be ap power..."
pointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right
of Management upon recommendation ofthe of choice is the heart ofthe power to appoint. In
local chief executive concerned ..." —
the exercise ofthe power of appointment, discre
that, they claim, can be likened to the afore- tion is an integral part thereof.
quoted provision of the Revised Administrative When the Constitution or the law clothes
Code of 1987. Respondents argue differently.
the President with the power to appoint a
The legislative intent is, of course, primor subordinate officer, such conferment must be
dial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in ascertain understood as necessarily carrying with it an
ing whether the language in a statute should ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be
be considered mandatory or directory, and the here pertinent to state that the President is the
application of a ruling in one particular instance head of government whose authority includes the
may not necessarily be apt in another for each power of control over all "executive departments,
must be determined on the basis of the specific bureaus and offices." Control means the author
law in issue and the peculiar circumstances at ity of an empowered officer to alter or modify,
tendant to it. More often than not, the problem, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate
•£$4
mj
fofffil
iiiiaiJ
officer has done in the performance of his duties, xxx xxx xxx
as well as to substitute the judgment ofthe latter,

"When the. Civil Service Commission
as and when the former deems it to be appropri
interpreted the recommending power ofthe
ate. Expressed in another way, the President Provincial Governor as purely directory,
has the power to assume directly the functions it went against the letter and spirit of the
of an executive department, bureau and office. constitutional provisions on local autonomy.
It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the
President can interfere in the exercise of discre entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the
tion of officials under him or altogether ignore right of local governments to develop self-
their recommendations. reliance and resoluteness in the handling of
It is the considered view of the Court, given their own funds, the goal of meaningful local
autonomy is frustrated and set back."
the above disquisition, that the phrase "upon rec
ommendation of the Secretary," found in Section The Court there has explained that the
9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised President merely exercises general supervision
Administrative Code, should be interpreted, over local government units and local officials;
as it is normally so understood, to be a mere hence, in the appointment ofa Provincial Budget
advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is es Officer, the executive department, through the
sentially persuasive in character and not binding Secretary of Budget and Management, indeed
or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. had to share the questioned power with the local
The recommendation is here nothing really more government.
than advisory in nature. The President, being
In the instant case, the recommendation of
the head of the Executive Department, could
the Secretary of Justice and the appointment of
very well disregard or do away with the action the President are acts of the Executive Depart
of the departments,- bureaus or offices even in ment itself, and there is no sharing of power to
the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents
opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond and purposes as being merely an extension ofthe
M
the scope of his authority. personality of the President.
The doctrine in San Juan, relied upon by WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No
petitioners, is tangential. While the tenor ofthe costs.
legal provision in Executive Order No. 112 has
some similarity with the provision in the 1987
Administrative Code in question, it is to be C. Flores v. Drilon and Gordon
G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
pointed out, however, that San Juan, in constru
ing the law, has distinctively given stress to the
BELLOSILLO, J.:
constitutional mandate on local autonomy, thus:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of
"The issue before the -Court is not limited R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Con-
to the validity of the appointment of one vertion and Development Act of 1992," under
Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
between the Secretary of Budget and Man Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and
agement and the Governor of the premier Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metro
province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous politan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this
position involves the application of a most original petition with prayer for prohibition,
important constitutional policy and principle, preliminaryinjunction and temporary restrain
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the ing order "to prevent useless and unnecessary
clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a expenditures of public funds by way of salaries
. law is capable of two interpretations, one in and other operational expenses attached to the
favor of centralized power in Malacanang office ..." Paragraph (d) reads
and the other beneficial to local autonomy,
the scales must be weighed in favor of au (d) Chairman administratorThe Presi
tonomy.
dent shall appoint a professionalmanager as
SgJ
•Ulrt
administrator ofthe Subic Authority with a exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury,

compensation to be determined by the Board J., "the choice of a person to fill an ôffice consti
subject to the approval of the Secretary of tutes the essence of his appointment," and Mr.
. Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to
ofthe Board and who shall serve as the chief office is intrinsically an executive act involving
executive officer of the Subic Authority: the exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng
Provided, however, That for the first year of Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
its operationsfrom the effectivity of this Act, Court40 we held:
the mayor of the City of Olohgapo shall be The power to appoint is, in essence, dis
appointed as the chairman and chiefexecu cretionary. The appointing power has the
tive officer ofthe Subic Authority (emphasis right of choice which he may exercise freely
supplied). according to his judgment, deciding for him
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, em self who is best qualified among those who
ployees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zam- have the necessary qualifications and eligi
bales, and officers and members of the Filipino bilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing
Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities power...
in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of
par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics the power to appoint. Appointment involves an
infringes on the following constitutional and exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not
statutory provisions: . . . (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers
of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he to the appointee. In other words, the choice of
President shall . . . appoint all other officers of the appointee is a fundamental component ofthe
the Government whose appointments are not
appointing power.
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint", since Hence, when Congress-clothes the President
it was Congress through the questioned proviso with the power to appoint an officer,it (Congress)
and not the President who appointed the Mayor cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
to the subject posts;38 .... President to only one candidate. Once the power
of appointment is conferred on the President,
p$$ such conferment necessarily carries the discre
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t] tion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of
he designation of a person, by the person or per prescribing the qualifications ofthe officer, Con
sons having authority therefor, to discharge the gress may not abuse such power as to divest the
duties of some office or trust,"39 or "[t]he selec appointing authority, directly or indirectly, ofhis
tion or designation of a person, by the person or discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently,
persons having authority therefor, to fillan office when the qualifications prescribed by Congress
or public function and discharge the duties ofthe can only be met by. one individual, such enact
same. In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, ment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointing power to choose and constitutes an ir
appointment as "the selection, by the authority regular restriction on the powerofappointment.41
vested with the power, of an individual who is to In the case at bar, while congress willed
exercise the functions of a given office." that the subject posts be filled with a presiden-
Considering that appointment calls for a
selection, the appointing power necessarily <°140 SCRA 22, 35 (1985).
4,Whileit is inarguable that Congress has plenary au
38Petitioners allege that the proviso constitutes a thority to prescribe qualifications to a public office, it "may
"limitation to the power of appointment of the President not howeverprescribe qualifications such that the President
and therefore violates the separation of powers" and that is entirely stripped ofdiscretion, thus converting appointment
"Congress cannot create the position and at the same time to a mere ministerial act" (Gonzales, Neptali A.,Administra
specify the person to fill up such position" (Petition, pp. 4-5; tive Law,Law on Public Officersand Election Law, 1966ed.,
Rollo, pp. 6-6). p. 173, citing Manalangv. Quitoriano, No. L-6898, 30April
^BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. 1954; 94 Phil. 903).
^j)
tial appointee for the first year of its operations service, the Court resolved to give due course to
from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso the petition and decide,, setting aside the finer
nevertheless limits the appointing authority to procedural questions of whether prohibition is
only one eligible, i,e.} the incumbent Mayor of the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's
Olongapo City. Since only one, can qualify for right to the Office of Commissioner ofthe Bureau
the post iri question, the President is precluded cf Customs and of whether the petitioners have
from exercising his discretion to-choose whom to a standing to bring this suit.
appoint. Such supposed power of appointment,
By the same token and for the same pur
sans the essential element of choice, is no power
pose, the Court allowed the Commission on
at all and goes against the very nature itself of
Appointments to intervene and file a petition
appointmept.
is*i
in intervention. Comment was required of re
While it may be viewed that the proviso spondents on said petition. The comment was
merely sets the qualifications ofthe officer during filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The
I&3*
the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must parties were also heard in oral argument on 8
be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly December 1987.
an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
This case assumes added significance be
qualifications where only one, and no other, can
cause, at bottom line, it involves a conflict be
qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment ofthe
tween two (2) great departments of government,
appointing power on the President is a perfectly
the Executive and Legislative Departments. It
valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his
also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Consti
choice to one is certainly an encroachment on
tution.
his prerogative.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by
the existence of relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what
D. Sarmiento v. Mison the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cater,
156 SCRA 549 (1987), Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold
km CreekMining Corp. v. Rodriguez,42 that:
PADILLA, J.: "The fundamental principle of consti
tutional construction is to give effect to the
Once more the-Court is called upon to delin
intent of the framers of the organic law and
eate constitutional boundaries. In this petition
for prohibition, the petitioners who are taxpay of the people adopting it. The intention to
ers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of which force is to be given is that which is
the Philippines and professors of Constitutional embodied and expressed in the constitutional
Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mi- provisions themselves."
son from performing the functions of the Office The Court will thus construe the applicable
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and constitutional provisions, not in accordance with
the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary how the executive or the legislative department
ofthe Department of Budget, from effecting dis may want them construed, but in accordance
bursements in payment of Mison's salaries and with what they say and provide.
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appoint
ment as Commissioner ofthe Bureau of Customs
Section 16, Article VII ofthe 1987 Constitu
is unconstitutional by reason of its not having tion says:
been confirmed by the Commission on Appoint "The President shall nominate and, with
ments. The respondents, on the other hand, the consent of the Commission on Appoint
maintain the constitutionality of respondent ments, appoint the heads of the executive
Mison's appointment without the confirmation departments, ambassadors, other publicmin
ofthe Commission on Appointments. isters and consuls, or officers of the armed
Because of the demands of public interest,
iyi
including the need for stability in the public «66 Phil. 259, at 264.
jpjfel
forces from the rank of colonel or naval cap Third, those whom the President may be
tain, and other officers whoseappointments authorized by law to appoint;
are vested in him in this Constitution. He
Fourth, officers lower in rank45 whose
shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to ap The first group of officers is clearly appointed
point. The Congress may, by law, vest the with the consent of the Commission on Ap
appointment of other officers lower in rank pointments. Appointments of such officers are
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
heads ofthe departments, agencies, commis confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
sions or boards. the President appoints.46
"The President shall have the power to The second, third and fourth groups of offi
make appointments during the recess ofthe cers are the present bone of contention. Should
Congress,whether voluntary or compulsory, they be appointed by the President with or with
1 but such appointments shall be effectiveonly out the consent (confirmation) ofthe Commission
until disapproval by the Commissionon Ap on Appointments? By following the accepted rule
pointmentsor until the next adjournment of in constitutional and statutory construction that
the Congress." an express enumeration of subjects excludes
others not enumerated, it would follow that only
It is readily apparent that under the provi
those appointments to positions expressly stated
sions ofthe 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there
in the first group require the consent (confirma
are four (4) groups ofofficers whomthe President
tion) ofthe Commission on Appointments. But we
shall appoint.These four (4) groups,to whichwe need not rely solely on this basic rule of consti
will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
tutional construction. We'can refer to historical
First, the heads of the executive depart background as well as to the records ofthe 1986
&i&)
ments, ambassadors, other public ministers Constitutional Commission to determine, with
and consuls, officers ofthe armed forces from more accuracy, if not precision, the intention
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
other officers whose appointments are vested people adopting it, on whether the appointments
in him in this Constitution;43 by the President, under the second, third and
fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation)
Second, all other officers of the Govern
of the Commission on Appointments. Again,
ment whose appointments are not otherwise
in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief
provided for by law;44
Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
"In deciding this point, it should be
^The "other officers" whose appointments are vested in
the President in the 1987 Constitution are: borne in mind that a constitutional provision
1. Regular membersof the Judicial and Bar Council must be presumed to have been framed and
(ART. VIII, Sec. 8[2]); adopted in the light and understanding of
2. Chairman and Commissioners ofthe Civil Ser prior and existing laws and with reference to
vice Commission (ART. LX-B, Sec. 1[2]);
3. Chairman and Commissioners of the Commis them. 'Courts are bound to presume that the
sion on Elections (ART. K-C, Sec. 1[2]); people adopting a constitution are familiar
4. Chairman and Commissioners ofthe Commis with the previous and existing laws upon the
sion on Audit (ART. K-D, Sec. 1[2J); and,
5. Members ofthe regional consultative commission
(ART. X,Sec.18) 45The 1935 Constitution says."inferior officers" while the
"When Congress creates inferior offices and omits to 1987 Constitution states "officers lower in rank."
provide for appointments to them, or provides in an uncon "Example: Sen. Raul S. Manglapus was first nomi
stitutional way for such appointment, the officers are within nated by the President for the position of Secretary of the
the meaningofthe clause "officers of the Government whose Department of Foreign Affairs (an executive department).
appointments arenototherwise provided for bylaw" andthe After his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on
power to appoint such officers devolves on the President. Appointments, the President appointed him Secretary of
(USC, Const., Par. H.p. 529, citing Op., Atty. Gen. 213.) Foreign Affairs.
subjects to which its provisions relate, and Heads ofAgencies, Commissions, and Boards
upon which they express their judgment and the power to appoint inferior officers in their
opinion in its adoption.' (Barry v. Truax, 13 respective offices."
N.D.^131; 99 N.W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)47"
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article presidential appointments required the consent
VII ofthe 1935 Constitution, it is provided that— (confirmation) of the Commission on Appoint
xxxxx ments. It is now a sad part of our political
history that the power of confirmation by the
" (3) The President shall nominate and
ku) Commission on Appointments, under the 1935
with the consent of the Commission on
Constitution, transformed that commission,
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and
the executive departments and bureaus, similar malpractices.
fotj
officers ofthe army from the. rank of colonel,
of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution,
captain or commander, and all other officers consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
of the Government whose appointments which it was molded and remolded by successive
are not herein otherwise provided for, and amendments, placed the absolute power of ap
those whom he may be authorized by law to pointment in the President with hardly any check
appoint; but the Congress may by law vest on the part of the legislature.
the appointment of inferior officers, in the
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the
President alone, inthe courts, or in the heads
1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Con
of departments.
stitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state
" (4) The President shall have the power that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and
to make appointments daring the recess of the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground"
the Congress, but such appointments shall by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments for the first group
Commission on Appointments or until the of appointments and leaving to the President,
next adjournment of the Congress. without such confirmation, the appointment of
xxxxx
other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
" (7) xxx, and with the consent of the officers of lower rank.
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
i^j
ambassadors, other public ministers and The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional
consuls x x x." Commission support this conclusion. The original
text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution Committee on the Executive ofthe 1986 Consti
provides that — tutional Commission, read as follows:
" Section 10. The President shall appoint "Section 16. The President shall nomi
giJ the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers nate and, with the consent of a Commission
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from on Appointment, shall appoint the heads
the rank of Brigadier General or Commo of the executive departments and bureaus,
dore, and all other officers of the govern ambassadors, other public ministers and
ment whose appointments are not herein consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
otherwise provided for, and those whom he the rank of colonel or naval captain and
may be authorized by law to appoint. How all other officers of the Government whose
ever, the Batasang Pambansa may by law appointments are not otherwise provided
vest in the Prime Minister, members of the for by law, and those whom he may be au
Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, thorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior
4766Phil. 259, at 265. officers in the President alone, in the courts,
ijgj
y>
or in the heads of departments"48 [Emphasis THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz

supplied]. is recognized.
t^»
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of . MR. FOZ: Madam President, my pro
its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitu posed amendment is on page 7, Section 16,
tion. When the frames[sic] discussed on the line 26 which is to delete the words 'and bu
L reaus,' and on line 28 of the same page, to
floor of the Commission the proposed text of
Section 16, Article VII. a feeling was manifestly change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain'
expressedto make the power ofthe Commission to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL.
toj onAppointments overpresidential appointments This last amendment which is co-authored
more limited than that held by the Commission by Commissionerde Castro is to put a period
in the 1935 Constitution. Thus — (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29
of the same page, start a new sentence with
MR. RAMA: xxx May I ask that : HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
Commissioner Monsod be recognized.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the
THE PRESIDENT: We will call Commis amendments one by one. The first proposed
sioner Davide later. amendment is to delete the words 'and bu
reaus' on line 26.
MR. MONSOD: With'the Chair's in
dulgence, I just want to take a few minutes MR. FOZ: That is correct.
of our time to lay the basis for some of the MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of
amendments that I would like to propose to
the other Commissioners, what would be
the Committee this morning.
the justification of the proponent for such a
XXX xxx xxx deletion?
On Section 16, I would like to suggest MR. FOZ:The position of bureau director
wit
that the power of the Commission on Ap is actually quite low in the executive depart
pointments be limited to the department ment, and to require further confirmation of
heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but presidential appointment ofheads ofbureaus
not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels. would subject them to political influence.
'jiiit\
xxx xxx xxx"49 (Emphasis supplied.) MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's

proposed amendment by deletion also in
In the course of the debates on the text of cludes regional directors as distinguished
Section 16, there were two (2) major changes from merely staff directors, because the
proposed and approved by the Commission. regional directors have quite a plenitude of
These were (1)the exclusion ofthe appointments powers within the regions as distinguished
^3
of heads of bureaus from the requirement of from staff directors who only stay in the
confirmation by the Commission on Appoint office.
ments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments
made under the second sentence50 ofthe section MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors
from the same requirement. The records of the are under the supervision ofthe staffbureau
deliberations ofthe Constitutional Commission directors.
show the following: xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a ques
Foz be recognized. tion to Commissioner Foz? The Commis
sioner proposed an amendment to delete
igsJ
«Pp. 384-385, Vol. H, RECORD OF THE CONSTITU 'and bureaus' on Section 16. Who will then
TIONAL COMMISSION OF 1986. appoint the bureau directors if it is not the
"Pp. 433-435, Vol. n, RECORD OFTHE 1986 CONSTI President ?
TUTIONAL COMMISSION.
"The second sentence of Sec. 16, ART,VII of the 1987 MR. FOZ: It is still the President who
Constitution refers to what this Decision calls the second and
third groups ofofficers appointedby the President.
will appoint them but their appointment
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • '427
shall no longer be subject to confirmation by officers mentioned therein do not have

the Commission on Appointments. to be confirmed by the Commission on
ffiftl
Appointments.
' ^.MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it
is in line with the same answer of Commis MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
sioner de Castro?
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Da-
MR. FOZ: Yes. vide is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. XXX xxx xxx
aiiiill)
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent
What is the reaction of the Committee? accept an amendment to his amendment, so
that after 'captain' we insert the following
xxx xxx xxx
words: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM
Committee feels that this matter should be IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
submitted to the body for a vote. FR. BERNA£: It is a little vague.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there
MR. REGALADO: We will take the are positions provided for in the Constitu
amendments one by one. We will first vote tion whose appointments are vested in the
on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus' Presides L, as a matter of fact like those ofthe
different constitutional commissions.
on line 26, such that appointments of bureau
directors no longer need confirmation by the FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list
Commission on Appointments. of officials found in Section 16 is not an
exclusive list of those appointments which
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The
President shall nominate, and with the con
constitutionally require confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
sent ofa Commission on Appointments, shall
appoint the heads of the executive depart MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek
ments, ambassadors . .. the incorporation of the words I proposed.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner
to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, Davide restate his proposed amendment?
(m
line 26 ? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
MR. DAVIPE: After 'captain,' add the
amendments is[sic] approved.
following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
xxx xxx xxx APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTEDIN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
FR. BERNAS: How about: 'AND OTHER
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS RE
Leader is recognized.
QUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz CONSTITUTION?'
is recognized.
j|VjjJ MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President,
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the that is modified by the Committee.
third proposed amendment on page 7, line
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
28.1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain'
and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee
it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. accept?
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the MR. REGALADO: Just for the record,
Committee accepts the proposed amendment of course, that excludes those officers which
because it makes it clear that those other the Constitution does not require confirma-
1^}
[fSi
tion by the Commission on Appointments, edition) which meanings could, on the contrary
like the members of the judiciary and the stress that the word "also" in said second sen
!ss> Ombudsman. tence means that the President, in addition tc
nominating and, with the consent of the Com
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is
mission on Appointments, appointing the officers
very clear from the modification made by enumerated in the first sentence, can appoinl
S^j Commissioner Bernas.
(without such consent (confirmation) the officers
THE FRESIDENT: So we have now this mentioned in the second sentence.
proposedamendment of Commissioners Foz Rather than limit the area of consideration tc
!^J
and Davide.
the possible meanings ofthe word "also" as usee
xxx xxx xxx in the context of said second sentence, the Courl
has chosen to derive significance from the fad
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection
iSi that the first sentence speaks of nomination b>
to this proposed amendment of Commis the President and appointment by the Presidenl
sioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the
with the consent ofthe Commission on Appoint
Committee ? (Silence) The Chair hears none;
ments, whereas, the second sentence speaks onlj
the amendment, as amended, is approved"61
of appointment by the President. And, this use ol
(Emphasis supplied).
different language in two (2) sentences proximate
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to to each other underscores a difference in message
the second and third groups of officers can be conveyed and perceptions established, in line
made by the President without the consent (con with Judge Learned Hand's observation thai
firmation) ofthe Commission on Appointments. "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition'
but, more so, because the recorded proceedings
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly
Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of and expressly justify such differences.
Sec. 16, Article VII reading —
jfifi
As a result of the innovations introduced
"... He (the President) shall also appoint in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
all other officers of the Government whose there are officers whose appointments require
appointments are not otherwise provided no confirmation of the Commission on Appoint
ijjj
for by law and those whom he may be autho ments, even if such officers may be higher in
rized by law to appoint ...xxx" (Emphasis rank, compared to some officers whose appoint
supplied) ments have to be confirmed by the Commission
^s>
with particular reference to the word "also,"im on Appointments under the first sentence of
plies that the President shall "in like manner" the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate,
appoint the officers mentioned in said second the appointment of the Central Bank Governor
taj sentence. In other words, the President shall requires no confirmation by the Commission on
appoint the officers mentioned in said second Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than
sentence in the same manner as he appoints of a colonel in the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines
ficers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by or a consul in the Consular Service.
^j
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) But these contrasts, while initially impres
of the Commission on Appointments. sive, merely underscore the purposive intention
pti . Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" and deliberate judgment of the framers of the
in said second sentence is not necessarily sup 1987 Constitution that, except as to those of
portive ofthe conclusion he arrives at. For, as ficers whose appointments require the consent
the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" of the Commission on Appointments by express
could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.
(Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62,1981 VII, appointments of other officers are left to the
President without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. This conclusion
•"Pp. 514-521, Vol. II, RECORD OFTHE 1986CONSTI
TUTIONAL COMMISSION.
is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must,
**>
ijti''>
ARTICLE VII:THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 429
tgai
that the framers ofthe 1987 Constitution were It willbe recalledthat, in the 1935Constitution,
knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the following provisionappears at the end ofpar.
the foreseeable effects thereof. 3, section 10, Article VII thereof—
o
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamen "x x x; but the Congress may by law vest
tally executive or presidential in character. Lim the appointment of inferior officers, in the
Sjgl itations on or qualifications of such power should President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
be strictly construed against them. Such limita of departments." [Emphasis supplied.]
tions or qualifications must be clearly stated in
fe> order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first The above provision in the 1935 Constitution
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly appears immediately after the provision which
stated that appointments by the President to the makes practically all presidential appointments
positions therein enumerated require the consent subject to confirmation by the Commission on
of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments, thus —
As to the fourth group of officers whom the "3. The President shall nominate and
President can appoint, the intervenor Commis with the consent of the Commission on Ap-
sion on Appointments underscores the third * pointments, shall appoint the heads of the
sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII ofthe 1987 Con executive departments and bureaus, officers
stitution, which reads: of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the
ffifff
"The Congress may, by law, vest the ap Navy and Air Forces from the rank ofcaptain
pointment of other officers lower in rank in or commander, and all other officers of the
the President alone, in the .courts, or in the Government whose appointments are not
^J heads of departments, agencies, commis herein provided for, and those whom he may
sions, or boards." [Emphasis supplied.] be authorized by law to appoint; x x x"
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest In other words, since the 1935 Constitution
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the subjects, as a general rule, presidential appoint
President alone, this implies that, in the absence ments to confirmation by the Commission on
of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw
appointed by the President subject to confirma fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide
tion by the Commission on Appointments; and, that Congress may, however, by law vest the
if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to
that higher-ranked officers should be appointed "officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987
l^J
by the President, subject also to confirmation by Constitution) in the President alone, in the
the Commission on Appointments. courts, or in the heads of departments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit In the 1987 Constitution, however, as
that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, already pointed out, the clear and expressed
abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower- intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest appointments from confirmation by the Commis
$jjfii) their appointment in the President, in the courts, sion on Appointments, except appointments to
or in the heads ofthe various departments, agen offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence
cies, commissions, or boards in the government. of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was
No reason however is submitted for the use of no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec.
pi
the word "alone" in said third sentence. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word
The Court is not impressed by both argu "President" in providing that Congress may by
ments. It is of the considered opinion, after a law vest the appointment of lower-ranked of
careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 ficers in the President alone, or in the courts, or
Constitutional Commission, that the use of the in the heads of departments, because the power
word "alone" after the word "President" in said to appoint officers whom he (the President) may
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than be authorized by law to appoint is already vested
anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftsmanship. in the President, without need of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, in the second Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be

sentence ofthe same Sec. 16, Article VII. appointed by the proper department head."
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was
Article VII could have stated merely that, in the amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential
case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Cus
by law vest their appointment in the President, in toms Code ofthe Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus
the courts, or in the heads of various departments amended, now reads as follows:
of the government. In short, the word "alone"
"Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau
in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of
of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs shall
the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from
have one chief and one assistant chief, to be
the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of
known respectively as the Commissioner
the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant
'M (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and
in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall
Article VH. And, this redundancy cannot prevail each receive an annual compensation in ac
over the clear and positive intent ofthe framers cordance with the rates prescribed by exist
isa)
of the 1987 Constitution that presidential ap ing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy
pointments, except those mentioned in the Commissioner of Customs shall beappointed
first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not bythePresident ofthe Philippines." (Empha
subject to confirmation by the Commission on sis supplied.)
Appointments.
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and
Coming now to the immediate question PD No. 34) were approved during the effectiv
before the Court, it is evident that the position ity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a President may nominate and, with the consent
bureau head) is not one of those within the first ofthe Commission on Appointments, appoint the
group ofappointments where the consentofthe heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the
Commission on Appointments is required. As a Bureau of Customs.
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the
1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitu
among those officers whose appointments need tion, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34
the consent ofthe Commission on Appointments, have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art.
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliber VII, with the result that, while the appointment
g*i) ately excluded the position of"heads ofbureaus" of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
from appointments that need the consent (con is one that devolves on the President, as an ap
firmation) ofthe Commission on Appointments. pointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the con
Moreover, the President is expressly autho firmation of the Commission on Appointments.
rized by law to appoint the Commissionerofthe
Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 Consequently, we rule that the President of
of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Philippines acted within her constitutional
the Tariff and Customs Code ofthe Philippines, authority and power in appointing respondent
which was enacted by the Congress ofthe Philip Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau
pines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows: of Customs, without submitting his nomination
to the Commission on Appointments for con
"601. ChiefOfficialsof theBureau. —The firmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the
Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and full authority and functions of the office and to
one assistant chief, to be known respectively receive all the salaries and emoluments pertain
as the Commissioner, (hereinafter known as ing thereto.
the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commis
sioner of Customs, who shall each receive WHEREFORE, the petition and petition
an annual compensation in accordance with in intervention should be, as they are, hereby
the rates prescribed by existing laws. The DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. by the majority opinion. Yet in the case of the

multi-sectoral members ofthe regional consulta
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano,
tive commission, whose appointment is vested by
Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, J J., concur.
the Constitution in the President under Article
Teehankee (C.J.), see brief statement. X, Section 18, their confirmation is required al
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in a sepa though their rank is decidedly lower.
rate opinion. I do not think these discrepancies were in
Gutierrez, Jr., J., please see separate opin tended by the framers as they would lead to the
ion. absurd consequences we should avoid in inter
preting the Constitution.
Cruz, J., see dissent.
Sarmiento, J., concurring in a separate There is no question that bureau directors
are not required to be confirmed under the
opinion.
first sentence of Section 16, but that is not the
provision we ought to interpret. It is the second
iiiii
sentence we must understand for a proper reso
CRUZ, J., dissenting: lution of the issues now before us. Significantly,
although there was a long discussion ofthe first
The view of the respondent, as adopted by
sentence in the Constitutional Commission, there
the majority opinion, is briefly as follows: Con
is none cited on the second sentence either in the
firmation is required only for the officers men
Solicitor-General's comment or in the majority
tioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to wit:
opinion. We can therefore only speculate on the
(1) the heads of the executive departments; (2) correct interpretation of this provision in the
l&fti
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; light of the first and third sentences of Section
(3) officers of the armed forces from the rank of 16 or by reading this section in its totality.
colonel or naval captain; and (4) other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President The majority opinion says that the second
in the Constitution. No confirmation is required sentence is the exception to the first sentence and
under the second sentence for (1) all other officers holds that the two sets of officers specified therein
whose appointments are not otherwise provided may be appointed by the President without the
for by law, and (2) those whom the President concurrence ofthe Commission on Appointments.
may be authorized by law to appoint. Neither is This interpretation is pregnant with mischievous
confirmation required by the third sentence for if not also ridiculous results that presumably
those other officers lower in rank whose appoint were not envisioned by the framers.
ment is.vested by law in the President alone. One may wonder why it was felt necessary
Following this interpretation, the Undersec to include the second sentence at all, consider
retary of Foreign Affairs, who is not the head of ing the majority opinion that the enumeration
his department, does not have to be confirmed by in the first sentence of the officers subject to
the Commission on Appointments, but the ordi confirmation is exclusive on the basis of expressio
nary consul, who is under his jurisdiction, must unius estexclusio alterius . If that be so, the first
îtj
be confirmed. The colonel is by any standard

sentence would have been sufficient by itself to
lower in rank than the Chairman of the Com
convey the idea that ail other appointees of the
President would not need confirmation.
mission on Human Rights, which was created
by the Constitution; yet the former is subject to One may also ask why, if the officers men
confirmation but the latter is not because he does tioned in the second sentence do not need confir
not come under the first sentence. The Special mation, it was still felt necessary to provide in
L Prosecutor, whose appointment is not vested by the third sentence that the appointment of the
the Constitution in the President, is not subject other officers lower in rank will also not need
to confirmation under the first sentence, and confirmation as long as their appointment is
L neither are the Governor ofthe Central Bank and
the members ofthe Monetary Board because they
vested by law in the President alone. The third
sentence would appear to be superfluous, too,
fall under the second sentence as interpreted again in view ofthe first sentence.
More to the point, what will follow if Con The respondent cites the following exchange
gress does not see fit to vest in the President reported in page 520, Volume II, ofthe Record of
alone the appointment of those other officers the Constitutional Convention:
lower in rank mentioned in the third sentence?
Conformablyto the language thereof, these lower MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the
officers will need the confirmation of the Com third proposed amendment on page 7, line
mission on Appointments while, by contrast, the 28,1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain'
higher officers mentionedin the second sentence and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute
will not.
it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
^1
Thus, a regional director in the Department MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
of Labor and the labor arbiters, as officers lower Committee accepts the proposed amendment
in rank than the bureau director, will have to because it makes clear that those other offi
be confirmed if the Congress does not vest their cers mentioned therein do not have to be con
appointment in the President alone under the firmed by the Commission on Appointments.
third sentence. On the other hand, their superior,
• However, the records do not show what
the bureau director himself, will not need to be
particular part of Section 16 the committee
confirmed because, according to the majority
chairman was referring to, and a reading in its
opinion, he falls not under the first sentence
entirety of this particular debate will suggest
but the second. This is carefulness in reverse,
that the body was considering the first sentence
like checking the bridesmaids but forgetting
of the said section, which I reiterate is not the
the bride.
controversial provision. In any case, although the
It must be borne in mind that one of the excerpt shows that the proposed amendment of
purposes of the Constitutional Commission was Commissioner Foz was accepted by the commit
to restrict the powers of the Presidency and so tee, it is not reflected, curiously enough, in the
prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship. final version of Section 16 as a perusal thereof
Among the many measures taken was the res will readily reveal. Whether it was deleted later
toration of the Commission on Appointments in the session or reworded by the style committee
to check the appointing power which had been or otherwise replaced for whatever reason will
much abused by President Marcos. We are now need another surmise on this rather confused
told that even as this body was revived to limit Constitution.
appointments, the scope ofits originalauthority
has itself been limited in the new Constitution. I need only add that the records of the Con
I have to disagree.
stitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids
and are at best persuasive only and not neces
My own reading is that the second sentence sarily conclusive. Interestingly, some quarters
is but a continuation of the idea expressed in have observed that the Congress is not prevented
the first sentence and simply mentions the other from adding to the list of officers subject to con
officers appointed by the President whoare also firmation by.the Commission on Appointments
subject to confirmation. The second sentence is and cite the debates on this matter in support
the later expression ofthe willofthe framers and of this supposition. It is true enough that there
so must be interpreted as complementing the rule was such a consensus, but it is equally true that
embodied in the first sentence or, if necessary, this thinking is not at all expressed, or even only
reversing the original intention to exempt bureau implied, in the language of Section 16 of Article
directors from confirmation. I repeat that there VII. Which should prevail then — the provision
were no debates on this matter as far as I know, as worded of the debates?
which simply means that my humble conjecture
on the meaning of Section 16 is as arguable, at It is not disputed that the power of appoint
least, as the suppositionsofthe majority. Weread ment is executive in nature, but there is no ques
and rely on the same records. At any rate, this tion either that it is not absolute or unlimited.
view is more consistent with the general purpose The rule re-established by the new Constitution
ofArticle VII, which, to repeat, was to reduce the is that the power requires confirmation by the
powers ofthe Presidency. Commission on Appointments as a restraint on
presidential excesses, in line with the system of "April 6,1988

checks and balances. I submit it is the exception Hon. Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
to this rule, and not the rule, that should be Speaker, House of Representatives
strictly construed. Quezon City .
In my view, the only officers appointed by
Sir: *
the President who are not subject to confirma
tion by the Commission on Appointments are Pursuant to Article VH, Section 16, para
(1) the members of the judiciary and the Om graph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7, of the
budsman and his deputies, who are nominated Constitution, the President has appointed
by the Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice- the following persons to the seats reserved
President when he is appointed to the -Cabinet; for sectoral representatives in paragraph (1),
and (3) "other officers lower in rank," but only Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution:
o
when their appointment is vested by law in the 1. Teresita Quintos-Deles - Women

President alone. It is clear that this enumeration
2. Al Ignatius G. Lopez - Youth
does not include the respondent Commissioner
of Customs who, while not covered by the first 3. Bartolome Arteche - Peasant
sentence of Section 16, comes under the second 4. Rey Magno Teves - Urban Poor
sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so
is also subject to confirmation. Copies of their appointments are en
closed.
I vote to grant the petition.
With best wishes.
E. Quintos-Deles, et al. v. Commission Very truly yours,

on Appointments
177 SCRA 259 (1989) (SGD.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary"
BIDIN, J.: On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned

sectoral representatives were scheduled to take
This is a special civil action for prohibition their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
and mandamus with injunction seeking to com at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order
pel respondent Commission on Appointments of Business. However, petitioner and the three
to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to other sectoral representatives-appointees were
perform and discharge her duties as a member not able to take their oaths and discharge their
of the House of Representatives representing duties as members of Congress due to the op
the Women's Sector and to restrain respondents position of some congressmen-members of the
from subjecting petitioner's appointment to the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that
confirmation process. sectoral representatives must first be confirmed
by the respondent Commission before they
The antecedent facts which gave rise to this could take their oaths and/or assume office as
petition are as follows: members of the House of Representatives. This
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra,
others were appointed Sectoral Representa Jr. to suspend the oathtaking ofthe four sectoral
tives by the President pursuant to Article representatives.
VII, Section J 6, paragraph 2 and Article In view of this development, Executive Sec
XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Ex retary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on
ecutive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. April 25, 1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of
transmitted by letter, also dated April 6, the President addressed to the Commission on
1988 (Annex L) the appointment of the said Appointments submitting for confirmation the
sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon appointments of the four sectoral representa
Mitra, Jr. as follows: tives as follows:
CONSTTTUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
"
434
($>•)
11 April 1988 since "President Corazon C. Aquino has submit

ted your appointment to the Commission on
The Honorable
Appointments for confirmation in a letter dated
Jovito R. Salonga April 11,1988, xxx the Commission on Appoint
The Senate President and ments now has sole jurisdiction over the matter."
The Members ofthe Commission On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received
on Appointments an invitation dated May 6,1988 to attend a Com
mission on Appointments Committee Meeting
Congress of the Philippines
scheduled for May 12, 1988 for the deliberation
Manila of her appointment as sectoral representative
for women (Annex DD). Petitioner sent a reply
Gentlemen:
dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, questioning the jurisdiction ofthe Commission on
paragraph 2, and Article XVIII, Section 7, Appointments over the appointment of sectoral
of the Constitution,. I hereby submit, for representatives (Annex EE).
confirmation, the appointments of the fol
K«l
lowing persons as Members of the House In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Com
of Representatives representing the sectors mittee of the Constitutional Commissions and
indicated opposite their respective names: Offices of the Commission on Appointments,
chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Commit
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES - Women tee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
AL IGNATIUS G. LOPEZ -Youth Hence, this petition for prohibition and man
BARTOLOME ARTECHE - Peasant damus praying that respondent Commission on
Appointments be enjoined from subjecting to
REY MAGNO TEVES - Urban Poor confirmation process the petitioner's appoint
An early confirmation of their appoint ment as sectoral representative for the women's
ments will be appreciated. sector and as member of Congress.
Petitions in intervention were likewise
Very truly yours. filed by Estefania Aldaba Lim, et al. (Rollo,
(Sgd)Corazon C. Aquino" p. 147); Ma. Iris Melizza, et al. (Rollo, p. 172);
Margarita Gomez, et al. (Rollo, p. 186); Hernani
Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April Panganiban, et al. (Rollo, p. 208); Presentacion
22,1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Castro, et al. (Rollo, p. 215); Sr. Teresa Dagdag,
Jr. (Annex V) appealed to the House of Repre et al. (Rollo, p. 251); and Civil Liberties Union
sentatives alleging, among others, that since "no (Rollo, p. 274).
Kfrfl attempt was made to subject the sectoral repre Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends
sentatives52 already sitting to the confirmation that her appointment as Sectoral Representative
process, there is no necessity for such confirma for Women by the President pursuant to Section
tion and subjection thereto of the present batch 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not
would certainly be discriminatory." require confirmation by the Commission on Ap
In reply, Speaker Mitra in a letter dated pointments to qualify her to take her seat in the
May 2,1988 (Annex BB)informedpetitioner that House of Representatives.
The opposite view is taken by the Solicitor
52It appears that on August 4, 1987, President Aquino General in his Statement of Position (In lieu of
initially appointed four sectoral representatives, namely: Comment), dated July 15,1988 (Rollo, p. 206) in
Romeo Angeles, RamonJabar, Estelita Juco and Dionisio S.
Ojeda torepresentthe Peasants,Labor, Disabled andWomen this wise: "In view ofthe President's submission
and Veterans and Elders sectors, respectively. Said sectoral ofthe four sectoral representatives, the petition
representatives, after takingtheir oathsofoffice, assumed er included, to the Commission on Appointments
the functions and duties of their officeswithout having been byletter dated April 11,1988, then confirmation
required toundergo confirmation process bytheCommission
on Appointments.
bythe Commission onAppointments is required."
fJJJJMJ
On August 15, 1988, respondent Commis . tives is reserved for sectoral representatives.
sion on Appointments, in addition to adopting The reservation is limited to three consecutive
the Statement of Position (in lieu of Comment) terms after ratification ofthe 1987 Constitution.
submitted by the Solicitor General, likewise Thus, Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI ofthe 1987
submitted its own Statement of Position (In Constitution provides:
lieu of Comment) and further manifested that
(1) the appointment of petitioner Deles was not "SEC. 5. (1) Th*e House of Representa
acted upon by the Commission on Appointments tives shall be composed of not more than
when Congress went into recess as required by two hundred and fifty members, unless
i^&t
the Constitution; (2) the case of petitioner Deles otherwise fixed by law, who sWl be elected
for appointment as sectoral representative to the from legislative districts apportioned among
House of Representatives has become moot and the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
academic not having been finally acted upon at Manila area in accordance with the number
the close of the session of Congress pursuant to of their respective inhabitants, and on the
Sec. 23 of the Rules of the Commission (Rollo, basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
pp. 233-234) which reads as follows: and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of regis
"Section 23. Suspension of Consider tered national, regional, and sectoral parties
ation of Nomination or Appointments to be or organizations.
Returned to the President. - Nominations or
appointments submitted by the President of "(2) The party-list representatives shall
the Philippines which are not finally acted constitute twenty per centum of the total
upon at the close of the session cf Congress number of representatives including those
sal
shall be returned to the President, and unless under the party-list. For three consecutive
resubmitted, shall not again be considered by terms after the ratification of this Constitu
the Commission." tion, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as
On January 31,1989, the Court after noting provided by law, by selection or election from
the reply filed by the petitioner and the rejoinder the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
filed by respondents, resolved to give due course cultural communities, women, youth, and
to the petition and the parties were required to such other sectors as may be provided by
submit their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. law, except the religious sector."
309). By way of manifestation and motion dated
March 9, 1989 (Rollo, p. 311), the Office ofthe Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Con
Solicitor General adopted its statement of posi stitution, the appointment of sectoral repre
tion (in lieu of comment) and rejoinder as its sentatives is vested upon the President until
memorandum. Petitioners and intervenor Civil otherwise provided by law, as follows:
\M Liberties Union submitted their memoranda on
March 22,1989 and March 30,1989, respectively.
"SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the Pre
sident may fill by appointment from a list
A supplemental statement of position (in lieu of
of nominees by the respective sectors the
memorandum) dated March 31, 1989 was filed
seats reserved for sectoral representation in
by respondent Commission.
paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this
The Constitution provides that the House of Constitution."
Representatives shall be composed of not more
The issue is, whether the Constitution
than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected requires the appointment of sectoral represen
tatives to the House of Representatives to be
from the legislative districts and those who as
provided by law, shall be elected thru a party-list confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
system. The party-list representatives shall con Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
stitute 20% ofthe total number of representatives enumerates, among others, the officers who may
or fifty (50) seats. One-half or twenty-five (25) be appointed by the President with the consent
of the seats allocated to party-list representa- ofthe Commission on Appointments, as follows:
kiifti
"SEC. 16. The President shall nominate The first group of officers is clearly ap
and, with the consent of the Commission pointed with the consent ofthe Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of on Appointments. Appointments of such of
the executive departments, ambassadors, ficers are initiated by nomination and, if the
other public ministers and consuls, or of nomination is confirmed by the Commission
ficers of the armed forces from the rank of on Appointments, the President appoints.
colonel or naval captain, and other officers xxx xxx
whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all (T)he purposive intention and deliberate
other officers of the Government whose ap judgment ofthe framers ofthe 1987 Constitu
pointments are not otherwise provided for by tion (is) that, except as to those officers whose
law, and those who he may be authorized by appointments require the consent of the
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, Commission on Appointments by express
vest the appointment of other officers lower mandate ofthe first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, VII, appointments of other officers are left to
or in the heads ofthe departments, agencies, the President without need of confirmation
commissions, or boards. by the Commission on Appointments. This
conclusion is inevitable, if we are to pre
The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the sume, as we must, that the framers of the
1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective what they were doing and ofthe foreseeable
effects thereof.
only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment Besides, the power to appoint is funda
of the Congress." mentally executive or presidential in charac
In Sarmiento v. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 ter. Limitations on or qualifications of such
[1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII of power should be strictly construed against
the Constitution to mean that only appointments them. Such limitations or qualification's must
to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the be clearly stated in order to be recognized.
said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec.
by the Commission on Appointments, as follows: 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that
appointments by the President to the posi
"It is readily apparent that under the tions therein enumerated require the consent
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just of the Commission on Appointments."
quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four Our ruling in Mison was reiterated in the
(4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer recent case of Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Sen.
isft from time to time, are:
Jovito Salonga, et al. (G.R. No. 86439, promul
gated on April 13,1989) wherein the Court held:
First, the heads ofthe executive depart
ments, ambassadors, other public ministers 'The Mison case was the first major case
and consuls, officers ofthe armed forces from under the 1987 Constitution and in constru
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and ing Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitu
other officers whose appointments are vested tion, xxxxxxxxx this Court, drawing
in him in this Constitution; extensively from the proceedings ofthe 1986
Second, all other officers of the Govern Constitutional Commission and the country's
ment whose appointments are not otherwise experience under the 1935 and 1973 Consti
provided for by law; tutions, held that only those appointments
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Third, those whom the President may be Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the
authorized by law to appoint; Commission on Appointments, namely, 'the
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose ap heads ofthe executive departments, ambas
pointments the Congress may by law vest in sadors, other public ministers and consuls,
the President alone. or officers of the armed forces from the rank
ARTICLE VU: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 437
^friijiJ
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers The invocation ofArt. XVIII, Section 7 ofthe
whose appointments are vested in him in Constitution as authority for the appointment of
this Constitution.' All other appointments petitioner places said appointment within the
by-the President are to be made without ambit ofthe first sentence ofSection 16,Art. VII;
the participation of the Commission on Ap- hence, subject to confirmation by the Commission
. pointments." on Appointments under the Mison doctrine. Pe
Since the seats reserved for sectoral rep titioner's appointment was furthermore made
resentatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16. paragraph 2
may be filled by appointment by the President by which provides:
express provision of Section 7, Art. XVHI of the
Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral rep "SEC. 16. x x x
resentatives to the House of Representatives are The President shall have the power to
among the "other officers whose appointments make appointments during the recess ofthe
are vested in the President in this Constitution," Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, but such appointments shall be effective
Art. VII whose appointments are subject to con only until disapproval by the Commission on
firmation by the Commission on Appointments Appointments or until the next adjournment
(Sarmiento v. Mison, supra ). ofthe Congress."
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested
The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16
in the President in the Constitution which, by
of Article VII as additional authority for the
express mandate of the Constitution, require
no confirmation such as appointments of mem
appointment of petitioner is of vital significance
kigi
bers of the Supreme Court and judges of lower to the case at bar. The records show that peti
courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman tioner's appointment was made on April 6,1988
and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such ex or while Congress was in recess (March 26,1988
emption from confirmation had been extended to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the
to appointments of sectoral representatives in said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VH in the
the Constitution. appointment extended to her.
Petitioner was appointed on April 6, 1988 Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2,

pursuant to Art. XVIII, Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16, Art. VH as authority for the appoint
Section 16, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, to ment of petitioner is, the recognition by the Presi
wit: dent as appointing authority that petitioner's
appointment requires confirmation by the Com
"6 April 1988 mission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2,
Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the
ijiiii Madam: President pursuant thereto "shall be effective
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, only until disapproval by the Commission on
paragraph 2 and Article XVHI, Section 7, of Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Constitution, you are hereby appointed the Congress." Ifindeed appointments of sectoral
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP representatives need no confirmation, the Presi
RESENTATIVES. dent need not make any reference to the constitu
tional provisions above-quoted in appointing the
By virtue hereof, you may qualify to said petitioner. As a matter offact, the President in a
position furnishing this office with copies of letter dated April 11,1989 had expressly submit
your oath of office.
ted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by
Very truly yours. the Commission on Appointments. Considering
that Congress had adjourned without respondent
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
Commission on Appointments having acted on
petitioner's appointment, said appointment/ *
Hon.TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES"
nomination had become moot and academic pur
(Annex "M," Petition, Rollo, p. 108.) suant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not executive departments, ambassadors, other
again be considered by the Commission." public ministers and consuls, or officers of
ti^>
the armed forces from the rank of colonel
Petitioners further contend that nowhere
or naval captain, and other officers whose
in the Constitution nor in Executive Order No.
appointments are vested in him in this
198 is mention made ofthe need for petitioner's
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
appointment to be submitted to the Commission officers of the Government whose appoint
on Appointments for confirmation. Executive ments are not otherwise provided for by law,
Order No. 198 promulgated on June 18, 1987 and those whom he may be authorized by
before the convening of Congress, is denomi law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
nated: "Providing for the Manner of Nomination vest the appointment of other officers lower
and Appointment of Sectoral Representatives in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
tig)
to the House of Representatives." We agree or in the heads of departments, agencies,
with the submission of respondent Commission commissions, or boards.
that the provisions of Executive Order No. 198
do not deal with the manner of appointment of .'The President shall have the power to
VZi*>i
sectoral representatives. Executive Order1 No. make appointments during the recess ofthe
198 confines itself to specifying the sectors to be Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
represented, their number, and the nomination but such appointments shall be effective only
of such sectoral representatives. until disapproval by the Commission on Ap
Si)
pointments or until the next adjournment of
The power of the President to appoint sec the Congress."
toral representatives remains directly derived
from Section 7, Article XVHI ofthe Constitution The power of the Commission on Appoint
ments (CA for brevity) to confirm appointments,
which is quoted in the second "Whereas" clause of
contained in the aforequoted paragraph 1 Sec. 16,
Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by
Art. VII, was first construed in Sarmiento III v.
the President of sectoral representatives require
MisonhZ as follows:
the consent ofthe Commission on Appointments
in accordance with the first sentence of Section ". . . it is evident that the position of
16, Art. VII ofthe Constitution. More to the point, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by- (a bureau head) is not one of those within
virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to the first group of appointments where the
Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVHI, consent ofthe Commission on Appointments
Section 7 of the Constitution which require sub is required. As a matter of fact, as already
mission to the confirmation process. pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes 'heads of bureaus' among those
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition
officers whose appointments need the con
and mandamus with preliminary injunction is
iiSl
sent of the Commission on Appointments,
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand,
pronouncement as to costs.
deliberately excluded the position of "heads
SO ORDERED. ofbureaus' from appointments that need the
conseht (confirmation) ofthe Commission on
Appointments.
F. Calderon v. Carale
G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992 ". . . Consequently, we rule that the
President of the Philippines acted within
PADILLA, J.: her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Com
Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. missioner ofthe Bureau of Customs, without
VH ofthe 1987 Constitution which provides: submitting his nomination to the Commis
"Sec. 16. The President shall nominate sion on Appointments for confirmation... ."
and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, apoint the heads of the 53G.R. No. 79974,17 December 1987,156 SCRA 549.
". . . In the 1987 Constitution, however, to the secondsentence in Section16,Art. VH,

as already pointed out, the clear and ex that is, without the confirmation ofthe Com
pressed intent of its framers was to exclude mission on Appointments because they are
presidential appointments from confirmation among the officers of government 'whom he
by the Commission on Appointments, except (the President) may be authorized by law to
appointments to offices expressly mentioned appoint.' And Section 2(c), Executive Order
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII. No. 163, 5 May 19^7, authorizes the Presi
Consequently, there was no reason to use dent to appoint the Chairman and Members
in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the Commission on Human Rights."
the word 'alone' after the word 'President'
in providing that Congress may by law vest Consistent with its rulings in Mison and
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in Bautista, in Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The
the President alone, or in the courts, or in Commission on Constitutional Commissions, et
the heads of the departments, because the a/,55 the power of confirmation of the Commis
power to appoint officers whom he (the Presi sion on Appointments over appointments by the
dent) may be authorized by law to appoint President ofsectoral representatives in Congress
is already vested in the President, without was upheld because:
need of confirmation by the Commission on "... Since the seats reserved for sectoral
Appointments, in the second sentence of representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5.
the same Sec. 16, Article VII." (emphasis Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
supplied). President by express provision of Section 7,
Next came Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Art. XVIII ofthe Constitution, it is indubita
Salonga,54 this time involving the appointment ble that sectoral representatives to the House
of the Chairman of the Commission on Human of Representatives are among the 'other of
Rights. Adhering to the doctrine in Mison, the ficers whose appointments are vested in the
Court explained: President in this Constitution,' referred to
in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
"... Since the position of Chairman of the whose appointments are subject to confirma
Commission on Human Rights is not among tion by the Commission on Appointments."
the positions mentioned in the first sentence
From the three (3) cases above-mentioned,
of Sec. 16, Art. VII ofthe 1987 Constitution,
these doctrines are deducible:
appointments to which are to be made with
the confirmation of the Commission on Ap 1. Confirmation by the Commission on
pointments, it follows that the appointment Appointments is required only for presidential
by the President ofthe Chairman ofthe CHR appointees mentioned in the first sentence of
is to be made without the review or partici Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
pation ofthe Commission on Appointments. whose appointments are expressly vested by the
To be more precise, the appointment of the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
Chairman and Members of the Commission representatives to Congress and members of
on Human Rights is not specifically provided the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Service and Election).
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
. 2. Confirmation is not required when the
Commission, the Commission on Elections
President appoints other government officers
and the Commission on Audit, whose ap
whoseappointments are not otherwise provided
pointments are expressly vested by the Con
for by law or those officerswhom he may be au
stitution in the President with the consent of
thorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman
the Commission on Appointments. The Presi
and Members of the Commission on Human
dent appoints the Chairman and Members of
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Con
the Commission on Human Rights pursuant
gress creates inferior offices but omits to provide
MG.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989,172 SCRA 160. MG.R. No. 83216,4 September 1989,177 SCRA259,260.
for appointment thereto, or provides in an un Appointments of other officers appointed by the

constitutional manner for such appointments, President additional to those mentioned hrthe
iiislj
the officers are considered as among those whose first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
appointments are not otherwise provided for by Constitution. Petitioner claims that the Mison
law. and Bautista rulings are not decisive ofthe issue
in this case for in the case at bar, the President
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-
issued permanent appointments to the respon
Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442)
dents without submitting them to the CA for
was approved.' It provides in Section 13 thereof
confirmation despitepassage ofa law (RA 6715)
as follows:
which requires the confirmation by the Commis
xxx xxx xxx sion on Appointments of such appointments.
The Chairman, the Division Presiding The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
Commissioners and other Commissioners contends that RA 6715 which amended the La
shall all be appointed by the President, sub bor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VH by
ject to confirmation by the Commission on expanding the confirmation powers of the Com
Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy mission on Appointments without constitutional
shall come from the nominees of the sector basis. Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest,
which nominated the predecessor. The Ex says the Solicitor General, with the following
ecutive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters exposition:
shall also be appointed by the President,
upon recommendation ofthe Secretary of La "As interpreted by this Honorable Court
bor and Employment, and shall be subject to in the Mison case, confirmation by the
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." Commission on Appointments is required
exclusively for the heads of executive
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President departments, ambassadors, public ministers,
Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commis consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
sioners of the NLRC representing the public, rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
workers and employers sectors. The appoint officers whose appointments are vested in
ments stated that the appointees may qualify the President by the Constitution, such as
and enter upon the performance of the duties of the members of the various Constitutional
the office. After said appointments, then Labor Commissions. With respect to the other
Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administra officers whose appointments are not otherwise
tive Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating provided for by the law and to those whom
the places of assignment ofthe newly appointed the President may be authorized by law to
commissioners. appoint, no confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments is required.
This petition for prohibition questions the
constitutionality and legality of the permanent "Had it been the intention to allow Con
appointments extended by the President of the gress to expand the list of officers whose
Philippines to the respondents Chairman and appointments must be confirmed by the Com
Members ofthe National Labor Relations Com mission on Appointments, the Constitution
mission (NLRC), without submitting the same to would have said so by adding the phrase "and
the Commission on Appointments for confirma other officers required by law" at the end of
tion pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the
%1
amended by said RA 6715. consent ofthe Commission on Appointments"
at the end ofthe second sentence. Evidently,
Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance our Constitution has significantly omitted to
with RA 6715 which has in its favor the pre provide for such additions.
sumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according
topetitioner,an encroachmenton the appointing "The original text of Section 16 ofArticle
power of the executive contained in Section 16, VH ofthe present Constitution as embodied
Art. VH,ofthe Constitution, as Congress may, by in Resolution No. 517 of the Constitutional
law, require confirmation by the Commissionon Commission reads as follows:
:/*m
'The President shall nominate and, nomination, confirmation and appointment

with the consent of the Commission on operates. This is only true of the first group
tm
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of enumerated in Section 16, but the word
"the executive departments and bureaus, nominate does not any more appear in the
ambassadors, other public ministers and 2nd and 3rd sentences. Therefore, the presi
consuls, or officers of the armed forces dent's appointment pursuant to the 2nd and
from the rank of captain or commander, 3rd sentences need no confirmation."
and all other officers of the Government
|»i whose appointments are not herein oth The only issue to be resolved by the Court in
erwise provided for by law, and those the present case is whether or not Congress may,
whom he may be authorized by law to by law, require confirmation by the Commission
appoint. The Congress may by law vest on Appointments of appointments extended by
the appointment of inferior officers in the the President to government officers additional
President alone, in the courts or in the to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence
head of the department.' of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the Com
"Three points should be noted regarding mission on Appointments.
subsection 3 of Section 10 ofArticle VII ofthe
To resolve the issue, we go back to Mison
1935 Constitution and in the original text of
where the Court stated:
Section 16 of Article VII of the present Con
stitution as proposed in Resolution No. 517. ". . . there are four (4) groups of officers
"First, in both of them, the appointments whom the President shall appoint. These four
of head of bureaus were required to be con (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer
firmed by the Commission on Appointments. from time to time, are:
"Second, in both of them, the appoint 'First, the beads of the executive depart
ments of other officers, 'whose appoint ments, ambassadors, other public ministers
ments are not otherwise provided for by and consuls, officers ofthe armed forces from
law to appoint' are expressly made subject the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
to confirmation by the Commission on Ap other officers whose appointments are vested
pointments. However, in the final version of in him in this Constitution;
Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Section 'Second, all other officers of the Govern
16 of Article VII ofthe present Constitution, ment whose appointments are not otherwise
km
the appointment ofthe above mentioned of provided for by law;
ficers (heads of bureaus; other officers whose
'Third, those whom the President may
appointments are not provided for by law;
be authorized by law to appoint;
and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint) are excluded from the list of 'Fourth, officers lower in rank whose ap
those officers whose appointments are to be pointments the Congress may by law vest in
confirmed by the Commission on Appoint the President alone."'
ments. This amendment, reflected in Section
Mison also opined:
16 of Article VH of the Constitution, clearly
shows the intent of the framers to exclude "In the course of the debates on the
such appointments from the requirement text of Section 16, there were two (2) ma
of confirmation by the Commission on Ap jor changes proposed and approved by the
pointments. Commission. These were (1) the exclusion
of the appointments of heads of bureaus
"Third, under the 1935 Constitution the from therequirement ofconfirmation by the
word 'nominate' qualifies the entire Subsec Commission on Appointments; and (2) the
tion 3 of Section 10 of Article VII thereof. exclusion of appointments made under the
"Respondentreiterates that if confirma secondsentence ofthe sectionfromthe same
tionis required, the three (3) stageprocess of requirement "
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VH refers modified or reversed except by the Court sitting
to all other officers of the government whose ap en banc.56
pointment are not otherwise provided for by law
"... The interpretation upon a law by this
and those whom the President may be authorized
Court constitutes, in a way, a part ofthe law
by law to appoint.
as ofthe date that law was originally passed,
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Com since this Court's construction merely es
missioners fall within the second sentence of tablishes the contemporaneous legislative
Section 16, Article VII ofthe Constitution, more intent that the law thus construed intends
specifically under the "third groups" of appoin to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
tees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the numerous authorities is a restatement of
President may be authorized by law to appoint. the legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim
g»)
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the obtinent'— the interpretation placed upon
NLRC are not among the officers mentioned the written law by a competent court has the
in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII force of law."57
whose appointments requires confirmation by :r The ruling in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-
the Commission on Appointments. To the extent Deles have interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consis
that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Com tently in one manner. Can legislation expand a
mission on Appointments of the appointments constitutional provision after the Supreme Court
of respondents Chairman and Members of the has interpreted it?
National Labor Relations Commission, it is un
constitutional because: In Endencia and Jugo v. David,56 the Court
held:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sen
tence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by "By legislative fiat as enunciated in sec
adding thereto appointments requiring confirma tion 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says
tion by the Commission on Appointments; and that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is
m>
not a decrease of compensation. This is a
2) it amends by legislation the second sen clear example of interpretation or ascertain
tence of Sec. 16, Art. VII ofthe Constitution, by ment of the meaning of the phrase 'which
imposing the confirmation of the Commission shall not be diminished during their continu
on Appointments on appointments which are ance in office,' found in section 9, Article VIII
otherwise entrusted only with the President. of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
1^J
Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative of judicial officers.''
prerogative. Determining their constitutional xxx xxx xxx
ity is a judicial function. The Court respects the
laudable intention ofthe legislature. Regretfully, 'The rule is recognized elsewhere that
however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of the legislature cannot pass any declara
RA 6715 amending Art. 215 ofthe Labor Code, tory act, or act declaratory of what the
law was before its passage, so as to give
L insofar as it requires confirmation ofthe Commis
sion on Appointments over appointments of the it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in
Chairman and Members of the National Labor
a statute is not conclusive of its mean
Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it,
ing as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to
legislature would be usurping a judicial
the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art.
function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur.,
VII thereof.
914, emphasis supplied.)
Supreme Court decisions applying or in
terpreting the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines. No doctrine "Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3), 1987 Constitution.
"People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061,27 February 1974,
mi or principle of law laid down by the Court in a 55 SCRA 607.
decision rendered en banc or in division may be 5BG.R. Nos. L-6355-56, 31 August 1953, 93 Phil. 699.
liijffii
'The legislature cannot, upon pass Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
ing law which violates a constitutional which is challenged and to decide whether the
provision, validate it so as to prevent an latter squares with the former" and to "announce
„ attack thereon in the courts, by a declara its considered judgment upon the question."
tion that it shall be so construed as not
to violate the constitutional inhibition.'
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art.
(11 Am., Jur., 919, emphasis supplied.)
VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately,
not unconsciously, intended by the framers of
"We have already said that the Legis the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the
lature under our form of government is as system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where
signed the task and the power to make and the Commission on Appointments exercised
enact laws, but not to interpret them. This the power of confirmation over almost all presi
is more true with regard to the interpreta dential appointments, leading to many cases of
tion ofthe basic law, the Constitution, which abuse of such power of confirmation. Subsection
is not within the sphere of the Legislative 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution
department. If the Legislature may declare provided:
what a law means, or what a specific portion
of the Constitution means, especially after "3. The President shall nominate and
the courts have in actual case ascertained its with the consent of the Commission on Ap
meaning by interpretatin and applied it in a pointments, shall appoint the heads of the
decision, this would surely cause confusion executive departments and bureau, officers
and instability in judicial processes and court of the Army from the rank of the colonel, of
decision. Under such a system, a final court the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of
determination of a case based on a judicial captain or commander, and all other officers
interpretation of the law or of the Constitu of the Government whose appointments are
tion may be undermined or even annulled by not herein otherwise provided for, and those
a subsequent and different interpretation of whom he may be authorized by law to ap
the law or ofthe Constitution by the Legisla point; ..."
tive department. That would be neither wise The deliberate limitation on the power of
nor desirable, besides being clearly violative confirmation ofthe Commission on Appointments
of the fundamental principles of our consti over presidential appointments, embodied in
tutional system of government, particularly Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has
those governing the separation of powers." undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disap
Congress, of course, must interpret the proval of members ofthe Congress. The solution
Constitution, must estimate the scope of its to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem,
constitutional powers when it sets out to enact is not judicial or legislative but constitutional.
legislation and it must take into account the A future constitutional convention or Congress
relevant constitutional prohibitions.59 sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly
may then consider either a return to the 1935
"... The Constitution did not change with Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a
public opinion. hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 con
It is not only the same words, but the stitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty
same in meaning... and as long as it speaks ofthe Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in ac
not only in the same words, but with the cordance with what it says and not in accordance
same meaning and intent with whichit spoke with how the legislature or the executive would
when it came from the hands of its framers, want it interpreted.
and was voted and adopted by the people..." WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The function of the Court in passing upon Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the 6715 insofar as it requiresthe confirmation ofthe
Commission on Appointments of appointments
of the Chairman and Members of the National
MSwisher, Carl Brent, The Supreme Court in Modern
Role, NYU Press, Inc., 1958, pp. 34-35.
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby
declared unconstitutional and of no legal force Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again
and effect. the appointment of petitioner to the same posi
tion in a 'Temporary" capacity.
SO ORDERED.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Maca
CRUZ, J., dissenting: pagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of
re-examined instead of being automatically re seven years and all expiring on February 2,2008.
affirmed simply because of its original adoption. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the
I do not believe we should persist in error on $he position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and
ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and
however unsound. assumed their positions as COMELEC Commis
sioners. The Office of the President submitted
NOTE: The doctrine in Caldero v. Carale to the Commission on Appointments on May 22,
was reiterated in Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
111243, May 25, 1994 (appointment of Central Borra and Tuason for confirmations. However,
Bank Governor); Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. the Commission on Appointments did not act on
107369. August 11, 1999. (appointment of the said appointments.
L head of the Philippine National Police.)
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
G. Matibag v. Benipayo
and Tuason to the same positions and for the
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
same term of seven years, expiring on February
2, 2008. They took their oaths of office for a sec
CARPIO, J.:
ond time. The Office of the President transmit
The Case ted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
Before us is an original Petition for Prohi
bition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of Congress adjourned before the Commis
preliminary injunction and a temporary restrain sion on Appointments could act on their ap
ing order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of pointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President
Civil Procedure. Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Macapagal-Arroyo renewed again the ad interim
Matibag ("Petitioner" for brevity) questions the appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to
constitutionality of the appointment and the the same positions. The Office of the President
right to hold office ofthe following: (1) Alfredo L. submitted their appointments for confirmation
Benipayo ("Benipayo" for brevity) as Chairman to the Commission on Appointments. They took
ofthe Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for their oaths of office anew.
brevity); and (2) Resurreccion Z. Borra ("Borra"
for brevity) and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. ("Tua- In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman,
son" for brevity) as COMELEC Commissioners. Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April
Petitioner also questions the legality of the ap 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV
pointment of Velma J. Cinco ("Cinco"for brevity) of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of
as Director IV ofthe COMELEC's Education and the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
Information Department ("EID" for brevity). the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law
Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-
The Facts
Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner's.
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en reassignment in a Memorandum dated April
banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc.
IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned
Chairperson Harriet 0. Demetriou renewed the Benipayo's failure to consult the Commissioner-
appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of
in a 'Temporary" capacity. On February 15,2001, petitioner.
f
On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested In the meantime, on September 6, 2001,
Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director President Macapagal-Arroyo renewed once again
fcai
IV of the EID and her reassignment to the the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as
Law Department. Petitioner cited Civil Service COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government years expiring on Februa/y 2,2008. They all took
offices that "transfer and detail of employees their oaths of office anew.
are prohibited during the election period begin
The issues for resolution of this Court are
ning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo as follows:
denied her request for reconsideration on April
18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
L dated November 6, 2000, which states in part: 2 Whether or not the assumption of office
by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis
"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission
of the ad interim appointments issued by the
on Elections by virtue ofthe powers conferred
President amounts to a temporary appointment
upon it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article LX-C of the
Election Code and other election laws, as an
Constitution;
exception to the foregoing prohibitions, has
RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to 3 Assuming that the first ad interim ap
appoint, hire new employees or fill new posi pointments and the first assumption of office by
tions and transfer or reassign its personnel, Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether
when necessary in the effective performance or not the renewal of their ad interim appoint
of its mandated functions during the prohib ments and subsequent assumption of office to
ited period, provided that the changes in the the same positions violate the, prohibition on
assignment of its field personnel within the reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
thirty-day period before election day shall be of the Constitution;
effected after due notice and hearing."
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim
for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc Appointment
in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Peti
tioner also filed an administrative and criminal Petitioner argues that an ad interim ap
complaint with the Law Department against pointment to the COMELEC is a temporary
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violat appointment that is prohibited by Section 1 (2),
ed Section 261 (h) ofthe Omnibus Election Code,. Article LX-C ofthe Constitution, which provides
as follows:
COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other 'The Chairman and the Commissioners
pertinent administrative and civil service laws, shall be appointed by the President with the
rules and regulations. consent ofthe Commission on Appointments
During the"pendency of her complaint before for a term of seven years without reappoint
the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant ment. Of those first appointed, three Mem
petition questioning the appointment and the bers shall hold office for seven years, two
right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Members for five years, and the last Members
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners ofthe for three years, without reappointment. Ap
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that pointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term ofthe predecessor. In no
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions
case shall any Member be appointed or des
ignated in a temporary or acting capacity."
on the independence of the COMELEC, as well
(Emphasis supplied.)
as on the prohibitions on temporary appoint
ments and reappointments of its Chairman and Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim
members.... appointmentcan be withdrawn or revoked bythe
President at her pleasure, and can even be disap second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
proved or simply by-passed by the Commission on the Constitution provides as follows: --
Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims
that an ad interim appointment is temporary in 'The President shall have the power to
character and consequently prohibited by the make appointments during the recess ofthe
last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article LX-C ofthe Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
Constitution. but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission oh
Based on petitioner's theory, there can be Appointments or until the next adjournment
no ad interim appointment to the COMELEC
ofthe Congress." (Emphasis supplied.)
or to the other two constitutional commissions,
namely the Civil Service Commission and the Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
Commission on Audit. The last sentence of Sec effective until such disapproval or next adjourn
tion 1 (2), Article LX-C ofthe Constitution is also ment, signifying that it can no longer be with
found in Article LX-B and Article LX-D providing drawn or revoked by the President. The fear that
for the creation ofthe Civil Service Commission the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
liflii and the Commission on Audit, respectively. Pe and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
titioner interprets the last sentence of Section 1 utterly without basis.
(2) of Article LX-C to mean that the ad interim
appointee cannot assume office until his ap More than half a century ago, this Court had
pointment is confirmed by the Commission on already ruled that an ad interim appointment is
Appointments for only then does his appointment permanent in character. In Summers v. Ozaeta,
become permanent and no longer temporary in 81 Phil. 754 (1948), decided on October 25,1948,
character. we held that:
The rationale behind petitioner's theory is ". . . . an ad interim appointment is one

that only an appointee who is confirmed by the made in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section
L Commission on Appointments can guarantee the
independence ofthe COMELEC. A confirmed ap
10, Article VQ ofthe Constitution, which pro
vides that the 'President shall have the power
pointee is beyond the influence of the President to make appointments during the recess of
or members ofthe Commission on Appointments the Congress, but such appointments shall
since his appointment can no longer be recalled be effective only until disapproval by the
or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the Commission on Appointments or until the
appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing next adjournment of the Congress.' It is an
and confirming powers since his appointment appointment permanent in nature, and the
can be terminated at any time for any cause. circumstance that it is subject to confirma
In the words of petitioner, a Sword* of Damocles tion by the Commission on Appointments
hangs over the head of every appointee whose does notalterits permanent character. Anad
confirmation is pending with the Commission interim appointment is disapproved certainly
on Appointments. for a reason other than that its provisional
We find petitioner's argument without merit. period has expired. Said appointment is of
course distinguishable from an 'acting* ap
An ad interim appointment is a permanent pointment which is merely temporary, good
appointment because it takes effect immediately until another permanent appointment is
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President issued." (Emphasis supplied.)
once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the The Constitution imposes no condition on
Commission on Appointments does not alter its the effectivity of an ad interim appointment,
permanent character. The Constitution itself and thus an ad interim appointment takes ef
makes an ad interim appointment permanent fect immediately. The appointee can at once
in character by making it effective until disap assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer,
proved by the Commission on Appointments or all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete
until the next adjournment of Congress. The v. Secretary ofthe Commission on Appointments,
frifil
40 SCRA 58 (1971), this Court elaborated on the done by the President ofthe Pamantasan in
i~j
nature of an ad interim appointment as follows: the meantime, while the Board of Regents,
which is originally vested by the University
. "A distinction is thus made between the
Charter with the power of appointment, is
exercise of such presidential prerogative unable to act....." (Emphasis supplied.)
requiring confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments when Congress is in ses Thus, the term "ad interim appointment,"
sion and when it is in recess. In the former, as used in letters of appointment signed by the
the President nominates, and only upon the President, means a permanent appointment
consent ofthe Commission on Appointments made by the President in the meantime that Con
may the person thus named assume office. gress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
It is not so with reference to ad interim ap appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked
pointments. It takes effect at once. The indi at any time. The term, although not found in the
vidual chosen may thus qualify and perform text of the Constitution, has acquired a'definite
his function without loss of time. His title to legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
such office is complete. In the language of The Court had again occasion to explain the na
the Constitution, the appointment is effec ture of an ad interim appointment in the more
tive 'until disapproval by the Commission on recent case of Marohombsar v. Court ofAppeals,
Appointments or until the next adjournment 326 SCRA 62 (2000), where the Court stated:
of the Congress.'"
"We have already mentioned that an
Petitioner cites Black's Law Dictionary ad interim appointment is not descriptive
which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in of the nature of the appointment, that is,
the meantime" or "for the time being." Hence, it is not indicative of whether the appoint
petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment ment is temporary or in an acting capacity,
is undoubtedly temporary in character. This rather it denotes the manner in which the
argument is not new and was answered by this appointment was made. In the instant case,
Court in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila the appointment extended to private respon
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22 dent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was
(1985), where we explained that: issued without condition nor limitation as
ii£j
to tenure. The permanent status of private
". . . . From the arguments, it is easy to
respondent's appointment as Executive As
see why the petitioner should experience
sistant II was recognized and attested to
difficulty in understanding the situation. Pri
by the Civil Service Commission Regional
vate respondent had been extended several
Office No. 12. Petitioner's submission that
'ad interim' appointments which petitioner private respondent's ad interim appointment
mistakenly understands as appointments is synonymous with a temporary appoint
temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal ment which could be validly terminated at
translation of the word 'ad interim' which
any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim
creates such belief. The term is defined by appointments are permanent but their terms
Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the are only until the Board disapproves them."
time being." Thus, an officer ad interim is one (Emphasis supplied.)
appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the
duties of the office during the absence or tem An ad interim appointee who has qualified
porary incapacity of its regular incumbent and assumed office becomes at that moment a
(Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth government employee and therefore part ofthe
Edition, 1978). But such is not the mean civil service. He enjoys the constitutional pro
ing nor the use intended in the context of tection that "[n]o officer or employee in the civil
Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban's service shall be removed or suspended except
appointments, the term is not descriptive of for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim
the nature ofthe appointments given to him. appointment becomes complete and irrevocable
Rather, it is used to denote the manner in once the appointee has qualified into office. The
which said appointments were made, that is, withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim ap-
pointment is possible only if it is communicated such designation, will not be estopped from
to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, challenging its withdrawal.
and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
xxx xxx xxx
tantamount to removal from office. Once an ap
pointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right The Constitution provides for many
to the office which is protected not only by stat safeguards to the independence ofthe Com
ute but also by the Constitution. He can only mission on Elections, foremost among which
be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, is the security of tenure of its members. That
consistent with the requirements of due process. guarantee is not available to the respondent
An ad interim appointment can be termi as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
nated for two causes specified in the Constitu Elections by designation of the President of
tion. The first cause is the disapproval of his the Philippines."
ad interim appointment by the Commission on Earlier, in NacionalistdParty v. Bautista, 85
Appointments. The second cause is the adjourn Phil. 101 (1949), a case decided under the 1935
ment of Congress without the Commission on Constitution, which did not have a provision
Appointments acting on his appointment. These prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to
two causes are resolutory conditions expressly the COMELEC, this Court nevertheless declared
imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor
appointments. These resolutory conditions con General as acting member of the COMELEC.
stitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the This Court ruled that the designation of an act
heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, ing Commissioner would undermine the inde
can complain because it is the Constitution itself pendence of the COMELEC and hence violate
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads the Constitution. We declared then: "It would be
of the ad interim appointees. more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim
While an ad interim appointment is perma of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a
nent and irrevocable except as provided by law, permanent Commissioner than to designate one
an appointment or designation in a temporary to act temporarily." (Emphasis supplied.)
or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked In the instant case, the President did in fact
at the pleasure of the appointing power. A tem appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
porary or acting appointee does not enjoy any vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to con
security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This firmation by the Commission on Appointments.
is the kind of appointment that the Constitu Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended per
tion prohibits the President from making to the manent appointments during the recess of Con
three independent constitutional commissions, gress. They were not appointed or designated in
including the COMELEC. Thus, in Brillantes v. a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commis
Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990), this Court struck sioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes v. Yorac and
down as unconstitutional the designation by then Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista
President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commis Party v. Bautista. The ad interim appointments
sioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly
the COMELEC. This Court ruled that: allowed by the Constitution which authorizes
the President, during the recess of Congress, to
"A designation as Acting Chairman is make appointments that take effect immediately.
by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need While the Constitution mandates that the
. be established to justify its revocation. As COMELEC "shall be independent," this provision
suming its validity, the designation of the should be harmonized with the President's power
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Com to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that
mission on Elections may be withdrawn by the independence ofthe COMELEC requires the
the President ofthe Philippines at any time Commission on Appointments to first confirm
and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is ad interim appointees before the appointees can
doubtful if the respondent, having accepted assume office will negate the President's power
to make ad interim appointments. This is con PRESIDENT. SHALL HAVE THE POWER
trary to the rule on statutory construction to give TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE
meaning and effect to every provision ofthe law. RECESS OF CONGRESS WHETHER IT
It will.also run counter to the clear intent of the BE VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY BUT
framers of the Constitution. SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EF
FECTIVE ONLYUNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY
The original draft of Section 16, Article
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
VII of the Constitution — on the nomination of
OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT
officers subject to confirmation by the Commis
OF THE CONGRESS.
sion on Appointments — did not provide for ad
interim appointments. The original intention of This is otherwise called the dd interim
the framers of the Constitution was to do away appointments.
with ad interim appointments because the plan
xxx xxx xxx
was for Congress to remain in session throughout
the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection
recess. However, because of the need to avoid to the proposed amendment of Commission
disruptions in essential government services, ers Aquinoand Bengzon,adding a paragraph
the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to the last paragraph of Section 16? (Silence)
to reinstate the provisions ofthe 1935 Constitu The Chair hears none; the amendment is
tion on ad interim appointments. The following approved." (Emphasis supplied)
discussion during the deliberations of the Con
stitutional Commission elucidates this: Clearly, the reinstatement in the present
Constitution of the ad interim appointing power
fej "FR. BERNAS:... our compulsory recess of the President was for the purpose of avoiding
now is only 30 days. So under such circum interruptions in vital government services that
stances, is it necessary to provide for ad otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies
interim appointments? Perhaps there should in government offices,including the three consti
be a little discussion on that. tutional commissions. In his concurring opinion
in Guevara v. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 (1966),
xxx xxx xxx
decided under the 1935 Constitution, Justice
MS. AQUINO: My concern is that un Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale
less this problem is addressed, this might behind ad interim appointments in this manner:
present problems in terms of anticipating
"Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim
interruption of government business, consid
ering that we are not certain of the length appointments so lirnited? Because, if they
of involuntary recess or adjournment of the expired before the session of Congress, the
Congress. We are certain, however, of the evil sought to be avoided — interruption in
involuntary adjournment of the Congress the discharge of essential functions — may
which is 30 days, but we cannot leave to take place. Because the same evil would re
conjecture the matter of involuntary recess. sult if the appointments ceased to be effective
during the session of Congress and before
FR. BERNAS: That is correct, but we are its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once
trying to look for a formula. I wonder if the Congress has adjourned, the evil aforemen
Commissioner has a formula ... tioned may easily be conjuredby the issuance
xxx xxx xxx of other ad interim appointments or reap
pointments." (Emphasis supplied)
MR. BENGZON: Madam President,
apropos of the matter raised by Commis Indeed, the timelyapplication ofthe last sen
sioner Aquino and after conferring with tence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitu
the Committee, Commissioner Aquino and tion barely avoided the interruption ofessential
I propose the following amendment as the government services in the May 2001 national
last paragraph of Section 16, the wordings elections. Following the decision of this Court
of which are in the 1935 Constitution: THE in Gaminde v. Commission on Appointments,
Msi
promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, who were originally
of office of constitutional officers first appointed extended ad interim appointments only on March
under the Constitution would have to be counted 22, 2001, to be confirmed by the Commission on
starting February 2, 19875 the date of ratifica Appointments before the May 14,2001 elections.
tion of the Constitution, regardless of the date
If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not
of their actual appointment. By this reckoning, extended ad interim appointments to fill up the
the terms of office of three Commissioners ofthe
three vacancies in the COMELEC, there would
COMELEC, including the Chairman, would end only have been one division functioning in the
on February 2, 2001. COMELEC instead of two during the May 2001
Then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet O. elections. Considering that the Constitution re
Demetriou was appointed only on January 11, quires that "all... election cases shall be heard
2000 to serve, pursuant to her appointment and decided in division," the remaining one di
papers, until February 15, 2002, the original vision would have been swamped with election
expiry date of the term of her predecessor, Jus cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution
tice Bernardo P. Pardo, who was elevated to motions for reconsideration "shall be decided by
this Court. The original expiry date of the term the Commission en banc" the mere absence of
of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores was one of the four remaining members would have
also February 15, 2002, while that of Commis prevented a quorum, a less than ideal situation
sioner Julio F. Desamito was November 3, 2001. considering that the Commissioners are expected
The original expiry dates of the terms of office to travel around the country before, during and
of Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioners after the elections. There was a great probability
Flores and Desamito were therefore supposed to that disruptions in the conduct ofthe May 2001
fall after the May 2001 elections. Suddenly and elections could occur because ofthe three vacan
unexpectedly, because of the Gaminde ruling cies in the COMELEC. The successful conduct of
there were three vacancies in the seven-person the May 2001 national elections, right after the
COMELEC, with national elections looming less tumultuous EDSA II and EDSA III events, was
than three and one-half months away. To their certainly essential in safeguarding and strength
credit, Chairperson Demetriou and Commis ening our democracy.
sioner Flores vacated their offices on February 2,
Evidently, the exercise by the President in
2001 and did not question any more before this the instant case of her constitutional power to
Court the applicability ofthe Gaminde ruling to make ad interim appointments prevented the
their own situation.
occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided
In a Manifestation dated December 28,2000 by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article
filed with this Court in the Gaminde case, Chair VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad
person Demetriou stated that she was vacating interim appointments is lodged in the President
her office on February 2, 2001, as she believed to be exercised by her in her sound judgment.
any delayin choosing her successor might create Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Ar
a "constitutional crisis" in view ofthe proximity of ticle VII of the Constitution, the President can
the May 2001 national elections. Commissioner choose either of two modes in appointing officials
Desamito chose to file a petition for intervention who are subject to confirmation by the Commis
in the Gaminde case but this Court denied the sion on Appointments. First, while Congress
intervention. Thus, Commissioner Desamito also is in session, the President may nominate the
vacated his office on February 2, 2001. prospective appointee, and pending consent of
the Commission on Appointments, the nominee
During an electionyear, Congress normally cannotqualifyand assume office. Second, during
goes onvoluntary recess between February and the recessof Congress, the President may extend
June considering that many of the members of an ad interim appointment whichallows the ap
the House of Representatives and the Senate pointee toimmediately qualify and assume office.
run for re-election. In 2001, the Eleventh Con
gress adjourned from January 9, 2001 to June Whether the President chooses to nomi
3,2001. Concededly, therewas no, more time for nate the prospective appointee or extend, an
'ARTICLE VH: THEEXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 451
ad interim appointment is a matter within the enjoys fiscal autonomy, appoints its own officials
prerogative ofthe President because the Consti and employees, and promulgates its own rules on
tution grants her that power. This Court cannot pleadings and practice. Moreover, the salaries of
inquire into the propriety ofthe choice made by COMELEC members cannot be decreased during
the President in the exercise of her constitutional their tenure.
power, absent grave abuse of discretion amount
In fine, we rule tha*t the ad interim appoint*
ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part,
ments extended by the President to Benipayo,
which has not been shown in the instant case.
Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and
The issuance by Presidents of ad interim ap Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute
pointments to the COMELEC is a long-standing temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
practice. Former President Corazon Aquino Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
issued an ad interim appointment to Commis
Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renew
sioner Alfredo E. Abueg. Former President Fidel
als of Appointments.
V. Ramos extended ad interim appointments
to Commissioners Julio F. Desamito, Japal M. Petitioner also argues that assuming the first
Guiani, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravail and ad interim appointments and the first assump
Manolo F. Gorospe. Former President Joseph tion of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
Estrada also extended ad interim appointments are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad
to Commissioners Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, interim appointments and their subsequent as
Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K. Sadain and sumption of office to the same positions violate
Ralph C. Lantion. the prohibition on reappointment under Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
The President's power to extend ad interim provides as follows:
appointments may indeed briefly put the ap
pointee at the mercy of both the appointing and "The Chairman and the Commissioners
^>
confirming powers. This situation, however, is shall be appointed by the President with the
only for a short period — from the time of is consent ofthe Commission on Appointments
suance of the ad interim appointment until the for a term of seven years without reappoint
Commission on Appointments gives or withholds ment. Of those first appointed, three Mem
its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions bers shall hold office for seven years, two
this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of Members for five years, and the last members
disruptions in vital government services. This for three years, without reappointment "
is also part of the check-and-balance under the (Emphasis supplied.)
separation of powers, as a trade-off against the
evil of granting the President absolute and sole Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim
power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely appointee is by-passed by the Commission on
subjected the President's appointing power to Appointments, his ad interim appointment can
the checking power of the legislature. no longer be renewed because this will violate
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
This situation, however, does not compromise which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner as
\m
the independence ofthe COMELEC as a constitu serts that this is particularly true to permanent,
tional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are appointeeswhohave assumed office, whichis the
precisely staggered to insure that the majority of situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their
its members hold confirmed appointments, and ad interim appointments are deemed permanent
not one President will appoint all the COMELEC in character.
members. In the instant case, the Commission
on Appointments had long confirmed four of the There is no dispute that an ad interim ap
incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a pointee disapproved by the Commission on Ap
majority, who could now be removed from office pointments can no longer be extended a new ap
only by impeachment. The special constitutional pointment. The disapproval is a finaldecision of
safeguards that insure the independence of the the Commission on Appointments in the exercise
COMELEC remain in place. The COMELEC ofits checking power on the appointing authority
of the President. The disapproval is a decision the Commission, because the incumbent can
on the merits, being a refusal by the Commis not continue holding office over the positive
sion on Appointments to give its consent after objection ofthe Commission.. It ceases, also,
deliberating on the qualifications of the appoin upon 'the next adjournment ofthe Congress/
tee. Since the Constitution does not provide for simply because the President may then issue
any appeal from such decision, the disapproval new appointments — not because of implied
is final and binding on the appointee as well as disapproval ofthe Commission deduced from
on the appointing power. In this instance, the its inaction during the session of Congress,
President can no longer renew the appointment for, under the Constitution, the Commission
not because of the constitutional prohibition on may affect adversely the interim appoint
reappointment, but because ofa final decision by ments only by action, never by omission.
the Commission on Appointments to withhold its If the adjournment of Congress were an
consent to the appointment. implied disapproval of ad interim appoint
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed ments made prior thereto, then the President
because of lack of time or failure of the Com- o could no longer appoint those so by-passed
mission on Appointments to organize is another by the Commission. But, the fact is that the
matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has President may reappoint them, thus clearly
not been finally acted upon on the merits by the indicating that the reason for said termina
Commission on Appointments at the close ofthe tion ofthe ad interim appointments is not the
session of Congress. There is no final decision by disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from
the Commission on Appointments to give or with said omission ofthe Commission, but the cir
hold its consent to the appointment as required cumstance that upon said adjournment of the
by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the Congress, the President is free to make ad
President is free to renew the ad interim appoint interim appointments or reappointments."
ment ofa by-passed appointee. This is recognized (Emphasis supplied.)
in Section 17 ofthe Rules ofthe Commission on
Guevara was decided under the 1935 Con
Appointments, which provides as follows:
stitution from where the second paragraph of
"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Section 16, Article VII ofthe present Constitution
Appointments Returned to the President. on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim.
Nominations or appointments submitted The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitu
by the President of the Philippines which tion governing ad interim appointments by the
are not finally acted upon at the close of the President is doubtless applicable to the present
session of Congress shall be returned to the Constitution. The established practice under
President and, unless new nominations or the present Constitution is that the President
appointments are made, shall not again be can renew the appointments of by-passed ad
considered by the Commission." (Emphasis interim appointees. This is a continuation ofthe
supplied.) well-recognized practice under the 1935 Consti
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission
tution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitu
tion which did not provide for a Commission on
on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can
be considered again if the President renews the Appointments but vested sole appointing power
in the President.
appointment.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the The prohibition on reappointment in Section
President can renew the ad interim appoint 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies
ments of by-passed appointees. Justice Roberto neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim
Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concur appointments. A disapproved ad interim appoint
ring opinion in Guevara v. Ihocentes, supra, ment cannot be revived by another ad interim ap
why by-passed ad interim appointees could be pointment because the disapproval is final under
extended new appointments, thus: Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and
not because a reappointment is prohibited under
"In short, an ad interim appointment Section 1 (2), Article IX-C ofthe Constitution. A
ceases to be effective upon disapproval by by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived
igi)
ARTICLE VII:THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 453
by a new ad interim appointment because there is three years, orevenforan unexpired term ofany
no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII length of time — can no longer be reappointed
of the Constitution, and such new appointment to the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly
will not result in the appointee serving beyond explained this intent in this manner:
the fixed term of seven years.
^^
"MR. FOZ. But there is the argument
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C ofthe Constitution
made in the concurring opinion of Justice
provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Com Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra v.
missioners shall be appointed ... for a term of
Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on
seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis
reappointment applies only when the term
supplied.) There are four situations where this
or tenure is for seven years. But in cases
provision will apply. The first situation is where
where the appointee serves only for less
an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
!£aJ than seven years, he would be entitled to
confirmation by the Commission on Appoint
reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying
ments, serves his full seven-year term. Such
words 'without reappointment' in the case of
person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC,
those appointed, then it is possible that an
whether as a member or as a chairman, because
interpretation could be made later on their
he will then be actually serving more than seven
case, they can still be reappointed to serve
years. The second situation is where the appoin
for a total of seven years.
tee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term
aa
and then resigns before his seven-year term of Precisely, we are foreclosing that pos
office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, sibility by making it clear-that even in the
whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy case of those first appointed under the 'Con
prising from retirement because a reappointment stitution, no reappointment can be made."
will result in the appointee also serving more (Emphasis supplied.)
than seven years. The third situation is where
the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired In Visarra v. Miraflor, 8 SCRA 1 (1963).
term of someone who died or resigned, and the Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring
appointee completes the unexpired term. Such opinion, quoted Nacionalista v. De Vera that
person cannot, be reappointed, whether as a a "[reappointment is not prohibited when a
member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retire Commissioner has held office only for, say, three
ment because a reappointment will result in the or six years, provided his term will not exceed
appointee also serving more than seven years. nine years in all." This was the interpretation
despite the express provision in the 1935 Consti
\m The fourth situation is where the appointee tution that a COMELEC member "shall hold
has previously served a term of less than seven office for a term of nine years and may not be
years, and a vacancy arises from death or res reappointed."
ignation. Even if it will, not result in his serv
ing more than seven years, a reappointment of To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase
such person to serve an unexpired term is also "without reappointment" appears twice in Sec
prohibited because his situation will be similar tion 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitu
to those appointed under the second sentence of tion. The first phrase prohibits reappointment
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. of any person previously appointed for a term of
This provision refers to the first appointees under seven years. The second phrase prohibits reap
the Constitution whose terms of office are less pointment of any person previously appointed
than seven years, but are barred from ever being for a term of five or three years pursuant to the
reappointed under any situation. Not one of these first set of appointees under the Constitution.
four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, In either case, it does not matter if the person
Borra or Tuason. previously appointed completes his term ofoffice
forthe intention is to prohibit any reappointment
The framers ofthe Constitution made it quite
of any kind.
clear that any person who has served any term of
office as COMELEC member—whether for a full However, an ad interim appointment that
term of seven years, a truncated term of five or has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
i^y
Appointments does not constitute a term of "Mr. Foz stated that the. Committee had
office. The period from the time the ad interim introduced basic changes in the conYmon
appointment is made to the time it lapses is provision affecting the three Constitutional
neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To Commissions, and which are: 1) fiscal au
hold otherwise would mean that the President tonomywhich provides (that) appropriations
by his unilateral action could start and complete shall be automatically and regularly released
the running ofa term of office in the COMELEC to the Commission in the same manner (as)
without the consent of the Commission on Ap provided for the Judiciary; 2) fixed term of
pointments. This interpretation renders inutile office without reappointment on a staggered
'Smi
the confirming power of the Commission on Ap basis to ensure continuity of functions and to
pointments. minimize the opportunity ofthe President to
appoint all the members during his incum
The phrase "without reappointment" ap
•toi
bency; 3) prohibition to decrease salaries
plies only to'one who has been appointed by the
of the members of the Commissions during
President and confirmed by the Commission on
their term of office; and 4) appointments of
Appointments, whether or not such person com
&s) -> members would not require confirmation."
pletes his term of office. There must be a confir
(Emphasis supplied.)
mation by the Commission on Appointments of
the previous appointment before the prohibition There were two important amendments
on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise subsequently made by the Constitutional Com
will lead to absurdities and negate the Presi mission to these four features. First, as discussed
dent's power to make ad interim appointments. earlier, the framers of the Constitution decided
to require confirmation by the Commission on
as) In the great majority of cases, the Commis
Appointments of all appointments to the con
sion on Appointments usually fails to act, for
stitutional commissions. Second, the framers
lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first
decided to strengthen further the prohibition
issued to appointees. If such ad interim appoint
Efel on serving beyond the fixed seven-year term, in
ments can no longer be renewed, the President
will certainly hesitate to make ad interim ap
the light of a former chair ofthe Commission on
pointments because most of her appointees will Audit remaining in office for years despite his
effectively be disapproved by mere inaction ofthe fixed term of seven years. The following exchange
Commission on Appointments. This will nullify in the deliberations of the Constitutional Com
the constitutional power ofthe President to make mission is instructive:
ad interim appointments, a power intended to "MR. SUAREZ: These are only clarifica-
avoid disruptions in vital government services.
tory questions, Madam President. May I call
This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that
the sponsor's attention, first of all, to Section
will wreak havoc on vital government services.
2 (2) on the Civil Service Commission wherein
The prohibition on reappointment is common it is stated: Tn no case shall any Member be
to the three constitutional commissions. The appointed in a temporary or acting capacity.'
framers of the present Constitution prohibited I detect in the Committee's proposed reso
reappointments for two reasons. The first is to lutions a constitutional hangover, if I may
prevent a second appointment for those who use the term, from the past administration.
have been previously appointed and confirmed Am I correct in concluding that the reason
even ifthey served for less than seven years. The the Committee introduced this particular
second is to insure that the members ofthe three provision is to avoid an incident similar to
constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the case ofthe Honorable Francisco Tantuico
the fixed term of seven years. As reported in who was appointed in an acting capacity as
the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Chairman of the Commission on Audit for
Commissioner Vicente B. Foz, who sponsored the about 5 years from 1975 until 1980, and then
proposed articles on the three constitutional com in 1980, was appointed as Chairman with a
missions, outlined the four important features of tenure of another 7 years. So, if we follow
the proposed articles, to wit: that appointment to (its) logical conclusion,
Wfr
k«l
he occupied that position for about 12 years case shall any Member be appointed in a
in violation of the Constitution? temporary or acting capacity."
MR. FOZ: It is only one of the consider MR. DE LOS REYES: Mr. Presiding
ations. Another is really to make sure that Officer, the reason for this amendment is
any member who is appointed to any of the that some lawyers make a distinction be
commissions does not serve beyond 7 years." tween an appointment and a designation.
(Emphasis supplied.) The Gentleman will recall that in the case
of Commissioner on Audit Tantuico, I think
Commissioner Christian Monsod further
his term exceeded the constitutional.limit but
clarified the prohibition on reappointment in
the Minister of Justice opined that it did not
this manner:
because he was only designated during the
"MR. MONSOD. If the (Commissioner) time that he acted as Commissioner on Audit.
will read the whole Article, she will notice So, in order to erase that distinction between
that there is no reappointment of any kind appointment and designation, we should
and, therefore as a whole there is no way specifically place the word so that there will
that somebody.can serve for more than seven be no more ambiguity. "In no case shall any
years. The purpose of the last sentence is to Member be appointed OR DESIGNATED in
' make sure that this does not happen by in a temporary or acting capacity."
cluding in the appointment both temporary
MR. FOZ: The amendment is accepted,
and acting capacities." (Emphasis supplied.)
Mr. Presiding Officer.
Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment
MR. DE LOS REYES: Thank you.
is intended to insure that there will be no reap
pointment of any kind. On the other hand, the THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tre-
prohibition on temporary or acting appointments nas): Is there any objection? (Silence) The
is intended to prevent any circumvention of the Chair hears none; the amendment is ap
prohibition on reappointment that may result in proved."
an appointee's total term of office exceeding seven
The ad interim appointments and subse
years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin
quent renewals of appointments of Benipayo,
prohibitions are very specific — reappointment
Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition
of any kind and exceeding one's term in office
on reappointments because there were no pre
beyond the maximum period of seven years.
vious appointments that were confirmed by the
Not contented with these ironclad twin Commission on Appointments. A reappointment
prohibitions, the framers of the Constitution presupposes a previous confirmed appointment.
tightened even further the screws on those who The same ad interim appointments and renewals
might wish to extend their terms of office. Thus, of appointments will also not breach the seven-
the word "designated" was inserted to plug any year term limit because all the appointments and
loophole that might be exploited by violators renewals ofappointments of Benipayo, Borra and
of the Constitution, as shown in the following Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February
discussion in the Constitutional Commission: 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not
extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
"MR. DE LOS REYES: On line 32, be
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever
tween the words "appointed" and "in," I pro
that the renewal ofthe ad interim appointments
pose to insert the words OR DESIGNATED
of these three respondents will result in any of
so that the whole sentence will read: "In no
the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin
case shall any Member be appointed OR prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing
DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting renewal of the ad interim appointment of these
capacity." three respondents, for so long as their terms of
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tre- office expireon February 2,2008, doesnot violate
nas): What does the Committee say? the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1
(2), Article IX-C ofthe Constitution.
MR. FOZ: But it changes the meaning
of this sentence. The sentence reads: 'In no
foijfri
H. Rufino v. Endriga the Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for

G.R. No. 139565, July 21, 2006 any reason the Board be left entirely vacant,
the same shall be filled by the President of
DECISION the Philippines acting in consultation with
the aforementioned ranking officers of the
CARPIO, J.: Center. (Emphasis supplied.)
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created Inextricably related to Section 6(b) is Sec
the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) tion 6(c) which limits the terms of the trustees,
forthe primary purpose ofpropagatingarts and as follows:
culture in the Philippines. The CCP is to awaken
the consciousness ofthe Filipino people to their (c) No person may serve as trustee who
artistic and cultural heritage and encourage is not a resident of the Philippines, of good
them to preserve, promote, enhance, and develop moral standing in the community and at
such heritage.
least 25 years of age: Provided, That there
shall always be a majority of the trustees
who are citizens ofthe Philippines. Trustees
The consolidated petitions in the case at bar may not be re-elected for more than two
stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving (2) consecutive terms. (Emphasis supplied.)
two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves The clear and categorical language of Section
on who between the contending groups, both 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP
claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote ofthe
Board, has the legal right to hold office. The remaining trustees. Should only one trustee
resolution ofthe issue boils down to the constitu survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the
tionality ofthe provision of PD 15 on the manner surviving trustee acting in consultation
of filling vacancies in the Board. witfrthe ranking officers ofthe CCP. Should
the Board become entirely vacant, the va
cancies shall be filled by the President of
At the heart ofthe controversy is Section 6(b) the Philippines acting in consultation with
of PD 15, as amended, which reads: the same ranking officers ofthe CCP. Thus, the
Board of Trustees.—The governing pow remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect
ers and authority of the corporation shall their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term.
be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not
eleven (11)Trustees who shall serve without allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more
than two consecutive terms.
compensation.
The Power of Appointment
,&&|
(b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees The source of the President's power to ap
due to termination of term, resignation, point, as well as the Legislature's authority to
incapacity, death or other cause as may be delegatethe powerto appoint, is foundin Section
provided in the By-laws, shall be filled 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
by election by a vote of a majority of provides:
the trustees held at the next regular
meeting following occurrence of such The President shall nominate and, with
vacancy. The electedtrustee shall then hold the consent of the Commission on Appoint
office for a complete term offour years unless ments, appoint the heads of the executive
sooner terminated by reason of resignation, departments, ambassadors, otherpublic min
incapacity, death or other cause. Should isters and consuls, or officers of the armed
only onetrustee survive,the vacancies shall forces from the rank of colonel or naval cap
be filled by the surviving trustee acting in tain, and other officerswhose appointments
consultation with the ranking officers ofthe are vested in him in this Constitution. He
Center. Such officers shall be designated in shall also appoint all other officers of the
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT- •457
Government whose appointments are not thelaw is silentonwho is the appointing power,
otherwise provided for by law, and those or if the law authorizing the head of a depart
whom he may be authorized by law to ap ment, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
point. The Congress may, by law, vest declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b)
the appointment of other officers lower and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
in rank in the President alone, in the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP
courts, or in the heads of departments, Board because the trustees fall under the third
agencies, commissions, or boards. group of officers.
The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the The Scope of the Appointment
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, Power ofthe Heads of Departments,
but such appointments shall be effective only Agencies, Commissions, or Beards
ijj
until disapproval by the Commission on Ap The original text of Section 16, Article VII of
pointments or until the next adjournment of the 1987 Constitution, as written in Resolution
the Congress. (Emphasis supplied.) No. 517 of the Constitutional Commission, is
The power to appoint is the prerogative of almost a verbatim copy of the one found in the
the President, except in those instances when 1935 Constitution. Constitutional Commissioner
the'Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., explains the evolu
of this fundamentally Executive power by the tion of this provision and its import, thus:
Legislative and Judicial branches violates the
The last sentence of the first paragraph
system of separation of powers that inheres in
of Section 16 x x x is a relic from the 1935
our democratic republican government.
and 1973 Constitutions, xxx.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Under the 1935 Constitution, the pro:
Constitution, the President appoints three
vision was: "but the Congress may by law
groups of officers. The first group refers to the
vest the appointment of inferior officers in
heads of the Executive departments, ambassa
the President alone, in the courts, or in the
dors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
heads of departments." As already seen, it
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
§*) meant that, while the general rule was that
or naval captain, and other officers whose ap
all presidential appointments needed confir
pointments are vested in the President by the
mation by the Commission on Appointments,
Constitution. The second group refers to those
Congress could relax this rule by vesting the
^j whom the President may be authorized by law
power to appoint "inferior officers" in "the
to appoint. The third group refers to all other
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
officers of the Government whose appointments
of departments." It also meant that while,
are not otherwise provided by law.
generally, appointing authority belongs
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth to the President, Congress could let
group of lower-ranked officers whose appoint others share in such authority. And the
ments Congress may by law vest in the heads of word "inferior" was understood to mean
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. not petty or unimportant but lower in
The present case involves the interpretation of rank than those to whom appointing
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authority could be given.
with respect to the appointment of this fourth Under the 1973 Constitution, accord
group of officers. ing to which the power of the President to
The President appoints the first group of appoint was not limited by any other body,
officers with the consent of the Commission the provision read: "However, the Batasang
on Appointments. The President appoints the Pambansa may by law vest in members of
second and third groups of officers without the the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, com
consent ofthe Commission on Appointments. The missions, and boards the power to appoint
President appoints the third group of officers if inferior officers in their respective offices."
No mention was made ofthe President. The may appoint must be oflower rank thanthose
premise was that the power to appoint vested by law with the power to appoint. ~
belonged to the President; but the Ba-
tasan could diffuse this authority by ^Congress May Vest the Authority
allowing it to be shared by officers other to Appoint
^J
than the President. Only in the Heads ofthe Named Offices
The 1987 provision also has the evident
Further, Section 16, Article VII ofthe 1987
intent of allowing Congress to giveto officers
^lJ Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the,
other than the President the authority to ap
heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
point. To that extent therefore reference to or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked
the President is pointless. And by using the
officers. Section 16 provides:
:iffij word "alone," copying the tenor of the 1935
provision, it implies, it is submitted, that The Congress may, by law, vest the ap
the general rule in the 1935 Constitutionof pointment of other officers lower in rank in
requiring confirmation by the Commission the President alone, in the courts, or in the
on Appointments had not been changed. heads of departments, agencies, com
Thereby the picture has been blurred. This missions, or boards. (Emphasis supplied.)
confused text, however, should be attributed
to oversight. Referenceto the President must In a department in the Executive branch, the
be ignored and the whole sentence must be head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize
read merely as authority for Congress to vest the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersec
appointing power in courts, in heads of de retary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the
partments, agencies, commissions, or boards Executive department. In an agency, the power
after the manner of the 1973 text. is vested in the head ofthe agency for it would
be preposterous to vest it"in the agency itself.
Incidentally, the 1987 text, in order to In a commission, the head is the chairperson of
eschew any pejorative connotation, avoids the commission. In a board, the head is also the
the phrase "inferior officers" and translates chairperson of the board. In the last three situ
it instead into "officers lower in rank," that ations, the law may not also authorize officers
£%&) is, lower in rank than the courts or the other than the heads ofthe agency, commission,
heads of departments, agencies, com
or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
missions, or boards.(Emphasis supplied.)
The grant of the power to appoint to the
The framers ofthe 1987 Constitution clearly
heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a
intended that Congress could by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the matter of legislative grace. Congress has the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the
'>$&)
or boards. The deliberations ofthe 1986 Consti heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the
tutional Commission explain this intent beyond power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so
grants, Congress may impose certain conditions
any doubt.
for the exerciseofsuch legislative delegation, like
The framers of the 1987 Constitution requiring the recommendation of subordinate
changed the qualifying word "inferior" tothe less officers or the concurrence ofthe other members
disparaging phrase "lower in rank" purely for of the commission or board.
style. However, the clear intent remained that
these inferior or lower in rank officers are This is in contrast to the President's power
the subordinates of the heads of depart toappoint which is a self-executing power vested
ments, agencies, commissions, or boards bythe Constitution itselfandthus notsubject to
who are vested by law with the power to ap legislative limitations orconditions. Thepower to
point.The express language oftheConstitution appoint conferred directly bytheConstitution on
and the clear intent of its framers point to only the Supreme Court en banc andonthe Constitu
one conclusion —the officers whom the heads of tional Commissions is also self-executing and not
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
iajj
The Constitution authorizes Congress to to members of a collegial body or to the head of

vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers that collegial body. Thus, the 1935Constitution
specifically in the "heads" ofthe specified offices, speaks of vesting the powerto appoint "in the
and in no other person. The word "heads" refers courts, or in the heads of departments." Simi
to the chairpersons ofthe commissions or boards larly, the 1973 Constitution speaks of"members
and not to their members, for several reasons. ofthe Cabinet,courts, heads ofagencies, com
missions, and boards."
First, a plain reading of the last sentence
of the first paragraph of Section 16; Article Also, the 1987 Constitution speaks ofvesting
VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the
word"heads"refers to all the offices succeeding heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
that term, namely, the departments, agencies, or boards." This is consistent with Section 5(67,
commissions, or boards. This plain reading is Article VIII ofthe 1987 Constitution which states
consistent with other related provisions of the that the "Supreme Courtshall xxx [ajppoint all
Constitution. officials and employees ofthe Judiciary in accor
dance with the Civil Service Law^" making the
Second, agencies, like departments, have no Supreme Court en banc the appointing power.
collegial governing bodies but have only chief In sharp contrast, when the 1987 Constitution
executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word speaks of the power to appoint lower-ranked
"heads" appliesto agencies. Anyother interpreta officers in the Executive branch, it vests the
tion is untenable.
power "in the heads of departments, agencies,
Third, all commissions or boards have chief commissions, or boards."
executives who are their heads. Since the Con In addition, the 1987Constitution expressly
stitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all provides that in the case of the constitutional
commissions or boards have chief executives or commissions, the power to appoint lower-ranked
heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the officers is vested in the commission as a body.
chief executives or heads of the commissions or Thus, Section 4, Article LX-A ofthe 1987 Consti
boards. tution provides, "The Constitutional Commis
Fourth, the counterpart provisions of Section sions shall appoint their officials and employees
in accordance with law."
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to Sixth, the last clause of the pertinent
"heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution lim sentence in Section 16, Article VH of the 1987
Iffi)
ited the grant ofthe appointmentpower onlyto Constitution is an enumeration of offices whose
"heads of departments." The 1973 Constitution heads may be vested by law with the power to
expanded such grant to other officers, namely, appoint lower-ranked officers. This is clear from
"members of the Cabinet, xxx, courts, heads of the framers' deliberations of the 1987 Constitu
agencies, commissions, and boards x x x." tion, thus:
If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Da-

the grant to members of commissions or boards, vide is recognized.
ffififr
it could have followed the same language used
for "members ofthe Cabinet" so as to state "mem MR. DAVIDE: On page 8, line 3, change
bers of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the period (.) after "departments" to a comma
the 1973 Constitution could have placed the (,) and add AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS,
words commissions and boards after the word OR BOARDS. This is just to complete the
enumeration in the 1935 Constitution from
"courts" so as to state "members of the Cabinet,
which this additional clause was taken.
xxx, courts, commissions and boards." Instead,
the 1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies, THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee
commissions, and boards." accept?
Fifth, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitu xxx
tions make a clear distinction whenever grant MR. SUMULONG: We accept the amend
ing the power to appoint lower^ranked officers ment.
MR. ROMULO: The Committee has ac governed by a Board of Trustees. Section 6 of PD

cepted the amendment, Madam President. 15, as amended, states:
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection Board of Trustees.— The governing powv
to the addition of the words "AGENCIES, ers and authority of the corporation shall
foj#i
COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS" on line 3, be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of
page 8? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without
amendment is approved. (Italicization in the compensation. ,
original; boldfacing supplied.)
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not
As an enumeration of offices, what applies an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16,
to the first office iii the enumeration also ap Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
plies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the
enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 Repugnant
refer to "departments," the same words "in the to Section 16, Article VII ofthe 1987
heads of" also refer to the other offices listed Constitution .
in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commis
sions, or boards." Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irrecon
cilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII
The Chairperson ofthe CCP Board ofthe 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of
is the Head of CCP
PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the
CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCF Board,
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On
its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments the other hand, JSection 16, Article VII of the
constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
head of CCP. Thus, Section 8 of PD 15 provides: agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only
"officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
Appointment of Personnel.— The Chair departments, agencies, commissions, or boards."
man, with the confirmation of the Board, This excludes a situation where the appointing
shall have the power to appoint all officers, officerappoints an officer equal in rank as him.
staff and personnel of the Center with such Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees ofthe
compensation as may be fixed by the Board, CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b)
who shall be residents of the Philippines. The and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it
Center may elect membership in the Govern violates Section 16, Article VII ofthe 1987 Con
ment Service Insurance System and if it so stitution.
elects, its officers and employees who qualify
shall have the same rights and privileges as It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD
well as obligations as those enjoyed or borne 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect"
by persons in the government service. Of and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the
ficials and employees of the Center shall be effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in
exempt from the coverageofthe CivilService the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the
Law and Rules. constitutional limitations on the power to appoint
by filling vacancies in a public office through
Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regula election by the co-workers in that office. Such
tions of the CCP recognizes that the head of the manner of filling vacancies in a public officehas
CCP is the Chairman of its Board .... no constitutional basis.
Thus, the Chairman ofthe CCP Board is the Further, Section 6(b) and (c)of PD 15 makes
"head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, the CCP trustees the independent appointing
under Section 16, Article VH ofthe 1987 Consti power of their fellow trustees. The creation of
tution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked an independent appointing power inherently
officers of the CCP. conflicts with the President's power to appoint.
Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation This inherent conflict has spawned recurring
controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees also not one of the independent constitutional
every time a new President assumes office. bodies. Neither is the CCPa quasi-judicial body
In the present case, the incumbent President nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must
appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while fall under the Executive branch. Under the Re
the remaining CCP trustees elected the same vised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency
isi
Endriga group to the same positions. This has "not placed by law or order creating them under
been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in any specific department" falls "under the Office
of the President."
the CCP Board, allowing the President to ap
point and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. Since the President exercises control over
In effect, there are two appointing powers "all the executive departments, bureaus, and of
over the same set of officers in the Execu fices," the President necessarily exercisescontrol
tive branch. Each appointing power insists on over the CCP which is an office in the Executive
exercising its own power, even if the two powers branch. In mandating that the President "shall
are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to have control of all executive xxx offices," Sec
this recurring anomaly. tion 17, Article VII ofthe 1987 Constitution does
not exempt any executive office—one performing
The President's Power of Control executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies — from the President's
There is another constitutional impedi
power ofcontrol. There is no dispute that the CCP
ment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and
performs executive, and not legislative, judicial,
(c) ofTD 15. Under our system of government,
or quasi-judicial functions.
all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices
are under the control of the President of the
Philippines. Section 17, Article VII ofthe 1987
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which autho
Constitution provides:
rizes the trustees ofthe CCP Board to fill vacan
The President shall have control of all cies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's
the executive departments, bureaus, power of control under Section 17, Article VII
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws ofthe 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section
be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.) 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from
political influence and pressure, specifically
The presidential power of control over the from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
Executive branch of government extends to all makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtu
executive employees from the Department Sec ally outside the control ofthe President. Such a
retary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional public office or board cannot legally exist under
power ofthe President is self-executing and does the 1987 Constitution.
not require any implementing law. Congress
cannot limit or curtail the President's power of
control over.the Executive branch. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition
in G.R. No. 139554. We declare UNCONSTIr
TUTIONAL Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential
Every government office, entity, or agency Decree No. 15, as amended, insofar as it autho
must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or rizes the remaining trustees to fill by election
Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the vacancies in the Board of Trustees ofthe Cultural
independent constitutional bodies, or must be Center of the Philippines...."
a quasi-judicial body or local government unit.
Otherwise, such government office, entity, or SEC. 17. THE PRESIDENT SHALL
agency has no legal and constitutional basis for HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECU
its existence.
TIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS, AND
The CCP does not fall under, the Legislative OFFICES. HE SHALL ENSURE THAT THE
or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.
1. Power of control. The power of supervision is the power o

a superior officer to "ensure that the laws ar<
Thepower ofcontrol has been defined as "the faithfully executed" by inferiors. The power o
power ofan officer to alter or modify ornullify or supervision does not include the power ofcontrol
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in but the powerofcontrol necessarily includes thi
the performance of his duties and to substitute power ofsupervision. (The power ofthe Presiden
thejudgment oftheformer for that ofthelatter." over local governments is only one of genera
Mondano v. Silvosa,97 Phil. 143,148 (1955). It is supervision. SeeArticle X, Sections 4 and 16.)
such power which has been given tothePresident
over all executive officers, from Cabinet members
2. Cases.
to the lowliest clerk. This is an element of the
presidential system where the President is "the A. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano
Executive ofthe Government ofthe Philippines,
L-27811, November 17,1967
and no other. The heads ofthe executive depart
ments occupy political positions and hold office
in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of SANCHEZ, J.:
Thomas Jefferson 'should be of the President's The question — May the Executive Secre
bosomconfidence,'and, in the language ofAttor tary, actingby authority ofthe President, revers<
ney General Cushing, 'are subject to thedirection a decision of the Director of Lands that ha<
ofthe President.'" Villena v. Secretary ofInterior, been affirmed by the Secretary of Agricultun
67Phil. 451,464 (1939).Also,Lacson-Magallanes and Natural Resources - yielded an affirmativt
Co. Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967). answer from the lower court.
The doctrine of "qualified political agency," Hence, this appeal certified to this Cour
recognizing that the Constitution has established by the Court of Appeals upon the provisions o
a single and not a plural executive, postulates Sections 17 and 31 of the" Judiciary Act of 1948
that "all executive and administrative organiza as amended.
tions are adjuncts ofthe Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents ofthe Chief Executive, Plaintiffcorporation took the foregoing deci
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive sion to the Court of First Instance praying tha
is required by the Constitution or law to act in judgment berendereddeclaring: (1) that the deci
person orthe exigencies ofthe situation demand sion ofthe Secretary ofAgriculture and Natura
that he act personally,the multifariousexecutive Resources has full force and (2) that the decisioi
and administrative functions ofthe Chief Execu ofthe Executive Secretary is contrary to law an<
tive are performed by and through the executive of no legal force and effect.
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed andpromulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless dis 2. Plaintiff next submits that the decisioi
approved or reprobated by the Chief Executive of the Executive Secretary herein is an undu<
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." delegation ofpower. The Constitution, petitione:
Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 and asserts, doesnot contain any provision whereby
463. Thus, a decision of a department secretary,
the presidential power of control may be del
when not reprobated by the Executive, is the egated to the Executive Secretary. It is arguec
last step in the process of "exhausting admin that it is the constitutional duty ofthe Presiden
istrative remedies." E.g., Demaisip v. Court of
to act personally upon the matter.
Tax Appeals, 106 Phil 237 (1959). But see Calo
v. Fuentes, 5 SCRA 397 (1962) and Ganob v. It is correct to say that constitutional pow
Ramos, 27 SCRA 1174 (1969). Thus, too, the ers there are which the President must exercist
Executive Secretary when acting "by authority in person. [Power to suspend the writ ofhabea.
ofthe President," may reverse the decision ofan corpus, toproclaim martial law (Sec. 10[2], Art
other department secretary.Lacson-Magallanes VII. Phil. Constitution) and to grant reprieves
v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967). commutations, and pardons, and remit fine.-
sSl
and forfeitures (Sec. 10 [6], idem) mentioned in Fernando,J., concursand submits a separate
Villena v. Secretaryof Interior,67 Phil. 451, 462- concurring opinion.
463.] Not as correct, however, is it to say that the
Chief Executive may not delegate to his Execu FERNANDO, J.; concurring:
tive Secretary acts which the Constitution does
not command that he perform in person. Reason
is not wanting for this view. The President is not Thequestion asked! inthe opening paragraph
expected to perform in person all the multifari ofthe opinion - "May the Executive Secretary,
ous executive and administrative functions. The acting by authority of the President, reverse a
Office""of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary decision of the Director of Lands that has been
unit which assists the President. The rule which affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
has thus gained recognition is that "under our Natural Resources[?]" — merits but one answer.
constitutional set-up the Executive Secretary It must be in the unqualified affirmative. So the
who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the Court holds. That is as it should be. Any other
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to af view would be highly unorthodox.
firm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Nonetheless, the thought seems to lurk in
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue. [Ex the opinion of a respectable number of members
tensive Enterprises v. Sarbo & Co., supra. See: of the bar that a provision as that found in the
Public Land Act to the effect that decisions of
Pajo v. Ago, L-15414, June 30, 1960]
Director of Lands on questions of facts shall
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that be conclusive when approved by the Secretary
the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the of Agriculture and Natural Resources [Sec. 4,
other department heads, no higher than anyone Commonwealth Act No. 941 (1936).] constitute
ofthem. From this, plaintiffcarves the argument a limitation of such power of control. This view
that one department head, on the pretext that he might have gained plausibility in the light of
is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude Ang-Angco v. Castillo, [L-17169, November 30,
into the zone of action allocated to another de 1963.] where the procedure set forth in the Civil
partment secretary. This argument betrays lack Service Act in 1959 was held binding in so far
of appreciation of the fact that where, as in this as the President is concerned in the case of dis
case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y author ciplinary action taken against non-presidential
ity of the President," his decision is that of the appointees.
President's. Such decision is to be given full faith
and credit by our courts. The assumed author The argument that what the then Executive
ity of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. Secretary acting for the President did was justi
For, only the President may rightfully say that fied by the constitutional grant of control elicited
the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do no favorable response. The Court apparently was
so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disap not receptive to a more expansive view of such
proved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," executive prerogative. This is not to say that
[Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra, at p. what was there decided was entirely lacking in
463. Cf. Ykalina v. Oricio, 93 Phil. 1076, 1080.] justification. It is merely to suggest that it may
that remains the act ofthe ChiefExecutive, and contain implications not in conformity with the
cannot be successfully assailed. [Pozon v. Execu broad grant of authority constitutionally con
tive Secretary (C. A.), 55 O. G. No. 18, pp. 3302, ferred on the President.
3305.] No such disapproval or reprobation is even
intimated in the record of this case. It is well-worth emphasizing that the Presi
dent unlike any other official in the Executive
For the reasons given, the judgment under Department is vested with both "constitutional
review is hereby affirmed.Costsagainst plaintiff. and legal authority" [Planas v. Gil (1939) 69
SO ORDERED. Phil. 52, at p. 76.] as Justice Laurel noted. Care
is to be taken then lest by too narrow interpreta
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, tion what could reasonably be included in such
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., competence recognized by the Constitution be
concur. unduly restricted. If my reading ofthe opinionof
:rrj&A
Justice Sanchez is correct, then there is a more any member of his cabinet, however illegal, ir
hospitable scope accorded suchpower ofcontrol. regular or improper may be these acts. The im
For me this is more in keeping with the funda plications, it is said, are serious. Fear, however,
mental law. Moreover there would be a greater is no valid argument against the system once
awareness on the part of all of the broad range adopted, established and operated. Familiar
ofauthority the President possessesby virtue of ity with the essential background of the type of
such a provision. government establishedunder our Constitution,
in the fight ofcertain well-known principles and
Reference to the words of Justice Laurel, who practices that go with the system, should offer
was himself one of the leading framers of the the necessary explanation. With reference to
Constitution and thereafter, as a member ofthis the Executive Department of the government,
Court,one ofits most authoritative expounders, there is one purpose which is crystal clear and is
uij> in the leading case of Villena v. Secretary ofIn readily visible without the projectionof judicial
terior, [67 Phil. 451 (1939)] is not inappropriate. searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a
Theirreverberating clang,to paraphrase Justice single, not plural, Executive. The first section
Cardozo, shoulddrownall weakersounds. Thus: of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with
"After serious reflection, we have decided to sus the Executive Department, begins with the
tain the contention ofthe government in this case enunciation of the principle that 'The executive
on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, power shall be vestedin a President ofthe Phil
that under the presidential type of government ippines.' This means that the President of the
which we have adopted and considering the Philippines is the Executive of the Government
departmental organization established and ofthe Philippines, and no other. The heads ofthe
continued in force by paragraph 1, Section 12 , executivedepartments occupypolitical positions
ArticleVII,ofour Constitution, all executive and and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in
administrative organizations are adjuncts ofthe the languageof Ihomas Jefferson, 'should be of
Executive Department, the heads ofthe various the President's bosom confidence' (7 Writings,
executive departments are assistants and agents Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-
ofthe Chief Executive, and, except in cases where General Cushing, 7 Op., Attorney-General, 453),
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitu 'are subject to the direction of the President.'
tion or the law to act in person or the exigencies Without minimizing the importance ofthe heads
of the situation demand that he act personally, ofthe variousdepartments, their personality is in
the multifarious executive and administrative realitybut the projectionofthat ofthe President.
functions ofthe Chief Executive are performed by Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized
and through the executivedepartments, and the by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of
acts ofthe secretaries of such departments, per the United States, 'each head of a department
formed and promulgatedin the regular course of is, and must be the President's alter ego in the
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated matters ofthat department where the President
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts is required by law to exercise authority' (Myers
ofthe Chief Executive. (Runkle v. United States v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21 at 30; 272
[1887], 122U. S., 543; Law ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law ed., 160). Secretaries of
Rep. 1141; see also U. S. v. Eliason [1839]; 16 departments, of course, exercise certain powers
Pet., 291; 10 Law ed., 968; Jones v. U. S. [1890], under the law but the law cannot impair or in any
137U. S. 202; 34 Law ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., wayaffect the constitutional powerofcontroland
80;Wolsey v. Chapman [1880], 101U. S. 755,25; direction ofthe President. As a matter of execu
Law ed., 915; Wilcox v. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., tive policy, they may be granted departmental
498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)" autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
The opinion of Justice Laurel continues: mere concession of the executive, in the absence
"Fear is expressed by more than one member of of valid legislation in the particular field. If the
this court that the acceptance ofthe principle of President, then, is the authority in the Execu
qualified politicalagencyin this and similar cases tive Department, he assumes the corresponding
would result in the assumption of responsibility responsibility. The head ofa department is a man
by the President of the Philippines for acts of of his confidence;he controls and directs his acts;
m/
he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; extent of including the power to remove an officer
he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It or employee in the executivedepartment. Appar
is therefore logicalthat he, the President, should ently, the power merely applies to the exercise
be answerable for the acts of administration of of control over the acts of the subordinate and
the entire Executive Department before his own not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It
conscience no less than before that undefined only means that the President may set aside the
power ofpubhcopinion which, in the languageof judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular performance of his duties.
government. These are the necessary corollaries
ofthe American presidential type ofgovernment, That meaning is also the meaning given to
the word "control" as used in administrative law.
and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the
Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section
system itself. We cannot modify the system un
79 (C) is given direct control of all bureaus and
less we modify the Constitution, and we cannot
offices under his department by virtue of which
modify the Constitution by any subtle process of
he may "repeal or modify decisions ofthe chiefs
judicial interpretation or construction."
'iMi
of said bureaus or offices," and under Section 74
Concepcion, C. J. and Castro, J., fully concur ofthe same Code, the President's control over the
in the above opinion of Justice Fernando. executive department only refers to matters of
general policy. The term "policy"means a settled
or definite course or method adopted and followed
B. Ang-Angco v. Castillo by a government, body, or individual, [Lockhead
9 SCRA 619 (1963) Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, of Los Angeles
County, 171 P. 2d 21, 24, 28 Cal. 2d 481,166 A.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J: L. R., 701] and it cannot be said that the removal
of an inferior officer comes within the meaning
[In simplified form, the issue here is whether of control over a specific policy of government.
the President, acting through the Executive
Secretary or directly, may take disciplinary ac But the strongest argument against the
tion against a Civil Service officer bypassing the theory of respondents is that it would entirely
procedure prescribed by the Civil Service Law. nullify and set at naught the beneficent purpose
Ultimately the question revolves on the scope of the whole civil service system implanted in
of the power of control which the President has this jurisdiction, which is to give stability to the
over executive officers.] tenure of office of those who belong to the classi
fied service, in derogation ofthe provisions of our
Constitution which provides that "No officer or
Let us now take the power of control given employee in the civil service shall be removed or
to the President by the Constitution over all of suspended except for cause as provided by law"
ficersand employees in the executivedepartment (Section 4, Article XII, Constitution). Here, we
which is now invoked by respondents as justifi have two provisions of our Constitution which
cation to override the specific provisions of the are apparently in conflict, the power of control
CivilServiceAct.This powerofcontrol is couched by the President embodied in Section 10 (1),Ar
in general terms for it does not set in specific ticle VIII, and the protection extended to those
manner its extent and scope. Yet, this Court in who are in the civil service of our government
the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, had already embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty
occasion to interpret the extent of such power to to reconcile and harmonize these conflictingpro
mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify visions in a manner that may give to both full
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer force and effect and the only logical, practical and
had done in the performance of his duties and rational way is to interpret them in the manner
to substitute the judgment ofthe former for that we do it in this decision. As this Court has aptly
said in the case of Lacson v. Romero:
ofthe latter," [Mondano v. Silvosa, L-7708, May
30, 1955; 41 0. G., 2884.] to distinguish it from x x x To hold that civil service officials
the power ofgeneral supervision over municipal holdtheir office at the willofthe appointing
government, but the decision does not go to the power subject to removal or forced transfer at
iiii&J
any time, would demoralize and undermine In resume, we may conclude that the aqtidn
and eventually destroy the wholecivilservice taken by respondent Executive Secretary, Bven
&&i
system and structure; The country would with the authority of the President, in taking
then go back to the days of the old Jackso- direct action on the administrative case of peti
nian SpoilsSystem under which a victorious tioner, without submitting the same to the Com
Chief Executive, after the elections could if missioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and
so minded, sweep out of office, civil service should be set aside.
employees differing in political color or affili
ation from him, and sweep in his politicalfol C. Namarco v. Area
lowers and adherents, especially those who 29 SCRA 648 (1969)
have given him help, political or otherwise.
iiliii
(Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, 754).
CAPISTRANO, J.:
There is somepoint in the argument that the
power ofcontrol ofthe President may extend to
the power to investigate, suspend or remove of The pivotal point at issue is whether the
ficers and employees whobelongto the executive President of the Philippines had authority to
department iftheyare presidential appointees or reverse the decision of the Board of Directors of
donotbelong to the classified servicefor suchcan the NAMARCO and to order the reinstatement
be justified under the principle that the power of Juan T. Arive. Respondents maintain that he
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint had, and they anchor-their stand on Section 10
(Lacson v. Romero, supra), but not with regard (1) Article VII, of the Constitution which reads:
JujjjjA to those officers or employees who belong to the
classified service for as to them that inherent "'The President shall have control of all
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with executive departments, .bureaus, or offices,
the provision ofour Constitution whichsays that exercise general supervision over all local
"the Congress may by law vest the appointment governments as may be provided by law,
of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in and take care that the laws be faithfully
the courts, or in heads of department" (Article executed."
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to Petitioners however, disagree, and contend
these officers whose appointments are vested on that the word "offices," interpreted in the light
heads ofdepartments, Congresshas provided by ofthe preceding words "executive departments,"
law fora procedurefor their removal precisely in and "bureaus," refers to offices performing gov
view of this constitutional authority. One such ernmental functions which have no juridical
law is the Civil Service Act of 1959. personality, and, therefore, does not include
We have no doubt that when Congress, government-owned and controlled corporations.
bylaw,vests the appointment ofinferioroffi They claim that the above-quoted constitu
cers in the heads of departments it may limit tional provision is not applicable and that what
and restrict power ofremoval as it seems best should apply is Section 13 (d) of Republic Act
for the public interest. The constitutional No. 1345, (NAMARCO Charter) which vests in
authority in Congress to thus vest the ap the General Manager the power and/or duty,
pointment implies authority to limit, restrict, with the approval of the Board of Directors, to
and regulate the removal by such laws as remove,suspend or otherwise discipline for cause
Congress may enact in relation to the officers any subordinate employee of the NAMARCQ.
so appointed. The head of a department has They contend that in reversing the order of the
no constitutional prerogative of appointment NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan
to officers independently of legislation of T. Arive from the service, and in ordering his
Congress, and by such legislation he must be reinstatement, the President of the Philippines
governed, not only in making appointments arrogated unto himself a power not authorized
but in all that is incident thereto. (U. S. v. either by the Constitution or by law, hence his
Perkins, 116 U. S. 483.) actuations were legally ineffective and certainly
jj4j)
isi
could not be a basis for issuance of the writ of which we feel is controlling in the two petitions
preliminary injunction. before us.
Weholdthat the President ofthe Philippines' That issue, simply, is whether or not the
authority to review and reverse the decision of Directorofthe National Bureau ofInvestigation
'$$1
the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to
Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO him by the Secretary of Justice.
and to order his reinstatement falls within the
constitutional power of the President over all
tjaiii
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Un It is an elementary principle of our repub
der our governmental setup, corporations owned lican government, enshrined in the Constitu
or controlled by the government, such as the tion and honored not in the breach but in the
wai NAMARCO, partake ofthe nature ofgovernment observance, that all executive departments,
bureaus or offices, which are administratively bureaus and offices are under the control ofthe
supervised by the Administrator ofthe Office of President of,the Philippines. This precept, first
Economic Coordination, "whose compensation embodied in the Commonwealth Constitution
and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive and60 reiterated in the 1973 Constitution,61 has
Department" and who "shall be responsible to the been retained in Article VII, Section 17 of the
President ofthe Philippines under whose control present Constitution.
hisfunctions xxx shall beexercised." (Executive The President's power of control is directly
Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950, section 1, exercised by him over the members ofthe Cabinet
issued under the Reorganization Act of 1950.) who, in turn and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respec
tive jurisdictions in the executive department.
The constitutional vesture of this power in the
D. De Leon v. Carpio President is self-executing and does not require
178 SCRA 457 (1989) statutory implementation, nor may its exercise
be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legis
CRUZ, J. lature.
These two cases have been consolidated Thus, in Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano,62 the
because they involvethe same issue against the Court held that a statute making decisions ofthe
respondent Director of the National Bureau of department secretaries final and unappealable
Investigation, who has refused to reinstate the would nevertheless not prevent the President
petitioners in defiance of the orders of the Civil from reviewing and if necessary reversing such
Service Commission as referred to him by the decisions by virtue of his constitutional power of
Secretary of Justice for implementation. control over the members of his Cabinet.
Theoretically, the President has full control
Unable to return to their respective positions, of all the members of his Cabinet and may ap
Estavillo and DeLeon cametothis Courtin sepa point them as he sees fit or shuffle them at plea
rate petitions for mandamus. The respondent sure, subject only to confirmation by the Com
was required to comment. He again questioned mission on Appointments, and replace them in
the jurisdiction of the Board, contending inter his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times
under the disposition of the President as their
alia that it had no authority to review dismissals
immediate superior. Justice Laurel put it aptly
made under the Freedom Constitution and that
in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior,63 when he
the petitioners'dismissals werealreadyfinal, not
said that "without minimizing the importance
having been seasonably appealed. The Solicitor
General also filed a Consolidated Comment to
these and other cases involving the validity of ""Article VII, Section 10, (1).
the variousongoing government reorganizations. "Article VII, Section 8.
"21 SCRA 895.
However, he did not touch on the vital issue "67 Phil. 451.
of the heads of the various departments, their of the exceptions to the rule. Even so, compli
personality is in reality.but the projectionofthat ance with the usual procedure could have easily
ofthe President." Hence, "their acts, performed obtained for the petitioners the relief they now
and promulgated in the regular course of busi seek from this Court.
ness are, unless disapproved or reprobated by Our conclusion is that this regrettable
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
controversy would not have arisen at all if the
the Chief Executive."
respondent had had the humility to recognize
It is recalled that in Noblejas v. Salas,64 the the limits of his authority and acted accord
fiscal who conducted the preliminary investiga ingly. Plainly put, Director Carpio should have
tion recommended that no criminal action be dutifully obeyed the orders of Secretary Ordonez
taken against the petitioner in viewofthe insuf as his immediate superior in the Department
ficiency of evidence against him and the finding Justice. That is what we must now order the
that he had acted in good faith. This recommen respondent to do.
dation was expressly approved by the Secretary
^\ of Justice. Subsequently, the new fiscal who had
taken over the prosecution disregarded these acts
and included the petitioner among the accused in E. Blaquera, et al. v. Alcasid
the same criminal case covered by the Secretary's G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
directive. The Court granted certiorari and set
aside the resolution of the trial court denying
the petitioner's motion to quash. We held that The President is the head ofthe government.
^j the fiscal was bound to obey the order of the Governmental powerand authority are exercised
Secretary ofJustice, whowas exercisingoverhim and implemented through him. His power in
the President's constitutional power of control. cludes the control over executive departments —
î In the case at bar, there is no question that 'The president shall have control of all
when he directed the respondent to reinstate the executive departments, bureaus, and
the petitioners, Secretary Ordonezwas actingin offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
^)
the regular discharge ofhis functions as an alter faithfully executed." (Section 17, Article VII,
ego of the President. His acts should therefore 1987 Constitution)
have been respected by the respondent Director
of the National Bureau of Investigation, which Control means "the power of an officer to
is in the Department ofJustice under the direct alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this officer had done in the performance of his duties
department, the respondent was (and is) bound and to substitute the judgment ofthe former for
m)
to obey the Secretary's directives, which are that of the latter." It has been held that "[t]he
presumptively the acts of the President of the President can, by virtue of his power of control,
Philippines. review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or
It remains to observe that what the petition decision, of his subordinate in the executive de
ers should have done in the first place was to partments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can
complain to Secretary Ordonez that his direc exercise this power motu proprio without need
tives for their reinstatement had been disre of any appeal from any party."
garded by Director Carpio. Thus informed, the When the President issued AO 29 limit
Secretary would have reiterated his orders and
ing the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining
required immediate compliancetherewith by the
heads of government agencies from granting
fei respondent. This is not to say that the doctrine
incentive benefits without prior approval from
of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
him, and directing the refund ofthe excess over
strictly required in this case for the petitioners
were raising a pure question of law. That is one the prescribed amount, the President was just
\m
exercising his power of control over executive
departments....
M67SCRA47.
iuffi) ARTICLE VH: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 469
F. Dadole, et al. v. COA local government officials with that of his

•iiiitf)
G.R. No. 125350, December 3,2002 power ofcontrol over executive officialsofthe
nationalgovernment. It wasemphasized that
CORONA, J.: the two terms — supervision and control —
Before us is a petition for certiorari under differed in meaning and extent. The Court
Rule 64 to annul the decision and resolution, distinguished themtis follows:
dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, ".. . In administrative law, supervision
respectively, of the respondent Commission means overseeing or the power or authority
lM
on Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the of an officer to see that subordinate officers
Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the perform their duties. If the latter fail or
monthly additional allowances received by the neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
ml petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court such action or step as prescribed by law to
(RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) sta makethem performtheir duties. Control, on
tioned in Mandaue City. the other hand, means the powerofan officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the per
To resolve the instant petition, there are formance of his duties and to substitute the
two issues that we must address: (1) whether judgment ofthe former for that ofthe latter."
LBC 55 of the DBMis voidfor going beyond the
supervisory powers ofthe President and for not
having beenpublished and (2) whetherthe yearly Clearly then, the President can only inter
appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of fere in the affairs and activities of a local gov
Mandaue that provides for additional allowances ernment unit if he or she finds that the latter
to judges contravenes the annual appropriation has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of
Issj
laws enacted by Congress. the President's supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any
Werule in favor of the petitioner judges. of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local
On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be affairsas long as the concerned localgovernment
null and void. unit acts within the parameters of the law and
the Constitution. Anydirective therefore bythe
Werecognizethat, although our Constitution President or any ofhis or her alter egos seeking
guarantees autonomy to local government units,
toalter the wisdom ofa law-conformingjudgment
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject on local affairs of a local government unit is a
to the power of control by Congress and the patent nullity because it violates the principle
power of supervision by the President. Section 4
of local autonomy and separation of powers of
ofArticle X of the 1987Philippine Constitution the executive and legislative departments in
provides that:
governing municipal corporations.
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to
shall exercise general supervision over local implement? Yes.
governments
LBC 55providesthat the additional monthly
In Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201, 214- allowancesto be givenby a localgovernment unit
215 (2000), we defined the supervisory power should not exceed Pl,000 in provinces and cities
of the President and distinguished it from the and P700in municipalities. Section458,par. (a)
power of control exercised by Congress. Thus: (l)(xi), ofRA7160, the law that supposedlyserves
as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of additional allowances "when the finances ofthe
the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been city government allow." The said provision does
interpreted to exclude the power of control. not authorize setting a definite maximum limit
In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted to the additional allowances granted to judges.
the President's power of supervision over Thus, we need not belabor the point that the
470
finances ofa citygovernment may allow the grant page 1225, ofRA 7663 (The General Appropria
of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if tions Act of 1994) which specifically idenfified
%>
the revenues ofthe saidcity government exceed the objects ofexpenditure ofthe IRA. Nowhere
its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a in said provisions ofthetwo budgetary laws does
city government with locally generated annual it say that theIRA can beused for additional al
revenues ofP40million and expenditures ofP35 lowances ofjudges. Respondent COA thus argues
million can afford to grant allowances of more thattheprovisions intheordinance providing for
than P1,000 each to,' say, ten judges inasmuch suchdisbursement are against the law,consider
as the finances of the city can affordit. ing thatthe grant ofthe subject allowances isnot
within thespecified use allowed by theaforesaid
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of yearly appropriations acts.
additional allowances is aninappropriate way of
enforcing thecriterion found in Section 458, par. We disagree.
(a)(l)(xi), ofRA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its Respondent COA failed to prove that
power ofsupervision over local government units Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the ad
^tti
by imposing aprohibition that did not correspond ditional allowances of the judges. There was no
with the law it sought to implement. In other evidence submittedby COA showing the break
words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had down oftheexpenses ofthecity government and
no legal basis. the funds used for said expenses....
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of
its lack ofpublication, in violation ofourruling WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
in Tanada v. Tuvera where we held that: GRANTED, and the assailed decision and reso
.... Administrative rules and regula lution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28,
tions must also be published if their purpose 1996, respectively, ofthe Commission on Audit
is to enforce or implement existing law pur are hereby set aside.
suant to a valid delegation.
G. DENR v. DENR Employees
We now resolve the second issue ofwhether G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003
»)
the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by

Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for
judges contravenes any law and should therefore The issue to be resolved in this petition are:
be struck down as null and void. (1) Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum
implementing the same were valid; and (2)
According torespondent COA, even ifLBC 55 Whetherthe DENRSecretary has the authority
were void, the ordinances enacted by Mandaue to reorganize the DENR.
toj
City granting additional allowances to the peti
tioner judges would "still (be) bereft oflegal basis
for want of a lawfulsource offunds considering In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,
that the IRA cannotbe used for suchpurposes." thisCourt upheld thecontinuing authority ofthe
Respondent COA showed that Mandaue City's President to carry out the reorganizationin any
funds consisted of locally generated revenues branch or agency of. the executive department.
andtheIRA. From 1989 to 1995, Mandaue City's Such authority includes the creation, alteration
yearly expenditures exceeded its locally gener or abolition of public offices. The Chief Execu
ated revenues, thus resulting in a deficit. Dur tive's authority to reorganize the National Gov
ing all those years, it was the IRA thatenabled ernment finds basisin Book III,Section 20ofE.O.
Mandaue City to incur a surplus. Respondent No. 292, otherwise known as theAdministrative
avers that Mandaue City used its IRA to pay Code of 1987, viz:
for said additional allowances and this violated
Section 20. Residual Powers. — Unless
paragraph 2ofthe Special Provisions page 1060, Congress provides otherwise, the President
ofRA 7845 (The General Appropriations Act of
1995) and paragraph 3ofthe Special Provision, shall exercise such other powers and func-
ARTICLE VII:THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT V 471
tions vested in the President which are pro 14, 2006; DENR v. DENR Employees, G.R. No.
vided for under the laws and which are not 149724, August 19, 2003.
specifically enumerated above or which are
not delegated by the President in accordance It has been held, moreover, that the express
with law.
grant of the power of control to the President0
justifies an executive action to carry out the
si
Further, in Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345 reorganization of an executive office under a
Phil. 962, 979 [1997], this Court had occasion broad authority of law. Anak Mindanao v. Ex
•
to rule: ecutive Sec, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007;

Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA. G.R.
This provision speaks of such other No. 167324, July 17, 2007; A reorganization can
powers vested in the President under the
involve the reduction of personnel, consolidation
law. What law then gives him the power of offices, or even abolition of positions by reason
to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. of economy or redundancy of functions. While the
1772 which amended Presidential Decree
power to abolish an office is generally lodged with
No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the the legislature, the authority of the President to
President of the Philippines the continuing reorganize the executive branch, which may in
authority to reorganize the national govern clude such abolition, is permissible under present
ment, which includes the power to group, laws. Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007.
%%$
offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities and Appeal to the President of decisions of lower
to standardize salaries and materials. The officers is not the only remedy that can be availed
^j
validity of these two decrees is unquestion of. In fact, appeals to the President can be lim
able. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides ited by law. Power of executive control of the
that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, President is not absolute. The definition of the
proclamations, letters of instructions and structure ofthe executive branch of government,
other executive issuances not inconsistent and the corresponding degrees of administra
with this Constitution shall remain operative tive control and supervision is not the exclusive
until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, preserve of the executive. It may be effectively
there is yet no law amending or repealing limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial
said decrees. decisions. All the more so in the matter of appel
late procedureAppeals are remedial in nature;
Applying the doctrine of qualified political hence, constitutionally subject to this Court's
agency, the power ofthe President to reorganize rule-making power. The Rules of Procedure was
the National Government may validly be del issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article
egated to his cabinet members exercising control VIII of the Constitution, which expressly em
over a particular executive department... powers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning the procedure in all courts. Phillips
Seafood v. BOI, G.R. No. 175787, February 4,
NOTE: Power of control; power to reorganize 2009.
The President's power of control means his

power to reverse the judgment of an inferior of SEC. 18. THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE
ficer. It may also be exercised in his behalf by THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL*
Department Heads. Thus the Secretary of Justice THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIP
may reverse the judgment of a prosecutor and PINES AND WHENEVER IT BECOMES
direct him to withdraw an information already NECESSARY, HE MAY CALL OUT SUCH
filed. Such action is not directly reviewable by ARMED FORCES TO PREVENT OR SUP
a court. One who disagrees, however, should PRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION
appeal to the Office of the President in order to OR REBELLION. IN,CASE OF INVASION
sjgjifl
exhaust administrative remedies prior to bring OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC
ing it to court. Orosa v. Roa. G.R. No. 14047, July SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A
PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY DAYS, NOR AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE

SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT. ~ :
OF HABEAS CORPUS OR PLACE THE
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE
PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF
OF THE WRIT SHALL APPLY ONLY TO
UNDER MARTIAL LAW. WITHIN FORTY-
PERSONS JUDICIALLY CHARGED FOR
EIGHT HOURS FROM THE PROCLAMA
REBELLION OR OFFENSES INHERENT
TION OF MARTIAL LAW OR THE SUSPEN
IN OR DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH
SION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
INVASION.
OF HABEAS CORPUS, THE PRESIDENT
SHALL SUBMIT A REPORT IN PERSON DURING THE SUSPENSION OF THE
OR IN WRITING TO THE CONGRESS. PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT, ANY PERSON
THE CONGRESS, VOTING JOINTLY, BY A THUS ARRESTED OR DETAINED SHALL
jgjgl VOTE OF AT LEAST A MAJORITY OF ALL BE JUDICIALLY CHARGED WITHIN
ITS MEMBERS IN REGULAR OR SPECIAL THREE DAYS, OTHERWISE HE SHALL BE
SESSION, MAY REVOKE SUCH PROCLA RELEASED.
MATION OR SUSPENSION, WHICH REVO
CATION SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE BY 1. Commander in Chief.
THE PRESIDENT. UPON THE INITIATIVE
The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when
OF THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS
read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
MAY, IN THE SAME MANNER, EXTEND
SUCH PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION
President holds supreme military authority and
FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY
is the ceremonial, legal, and administrative head
of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
THE CONGRESS, IF THE INVASION OR
REBELLION SHALL PERSIST AND PUB
require that the President must be possessed of
LIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. military training and talents, hut as Command
er-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
THE CONGRESS, IF NOT IN SESSION, operations and to determine military strategy.
SHALL, WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS Normally, he would be expected to delegate the
FOLLOWING SUCH PROCLAMATION actual command of the armed forces to mili
OR SUSPENSION, CONVENE IN ACCOR tary experts; but the ultimate power is his. "As
iiii
DANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUTNEED Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct
OF A CALL. the movements of the naval and military forces
THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW, placed by law at his command, and to employ
IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING
them in the manner he may deem most effectual
FILED BY ANY CITIZEN, THE SUFFI to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy."
CIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE
Fleming v. Page, 9 How 603, 615 U.S. (1850).
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF authorized by Section 18 under specified condi
THE WRIT OR THE EXTENSION THEREOF tions, (1) to call out such armed forces to prevent
jka AND MUST PROMULGATE ITS DECISION or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebel
THEREON WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM lion, (2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of
ITS FILING. habeas corpus, and (3) to place the Philippines
or any part thereof under* martial law."
A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW DOES
NOT SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF THE The power of the President to call out the
CONSTITUTION, NOR SUPPLANT THE armed forces is a broad power. It may be gathered
FUNCTIONING OF THE CIVIL COURTS from the broad grant of power that the actual use
OR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES, NOR to which the President puts the armed forces is,
AUTHORIZE THE CONFERMENT OF unlike the suspension ofthe privilege ofthe writ
JURISDICTION ON MILITARY COURTS of habeas corpus, not subject to judicial review.
AND AGENCIES OVER CIVILIANS WHERE He is authorized "whenever it becomes neces
CIVIL COURTS ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION, sary, [to] call out [the] armed forces to prevent
aitl
or suppress lawless violence." What was said by What emerges from the above observations
the American Supreme Court in Martin v. Mott, on martial law as police power as well as from
12 Wheat 19 U.S. (1827) which Lansang v. Gar the text of the Constitution is that martial law
cia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971) said was not applicable is a flexible concept. Martial law depends on two
to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of factual bases: (1) the existence of actual invasion
habeas corpus, must be considered applicable or rebellion, and (2) the* requirements of public
to the broad power to make use of the armed safety. Necessity creates the conditions for mar
forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, tial law and at the same time limits the scope of
invasion, [insurrection,] or rebellion." "The martial law. Certainly, the necessities created
authority to decide whether the exigency has by a state of invasion would be different from
arisen," declared the American Court, "belongs those created by rebellion. Necessarily, therefore,
exclusively to the President, and ... his decision the degree and kind of vigorous executive action
is conclusive upon all other persons." Martin v. needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees
Mott, 12 Wheat at 30. of emergency could not be identical under all
conditions.
all 2. Martial law.
Because of this amorphous shape of martial
Martial law is essentially police power. This law power, the Marcos Supreme Court arrived
is borne out by the constitutional text which sets at the following conclusions: '
down "public safety" as the object ofthe exercise
1. That the proclamation of martial law au-
of martial law. Pubhc safety is the concern of
tomati cally suspends the privilege of the writ
police power. What is peculiar, however, about
of habeas corpus;
martial law as police power is that, whereas
police power is normally a function of the leg 2. That the President of the Philippines,
islature executed by the civilian executive arm, "as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or ad
under martial law, police power is exercised by ministrator of martial law . . . can promulgate
the executive with the aid of the military and in proclamations, orders and decrees during the
place of "certain governmental agencies which for period of martial law essential to the security and
the time being are unable to cope with existing preservation ofthe Republic, to the defense ofthe
conditions in a locality which remains subject political and social liberties of the people, and to
to the sovereignty." In the language of Justice the institution of reforms to prevent the resur
Black, it authorizes "the military to act vigor gence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or
ously for the maintenance of an orderly civil the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact
government." Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. of a world recession, inflation or economic crisis
304, 323 (1946). Or in the language of Justice which presently threatens all nations including
Stone, it is: highly developed countries ..."
Idsi
the exercise of the power which resides in 3. That the President of the Philippines, as
the executive branch of the government to legislator during the period of martial law, can
preserve order and insure the public safety legally create military commissions or courts
in times of emergency, when other branches martial to try not only members of the armed
ofthe government are unable to function, or forces but also civilian offenders for specified of
their functioning would itself threaten the fenses. [This summary is taken from Gumaua v.
public safety ... It is the law of necessity Espino,96 SCRA403,403-7 (February 29,1980).]
to be prescribed and administered by the The new Constitution rejects the above
executive power. Its object, the preservation Marcos Court pronouncements and now says
of the pubhc safety and good order, defines categorically: "A state of martial law does not
the scope, which will vary with the circum suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
stances and necessities of the case. The ex supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
I ercise of the power may not extend beyond
what is required by the exigency which calls
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the con
ferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
it forth ...Id. at 335-6. agencies over civilians where civil courts are
iiiift
able to function, nor automatically suspend the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President
privilege of the writ." expressed his desire to improve the peace-and
ist order situation in Metro Manila through a more
In general,the limits that have been imposed effective crime prevention program including
on the power to suspend the privilege and the increased police patrols...
powerto imposemartial law are: (1) a time limit
Siisl
of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation
by Congress; (3) review and possible nullification The selected areas of deployment under the
by the Supreme Court. LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM
Whatever doubt there may have been under City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills,
the former Constitutions, the new Constitution SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center,
now categorically states that the validity of the LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
imposition ofmartial lawor the suspension ofthe Airport.
privilege is not a political question: the "Supreme On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar
Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding of the Philippines (the "IBF') filed the. instant
L filedby any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment ofthe Philippine Marines, null and
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
extension thereof and must promulgate its deci
sion thereon within thirty days from its filing." I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE

3. Cases. MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE
OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A. IBP v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OB
TAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD
KAPUNAN, J.:
JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW EN
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari FORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOY
and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a MENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II,
temporary restraining order seeking to nullity SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
on constitutional grounds the order of President
Joseph EjercitoEstrada commandingthe deploy B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES
sal
ment ofthe Philippine Marines (the Marines) to AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILI
join the Philippine National Police (the "PNF') TARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOV
in visibility patrols around the metropolis. ERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DERO
GATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF
In view of the alarming increase in violent THE CONSTITUTION;
crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnap
pings andcarnappings, the President, in a verbal C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE
conduct jointvisibility patrolsfor the purpose of MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN
crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the
II
Armed Forces ofthe Philippines (the "AFP"), the
Chief of the PNP and the Secretary ofthe Interior IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT
and Local Government were tasked to execute IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION
and implement the said order... IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY
MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD
Subsequently, the President confirmed his
REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
previous directive on the deployment of the Ma
rines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, Asserting itself as the officialorganization of
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty
t&jjffl

S&jjj
to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, incidental interest. The gist of the question
the IBP questions the validity ofthe deployment of standing is whether a party alleges such
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP personal stake in the outcome ofthe contro
in law enforcement. versy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumina
The petition has no merit. tion of difficult constitutional questions.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors
ffifel that it is in possession of the requisites of stand its standing on its alleged responsibility to up
ing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the hold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart
President did not commit grave abuse of discre from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts
tion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction no other basis in support of its locus standi. The
nor did he commit a violation of the civilian mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to pre
supremacy clause of the Constitution. serve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
The power of judicial review is set forth in
with standing in this case. This is too general
Section 1, Article VIII ofthe Constitution, to wit:
an interest which is shared by other groups and
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall the whole citizenry. . ..
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such Having stated the foregoing, it must be em
lower courts as may be established by law. phasized that this Court Jhas the discretion to
Judicial power includes the duty of the take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy
courts ofjustice to settle actual controversies the requirement of legal standing when para
involving rights which are legally demand- mount interest is involved. . . . In this case, a
able and enforceable, and to determine reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
whether or not there has been grave abuse advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
of discretion amounting to lack or excess attention of this Court in view of their serious
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or ness, novelty and weight as precedents. More
instrumentality of the Government. over, because peace and order are under constant
threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
When questions of constitutional significance tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao
are raised, the Court can exercise its power of insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised
judicial review only if the following requisites in the petition almost certainly will not go away.
are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
and substantial interest of the party raising the and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
constitutional question; (3) the exercise ofjudicial
The President did not commit grave abuse of
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
discretion in calling out the Marines.
the case. In the case at bar, the bone of contention
concerns the factual determination ofthe Presi
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with
dent ofthe necessity of calling the armed forces,
the requisites of standing in this case.
particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in vis
"Legal standing" or locus standi has ibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits
been defined as a personal and substantial that the deployment of the military personnel
interest in the case such that the party has falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a the President as stated in Section 18, Article VH
result of the governmental act that is being ofthe Constitution, specifically, the power to call
challenged. The term "interest" means a ma out the armed forces to prevent or suppress law
terial interest, an interest in issue affected less violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP
by the decree, as distinguished from mere questions, however, is the basis for the calling
interest in the question involved, or a mere of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that in times ofpeace is not in any way diminished
wouldjustify the need for the calling ofthe mili by the relative want of an emergency speci
tary to assist the police force. It contends that fied in the commander-in-chief provision. For
no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to in makingthe President commander-in-chief
warrant the calling ofthe Marines. Thus, the IBP the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of be said to exclude the President's exercising
the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deploy as Commander-in-Chief powers short ofthe
ment." calling of the armed forces, or suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, con or declaring martial law, in order to keep
tends that the issue pertaining to the necessityof the peace, and maintain public order and
calling the armedforces is not proper for judicial security.
scrutinysinceit involves a political question and
the resolution of factual issues which are beyond Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the
the review powers of this Court. powerinvolved is the President's powerto call out
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
M\ As framed by the parties, the underlying violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of
issues are the scope of presidential powers and the controversy will reach a similar result.
limits, and the extent of judicial review. But,
while this Court givesconsiderableweightto the We now address the Solicitor General's argu
parties' formulation ofthe issues, the resolution ment that the issue involved is not susceptible
oi the controversy may warrant a creative ap to review by the judiciary because it involves a
proach that goes beyond the narrow confines of political question, and thus, not justiciable.
the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in As a general proposition, a controversy is
agreement that the power exercised bythe Presi justiciable if it refers to a matter which is ap
dent is the power to call out the armed forces, propriate for court review. It pertains to issues
the Court is of the view that the power involved which are inherently susceptible ofbeing decided
may be no more than the maintenance of peace on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the
and order and promotion of the general welfare. Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction
For one, the realities on the ground do not show over actual constitutional cases brought before
&&!l
that there exist a state of warfare, widespread it even in instances that are ripe for resolution.
civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates
the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a to rule on are "political questions." The reason is
point discussed in the latter part ofthis decision. that pohticalquestions are concernedwith issues
In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality,
Marcos v. Manglapus: of a particular act or measure being assailed.
More particularly, this case calls for the Moreover, the political question being a function
of the separation of powers, the courts will not
exercise ofthe President's powers as protec
tor of the peace. [Rossiter, The American normally interfere with the workings of another
co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear
Presidency]. The power of the President to
need for the courts to step in to uphold the law
keep the peace is not limited merely to ex
and the Constitution.
ercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State As Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957),
against external and internal threats to its puts it, pohtical questions refer "to those ques
existence. The President is not only clothed tions which, under the Constitution, are to be
with extraordinary powers in times of emer decided bythe peoplein their sovereigncapacity,
aj
gency, but is also tasked with attending or in regard to which full discretionary authority
to the day-to-day problems of maintaining has been delegated to the legislative or executive
peace and order and ensuring domestictran branch ofgovernment. Thus, if an issue is clearly
quility in times when no foreign foe appears identified by the text of the Constitution as
on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the matters for discretionary action by a particular
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties branch ofgovernmentor to the people themselves
then it is held to be a political question. In the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contem
classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker plation of law, as where the power is exercised
v. Carr, 24. 369 U.S. 186, 82 S ct. 691, 7 L. Ed in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
2d 663, 678 (1962), [p]rominent on the surface of passion or hostility. Under this definition, a
of any case held to involve a political question is court is without power to directly decide matters
found a textually demonstrable constitutional over which full discretionary authority has been
commitment ofthe issue to a coordinate political delegated. But while this Court has no power to
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable substitute its judgment for that of Congress or
and manageable standards for resolving it; or of thePresident, it may look into the question of
the impossibility of deciding without an initial whether such exercise has been made in grave
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonju abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary
dicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's power is granted either department of govern
undertaking independent resolution without ment, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry,
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may
branches of government; or an unusual need for give rise to justiciable controversy.
unquestioning adherence to a political decision
When the President calls the armed forces to
already made; or the potentiality of embarrass
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
ment from multifarious pronouncements by vari
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
ous departments on the one question.
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept from the intent ofthe framers and from the text
of judicial review by providing that [T]he Judi ofthe Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot
cial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom
and in such lower courts as may be established or substitute its own. However, this does not
by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the prevent an examination of whether such power
courts of justice to settle actual controversies was exercised within permissible constitutional
involving rights which are legally demandable limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
and enforceable, and to determine whether or constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion the constitutional intent to give the President full
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on discretionary power to determine the necessity of
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
Government." Under this definition, the Court the petitioner to show that the President's deci
cannot agree with the Solicitor General that sion is totally bereft of factual basis. The present
the issue involved is a political question beyond petition fails to discharge such heavy burden
the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When as there is no evidence to support the assertion
the grant of power is qualified, conditional or that there exist no justification for calling out
subject to limitations, the issue of whether the the armed forces. There is; likewise, no evidence
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been to support the proposition that grave abuse was
met or the limitations respected, is justiciable — committed because the power to call was exer
the problem being one of legality or validity, not cised in such a manner as to violate the consti
its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit tutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
constitutional boundaries has been given to this military. In the performance of this Court's duty
Court. When political questions are involved, of purposeful hesitation before declaring an act of
the Constitution limits the determination as to another branch as unconstitutional, only where
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
discretion amounting to lack or excess of juris shall the Court interfere with the President's
diction on the part of the official whose action is judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
being questioned.
There is a clear textual commitment under
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply the Constitution to bestow on the President full
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that discretionary power to call out the armed forces
is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a such power. Section 18, Article VII ofthe Consti-
tution, which embodies the powers ofthe Presi plant the functioning of the civil courts o]
dent as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part: legislative assemblies, norauthorize the con
ferment of jurisdiction on military courts anc
The President shall be the Commander- agencies over civilians where civil courts ar<
( in-Chiefofall armed forces ofthe Philippines able to function, nor automatically suspenc
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may the privilege of the writ.
call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasionor rebel The suspension of the privilege of th<
lion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when writ shall apply only to persons judiciallj
the public safety requires it, he may, for a charged for rebellion or offenses inherent ir
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend or directly connected with invasion.
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, During the suspension of the privilege
or place the Philippines or any part thereof of the writ, any person thus arrested 01
under martial law.
detained shall be judicially charged withir
xxx xxx xxx three days, otherwise he shall be released.
The full discretionary power ofthe President Under the foregoing provisions, Congress
to determine the factual basis for the exercise of may revoke such proclamation or suspensior
the calling out power is also implied and further and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
(£!*)
reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
which reads, thus: equivalent provision dealing with the revocation
xxx
or review ofthe President's action to call out the
xxx xxx
armed forces. The distinction places the calling
Within forty-eight hours from the proc out power in a different category from the power
lamation of martial law or the suspension to declare martial law and the power to suspend
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, oth
the President shall submit a report in person erwise, the framers of the Constitution would
or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, have simply lumped together the three powers
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a major and provided for their revocation and review
ity of all its Members in regular or special without any qualification. Expressio unius est
ffiifei
session, may revoke such proclamation or exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly
suspension, which revocation shall not be limited to certain matters, it may not, by inter
set aside by the President. Upon the initia pretation or construction, be extended to other
tive of the President, the Congress may, in matters. That the intent of the Constitution is
the same manner, extend such proclamation exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power
or suspension for a period to be determined to call is fully discretionary to the President, is
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional
shall persist and public safety requires it. Commission, to wit:
The Congress, if not in session, shall FR. BERNAS. It will not make any dif
within twenty-four hours following such ference. I may add that there is-a graduated
proclamation or suspension, convene in ac power of the President as Commander-in-
cordance with its rules without need of a call. Chief. First, he can call out such Armed
The Supreme Court may review, in an Forces as may be necessary to suppress
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, lawless violence; then he can suspend the
the sufficiencyofthe factual basis ofthe proc privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then
lamation of martial law or the suspension he can impose martial law. This is a gradu
of the privilege of the writ or the extension ated sequence.
thereof, and must promulgate its decision When he judges that it is necessary to
thereon within thirty days from its filing. impose martial law or suspend the privilege
A state of martial law does not suspend of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is
the operation of the Constitution, nor sup subject to review. We are making it subject to
review by the Supreme Court and subject to the power to call out the armed forces. The only
concurrence by the National Assembly. But criterion is that "whenever it becomes neces
when he exercises this lesser power of call sary," the President may call the armed forces to
ing on the Armed Forces, when he says it is prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment rebellion." The implication is that the President
cannot be reviewed by anybody. is given full discretion* and wide latitude in the
xxx xxx
exercise of the power to call as compared to the
xxx
two other powers.
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to
we only have imminent danger, the matter
support the assertion that the President acted
can be handled by the first sentence: 'The
without factual basis, then this Court cannot
President...may call out such armed forces
undertake an independent investigation beyond
to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
the pleadings. The factual necessity ofcalling out
invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that
the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
cannot be objectively established since matters
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a considered for satisfying the same is a combi
President feels that there is imminent dan nation of several factors which are not always
ger, the matter can be handled by the First accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of
iii*i) Sentence: 'The President . . . may call out textual standards that the court may use to judge
such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
we feel that that is sufficient for handling courts. Certain pertinent information might be
imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
instead of imposing martial law or suspend courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
ing the writ of habeas corpus, he must neces which the President might decide that there is
sarily have to call the Armed Forces of the a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. nature not constituting technical proof.
Is that the idea? On the other hand, the President as Com
MR. REGALADO. That does not require mander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network
any concurrence by the legislature nor is it to gather information, some of which may be
subject to judicial review. classified as highly confidential or affecting the
.security ofthe state. In the exercise ofthe power
The reason for the difference in the treat to call, on-the-spot decisions may be impera
ment of the aforementioned powers highlights tively necessary in emergency situations to avert
the intent to grant the President the widest lee great loss of human lives and mass destruction
way and broadest discretion in using the power of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
to call out because it is considered as the lesser military to prevent or suppress lawless violence
and more benign power compared to the power must be done swiftly and decisively if it were
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
corpusand the power to impose martial law, both farfetched when we consider the present situa?
of which involve the curtailment and suppres tion in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem
sion of certain basic civil rights and individual couldspill overthe other parts ofthe country.The
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by determination ofthe necessity for the calling out
Congress and review by this Court. powerif subjectedto unfettered judicial scrutiny
could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an
the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to injunction or a temporaryrestraining orderevery
suspend the privilege ofthe writ ofhabeas corpus
time it is exercised.
or to impose martial law, two conditions must
iigj concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the
rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. Constitution to vest upon the President, as
These conditions are not required in the case of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full
discretion to call forth the military when in his orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to pre It is their responsibility to direct and manage
vent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise,
rebeUion. Unless the petitionercan showthat the their duty to provide the necessary equipment
exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, to the Marines and render logistical support to
the President's exercise of judgment deserves to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it can
be accorded respect from this Court. not be properly argued that military authority
is supreme over civilian authority.
The President has already determined the
la> necessity and factual basis for calling the armed Moreover, the deployment ofthe Marines to
forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian char
asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store acter of the police force. Neither does it amount
^j
robberies,holdups, kidnappings and carnappings to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the
continue to occur in Metro Manila..." We do not task of law enforcement in violation of Section
doubt the veracity ofthe President's assessment 5(4), Article XVI ofthe Constitution.
ofthe situation, especially in the light of present In this regard, it is not correct to say that
developments. The Court takes judicial notice General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law
elements in the shopping malls, public utili enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a
ties, and other public places. These are among civilianpost in derogation ofthe aforecited provi
the areas of deployment described in the LOI sion. The real authority in these operations, as
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a
the President has sufficient factual basis to call civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
sai
for military aid in law enforcement and in the military. Such being the case, it does not mat
exercise of this constitutional power. ter whether the AFP Chief actually participates
The deployment of the Marines does not in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it exercise any authority or control over the same.
infringe the civilian character ofthe police force. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be
Prescinding from its argument that no emer no appointment to a civilian position to speak
iaj
gency situation existsto justify the calling ofthe of.Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment joint visibility patrols doesnot destroy the civil
of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforce ian character of the PNP.
ment is "militarized" in violation of Section 3,
Article II of the Constitution. Considering the above circumstances, the
Marines render nothing more than assistance
Wedisagree. The deployment ofthe Marines required in conductingthe patrols. Assuch, there
does not constitute a breach of the civilian su can be no "insidious incursion" ofthe military in
premacy,clause. The calling of the Marines in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation ofthe
this case constitutes permissible use of military civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
;'^fi
assets for civilian law enforcement. The par
ticipation of the Marines in the conduct of joint It is worth mentioning that military as
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. sistance to civilian authorities in various forms
The limited participation of the Marines is evi persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philip
dent in the provisions of the LOI itself, which pine experience reveals that it is not averse to
sufficiently provides the metes and hounds of requesting the assistance of the military in the
the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the implementation and execution of certain tradi
local police forces are the ones in charge of the tionally "civil" functions. As correctly pointed
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority out by the Solicitor General, some of the multi
belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila farious activities wherein military aid has been
Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP- rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring
ay
Phihppine Marines joint visibilitypatrols. Under both the civilian and the military together in a
the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or relationship of cooperation, are:
'.Iffift
ji&jj
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT • 481
1. Elections; generally prohibited, except in certain allowable

circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
2. Administration of the Philippine Na
\m tional Red Cross; § 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as
3. Relief and rescue operations during ca posse comitatus.
lamities and disasters; Whoever, except in cases and under
4. Amateur sports promotion and develop circumstances expressly authorized by the
ment; Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
Development ofthe culture and the arts; uses any part ofthe Army or the Air Force as
5.
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
6. Conservation of natural resources; laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
program; To determine whether there is a viola
8. Enforcement of customs laws; tion of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of
military personnel, the US courts apply the
9. Composite civilian- military law enforce following standards, to wit-
ment activities;
Were Army or Air Force personnel used
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
by the civilian law enforcement officers at
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elemen Wounded Knee in such a manner that the
tary and high school students; military personnel subjected the citizens
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities; to the exercise of military power which was
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in
13. Sanitary inspections; nature, either presently or prospectively?
14. Conduct of census work; xxx
xxx xxx
15. Administration ofthe Civil Aeronautics

When this concept is transplanted into the
Board;
present legal context, we take it to mean that
16. Assistance in installation of weather military involvement, even when not expressly
tiSijijlJ forecasting devices; authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does
17. Peace and order policy formulation in not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
local government units. actually regulates, forbids or compels some con
duct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on threat of some future injury would be insufficient.
executive power resulting from a systematic, (Emphasis supplied.)
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before Even if the Court were to apply the above
questioned.What we have here is mutual support rigid standards to the present case to determine
and cooperationbetween the military and civilian whether there is permissible use ofthe mihtary
authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is in
evitable that no violation ofthe civilian suprem
In the United States, where a long tradition
ofsuspicion and hostility towards the use of mih acy clause in the Constitution is committed...
tary force for domestic purposes has persisted, It appears that the present petition is an
and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not chored on fear that once the armed forces are
expressly provide for the power to call, the use deployed, the militarywill gainascendancy, and
of military personnel by civilian law enforcement thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such
officers is allowed under circumstances similar apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The
to those surrounding the present deployment of power tocall the armed forces is just that —call
the Philippine Marines. ing out the armed forces. Unless, petitionerIBP
Under the Posse Comitatus Act ofthe US, the can show, which it has not, that in the deploy
use ofthe military in civilian law enforcement is ment of the Marines, the President has violated
&iî
482 • .CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

y^
the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state
jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the
Court is not inclined to overrule the President's instant petitions have been rendered moot and
determination ofthe factual basis for the calling academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proc
of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless lamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used
;#£>
violence. by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests,
the Secretary ofJustice denies that it has issued
One last point. Since the institution of the a particular order to arrest specific persons in
joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a connection with the "rebellion." He states that
single citizen has complained that his political what is extant are general instructions to law
or civil rights have been violated as a result of enforcement officers and military agencies to
the deployment ofthe Marines. It was precisely implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as
&i!ii) to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil stated in respondents' Joint Comments:
liberties of the people that the joint visibility
patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy [I]t is already the declared intention of
will be in full bloom only when people feel secure the Justice Department and police authori
in their homes and in the streets, not when the ties to obtain regular warrants of arrests
shadows.of violence and anarchy constantly lurk from the courts for all acts committed prior
in their midst. to and until May 1, 2001 which means that
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the preliminary investigations will henceforth
petition is hereby DISMISSED. be conducted.
With this declaration, petitioners' apprehen-'

B. Lacson v. Perez sions as to warrantless arrests should be laid
G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001 to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion,

fetiftj MELO, J: the authorities may only resort to warrantless
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Ar arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as pro
royo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed vided under Section 5, Rule 113 ofthe Rules of
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The war
stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and rantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not
attempting to break into Malacanang, issued based on the declaration ofa "state of rebellion."
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 direct Aside from the foregoing reasons, several
ing the ArmedForces ofthe Philippinesand the considerations likewise inevitably call for the
^£|
PhilippineNational Police to suppress the rebel dismissal of the petitions at bar.
lion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless
' arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters
\m ofthe "rebellion" were thereafter effected. G.R. No. 147799
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's
the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part,
allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the ar argues that the declaration of a "state of rebel
rests, the following four related petitions were lion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of
filed before the Court — powers, being an encroachment on the domain
All the foregoing petitions assail the decla of the judiciary which has the constitutional
ration ofa state of rebellion by President Gloria prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took
Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to
no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, the general rule on the allocation of the govern
on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo mental powers.
ma
aai
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article menoftheArmed Forces ofthe Philippines (AFP)
^)
VII of the Constitution expressly provides that stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments
"[t]he President shall be the Commander-in- in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27,2003.
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out demanded, among other things, the resignation
such armed forces to prevent or suppress law of the President, thetSecretary of Defense and
less violence, invasion or rebellion ..." Thus, we the Chief ofthe Philippine National Police(PNP).
held in Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000): In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the
President issued later in the day Proclamation
. . . The factual necessity of calling out No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring
the armed forces is not easily quantifiable "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed
tia) and cannot be objectively established since Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation
matters considered for satisfying the same No. 427 reads in full:
is a combination of several factors which are
not always accessible to the courts. Besides PROCLAMATION NO. 427 DECLAR
ia)
the absence of textual standards that the ING A STATE OF REBELLION
court may use to judge necessity, information WHEREAS, certain elements of the
necessary to arrive at such judgment might Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, armed with
also prove unmanageable for the courts. high-powered firearms and explosives, acting
Certain pertinent information might be dif
upon the instigation and command and direc
ficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
tion of known and unknown leaders, have
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
seized a building in Makati City, put bombs
which the President might decide that there
in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of
is a need to call out the armed forces may be
support for, and took arms against the duly
of a nature not constituting technical proof..
L On the other hand, the President as
constituted Government, and continue to rise
publicly and show open hostility, for the pur
Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence pose of removing allegiance to the Govern
network to gather information, some of which ment certain bodies of the Armed Forces of
kmi may be classified as highly confidential or the Philippines and the Philippine National
affecting the security ofthe state. In the exer Police, and depriving the President of the
cise ofthe power to call, on-the-spot decisions Republic of the Philippines, wholly or par
may be imperatively necessary in emergency tially, of her powers and prerogatives which
situations to avert great loss of human lives constitute the crime of rebellion punishable
and mass destruction of property under Article 134 ofthe Revised Penal Code,
as amended;
•fe&
- G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MA

ii^j is not a real party-in-interest. . .. CAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the pow
ers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion,
petitions are hereby DISMISSED... compelling me to declare a state of rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing
C. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary General Order No. 4 in accordance with Sec
w}
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004 tion 18, Article VII ofthe Constitution, call
ing out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
TINGA,J.:
and the Philippine National Police to imme
y^j They came in the middle ofthe night. Armed diately carry out the necessary actions and
with high-powered ammunitions and explosives,' measures to suppress and quell the rebeUion
some three hundred junior officers and enlisted with due regard to constitutional rights.
484
im
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded: The President, however, did not immediately lift
the declaration of a state of rebeUion and did so
i^
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4 only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation
No. 435:
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE In the interim, several petitions were filed
TO SUPPRESS REBELLION before this Court challenging the validity of
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, armed with
high-powered firearms and explosives, acting Required to comment, the Solicitor General
upon the instigation and command and direc argues that the petitions have been rendered
tion of known and unknown leaders, have
seized a building in MakatiCity, put bombs moofby thelifting ofthe declaration. In addition,
in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of the Solicitor General questions the standing of
support for, and took arms against the duly the petitioners to bring suit.
constituted Government, andcontinue torise The Court agrees with the Solicitor Gen
publicly and show open hostility, for the pur eral that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435,
pose of removing allegiance to the Govern declaring that the state ofrebellion has ceased
ment certain bodies ofthe Armed Forces of to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule,
the Philippines and thePhilippine National courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial
Police, and depriving the President of the power being limited to the determination of
Republic of the Philippines, wholly or par "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will
tially, of herpowers and prerogatives which decide a question, otherwise moot, ifit is"capable
constitute the crime ofrebellion punishable of repetition yetevading review." The case atbar
underArticle 134 etseq. ofthe Revised Penal is one such case.
Code, as amended; Once before, the President on May 1, 2001
declared a state of rebellion and called upon
NOW. THEREFORE, L GLORIA MACA the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion
PAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order
vested in me by the Constitution as Presi No. 1. On that occasion, "an angry.and violent
dent ofthe Republic ofthe Philippines and mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
•:î
Commander-in-Chief ofall the armedforces weapons, clubs, stones andother deadly weapons'
ofthePhilippines andpursuant toProclama assaulted and attempted to break into Mala
tion No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby canang." Petitions were filed before this Court
caU upon theArmed Forces ofthePhilippines assailing the validity ofthe President's declara
and the Philippine National Police to sup tion. Fivedays after such declaration, however,
the President lifted the same. The mootness of
press and quell the rebellion. the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompany
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed ing cases precluded this Court from addressing
Forces ofthe Philippines andthe Chief ofthe the constitutionality ofthe declaration.
Philippine National Police and the officers To prevent similar questionsfrom reemerg-
and men ofthe Armed Forces ofthe Philip
pines and the Philippine National Police to ing, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to
immediately carry outthenecessary and ap rest the validity of the declaration of a state
propriate actions and measures to suppress of rebellion in the exercise of the President's
and quell the rebellion with due regard to calling out power, the mootness ofthe petitions
notwithstanding.
constitutional rights.
By the evening ofJuly 27,2003, the Oakwood

occupation had ended. After hours-long negotia It is true that for the purpose of exercising
tions, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. the calling out power the Constitution [Section
L
18, Article VII] does not require the President to General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the
make a declaration of a state of rebellion. . dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the
mere declaration of a state of rebeUion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected
The above provision grants the President, as rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not
i!al Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated suspend the operation ofthe Constitution or au
power[s]." From the most to the least benign, tomatically suspend the privilege of the writ of
these are: the calling out power, the power to habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that
•ftî
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas cor a simple declaration ofa state of rebellion could
pus, and the power to declare martial law. In the not bring about these conditions. At any rate,
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitu
the presidential issuances themselves caU for the
tion requires the concurrence of two conditions,
suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to
namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that
constitutional rights."
public safety requires the exercise of such power.
However, as we observed in Integrated Bar ofthe For the same reasons, apprehensions that
••^••i
Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not the military and police authorities may resort
required in the exercise ofthe calling out power. to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded.
The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes In Lacson v. Perez, supra, majority of the Court
L necessary,' the President may call the armed
forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebel
lion, the authorities may only resort to warrant
invasion or rebellion."' less arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section provided under Section 5, Rule 113 ofthe Rules
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
President from declaring a state of rebellion. warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus,
Note that the Constitution vests the President not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebel
not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, lion.'" In other words, a person may be subjected
first and foremost, with Executive powers. to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebeUion
whether or not the President has declared a state
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution states: 'The executive power shall of rebeUion, so long as the requisites for a valid
be vested in the President. ..." As if by exposi warrantless arrest are present.
tion, Section 17 ofthe same Article provides: "He It is not disputed that the President has fuU
shaU ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." discretionary power to caU out the armed forces
tm
The provisions trace their history to the Constitu and to determine the necessity for the exercise
tion of the United States. of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within consti
tutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
•The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here
calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion
state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most,
ga that the President acted without factual basis.
it only gives notice to the nation that such a state
exists and that the armed forces may be caUed to The argument that the declaration ofa state
prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
^j may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the re
enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. port requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no
But this Court's mandate is to probe only into indication that military tribunals have replaced
py
the legal consequences of the declaration. This civil courts in the "theater ofwar" or that military
Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of authorities have taken over the functions of civil
any legal significance. For all legal intents, the government. There is no aUegation ofcurtailment
declaration is deemed not written.
of civil or political rights. There is no indication
Should there be any "confusion" generated that the President has exercised judicial and leg
by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and islative powers. In short, there is no illustration
i&i^
that the President has attempted to exercise or 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),
has exercised martial law powers. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
mi
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can
that respondent officials of the Government, in
the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
their professed efforts to defend and preserve
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon
democratic institutions, are actuaUy trampling
a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2),
upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected
Article VI of the Constitution:
by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are
MA
Sec. 23.(1) void for being unconstitutional?
(2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, On February 24, 2006, as the nation cel
igi
authorize the President, for a limited period ebrated the 20th Anniversary ofthe Edsa People
and subject to such restrictions as it may PowerI, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declar
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and ing a state of national emergency, thus:
l^j
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution ofthe NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria
Congress, such powers shaU cease upon the Macapagal-Arroyo, President ofthe Republic
next adjournment thereof. of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
The petitions do not cite a specific instance
virtue ofthe powers vested upon me by Section
where the President has attempted to or has
18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
which states that: "The President. . .
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
whenever it becomes necessary,... may call
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
out (the) armed forces to.prevent or suppress
in caUing out the armed forces, was merely ex
... rebellion...," and in my capacity as their
ercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
executive powers, vested on the President by
to maintain law and order throughout
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
delegated legislative powers contemplated by
forms of lawless violence as well as any
Section 23 (2), Article VI.
act of insurrection or rebellion and to
g*i
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby enforce obedience to all the laws and
DISMISSED. to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and as provided in Section
D. Randolf David v. Ermita
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
SH
She cited the following facts as bases:
AU powers need some restraint; practical
adjustments rather than rigid formula are nec WHEREAS, over these past months,
essary. Superior strength — the use of force — elements in the political opposition have
cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, conspired with authoritarians ofthe extreme
the courts should be vigUant in safeguarding the Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and
constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically the extreme Right, represented by military
their liberty. adventurists — the historical enemies of
the democratic Philippine State — who are
now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a
certiorari and prohibition allege that in issu broad front, to bring down the duly consti
ing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP tuted Government elected in May 2004;
vrtitA
WHEREAS, these conspirators have WHEREAS, these series of actions is

iMl
repeatedly tried to bring down the President; hurtingthe Philippine State by obstructing
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements governance, including hindering the growth
have been recklessly magnified by certain of the economy and sabotaging the people's
segments of the national media; confidence in the government and their faith
in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurt
ing the Philippine State — by obstructing WHEREAS, these actions are adversely
governance including hindering the growth affecting the economy;
Md
of the economy and sabotaging the people's WHEREAS, these activities give totali
confidence in government and their faith in tarian forces; of both the extreme Left and
the future of this country; extreme Right the opening to intensify their
itti
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely avowed aims to bring down the democratic
affecting the economy; PhUippine State;
WHEREAS, these activities give totali WHEREAiS, Article 2, Section 4 of our

tarian forces of both the extreme Left and Constitution makes the defense and pres
extreme Right the opening to intensify their ervation of the democratic institutions and
avowed aims to bring down the democratic the State the primary duty of Government;
Philippine State; WHEREAS, the activities above-de
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the scribed, their consequences, ramifications
our Constitution makes the defense and pres and collateral effects constitute a clear and
ervation of the democratic institutions and present danger to the safety and the integrity
the State the primary duty of Government; of the Philippine State and of the Filipino
people;
WHEREAS, the activities above-de
scribed, their consequences, ramifications WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date
and collateral effects constitute a clear and February 24,2006 has been issued declaring
present danger to the safety and the integrity a State of National Emergency;
of the Philippine State and of the Filipino NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
people; MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the
powers vested in me under the Constitution
On the same day, the President issued G. 0.
tyii
No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus: as President of the Republic of the Philip
pines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Re
WHEREAS, over these past months, public of the PhUippines, and pursuant to
elements in the political opposition have Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24,
conspired with authoritarians ofthe extreme 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces
Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
the extreme Right, represented by military National Police (PNP), to prevent and sup
adventurists — the historical enemies of press acts of terrorism and lawless violence
the democratic Philippine State — and who in the country;
are now in a tactical alliance and engaged I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the
in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as
over a broad front, to bring down the duly-
the officers and men of the AFP and PNP,
constituted Government elected in May 2004; to immediately carry out the necessary
ittj
WHEREAS, these conspirators have and appropriate actions and measures
repeatedly tried to bring down our republican to suppress and prevent acts of terror
government; ism and lawless violence.
WHEREAS, the claims of these ele On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after
ments have been recklessly magnified by the declaration of a state of national emergency
certain segments of the national media; and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclama While he explained that it is not respondents'
tion No. 1021 which reads: task to state the facts behind the questioned
Proclamation, however, they are presenting the
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation
Article VII and Section 17, Article XH ofthe of the issues.
Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel
state of national emergency; Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmien-
to, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang,
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the
No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell
which were issued on the basis of Proclama in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public state
tion No. 1017, the Armed Forces ofthe PhU ment, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude
ippines (AFP) and the Philippine National arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to
Police (PNP), were directed to maintain "show and proclaim our displeasure at thesham
I law and order throughout the PhUippines, regime. Let us demonstrate ourdisgust, notonly
prevent and suppress all form o£ lawless bygoing to thestreetsinprotest, butalso bywear
violence as well as any act of rebellion and to ing red bands on our left arms."
undertake such action as may be necessary;
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have ef
hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I"
fectively prevented, suppressed and quelled
which detaUed plans for bombings and attacks
the acts lawless violence and rebellion;
during the Philippine MUitary Academy Alumni
ai|i
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to as
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President ofthe sassinate selected targets including some cabinet
Republic of the PhUippines, by virtue of the members and President Arroyo herself.Upon the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare advice of her security, President Arroyo decided
that the state ofnational emergency has not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next
ceased to exist. day, at the height ofthe celebration, a bomb was
found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
In their presentation of the factual bases of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was re
the proximate cause behind the executive issu captured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
ances was the conspiracy among some military province. Found in his possession were two (2)
officers, leftist insurgents of the New People's flash disks containing minutes of the meetings
Army (NPA), and some members of the politi between members ofthe Magdalo Group and the
cal opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate National People's Army (NPA), a tape recorder,
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies
oust or assassinate the President and take-over of subversive documents. Prior to his arrest, Lt.
the reigns of government as a clear and present San Juan announced through DZRH that the
danger. "Magdalo's D-Day would be on February 24,
During the oral arguments held on March 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo
leading to the issuance ofPP 1017and G.O. No.5. Lomibao intercepted information that members
Significantly, there was no refutation from ofthe PNP- Special Action Force were planning
petitioners' counsels. to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF
The Solicitor General argued that the intent Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to
of the Constitution is to give full discretion "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly
ary powers to the President in determining obeyed and issued a pubhc statement: "All SAF
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. units areundertheeffectivecontrolof responsible
He emphasized that none of the petitioners has arid trustworthy officers withprovenintegrity and
shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. unquestionable loyalty."
Li
On the same day, at the house of former He claimed that with the forces of the national
Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conserva
Aquino's brother, businessmen and mid-level tive political parties, coalitions, plus the groups
government officials plotted moves tobring down that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is
the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of probable that the President's ouster is nearing
!{ii&i TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
longtime Arroyo critic, caljed a U.S. government
official about his group's plans if President Ar Respondents further claimed that the bomb
royo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code- ing of telecommunication towers and ceU sites
named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as
DanUo Lim, Commander ofthe Army's eliteScout additional factual basis for the issuance of PP
- Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid ofan army
îil planned movement against Arroyo." outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of
three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the
B/Gen. DanUo Lim and BrigadeCommander Communist Party ofthe Philippines ordering its
Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila
Senga, Chiefof Staff of the Armed Forcesofthe radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in
Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of sol mass protests.
diers would join the rallies to provide a critical
mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo By midnight 'of February 23, 2006, the
protests to be held on February 24, 2006. Ac President convened her security advisers and
cording to these two (2) officers, there was no several cabinet members to assess the gravity
way they could possibly stop the soldiers because ofthe fermenting peace and order situation. She
they too, were breaking the chain of command directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for
to join the forces foist to unseat the President. all their men and ensure that the chain of com
However, Cen. Senga has remained faithful to mand remains solid and undivided. To protect
$M
his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of the young students from any possible trouble
command. He immediately took custody of B/ that mightbreak loose on the streets, the Presi
Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return dent suspended classes in all levels in the entire
National Capital Region.
to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio.
For their part, petitioners cited the
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensifica events that followed after the issuance of
tion of political and revolutionary work within PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
the mUitary and the police establishments in Immediately, the Office of the President
order to forge alliances with its members and announced the cancellation of all programs
key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka and activities related to the 20th anniversary
Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party celebration ofEdsaPeople Power I; and revoked
and revolutionary movement and the entirepeople the permits to hold rallies issued earlier bythe
look forward to the possibility in the comingyear local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gon
ofaccomplishing its immediate task ofbringing zales stated that political rallies, which to the
down the Arroyo regime; ofrendering itto weaken President's mind were organized for purposes
and unable to rule that it will not take much of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential
longer to end it." Chiefof Staff Michael Defensor announced that
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokes "warrantless arrests and take-over offacilities,
man for the National Democratic Front (NDF) including media, can already be implemented."
at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: Undeterred by the announcements that ral
"Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and lies andpublic assemblies would notbeallowed,
police are growing rapidly, hastened by the groups ofprotesters(members ofKilusang Mayo
economic difficulties suffered by the families of Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor
AFPofficers and enlisted personnel who under Vnions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]),
take counter-insurgency operations in the field" marched from various parts of Metro Manila
with the intention of converging at the EDSA that "ifthey do not follow the standards ~and
shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA the standards are — if they would contribute to
site were violently dispersed by huge clusters instability in the government, or if they do not
of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and
used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water Proc. No. 1017— we will recommend a 'takeover."'
cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up National Telecommunications' Commissioner
the marching groups, and scatter the massed Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks
participants. The same police action was used to "cooperate"with the government for the dura
against the protesters marching forward to Cu- tion ofthe state of national emergency. He asked
bao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan for "balanced reporting"from broadcasters when
Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds covering the events surrounding the coup at
of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration tempt foiled by the government. He warned that
rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de his agency wUl not hesitate to recommend the
Roxas Street in Makati City. closure ofany broadcast outfit that violates rules
set out for media coverage when the national
Accordingto petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, security is threatened.
the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the
dispersal of their assemblies. Also, on February 25,2006, the police arrest
ed Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing
During the dispersal of the raUyists along the Anakpawis Party and Chairman ofKilusang
EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) pe Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse
titioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his
University of the Philippines and newspaper arrest dated 1985. Beltran's lawyer explained
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos re
At around 12:20 in the early morning .of gime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however,
February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal is not a party in any of these petitions.
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of When members of petitioner KMU went to
llal
the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told
5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. they could not be admitted because of PP 1017
The raiding team confiscated news stories by and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups and detained, while the rest were dispersed by
of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp the police.
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the
editorial and business offices of the newspaper; Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo
while policemenfrom the Manila Police District eluded arrest when the police went after him dur
were stationed outside the building. ing a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon
City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and
A few minutes after the search and seizure at Art, were taken into custody.
the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded
the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Retired Major General Ramon Montano,
Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid former head ofthe Philippine Constabulary, was
Abante.
arrested whUe with his wife and golfmates at the
Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarifias,
The raid, according to Presidential Chief Cavite.
of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a
'strongpresence,' to tell media outlets not to con Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis
nive or do anything that would help the rebels Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative
in bringing down this government." The PNP Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative
warned that it would take over any media or Teodoro Casino and Gabriela Representative
ganization that would not follow "standards set Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel
by the government during the state of national Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office
emergency." Director General Lomibao stated in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the
la
S*l ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 491
custody of the House of Representatives where A. PROCEDURAL

k^t the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the al
First, we must resolve the procedural road
blocks.
leged violations ofthe rights ofRepresentatives
Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being
raised in these petitions. 7- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued American system to this country is the concept
PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v.
Madison. Thisconcept rests on the extraordinary
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions simple foundation —
challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017and
G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against The Constitution is the supreme law.
the above-named respondents. Three (3) of It was ordained by the people, the ultimate
these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as source of all political authority. It confers
respondent. limited powerson the national government.
x x x If the government consciously or
unconsciously oversteps these limita
In respondents' Consolidated Comment, tions there must be some authority com
the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petent to hold it in control, to thwart
petitions should be dismissed for being moot; its unconstitutional attempt, and thus
second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), to vindicate and preserve inviolate the
171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU, et al), 171485 will of the people as expressed in the
(Escudero, et al.) and 171489(Cadiz, etal.) have Constitution. This power the courts
no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for exercise. This is the beginning and the
petitioners to implead President Arroyo as re end ofthe theory of judicial review.
spondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and But the power of judicial review does not
legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."
the people's right to free expression and redress Courts may exercise such power only when the
of grievances. following requisites are present: first, there must
On March 7,2006, the Court conducted oral bean actual case or controversy;second, petition
arguments and heard the parties on the above ers have to raise a question of constitutionality;
interlocking issues which may be summarized third, the constitutional question must be raised
as follows: at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the de
cision of the constitutional question must be
A. PROCEDURAL: necessary to the determination ofthe case itself.
. 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders Respondents maintain that the first and sec
hoi
the petitions moot and academic. ond requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit
our discussion thereon.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
1) Whether the Supreme Court can susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite
review the factual bases of PP 1017. and concrete, touching the legal relations ofpar
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are ties having adverse legal interest;" a real and
unconstitutional. substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence
a. Facial Challenge of such actual case or controversy, contending
b. Constitutional Basis that the present petitions were rendered "moot
and academic" by President Arroyo's issuance
c. As Applied Challenge of PP 1021.
L
Such contention lacks merit. B. SUBSTANTIVE
A moot and academic case is one that ceases

/. Review of Factual Bases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for
list
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dis President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
miss it on ground of mootness.
The issue of whether the Court may review
The Court holds that President Arroyo's
the factual bases of the President's exercise of
I!)
issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
his Commander-in-Chief power has reached
petitions moot and academic. During the eight
(8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police its distUled point — from the indulgent days of
officers, according to petitioners, committed Barcelon v. Baker, and Montenegro v. Castaneda
^J
illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia, Aquino,
and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do Jr. v. Enrile, and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile. The
they justify these alleged illegal acts? These tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining
are the vital issues that must be resolved in the "political questions," particularly those questions
present petitions. It must be stressed that "an "in regard to which full discretionary authority
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers has been delegated to the legislative or execu
no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords tive branch of the government." Barcelon and
no protection; it is in legal contemplation, Montenegro were in unison in declaring that
inoperative." the authority to decide whether an exigency has
arisen belongs to the President and his decision
L The "moot and academic" principle is not a
magical formula that can automaticaUy dissuade is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide took the opposite view. There, the members ofthe
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, Court were unanimous in the conviction that the
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; Court has the authority to inquire into the exis
second, the exceptional character ofthe situation tence of factual bases in order to determine their
and the paramount public interest is involved; constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of
third, when constitutional issue raised requires separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the system ofchecks and balances, "under which the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the President is supreme, xxx only if and when he
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Ba
£ffii] sic Law, and the authority to determine whether
All the foregoing exceptions are present here
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
and justify this Court's assumption ofjurisdiction
over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutionally supreme." In 1973, the unani
violates the Constitution. There is no question mous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino
that the issues being raised affect the public's v. Enrile. There, the Court was almost evenly
interest, involving as they do the people's basic divided on the issue of whether the validity of
rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and the imposition of Martial Law is a political or
of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty justiciable question. Then came Garcia-Padilla
to formulate guiding and controlling constitu v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It
tional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the declared that there is a need to re-examine the
symbolic function of educating the bench and the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or
bar, and in the present petitions, the military national emergency, the President must be given
and the police, on the extent of the protection absolute control for the very life ofthe nation and
given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, the government is in great peril. The President,
respondents' contested actions are capable of it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience,
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject the People, and God."
to judicial review.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v
Zamora — a recent case most pertinent to these
iiiiiiiii
îj
cases at bar— echoed a principle simUar toLan partxcularly in the Philippine Marines, and
sang. While the Courtconsidered the President's the reproving statements from the communist
"calling-out" power as a discretionary power leaders. There was also theMinutes ofthe Intel
solely vested in his wisdom, it stressedthat "this ligence Report and Security Group ofthe Phtiip-
does notpreventan examination ofwhether such pine Army showing thegrowing alliance between
power was exercised within permissible consti
tutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
the NPA and the mUftary. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion." contraryallegations, the Courtis convinced that
This rulingis mainly a result ofthe Court's reli the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
ance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitu calling for military aid.
tionwhich fortifies the authorityofthe courts to
determine inanappropriate action the validity of Indeed, judging the seriousness of the in
the acts ofthe political departments. Under the cidents, President Arroyo was not expected to
new definition of judicial power, the courts are simply fold herarms and do nothing toprevent or
authorized not only"tosettle actualcontroversies suppress what shebelieved was lawless violence,
t|]§^)
involving rights which are legally demandable invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
and enforceable," but also"todeterminewhether such power orduty must not stifle liberty.
or not there has been a grave abuse of discre
tion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction II. Constitutionahty of PP 1017and G.O. No. 5
on the part ofanybranch or instrumentality of
the government." The latter part ofthe author Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
ityrepresents a broadening ofjudicial power to on the Power of the President
enable the courts of justice to review what was in Times of Emergency
before a forbidden territory,to wit, the discretion
ofthe political departments ofthegovernment. It This case brings tofore a contentious subject
speaks ofjudicial prerogative not only in terms — the power of the President in times of emer
ofpower but also of duty. gency. Aglimpse at the various political theories
relating to this subject provides an adequate
As to how the Court may inquire into the backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
President's exercise ofpower, Lansang adopted
the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further
than to satisfythe Court not that the President's In thefinal analysis, thevarious approaches
decision is correct," but that "the President did to emergency of the above political theorists —
not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down from Lock's "theory ofprerogative," to Watkins'
is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Inte doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and,
grated Bar ofthe Philippines, this Court further eventually, to Mcllwain's "principle of consti
ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner tutionalism" —ultimately aim to solve one real
to show that the President's decision is totally problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of
bereft offactual basis" and thatifhe faUs, by way allotting increasing areas ofdiscretionary power
ofproof, tosupport his assertion, then"this Court tothe Chief Executive, whUe insuring that such ,
cannot undertake an independent investigation powers wUl beexercised with a senseofpolitical
beyond the pleadings."
responsibility and under effective limitations
Petitioners failed to show that President and checks.
Arroyo's exercise ofthe calling-out power, by is OurConstitution has fairly coped with this
suingPP 1017, is totally bereft offactual basis. problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive
Areading oftheSolicitor General's Consolidated regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored
narration of the events leading to the issuance to create a government in the concept of Justice
ofPP 1017, with supporting reports forming part Jackson's "balanced power structure."Executive,
of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its
ownsphere. But none has the monopoly ofpower applied to protected conduct. Here, the incon
tijiii) in times ofemergency. Each branch is given a role trovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains
to serve as limitation or check upon the other. to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which
This system does not weaken the President, it is manifestly subject to state regulation.
just limits his power, using the language ofMcll- Second, facial invalidation of laws is con
wain. In other words, in times of emergency, our sidered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
Constitution reasonably demands that we repose
used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity
"generaUy disfavored;" Tfie reasonforthisisobvi
and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the
ous. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
same time, it obliges him to operate within care
constitutional adjudication is the principle that
fully prescribed procedural limitations.
a person to whom a law may be applied wUl not
•
a. "Facial Challenge"
be heard to challenge a law on the ground that
it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionaUy
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on to others, i.e., in other situations not before the
its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional
that its enforcement encroached on both un Law explains further:
protected and protected rights under Section 4,
Article HI ofthe Constitution and sent a "chilling The most distinctive feature of the
effect" to the citizens.
overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of con
A facial review of PP 1017, using the over stitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular
breadth doctrine, is uncalled for. litigant claims that a statute is unconstitu
First and foremost, the overbreadth doc tional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
trine is an analytical tool developed for testing prevails, the courts carve away the unconsti
"on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, tutional aspects of the'law by invalidating
also known under the American Law as First its improper applications on a case to case
Amendment cases. basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is
and can only assert their own interests. In
not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless chaUenges are permitted to raise the rights
violence. In United States v. Salerno the US Su
of third parties; and the court invalidates
preme Court held that "we have not recognized the entire statute "on its face," not merely
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited con "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
text ofthe First Amendment" (freedom of speech). becomes unenforceable untU a properly au
thorized court construes it more narrowly.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not The factor that motivates courts to depart
intended for testing the validity of a law that "from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
, "reflects legitimate state interest in maintain concern with the "chUling;" deterrent effect
ing comprehensive control over harmful, consti ofthe overbroad statute on third parties not
tutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are assumes that an overbroad law's 'Very exis
considered "harmful" and "constitutionally un tence may cause others not before the court
protected conduct." ... to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling
is designed to remove that deterrent effect
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are enter on the speech of those third parties.
tained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and In other words, a facial challenge using the
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to
at aU, have been curtaUed when invoked against examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be defects, not on the basis of its actual operation
im
EJtft
to petitioners, but on the assumption or predic Third provision:

tionthat its very existence may cause others not
before the Court torefrain from constitutionaUy "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of
protected speech or expression. the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency."
t%l
And third, a facial challenge on the ground First Provision: Calling-out Power
ofoverbreadth is the most difficult challenge to The first provisionpertains to the President's
mount successfuUy, since the challenger must
establish that there can be no instance when calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive
the assailed law maybe valid. Here, petitioners Secretary, this Court, throughMr.JusticeDante
did not even attempt to show whether this situ O. Tinga, held that Section 18,Article VIIofthe
ation exists. Constitution reproduced... grants the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" ofgradu
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of ated powers. From the most totheleast benign,
PP 1017 on the ground ofvagueness. This, too, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
is unwarranted. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas cor
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the pus, and the power to. declare Martial Law
"void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that
"a law is facially invalid if men ofcommon intel Under the calling-out power, the President
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning may summon the armed forces to aid him in
and differ as toits application." It is subject to the suppressing lawless violence, invasion and
same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. rebellion. This involves ordinary police action.
For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing But every act that goes beyond the President's
"on their faces" statutes in freespeech cases. And calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may vires. For this reason, a President must be careful
challenge a statute onits face only if it is vague in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke
in all its possible applications. Again, petition a greater power when he wishes to act under a
ers did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Con
is vague in all its application. They also failed stitution, the greater the power, the greaterare
to establish that men of common intelligence the limitations.
cannot understand the meaning and application It is pertinent to state, however, that there
of PP 1017.
is a distinction between the President's author
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
ityto declare a "stateofrebellion" (inSanlakas)
and the authority to proclaim a state ofnational
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP emergency. WhUe PresidentArroyo's authorityto
km 1017. declare a "state of rebeUion" emanates from her
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be powers as Chief Executive, the statutory author
divided into three important provisions, thus: ity cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2,
Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of
First provision: 1987, which provides:
"by virtue ofthe power vested upon me by SEC. 4. - Proclamations. - Acts of the
Section 18, ArtUce VII... do hereby command the President fixing a date or declaring a status
Armed Forces ofthe PhUippines, to maintain law or condition of public moment or interest,
and order throughout the PhUippines, prevent upon the existence ofwhich the operation ofa
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
«gn any act of insurrection or rebellion"
specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamationswhich
Secondprovision: shall have the force of an executive order.
"and to enforceobedienceto all the laws and President Arroyo's declaration of a "state of
to all decrees, orders and regulations promul rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status
gated bymepersonaUy or upon mydirection;" or cpndition of public moment or interest, a dec-
t&££)
&ii£i) 496 • CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
laratibn allowed under Section 4 cited above. clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws.andto
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, all decrees, ordersand regulations promulgated
is harmless, without legal significance, and by mepersonally or upon mydirection."
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is Petitioners' contention is understandable. A
more than that. In declaring a state of national reading ofPP1017 operative clause shows thatit
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely was lifted from Former President Marcos' Proc
onSection 18, Article VII ofthe Constitution, a lamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or sup
Liiai
press lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND
alsoreliedonSection 17,ArticleXII, a provision E. MARCOS, President of the PhUippines
on the State's extraordinary powerto take over by virtue ofthe powers vested upon me by
ffi»ft privately-owned public utility and business af Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) ofthe
fected with public interest. Indeed, PP1017 caUs Constitution, doherebyplace the entirePhU
forthe exercise ofan awesome power. Obviously, ippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 oi
!&&)
suchProclamation cannotbe deemed harmless, the Constitution under martial law and, ir
without legal significance, or not written, as in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief
the case of Sanlakas. do hereby command the Armed Forces ol
the Philippines, to maintain law and ordei
Some ofthepetitioners vehemently maintain throughout the Philippines, prevent or sup
that PP 1017 is actuaUy a declarationofMartial press aU forms oflawless violence as weU as
Law. It is not so. What defines the character of any act of insurrection or rebellion and tc
tî
PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees
what the President invoked was her calling-out orders and regulations promulgated by m<
power.
personally or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 whicl
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
granted President Marcos legislative power. Ifc
enabling clause states: "to enforce obedience t(
The second provision pertains tothepower of all the laws and decrees, orders and regulation*
the Presidenttoensurethat the lawsbefaithfully promulgated by me personally orupon my direc
executed. Thisis basedonSection 17,Article VII tion." Upon theotherhand, theenabling clause o
which reads: PP 1017 issuedbyPresidentArroyo is:to enforce
il^j
obedience to all the laws and toall decrees, orders
SEC. 17. The President shall have
control of all the executive departments,
and regulations promulgated by me persona^
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that or upon my direction."
the laws be faithfully executed. Is it within the domain of President Arroyi
topromulgate "decrees?"
As the Executive in whom the executive
power is vested, the primary function of the PP 1017states in part: "toenforce obedient
President is to enforce the laws as well as to to all the laws and decrees xxx promulgatedb?
formulate policies to be embodied in existing me personally or upon my direction:"
laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by The President is granted an Ordinanci
the officials and employeesofhis department.... Power under Chapter.2, Book III of Executivi
Petitioners, especiaUy Representatives Fran Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of1987)
cis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael She may issue any of the following:
Mariano, Teodoro Casino, Liza Maza, and Josel
Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of tin
as it arrogateduponPresident Arroyo the power President providing for rules ofa general o:
to enact laws and decreesin violationofSection permanent character in implementation o:
1, Article VI oftheConstitution, which vests the execution of constitutional or statutory pow
power to enact laws inCongress. They assaU the ers shaU bepromulgated in executive orders
jgl
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts As this Court stated earlier, PresidentArroyo

of the President which relate to particular hasno authority toenact decrees. It follows that
aspect of governmental operations in pur these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
suance of his duties as administrative head enforced. With respect to "laws," shecannot call
shall be promulgated in administrative the mUitary to enforce or implement certain laws,
orders.
such as customs laws? laws governing family
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the and property relations, laws on obligations and.
asj President fixing a date or declaring a status contracts and the like. She can only order the
or condition of public moment or interest, military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws per
uponthe existence ofwhich the operation ofa tinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
specific lawor regulation is made to depend, Third Provision: Power to Take Over
shall bepromulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order. The pertinent provision ofPP 1017 states:
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of xxx and to enforce obedience to all the
,the President on matters of administrative laws and to all decrees, orders, and regula
detail or ofsubordinate or temporary inter tions promulgated by me personally orupon
est which only concern a particular officer or my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
office of the Government shall be embodied Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
in memorandum orders. declare a state ofnational emergency.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts The import ofthis provision is that President
of the President on matters relating to in Arroyo, during the state ofnational emergency
ternal administration, which the President under PP 1017, can call the military not only
desires to bring to the attention of all or to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all
'mi
some of the departments, agencies, bureaus decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the
or offices ofthe Government, for information provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
or compliance, shall be embodied in memo
randum circulars. Sec. 17. In times ofnational emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the
Sec.7. General orSpecialOrders.—Acts State may, during the emergency andunder
and commands ofthePresident inhis capac reasonable terms prescribed byit, temporar
ity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed ily take over or direct the operation ofany
i«j
Forcesof the Philippines shall be issued as privately-owned public utility or business
general or special orders. affected with public interest.
President Arroyo's ordinance power is
limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot What could be the reason ofPresidentArroyo
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former in invoking theabove provision when she issued
PP1017?
President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
Decrees are laws which are ofthe same category The answeris simple. During the existence
and binding force as statutes because they were of the state of national emergency, PP 1017
issued by the President in the exercise of his purports to grant the President, without any
legislative power during the period of Martial authority or delegation from Congress, to take
Law under the 1973 Constitution. over or direct the operation of any privately-
This Court rules that the assaUed PP 1017 owned public utUity or business affected with
public interest.
isunconstitutional insofar asit grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." This provision was first introduced in the
Legislative power is peculiarly within the prov 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial
ince of the Legislature.... law" thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Con
^j
vention. In effect at the time of its approval
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all was President Marcos' Letter of Instruction
decrees and laws through the military? No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the
IjjjiJ
Secretary of National Defense to take over "the existence of a state of war), then the Framers
management,controland operationofthe Manila could have provided so. Clearly, they did-not
Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance intend that Congress should first authorize the
Telephone Company, the National Waterworks President before he can declare a "state of na
and SewerageAuthority, the Philippine National tional emergency." The logical conclusion then is
Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila that President Arroyo could validly declare the
(and) Filipinos Orient Airways . . . for the suc existence of a state of national emergency even
cessfulprosecution bythe Government of its effort in the absence bf a Congressional enactment.
to contain, solve and end the present national But the exercise of emergency powers, such
emergency." as the taking over of privately owned pubhc util
Petitioners, particularly the members ofthe ity or business affected with public interest, is
Siiiii) House of Representatives, claim that President a different matter. This requires a delegation
Arroyo's inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in from Congress.
PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature's
Courts have often said that constitutional
emergency powers.
provisions in pari materia are to be construed
This is an area that needs delineation. together. Otherwise stated, different clauses,
Sections, and provisions of a constitution which
A distinction must be drawn between the
relate to the same subject matter wUl be con
President's authority to declare "a state of na strued together and considered in the light of
tional emergency" and to exercise emergency each other. Considering that Section 17 of Ar
powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, ticle XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objec be read together to determine the limitation of
tion can be raised. But to the second, manifold the exercise of emergency powers.
constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
reads: of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to del
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of egate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
assembled, voting separately, shall have it. However, knowing that during grave emer
the sole power to declare the existence of a gencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the
state of war.
Framers'of our Constitution deemed it wise to
(2) In times of war or other national allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
emergency, the Congress may, by law, au the President...
thorize the President, for a limited period
Section 17, Article XII must be understood
and subject to such restrictions as it may
as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
The taking over of private business affected with
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution ofthe
publicinterest is just another facet of the emer
gency powers generaUy reposed upon Congress.
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State
next adjournment thereof.
may, during the emergency and under reasonable
It may be pointed out that the second para terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
graph of the above provision refers not only to direct the operation of any privately ownedpublic
L_, war but also to "other national emergency." If the utility or business affected with public interest,"
intention ofthe Framers of our Constitution was it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
to withhold from the President the authority to whether or not the President may exercise such
declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant power is dependent on whether Congress may
to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and. delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
grant it to Congress Qike the declaration of the the reasonable terms thereof...
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends features of whose Constitution have been
that the term ."emergency" under Section 17, copied in ours, have specific functions of
Article XII refersto"tsunami," "typhoon," "hurri thelegislative branch ofenacting laws been
cane"and "simUaroccurrences." This is a limited surrendered to another department-unless
view of "emergency."
^J
we regard as legislatingthe carrying out of•
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the a legislative policy according to prescribed
existence ofconditions suddenly intensifying the standards; no, noteven when thatRepublic
degree ofexisting danger to life orwell-being be was fighting a total war, or when it was en
yond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit gaged in a life-and-death struggle topreserve
in this definitions are theelements of intensity, the Union. The truth is that under our con
variety, and perception. Emergencies, as per cept of constitutional government, in times
m)
ceived by legislature or executive in the United of extreme perils more than in normal cir
Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide cumstances 'the variousbranches, executive,
range ofsituations, classifiable under three (3) legislative, and judicial,' given theability to
principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, act, are called upon 'to perform the duties and
and c) national security. discharge the responsibilities committed to
them respectively."
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Con
stitution, is ofthe same breadth. It may include FoUowing our interpretation of Section 17,
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence orepidemic, Article XII, invoked byPresident Arroyo in issu
typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of ing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclama
nationwide proportions or effect. . . . tion does not authorize herduring theemergency
to temporarily take over or direct the operation
ofanyprivately owned public utilityor business
It may be argued that when there is na affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
tional emergency, Congress may not be able to
convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to Let it be emphasized that whUe the President
the President the power to take over privately- alone candeclare a state ofnational emergency,
owned public utility or business affected with however, without legislation, he has nopower to
public interest. take overprivately-owned public utility or busi
In Araneta v. Dinglasan, this Court em ness affected with public interest. The President
phasized that legislative power, through which cannot decidewhether exceptionalcircumstances
i p^j
extraordinary measures are exercised, remains existwarrantingthe take overofprivately-owned
in Congress even in times of crisis.. public utility or business affected with public
interest....
After aU the criticisms that have been
•made against the efficiency of the system of C. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
the separation of powers, the fact remains
that the Constitutionhas set up this form of One of the misfortunes of an emergency,
government, with all its defects and short
particularly, that which pertains to security, is
comings, in preference to the commingling that mUitary necessity and the guaranteedrights
of powers in one man or group of men. The of the individual are often not compatible. Our
jjjijfl Filipino people by adopting parliamentary history reveals that in the crucible of conflict,
government have given notice that they many rights are curtailed and trampled upon.
share the faith of other democracy-loving Here, the right against unreasonable search and
peoplesin this system, with all its faults, as seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and
the ideal. The point is, under this framework the freedom of speech, ofexpression, ofthe press,
of government, legislation is preserved for and ofassembly under the BUI ofRights suffered
Congress all the time, not excepting periods the greatest blow.
ifijjfl
of crisis no matter how serious. Never in Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate
the history of the United States, the basic "direct injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and and not a mere incidental result arising from its
[mj Llamas aUeged that, on February 24, 2006,they exertion. .. .
were arrested without warrants on their way
to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of
kg) People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP SUMMATION
1017 as basis ofthe arrest.
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Oli- issuance of PP 1021 — a supervening event —
la) vares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed would have normally rendered this case moot
that on February 25, 2006, the CIDGoperatives and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still
"raided and ransacked without warrant" their operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly
office. Three policemen were assigned to guard in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guar
their office as a possible "source of destabiliza- antee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not
tion." Again, the basis was PP 1017. again be.issued.Already, there have been media
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017
and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their mem would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become
bers were "turned away and dispersed" when "unruly and violent." Consequently, the tran-"
they went to EDSA and later, to AyalaAvenue, to scendental issues raised by the parties should
celebrate the 20th Anniversary ofPeoplePowerI. not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to
prevent future constitutional aberration.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
suffered by the said petitioners shows that they constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
resulted from the implementation, pursuant to
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
^lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
PP1017andG.O. No5onthe basis of these illegal and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
acts? In general, does the illegal implementation However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giv
ofa law render it unconstitutional? ing the President express or implied power (1)
to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce
Settled is the rule that courts are not at obedience to all laws even those not related to
liberty to declare statutes invalid althoughthey lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
may be abused and misabused and may afford by the President; and (3)to imposestandards on
an opportunity for abuse in the manner of ap media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
plication. The validity of a statute or ordinance are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court
is to be determined from its general purpose and also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of
its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not the Constitution, the President, in the absence
from its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is ofa legislation, cannottake overprivately-owned
merely an invocation ofthe President's calling- public utility and private business affected with
out power. Its general purpose is to command public interest.
the AFP to suppress all forms oflawlessviolence,
invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No.
end desired which prompted President Arroyo 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President
to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP — acting as Commander-in-Chief— addressed
1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provi
to conduct iUegal arrest, search or violate the sions ofPP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a
citizens' constitutional rights. valid standard - that the military and the police
should take only the "necessary and appropriate
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or or actions and measures to suppress and prevent
dinance unconstitutional on the ground that acts of lawless violence." But the words "acts of
its implementor committed illegal acts? The terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been le
answer is no. The criterion by which the valid gally defined and made punishable by Congress
ity ofthe statute or ordinance is to be measured and should thus be deemed deleted from the
is the essential basis for the exercise of powef, said G.O...
Sj»
NOTE: PhUippine Coast Guard term. However, it should be noted that remis
The paramount effect of the transfer of the sionoffines and forfeitures merely prevents the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) from the Depart coUection of fines or the confiscationof forfeited
ment of National Defense to the Office of the property; it cannot have the effect of returning
President and eventually to the DOTC is the property which has been vested in third parties
transformation of the PCG into a non-mUitary or money in the public treasury.
agency. Thus, the PCG is already civUian in char United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (U.S.
acter. By removing the PCG under the control 1833), defines pardon thus:
and supervision ofthe military, the PCG ceased
to be a part of the military establishment, and A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding
has already assumed civilian character. Thus, from the power entrusted with the execution
the promotions and appointments ofPCG officers ofthe laws, which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the
do not require confirmation by the Commission
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is
onAppointments sincethe constitutional provi the private, though official, act ofthe execu
sion on "officers of the armed forces from the tive magistrate, delivered to the individual
rank ofcolonel or naval captain"requiringsuch for whose benefit it is intended and not com
confirmation refers only to mUitary officers. So municated officiaUy tothe Court... Apardon
riano v. Lista, 447 PhU. 566 (2003). is a deed, to the validity of which delivery
is essential, and delivery is not complete
SEC. 19. EXCEPT IN CASES OF IM without acceptance. It may~then be rejected
PEACHMENT, OR AS OTHERWISE PRO by the person to whom it is tendered; and if
VIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE it be rejected, we have discovered no power
PRESIDENT MAY GRANT REPRIEVES, in a court to force it on him.
COMMUTATIONS, AND PARDONS, AND As to the necessity ofacceptance, it is submit
REMIT FINES AND FORFEITURES, AF ted that a distinction must be made between ab
TER CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT. solute and conditional pardon. Absolute pardon
HE SHALL ALSO HAVE THE POWER is completeeven without acceptance; whereas "a
TO GRANT AMNESTY WITH THE CON conditional pardon has no force until accepted
CURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE by the condemned. The reason is obvious. The
MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. condition may be less acceptable to him than
the original punishment, and may in fact be
1. Executive clemency in general. more onerous." See Cabantag v. Wolfe, 6 PhU.
273, 278 (1906).
That Section 11 gives to the President the
power of executive clemency is a tacit admission It should also be added that the grant of ex
that human institutions are imperfect and that ecutive clemency terminates a pending appeal.
there are infirmities in the administration ofjus People v. Crisola, 128 SCRA 1 (March 2,1984).
tice. The power therefore exists as an instrument
2. Pardon.
forcorrecting these infirmities and formitigating
whatever harshness might be generated by a too
strict application of the law.
A. Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
Thevarious forms ofexecutive clemency are:
reprieves, commutations, pardons, remission FERNAN, C.J.:
of fines and forfeitures, amnesty. A reprieve
"postpones the execution ofan offense to a day
certain." People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 (1937), The benign mercy of pardon is of British
and a commutation "is a remission of a part of origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the
the punishment; a substitution ofa less penalty King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence
for the one originaUyimposed."Id. at 111.Remis on the subject has been largely influenced by
sionoffines and forfeituresis a self-explanatory American case law.
jjal
502 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERSOF GOVERNMENT
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceed courts on the various consequences of pardon:"
ing from the power entrusted with the execution "xxx we adopt the broad view expressed ixLCris-
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on tobal v. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, December 7,
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the 1940, that subject to the limitations imposedby
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot
the private, though official act of the executive be restricted or controlled by legislative action;
magistrate,delivered to the individual for whose that an absolute pardon not only blots out the
benefit it is intended, and not communicated of- crime committed but removes all disabUities
km
ficiaUy to the Court, x x x.A pardonis a deed, to resulting from the conviction, xxx. (W)e are of
the validity of which delivery is essential, and the opinion that the better view in the light of
delivery is not complete without acceptance."65 the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not
At the time the antecedents of the pres
to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of
(M
the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry into
ent case took place, the pardoning power was
governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended the environmental facts, should be at liberty
in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of
provision reads:
relieving completely the party xxx concerned
from the accessory and resultant disabUities-of
The President may, except in cases of im criminal conviction."
peachment, grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v.
and with the concurrence of the Batasang Labrador cases,68 and several others69 show the
Pambansa, grant amnesty.66 unmistakable application of the doctrinal case
fe»
of Ex Parte Garland,70 whose sweeping gener
The 1981 amendments had deleted the ear alizations to this day continue to hold sway in
lier rule that clemency could be extended only our jurisprudence despite the fact that much
upon final conviction, implying that clemency of its relevance has been-downplayed by later
tiitii
couldbe given even before conviction. Thus, pe American decisions.
titioner's unconditional pardon was granted even
as her appeal was pendingin the High Court. It Consider the following broad statements:
is worth mentioning that under the 1987Consti A pardon reaches both the punishment
tution, the former limitation of final conviction prescribed for the offense and the guUt of
was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
that in the present case, it is not material when releases the punishment and blots out ofex
the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the
istencethe guUt, so that in the eyeofthe law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never
same.Having acceptedthe pardon, petitioner is
deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her committed the offense. If granted before
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
assumed the character of finality.
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction,
from attaching; if granted after conviction,
Having disposed of that preliminary point, it removesthe penalties and disabilities and
we proceed to discuss the effects' ofa full andab restores him to all his civil rights; it makes
solute pardonin relationto the decisive question him, as it were, a new man, and giveshim a
ofwhether or not the plenary pardon had the ef new credit and capacity.71
&jj
fect ofremoving the disqualifications prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code. Such generalities have not been universally
accepted, recognized or approved.72 The modern
In Pelobello v. Palatino61 we find a reit trend of authorities now rejects the unduly
i^f eration of the stand consistently adopted by the
^Supra.
Ûnited States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-1, cited in 69In reLontok, 43Phil. 293; Pendonv. Diasnes, 91Phil
Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 848 and Mijares v. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507.
Part 1,1974 Ed., p. 355. 704 Wall. 333,18 L. Ed. 366. .
Ârticle VII, Section 11. nEx Parte Garland, supra at 367.
™67 C. J. S. 576-577.
6772 Phil. 441.
ma
ARTICLE VTI: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 503
broad language of the Garland case (reputed to though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
be perhaps the most extreme statement which backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
has been made on the effects ofa pardon). Toour
mind, this is the more realistic approach. While Petitioner maintains that when she was
a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive de
affll out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of clared her not guilty ofthe crime for which she
the law the offender is as innocent as though he was convicted. In the case ofState v. Hazzard,78
never committed the offense, it does not operate we find this strong observation: "Toassume that
for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is all or even a major number ofpardons are issued
forgiveness or remission ofguilt. Pardon implies because ofinnocence ofthe recipients is not only
to indict our judicial system, but requires us to
guilt. It does not erase the fact ofthe commission
assume that which we all know to be untrue. The
of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does
very act of forgiveness implies the commission
not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgive
of wrong, and that wrong has been established
ness and not forgetfulness.73
by the most complete method known to modern
The better considered cases regard full civilization. Pardons may relieve from the dis
pardon (at least one not based on the offender's ability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon
innocence) as relieving the party from all the pu a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of
nitive consequencesofhis criminal act, including bad character, which has been definitely fixed."79
the disqualifications or disabilities based on the In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress
finding of guilt.74 But it relieves him from noth one vital point: WhUe we are prepared to con
ing more. 'To say, however, that the offender is cede that pardon may remit all the penal conse
a 'new man', and 'as innocent as if he had never quences of a criminal indictment if only to give
committed the offense;' is to ignore the difference meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presi
between the crime and the criminal. A person ad dential prerogative, should not be circumscribed
judged guUty ofan offense is a convicted criminal, by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the
though pardoned; he may be deserving ofpunish fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guUt
ment, though left unpunished; and the law may of an individual and that once he is absolved,
regard him as more dangerous to society than one he should be treated as if he were innocent. For
ililiiiJ never found guilty of crime, though it places no whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the
restraints upon him following his conviction."75 .past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retro
such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned
convict in character and conduct with one who
spective.76 It makes no amends for the past. It
has constantly maintained the mark of a good,
affords no relief for what has been suffered by
law-abiding citizen.
the offender. It does not impose upon the govern
ment any obligation to make reparation for what Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the
has been suffered. "Since the offense has been crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite
established by judicial proceedings, that which the public manifestation of mercy and forgive
has been done or suffered while they were in force ness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men
is presumed to have been rightfully done and will take into account in their subsequent deal
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be ings with the actor."80
required."77 This would explain why petitioner, Pardon granted after conviction frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal dis
abUities and restores him to all his civU rights.
T367 C. J. S. 576-577; Page v. Watson, 192 So. 205,126
A. L. R. 249, 253. But unless expressly grounded on the person's
"Coram, of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service, innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back
203 N. E. 2d 95.
"State v. Cullen, 127 P. 2d 257, cited in 67 C. J. S. 577,
note 18. 78247 p. 957.
iiifcl 76Morris v. Hartsfield, 197 S. E. 251. "See also State v. Serfling, 230 P. 847.
"Illinois C. R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92, 33 L. Ed. ^Comm. of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service,
550, 554-555, citing Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149. 203 N. E. 2d 95.
lost reputation for honesty, integrity arid fair city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the
dealing.81 This must be constantly kept in mind usual procedure required for a new appointment.
lest we lose track of the true character and pur
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption
pose of the privilege.
from the payment ofthe civU indemnity imposed
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot
effusive language ofthe Garland case, we are in oblige her. Civil liabUity arising from crime is
fuU agreement with the commonly-held opinion governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convict notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
ed felon to public office necessarily relinquished reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
or forfeited by reason ofthe conviction82although amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petition
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility er's civil liability may only be extinguished\by
for appointment to that office.83 the same causes recognized in the Civil Code,
namely: payment, loss ofthe thing due, remission
The rationale is plainly evident. Pubhc offices of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
are intended primarily for the coUective protec debtor, compensation and novation.84
M*i
tion,safety and benefit ofthe common good. They
cannot be compromised to favor private interests. WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution af
To insist on automatic reinstatement because former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio
of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would AFFIRMED. No costs.
be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit fuU and SO ORDERED.
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power
from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,
be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is Grifio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, J J.,
concur.
unsuitable by reason ofthe pardoned conviction.
I For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom
Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result and in
the Separate Opinions of Justices Padilla and
line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility
Feliciano.
from public office forms part of the punishment
aui
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa Gutierrez, Jr., J., I join Justice Feliciano in
thru falsification of pubhc documents. It is clear his concurring opinion.
from the authorities referred to that when her Cruz, J., I concur subject to Mr. Justice
guUt and punishment were expunged by her Feliciano's reservation in his separate opinion.
pardon, this particular disability was likewise Feliciano, J., Please see separate concurring
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for opinion.
reappointment to the office which was forfeited
by reason of her conviction. And in considering Padilla, J., Please see separate opinion.
her qualifications and suitabUity for the public Sarmiento, J., I join the separate opinion of
post, the facts constituting her offense must be Justices PadUla and Feliciano.
and should be evaluated and taken into account
to determine ultimately whether she can once SEPARATE OPINION
again be entrusted with public funds. Stated PADILLA, J.:
differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding pubhc employment but it cannot go be Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary
yond that. To regain her former post as assistant denied petitioner's request for automatic rein
statement as weU as her other claims, because of
8lIbid. which denial, this petition for review on certiorari
Îllinois C. R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92,33 L. E. 550; was filed before the Court seeking the setting
•jty'i
Page v. Watson, 192 So. 205,126 ALR, 249; State v. Hazzard,
247 P. 957 and In re Stephenson, 10 So. 2d 1.
M59 Am. Jur. 2d 40. "Articles 36,112-113, Revised Penal Code.
aside and reversal ofthe decision ofthe respon is a pubhc trust." Therestorationofthe rightto
dent Assistant ExecutiveSecretary, on the main hold public office to onewho has lostsuch right
contention that, as a public officer who has been by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but
granted an absolute pardon by the President, she subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to infer
is entitled to reinstatement to her former position ence, no matter how intensely arguable, but
without need of a new appointment, and to the must be statedin express, explicit, positive and
other reliefs prayed for. specific language. To require this would not be
asking too much.
There can be no dispute that the pardon
ml extinguished petitioner's criminal liabUity. At I am aware that there are broad statement in
the same time, Art. 36 ofthe Revised Penal Code Cristobal v.Labrador, 71 PhU. 341 and Pe/ofce/Zo
categorically covers the effects ofa pardon on the v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 which may be under
pardoned's right to hold office, suffrage and on stood to mean that an absolute pardon, without
his civU liability. It states: qualification,restores full civilrights whichhave
been construed, in turn, to include the right to
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. — A pardon hold public office (Versozav. Fernandez,'55 PhU.
shall not work the restoration of the right 323).
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights beexpressly restored bythe If such be the message of said cases, then I
terms of the pardon. submh^that a modification is in order, so that
an absolute pardon to work a restoration of
A pardon shaU in no case exempt the cul the right to hold public office must expressly so
prit from the payment ofthe civil indemnity state, in order to give substance and meaning to
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Italics the sound provisions of Article 36 ofthe Revised
supplied.) Penal Code,particularly in the light ofour times
Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code and experience.
to the case at bar, it is, to my mind, clear that ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the peti
the pardon extended by the President to the pe tion.
titioner did not per se entitle her to again hold
public office (including therefore the office of As FELIQIANO, J: Concurring:
sistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) or to suffrage; I concur in the result reached in the impor
nor did such pardon extinguish her civU liabUity tant and eloquent opinion of the Chief Justice.
for the criminal conviction, subject matter ofthe I also join in the separate concurring opinion of
pardon. Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I would
An examination of the presidential pardon add a few brief statements, basically for my own
in question shows that, while petitioner was clarification. Article 36 of the Revised Penal
granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon Code states:
and. restored to full civil and political rights," Article 36. Pardon; its effects. — A par
yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the don shaU not work the restoration ofthe right
right to hold public office was thereby restored to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
to the petitioner. In view ofthe expressexclusion unless such rights be expressly restored by
by Art. 36, R.P.C., ofthe right to hold public of the terms of the pardon.
fice, notwithstanding a pardon unlesstherightis
expressly restored by the pardon, it is my consid A pardon shall in no case exempt the cul
ered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon prit from the payment ofthe civUindemnity
granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore imposed upon him by the sentence. (Italic
supplied.)
L the right to hold pubhc office as an effect of such
pardon, that right must be kept away from the It is worthy of note that the rule embodied
petitioner. in Article 36 is reiterated four (4) times by the
It is a recognized principle in public law - Revised Penal Code in its following provisions:
hopefully to be honored more in its compliance Article 40. Death — Its accessory penal
rather than in its breach — that a "public office ties. — The death penalty, when it is riot
executed by reason of commutation or pardon and unconditional pardon [which] restored [pe-
shaU carry with it that of perpetual absolute . titioner] to full civU and political rights."85 WhUe
disqualification^ and that of civil interdic the right of suffrage and the right to hold pubhc
tion during thirty years following the date office or employment are commonly regarded as
of sentence, unless such accessory penalties "political rights,"86 it must be noted that there
have beenexpressly remitted in thepardon. are other "political rights"87 and that the par
don given to petitioner did not expressly and in
Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclu-
printer's ink restore to petitioner the particular
sion temporal. — Their accessory penalties.
;$&i right to hold public office and the specific right
— The penalties of reclusion perpetua and to vote at elections and plebiscites.
reclusion temporal shall carry with them
that of civil interdiction for life or during the I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla
ms period ofthe sentence as the case may be, and that because ofthe nature of a public office as a
that of perpetual absolute disqualification public trust, Articles 36 and 40-43 appropriately
which the offender shall suffer even though require a very high degree of explicitness if a
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless pardon is to work the restoration of such right
the same shall have been expressly remitted to petitioner. Exactly the same point may, of
in the pardon. course, be made in respect of the restoration of
the right to vote.
L Article 42. Prision mayor — Its accessory
penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal
shaU carry with it that of temporary absolute Code, quoted above, have been in our statute
disqualification and that of perpetual special books since 1930.1 believe that they have been
disqualification from the right of suffrage left intact by the constitutional provisions on par
which the offender shall suffer although don, whether one refers to the 1935 Constitution
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless or to the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. I do not
the same shall have been expressly remitted believe that Articles 36, et al. collided with any
in the pardon. provision or principle embodied in either of our
prior constitutions. The Chief Justice appears
Article 43. Prision correccional — Its to agree with this position when he referred to
m)
accessory penalties. — The penalty of pri Article 36 ofthe Revised Penal Code (Opinion, p.
sion correccional shall carry with it that of 5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that:
suspension from public office, from the right "the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
to follow a profession or calling, and that removingher disqualification from holding public
of perpetual special disqualification from employment but it cannot go beyond that."
the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shaU exceed eighteen months. It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36,
Theoffendershall suffer the disqualification et al. of the Revised Penal Code have not been
shown to be an unconstitutional restriction on
provided in this articlealthoughpardoned as
totheprincipalpenalty, unlessthesameshall the pardoning power ofthe President. The limita
have been expressly remitted in the pardon. tion on the President's pardoning power, if limita
tion it be, does not appear to be an unreasonably
(Italics supplied.)
onerous one. Articles 36, et al. merely require
The ChiefJustice points out that the penalty the President to become completely explicit if
imposedupon petitioner for the complex crimeof the pardon he extends is intended to wipe out
estafa through falsification of public documents, not merely the principal but also the accessory
included the accessory penalties of temporary penalty of disqualification from holding public
absolute disqualification from public officeor em office and from voting and to restore the recipient
ployment and perpetual special disqualification ofthe pardon to the exercise ofsuch fundamental
from the right ofsuffrage. The 17 December 1984
"Rollo, p. 90.
pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case "Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
was written on a standard printed form which 87Malcolm and Laurel, The Constitutional Law of the
states in printed words that it was "an absolute Philippines, p. 378 (1936).
political rights. Such requirement of explicitness ditional pardon and was consequently released
seems entirely in line with the fundamental point from confinement.
made by the Chief Justice that a pardon does
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons
not blot out the factual guUt of the recipient of
the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recom
mend to the President the canceUation of the
pardon to a public officer or employee who has
been unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced conditional pardon granted to the.petitioner. In
to disqualification from voting and from holding making its recommendation to the President, the
such office, does not create the presumption that Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in
the recipient ofthe pardon has thereby suddenly Tesoro v. Director ofPrisons (68 PhU. 154 [1939])
become moraUy eligible once more to exercise the and Espuelas v. Provincial Warden ofBohol (108
right to vote and to hold public office. PhU. 356 [I960]). The evidence before the Board
showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982,
In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner petitioner had been charged with twenty counts
was ineffective to restore to her the right to hold of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and
public office and on this ground, I vote to DENY Q-20756, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986)
the Petition for Review and to AFFIRM the as- pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of
saUed Resolution ofthe then Executive Secretary Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Bosrd
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner
NOTE: Sabello v. Department ofEducation, had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court
G.R. 87687, December 26, 1989 added a refine of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition
ment to the Monsanto case. Petitioner was a in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction
teacher with the rank of Principal I. Convicted was then pending appeal before the Intermedi
of a criminal offense, he was sentenced to one ate Appellate Court. The Board also had before
year imprisonment and disqualification to hold it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from
public office. Subsequently he was given absolute the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"),
pardon and restored to "full civil and political addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per
rights." He applied for reinstatement and was this letter, the records of the NBI showed that
given the position merely of classroom teacher. a long list of charges had been brought against
The Court ruled that Sabello was entitled to his the petitioner during the last twenty years for a
old rank reasoning that, although one who is wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other
given absolute pardon has no demandable right forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion,
to reinstatement, since the petitioner in this Ulegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
instance had actually been reinstated and there explosives, malicious mischief,' violation of Batas
were no circumstances that would warrant the Pambansa Big. 22, and violation of Presidential
diminution of his rank, justice and equity dictat Decree No. 772 (interfering with police func
ed that he be given his former rank of Principal I. tions). Some of these charges were identified in
the NBI report as having been dismissed. The
B. Torres v. Gonzales NBI report did not purport to be a status report
152 SCRA 272 (1987) on each ofthe charges there listed and identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister
FELICIANO, J.: of Justice wrote to the President of the PhUip
pines informing her of the Resolution of the
Board recommending cancellation of the condi
2. On 18 AprU 1979, a conditional pardon tional pardon previously granted to petitioner.
was granted to the petitioner by the President 5. On 8 September 1986, the President can
of the Philippines on condition that petitioner celled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines. Should this condition be vio 6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent
lated, he wiU be proceeded against in the manner Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the con President" an Order of Arrest and Recommit-
ment against petitioner. The petitioner was ac the basis ofhis report, the Board recommended to
cordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa the President ofthe PhUippines the arrest and re
to serve the unexpired portion, of his sentence. commitment ofthe petitioner. Tesoro contended,
among other things, that a judicial pronounce
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the ment to the effect that he has committed a crime"
jfei Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims
is necessary before he could properly be adjudged
that he did not violate his conditional pardon as having violated his conditional parole.
since he has not been convicted by final judgment
of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Addressing this point, this Court, speaking
^j
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the
ofthe crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q- determination of whether the conditions ofTeso
22926.88 Petitioner also contends that he was not ro's parole had been breached rested exclusively
given an opportunity to be heard before he was in the sound judgment of the Governor-General
arrested and recommitted to prison, and accord and that such determination would not be re
ingly claims he has been deprived of his rights viewedby the courts. As Tesoro had consented to
under the due process clause ofthe Constitution. place his hberty on parole upon the judgment of
$$fl
the power that had granted it, we held that "he
The issue that confronts us therefore is [could not] invoke the aid ofthe courts, however
whether or not conviction of a crime by final judg erroneous the findings may be upon which his
ment of a court is necessary before the petitioner recommitment was ordered."91 Thus, this Court
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for held that by accepting the terms under which
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect
&&1
and accordingly to serve the.balance of his origi agreed that the Governor-General's determina
nal sentence. tion (rather than that of the regular courts of
law) that he had breached one of the conditions
This issue is not novel. It has been raised of his parole by committing adultery whUe he
^^j before this Court three times in the past. was conditionally at Hberty, was binding and
This Court was first faced with this issue in conclusive upon him. In reaching this conclu
Tesoro v. Director of Prisons.69 Tesoro, who had sion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the
been convicted of the crime of falsification of Revised Administrative Code which empowered
public documents, was granted a parole by the the Governor-General
then Governor-General. One ofthe conditions of to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or
the parolerequired the parolee "not [to] commit pardons, either plenary or partial, condi
any other crime and [to] conduct himself in an tional or unconditional; to suspend sentences
orderly manner."90 Two years after the grant of without parole, remit fines, and order the dis
parole, Tesoro was charged before the Justice charge of any convicted person upon parole,
of the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the subject to such conditions as he may impose;
crime of adultery said to have been committed and to authorize the arrest and recommitment
with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The of any such person who, in his judgment,
fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the shall fail to comply with the condition, or
correspondinginformation which, however,was conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspen
dismissed for non-appearance of the complain sion of sentence. (Italics supplied.)
ant. Thecomplainant than wentbefore the Board In Sales v.Director of Prisons,92 the petitioner
of Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro had been convicted of the crime of frustrated
with violation of the conditions of his parole. murder. After serving a little more than two
After investigation by the parole officer, and on yearsofhis sentence, he was given a conditional
pardonby the President ofthe PhUippines, "the
MBy an instrument dated 28 January 1987, petitioner condition being that he shall not again violate
wasgranted bythePresident an absolute pardon for hiscon any of the penal laws of the Philippines and
L, viction for sedition. This instrument was apparently released
much later — i.e., sometime in March 1987.
o^ Phil. 154 (1939). 9168 Phil., at 161.
M68Phil, at 157. 9287 Phil. 495 (1950).
taj
that, should this condition be violated, he shaU himself determine when that contingency
be proceeded against in the manner prescribed has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
tail I
by law."93 lEight years after the grant ofhis con competency to bind himself in thepremises,
ditional pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa had expressly contracted and agreed, that,
and sentenced to three months and eleven days whenever the governor should conclude that
of arresto mayor. He was thereupon recommitted he had violated the conditions of his parole,
to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his an executive order for his arrest and remand-
original sentence. Sales raised before this Court ment to prison should at once issue, and be
two principal contentions. Firstly, he argued that conclusive upon him.9*
Section 64 (i) ofthe Revised Administrative Code
had been repealed by Article 159 ofthe Revised In Espuelas v. Provincial Warden ofBohol,95
the petitioner had been convicted ofthe crime of
Penal Code. He contended, secondly, that Sec
ai«|
tion 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence,
process clause of the Constitution (Article III
he was granted by the President a conditional
[1], 1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. pardon "on condition that he shall hot again vio
Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected late any of the penal laws of the PhUippines."96
'•SMI
both contentions of Sales.

Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and
was released from confinement. Sometime
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice ofthe
ia4 Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, ofthe crime of
(i), Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed usurpatioh of authority. He appealed to the Court
out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sen of First Instance. Upon motion ofthe provincial
B"i
tence Law, which was enacted .subsequent to fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the
the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved case provisionally, an important prosecution wit
the authority conferred upon the President by ness not having been available on the day set for
Section 64. The'Court also held that Article 159 trial. A few months later, upon recommendation
i^tj
and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that ofthe Board of Pardons and Parole, the President
the proceeding under one provision did hot neces ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the
sarily preclude action under the other. unexpired period of his original sentence.
^1
Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the con
not repugnant to the constitutional guarantee tinuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the
of due process. This Court in effect held that Revised Administrative Code. This Court, quot
since the petitioner was a convict "who had al- ing Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
,ready been seized in a constitutional way, been
confronted by his accusers and the witnesses Due process is not necessarily judicial.
against him — been convicted of crime and been The appellee had had his day in court and
sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not been afforded the opportunity to defend him
constitutionally entitled to another judicial self during his trial for the crime of inciting
determination of whether he had breached the to sedition, with which he was charged, that
condition of his parole by committing a subse brought about or resulted in his conviction,
quent offense. Thus: sentence and confinement in the peniten
tiary. When he was conditionally pardoned
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)Jsupervenes it was a generous exercise by the Chief Ex
to avoid the necessity for any action by the ecutive of his constitutional prerogative. The
courts in the premises. The executive clem acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner
ency under it is extended upon the conditions carrie[d] with it the authority or power ofthe
ûl named in it, and he accepts it upon those Executive to determine whether a condition
conditions. One of these is that the governor or conditions ofthe pardon has or have been
may withdraw his grace in a certain contin
gency, and another is that the governor shall "Underscoring supplied. The Court was here (87 Phil.,
at 496) quoting from Fuller v. State of Alabama, 45 LRA 502.
B5108Phil. 353 (1960).
9387 Phil., at 493. M108 PhU., at 355.
• violated. To no other department ofthe Gov we here deal with are the consequences, of an
ernment [has] such power been intrusted.97 ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon.
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the
The status of our case law on the matter
petitioner herein, who is' recommitted must of
under consideration may be summed up in the
course be convicted by final judgment ofa court
following propositions:
of the subsequent crime or crimes with which
1. The grant of pardon and the deter he was charged before the criminal penalty for
mination of the terms and conditions of a such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon
conditional pardon are purely exequtive acts him. Again, since Article 159 ofthe Revised Pe
which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. nal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony,
the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
2. The determination of the occurrence violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
js£
of a breach ofa condition ofa pardon, and the prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
proper consequences of such breach, may be before he can be made to suffer the penalty pre
either a purely executive act, not subject to scribed in Article 159.
KM)
judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be Succinctly put, in proceeding against a con
a judicial act consisting of trial for and con vict who has been conditionaUy pardoned and
viction of violation of a conditional pardon who is alleged to have breached the conditions
under Article 159 ofthe Revised Penal Code.
of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section
Where the President opts to proceed under
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (n)
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
of prision correccional, minimum period, upon,
conviction therefore by final judgment of a
a convict who "having been granted conditional
court, in order that a convict may be recom
pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
mended for the violation of his conditional
any ofthe conditions of such pardon." Here, the
pardon. President has chosen to proceed against the
3. Because due process is not semper petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
ei ubique judicial process, and because the Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise
conditionally pardoned convict had already of the President's executive prerogative and is
been accorded judicial due process in his trial not subject to judicial scrutiny.
and conviction for the offense for which he WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DIS
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) MISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
of the Revised Administrative Code is not
afflicted with a constitutional vice. SO ORDERED.
We do not believe we should depart from the • Teehankee (C.J.), Fernan, Melencio-Her-
clear and well understood rules and doctrine on rera, Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, PadUla, Bidin,
this matter.
Sarmiento and Cortes, J J., concur
•pj
It may be emphasized that what is involved Yap, J., on leave.

in the instant case is not the prosecution of the Narvasa, J., took no part. On account of
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular personal relationship.
course of administration of the criminal law.
Cruz, J., see dissent.
What is involved is rather the ascertainment of
whether the convict has breached his undertak Paras, J., I agree with the dissent of Justice
t^> Cruz.
ing that he would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of CRUZ, J., dissenting:
reimposition upon him of the remitted portion
a§!^ of his original sentence. The consequences that The petitioner challenges his recommitment,
claiming he has not violated the condition of his
"lOS Phil., at 357-358; underscoring supplied. pardon "that he shall not again violate any ofthe
iiiiii*
penal laws ofthe PhUippines." The government I am ofthe opinion that the 'commission'
bases its stand on the case ofEspuelasv. Provin of a crime may only be determined upon
cial Warden ofBohol, 108 PhU. 353, where it was the 'conviction' of the accused. It is not suf
held, in connection witha simUar condition, that ficient that a persbn becharged with haying
mere commission of a crime, as determined by committed a crime in order to consider that
the President, was sufficientto justifyrecommit he is convicted thereof. His innocence is a
ment. Conviction was considered not necessary. legal presumption which is overcome only
I would grant the petition. byhis conviction after he is dulyand legaUy
prosecuted. And the courts of justice are
There is no question that the petitioner is the only branch of the government which
facing a long list of criminal charges, but that has exclusive jurisdiction under the law to
certainly is not the issue. The point is that, as make a pronouncement on the conviction of
P&
many as such charges may be, none of them so far an accused.
has resulted in a final conviction, without which
he cannot be recommitted under the condition of Black defines "commission" as "doing or
his pardon. preparation; the performance of an act." (Groves
v. State, 116Ga. 516)."Conviction," on the other
Mere accusation is not synonymous with hand, is "the result ofa criminal trial which ends
guilt, (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A
in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is
prima facie case only justifies the filing of the
guilty as charged." Continuing, he says, "in or
corresponding information, but proof beyond
dinary parlance, the meaning ofthe word convic
reasonable doubt is stiU necessary for convic
tion is the finding by the jury ofa verdict that the
tion. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses
foi||) accused is guilty. But, in legal parlance, it often
the defendant ofa crime; it is the conviction that
makes him a criminal. In other words, a person denotes the finaljudgmentofthe court. "(Blaufus
is considered to have committed a crime only if v. People, 69 N. Y., 109, 28 A-Rep. 148; Marino
he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by v. Hibbard, 243 Mass. 90). To convict is "to con
his accuser but by the judge. demn after a judicial investigation ." (p.403). A
convict is "one who has been finally condemned
That this conviction must be pronounced by by a court, one who has been adjudged guUty of
fatti the judge and no other is tooobvious a proposition a crime or misdemeanor." (Molineur v. Colhns,
to be disputed. The executive can only allegethe 177 N. Y., 395). Emphasis is mine.
commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it
through indubitable evidence. If the prosecution In the instant case, the government does
%$)
succeeds, the court wiU then affirm the aUegation not deny that the petitioner has not been finaUy
of commissionin a judgment of conviction. convicted of any of the offenses imputed to him.
There are several convictions by the lower court,
The current doctrine holds that, by virtue to be sure, but all of them are on appeal. From
of Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative the judicial viewpoint, therefore, the petitioner
Code, the President may in his judgment deter has, since accepting his conditional pardon not
mine whether the condition of the pardon has violated any ofthe penal laws ofthe PhUippines
been violated.
as to be subject to recommitment.
I agree that the authority is validly conferred In the landmark case of United States v.
as long as the condition does not involve the
Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 100, it was remarked that
commission of a crime but, say, merely requires
"a conditional pardon is in force and substance a
good behavior from the pardonee. But insofar as
contract between the executive power ofthe State
it allows the President to determine in his judg
and the person for whom it is granted." Once ac
ment whether or not a crime has been committed,
I regard the authority as an encroachment on cepted, therefore, the stipulated condition binds
judicial functions. not only the pardonee, who must observe the
same, but the State as well, which can recommit
Dissenting from the majority opinion in the the pardonee only if the condition is violated.
case ofTesoro v.Director ofPrisons, 68 Phil. 154, Stated otherwise, the condition is a limitation
Justice Pedro Concepcion declared: not only ofthe pardonee's conduct but also ofthe
•SM
512 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS'OF GOVERNMENT
gU
President's power of recommitment, which can of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to

be exercised only ifthe condition is not observed. due process and the constitutional presumption
Even if considered "an act of grace," declared
of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discre
this Court in Infante v. Provincial Warden of
tion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Negros Occidental, 32 Phil. 311, "there is general Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted
agreement that limitations upon its operation by the Court of First Instance of ManUa some
should be strictly construed (46 C. J. 1202) so time before 1979. These convictions were af
that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of firmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum
more than one interpretation, it is to be construed sentence would expire on November 2,2000. On
most favorably to the grantee (39 Am. Jur. 564)." April 18,1979, a conditional pardon was granted
I am for the reversal of Espuelas v. Provin to Torres by the President of the PhUippines on
cial Warden of Bohol and the immediate release condition that petitioner would "not again violate
of the petitioner on the ground that he has not any of the penal laws of the PhUippines." Peti
violated the condition of his pardon. tioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.
C. In re: Torres v. Director of Bureau On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons
of Prison and Parole resolved to recommend to the Presi
G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995 dent the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to Torres because Torres had been
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: charged with twenty counts of estafa before,
and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial
We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Di Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986,
rector of Prison,96 Sales v. Director of JPrisons" the President canceled the conditional pardon
Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol100 and of Torres. On October 10,1986, then Minister of
&&)
Torres v. Gonzales,101 that, where a conditional Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority
pardonee has allegedly breached a condition ofthe President" an Order of Arrest and Recom
of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed mitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa
Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
pronouncement of guUt of a subsequent crime Torres impugned the validity ofthe Order of Ar
or for bis conviction therefor by final judgment, rest and Recommitment in the aforecited case of
'^)
in order to effectuate the recommitment of the Torres v. Gonzales. There we ruled that:
pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the
determination ofthe terms and conditions ofthe "Succinctly put, in proceeding against a
pardon, the determination of the occurrence of convict who has been conditional pardoned
the breach thereof; and the proper sanctions for and who is alleged to have breached the con
such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus,. ditions of his pardon, the Executive Depart
are not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ment has two options: (i) to proceed against
ruled in the past, and we so rule now. him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Ad
ministrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against
In this original petition for habeas corpus, him under Article 159 ofthe Revised Penal
the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to
Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release proceed against the petitioner under Section
from prison on the ground that the exercise of 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) That choice is an exercise ofthe President's
ofthe Revised Administrative Code to determine executive prerogative and is not subject to
the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition judicial scrutiny."
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife
M68Phil. 154. and chUdren, seeks anew relief from this court.
"87 Phil. 495.
,00108 Phil. 353.
Unfortunately, there is no adequate basis for us
,01152 SCRA 272. to oblige him.
iiig)
sijii)
A conditional pardon is in the nature ofa con pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of
tract between the sovereign power or the Chief the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect against him, warrants the same. Courts have
that the former wiU release the latter subject ho authority to interfere with the grant by the
to the»conditibn that if he does not comply with President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It
the terms ofthe pardon, he will be recommitted has been our fortified ^ruling that a finaljudicial
to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the pronouncement as to the guUt of a pardonee is
sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's not a requirement for the President to determine
consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, whether or not there has been a breach of the
the pardonee has thereby placed himself under terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise
the supervision of the Chief Executive or his nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the rein
delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the statement of a conditional pardon revoked by the
t&£)
pardonee complies with the terms and conditions President in the exercise of powers undisputedly
ofthe pardon. Under Section 64 (I) ofthe Revised solely and absolutely loaded in his office.
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is au
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for ha
thorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration
beas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
of any such person who, in his judgment, shall merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
fail to comply with the condition, or conditions
of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." WE CONCUR:
It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdic- Padilla, C.J., Davide, BellosUlo and Kapu-
tion-that this exercise of presidential judgment nan, J J., concur.
is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination
of the violation of the conditional pardon rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief D. Garcia v. Commission on Audit
Executive, and the pardonee, having consented G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993
iiliili to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon
the judgment of the power that has granted it, BELLOSILLO, J.:
cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
Petitioner comes to us on a petition for review
erroneous the findings may be upon which his
on certiorari of the decision of 23 July 1985 of
recommitment was ordered.
respondent Commission on Audit (COA) denying
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he his claim for payment of back wages, after he was
has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three reinstated to the service pursuant to an execu
criminal cases filed against him subsequent to tive clemency. He prays for the extraordinary
his conditional pardon, and that the third case remedy of mandamus against pubhc respondents
remains pending for thirteen (13) years in appar to enforce his claim.
ent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint Region IV Station ofthe Bureau of Telecommu
of a person's hberty has been judicially adjudged nications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, peti
as Ulegal or unlawftul. In the instant petition, the tioner was summarily dismissed from the service
incarceration of Torres remains legal consider on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with
ing that, were it not for the grant of conditional the decision ofthe then Ministry of Pubhc Works,
pardon which had been revoked because of a Transportation and Communications in Adm.
breach thereof, the determination of which is Case No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph
beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena
his final sentence for his first conviction until City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom
November 2, 2000. lines. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Exe Based on the same facts obtaining in the
cutive, who in the first place was the exclusive administrative action, a criminal case for quali
author ofthe conditional pardon and of its revoca fied theft was filed against petitioner with the
tion, is the coroUary prerogative to reinstate the then CourtofFirst Instance (nowRegional Trial
fiigi^
Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial extend executive clemency under the following
court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner circumstances: ~
:§0
of the offense charged.
"Except in cases of impeachment or a$
Consequently, petitioner sought reinstate otherwise provided in this Constitution, th(
ment to his former position in view of his acquit President may grant reprieves, commuta
tal in the criminal case. In an indorsement dated
tions, and pardons, and remit fines and for
7 April 1980, petitioner's request to be reinstated feitures, after conviction by final judgment.
was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunica
'$0 tions. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President "He shall also have the power to grant
of the PhUippines for executive clemency. amnesty with the concurrence of a majority
of aU the Members of the Congress."
From among the different acts of executive
In his comment to the petition, the Solicitor clemency spelledout above, the clemency granted
General recommends that the petition be given to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the
due course and the petitioner be awarded back nature of an executive pardon. A reading ofReso
wages to be determined in the light of existing lution No. O.P. 1800 partly quoted hereunderis
laws and jurisprudence. The Solicitor General enlightening:
submits that the award is implicit in the grant
of executive clemency, the ultimate objective of "In a 3rd Indorsement dated September
which is to accord full justice to petitioner. 5,1980, the Director of Telecommunications
interposed no objection to the petition, whUe
On the other hand, the COA asks this Court
the Minister of Transportation and Com
to deny the petition for the following reasons':
munications, in his 4th Indorsement dated
(a) petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case
November 17,1980, favorably recommended
did not necessarily free him from administrative
the grant of executive clemency to petitioner
liability; (b) petitioner's unexplained failure to
for the reason that 'while it is a rule that an
&&?) appeal the decision in the administrative case
administrative case is separate and distinct
was tantamount to a waiver or renunciation of
from a criminal case and an acquittal in the
his right to back wages; (c) the executive clem
latter case does not ipso facto result in the
ency was granted to petitioner for the purpose of
exoneration in the former case, yet an excep
reinstatement only since it was sUent on the mat
tion could arise if the basis for the acquittal
ter of back wages; (d) the award of back wages is
was the innocence of the accused as in the
aUowed only if the respondent is exonerated from
case of petitioner Garcia.'
the administrative charge or that his suspension
or dismissal is declared Ulegal or unjustified by "Asked for comment pursuant to Section
the court; and, (e) petitioner did not render any 43 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the CivU
service during the period before his reinstate Service Commission recommends the grant
ment, hence, he is not entitled to back wages of executive clemency to petitioner in view of
based on the "no service, no pay" rule. the findings of the court that 'instead of com
ing forward to the defense ofthe accused who
The petition is meritorious.
actuaUy was authorized to uproot or recover
Every civilized country recognizes, and has the poles in question and of commending the
therefore provided for, the pardoning power to latter for his high sense of responsibility in
•ffil be exercised as an act of grace and humanity, in preventing losses to the government, said
proper cases. Without such a power of clemency, high officials had even the temerity to dis
to be exercised by some department or function own and deny the authority they gave to the
ary of a government, a country would be most accused resulting in his separation from the
imperfect and deficient in its political morality service and having him all alone in defending
and in that attribute of Deity whose judgments himself against the accusation of the very
are always tempered with mercy. government he tried to protect.'
Our Constitution reposes in the President "After a careful study, this Office is
the power and the exclusive prerogative to inclined to grant executive clemency to peti-
tioner in the light ofthe decision ofthe court acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal
acquitting him ofthe crime of qualified theft of petitioner by the trial court was founded not
which was based on the same acts obtaining on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but
. in Administrative Case No. 975 against him, on the fact that petitioner did not commit the
coupled with the favorable recommendation offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him
of the Minister of Transportation arid Com innocent ofthe charge, the trial court commended
munications and the Civil Service Commis petitioner for his concern and dedication as a
sion. public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is
the primary reason behind the grant of execu
"In view of the foregoing, petitioner
tive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
Vicente Garcia is hereby granted executive
recommendations for his reinstatement by the
clemency."
Ministry of Transportation and Communications
Time and again this. Court has unfolded the and the Civil Service Commission.
effects of a pardon upon the individual to whom The bestowal of executive clemency on peti
it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have tioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
firmly established the general rule that while a effects of the administrative decision which
pardon has generally been regarded as blotting found him guUty of dishonesty and ordered his
out the existence of guUt so that in the eyes ofthe separation from the service. This can be inferred
law the offender is as innocent as though he never from the executive clemency itself exculpating
committed the offense, it does not operate for all petitioner from the administrative charge and
purposes. The very essence ofa pardon is forgive thereby-directing his reinstatement, which is
ness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
It does not erase the fact cf the commission of This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply
the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon to be reinstated to his former employment; he is
frees the individual from all the penalties and restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil of the clemency.
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the
innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for government service entitles him to back wages.
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
offender regains his eligibUity for appointment to innocent from the start and to make reparation
pubhc office which was forfeited by reason ofthe for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
conviction of the offense. But since pardon does dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise
ftfojl
not generally result in automatic reinstatement would defeat the very intention ofthe executive
because the offender has to apply for reappoint clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. More
ment, he is not entitled to back wages, over, the right to back wages is afforded to those
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based who have been UlegaUy dismissed and were thus
ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquit
on the innocence ofthe individual, it affirms this
innocence and makes him a new man and as in
ted ofthe charges against them. There is no doubt
that petitioner's case falls within the situations
nocent as if he had not been found guilty of the
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
offense charged. When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense,
the pardon relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restor E. Llamas v. Orbos
ing to him his clean name, good reputation and G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found
PARAS, J.:
administratively liable for dishonesty and con
sequently dismissed from the service. However, The case before Us calls for a determination
tijilsi
he was later acquitted by the trial court of the ofwhetheror not the President ofthe PhUippines
charge of qualified theft based on the very same has the power to grant executive clemency in
ffifli
ii>
administrative cases. In connection therewith, Corrupt Practices Act, which act amounts to
two important questions are also put in issue, serious neglect of duty and/or abuse o£au
namely, whether or not the grant of executive thority, for which the penalty of suspension
clemency and the reason therefore, are political from office for a period of ninety (90) days,
questions beyond judicial review, and whether effective upon the finality of this Decision,
or not the questioned act was characterized by is hereby imposed upon him. (p. 3, Petition.)
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolu
jurisdiction. tion imposed not a preventive suspension but a
Petitioner RodolfaD. Llamas is the incum penalty of suspension.
bent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, Respondent governor moved for a reconsid
on March 1,1991 he assumed, by virtue ofa deci eration ofthe above-quoted decision but the same
sion of the Office of the President, the governor was denied on October 19, 1990. Aggrieved, he
ship(p. 1,Petition). Privaterespondent Mariano appealed the DLGdecision dated September 21,
Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of 1990 and the order of denial dated October 19,
the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from 1990 to the Office of the President (O.P. Case
office for a period of 90 days. Public respondent No. 4480). ~
Oscar. Orbos was the Executive Secretary aj the
On February 26,1991, herein public respon
time of the filing of this petition and is being
dent Executive Secretary issued a Resolution
impleaded herein in that official capacity for dismissing respondent governor's appeal and
havingissued, by authority ofthe President, the
affirmingthe September 21,1990 DLGdecision.
assailed Resolution granting executive clemency
to respondent governor. Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66,
Chapter 4 of B.P. Big. 337, to the effect that
Sometime in 1989, petitioner, together with
the decision of the Office of the President in
Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr.
administrative suspension of local officialsshall
and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a be immediately executory without prejudice
verified complaint dated June 7, 1989 against to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on
respondent governorbeforethe then Department March 1, 1991, took his oath of office as acting
of Local Government (DLG, for short), charging governor. Under the administrative suspension
him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f) order, petitioner had up to May 31,1991 as act
203(2) (p), and 208(w), ofBatas Pambansa (B.P.) ing governor. On the same date (March1,1991),
Big. 337, otherwise known as the LocalGovern respondent governormovedfor a reconsideration
ment Code, and other appropriate laws, among of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which
them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. petitioner filed an opposition. From the allega
Prior to that, petitioner filed with the Office of tions ofthe petitioner in his petition, respondent
the Ombudsman a verified complaint dated No governor accepted his suspensionand turned over
vember 10, 1988 against respondent governor his office to petitioner.
for the latter's allegedviolation ofSection 3-Gof
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,otherwise knownas To the surprise of petitioner, however, re
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. spondentgovernor on March 19,1991, issued an
"administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in
which the latter signified his intention to "(con
[mi After trial, the Secretary of the then Depart tinue, as I am bound to exercise my functions as
ment of Local Government rendered a decision governor and shall hold office at my residence,"
dated September 21, 1990, dispositive portion in the belief that "the pendency of my Motion
of which reads: for Reconsideration precludes the coming into
finality as executory the DLG decision." (Annex
WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un "E,"Petition; p. 10, Comment). And, as categori
OcampoIII is, as hereby found guilty of hav cally stated in the petition, the reassumption
ing violated Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. ceremony by respondent governor was held on
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and May 21,1991 (p. 8, Petition).
L
Without ruling on respondent governor's proceeds of the loan from LTFI have been
Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent utilized in hybrid corn production; and
j^&) issued a Resolution dated May 15,1991, in O.P.
5. Letter of the President of the
Case No. 4480, which reads:
Federation of Tobacco Leaf Producers of
This refers to the petition of Gov. Mari Tarlac, Inc., informing of the payment of
ano Un Ocampo III of Tarlac for executive 76 of the amount (P203.966.00) loaned to
clemency, interposed in connection with the the Federation for tobacco production.
decision of the Secretary of then Department Petitioner's act, vis-a-vis the loan to
î
of Local Government (DLG) dated 21 Sep LTFI, may have been promp by an over
tember 1990, as affirmed in a Resolution of eagerness to accelerate the delivery of live
this Office dated 26 February 1991, suspend lihood services to his provincemates. As
ing petitioner from office for period of ninety the truism goes, however, the end does not
(90) days upon the finality of said decision. always justify the means. Be that as it may,
As will be recalled, the DLG Secretary but without belaboring the propriety of the
imposed the penalty of suspension upon his loan agreement aforementioned, some mea
finding that petitioner was guilty of serious sure of leniency may be accorded petitioner
neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for as the purpose of his suspension may have
0 entering into a loan contract with the Ling- made its mark.
kod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI) grossly/
WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un
manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Prov
Ocampo III is hereby granted executive
ince. In his letter-petition of 10 May 1991,
clemency in the sense that his ninety-day
thereby pleading for a thirty (30)-day re
suspension is hereby reduced to the period
duction of his suspension, petitioner invited
already served.
attention to the DLG Secretary's decision
clearing him of having personally benefit SO ORDERED.
ted from the questioned transaction. In the
same letter, petitioner manifests serving (Annex "F," Petition; pp. 25-26, Rollo)
more than sixty (60) days of the ninety-day By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, re
suspension. Previously, petitioner submitted spondent governor reassumed the governorship
documents and letters from his constituents
of the province, allegedly without any notification
tending to show the relative success of his made to the petitioner.
livelihood loan program pursue under the
aegis of the LTFI and/or the Foundation's Petitioner posits that the issuance by public
credible loan repayment record. To cite some: respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was
"whimsical, capricious and despotic, and consti
1. Certification of the Chair-
tuted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack
ii»> man,Tarlac Integrated Livelihood Co
of jurisdiction," (p. 6, petition) basically on the
operative, Inc., attesting to the full pay ground th executive clemency could be granted
ment of its loan (P15.05 M) plus interest
by the President only in criminal cases as there
with LTFI;
is nothing in the statute books or even in the
2. Certification of the Manager, Constitution which allows the grant thereof in
Rural Bank of Gerona (Tarlac), Inc., at administrative cases. Petitioner also contends
testing to the gradual liquidation of the that since respondent governor refused to rec
loan granted to family-borrowers out of ognize his suspension (having reassumed the
funds provided by LTFI; governorship in gross defiance of the suspen
sion order), executive clemency cannot apply to
3. Letter of Jover's Phil, express
ing gratitude for the loan assistance
him; that his rights to due process were violated
extended for its export activities by LTFI;
because the grant of executive clemency was so
sudden that he was not even notified thereof;
4. Letter of the Tarlac Provincial and that despite a finding by public respondent
Agricultural Officer informing that the of impropriety in the loan transaction entered
fifflft
into by respondent governor, the former failed to respondent governor guilty of neglect of duty and/
justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension or abuse of authority and which suspended him
heb on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the for ninety [90] days) final.
executive clemency granted by public respondent
Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex Hon
was "the product of a hocus-pocus strategy" (p. 1,
distinguit, nee nos distinguire debemos" We can
Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because there
was allegedly no real petition for the grant of not sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if
executive clemency filed by respondent governor. the law does not distinguish, so We must no dis
tinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
%i:«\
between which cases executive clemency may be
Petitioner's main argument is that the exercised by the President, with the sole exclu
President may grant executive clemency only in sion of impeachment cases. By the same token,
pj) criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 if executive clemency may be exercised only in
of the Constitution which reads: criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases
Sec. 19. Except in cases ofimpeachment, from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of
f*J
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
the President may grant reprieves, commuta interpretation, cases of impeachment are auto
tions, and pardons, and remit fines and for matically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
aj> feitures, after conviction by final judgment. necessarily involve criminal offenses.
He shall also have the power to grant In the same vein, We do not clearly see any
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of valid and convincing reason why the President
&î all the members of the Congress. (Emphasis cannot grant executive clemency in administra
supplied) tive cases. It is Our considered view that if the
According to the petitioner, the qualifying President can grant reprieves, commutations
phrase "after conviction by final judgment" and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
applies solely to criminal cases, and no other in criminal cases, with much more reason can
law allows the grant of executive clemency or she grant executive clemency in administrative
pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an cases, which are clearly less serious than crimi
administrative case," allegedly because the word nal offenses.
"conviction" refers only to criminal cases (par. 22-
A number of laws impliedty or expressly
b, c, d, Petition). Petitioner, however, describes
^> recognize or support the exercise of the executive
in his very own words, respondent governor as
clemency in administrative cases.
one who has been "convicted in an administra
tive case" (par. 22-a, petition). Thus, petitioner Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious
concedes that the word "conviction" may be used cases,... the President may commute or remove
either in a criminal case or in an administrative administrative penalties or disabilities issued
case. In Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA upon officers and employees, in disciplinary
536, We ruled: cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he
For misfeasance or malfeasance ... may impose in the interest of the service."
any [elective official] could ... be proceeded During the deliberations of the Constitu
fed
against administratively or ... criminally. tional Commission, a subject of deliberations
In either case, his culpability must be es was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec.
tablished ... 19 which reads as follows: "However, the power
fe It is also important to note that respondent to grant executive clemency for violation of cor
governor's Motion for Reconsideration filed on rupt practices laws may be limited by legisla
March 1, 1991 was withdrawn in his petition tion.'' The Constitutional Commission, however,
for the grant of executive clemency, which fact voted to remove the amendment, since it was in
rendered the Resolution dated February 26, derogation of the powers of the President. As Mr.
1991 affirming the DLG Decision (which found Natividad stated:
ARTICLEVH: THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT • 519
I am also against this provision which Of equal importance are the following pro
will again chip more powers from the Presi visions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
dent. In case of other criminals convicted known as the Administrative Code of 1987, Sec
in our society we extend probation to them tion I, Book III of which provides:
while in this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only way SECTION 1. Power of Control The Presi
we can offer mercy to them is through this dent shall have cdntrol of all the executive
executive clemency extended to them by the • departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
President. If we still close this avenue to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
them, they would be prejudiced even worse
Shi> than the murderers and the more vicious
killers in our society .... SECTION 38. Definition ofAdministra
tiveRelationships. Unless otherwise express
The proposal was primarily intended to pre ly stated in the Code or in other laws defining
vent the President from protecting his cronies. the special relationships of particular agen
Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred cies, administrative relationships shall be
to trust in the discretion of Presidents and re categorized and defined as follows:
frained from putting additional limitations on
his clemency powers. (II RECORD of the Con (1) Supervision and Control. Supervi
stitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-525) sion and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is en
It is evident from the intent of the Consti trusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
tutional Commission, therefore, that the Presi direct the performance of duty; restrain the
dent's executive clemency powers may not be commission of acts; review, approve, reverse
limited in terms of coverage, except as already or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
pi
provided in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, officials or units; determine priorities in the
amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for execution of plans and programs. Unless a
violation of election laws, rules and regulations different meaning is explicitly provided in
shall be granted by the President without the the specific law governing the relationship of
favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" particular agencies the word "control" shall
(Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those al encompass supervision and control as defined
ready adjudged guilty criminally in court may be in this paragraph.... (emphasis supplied)
pardoned, those adjudged guttty.administratively
should likewise be extended the same benefit. The disciplinary authority to investigate,
suspend, and remove provincial or city officials
In criminal cases, the quantum- of evidence devolves at the first instance on the Depart
required to convict an individual is proof beyond ment of Interior and Local Government (Sees.
reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to 61 and 65, B.P. Big. 337) and ultimately on the
the President the power to pardon the act done by President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority,
the proved criminal and in the process exempts however, is the "supervision and control" power
him from punishment therefor. On the other of the President to reduce, if circumstances so
hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the
tpj evidence required is mere substantial evidence to suspension or removal order, even "in the sense"
support a decision, not to mention that as to the of granting executive clemency. "Control," within
admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to
are not bound by the technical and rigid rules substitute one's own judgment for that of a sub
of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. ordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political
It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those Agency, the different executive departments are
found guilty administratively of some charge if mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are
the same effects of pardon or executive clemency presumptively the acts of the President until
cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of countermanded or reprobated by her (Vinena v.
modifying a decision to subserve the interest of Secretary, 67 Phil. 451; Free Telephone Workers
the public, (p. 34, Comment ofpublic respondent) Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 108
i£l
SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon this view, it is Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. "Once
urged by the Solicitor General that in the present granted, it is binding and effective. It serves
case, the President, in the exercise of her power to put an end to this appeal." (Mansanto v.
of supervision and control over all executive Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239,170 SCRA 190.
departments, may substitute her decision for 196). (See also Peo v. Crisola, 129 SCRA 13)
that of her subordinate, most especially where
&«>
Consequently, respondent governor's accep
the basis therefor would be to serve the greater
tance of the presidential pardon "serves to put
public interest. It is clearly within the power
an end" to the motion for reconsideration and
of the President not only to grant "executive
imi renders the subject decision final, that of the
clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling period already served.
issued by a subordinate against an erring public
official, where a reconsideration of the- facts al Finally, petitioner's argument that his con
I leged would support the same. It is in this sense stitutional rights to due process were violated
is unmeritorious. Pardon has been defined as
that the alleged executive clemency was granted,
after adducing reasons that subserve the public "the private, though official, act of the executive
interest, "the relative success of. . . livelihood magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
(ei
loan program." (pp. 39-40, Comment of public benefit it is intended and not communicated o£~
respondent) ficially to the court...." (Bernas, The Constitution
of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed. 1988, pp.
We wish to stress however that when we j 239-240, citing U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 [U.S.
say the President can grant executive clemency 1833]). Thus, assuming that petitioner was not
in administrative cases, We refer only to all notified of the subject pardon, it is only because
administrative cases in the. Executive branch, said notice is unnecessary. Besides, petitioner's
Iâ
not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the claim that respondent governor has not begun
government. serve sentence is belied by his very own factual
Noteworthy is the fact that on March 1,1991, allegations in his petition, more particularly
[&a that he served as Acting Governor of Tarlac ef
respondent governor filed a motion for reconsid
fective from the date he took his Oath of Office
eration and the same may be regarded as implic
itly resolved, not only because of its withdrawal on February 28,1991 up to the time respondent
but also because of the executive clemency which governor reassumed the governorship of Tarlac
in effect reduced the penalty, conformably with on May 21, 1991 (par. 30 petition). It is, there
the power of "control."
fore, error to say that private respondent did
not serve any portion of the 90-day suspension
fe)
On petitioner's argument that private re meted upon him.
spondent's motion for reconsideration has abated
the running of the reglementary period for final
We fail to see any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
ity of judgment in O.P. Case No. 4480 (that is,
committed by public respondent.
there being no final judgment to speak of, the
pardon granted was premature and of no effect, WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ren
Sj'fr)
We reiterate the doctrine that upon acceptance dered: (1) DECLARING that the President did
of a presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed not act arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave
to have waived any appeal which he may have abuse of discretion in issuing the May 15, 1991
filed. Thus, it was held that: Resolution granting on the grounds mentioned
The commutation of the penalty is im
therein, executive clemency to respondent gov
pressed with legal significance. That is an
ernor and that, accordingly, the same is not
exercise of executive clemency embraced unconstitutional (without prejudice to criminal
in the pardoning power. According to the proceedings which have been filed or may be filed
Constitution: "The President may except against respondent governor), and (2) DENYING
in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, the rest of the prayers in the petition for being
l^g) unmeritorious, moot and academic. No costs.
commutations and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the SO ORDERED.
43
liiH
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT --• 621
Fernan, C.</., Bidin, Sarmiento", Grino- the Government from pursuing criminal actions
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., against the private respondents for the death of
J J., concur. Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early
martial law.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
It appears that sometime in 1973, the private
Separate Opinions
respondents were charged with double murder
before Military Commission No. 34. On July
CRUZ, J., concurring: 27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision
I concur in the result and would sustain the acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo
challenged resolution ofMay 18,1991, on the ba Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.
sis only of the President's control power. I think Paredes was thereupon released from custody
while Ganzon was made to serve sentence until
the discussion of the pardoning power is unneces
he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed
sary and may even be misleading as the ponencia
under house arrest under guard. In 1985, Gan
itself says that it was not by virtue thereof that
zon joined the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL),
the private respondent's penalty was reduced.
the party in power, where he was designated as
The correct approach, if I may respectfully sug
campaign manager.
gest it, is to uphold the resolution solely on the
strength of the President's power of "control of all In 1988, administration having changed,
the executive departments, bureaus and offices" then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez direct
under Article VII, Section 17, of the Constitution. ed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct
a preliminary investigation against the private
We have held in many cases that a Cabinet respondents for the above murders. The private
member is an alter ego of the President whose respondents moved for dismissal, in Ganzon's
acts may be affirmed, modified or reversed by case, on the ground that he, Ganzon, had been
the latter in his discretion. (Villena v. Sec. of extended an absolute pardon by the President
the Interior, 67 Phil. 451; Lacson-Magallanes v. Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been previ
(&£
Palo, 21 SCRA 895; Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA ously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and
582; De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457). What in Paredes' case, on the ground that he, Paredes,
happened in this case was that President Aquino had been acquitted. Trampe, however, denied
saw fit to amend the decision rendered by the both requests and reconsideration having been
Secretary of Local Government on September 21, likewise denied, the private respondents went to
1990, by reducing the 90-day suspension imposed the Court of Appeals on prohibition.
on Gov. Ocampo. The President had the author As above indicated, the Court of Appeals
ity to do this, and she could exercise it through granted prohibition...
the Executive Secretary. His act, not having
been "reprobated or disauthorized" by her, is
presumed to be the act of the President herself. The petitioners allege that the Court of Ap
The Court is not concerned with the wisdom
peals, in granting prohibition, committed a grave
of that act, only its legality. I believe the act is abuse of discretion: (1) Rodolfo Ganzon has not
legal but reserve judgment on its wisdom. adequately proved the fact of presidential par
don; (2) there exists no evidence in the files of the
PADILLA, J., dissenting: (OMITTED) Government to prove pardon; (3) Ganzon's copy
is a bare machine copy and Ganzon has failed to
adequately establish the loss of the original; (4)
F. Drilon v. Court of Appeals
the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been
G.R. No. 91626, October 3,1991
properly sealed and authenticated, or executed
in official Malacanang stationery; and (5) the
SARMIENTO, J.: disposition of the murder cases by the military
The Department of Justice has brought suit does not preclude the filing of new informations
to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeals by the civilian government.
promulgated on October 25, 1989, prohibiting
km
As to the alleged grant of pardon in favor of .. . The records also show that Ganzon had
Rodolfo Ganzon: served time until 1978, when he was placed un
WM der "house arrest" by then President Marcos. Jie
1. But first, We would like to state also claims that in 1986, he was pardoned by the
that from the evidence, We find that Mayor then President, an alleged pardon he is invoking
Ganzon was extended absolute pardon by to deter the reinvestigation by the Department
the former President. Former Deputy Presi of Justice. To the mind of the Court, Ganzon
dential Executive Assistant Joaquin Venus, has accepted the judgment against him, and as
Jr. declared before us that Ganzon's absolute Tan asked, "why should [he] who has accepted
pardon was signed by the former President the justness of the verdict of the military court
in.Iloilo City on January 27,1986 in his pres who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and
ence; that the pardon was accepted by Mayor who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be
Ganzon as signified by his signature thereon; dragged through the harrow of another hearing
that Exhibit C-l is a photocopy of the signed in a civil court to risk being convicted a second
original; that the original copy was given to time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
Mayor Ganzon while he retained a photocopy
for transmittal to former Presidential Execu
tive Assistant Juan Tuvera... As we indicated, Ganzon served six years in
the stockades of the military no doubt as a result
Likewise, former Presidential Execu
of his conviction but was released in 1978 and
tive Assistant Juan Tuvera testified that he
put under so-called house arrest (although then
was given by Deputy Presidential Executive President Marcos never apparently carried this
Assistant Venus the xerox copy of the presi out seriously as Ganzon was free apparently,
dential pardon extended to Mayor Ganzon; to move in and out of his residence). The Court
that Exhibit C-l is a copy of said pardon is of the considered opinion that these twin
bearing the signature of the former president developments six-year service of sentence and
of which he is familiar; that he showed to the subsequent release are significant, since if then
former President the xerox copy of the pardon President Marcos ordered Ganzon's release after
and the latter confirmed having signed the six years of imprisonment, he then President
original; that the former President asked him Marcos, unavoidably commuted Ganzon's im
i-&4
to give the copy to him as he would show the prisonment to six years (give or take a few days),
same to some visitors and to the former First although as a condition, Ganzon shall remain
Lady later in the evening ... under "house arrest." Court is of the opinion
that if Ganzon's sentence had been commuted,
We find no reason, and none has been
he, Ganzon, has therefore served his sentence
offered, why these two high ranking officials
and if he has served his sentence fully, he can
of the former administration would trifle
no longer be reinvestigated, or, as the Cruz cases
with and declare falsehood regarding the
decreed, be made to "complete the service of [his]
presidential grant of pardon Mayor Ganzon.
sentence."
We find them to be trustworthy and their
testimony be deserving of full faith and Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the
credit. If Mayor Ganzon was not actually present Charter the "pardoning power" of the
extended absolute pardon, then he should President (that is, to grant reprieves, commuta
have remained incarcerated or under house tions, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures)
arrest until the present time. But such is not is final and unappealable so is commutation of
the case, and the military or the Government sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces
has not explained why Mayor Ganzon has a sentence. It extinguishes criminal liability par
been enjoying unrestrained freedom all these tially, and has the effect of changing the penalty
years since January 27, 1986. to a lesser one.
XXX XXX XXX The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case,
that commutation of sentence need be in a spe
cific form. It is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon
L
. was voluntarily released in 1978 with terms or Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Pa
conditions, except that he should remain under ras, Padilla, Bidin, Griiio-Aquino andMedialdea,
&$l house arrest. JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano,
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur in the result. Regalado,'
The Court can not consider Ganzon's house
J., Pro hac vice.
arrest as. a continuation of his sentence, first, #»
because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather

a mere means of "taking ... a person custody in 3. Amnesty.
order that he may be forthcoming to answer Amnesty "commonly denotes the 'general
for commission of an offense," or, during early pardon to rebels for their treason and other
martial law, a means to carry out Proclamation high political offenses," or the forgiveness which
No. 1881, and second, because of the records own one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
scant condition as the exact terms of his "house who have offended by some breach of the law of
arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer exists.) nations." Villa v. Allen, 2 Phil. 436, 439 (1903).
Hence, the view of the Court is that irrespective
of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his sentence While amnesty is the generally the form of
and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvesti executive clemency given to political offenders,
gated for the same offense, much more undergo this does not mean that individual pardon may
further imprisonment to complete his service. not be extended to them.
o
The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off When a convicted prisoner claims to be cov
too lightly, so to speak, is immaterial, and even as ered by a general amnesty, a court orders his
we sympathize with his victims' bereaved fami release in a habeas corpus petition. The proper
lies, we can not ignore the legal effects of then remedy is to submit his case to the proper am
President Marcos' acts as we did not ignore the nesty board, in this case, the COMELEC. De Vera
legal implications of trials by military tribunals, v. Animas, L-48176, 14 August 1978.
although void, as faits accomplis. The differences between pardon and amnesty
The Court therefore need not consider wheth were enumerated in Barrioquihto v. Fernandez,
er or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and 85 Phil. 642 (1949) thus:
whatever "pardon" the former President may Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive
have extended to him did not erase the fact that and as such it is a private act which must be
as early as 1978, he was a free man. Of course, pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,
he was supposed to have remained under house because the courts take no notice thereof;
arrest but as we said, not as a continuation of while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
and commitment powers during martial rule. The is a public act of which the courts should
question of whether or not he should continue to take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
remain under house arrest is also a moot ques after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
tion as we noted, and arrests except upon lawful classes of persons or communities who may
judicial orders are no longer possible. be guilty of political offense, generally before
The Court's disposition, it is true, leaves or after the institution of the criminal pros
Ganzon to all intents, and purposes "scot-free," ecution and sometimes after conviction. Par-,
yet whatever liberal treatment he may have re don looks forward and relieves the offender
ceived is not his fault either, and in the second from the consequences of an offense ofwhich
place, "worse" people have been better rewarded he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
in this regime. forgives the punishment, and for that reason
it does "not work restoration of the rights to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court unless such rights be expressly restored by
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case
as to costs.
exempts the culprit from the payment of the
IT IS SO ORDERED. civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
|sj
- sentence" (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). of a majority of all the members of Congress.
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes (3) In addition, Article IX, C, Section 5 says:
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so "No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
overlooks and obliterates the offense with sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
which he is charged that the person released regulations shall be granted by the President
by amnesty stands before the law precisely as without the favorable recommendation of the
though he had committed no offense. Commission [on Elections]."
The rule in this jurisdiction is that, to avail
of amnesty, the accused must confess guilt of A. People v. Salle, Jr.
the crime charged. Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 152 G.R No. 103567, December 4, 1995
(1963); People v. Pasilan, 14 SCRA 694 (1965).
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
NOTE: Tax amnesty.
Concurrence of Congress is needed when The pivotal issue thus raised is the enforce
amnesty is granted as in the exercise of the power ability of a pardon granted to an accused during,
of executive clemency. What the President did the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
in granting tax amnesty by issuing P.D. 1840 conviction by the trial court.
was an exercise of his legislative power under
Amendment 6 which did not require concurrence This calls for a review of the Philippine laws
of the Batasan. Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, on presidential pardons. We shall start with the
G.R. No. 58289, July 24, 1982. Jones Law. Section 21 thereof provided in part
as follows:
But it is not altogether clear how a tax am
nesty is not in the nature of an act of executive SEC. 21. That the supreme executive
clemency when its effect is to condone tax offend power shall be vested in ah executive officer,
ers. It is arguable, however, that a tax amnesty, whose official title shall be "The Governor-
of which both offenders and non-offenders may General of the Philippine Islands." ... He is
avail, is primarily a revenue measure, i.e., it is hereby vested with the exclusive power to
primarily intended to facilitate collectionoftaxes grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines
iiiJ
which could have otherwise been lost through and forfeitures. . . .
evasion. The condonation of possible offenders Then came the 1935 Constitution. Paragraph
is merely incidental to the fiscal intent. The 6, Section 10, Article VII thereof provided as
President could legislate amnesty then because of follows:
Amendment 6. Hence, without legislative power
the President cannot now unilaterally grant tax (6) The President shall have the power
amnesty. to grant reprieves, commutations, and par
dons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
4. Limits on executive clemency. conviction, for all offenses, except in cases
of impeachment, upon such conditions and
Reprieves, commutations, pardons, and re with such restrictions and limitations as he
mission of fines and forfeitures" can be granted
may deem proper to impose. He shall have
only "after conviction by final judgement." This the power to grant amnesty with the concur
is a return to the rule under the 1935 and 1973
rence of the Congress.
Constitutions and a rejection of the 1981 amend
ment which did away with the need for prior con This provision differed from that of the Jones
viction. The purpose is to prevent the President Law in some respects. Thus, in People v. Vera,102
from preempting the action of the judge. this Court held:
Section 19 sets down three other limitations Under the Jones Law, as at common
on the power of executive clemency: (1) it cannot law, pardon could be granted any time after
be exercised over cases of impeachment; (2) a
grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence 1M65 Phil. 56, 97-98.
fes>
the commission of the offense, either before President may grant reprieves, commuta
or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the tions, and pardons, and remit fines and for
United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok feitures, after conviction by final judgment.
[19221,43 Phil. 293). The Governor-General
He shall also have the power to grant
of the Philippines was thus empowered, like
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
•Ml the President of the United States, to pardon
a person before the facts of the case were fully all the Members of the Congress, (emphasis
supplied)
brought to light. The framers of our Constitu
tion thought this undesirable and, following Where the pardoning power is subject to the
t&uJ
most of the state constitutions, provided that limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at
the pardoning power can only be exercised anv time after conviction even if the judgment
"after conviction."
is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different
j^tf.l
The requirement of after conviction operated where the requirement is "'final conviction," as
as one of the limitations on the pardoning power was mandated in the original provision of Section
of the President. Thus: 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "convic
tion by final judgment," as presently prescribed
It should be observed that there are two
in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitu
limitations upon the exercise of this consti
tion. In such a case, no pardon may be extended
tutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not A judgment of conviction becomes final (a)
extend to cases of impeachment.103 when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when
the accused commences to serve the sentence,
The 1973 Constitution went further by pro
viding that pardon could be granted only after (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived
final .conviction. Section 14 of Article IX thereof in writing, except where the death penalty was
reads as follows:
imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the ac
cused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
The Prime Minister may, except in cases right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction
of impeachment, grant reprieves, commuta is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore
tions, and pardons, remit fines and forfei attained finality, as in the instant case, executive
jfttiJ
tures, after final conviction, and, with the clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
concurrence of the National Assembly, grant
amnesty, (emphasis supplied) We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling
of this Court in People v. Crisola104 that the grant
The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Consti of executive clemency during the pendency of the
tution, however, removed the limitation of final appeal serves to put an end to the appeal. Thus:
conviction, thereby bringing back to the afore
mentioned provision of the Jones Law. Section . The commutation of the penalty is im
11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as thus pressed with legal significance. That is an
amended, reads: exercise of executive clemency embraced
in the pardoning power. According to the
The President may, except in cases of
Constitution: "The President may, except
impeachment, grant reprieves, commuta
in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,
tions and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures
commutations and pardons, remit fines and
and, with the concurrence of the Batasang
forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the
Pambansa, grant amnesty.
Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty." Once
But the said limitation was restored by the granted, it is binding and effective. It serves
present Constitution. Section 19, Article VII to put an end to this appeal.
thereof reads as follows:
It must, nevertheless, be noted that the con
Except in cases of impeachment, or as stitutional provision quoted is that of the 1973
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
l03Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 PhiL. 34, 38 (1940). 10U28 SCRA 1, 3 (1984).

Constitution, as amended, which authorized the at any time, and even without the knowledge of
exercise of the pardoning power at anytime, ei the court, extend executive clemency to any one
'•tifoi
ther before or after conviction. Also, in Monsanto whom he, in good faith or otherwise, beheves to
v. Factoran,105 this Court stated that the accep merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied
tance of a pardon amounts to an abandonment of that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amend
an appeal, rendering the conviction final; thus: ment to the 1973 Constitution on the pardon
ing power which did no require conviction, the
The 1981 amendments had deleted the President had unimpeded power to gran pardon
earlier rule that clemency could be extended even before the criminal case could be heard.
Ul
only upon final conviction, implying that And under the 1935 Constitution which required
clemency could be given even before convic "conviction" only, the power could be exercised
tion. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon at any time after conviction and regardless of
was granted even as her appeal was pending the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there
in the High Court. It is worth mentioning could be th risk not only of a failure of justice
that under the 1987 Constitution, the former but also of a frustration of the system of admin
limitation of final conviction was restored. istration of justice in view of the derogation of
But be that as it may, it is our view that in the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court.
the present case, it is not material when the Where the President is not so prevented by the
pardon was bestowed, whether before or after Constitution, not even Congress can impose any
conviction, for the result would still be the restriction to prevent a presidential folly. Hence,
same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner nothing but a change in the constitutional provi
is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and sion consisting in the imposition of "convict ion
her unreversed conviction by the Sandigan by final judgment" requirement can change the
bayan assumed the character of finality. . rule. The new Constitution did it.
This statement should not be taken as a Hence, before an appellant may be validly
guiding rule for it is nothing but an obiter dic granted pardon, he must first ask for the with
tum. Moreover, the pardon involved therein drawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction
was extended on 17 December 1984 or under must first be brought to finality.
the regime of Section 11, Article VII of the 1973
Accordingly, while this Court, in its reso
Constitution, as amended, which allowed the
grant of pardon either before or after conviction. lution of 21 March 1991 in People v. Pedro
Sepada,101 dismissed the appeal for having be
•StfiiJ
The reason the Constitutional Commission come moot arid academic in view of the parole
adopted the "conviction by final judgment" re granted to the appellant, it explicitly declared
quirement, reviving in effect the original provi the necessity of a final judgment before parole
sion of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning or pardon could be extended. Thus:
i^j
power, was, as expounded by Commissioner
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the
Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from
COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS the appeal
exercising executive power in derogation of the
for having become moot and academic. To
judicial power.106
avoid any possible conflict with the judicial
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case determination of pending appeals, the Court
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate further DIRECTED the Board of Pardons
court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of sepa and Parole to adopt a system which enables it
ration of powers demands that such exclusive to ascertain whether a sentence has become
authority of the appellate court be fully respected final and executory and has, in fact, been
and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the executed before acting on any application
present Constitution adopted the "conviction by for parole or pardon. The Court Administra
final judgment" limitation, the President could, tor shall coordinate with the Deparment of
Justice on how this may be best achieved.
105170 SCRA 190 (1989).
106Recordof the Constitutional Commission, vol. 2, 395. ,07G.R. No. L-47514.
ii'-j-t
fci&isa
Recently, in its resolutionof31January 1995 cation issued bythe trial court or theappellate
in People v. Hinlo,lQ& this Court categorically court, as the case may be. The acceptance ofthe
EilffiA
declared to be "in clear violation of the law" the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment
"practice of processing applications for pardon or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
or parole.despite pending appeals." This Court accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
resolved therein as follows: sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in or appeal shall render those responsible therefor
dertoput a stop tothe practice ofprocessing administratively liable. Accordingly those in
applications for pardon and parole despite custody ofthe accused must notsolely relyonthe
pending appeals which is in clear violation pardon as a basis for the release of the accused
of the law, the Court Resolved to: from confinement.
(1) REQUIRE Atty. Conrado H. Edig, And now on the instant case. Considering
counsel de parte of accused Bernardo Hinlo, that appellant RickyMengote has not filed a mo
Catalino Capin, Martin Hinlo and Cecerio tion to withdraw his appeal up to this date the
Ongco, who were given pardon, to secure conditional pardon extended to him should not
and file the withdrawal of the appeals of have been enforced.Nonetheless, sincehe stands
said accusedwithin days fromreceipt ofthis on the same footing as the accused-appellants
Resolution; in the Hinlo case, he may be freed from the full
force, impact, and effect of the rule herein pro
(2) CALL the attention of the Presiden nounced subject to the condition set forth below.
tial Committee to observe the proper proce This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after
&MA dure as required bylaw beforegranting bail, 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the
pardon or parole in cases before it; and grantee's appeal.
(3) REMIND the Board of Pardons and WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appel
Parole about the Court's directive in People lant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given
v. Sepada case. thirty (30) day's from notice hereof within which
The above pronouncements of this Court to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
in Sepada and in Hinlo may still be unheeded, appeal and to submit it to this Court. The con
either throughdeliberate disregardthereoforby ditional pardon granted the said appellant shall
reason of an erroneous application of the obiter be deemed to take effectonly upon the grant of
dictum in Monsanto or of the ruling in Crisola. such withdrawal. In case ofnon-compliance with
Hence, the need for decisive action on the matter. this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections must exert every possible effort to
Wenow declare that the "conviction by final take back into his custody the said appellant,
judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article for which purpose he may seek the assistance of
VII"of the present Constitution prohibits the the Philippine National Police or the National
grant ofpardon, whether full or conditional,to an Bureau of Investigation.
accused during the pendency of his appeal from
his conviction by the trial court.Anyapplication Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
therefor, if his conviction bythe trial court. Any the Office of the President, the Department of
applicationtherefor, if one is made, should not be Justice, the Board of Pardons and Parole and
acted upon or the process toward its grant should the Presidential Committee for the Grant ofBail,
not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Release or Pardon.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities SO ORDERED.
oftheGovernment concerned mustrequireproof
from the accused that he has not appealed from Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado,
hisconviction or that he has withdrawn his ap Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
peal. Such proof may be in the form of a certifi- Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
,09G.R. No. 110035.
B. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner
contends: (1) the stay order... is within the scope
PUNO, J.: of judicial power and duty and does not trench on
For resolution are public respondents' Ur executive powers nor on congressional preroga
gent Motion for Reconsideration ofthe Resolution tives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to
of this Court dated January 4,1999 temporar stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did
ily restraining the execution of petitioner and not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents are estopped from challenging the
respondents that: Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty
that the law on capital punishment will not be
"(1) The Decision in this case having become
repealed or. modified until Congress convenes
final and executory, its execution enters the
and considers all the various resolutions and
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
bills filed before it.
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be con
ii&s
strued as trenching on that sphere of executive
authority.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised
(2) The issuance of the temporary restrain by the public respondents.
ing order . . . creates dangerous precedent as
there will never be an end to litigation because
there is always a possibility that Congress may First. We do not agree with the sweeping
repeal a law.
submission of the public respondents that this
(3) Congress had earlier deliberated exten Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar
sively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, and hence can no longer restrain the execution
whatever question may now be raised on the of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents
Death Penalty Law before the present Congress are invoking the rule that final judgments can
within the 6-month period given by this Hon no longer be altered in accord with the principle
orable Court had in all probability been fully that "it is just as important that there should
debated upon ... be a place to end as there should be a place to
(4) Under the time honored maxim lex begin litigation." To start with, the Court is not
futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward changing even a comma of its final Decision. It
while the judge looks at the past... the Honor is appropriate to examine with precision the
able Court in issuing the TRO has transcended metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court
its power of judicial review. that became final. These metes and bounds are
clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in
(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/
this case ...
supervening events transpired to the effect that
the repeal or modification of the law imposing The records will show that before the En
death penalty has become nil, to wit: try of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the
a. The public pronouncement of Presi Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court
dent Estrada that he will veto any law im on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he
posing the death penalty involving heinous submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
crimes. implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with
our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
b. The resolution of Congressman Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the
Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal Court that he has caused the publication of the
of the law;
said Amended Rules and Regulations as required
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolu by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that
tion to repeal the law only bears his signature the Decision of this Court that became final and
and that of Senator Pimentel." unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is
£iJ
not unconstitutional; (2) that Sections 17 and on the part of the court with reference to
19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement the ending of the cause that the judicial
R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 authority terminates by having then passed
cannot be enforced and implemented until Sec completely to the Executive. The particulars
tions 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to ofthe executionitself, which are certainlynot
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also always included in the judgment and writ of
daylight clear that this Decision was not altered execution, in any event are absolutely under
a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission the control of the judicial authority, while
of the Solicitor General; the rule on finality of the executive has no power over the person
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdic of the convict except to provide for carrying
tion to execute and enforce the same judgment. out of the penalty°and to pardon.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the
well established jurisprudence on this issue as Getting down to the solution ofthe question
follows: in the case at bar, which is that of execution of
a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hy
"the finality of a judgment does not mean pothesis that postponement of the date can be
that the Court has lost all its powers nor the requested. There can be no dispute on this point.
case. By the finality of the judgment, what It is a well-known principle that notwithstand
the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, ing the order of execution and the executory
modifyor alter the same. Even after the judg nature thereof on the date set or at the proper
ment has become final the court retains its time, the date therefor can be postponed, even
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There in sentences of death. Under the common law
is a difference between the jurisdiction of the this postponement can be ordered in three ways:
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdic (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
tion to amend, modify or alter the same. The (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
former continues even after the judgment has law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the
iiiiijij become final for the purpose of enforcement common law to render impossible that assertion
of judgment; the latter terminates when the in absolute terms that after the convict has once
judgment becomes final. . . . For after the been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
judgment has become final facts and circum* the case to investigate the facts that show the
stances may transpire which can render the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
execution unjust or impossible. direction of the court, it is acknowledged that
even after the date of the execution has been
In truth, the argument of the Solicitor Gen
eral has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the (court) has performed its ministerial
pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915,
duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part
this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case
is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
of Director of Prisons v. Judge, Court of First
eught to delay the execution, and there is an
Instance, 29 Phil. 267 (1915), p. 270, viz:
imperative duty to investigate the emergency
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly and to order a postponement. Then the question
declared in various decisions, which consti arises as to whom the application for postponing
tute jurisprudence on the subject, that in the execution ought to be addressed while the
criminal cases, after the sentence has been circumstances is under investigation and as to
pronounced and the period for reopening the who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."
same has elapsed, the court cannot change The power to control the execution of its
or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
has terminated. When in cases of appeal or cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction
review the cause has been returned thereto for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial
for execution, in the event that the judgment power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial courts as may be established by law. To be sure,
duty in issuing the proper order. But it does the most important part of a htigation, whether
not follow from this cessation of functions civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
biifl
530 CONSTTTUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
decisions where supervening events may change vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
the circumstance of the parties and compel courts independence. Under the 1935 Constitution; the
IjO
to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants power of this Court to promulgate rules concern
to prevent unfairness. It is because of these un ing pleading, practice and procedure was granted
foreseen, supervening contingencies that courts but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
have been conceded the inherent and necessary power for it was subject to the power of Congress
power of control of its processes and orders to to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section
make them conformable to law and justice. For 13, Article VIII provides:
this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that
"SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall,
"when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
have the power to promulgate rules concern
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes ing pleading, practice and procedure in all
and other means necessary to carry it into effect courts, and the admission to the practice
«i> may be employed by such court or officer and if of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of courts of the same grade and shall not dimin
such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out ish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
by law or by these rules, any suitable process The existing laws on pleading, practice and-
or mode of proceeding may be adopted which procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
rules." It bears repeating that what the Court the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
restrained temporarily is the execution of its modify the same. The Congress shall have
own Decision to give it reasonable time to check the power to repeal, alter or supplement
its fairness in light of supervening events in the rules concerning pleading, practice and
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, con procedure, and the admission to the practice
trary to popular misimpression, did not restrain of law in the Philippines."
the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
The said power of Congress, however, is not
:^wl
The more disquieting dimension of the as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In
submission of the public respondents that this re Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power
Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execu to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
tion of petitioner is that it can diminish the in admission to the practice of law, enacted the
dependence of the judiciary. Since the implant Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as
of republicanism in our soil, our courts have a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August
final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations.
jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules con This Court struck down the law as unconstitu
cerning pleading, practice and procedure which, tional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held
among others, spelled out the rules on execution that ". . . the disputed law is not a legislation;
of judgments. These rules are all predicated on it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by
the assumption that courts have the inherent, this Court during the aforecited years affecting
necessary and incidental power to control and the bar candidates concerned; and although this
supervise the process of execution of their deci Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
sions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
governs judgments in criminal cases. It should executive department, that may do so. Any at
be stressed that the power to promulgate rules tempt on the part of these departments would be
of pleading, practice and procedure was granted a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case
by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its with the law in question." The venerable jurist
independence, for in the words of Justice Isa- further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the
gani Cruz "without independence and integrity, ultimate power to grant hcense for the practice of
courts will lose that popular trust so essential to law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
the maintenance of their vigor as champions of passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously character, or as other authorities say, merely to
liffif
fortfl
fix the minimum conditions for the hcense." By its .all courts, the admission to the practice of
ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
im the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supple to the underprivileged. Such rules shall pro
ment the rules concerning pleading, practice and vide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
procedure, and the admission to the practice of for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
<mt
law in the Philippines. uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan shall not diminish, increase, or modify sub
was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For stantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
isa the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court."
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, .
. . which, however, may be repealed, altered or o
The rule making power of this Court was

&m
supplemented by-the Batasang Pambansa ..." expanded. This Court for the first time was
More completely, Section 5(2) of its Article given the power to promulgate rules concerning
X provided: the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first
XXX XXX XXX time the power to disapprove rules of procedure
"SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But
K">
have the following powers. most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
xxx xxx xxx supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
(5) Promulgate rules concerning plead and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
ing, practice, and procedure in all courts, rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
the admission to the practice of law, and the longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
integration of the Bar, which, however, may so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of
ilff't
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the inde
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall pro pendence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge,
vide a simplified and inexpensive procedure as public respondents do, that this Court has no
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be jurisdiction to control the process of execution of
Uniform for all courts of the same grade, its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify has exercised since time immemorial.
substantive rights."
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitu respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this
tion further strengthened the independence of Court to control and supervise the implementa
the judiciary by giving to it the additional power tion of its decision in the case at bar. As afores-
to promulgate rules governing the integration tated, our Decision became final and executory on
of the Bar. November 6,1998. The records reveal that after
The 1987 Constitution molded an even
November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no
stronger and more independent judiciary. Among less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the
others, it enhanced the rule making power of jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation
this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the
Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104,
xxx xxx xxx
Quezon City to provide him " a certified true copy
"SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall of the Warrant of Execution dated November
have the following powers: 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day
of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him)
xxx xxx xxx
•
to reveal or announce the contents thereof, par
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the ticularly the execution date fixed by such trial
protection and enforcement of constitutional court to the publicwhen requested." The relevant
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in portions ofthe Manifestation and Urgent Motion
jjw,>
filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this date of execution set by the President would
Court "to provide the appropriate relief state: be earlier than that designated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclo
sure of information about the date of execu
5. Instead of filing a comment on
tion to herein respondent and the public
Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however,
violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights)
herein respondent is submitting the instant and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of
Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, in
Principles and State Policies) of the 1987
ter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date Philippine Constitution which read:
of execution deprives herein respondent of
vital information necessary for the exercise SECTION 7. The right of the people
of his statutory powers, as well as renders to information on matters of public con
nugatory the constitutional guarantee that cern shall be.rccognized. Access to official
recognizes the people'sright to information of records,- and to documents and papers
public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable pertaining to official acts, transactions,
Court to provide the appropriate relief. or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy
6. The non-disclosure of the date of ex development, shall be afforded the citi
ecution deprives herein respondent of vital zen, subject to such limitations as may
information necessary for the exercise of his be provided by law.
power of supervision and control over the
Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable
39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative conditions prescribed by law, the State
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV adopts and implements a policy of full
of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the
Amended Rules and Regulations to Imple 9. The 'right to information' provision is
ment Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and self-executing. It supplies 'the rules by means
for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to of which the right to information may be en
it that.laws and rules relative to the execu joyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitution
tion of sentence are faithfully observed. al Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford
7. On the other hand, the willful omis access to sources of information. Hence, the
sion to reveal the information about the fundamental right therein recognized may
precise day ofexecution limits the exercise by be asserted by the people upon the ratifica
the President of executive clemency powers tion of the Constitution without need for any
pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Execu ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165)
tive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Con What may be provided for by the Legislature
stitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal are reasonable conditions and limitations
Code, as amended, which provides that the upon the access to be afforded which must,
death sentence shall be carried out 'without of necessity, be consistent with the declared
prejudice to the exercise by the President of State policy of full public disclosure of all
his executive clemency powers at all times." transactions involving public interest (Con
(Emphasis supplied) For instance, the Presi stitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot
dent cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone be overemphasized that whatever limitation
the execution of a sentence to a day certain may be prescribed by the Legislature, the
(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in right and the duty under Art. Ill, Sec. 7 have
the absence of a precise date to reckon with. become operative and enforceable by virtue of
The exercise of such clemency power, at this the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision
time^ might even work to the prejudice of the of the Supreme Court En banc in Legaspi v.
convict and defeat the purpose of the Consti Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530,
tution and the applicable statute as when the 534-535 [1987])."
•ili&J
i§)
ARTICLE VTI: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 533

iiiiiiii
The same motion to compel Judge Ponfer- who has been convicted by final judgment still
rada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theo claimedin the appropriate courts. Forinstance, a
dore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his death convict who becomes insane after his final
client's right to due process and the public's conviction cannot be executed while in a state of
tssa
right to information. The Solicitor General, as insanity. As observed^ by Aritieau, "today, it is
counsel for public respondents, did not oppose generally assumed that due process of law will
petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court prevent the government from executing the death
has no more jurisdiction over the process of ex sentence upon a person who is insane at the time
ecution of Echegaray. This Court granted the of execution." The suspension of such a death
relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial
by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
of December 15,1998. There was not a whimper power of reprieve though its effect is the same
of protest from the public respondents and they — the temporary suspension of the execution of
are now estopped from contending that this Court the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A.
jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
convenience of litigants. imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment
is like that of commutation of sentence. But by
1^) II no stretch of the imagination can the exercise
Second. We likewise reject the public respon by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws
dents' contention that the "decision in this case be considered as a violation of the power of the
having become final and executory, its execu President to commute final sentences of convic
tion enters the exclusive ambit of authority of tion. The powers of the Executive, the Legisla
the executive department ... By granting the tive and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
TRO the Honorable Court has in effect granted convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reprieve which is an executive function." Public reason that there is no higher right than the right
respondents cite as their authority for this propo to life. Indeed, in various States in the United
sition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution States, laws have even been enacted expressly
'£$$
which reads: granting courts the power to suspend execution
of convicts and their constitutionality has been
"Except in cases of impeachment, or as upheld over arguments that they infringe upon
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the the power of the President to grant reprieves.
President may grant reprieves, commuta For the public respondents therefore to contend
tions, and pardons, and remit fines and forfei that only the Executive can protect the right to
tures after conviction by final judgment. He life of an accused after his final conviction is to
shall also have the power to grant amnesty violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
with the concurrence of a majority of all the powers of the three branches of our government.
members of the Congress."
m
The text and tone of this provision will not
yield to the interpretation suggested by the public Third. The Court's resolution temporarily
respondents. The provision is simply the source restraining the execution of petitioner must be
ofpower of the President to grant reprieves, com put in its proper perspective as it has been griev
mutations, and pardons and remit fines and for ously distorted especially by those who make a
feitures after conviction by final judgment. It also living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
provides the authority for the President to grant Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of 28, i998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several
all the members of the Congress. The provision, grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the on January 4, the first working day of 1999"; (b)
i$0 power ofcourts to control the enforcement of their that members of Congress had either sought for
decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused his executive clemency and/or review or repeal
î
SaJ
ffffij
534 CONSTirUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.l) unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal
that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution ask or modification of the law is going to be made."
ing that clemency be granted to the petitioner The extreme caution taken by the Court was
and that capital punishment be reviewed has compelled, among others, by the fear that any
been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; error of the Court in not stopping the execution
(b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Sena of the petitioner will preclude any further relief
tor Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was
they would seek a review of the death penalty at stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize
law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The
repeal ofcapital punishment, and (b.4)Congress Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that
man Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty-five (35) the legislature will not change the circumstance
other congressmen are demanding review of the of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was
same law. believed that law and equitable considerations
demand no less before allowing the State to take
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the
the life of one its citizens.
Court was already in its traditional recess and
would only resume session on January 18,1999. The temporary restraining order of this—
Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the
called the Court to a Special Session on January crystallization of the issue whether Congress
4, 1999 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's is disposed to review capital punishment. The
Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five public respondents, thru the Solicitor General,
(5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt
due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus,, the Court had the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend
the difficult problem of resolving whether peti the death penalty law. He names these superven
tioner's allegations about the moves in Congress ing events as follows:
to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are xxx xxx xxx
jjgflil mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority,
there were good reasons why the Court should "a. The public pronouncement of Presi
not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations dent Estrada that he will veto any law re
as mere speculations and surmises. They noted pealing the death penalty involving heinous
that petitioner's allegations were made in a crimes.
pleading under oath and were widely publicized b. The resolution of Congressman
in the print and broadcast media. It was also of Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal
judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new of the law;
Congress and has no less than one hundred
thirty (130) new members whose views on capital c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolu
punishment are still unexpressed: The present tion to repeal the law only bears his signature
Congress is therefore different from the Congress and that of Senator Pimentel."'
that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No.
7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No.
8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence
petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. Darrow predicted that "the question of capital
There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's punishment has been the subject of endless
allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. discussion and will probably never be settled
And verification from Congress was impossible so long as men believe in punishment." In our
as Congress was not in session. Given these clime and time when heinous crimes continue
constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and
judgment but took an extremely cautious stance moral predicates of capital punishment has been
by temporarily restraining the execution of peti regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of
tioner. The suspension was temporary — "until the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death
June 15,1999, coeval with the constitutional du partisans on the right and righteousness of their
ration of the present regular session of Congress, postulates. To be sure, any debate, even ifit is no
more than an exchange ofepithets is healthy in a EIGN DEBT, AND CONTAINING OTHER
democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to MATTERS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BYLAW.
i|iili
discord due to the overuse of words that wound,
when anger threatens to turn the majority rule SEC. 21. NO TREATY OR INTERNA
to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to TIONAL AGREEMENT SHALL BE VALID
jffi^ assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights AND EFFECTIVE UNLESS CONCURRED
to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan IN BY AT LEAST fwO-THIRDS OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.
reminds us " it is the very purpose of the Consti
tution— and particularly the Bill of Rights — to
declare certain values transcendent, beyond the 1. Foreign relations powers.
reach of temporary political majorities." Man Some of the foreign relations powers of the
has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice President are: (1) the power to negotiate treaties
^)
than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice and international agreements; (2) the power to
will bloom only when we can prevent the roots appoint ambassadors and other public ministers,
of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. and consuls; (3) the power to receive ambassadors
iici)
The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by and other public ministers accredited to the Phil
rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the ippines; (4) the power to contract and guarantee
mother of unfairness. The business of courts in foreign loans on behalf of the Republic; (5) the
rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass power to deport aliens.
<&iii
their litmus test only when they can be fair to him
who is momentarily the most hated by society. The President negotiates treaties and inter
national agreements. In the negotiation phase
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the of treaty-making, the executive may completely
|jM>
public respondents' Urgent Motion for Recon exclude Congress. However, the fruit of the ex
sideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent ecutives' negotiation does not become binding
Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Tempo treaty without the concurrence of "at least two- •
liii rary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court 2. International agreements.
judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Tri Whereas under the 1935 and 1973 Constitu
al Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew tions109 legislative concurrence was needed only
the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in treaties, the 1987 Constitution now requires
in accordance with applicable provisions of law Senate concurrence in treaties and "international
and the Rules of Court, without further delay. agreements." It thus becomes necessary to ask
what type of international agreements require
SEC. 20. THE PRESIDENT MAY CON Senate concurrence.
TRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS
ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE Treaties of any kind, whether bilateral or
PHILIPPINES WITH THE PRIOR CONCUR multilateral, require Senate concurrence. Trea
RENCE OF THE MONETARY BOARD, AND ties, however, are not the only forms of interna
SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY tional agreements into which the Chief Executive
BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE MONETARY may enter. The authority of the Executive, to
BOARD SHALL, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS enter into executive agreements without concur
FROM THE END OF EVERY QUARTER OF rence of the legislature has traditionally been
THE CALENDAR YEAR, SUBMIT TO THE recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. "The
CONGRESS A COMPLETE REPORT OF concurrence of [the legislature] is required by
ITS DECISIONS ON APPLICATIONS FOR our fundamental law in the making of'treaties',
LOANS TO BE CONTRACTED OR GUAR which are, however, distinct and different from
ANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR GOV 'executive agreements', which may be validly en-
ERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVJE 109Article VII, Section 10, (1935); Article VIII, Section
THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE FOR 14(1), U973).
jftjj
tered into without such concurrence."110However, were concluded by the President pursuant
as Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High Commis to the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 (2&Stat.
sioner to the Philippines noted: "Thepoint where 567, 612), and nine such agreements were
ordinarycorrespondence betweenthis and other entered into under the Dingley Tariff Act of
governments ends and agreements — whether 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203, 214.) A very much
fyjfrJ denominated executive agreements or exchange larger number of agreements, along the lines
ofnotes or otherwise—begin, may sometimes be ofthe one with Rumania previouslyreferred
difficult ofready ascertainment."111 The practice to, providing for most-favored-nation treat
in fact was that agreements whichwere deemed ment in customs and related matters have
torequire concurrence were embodied in treaties been entered into since the passage of the
whereas those which were deemed as not requir TariffAct of 1922, not by direction ofthe Act
ing concurrence were embodied in executive but in harmony with it.
agreements. Thefollowing is an attempt, under xxxxx International agreements in
the Old Constitution, to delineate what may be volving political issuesorchanges ofnational
covered byexecutive agreements and what must policy and those involving international
be covered by treaties.112 arrangements of a permanent character
usually take the formoftreaties. But interna
x x x the right of the Executive to enter tional agreements embodying adjustments of
into binding agreements without the neces detail carryingout well-established national
&ai sity of subsequent Congressional approval policies and traditions and those involving
has been confirmed by long usage. From the arrangements of a more or less temporary
earliest days of our history we have entered nature usually take the form of executive
intoexecutive agreements coveringsuch sub agreements.
jects as commercial and consular relations,
most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, What comes out from the discussion in the
L trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigationarrangements and the settle
1986 Constitutional Commission is that not all
executive agreements require Senate concur
ment of claims. The validity of these has never rence. Executive agreements and other inter
been seriously questioned by our courts. national agreements which are in the nature
of original agreements of a permanent nature
xxxxx or which establish national policy require con
Agreementswith respect to the registra currence because they in fact are treaties. But
tion of trademarks have been concluded by executive agreements which are merely imple
the Executive with various countries under mentation of treaties or of statutes or of well
the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 estabhshedpolicy or are ofa transitory effectivity
Stat. 502). Postal conventions regulating the do not require concurrence.113 •
isi
reciprocal treatment of mail matters, money Regarding the transitoryprovision inArticle
orders, parcelpost,etc.,have beenconcluded XVIII, Section 4, it may be noted that the Com
by the Postmaster General with various mittee Report did not contain a provision on
countries under authorization by Congress treaties. Thepresent Section 4 wasfirst proposed
beginning with the ActofFebruary 20,1792 by Commissioner Davide in the following tenor:
(1Stat. 232,239.) Ten executive agreements "Allexisting treaties or international agreements
which have not been ratified by the Batasang
"°Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 Pambansa because of Section 16 of Article XIV
SCRA 351, 355-6 (1961). of the 1973 Constitution shall remain valid until
inSayre, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreements disapproved by the Senate."114 Davide therefore
auj
Acts"39 COLUMBIAL.R. 651,755, quotedin 3 SCRAat 357.
,I2itf., quoted in 3 SCRA 356. For a classification of ex wasreferringtointernational agreements affect
ecutive agreements, seeUSAFFE VeteransAssociation, Inc. ing the economy and natural resources which
v. Treasurer of the Phil., 105 Phil. 1030,1038 (1959). On the
legal force of executive agreements in relation to statutes,
see obiter dictum in Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230, 1,3II RECORD 544-546.
243(1963). "*Id. at 462.
•'iijjt
liljB/
under Section 16 of Article XTV of the 1973 Con 3. Deportation of aliens.

stitution did not require legislative ratification.
In effect therefore Davide was asking for author Who has the power to deport aliens? Tan
ity for the Senate to unilaterally repudiate exist Tong v. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 934, 936
ing valid agreements touching on the economy. (1955) answers the question thus:
Although Davide realized that treaties could be The power to deport aliens is lodged in
modified by statute, he considered revocation by the President of tne Republic of the Philip
the Senate a less "circuitous" route.115 pines. As an act of state, it is vested in the
Executive by virtue of his office,subject only
The Davide formulation encountered serious
to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of
objections116 and eventually underwent modifi
the Revised Administrative Code or to such
cation. One serious modification, proposed by
future legislation as may be promulgated on
Commissioner Padilla, was the elimination of
ffiiA
the subject (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil.
the reference to "Section 16 of Article XIV of the
41). There is no provision in the Constitution
1973 Constitution."117 With this modification the
nor act of the legislature defining the power,
provision is made applicable to all treaties and as it is evident that it is the intention of
international agreements. Another modification the law to grant to the Chief Executive full
was the substitution of the phrase "shall not be discretion to determine whether an alien's
renewed or extended without the concurrence of residence in the country is so undesirable
at least two-thirds of the Members of the Sen as to effect or injure the security, welfare or
ate" for "shall remain valid until disapproved interest of the state. The adjudication of facts
by the Senate." This modification, introduced upon which the deportation is predicated
by Commissioner Azcuna, extends the provision also devolves on the Chief Executive whose
to treaties and international agreements which decision is final and executory.
might have a renewal or extension clause.118 In
sum, what Section 4 means, is that any treaty 4. Cases.
ffiftfl or international agreement, even if valid under
previous constitutions and even if containing
A. Pimentel v. Ermita
a renewal or extension clause, can be renewed
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
or extended only according to the procedure
prescribed in Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution. PUNO J.:
The Constitutional Commission discussion This is a petition for mandamus filed by

also shows that "renewal" of a treaty or inter petitioners to compel the Office of the Execu
national agreement means the extension of the tive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
life of an expiring agreement but under terms Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court to
different from the original, whereas "extension"
the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence
means the prolongation of the life of an expir
in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the
ing agreement under the same terms as the
1987 Constitution.
original.119 Moreover, the provision's proponent,
Commissioner Azcuna, categorically explained, The Rome Statute estabhshed the Inter
without distinction and in reply to Commissioner national Criminal Court which "shall have the
Ople, that this provision is not meant to apply to power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
executive agreements.120 the most serious crimes of international concern
xxx and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions." Its jurisdiction covers the
116/rf. at 463. crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
u6Id. at 464-468. crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in
lllId. at 470.
the Statute. The Statute was opened for signa
nsId. at 463, 468-470.
ll9Id. at 469-470. ture by all states in Rome on July 17,1998 and
™Id. at 469. had remained open for signature until December
*sJ
L
31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
New York. The Philippines signed the Statute treaty-making, the President has the sole author
on December 28, 2000 through Charge d' Affairs ity to negotiate with other states.
Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to
Nonetheless, while the President has the
the United Nations. Its provisions, however, re
sole authority to negotiate and enter into trea
quire that it be subject to ratification, acceptance
ties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his
or approval of the signatory states.
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
Petitioners filed the instant petition to com the members of the Senate for the validity of the
pel the respondents — the Officeof the Executive treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty
— to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the or international agreement shall be valid and ef
Senate of the Philippines for ratification. fective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
tgu of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935 and
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratifi
the 1973 Constitution also required the concur
cation of a treaty, under both domestic law and
rence by the legislature to the treaties entered
international law, is a function of the Senate:
into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII
iiidiil)
Hence, it is the duty of the executive department
of the 1935 Constitution provided:
to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute
to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion
%t,(\i with respect to.ratification of treaties. Moreover,
The participation of the legislative branch in
petitioners submit that the Philippines has the treaty-making process was deemed essential
a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute
to provide a check on the executive in the field of
under treaty law and customary international
foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence
law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention
of the legislature in the treaties entered into by
on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to
the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy
refrain from acts which would defeat the object
system of checks and balance necessary in the
and purpose of a treaty when they have signed
nation's pursuit of political maturity arid growth.
the treaty prior to ratification unless they have
made their intention clear not to become parties In filing this petition, the petitioners inter
to the treaty. pret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Consti
tution to mean that the power to ratify treaties
belongs to the Senate.
The core issue in this petition for mandamus
I is whether the Executive Secretary and the De
We disagree.
partment of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on Interna
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the tional Law, describes the treaty-making process
Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philip in this wise:
pine Mission to the United Nations even without The usual steps in the treaty-making
the signature of the President. process are: negotiation, signature, ratifica
We rule in the negative. tion, and exchange of the instruments of
ratification. The treaty may then be submit
In our system of government, the President, ted for registration and publication under
being the head of state, is regarded as the sole the U.N. Charter, although this step is not
organ and authority in external relations and
essential to the validity of the agreement as
is the country's sole representative with foreign
between the parties.
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country's mouthpiece Negotiation may be undertaken directly
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the by the head of state but he now usually as
President is vested with the authority to deal signs this task to his authorized representa
with foreign states and governments, extend or tives. These representatives are provided
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic rela with credentials known as full powers, which
tions, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact they exhibit to the other negotiators at the
itf<
start of the formal discussions. It is standard separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
practice for one of the parties to submit a process. As earlier discussed, the signature is
draft of the proposed treaty which, together primarily intended as a means ofauthenticating
with the counter-proposals, becomes the the instrument and as a symbol of the good
basis of the subsequent negotiations. The faith of the parties. It is usually performed by
negotiations may be brief or protracted, the state's authorize^ representative in the
depending on the issues involved, and may diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other
even "collapse" in case the partiesare unable hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms
to come to an agreement on the points under and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded
iai
consideration. by.its representative. It is generally held to be an
If and when the negotiators finally de executive act, undertaken by the head of the state
cide on the terms of the treaty, the same is or of the government. Thus, Executive Order
*ij4
opened for signature. This step is primarily No. 459 issued by President Fidel V.-Ramos on
intended as a means of authenticating the in November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in
strument and for the purpose of symbolizing the negotiation of international agreements and
the good faith of the parties; but, significant its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty
ly, it does not indicate the final consent has been signed by the Philippine representative,
of the state in cases where ratification the same shall be transmitted to the Department
of the treaty is required. The document of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign
is ordinarily signed in accordance with the Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers
alternat, that is, each of the several negotia and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the
tors is allowed to sign first on the copy which President for ratification. After the President has
he will bring home to his own state. ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign
Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for
Ratification, which is the next step, is concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of
the formal act by which a state confirms and the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to
by its representatives. The purpose of render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order
ratification is to enable the contract
No. 459 reads:
L ing states to examine the treaty more
closely and to give them an opportunity Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for
to refuse to be bound by it should they the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an
find it inimical to their interests. It is for Executive Agreement. — The domestic
this reason that most treaties are made requirements for the entry into force of a
subject to the scrutiny and consent of treaty or an executive agreement, or any
a department of the government other amendment thereto, shall be as follows:
than that which negotiated them.
xxx
A. Executive Agreements.
The last step in the treaty-making pro i. All executive agreements shall be
cess is the exchange of the instruments of transmitted to the Department of Foreign Af
ratification, which usually also signifies the fairs after their signing for the preparation of
effectivity of the treaty unless a different the ratification papers. The transmittal shall
date has been agreed upon by the parties. include the highlights of the agreements and
Where ratification is dispensed with and no the benefits which will accrue to the Philip
effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, pines arising from them.
the instrument is deemed effective upon its ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs,
signature. [Emphasis supplied.] pursuant to the endorsement by the con
Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of cerned agency, shall transmit the agree
the treaty by the Philippine representative with ments to the President of the Philippines for
iid>U
ratification. It should be underscored that the his ratification. The original signed instru
signing of the treaty and the ratification are two ment of ratification shall then be returned
la
to the Department of Foreign Affairs for which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries.
appropriate action. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treatjvbut
t!fe?i it goes without saying that the refusal must be
B. Treaties. based on substantial grounds and not on super
ficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other
i. All treaties, regardless of their desig state would be justified in taking offense.
nation, shall comply with the requirements
provided in sub-paragraph[s] 1 and 2, item It should be emphasized that under our
A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs the President, subject to the concurrence of the
shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is lim
Philippines for concurrence in the ratification ited only to giving or withholding its consent,
by the President. A certified true copy of the or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
treaties, in such numbers as may be required . within the authority of the President to refuse to
by the Senate, together with a certified true submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured
copy of the ratification instrument, shall its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
accompany the submission of the treaties to Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty—
the Senate. which has been signed in its behalf is a serious
step that should not be taken lightly, such deci
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the sion is within the competence of the President
Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court
shall comply with the provision of the treaties via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
in effecting their entry into force. jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
Petitioners' submission that the Philippines President in the performance of his official du
is bound under treaty law and international law ties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ
to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it
basis. The signature does not signify the final is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratifica branch of the government to transmit the signed
tion that binds the state to the provisions thereof. text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
In fact, the Rome Statute itselfrequires that the
signature of the representatives of the states be B. Lim v. Executive Secretary
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002
of the signatory states. Ratification is the act
by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
DE LEON, JR., J.:
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying
a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its This case involves a petition for certiorari and
willingness to be bound by the provisions of such prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention,
treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state's praying that respondents be restrained from pro
representative, the President, being accountable ceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and
to the people, is burdened with the responsibility that after due notice and hearing, that judgment
and the duty to carefully study the contents of be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunc
the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical tion and/or prohibition against the deployment
to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being
the President has the discretion even after the illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
signing of the treaty by the Philippine repre
The facts are as follows:
sentative whether or not to ratify the same. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does Beginning January of this year 2002,
not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this personnel from the armed forces of the
power of the head of states. If that were so, the United States of America started arriving
requirement of ratification of treaties would be in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction
pointless and futile. It has been held that a state with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan
has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises
are the largest combined training operations On February 7, 2002 the Senate conducted
involving Filipino and American troops. In a hearing on the "Balikatan" exercise wherein
theory, they are a simulation of joint military Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement en presented the Draft Terms of Reference (TOR).
tered into by the Philippines and the United Five days later, he approved the TOR, which we
States in 1951. quote hereunder: (OMITTED)
Prior to the year 2002, the last "Balikatan"
was held in 1995. Tliis was due to the paucity of
m
Petitioners Lim and Ersando present the
any formal agreement relative to the treatment of
following arguments:
United States personnel visiting the Philippines.
In the meantime, the respective governments of I •,
^1
the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED
on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus- was
STATES SIGNED THE MUTUAL DEFENSE
eventually cured when the two nations concluded
TREATY (MDT) in 1951 TO PROVIDE MUTUAL
M<&
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ACCORDANCE
. The entry of American troops into Philippine WITH THE 'CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES'
soil is proximately rooted in the international OF EACH COUNTRY ONLY IN THE CASE OF
- anti-terrorism campaign declared by President AN ARMED ATTACK BY AN EXTERNAL AG
George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events GRESSOR, MEANING A THIRD COUNTRY
that occurred on September 11, 2001. On that AGAINST ONE OF THEM.
m day, three (3) commercial aircrafts were hijacked, BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION
flown and smashed into the twin towers of the
CAN IT BE SAID'THAT THE ABU SAYYAF
World Trade Center in New York City and the BANDITS IN BASILAN CONSTITUTE AN
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. by ter EXTERNAL ARMED FORCE THAT HAS
„
rorists with alleged links to the al-Qaeda ("the SUBJECT THE PHILIPPINES TO AN ARMED
Base"), a Muslim extremist organization headed EXTERNAL ATTACK TO WARRANT U.S.
by the infamous Osama bin Laden. Of no com MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MDT
iii)
parable historical parallels, these acts caused OF 1951.
billions of dollars worth of destruction of property
and incalculable loss of hundreds of lives. II
Ml
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. NEITHER DOES THE VFA OF 1999 AU
Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for THORIZE AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO EN
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the consti GAGE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PHILIP
^j tutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined PINE TERRITORY, NOT EVEN TO FIRE BACK
subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG "IF FIRED UPON."
MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, Substantially the same points are advanced
who filed a petition-in-intervention on February by petitioners SANLAKAS and PARTIDO.
-
11,2002.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General points
Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capaci to infirmities in the petitions regarding, inter
.
ties as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SAN alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file suit, the
LAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver prematurity of the action, as well as the impropri
that certain members of their organization are ety ofavaihng of certiorari to ascertain a question
residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence of fact. Anent their locus standi, the Solicitor
«
will be directly affected by the operations being General argues that first, they may not filesuit in
conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for their capacities as taxpayers inasmuch as it has
a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1" involves
L citing the unprecedented importance of the issue
involved.
the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending pow
ers. Second, their being lawyers doesnot invest
&aal
r V
*
*\
&&i
them with sufficient personality to initiate the We have since then applied the exception in
case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the many other cases, [citation omitted] —
•Philippines v. Zamora. Third, Lim and Ersando
have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing
of direct personal injury. We agree. Although courts generally avoid having to
decide a constitutional question based on the
It is also contended that the petitioners are doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins
indulging in speculation. The Solicitor General upon the departments of the government a be
is of the view that since the Terms of Reference coming respect for each others' acts, this Court
are clear as to the extent and duration of "Ba nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the
likatan 02-1," the issues raised by petitioners are instant petitions.
premature, as they are based only on a fear of
future violation of the Terms of Reference. Even Hence, we treat with similar dispatch the
petitioners' resort to a special civil action for general objectionto the supposed prematurity of
certiorari is assailed on the ground that the writ the action. At any rate, petitioners' concerns on
may only issue on the basis of established facts. the lack ofany specific regulation on the latitude
of activity US personnel may undertake and tha.
Apart from these threshold issues, the So duration of their stay has been addressed in the
licitor General claims that there is actually no Terms of Reference.
question of constitutionality involved. The true
object of the instant suit, it is said, is to obtain The holding of"Balikatan 02-1"must be stud
an interpretation of the VFA. The Solicitor Gen ied in the framework of the treaty antecedents
eral asks that we accord due deference to the
to which the Philippines bound itself. The first
L executive determination that "Balikatan 02-1" is of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT;
for brevity). The MDT has been described as the
covered by the VFA, considering the President's
monopoly in the field of foreign relations and "core" of the defense relationship between the
her role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine Philippines and its traditional ally, the United
armed forces.
States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and
technological capabilities of our armed forces
Given the primordial importance of the issue through joint training with its American coun
involved, it will suffice to reiterate our view on terparts; the "Balikatan" is the largest such
this point in a related case: training exercise directly supporting the MDTs
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA
importance and the constitutional significance adverts and the obligations thereunder which it
iaj
of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, seeks to reaffirm.

in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agree
aside the procedural barrier and takes cogni ment in 1992 and the decision not to renew it.
zance of the petitions, as we have done in the created a vacuum in US-Philippine defense
early Emergency Powers cases, where we had relations, that is, until it was replaced by the
occasion to rule: Visiting Forces Agreement. It should be recalled
that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to
*... ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
three, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA.
allowed to question the constitutionality of
The VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism"
several executive orders issued by President
by which "United States military and civilian
Quirino although they were involving only an personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philip
indirect and general interest shared in com pines in connection with activities approved by
mon with the public. The Court dismissed the the Philippine Government." It contains provi
objection that they were not proper parties sions relative to entry and departure of Ameri
and ruled that 'transcendental importance to can personnel, driving and vehicle registration,
the public of these cases demands that they criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft,
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.' as well as the duration of the agreement and its
[m
termination. It is the VFA which gives continued the conclusion of the treaty and accepted
relevance to the MDT Respite the passage of by the other parties as an instrument
years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promo related to the party.
tion of optimal cooperation between American
3. There shall be taken into account,
and Philippine military forces in the event of an
together with the context:
attack by a common foe.
(a) any subsequent agreement be
The first question that should be addressed
tween the parties regarding the interpre
is whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the
tation of the tre'aty or the application of
Visiting Forces Agreement. To resolve this, it is
its provisions;
necessary to refer to the VFA itself. Not much
help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since (b) any subsequent practice in the
the terminology employed is itself the source of application of the treaty which establish
im> the problem. The VFA permits United States es the agreement of the parties regarding
personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in. its interpretation;
"activities," the exact meaning of which was left (c) any relevant rules of interna
undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permit tional law applicable in the relations
ting a wide scope of undertakings subject only between the parties.
to the approval of the Philippine government.
The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is 4. A special meaning shall be given to
couched in the negative, in that United States a term if it is established that the parties so
personnel must "abstain from any activity incon intended.
sistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in Article 32
particular, from any political activity." All other
activities, in other words, are fair game. Supplementary means of interpretation
We are not left completely unaided, however. Recourse may be had to supplementary
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, means of interpretation, including the pre
which contains provisos governing interpreta paratory work of the treaty and the circum
tions of international agreements, state: stances of its conclusion, in order to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application of
SECTION 3. — INTERPRETATION OF article 31, or to determine the meaning when
TREATIES the interpretation according to article 31:
* Article 31 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or
i&&J
obscure; or
General rule of interpretation
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good absurd or unreasonable.
faith in accordance with the ordinary mean
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in It is clear from the foregoing that the car
their context and in the light of its object and dinal rule of interpretation must involve an
purpose. examination of the text, which is presumed to
verbalize the parties' intentions. The Conven
2. The context for the purpose of the tion likewise dictates what may be used as aids,
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers
addition to the text, including its preamble to as the context of the treaty, as well as other
and annexes: elements may be taken into account alongside
(a) any agreement relating to the the aforesaid context. As explained by a writer
treaty which was made between all the on the Convention,
parties in connection with the conclusion [t]he Commission's proposals (which
of the treaty; were adopted virtually without change by
(b) any instrument which was made the conference ancl are now reflected in
by one or more parties in connectionwith Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention) were
ffiift
clearly based on the view that the text of a ties — as opposed to combat itself— such as the
treaty must be presumed to be the authentic one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
expression of the intentions of the parties; authorized.
the Commission accordingly came down
firmly in favour of the view that 'the starting That is not the end of the matter, though.
point of interpretation is the elucidation of Granted that "Balikatan 02-1" is permitted under
the meaning of the text, not an investigation the terms of the VFA, what may US forces legiti
ab initio into the intentions of the parties'.
mately do in furtherance of their aim to provide
This is not to say that the travaux preara-
advice, assistance and training in the global
toires of a treaty, or the circumstances of its
effort against terrorism? Differently phrased,
conclusion, are relegated to a subordinate,
may American troops actually engage in combat
and wholly ineffective, role. As Professor
in Philippine territory? The Terms of Reference
Briggs points out, no rigid temporal prohibi
are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of Section I
iipfr
tion on resort to travaux preparatoires of a
stipulatesthat US exercise participants may not
engage in combat "except in self-defense." We
treaty was intended by the use of the phrase
wryly note that this sentiment is admirable in
'supplementary means of interpretation' in
the abstract but difficult in implementation. The
what is now Article 32 of the Vienna Conven
target of "Balikatan 02-1," the Abu Sayyaf, can
tion. The distinction between the general
not reasonably be expected to sit idly while the
rule ofinterpretation and the supplementary
battle is brought to their very doorstep. They can
means of interpretation is intended rather
not be expected to pick and choose their targets
to ensure that the supplementary means do
for they will not have the luxury of doing so. We
not constitute an alternative, autonomous
state this point if only to signify our awareness
method of interpretation divorced from the that the parties straddle a fine line, observing
general rule. the honored legal maxim "Nemopotest facereper
The Terms of Reference rightly fall within alium quod nonpotest facereper directum." The
the context of the VFA.
indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry,
that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war
After studied reflection, it appeared far principally conducted by the United States gov
fetched that the ambiguity surrounding the ernment, and that the provision on self-defense
meaning of the word "activities" arose from serves only as camouflage to conceal the true
accident. In our view, it was deliberately made nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement
that way to give both parties a certain leeway in on this matter thereby becomes crucial.
negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces
In our considered opinion, neither the MDT
may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes
nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
other than military. As conceived, the joint ex
offensive war on Philippine territory. We bear
ercises may include training on new techniques
in mind the salutary proscription stated in the
of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's
Charter of the United Nations, to wit:
marine resources, sea search-and-rescue opera
tions to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief Article 2
operations, civic action projects such as the build
The Organization and its Members, in
ing of school houses, medical and humanitarian
pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
missions, and the like.
shall act in accordance with the following
Under these auspices, the VFA gives le Principles.
gitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It
xxx xxx xxx
is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1,"
a "mutual antiterrorism advising, assisting and 4. All Members shall refrain in their
iî
training exercise," falls under the umbrella of international relations from the threat or
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context use of force against the territorial integrity or
of the agreement. Both the history and intent of political independence of any state, or in any
the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA sup other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
port the conclusion that combat-related activi of the United Nations.
XXX XXX XXX be allowed in the Philippines except under a

. In the same manner, both the Mutual
treaty duly concurredin by the Senate and,
Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agree when the Congress so requires, ratifiedbya
ment, as in all other treaties and international
majority of the votes cast by the people in a
agreements to which the Philippines is a party,
national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as*a treaty by the other con
must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitu
tracting state.
tion. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty
was concluded way before the present Charter, The aforequoted provisions betray a marked
though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid antipathy towards foreign military presence in
source of international obligation. The present the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Constitution contains key provisions useful in Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the
determining the extent to which foreign military Philippines only by way of direct exception. Con
troops are allowed in Philippine territory. Thus, flict arises then between the fundamental law
in the Declaration of Principles and State Poli and our obligations arising from international
cies, it is provided that: agreements.
XXX XXX XXX A rather recent formulation of the relation
of international law vis-a-vis municipal law was
SEC: 2. — The Philippines renounces
expressed in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court, of Ap
war as an instrument of national policy,
peals, 224 SCRA 576, 593 (1993), to wit:
adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the . . . Withal, the fact that international
land and adheres to the policy of peace, law has been made part of the law of the
J]$ftl)
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and land does not by any means imply the pri
amity with all nations. macy of international law over national law
in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine
XXX XXX XXX
iiiJ of incorporation as applied in most coun
SEC. 7. — The State shall pursue an in tries, rules of international law are given
dependent foreign policy. In its relations with a standing equal, not superior, to national
other states the paramount consideration legislation.
shall be national sovereignty, territorial
This is not exactly helpful in solving the.
integrity, national interest, and the right to
problem at hand since in trying to find a middle
self-determination.
ground, it favors neither one law nor the other,
SEC. 8. — The Philippines, consistent which only leaves the hapless seeker with an
with the national interest, adopts and pur unsolved dilemma. Other more traditional ap
sues a policy of freedom from nuclear weap proaches may offer valuable insights.
ons in the country.
From the perspective of public international
XXX XXX XXX law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pur
suant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
The Constitution also regulates the foreign
Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
relations powers of the Chief Executive when
the parties to it and must be performed by them
it provides that "[n]o treaty or international
in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
law as justification for its failure to perform a
members of the Senate." Even more pointedly,
treaty."
the Transitory Provisions state:
Our Constitution espouses the opposing
Sec. 25. — After the expiration in 1991 view. Witness our jurisdiction as stated in Sec
of the Agreement between the Republic of tion 5 of Article VIII:
the Philippines and the United States of
ftffi
America concerning Military Bases, foreign The Supreme Court shall have the fol
military bases, troops or facilities shall hot lowing powers:
XXX XXX XXX curacy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason
that facts must be established in accordance^with
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the rules of evidence. As a result, we cannot ac
the Rules of Court may provide, final judg cept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners'
ments and order of lower courts in:
allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged
in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere
(A) All cases in which the constitution training exercise an offensive effort by foreign
ality or validity of any treaty, international troops on native soil. The* petitions invite us to
or executive agreement, law, presidential speculate on what is really happening in.Mind-
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, anao, to issue, make factual findings on matters
ordinance, or regulation is in question. well beyond our immediate perception, and this
we are understandably loath to do.
XXX XXX XXX
It is all too "apparent that the determination

In Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155,1191
(1957), we rulSd that the provisions of a treaty
thereof involves basically a question of fact. On
this point, we must concur with the Solicitor
are always subject to qualification or amend
General that the present subject matter is not-a-
ment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject
fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. We
to the police power of the State. In Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230, 242 (1963)
have held in too many instances that questions
s&i&
of fact are not entertained in such a remedy.
... As regards the question whether an The sole object of the writ is to correct errors
international agreement may be invalidated of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The
by our courts, suffice it to say that the Consti phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise
£&£j
tution of the Philippines has clearly settled meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too
it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform
Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law,
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the and despotic manner by reason of passion and
law or the rules of court may provide, final personal hostility."
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
— (1) All cases in which the constitutionality In this connection, it will not be amiss to add
or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
executive order or regulation is in question." Under the expanded concept ofjudicial power
In other words, our Constitution authorizes under the Constitution, courts are charged with
the nullification of a treaty, not only when it the duty "to determine whether or not there has
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
when it runs counter to an act of Congress. lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt branch or instrumentality of the government."
that US forces are prohibited from engaging in From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding
an offensive war on Philippine territory. of"Balikatan 02-1"joint military exercise has not
intruded into that penumbra of error that would
Yet a nagging question remains: are Ameri otherwise call for correction on our part. In other
can troops actively engaged in combat alongside words, respondents in the case at bar have not
Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
training and assistance exercise? Contrary to to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
what petitioners would have us do, we cannot
take judicial notice of the events transpiring WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-
down south, as reported from the saturation in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without
coverage of the media. As a rule, we do not take prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient
cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per in form and substance in the proper Regional
se, not because of any issue as to their truth, acr Trial Court.
C. Bayan v. Executive Secretary Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).

G.R. No. 138570, 6ctober 10, 2000 Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to
a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted
BUENA, J.: to a final series of conferences and negotiations
that culminated in Manila on January 12 and
Confronting the Court for resolution in the 13,1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ra
instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and mos approved the VFA, which was respectively
prohibition are issues relating to, and borne signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon
by, an agreement forged in the turn of the last and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard
century between the Republic of the Philippines on February 10, 1998.
and the United States of America — the Visiting
Forces Agreement. On October 5,1998, President Joseph E. Es
trada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
The antecedents unfold. Affairs, ratified the VFA.
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and On October 6, 1998, the President, acting
fe*>
the United States of America forged a Military through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Bases Agreement which formalized, among oth Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of
ers, the use of installations in the Philippine the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification,
territory by United States military personnel. the letter of the President and the VFA, for
To further strengthen their defense and security concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII
relationship, the Philippines and the United of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn,
States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign
August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties Relations, chaired by Senator Bias F. Ople, and
agreed to respond to any external armed attack its Committee on National Defense and Secu
on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, rity, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for
and aircraft. their joint consideration and recommendation.
g~>
In view of the impending expiration of the Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by
the two Committees.
RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
L Philippines and the United States negotiated for
a possible extension of the military bases agree
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted
Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommend
ment. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine ing the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of the creation of a Legislative Oversight Commit
(is Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, tee to oversee its implementation. Debates then
in effect, would have extended the presence of ensued.
US military bases in the Philippines. With the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agree On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolu
ment, the periodic military exercises conducted tion No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by
between the two countries were held in abey a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate
ance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as
relationship between the Philippines and the Senate Resolution No. 18.
United States ofAmerica continued pursuant to On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered
the Mutual Defense Treaty. into force after an Exchange of Notes between
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, respondent Secretary Siazon and United States
headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secre Ambassador Hubbard.
tary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and
the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism
Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange for regulating the circumstances and conditions
notes on "the complementing strategic interests under which US Armed Forces and defense
of the United States and the Philippines in personnel my be present in the Philippines,...
the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the [Text of VFA is omitted]
^
548
We have simplified the issuesraised bythe Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents
petitioners into the following: invoke, reads:
"No treaty or international agreement
II. Is the VFA governed by the provisions of shall be valid and effective unless concurred
Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
XVIII of the Constitution? of the Senate."
^j III. Does the VFA constitute an abdication Section 25,Article XVIII, provides:
ofPhilippine sovereignty?
"After the expiration in 1991 of the
a. Are Philippine courts .deprived of Agreement between the Republic of the
»«l their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses Philippines and the United StatesofAmerica
committed by US military personnel? concerning Military Bases, foreign military
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
iiaA its jurisdiction over bffenses punishable by inthePhilippines except under a treaty duly
reclusion perpetua or higher? concurred in by the. Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
IV. Does the VFA violate: ofthe votes cast by the people in a national
a. the equal protection clause under referendum held for that purpose, andi rec
Section 1, Article HI.of-the Constitution? ognized as a treaty bythe othercontracting
State."
b. the prohibition against nuclear
tai Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties
weapons under Article II, Section 8?
or international agreements in general, in
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Con which case, the concurrence of at least two-
stitution granting the exemption from taxes thirds (2/3) ofall the Members ofthe Senate
andduties for theequipment, materials, sup is required to make the subject treaty, or
plies and other properties imported into or international agreement, valid andbinding
acquired in the Philippines by, or onbehalf, onthe part ofthe Philippines. Thisprovision
Sij of the US Armed Forces? lays down the general rule on treaties or
international agreements andapplies toany
form oftreatywitha wide variety ofsubject
fe) - APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL matter, such as, but not limited to, extradi
PROVISION tion or tax treaties or those economic in na
ture.All treatiesor international agreements
One focal point ofinquiry inthiscontroversy enteredintobythe Philippines, regardless of
•^> is the determination of which provision of the subject matter, coverage, or particular des
Constitution applies, with regard to the exer ignationor appellation, requiresthe concur
cise by the Senate of its constitutional power rence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that
Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable consider In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is
ing that theVFA has for its subject thepresence a special provision that applies to treaties
offoreign military troops in the Philippines. which involve thepresence offoreign military
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that bases, troops orfacilities in the Philippines.
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch Under this provision, the concurrence ofthe
as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an Senateis only oneofthe requisites torender
agreement which involves merely the temporary compliance withthe constitutional require
visits ofUnited States personnel engaged injoint ments andtoconsider theagreement binding
military exercises. on the Philippines. Section 25,ArticleXVIII
further requires that "foreign military bases,
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the
two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Philippines only by virtue ofa treaty duly
Senate on treaties orinternational agreements. k concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a
n$M
majority of. the votes cast in a national ref law prevails over a general one. Lexspecialis
isi erendum held for that purpose if so required derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the
by Congress, and recognized as such by the same statute a particular enactment andalso
other contracting state. a general one which, in its most comprehen
sive sense, would include what is embraced
It is our considered view that both con
in the former, the particular enactment must
stitutional provisions, far from contradicting
be operative, and the general enactment
each other, actually share some common
must be taken to affect only such cases within
ground. These constitutional provisions both
Isi its general language which are not within the
embody phrases in the negative and thus,
provision of the particular enactment.
are deemed prohibitory in mandate and
character. In particular, Section 21 opens
with the clause "No treaty...," and Section
25 contains the phrase "shall npt be allowed."
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Sec
Additionally, in both instances, the concur tion 25, Article XVHI is inapplicable to mere
rence of the Senate is indispensable to render transient agreements for the reason that
$$}
the treaty or international agreement valid there is no permanent placing ofstructure for
and effective.
the establishment of a military base. On this
score, the Constitution makes no distinction
To our mind, the fact that the President between "transient" and "permanent." Cer
w$\
referred the VFA to the Senate under Section tainly, we findnothingin Section25, Article
21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended . XVTnthatTequiresforeignixoopsijrfacilities
its concurrence under the same provision, to be stationed or placed permanently in the
is immaterial. For in either case, whether Philippines.
under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25,
,Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crys It is aTudiment in legal hermeneutics
talline that the concurrence of the Senate is that when no distinction is made by law; the
mandatory to comply with the strict consti- Court should hot distinguish — Ubi lex non
tutiqnal requirements. distinguit nee nos distinguire debemos.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement In like manner, we do not subscribe to

^gj
which defines the treatment of United States the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. is not controlling since no foreign military
It providesfor the guidelines to govern such bases, but merely foreign troops and fa
visits of military personnel, and further cilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably,
defines the rights of the United States and a perusal of said constitutional provision
the Philippine government in the matter of reveals that the proscription covers "foreign
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated
isJ
and aircraft, importation and exportation of differently, this prohibition is not limited to
equipment, materials and supplies. the entry of troops and facilities without any
foreign bases being established. The clause
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, does not refer to "foreign military bases,
which specifically deals with treaties in troops, or facilities" collectively but treats
volving foreign military bases, troops, or them as separate and independent subjects.
facilities, should apply in the instant case. The use of comma and the disjunctive word
To a certain extent and in a limited sense, "or." clearly signifies disassociation and
however, the provisions of Section 21, Article independence of one thing from the others
VII will find applicability with regard to the included in the enumeration, such that,
issue and for the sole purpose of determining the provision contemplates three different
the number of votes required to obtain the situations — a military treaty the subject of
valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)
further discussed hereunder. foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statu of the three standing alone places it under
tory construction that a special provision or the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
HfA
To this end, the intention of the fram- sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a
ers of the Charter, as manifested during treaty; (b) the treaty must be dulyconcurred
'•:[iai the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional in by the Senate and, when so required by
Commission, is consistent with this inter Congress, ratified by a majorityofthe votes
pretation: cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
"MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to ad contracting state.
dress a question or two to Commissioner
Bernas.
There is no dispute as to the presence of
the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.
This formulation spejaks of three things: The concurrence handed by the Senate through
foreign military bases, troops orfacilities. My Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the pro
first question is: If the country does enter visions of the Constitution, whether under the
into such kind of a treaty, must it cover the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII,
three-bases, troops-^r facilities or could the or the specific mandate mentionedin Section 25,
treaty entered into cover only oneor two? Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article
FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover requiring ratification by a majorityof the votes
only one. Whetherit covers onlyoneor it cov cast in a national referendum being unnecessary
ers three, the requirement will be the same. since Congress has not required it.
&l MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Asto the matter ofvoting, Section21,Article
Philippine government can enter into a VIIparticularlyrequires that a treaty orinterna
treaty covering notbasesbut merely troops? tional agreement, to be valid and effective, must
be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
FR. BERNAS. Yes. members of the Senate. On the other hand, Sec
MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any tion 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the
reason why the, government can enter into treaty be a "dulyconcurredin by the Senate."
a treaty covering only troops. Applying the foregoing constitutional provi
FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we sions, a two-thirdsvote ofall the members oftjie
stretch our imagination a little bit more, we Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence
will find some. We just want to cover every contemplated bylawmaybevalidly obtained and
thing." (Emphasis Supplied.) deemed present. Whileit is true that Section 25,
Article XVIIIrequires, among other things, that
Moreover, military bases established within the treaty —the VFA, in the instant case—be a
the territory of another state is no longer viable "duly concurred in by the Senate," it is very true
because of the alternatives offered by new means however that said provisionmust be related and
and weaponsofwarfare such as nuclear weapons, viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied
frail
guided missiles as well as huge seavessels that in Section 21,ArticleVII, whichin more specific
can stay afloat in the sea even for months and terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty,
years without returning to their home country. or international agreement, be made by a two-
Thesemilitary warships are actuallyused as sub thirds vote of all the members of the Senate.
stitutes for a land-home base not only of military Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be
aircraft but also of military personnel and facili treated in isolation to Section 21, Article, VII.
ties. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to
a land-based military headquarters. As noted, the "concurrence requirement" un
der Section 25, Article XVTH must be construed
At this juncture, weshall then resolve the is in relationto the provisions ofSection 21,Article
sue ofwhether or not the requirements ofSection VII. In a more particular language, the concur
25 were complied with when the Senate gaveits rence ofthe Senate contemplated under Section
concurrence to the VFA. 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows for of all the members of the Senate favorably vote
gt) eignmilitary bases, troops, orfacilities in the to concur with the treaty — the VFA in the in
country, unless the following conditions are stant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter their ordinary meaning except where technical
provides that the Senate shall be composed of terms are employed, in which case the signifi
iiiii twenty-four (24) Senators. Without a tinge of cance thus attached to them prevails. Its lan
doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less guage should be understood in the sense they
than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on have in common use.
the proposal is an unquestionable compliance Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the
with the requisite number of votes mentioned United States treats the VFA only as an execu
in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there tiveagreementbecause, under internationallaw,
were actually twenty-three (23)incumbent Sena an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
^| tors at the time the voting was made, will not To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the
alter in any significant way the circumstance elements of an agreement under international
that more than two-thirds of the members of law, the said agreement is to be taken equally
the Senate concurred with the proposed YFA, as a treaty.
even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based
on this figure of actual members. In this regard, A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Conven
the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of tion on the Law of Treaties, is "an international
the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, instrument concluded between States in written
suffice so as to render compliance with the strict form and governed byinternational law,whether
constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
the subject treaty. related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation." There are many other terms used
Having resolved that the first two requisites for a treaty or international agreement, some of
prescribed in Section 25, Article XVTII are pres which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis
ent, we shall now pass upon and delve on the d'arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration,
requirement that the VFAshould be recognized exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and
as a treaty by the United States of America. modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius
Petitioners contend that the phrase "rec onward, have pointed out that the names or titles
ognized as a treaty," embodied in Section 25, of international agreements included under the
Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have general term treaty havelittle or nolegal signifi
the advice and consent of the United States Sen cance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish
i^lij ate pursuant to its own constitutional process, little more than mere description.
and that it should not be considered merely an Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention pro
executive agreement by the United States. vides that "the provisionsofparagraph 1regard
In opposition, respondents argue that the let ing the use of terms in the present Convention
ter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stat are without prejudice to the use of those terms,
ingthatthe VFAis binding onthe United States or to the meanings which may be givento them
Government is conclusive, on the point that the in the internal law of the State."
VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United Thus, in international law, there is nodiffer
States of America. According to respondents, the ence between treaties and executive agreements
VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted as a in their binding effect upon states concerned,
treaty by the United States. as long as the negotiating functionaries have
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase remainedwithin their powers. Internationallaw
"recognized as a treaty" means that the other continues to make no distinction between trea
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the ties andexecutive agreements: they areequally
agreement as a treaty. To require the other con binding obligations upon nations.
tracting state, the United States of America in In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the
this case, to submit the VFA to the United States binding effect of executive agreements even
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitu without the concurrence of the Senate or Con
tion, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. gress. In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern
Well-entrenched is the principle that the Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351, 356:357 [1961], wfe
words used in the Constitution are to be given had occasion to pronounce: -*•.-?»
". . . the right of the Executive to enter the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United
into binding agreements without the neces States of America accepts or acknowledges-the
sity of subsequent Congressional approval VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further tocom-
has been confirmed by long usage. From ply with its obligations under the treaty, there
the earliest days of our history we have is indeed marked compliance with the mandate
iiliiiiii
entered into executive agreements covering of the Constitution.
such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent Worth stressing too, is that the ratification,
rights, trademark and copyright protection, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence
postal and navigation arrangements and the of the Senate should be taken as a clear and
settlement of claims. The validity of these unequivocal expression of our nation's consent
has never been seriously questioned by our to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant
courts.
duty to uphold the obligations and responsibili
ties embodied thereunder. .
xxx XXX xxx
Ratification is generally held to be an execu
"Furthermore, the United States Su tive act, undertaken by the head of the state or
preme Court has expressly recognized the of the government, as the case may be, through—
validity and constitutionality of executive which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
agreements entered into without Senate proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic
approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.
753-754) (See, also, U.S. v. Curtis Wright The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty
Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty
255; U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81L. ed. provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise
1134; U.5. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. established that the negotiating States agreed
796; Ozanic v. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law that ratification should be required, (c) the rep
Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 1905-1906; California resentative of the State has signed the treaty
Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the
-International Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, State to sign the treaty subject to ratification ap
pp. 1405,1416-1418; Willoughby on the U.S. pears from the full powers of its representative,
Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537- or was expressed during the negotiation.
540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol.
V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is
Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Emphasis vested in the President and not, as commonly
Supplied)" (Emphasis Ours) believed, in the legislature. The role of the Sen
ate is limited only to giving or withholding its
The deliberations of the Constitutional Com consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
mission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is
enlightening and highly-instructive: With the ratification of the VFA, which is
equivalent to final acceptance, and with .the
"MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes exchange of notes between the Philippines and
without saying that as far as ratification of the United States of America, it now becomes
the other state is concerned, that is entirely obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
their concern under their own laws. principles of international law, to be bound by
the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept Section 2, Article II ofthe Constitution, declares
whatever they say. If they say that we have
that the Philippines adopts the generally ac
done everything to make it a treaty, then as cepted principles of international law as part of
far as we are concerned, we will accept it as the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
a treaty."
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
The records reveal that the United States amity with all nations.
Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. As a member of the family of nations, the
Hubbard, has stated that the United States Philippines agrees to be bound by generally ac
government has fully committed to living up to cepted rules for the conduct of its international
!:|::jl'l|li
relations. While the international obligation gross as to amount to an evasion ofpositiveduty

Viiall
devolves upon the state and not upon anypar enjoined or to act at all in contemplation oflaw.
ticular branch, institution, or individual member
of its government, the Philippines is nonethe Byconstitutional fiat and bythe intrinsicna-
less responsible for violations committed byany =ture ofhis office, the President, as head ofState,
'Ml
branch or subdivision of its government or any is the sole organand authorityin the external af
official thereof. As an integral part of the com fairsofthe country. In manyways, the President
munity of nations, we are responsible to assure is thechiefarchitect ofthe nation's foreign policy;
fe&J that our government, Constitution and laws will his "dominance in the field of foreign relations
carry out our international obligation. Hence, is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and
we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a influence, his conduct in the external affairs of
convenient excuse for non-compliance with our the nation, as Jefferson describes, is "executive
obligations, duties and responsibilities under altogether."-
international law. As regards the power to enter into treaties or
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration international agreements, the Constitution vests
of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the the same in the President, subject only to the
InternationalLaw Commission in 1949 provides: concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
"Every State has the duty to carry out in good members ofthe Senate. In this light,the negotia
faith its obligations arising from treaties and tionofthe VFA and the subsequent ratificationof
othersources ofinternational law, andit may not the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain
invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of
as an excuse for failure to perform this duty." his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted
him no less than by the fundamental law itself.
Equally important is Article 26 of the Con Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
vention which provides that "Every treaty in intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to in
&&j force is binding upon the parties to it and must vade it. Consequently,the acts or judgment calls
be performed by them in good faith." This is ofthePresident involving the VFA—specifically
known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda the actsofratification and enteringintoa treaty
aii
which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have and those necessary or incidental to the exercise
been one of the most fundamental principles of ofsuch principal acts — squarely fall within the
positive international law, supported by the ju sphereofhis constitutional powers and thus, may
risprudence of international tribunals. not be validly struck down, much less calibrated
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
by this Court, in the absence ofclear showing of
grave abuse of power or discretion.
In the instant controversy, the President, in
It is the Court's considered view that the
effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power
andperforming a task conferred upon him bythe President, in ratifying the VFA and in submit
Constitution —thepower toenter into and ratify ting the same to the Senate for concurrence,
treaties. Through the expediency ofRule65ofthe acted within the confines and limits of the pow
Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated ers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no
cases impute grave abuse of discretion on the moment that the President, in the exercise of
part ofthe Chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, his wide latitude of discretion and in the hon
and referring the same to the Senate pursuant est belief that the VFA falls within the ambit
to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII ofthe of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, .
Constitution. referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence
under the aforementioned provision. Certainly,
On this particular matter, grave abuse of no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, pat
discretion impliessuch capricious and whimsical ent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of imputed to the President in his act of ratifying
jurisdiction, or, when the poweris exercised in an the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for
arbitraryordespotic mannerbyreason ofpassion the purpose of complying with the concurrence
or personal hostility, and it must be sopatent and requirement embodied in the fundamental law.
L
L
In doing so, the President merely, performed a tion of powers and of checks and balances jalive
constitutional task and exercised a prerogative arid vigilantly ensures that these cherishedTfudi-
that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. ments remain true to their form in a democratic
Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the government such as ours. The Constitution thus
Senate for concurrence under the provisions of animates, through this treaty-concurring power
Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and
of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the balances indispensable toward our nation's
President may not be faulted or scarred, much pursuit of political maturity and growth; True
MM I
less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse enough, rudimentary is the principle that mat
of discretion in some patent, gross, and gapri- ters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act
cious manner. are beyond the ambit and province of the courts
to inquire.
•4&1
For while it is conceded that Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened In fine, absent any clear showing of grave
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally abuse of discretion on the part of respondents,
left to the political departments to decide, such this Court — as the final arbiter of legal contro
£g£)
as those relating to national security, it has not versies and staunch sentinel of the rights, of the-
altogether done away with political questions people — is then without power to conduct an
such as those which arise in the field of foreign incursion and meddle with such affairs purely
M relations. The High Tribunal's function, as sanc executive and legislative in character and na
tioned by Article VIII, Section 1, "is merely (to) ture. For the Constitution no less, maps out the
check whether or not the governmental branch distinct boundaries and limits the metes and
or agency has gone beyond the constitutional bounds within which each of the three political
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has branches of government may exercise the powers
a different view. In the absence of a showing ... exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
(of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing
îJ
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
disquisition's, the instant petitions are hereby
exercise its corrective power ... It has no power
DISMISSED.
to look into what it thinks is apparent error. ,
SO ORDERED.
As to the power to concur with treaties, the
Constitution lodges the same with the Senate Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Men-
alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that doza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-
power, or exercises its prerogative within the Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concur.
concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed

Panganiban, J., took no part due close per
to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave
sonal and former professional relations with a
abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the
petitioner, Sen. J.R. Salonga.
exercise of its discretion and acting within the
limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted Separate Opinions
^J for having simply performed a task conferred and
PUNO, J., dissenting:
sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
The cases at bar offer a smorgasbord of is
For the role of the Senate in relation to
sues. As summed up by the Solicitor General,
treaties is essentially legislative in character;
they are:
the Senate, as an independent body possessed
of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to
SU either accept or reject the proposed agreement,
II. IS THE VFA CONSISTENT WITH THE
and whatever action it takes in the exercise of
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CON
its wide latitude of'discretion, pertains to the
STITUTION?
wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In
this sense, the Senate partakes a .principal, yet III. IS THE VFA GOVERNED BY THE
delicate, role in keeping the principles of separa PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII
OR SECTION. 25, ARTICLE XVIII OF THE in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
CONSTITUTION? concurred in by the Senate and, when the
IV. DOES THE VFA CONSTITUTE AN AB Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
DICATION OF PHILIPPINE SOVEREIGNTY? of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and rec
(a) DOES THE VFA DEPRIVE PHILIP ognized as a treaty by the other contracting
PINE COURTS OF THEIR JURISDICTION State."
TO HEAR AND TRY OFFENSES COMMIT
TED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL? This provision lays down three constitutional
requisites that must be complied with before
(b) IS THIS COURT DEPRIVED OF ITS foreign military bases, troops, or facilities can
JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES PUN be allowed in Philippine territory, namely: (1)
ISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA OR their presence should be allowed by a treaty
HIGHER? duly concurred in by thl Philippine Senate; (2)
(c) IS THE GRANT OF TAX EXEMP when Congress so requires, such treaty should
TIONS UNDER THE VFA UNCONSTITU be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
TIONAL? Filipino people in a national referendum held for
that purpose; and (3)such treaty should be recog
V. DOES THE VFA VIOLATE THE EQUAL nized as a treaty by the other contracting party.
lii'-hl/ PROTECTION CLAUSE UNDER SECTION 1,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION? To start with, respondents, with unrelent
ing resolve, claim that these constitutional
. VI. IS THE NUCLEAR BAN UNDER SEC requirements, are not applicable to the VFA.
TION 8, ARTICLE II OF THE CONSTITUTION They contend that the VFA, as its title implies,
VIOLATED BY THE VFA? contemplates merely temporary visits of U.S.
VII. ARE FILIPINOS DENIED THEIR PER military troops in Philippine territory, and thus
SONAL AND PROPERTY RIGHT TO SUE FOR doesnot comewithin the purview ofSec. 25, Art.
TORTS AND DAMAGES? XVIII of the Constitution. They assert that this
constitutional provision applies only to the sta
VIII. WAS THERE UNDUE DELEGATION
tioning or permanent presence of foreign military
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE APPROV
troops on Philippine soil since the word "troops"
AL OF THE VFA?
is mentioned along with "bases" and "facilities"
IX. DOES THE VFA CONTRAVENE THE which are permanent in nature. This assertion
POLICY OF NEUTRALITY UNDER SECTION would deserve serious attention if the temporary
7, ARTICLE II OF THE CONSTITUTION? nature of these visits were indeed borne out by
the provisions of the VFA. If we turn, however,
X. IS THE TERM "ACTIVITIES" UNDER
a heedful eye on the provisions of the VFA as
THE COVERAGE OF THE VFA VAGUE, UN
QUALIFIED OR UNCERTAIN?"
well as the interpretation accorded to it by the
government officials charged with its negotia
I like to think that the most significant issue tion and implementation, the temporary nature
is whether the VisitingForces Agreement (VFA) of the visits would turn out to be a mirage in a
violates Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. I desert of vague provisions of the VFA. Neither
shall therefore limit my opinion on this jugular the VFAnor the Mutual Defense Treaty between
issue. the Republic of the Philippines and the United
The 1987 Constitution provides in Sec. 25, States of America to which the VFA refers in its
Art. XVIII, viz: preamble, provides the slightest suggestion on
the duration of visits of U.S. forces in Philippine
"After the expiration in 1991 of the territory. The joint public hearings on the VFA
Agreement between the Republic of the conducted by the Senate Committee on Foreign
#Philippines and the United States ofAmerica Relations and the Senate Committee on-National
concerning Military Bases, foreign military Defense and Security give us a keyhole to the
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed time frame involved in these visits.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. tional security, then you will have to continue
Siason, the Philippines signatory to the VFA, exercising, Your Honor, because we cannot
testified before the said committees that even take a chance on it.
before the signing of the VFA, Philippine and
SEN. PIMENTEL. So, this will be
U.S. troops conducted joint military exercises in
temporarily permanent, or permanently
Philippine territory for two days to four weeks
temporary?
at the frequency of ten to twelve exercises a
year. The "Balikatan," the largest combined MR. SIAZON. Permanently temporary,
military exercise involving about 3,000 troops, Your Honor."
lasted at an average of three to four weeks and
occurred once every year or one and a half years. The worthiest of wordsmiths cannot always
He further declared that the VFA contemplates manipulate the meaning of words. Black's Law
the same time line for visits of U.S. troops, but Dictionary defines "temporary" as "that which is
argued that even if these troops conduct ten to to last for a limited time only, as distinguished
twelve exercises a year with each exercise last from that which is perpetual or indefinite in its
ing for two to three weeks, their stay will not be duration" and states that "permanent" is "gener
uninterrupted, hence, not permanent. Secretary ally opposed to 'temporary' but not always mean7"
of National Defense Orlando S. Mercado further ing perpetual." The definitions of "temporary"
testified that the VFA will 'allow joint military and "permanent" in Bouvier's Law Dictionary
exercises between the Philippine and U.S. troops are of similar import: temporary is "that which
on a larger scale than those we had been under is to last for a limited time" while permanent
taking since 1994. As the joint military exercises "does not always embrace the idea of absolute
iiiiiiJ will be conducted on a larger scale, it would be perpetuity." By these definitions, even the con
reasonable to project an escalation of the dura tingency that the Philippines may abrogate the
tion as well as frequency of past joint military VFA when there is no longer any threat to our
exercises between Philippine and U.S. troops. national security dbes not make the visits of U.S.
These views on the temporary nature of visits troops temporary, nor do short interruptions in
of U.S. troops cannot stand for, clearly, the VFA or gaps between joint military exercises carve
does not provide for a specific and limited period them out from the definition of "permanent" as
of effectivity. It instead provides an open-ended permanence does not necessarily contemplate
term in Art. LX, viz: ". .. (t)his agreement shall absolute perpetuity.
remain in force until the expiration of 180 days It is against this tapestry woven from the
from the date on which either party gives the realities of the past and a vision of the future
other party notice in writing that it desires to joint military exercises that the Court must draw
terminate the agreement." No magic of semantics a line between temporary visits and permanent
will blur the truth that the VFA could be in force stay of U.S. troops. The absence in the VFA of the
indefinitely. slightest suggestion as to the duration of visits
The following exchange between Senator of U.S. troops in Philippine territory, coupled
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. and Secretary Siazon with the lack of a limited term of effectivity of
in the public hearings on the VFA is apropos to the VFA itself justify the interpretation that
the issue: the VFA allows permanent, not merely tempo
rary, presence of U.S. troops on Philippine soil.
&&1
"SEN. PIMENTEL. In other words, this Following Secretary Siazon's testimony, if the
kind ofactivities are not designed to last only visits of U.S. troops could last for four weeks at
within one year, for example, the various the most and at the maximum of twelve times a
visits, but can cover eternity until the treaty year for an indefinite number of years, then by
is abrogated? no stretch of logic can these visits be character
MR. SIAZON. Well, Your Honor, this is ized as temporary because in fact, the U.S. troops
an exercise for the protection of our national could be in Philippine territory 365 days a year
security, and until conditions are such that for 50 years — longer than the duration of the
there is no longer a possible threat to our na 1947 RP-US Military Bases Agreefment which
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT • 557.
r
expired in 1991 and which, without question, theMilitary Bases Agreement was a treaty, but
contemplated permanent presence ofU.S. bases, by the laws ofthe United States, it was a mere
facilities, and troops. executive agreement. This asymmetry in the
Tobe sure, evenformer Secretary ofJustice, legal treatment oftheMilitary Bases Agreement
Serafin Guevas, admitted in the same public by the two countries was believed to be a slur to
hearings that the subject matter of the VFA, our sovereignty. Thus, in the debate among the
i.e., the visits and activities of U.S. troops in Constitutional Commissioners, the unmistakable
Philippine territory, partakes of a permanent intention of the commission emerged that this
character. He declared with clarity: anomalous asymmetry must neverbe repeated.
To correct thishistorical aberration, Sec. 25, Art.
"MR. CUEVAS. . . . Why we considered XVIII oftheConstitution requires that thetreaty
this as a treaty is because the subjecttherein allowing the presence offoreign military bases,
treated had some character of permanence; troops, and facilities shouldalsobe"recognized as
and secondly, there is a change insofar as a treaty by the other contacting party." In plain
some of our laws are concerned." language, recognition of the United States as the
Thus, regardless of whether Sec. 25, Art. othercontracting party ofthe VFA should beby
XVEH of the Constitution contemplates perma the U.S. President with the advice and consent
nent presence of foreign military troops alone, of the U.S. Senate.
''ad or temporary presence as well, the VFA comes The following exchanges manifest this in
within its purview as it allows the permanent tention:
presence of U.S. troops on Philippine soil.
Contrary to respondents' allegation, the deter "MR. OPLE.Willeither ofthe twogentle
mination of the permanent nature of visits of men yield to just one question for clarifica
U.S. troops under the VFA is an issue ripe for tion? Is there anything in this formulation,
adjudicationsince Sec. 25 ofArt. XVIII speaksof whether that of Commissioner Bernas or of
the manner bywhich U.S. troops maybeallowed Commissioner Romulo, that willprevent the
to enter Philippine territory. We need not wait Philippine government from abrogating the
and see, therefore, whether the U.S. troops will existing bases agreement?
actuallyconduct militaryexercises onPhilippine
soil on a permanent basis before adjudicating FR. BERNAS. To my understanding,
none.
this issue. What is at issue is whether the VFA
allows such permanent presence of U.S. troops MR. ROMULO. I concur with Commis
in Philippine territory. sioner Bernas.
To determine compliance of the VFA with MR. OPLE. I was very keen to put this
the requirements of Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the question because I had taken the position
Constitution, it is necessary to ascertain the from the beginning — and this is embodied
intent of the framers of the Constitution as well in a resolution filed by Commissioners Na-
as the will of the Filipino people who ratified tividad, Maambong and Regalado — that it
frvîrr
the fundamental law. This exercise would inevi is very important that the government of the
tably take us back to the period in our history Republicofthe Philippines be in a position to
when U.S. military presence was entrenched terminate or abrogate the bases agreement
in Philippine territory with the establishment as one of the options .... we have acknowl
and operation of U.S. Military Bases in several edged starting at the committee level that the
parts of the archipelago under the 1947 R.P.- bases agreement was ratified by our Senate;
U.S. Military Bases Agreement. As articulated it is a treaty under Philippine law. But as far
by Constitutional Commissioner Bias F. Ople as the Americans are concerned, the Senate
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission delib never took cognizance of this and therefore,
erations on this provision, the 1947 R.P.-U.S. it is an executive agreement. That creates a
Military Bases Agreement was ratified by the wholly unacceptable asymmetry between the
Philippine Senate, but not by the United States two countries. Therefore, in my opinion, the
Senate.In the eyes ofPhilippine law, therefore, right step to take, if the government of our
iaa
country will deem it in the national interest the treaty because under American consti
to terminate this agreement or even to rene tutional law, there must be concurrence on
inn
gotiateit, is that we must begin with a clean the part of the Senate of the United States
slate; we should not be burdened by the .flaws to conclude treaties.
of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement... xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, I FR. BERNAS. When I say that the
think the two phrases in the Bernas for other contracting state must recognizeit as a
mulation take care of Commissioner Ople's treaty, by that I mean it must performall the
concerns. acts required for the agreement to reach the
The first says "EXCEPT UNDER THE status of a treaty under their jurisdiction."
TERMS OF A TREATY." That means that (emphasis supplied)
if it is to be renegotiated, it must be under
the terms of a new treaty. The second is the
In ascertaining the VFA's compliance with
the constitutional requirement that it be "recog
concluding phrase which says: "AND REC
OGNIZED AS A TREATY BY THE OTHER
nized as a treaty by the other contracting state,"
CONTRACTING STATE."
it is crystalclearfrom the above exchanges otthe
Constitutional Commissioners that the yardstick
xxx xxx xxx should be U.S. constitutional law. It is therefore
MR. SUAREZ. Is the proposal prospec apropos to make a more in depth study of the
tive and not retroactive in character?
U.S. President's power to enter into executive
agreements under U.S. constitutional law.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, it is prospective
because it does not touch the validity of the
Sec. 2, Art. II, Clause 2 of the U.S. Consti
present agreement. However, if a decision tution provides that the President "shall have
should be arrived at that the present agree
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
llâI ment is invalid, then even prior to 1991, this of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur."The U.S.
becomes operative right away.
Constitution does not define "treaties." Neverthe
MR. SUAREZ. In other words, we do not less, the accepted definition of a "treaty" is that
impressthe previous agreementswith a valid of "an agreement between two or more states or
character, neither do we say that they are international organizations that is intended to
null and void ab initio as claimed by many be legally binding and is governed by interna
of us here. tional law." Although the United States did not
FR. BERNAS. The position I hold is that
formally ratify the Vienna Convention on the
Law ofTreaties, its definition ofa treaty has been
it is not the function of this Commission to
applied by U.S. courts and the State Department
pass judgmenton the validity or invalidity has stated that the Vienna Convention repre
of the subsisting agreement.
sents customary international law. The Vienna
MR. SUAREZ. ... the proposal requires Conventiondefines a treaty as "an international
recognition of this treaty by the other con agreement concluded,between States in written
tracting nation.How would that recognition form and governed by international law." It has
be expressed by that other contracting na been observed that this definition is broader than
tion? That is in accordance with their con the sense in which "treaty" is used in the U.S.
stitutional or legislative process, I assume. Constitution. In U.S. practice, a "treaty" is only
one of four types of international agreements,
FR. BERNAS. As Commissioner Ro- namely:Article II treaties, executiveagreements
mulo indicated, since this certainly would pursuant to a treaty, congressional-executive
refer only to the United States, because it is agreements, and sole executive agreements.
only the United States that would have the
possibility ofbeing allowed to have treaties The term "executiveagreement" is used both
here, then we would have to require that colloquially and in scholarly and governmental
the Senate of the United States concur in writings as a convenient catch-all tosubsume all
\fijjiij
ARTICLE VH: THEEXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT •. 559
international agreements intended to bind the offorce or diplomacy. Last but not the least, the
United States and another government, other nuclearweapons race and instantaneousglobal
'$$)
than those which receive consent of two-thirds communication made centralized foreign policy
of the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Constitution does machinery under the U.S. President necessary.
not expressly confer authority to make these
executive agreements, hence the authority to These executiveâgreements which have
make them, their scope, and legal force have grown to be the primary instrument of U.S.
been the subject of a long-ongoing debate. This, foreign policy maybeclassified into threetypes,
notwithstanding, executive agreements have namely:
grown to be a primary instrument of foreign (1) Treaty-authorizedexecutiveagreements,
policy in the United states. In 1789-1839, the i.e., agreements madebythe Presidentpursuant
United States concluded 60 treaties and only27 to authority conferred in a prior treaty;
km executive agreements. In 1930-1939, the United
States entered into 142 treaties and 144 execu (2) Congressional-executive agreements, i.e.,
tive agreements. In 1940-1949,116 treaties and agreements either (a) negotiated by the Presi
919 executive agreements were concluded by dent with prior Congressional authorization or
the United States. From 1980-1988, the United enactment; or (b) confirmed by both Houses of
States entered into 136 treaties and 3,094 Congress after the fact of negotiation; and
executive agreements. In sum, by 1988, there (3) Presidential or sole executive agree
were 12,778 executive agreements as opposed ments, i.e., agreements made by the President
to 1,476 treaties, accounting for about 90% of based on his exclusivepresidential powers, such
the international agreements concluded by the as the power as ^cmmander-in-chiefof the armed
rgjJ United States. forces pursuant to which he conducts military op
The upsurge in the use of executive agree erations with U.S. allies, or his power to receive
ments in the post World War II period may be ambassadors and recognizeforeigngovernments.
attributed to several factors. President Franklin This classification is important as the
Roosevelt set a precedent for the more recent different types of executive agreements bear
presidents by, for instance, completing the De- distinctions in terms of constitutional basis,
stroyer-for-Bases deal of 1940 with an executive subject matter, and legal effects in the domestic
agreement. President Harry S. Truman likewise arena. For instance, treaty-authorized executive
concluded the Potsdam Agreement by executive agreements do not pose constitutional problems
agreement. The U.S. Presidents also committed as they are generally accepted to have been
military missions in Honduras and El Salvador pre-approved by the Senate when the Senate
in the 1950's; pledged security to Turkey, Iran, consented to the treaty which authorized the
and Pakistan; acquired permission from the Brit executive to enter into executive agreements; an
ish to use the islandofDiego Garcia formilitary other view supporting its acceptance is that the
purposes in the 1960's; and establisheda military Senate delegated to the President the authority
mission in Iran in 1974. all by way of executive to make the executive agreement. In comparison,
agreements. U.S. Supreme Court decisions af the constitutionality of congressional-executive
firming the validity of executive agreements agreements has provoked debate among legal
havealsocontributed to the explosive growth in scholars. One view, espoused by interpretivists
their usage. Another factor that accelerated its such as Edwin Borchard, holds that all interna
use was the foreign policy cooperation between tional agreements must be strictly in accordance
Congress and the executive as expressed in the with Sec. 2, Art. II of the U.S. Constitution,
postwar refrain that "politics must end at the and thus congressional-executive agreements
water's edge."The fourth factor is the expansion are constitutionally invalid. According to them,
ofexecutive institutionsincluding foreign policy allowing congressional-executive agreements
machinery and information. The fifth factor is the would enhance the power of the President as
ColdWar which put the United States in a "con wellas ofthe HouseofRepresentatives, in utter
stant state ofemergency" whichrequired expedi violation of the intent of the framers of the U.S.
encyin decisions and actions regarding the use Constitution. The opposite school of thought, led
.iiffri
by Myer S. McDougal and Asher Lans, holds that istrative agreements between the two Govern
congressional-executive agreements and treaties ments." Pursuant to this provision in the treaty,
are interchangeable, thus, such agreements are the executive entered into an administrative
constitutional. These non-interpretivists buttress agreement covering, among other matters, juris
their stance by leaning on the constitutional diction of the United States over offenses com
clause that prohibits states, without consent mitted in Japan by members of the U.S. armed
of Congress, from "entering) into any Agree forces. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
ment or Compact with another State, or with a validity of the Administrative Agreement as it
Sii Foreign Power." By making reference to inter was concluded by the President pursuant to the
national agreements other than treaties, these • authority conferred upon him by Art. Ill of the
scholars argue that the framers of the Constitu Security Treaty between Japan and the United
tion intended international agreements, other states to make administrative agreements be
i&)
than treaties, to exist. This school of thought tween the two governments concerning "(t)he
generally opposes the "mechanical, filiopietistic conditions which shall govern the disposition of
theory, (which) purports to regard the words armed forces of the United states of America in
of the Constitution as timeless absolutes" and and about Japan." —
gives emphasis to the necessity and expedi Respondents boldly claim that the VFA
ency of congressional-executive agreements in is authorized by Art. II of the RP-US Mutual
modern foreign affairs. Finally, sole executive Defense Treaty which provides that, "(i)n order
agreements which account for a relatively small
more effectively to achieve the objective of this
percentage ofexecutive agreements are the most
Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-
constitutionally problematic since the system
help and mutual aid will maintain and develop
of checks and balances is inoperative when the
their individual and collective capacity to resist
President enters into an executive agreement
armed attack." The alleged authorization is not
with neither the Senate's or Congress' consent.
as direct and unequivocal as Art. Ill of the Secu
This last type of executive agreement draws au
rity Treaty Between the U.S. and Japan, hence
thority upon the President's enumerated powers
it would be precarious to assume that the VFA
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, such as
derives authorization from the Mutual Defense
the President's power as Commander-in-Chief of
Treaty. The precariousness is heightened by the
the U.S. army and navy.
fact that when the U.S. Senate ratified the Agree
I respectfully submit that, using these three ment Between the Parties to the North Atlantic
types of executive agreements as bases for clas Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces
sification, the VFA would not fall under the which was concluded pursuant to the North
category of an executive agreement made by the Atlantic Treaty (NATO), the Senate included
president pursuant to authority conferred in a in its instrument of ratification statements on
prior treaty because although the VFA makes matters of jurisdiction over U.S. forces stationed
reference to the Mutual Defense Treaty in its abroad, among which was an admonition that the
Preamble, the Mutual Defense Treaty itself does Agreement's provisions on criminal jurisdiction
not confer authority upon the U.S. President to which have similar features as the VFA, do not
enter into executive agreements in implementa constitute a precedent for future agreements.
tion ofthe Treaty. Issues have occasionally arisen We can reasonably gather from the U.S. Sen
about whether an executive agreement was ate's statements that criminal jurisdiction over
entered into pursuant to a treaty. These issues, U.S. forces stationed abroad is a matter of Sen
however, involved mere treaty interpretation. ate concern, and thus Senate authorization for
In Wilson v. Girard, 354 US 524 (1957), the U.S. the President to enter into agreements touching
Supreme Court had occasion,to interpret Art. Ill upon such jurisdictional matters cannot so easily .
of the Security Treaty Between the United States be assumed.
of America and Japan which stated that, "(t)he
conditions which shall govern the disposition of Neither does the VFA fall under the category
^)
armed forces of the United states of America in of a Congressional — Executive Agreement as it
and about Japan shall be determined by admin was not concluded by the U.S. President pursu-
ARTICLE VII:THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 561
ant to Congressional authorization or enactment preempts the California lawonairline liability.

nor has it beenconfirmedlby the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in unmistak
iig)
At best, the VFA would be more akin to a able terms that a treaty enjoys supremacy over
sole or presidential executive agreement which state law, viz:
would be valid if concluded on the basis of the "Plainly, the external powers of the Unit
U.S. President's exclusive power under the U.S. ed states are to be exercised withoutregard
Constitution. Respondentsargue that except for to state laws or policies. The supremacy of
the Status ofForces Agreement (SOFA) entered a treaty in this respect has been recognized
•rStA
into pursuant to the NATO, the United States, from the beginning. Mr. Madison, in the
by way of executive agreements, has entered Virginia Convention, said that if a treaty
into 78 Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) does not supersede existing state laws, as far
jgjil
which extend privileges and immunities to U.S. as they contravene its operation, the treaty
force's stationed abroad, similar to the provisions wouldbe ineffective. 'To counter-act it by the
of the VFA. Respondents have failed, however, supremacy of the state laws, wouldbring on
to qualify whether these executive agreements the Unionthe just charge ofnational perfidy,
S&&I
are sole executive agreements or were concluded and involve us in war." 3 Elliot, Debates, 515
pursuant to Congressional authorization or were .... this rule in respect of treaties is estab
authorized by treaty. This detail is important in lished by the express language ofcl. 2,Art. 6,
Sat view of the above discussion on the sense of the of the Constitution .. ."(emphasis supplied)
Senate on criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces
stationed abroad. It is also generally conceded that sole execu
tive agreements are supreme over state law and
sj It will contribute to the elucidation of the policy. Two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
legal status of the VFA under U.S. law if we Court support this view.
compare the legal force of sole executive agree
ments and of treaties. Under international law, The first of these two cases, United States
î
treaties and executive agreements equally bind v. Belmont, involved the Litvinov Assignment,
the United States. If there is any distinction be a sole executive agreement executed between
tween treaties and executive agreements, it must the United States and the Soviet Government.
<aafl
be found in U.S. constitutional law. The distinc In 1918,the Soviet government, by laws and de
tions, if any, between the legal force of treaties crees, nationalized, among others, a Russian cor
and executiveagreements on the domestic plane poration, and appropriated its assets including a
may be treated on three levels, namely, vis-a-vis: sum ofmoney depositedwith Belmont, a private
(1) state law; (2) acts of Congress and treaties; banker doing business in New York. The sum of
and (3) the U.S. Constitution. money remained Russian property until 1933,at
which time the Soviet government released and
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitu assigned to the United States all amounts due
tion provides: the Soviet government from American nationals,
including the deposit account of the Russian cor
"This Constitution, and the Law of the
poration with Belmont. The assignment, better
United States which shall be made in pur known as the Litvinov Assignment, was effected
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
by an exchange of diplomatic correspondence
which shall be made, under the Authority between the Soviet government and the United
of the United States, shall be the supreme States to bring about a final settlement of the
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every claims and counter-claims between the Soviet
State shall be bouhd thereby, any Thingin government and the United States. Coincident
the Constitution or Laws of any state to the with the assignment, the U.S. President recog
Contrary notwithstanding. nized the Soviet Government and normal dip
It is well-settled that this clause provides lomatic relations were established between the
the constitutional basis for the superiority ofa two governments.
ii§\)
treaty over state law. Thus, the Warsaw Conven Upon demand duly made by the United
tion to which the United States is a signatory States, the executors of Belmont's will failed and
562 CONSTITUTIONAL/STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
refused to pay the sum of money deposited by the and cannot be subjected to any curtailment
Jig)
Russian corporation with Belmont. The United or interference on the part of the several
States thus filed a suit in a federal district court states." (emphasis supplied)
to recover the sum of money. The court below held
The other case, United States v. Pink, like
that the situs of the bank deposit was within the *
State of New York and not within Soviet territo
wise involved the Litvinov Assignment. The U.S.
ry. Thus, the nationalization decree, if enforced, Supreme Court here reiterated its ruling in the
would amount to an act of confiscation which was
Belmont case and held that the Litvinov Assign
contrary to the controlling public policy of New ment was an international compact or agreement
i&l
York. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held having similar dignity as a treaty under the
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.
that no state policy could prevail against the
Litvinov Assignment. It ruled as follows: While adherents of sole executive agree
^j
'The assignment and the agreements in ments usually point to these two cases as bearing
connection therewith did not, as in the case
judicial imprimatur of sole executive agreements,
of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty the validity of sole executive agreements seems
iift)
making clause of the Constitution (Sec. 2, to have been initially dealt with by the U.S. Su
Art. 2), require the advice and consent of preme Court in 1933 in Monaco v. Mississippi
the Senate.
wherein Chief Justice Hughes stated that, "(t)
tst
he National Government, by virtue of its control
A treaty signifies "a compact made between, of our foreign relations is entitled to employ the
two or more independent nations with a view to resources of diplomatic negotiations and to effect
the public welfare." B. Altman & Co. v. United
L states, 224 U.S. 583, 600, 56 L. ed. 894, 910, 32
such an international settlement as may be found
to be appropriate, through treaty, agreement of
S. Ct. 593. But an international compact, as this arbitration, or otherwise."
was, is not always a treaty which requires the
participation of the Senate. There are many such Subsequent to the Belmont and Pink cases,
&3&1
compacts, of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a the U.S. Supreme Court once again upheld the
postal convention, and agreements like that now validity of a sole executive agreement in Dames
under consideration are illustrations." (emphasis & Moorev. Regan. This case involved the Algiers
$ml
supplied) Accord, an executive agreement negotiated and
concluded by President Carter and confirmed by
On the supremacy of executive agreements President Reagan to resolve the Iran Hostage
over state law, it ruled as follows: Crisis in 1981. That agreement provided, among
"Plainly, the external powers of the Unit others, that the United states and Iran agreed
ed states are to be exercised without regard to cancel certain claims between them and to es
to state laws or policies. The supremacy of tablish a special tribunal to resolve other claims,
a treaty in this respect has been recognized including those by U.S. nationals against Iran.
from the beginning. Mr. Madison, in the The United states also agreed to close its courts
Virginia Convention, said that if a treaty to those claims, as well as to suits by U.S. citizens
mm does not supersede existing state laws, as far against the government of Iran for recovery of
as they contravene its operation, the treaty damages arising from the Hostage Crisis. Al
would be ineffective. 'To counter-act it by the though the agreement was entered into by the
supremacy of the state laws, would bring on President pursuant to Congressional authoriza
the Union the just charge of national perfidy, tion, the Court found that the President's action
and involve us in war." 3 Elliot, Debates, 515 with regard to claims was not so authorized.
... And while this rule in respect of treaties Nevertheless,, the U.S. Supreme Court, noting
is established by the express language of cl. the power of presidents in foreign affairs which
2, Art. 6, of the Constitution, the same rule includes the power to settle claims, as well as
would result in the case of all international Congressional acquiescence to such practice,
compacts and agreements from the very fact upheld the validity of the Algiers Accord.
that complete power over international af Upon the other hand, those opposed to sole
fairs is in the national government and is not executive agreements argue that the pronounce-
ments of the Court in the Belmont ahd Pink cases also concede that sole executive agreements will
mean that sole executive agreements override not ordinarily be valid if repugnant to existing
state legislation only when founded upon the legislation.
President's constitutional power to recognize
foreign governments. In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., a
leading lower court decision discussing the issue
While treaties and sole executive agreements of supremacy of executive agreements over fed
have the same legal effect on state law, s,ole ex eral legislation, the Fourth circuit held that, "the
ecutive agreements pale in comparison to treaties executive agreement was void because it was not
when pitted against prior inconsistent acts of authorized by Congress and.contravened provi
Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court has long ago sions of a statute dealing with the very matter
declared that the Constitution mandates that a to which it related ..." The U.S. Supreme Court
treaty and an act of legislation are both "supreme itself has "intimated that the President might
law of the land." As such, no supreme efficacy is act in external affairs without congressional
given to one over the other. If the two relate to authority, but not that he might act contrary to
the same subject matter and are inconsistent, an Act of Congress." The reason for this is that
the one later in date will prevail, provided the the U.S. President's power to enter into inter
treaty is self-executing, i.e., "whenever it oper national agreements derives from his position
ates of itself without aid of legislation." In The as Chief Executive. By Sec. 7, Art. I of the U.S.
Cherokee Tobacco (Boudinot v. United States), Constitution, the president does not have power
the U.S. Supreme Court also held that where to repeal existing federal laws. Consequently,
there is repugnance between a treaty and an Act he cannot make an indirect repeal by means of
of Congress, "(a) treaty may supersede a prior a sole executive agreement.
9
Act of Congress ... and an Act of Congress may
supersede a prior treaty " Settled is the rule, On the other side of the coin, it is argued,
therefore, that a treaty supersedes an earlier re that when the U.S. President enters into a sole
pugnant Act of Congress, and an Act of Congress executive agreement pursuant to his exclusive
supersedes an earlier contradictory treaty. As a presidential authority in the field of foreign re
corollary, a treaty, being placed on the same foot lations, such agreement may prevail over prior
ing as an act of legislation, can repeal or modify inconsistent federal legislation. In this situation,
a prior inconsistent treaty. the doctrine of separation of powers may permit
the U.S. President to disregard the prior incon
In the case of sole executive agreements, sistent Act of Congress as an "unconstitutional
commentators have been in general agreement invasion of his power." However, aside from lack
pft)
that unlike treaties, sole executive agreements ing firm legal support, this view has to contend
cannot prevail over prior inconsistent federal with the problem of determining which powers
legislation. Even proponents of sole executive are exclusively executive and which powers
agreements admit that while a self-executing overlap with the powers of Congress.
treaty can supersede a prior inconsistent statute,
it is verydoubtfulwhether a soleexecutive agree Again, although it is doubtful whether
' ^^
ment, in the absence of appropriate legislation, sole executive agreements can supersede prior
will be given similar effect. Wallace McClure, a inconsistent federal legislation, proponents of
leading proponent of the interchangeability of sole executive agreements interpret the Pink
treaties and executive agreements, opined that case to mean that sole executive agreements
•'$$)
it would be contrary to "the entire tenor of the are on equal footing with a treaty, having been
Constitution" for sole executive agreements to accorded the status of "law of the land" under
supersede federal law. The Restatement (Third) the supremacy clause and the Litvinov Assign
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ment having been recognized to have similar
postulates that a sole executive agreement could dignity as a treaty. As such, it is opined that
prevail at least over state law, and (only) pos a sole executive agreement may supersede a
sibly federal law without implementing legisla prior inconsistent treaty. Treaties of the United
tion. Myer S. McDougal and Asher Lans who States have in fact been terminated on several
are staunch advocates of executive agreements occasions by the President on his own authority.
564 • "• CONSTITUTIONALSTRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
President Roosevelt terminated at least two trea ments under U.S. Law. The observation of Louis
ties under his independent constitutional powers: Henkin, a noted international and U.S. consti
.the extradition treaty with Greece, in 1933, and tutional law scholar, captures the sentiments of
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the framers of the Philippine Constitution and of
Japan, in 1939. That sole executive agreements the Filipinosin'craftihg Sec. 25,Art. XVIII ofthe
may repeal or terminate a treaty is impliedly 1987 Constitution — "(o)ften the treaty process
recognized in Charlton v. Kelly asfoilows: "The will be used at the insistence of other parties to
executive department having thus elected to an agreement because they believe that a treaty
waive any right to free itself from the obligation has greater 'dignity' than an executive agree
i&^J
[ofthe treaty], it is the plain duty of the court to ment, because its constitutional effectiveness
recognize the obligation. is beyond doubt, because a treaty will 'commit'
the Senate and the people of the United States
As against the U.S. Constitution, treaties and and make its subsequent abrogation or violation
sole executive agreements are in equal footing as less likely."
they are subject to the same limitations. As early
as 1870, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that, With the cloud ofuncertainty still hanging on
iiiiii "a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be the exact legal force of sole executive agreements
held valid ifit be in violation ofthat instrument." under U.S. constitutional law, this Court must
In Missouri v. Holland, it was held that treaties strike a blow for the sovereignty of our country
must not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Su by drawing a bright line between the dignity
i^)
preme Court also discussed the constitutionally and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole
implied limitations on the treaty making power executive agreement. However we may wish it,
the VFA, as a sole executive agreement, cannot
in Reid v. Covert,where Justice Black stated that
"(n)oagreement with a foreign nation can confer climb to the same lofty height that the dignity of
a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls short of
power on the Congress, or any other branch of
the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the
Government, which is free from the restraints
1987 Constitution that the agreement allowing
i^%) of the Constitution." He concluded that the U.S.
the presence of foreign military troops on Philip
Constitution provides limits to the acts of the'
pine soil must be "recognized as a treaty by the
president, the joint action of the president and
other contracting state."
Mi
the Senate, and consequently limits the treaty
making power. I vote to grant the petitions.
There is no dispute that the constitutional
limitations relating to treaties also apply to sole D. Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion
executive agreements. It is well-settled that the G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and
other substantive provisions of the U;S. Constitu RESOLUTION
£&)
tion constitute limitations on both treaties and
executive agreements. Numerous decisions have PUNO, J.:
also held that both treaties and sole executive
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we
agreements cannot contravene private rights dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the
protected by the U.S. Constitution. petitioner to furnish private respondent copies
In conclusion, after a macro view of the of. the extradition' request and its supporting
landscape of U.S. foreign relations vis-a-vis U.S. papers and to grant him a reasonable period
constitutional law, with special attention on the within which to file his comment with support
legal status of sole executive agreements, I re ing evidence.
spectfully submit that the Court will be standing
on unstable ground if it places a sole executive
agreement like the VFA on the same constitu The jugular issue is whether or not the pri
tional plateau as a treaty. Questions remain and vate respondent is entitled to the due process
the debate continues on the constitutional basis right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
as well as the legal effects of sole executive agree stage of the extradition process.
(jpj
We now hold that private respondent is Philippines isa signatory provides that"atreaty
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
First. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the terms of the treaty in their contextand in light
RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time of its object and purpose." (emphasis supplied)
10
whenan extraditee shall be furnished a copy of The preambular paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069
the petitionforextraditionas well as its support define its intent, viz:
ing papers, i.e., after the filing ofthe petition for
'$0
extradition in the extradition court, viz: "WHEREAS, under the Constitution^
the Philippines adoptsthe generally accepted
"SECTION 6. Issuance of Summons; principles ofinternational law as part ofthe
Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of No law ofthe land, and adheres to the policy of
tices. — (1) Immediately upon receipt of the peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
petition, the presiding judge of the court and amity with all nations;
shall, as soon as practicable, summon the ac WHEREAS, the suppression of crime
cused to appear and to answer the petition on is the concern not only of the state where
the day and hour fixed in the order... Upon it is committed but also of any other state
receipt of the answer, or should the accused to which the criminal may have escaped,
after having received the summons fail to because it saps the foundation of social life
answer within the time fixed, the presiding and is an outrage upon humanity at large,
judge shall hear the case or set another date and it is in the interest of civilized communi
for the hearing thereof. ties that crimes should>not go unpunished;
(2) The order and noticeas wellas a copy WHEREAS, in recognition of this prin
of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be ciple the Philippines recently concluded
promptly servea* each upon the accused and an extradition treaty with the Republic of
the attorney having charge of the case." Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar
treaties with other interested countries;
It is of judicial notice that the summons in
cludes the petition for extradition which will be .. ." (emphasis supplied)
answered by the extraditee.
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradi like the Philippines forge extradition treaties
tion Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069which gives an to arrest the dramatic rise of international and
extraditee the right to demand from the peti transnational crimes like terrorism and drug
tioner Secretary of Justice copiesof the extradi trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the as
tion request from the US government and its surance that the punishment ofthese crimes will
:$M
supporting documents and to comment thereon not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial
while the request is still undergoing evaluation. sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be
We cannot write a provision in the treaty giv the unbending commitment that the perpetra
ing private respondent that right where there tors of these crimes will not be coddled by any
is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot signatory state.
alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion
of any clause, small or great, or dispense with It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradi
any of its conditions and requirements or take tion Treaty calls for an interpretation that will
away any qualification, or integral part of any minimize if not prevent the escape ofextraditees
stipulation, upon any motion ofequity, orgeneral from the long arm of the law and expedite their
ipj
convenience, or substantial justice." trial. The submission of the private respondent,
that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy
iiiiilijj
Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted inlight ofthe US government request for his extradition
of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna and its supporting documents even while they
Conventionon the Law of Treaties to which the are still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary
tiJfl
566 CONSTTTUnONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The to the demanding government requires his
fear ofthe petitionerSecretaryofJusticethat the surrender." Glucksman v. Henkel, 221~U;S.
demanded notice is equivalent to a noticeto flee 508, 511 (1911) (emphasis supplied)
must be deeply rooted on the experience of the
executive branch of our government. As it comes
from the branch of our government in charge of
the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the SEC. 22. THE PRESIDENT SHALL SUB
careful consideration of this Court. In addition, MIT TO THE THE CONGRESS WITHIN
it cannotbe gainsaid that private respondent's THIRTY DAYS FROM THE OPENING OF
demand for advance notice can delay the sum EVERY REGULAR SESSION, AS THE BA
mary process ofexecutive evaluation ofthe ex SIS OF THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
tradition request and its accompanying papers. BILL, A BUDGET OF RECEIPTS AND
The foresight ofJustice OliverWendell Holmes EXPENDITURES AND SOURCES OF FI
did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held: ^ NANCING, INCLUDING RECEIPTS FROM
EXISTING AND PROPOSED REVENUE
"It is common in extradition cases "to MEASURES. „
attempt to bring to bear all the factitious SEC. 23. THE PRESIDENT SHALL AD
niceties of a criminal trial at common law.
DRESS THE CONGRESS AT THE OPEN
But°it is a waste of time ... if there is pre
ING OF ITS REGULAR SESSION. HE MAY
sented, even in somewhat untechnical form
ALSO APPEAR BEFORE IT ATANY OTHER
according to our ideas, such reasonable
TIME.
ground to suppose him guilty as to make it
'<J0) " proper that he should be tried, good faith
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t»t
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Article VIII
iî
The Judicial Department
SECTION 1. THE JUDICIAL POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN ONE SUPREME COURT

AND IN SUCH LOWER COURTS AS MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW.
JUDICIAL POWER INCLUDES THE DUTY OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE TO SETTLE
ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING RIGHTS WHICH ARE LEGALLY DEMANDABLE
AND ENFORCEABLE, AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A
iijî
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
ON THE PART OF AJSTY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
1. Judicial power.
Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction." Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). It is
"the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights." Lopez
v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966). Section 1 says: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies,involving rights which are legally demandable and enforce
|al
able and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Does this
definition do away with the "political questions doctrine"? At most it is a reproof of the practice of
gi) the Marcos Supreme Court of shying away from reviewing abuse of discretion by the Chief Executive
and using the political questions doctrine as an excuse. (More will be said about political questions
under Section 5.)
Courts are given "judicial power," nothing What about declaratory judgments? Are they
more. Hence, by the principle of separation of advisory opinions merely? What distinguishes a
powers, courts may neither attempt to assume declaratory judgment from an advisory opinion
apl
nor be compelled to perform non-judicial func is that the former involves parties with real
tions. Thus, a court may not be required to act as conflicting legal interests whereas an advisory
a board of arbitrators. Manila Electric Co. v. Pa- opinion is a response to a legal issue posed in
say Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932). Nor the abstract in advance of any actual case in
may it be charged with administrative functions which it may be presented. As a consequence of
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfill this distinction, an advisory opinion binds no one
ment of judicial duties. Noblejas v. Teehankee, whereas a declaratory judgment is a final one and
23 SCRA 405 (1968). Neither is it the function of is forever binding on the parties. The former is
the judiciary to give advisory opinions. Directorof thus not a judicial act but the latter is.
Prisons v.Ang ChoKio, 33 SCRA 494,509 (1970).
567
sfij
2. Cases. in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of

petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein
A. Santiago v. Bautista she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been
32 SCRA 188 (1970) . prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so
much benefited, by the circumstance that the
latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored
BARREDO, J.:
during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in
No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead
tiit
appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the
in Grade Six at the public school named Sero committee referred to in this case had been il
Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the legally constituted as the same was composed
S»t school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of
"Committee On The Rating Of Students For Hon the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of
or" was constituted by the teachers concerned at Public Schools which provides that the committee
said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor to select the honor students should be composed
students" ofits graduating class. With the school of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are
Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, direct and circumstantial matters, which shall
and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca be proven during the trial, wherein respondents
{gSil
Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida have exercised grave abuse of discretion and
Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the irregularities, such as the changing of the final
above-named committee deliberated and finally ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Lifigat and and Patricia Lifigat from 80% to 85%, and some
Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75%
honors, respectively. The school's graduation in Grade VI, which proves that there was already
exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at
but three days before that date, the "third placer" the end of the school year; that several district
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, examinations outside of teachers' daily units and
and with his father as counsel, sought the invali other than periodical tests were given, ratings in
L dation of the "ranking of honor students" thus which were heavily considered in the determina
tion of periodical ratings, whereas according to
made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil
case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division
against the above-named committee members Superintendent of schools of the place such dis
along with the District Supervisor and the Aca trict examinations were not advisable; that there
demic Supervisor of the place. was a unanimous agreement and understanding
among the respondent teachers to insult and
^) The corresponding complaint filed alleged, prejudice the second and third honors by rating
inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is
Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero El very unnatural; that the words "first place" in
ementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and
be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with the honor replaced with the words "second place," which
rank of third place, which is disputed; that the is an instance of the unjust and discriminating
teachers of the school had been made respon abuses committed by the respondent teachers in
dents as they compose the "Committee on the the disputed selection of honor pupils they made;
Rating of Students for Honor," whose grave abuse that petitioner personally appealed the matter to
of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the School Principal, to the District Supervisor,
the other defendants were included as Principal, and to the Academic Supervisor, but sajd offi
District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of cials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his
the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been grievances, and as to appeal to higher authori
L a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade
V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia
ties will be too late, there is no other speedy and
adequate remedy under the circumstances; and,
Lifigat (second placer in the disputed ranking that petitioner and his parents suffered mental
ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 569
and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. that they are therefore automaticallyvested with
They prayed the court, among others, to set aside judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still,
&iii)
the final list of honor students in Grade VI of this Court has not even been appraised by ap
the Sero Elementary School for that school year pellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service
1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, Manual ofTeachers for Public Schoolsappellees
to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially allegedly violated in tlêcomposition of the com
and formally publishing and proclaiming the said mittee they constituted thereunder, and, in the
honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exer performance of that committee's duties.
i f$fi
cises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st
of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed At any rate, the situation brought before Us
for was denied by the lower court in its order of in this case, tho seemingly one offirst impression,
May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that is not without substantial parallel. In the case of
the graduation exercises were then already set Felipe v. Leuterio, etc., et al.,1 the issue presented
on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the re for determination was whethereor not the courts
straining of the same would be shocking to the have the authority to reverse the award of the
school authorities, parents, and the community board of judges of an oratorical contest, and this
who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of Court declared that the judiciary has no power
that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the gradu to reverse the award of the board of judges of
ation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for that contest and, for that matter, it would not
the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and
with the same protested list of honor students. similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:
Having been required by the above-men For more than thirty years oratorical
tioned order to answer the petition within ten tilts have been held periodically by schools
(10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate
of the case instead oratorical competitions are of more recent
l^j origin. Members of this court have taken part
In an order dated June 4,1965, the motion to in them either as contestants in their school
dismiss of respondents was granted,. . . days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual
Appellant here assails the holding of the oratorical contest, first prize was awarded
fftjfl
lower court that his petition states no cause of to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Jus
action tice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the
board ofjudges afterwards. They know some
It is evident... that the so called committee few verdicts did not reflect the audience's
on the rating of students for honor whose actions preference and that errors have sometimes
are questioned in this case exercised neither been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet
judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the perfor no party ever presumed to invoke judicial,
mance of its assigned task [BJeforea tribunal intervention; for it is unwritten law in such
board, or officer, may exercise judicial or quasi contests that the board's decision is final and
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law unappealable.
that gives rise to some specific rights of persons
Like the ancient tournaments of the
or property under which adverse claims to such
Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply
rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
the highest tenets of sportsmanship; finality
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal,
of referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs
board or officerclothed with power and authority of protest. The participants are supposed
to determine what that law is and thereupon ad to join the competition to contribute to its
judicate the respective rights of the contending success by striving their utmost: the prizes
fe,
parties. As pointed out by appellees, however, are secondary.
there is nothing on record about any rule of law
that provides that when teachers sit down to No rights to the prizes may be asserted
assess the individual merits of their pupils for by the contestants, because theirs was
purposes of rating them for honors, such function
involves the determination of what the law is and '91 Phil. 482 (May 30, 1952).
Ml
merely the privilege to compete for the prize, agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
and that privilege did not ripen into a de constitutes a political question which is beyond
mandable right unless and until they were the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
proclaimed winners of the competition by
The present Constitution limits resort to
the appointed arbiters or referees or judges. the political question doctrine and broadens
Incidentally, these school activities have the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
been imported from the United States. We the Court, under previous constitutions, would
found in American jurisprudence no litiga have normally left to the political departments
i j$jiifl tion questioning the determination of the to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues
board of judges. beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determina
tion of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through
îi
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for ex
over the matter, the, respondent judge rea ample, question the President's recognition of a
soned out that where there is a wrong there foreign government, no matter how premature
is a remedy and that courts of first instance or improvident such action may appear. We
are courts of general jurisdiction. cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it
may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the as undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend
sumption that Imperial suffered some wrong the Constitution under the guise of resolving a
at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, dispute brought before us because the power is
there was error on the part of one judge, reserved to the people.
'&£&! at most. Error and wrong do not mean the
same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid There is nothing in the case before us that
precludes our determination thereof on the po
principle is the deprivation or violation of a
litical question doctrine. The deliberations of the
right. As stated before, a contestant has no
S Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners
right to the prize unless and until he or she
show that the framers intended to widen the
is declared winner by the board of referees
scope of judicial review but they did not intend
or judges.
courts of justice to settle all actual controver
IMjft
Granting that Imperial suffered some sies before them. When political questions are
loss or injury, yet in law there are instances involved, the Constitution limits the determi
of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of nation to whether or not there has been a grave
them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
would be a different proposition. But then of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
her action should be directed against the action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
individual judge or judges who fraudulently established, the Court will not substitute its
or maliciously injured her. Not against the judgment for that of the official concerned and
other judges. decide a matter which by its nature or by law
is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it
would appear clear that the second paragraph of
B. Marcos v. Manglapus Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defin
177 SCRA 668 (1989) ing "judicial power," which specifically empowers
the courts to determine whether or not there
£^)
has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
The Extent of Review of any branch or instrumentality of the govern
ment, incorporates in the fundamental law the
Under the Constitution, judicial power in ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. b-33964,
cludes the duty to determine whether or not there December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that:
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any Article VII of the [1935] Constitution
branch or instrumentality of the Government. vests in the Executive the power to suspend
[Art.VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
L
under specified conditions. Pursuant to the Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
principle of separation of powers underlying Reconsideration. It is the submission of public
la respondents that:
our system of government, the Executive is
supreme within his own sphere. However, "(l)The Decision in this case having
the separation of powers, under the Cons become final and executory, its execution
titution, is not absolute. What is more, it enters the exclusive-ambit of authority of
goes hand in hand with the system ofchecks the executive authority. The issuance of the
and balances, under which the Executive is TRO may be construed as trenching on that
supreme, as regards the suspension of the sphere of executive authority;
privilege, but only if and when he acts within
the sphere allocated to him by the Basic Law, (2) The issuance of the temporary
and the authority to determine whether or restraining order . . .. creates dangerous
ijfeii
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial precedent as there will never be an end to
Department, which, in this respect, is, in litigation because there is always a possibil
turn, constitutionally supreme. ity that Congress may repeal a law.
In_the exercise of such authority, the
function of the Court is merely to check — In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner
not to supplant — the Executive, or to as contends: (1) the stay order... is within the scope
certain merely whether he has gone beyond ofjudicial power and duty and does not trench on
the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction,
executive powers nor on congressional preroga
not to exercise the power vested in hira or tives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to
to determine the wisdom of his act.... [At
stay execution was reasonable; (3)the Court did
479-480.]
not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
Accordingly, the question for the Court to involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
L determine is whether or not there exist factual
bases for the President to conclude that it was
respondents are estopped from challenging the
Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty
in the national interest to bar the return of the that the law on capital punishment will not be
Marcoses to the Phihppines. If such postulates repealed or modified until Congress convenes
L do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or and considers all the various resolutions and
acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused bills filed before it.
her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised
the parties, from their oral arguments, and the
facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the public respondents.
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the I
Philippines and the National SecurityAdviser,
wherein petitioners and respondents were rep First. We dc not agree with the sweeping
resented, there exist factual bases for the Presi submission of the public respondents that this
dent's decision. Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar
and hence can no longer restrain the execution
of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents
are invoking the rule that final judgments can
C. Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice nolonger be altered in accord with the principle
G.J?. No. 132601, January 19, 1999 that "it is just as important that there should
be a place to end as there should be a place to
PUNO, J.: begin litigation." To start with, the Courtis not
changing even a comma ofits final Decision...
For resolution are public respondents' Ur
gent Motion for Reconsideration ofthe Resolution ... Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthe
of this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporar sized the well established jurisprudence on this
ily restraining the execution of petitioner and issue as follows:
L
• 572 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
, "the finality of a judgment does not mean ing the order of execution and the executory
that the Court has lost all its powers nor the nature thereof on the date set or at the proper
case. By the finality of the judgment, what time, the date therefor can be postponed, even
the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, in sentences of death. Under the common law
modify or alter the same. Even after the judg this postponement can be ordered in three ways:
{MJ ment has become final the court retains its (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
is a difference between the jurisdiction of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdic common law to render impossible that assertion
iiliiJ
tion to amend, modify or alter the same. The in absolute terms that after the convict has once
former continues even after the judgment has been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
become final for the purpose of enforcement the case to investigate the facts that show the
ofjudgment; the latter terminates when the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
judgment becomes final. . . . For after the direction of the court, it is acknowledged that
judgment has becomefinal facts and circum even after the date of the execution has been
ffifj
stances may transpire which can render the fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
execution unjust or impossible." after the (court) has performed its ministerial
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part
as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge ought to delay the execution, and there is an
ofFirst Instance, 29 Phil. 267 (1915), p. 270, viz.: imperative duty to investigate the emergency
and to order a postponement. Th<m the question
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly arises as to whom the application for postponing
declared in various decisions, which consti the execution ought to be addressed while the
tute jurisprudence on the subject, that in circumstances is under investigation and as to
criminal cases, after the sentence has been who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."
pronounced and the period for reopening the
same has elapsed, the court cannot change The power to control the execution of its
or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
has terminated. When in cases of appeal or cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction
•&\§\
review the cause has been returned thereto for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial
for execution, in the event that the judgment power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial courts as may be established by law....
duty in issuing the proper order. But it does
not follow from this cessation of functions
on the part of the court with reference to NOTE: Abuse of discretion. We hold that
the ending of the cause that the judicial the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
authority terminates by having then passed when it contravened the rulings of this Court
completelyto the Executive. The particulars in Baseco and Cojuangco-Roxas — thereby un
of the execution itself, which are certainly not lawfully, capriciously and arbitrarily depriving
•fifrii
always included in the judgment and writ of the government of its right to vote sequestered
execution, in any event are absolutely under shares purchased with coconutlevyfunds which
the control of the judicial authority, while are prima facie public funds.
the executive has no power over the person Indeed, grave abuse of discretion may arise
of the convict except to provide for carrying when a lower court or tribunal violates or con
out of the penalty and to pardon. travenes the Constitution, the law or existing
Getting down to the solution of the question jurisprudence. In one case, this Court ruled that
in the case at bar, which is that of execution of the lower court's resolution was "tantamount
a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hy to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the
pothesis that postponement of the date can be highest Court... and unmistakably a very grave
lij&fol
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. abuse of discretion." Republicv. COCOFED, G.R.
It is a well-known principle that notwithstand Nos. 147062-64, December 14, 2001.
D. United States v. Nixon B

418 U.S. 683 (1974)
In support of his claim of absolute, privilege,
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opin the President's counsel urges two grounds, one
ion of the Court. of which is common to all governments and one
of which is peculiar to our system of separation
This case (No. 73-1766) presents for review
of powers. The first ground is the valid need
the denial of a motion, filed on behalf of the Presi
for protection of communications between high
dent of the United States, in the case of United
government officials and those who advise and
States vs. Mitchell (D.C. Crim. No. 74-110), to
assist them in the performance of their manifold
quash a third-party subpoena duces tecum is
duties; the importance of this confidentiahty is
sued by the United States District Court for the
too plain to require further discussion. Human
District of Columbia, pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim.
'M\ experience teaches that those who expect pubhc
Proc. 17(c). The subpoena directed the President
to produce certain tape recordings and docu dissemination of their remarks may well temper
ments relating to his conversations with aides candor with a concern for appearances and for
and advisers. The court rejected the President's their own interests to the detriment of the deci
\M
claims of absolute executive privilege, of lack sion making process....

of jurisdiction, and of failure to satisfy the re The second ground asserted by the Presi
quirements of Rule 17(c). The President appealed dent's counsel in support of the claim of absolute
iai
to the Court of Appeals. We granted the United privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of
States' petition for certiorari before judgement, powers....
and also the President's responsive cross-petition
for certiorari before judgement, because of the However, neither the doctrine of separation
pubhc importance of the issues presented and of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of
the need for their prompt resolution . high level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process un
IV der all circumstances. The President's need for
THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
complete candor and objectivity from advisers
î
calls for great deference from the courts. How
ever, when the privilege depends solely on the
. . . we turn to the claim that the sub broad, undifferentiated claim of pubhc interest
M poena should be quashed because it demands in the confidentiality of such conversations, a
"confidential conversations between a Presi confrontation with other values arises. Absent
dent and his close advisors that it would be a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic
'mi
inconsistent with the public interest it would or sensitive national security secrets, we find
produce."... it difficult to accept the argument that even
the very important interest in confidentiality
In the performance of assigned constitutional
of presidential communications is significantly
duties each branch of the Government must ini
diminished by production of such material for in
tially interpret the Constitution, and the inter
pretation of its powers by any branch is due great camera inspection with all the protection that a
respect from the others. The President's counsel, district court will be obliged to provide.
as we have noted, reads the Constitution as The impediment that an absolute, unquali
providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality fied privilege would place in the way of the prima
for all presidential communications. Many deci ry constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to
sions of this Court, however, have unequivocally do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly
reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 conflict with the function of courts under Art. in.
Cranch 137 (1803), that "it is emphatically the In designing the structure of our Government
province and duty of the judicial department to
and dividing and allocating the sovereign power
say what the law is." Id., at 177.
among three co-equal branches, the Framers of
the Constitution sought to provide a comprehen-
sive system, but the separate powers were not the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly
intended to operate with absolute independence. manifest than in our view that "the twofold aim
[of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape
"While the Constitution diffuses power
or innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295
the better to secure liberty, it also contem
U.S. 78, 88 (1935). We have elected to employ an
plates that practice will integrate the dis
adversary system of criminal justice in which
persed powers into a workable government.
the parties contest all issues before a court of
It enjoins upon its branches separateness
law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the
but interdependence, autonomy but reci
adversary system is both fundamental and com
;Mi procity." Youngstowh Sheet & Tube Co. v.
prehensive. The ends of criminal -justice would
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
be defeated if judgements were to be founded on
J., concurring).
a partial or speculative presentation of facts...
'&i&l To read the Art. II powers of the President
as providing an absolute privilege as against a
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal We conclude that when the ground for as
statutes on no more than a generalized claim of serting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
the public interest in confidentiality of nonmil- sought for use in a criminal trial is based only
itary and non-diplomatic discussions would on the generalized interest in confidentiahty, it
upset the constitutional balance of "a workable cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
government" and gravely impair the role of the of due process of law in the fair administration
courts under Art. III. of criminal justice. The generalized assertionof
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
L need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Since we conclude that the legitimate needs
of the judicial process may outweigh presiden D
tial privilege, it is necessary to resolve those
competing interest in a manner that preserves We have earlier determined that the District
the essential functions of each branch. The right Court did not err in authorizing the issuance
and indeed the duty to resolve that question of the subpoena. If a President concludes that
does not free the judiciary from according high compliance with a subpoena would be injurious
respect to the representations made on behalf of to the public interest he may properly, as was
the President. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.Cas. done here, invoke a claim of privilege on the
187, 190, 191-192 (No. 14, 694 [1807]). return of the subpoena. Upon receiving a claim
of privilege from the Chief Executive, it became
The expectation of a President to the confi the further duty of the District Court to treat
dentiality of his conversations and correspon the subpoenaed material as presumptively privi
wj
dence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial leged and to require the Special Prosecutor to
deliberations, for example, has all the values to demonstrate that the presidential material was
which we accord deference for the privacy of all "essential to the justice of the [pending criminal]
citizens and added to those values the necessity case." United States v. Burr, supra, at 192. Here
&y
for protection of the public interest in candid, the District Court treated the material as pre
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in sumptively privileged, proceeded to find that the
presidential decision-making. A President and Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing
those who assist him must be free to explore to rebut the presumption and ordered an in cam
alternatives in the process of shaping policies
era examination of the subpoenaed material. On
and making decisions and to do so in a way
the basis of our examination of the record we are
many would be unwilling to express except pri
unable to conclude that the District Courterred
vately. These are the considerations justifying
in ordering the inspection. Accordingly we affirm
a presumptive privilege for presidential com
the order of the District Court that subpoenaed
munications. . .
materials be transmitted to that court. We now
But this presumptive privilege must be con turn to the important question of the District
sidered in light of our historic commitment to Court's responsibilities in conducting the in
iiiiii)
ARTICLE Vin: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 575
camera examination of presidential materials or and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
communications delivered under the compulsion evading review..." Quizon v. Comelec, G.R. No.
of the subpoena duces tecum. 177927, February 15, 2008; Mattel, Inc. v. Fran
cisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30, 2008.
E. Infotech Foundation, et al. v. Comelec
G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004
SEC. 2. THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE
THE POWER TO DEFINE, PRESCRIBE,
AND APPORTION THE JURISDICTION
PANGANIBAN, J.: OF THE VARIOUS COURTS BUT MAY NOT
Pfifr
There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an DEPRIVE THE SUPREME COURT OF ITS
act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law JURISDICTION OVER CASES ENUMER
or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whim ATED IN SECTION 5 HEREOF.
•ffiflfo
sically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED REORGA
ill will or personal bias. In the present case, the NIZING THE JUDICIARY WHEN IT UN
Commission on Elections approved the assailed DERMINES THE SECURITY OF TENURE
Resolution and awarded the subject Contract not OF ITS MEMBERS.
only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence,
but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding 1. Congress and judicial power.
rules and procedure. For the automation of the
counting and canvassing of th§ ballots in the Although judicial power is vested in the
2004 elections, Comelec awarded the Contract judiciary, the proper exercise of such power re
to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that quires prior legislative action: (1) defining such
had not participated in the bidding. Despite this enforceable and demandable rights and prescrib
grant, the poll body signed the actual automation ing remedies for violations of such rights; and (2)
Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.," a determining the court with jurisdiction to hear
company that joined the bidding but had not met and decide controversies or disputes arising from
the eligibility requirements. legal rights.
Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertak Implicit in the conferment of power on Con
ing with inexplicable haste, without adequately gress to create courts and to determine their
checking and observing mandatory financial, jurisdiction is the denial of the same power to
technical and legal requirements. It also accepted other departments. Thus, in U.S.T. v. Board of
the proferred computer hardware and software Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953), the Executive
even if, at the time of the award, they had unde
Order which not only created a Board of Tax
Appeals pursuant to a delegating statute but
niably failed to pass eight critical requirements
also went "as far as depriving the Courts of First
designed to safeguard the integrity of elections.
Instance of their jurisdiction to act on internal
revenue cases" was declared unconstitutional to
NOTE: Moot cases.
the extent that it attempted to impair the juris
"A moot case is one that ceases to present a diction of Courts of First Instance.
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
The acts of President Marcos whereby he
events, so that a declaration thereon would be
reallocated the jurisdiction of courts can only be
of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
explained by his extraordinary legislative powers
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss
under the 1973 Constitution. There is no such
it on ground of mootness. However, Courts will
power under the 1987 Constitution.
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitu Congress has the power to create new courts
tion; second, the exceptional character of the and to apportion jurisdiction among various
situation and the paramount public interest is courts. However, in the exercise of this power
involved; third, when the constitutional issue Congress may not impair the independence of
raised requires formulation of controlling prin the judiciary. For this purpose, the Constitu
ciples to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; tion has given to the Supreme Court, in Section
5, certain powers which Congress may not take the smooth functioning of the administrative
away. Moreover, any reorganization of the judi machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear,
cial system should be done in a manner which however, that on issues definitely outside ofthis
does not impair security of tenure. (More will be dimension and involving questions of law, courts
said about security of tenure under Section 11.) could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from
Mi&J
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
2. Cases. administrative acts.
A. Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.

G.R. No. 86695, September 3,1992 It is apparent that the present controversy
did not arise from the discretionary acts of the
CRUZ, J.: administrative body nor does it involve merely
technical matters. What is involved here is
This controversy involves the extent and non-compliance with the procedural rules on
apphcabihty of P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits any bidding which required strict observance. The
court from issuing injunctions in cases involving purpose of the rules implementing P.D. No. 1594
infrastructure projects of the government. is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent
favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of
these contracts to the detriment of the public.
The decree reads pertinently as follows: This purpose was defeated by the irregularities
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines committed bv PBAC.
shall have jurisdiction to issue any re
&?iifg> straining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary infrastructure project, or a min P.D. No. 1818 was not intended to shield
ing, fishery, forest or other natural resource from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed
development project of the government, or by administrative agencies such as the anoma
any public utility operated by the govern lies above described. Hence, the challenged
ment, including among others public utilities restraining order was not improperly issued by
for the transport of the goods and commodi the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary
li^
ties, stevedoring and arrastie contracts, to injunction should not have been denied....
prohibit any person or persons, entity.or
government official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation
of any such project, or the operation of such SEC. 3. THE JUDICIARY SHALL ENJOY
pubhc utility, or pursuing any lawful activity FISCAL AUTONOMY. APPROPRIATIONS
necessary for such execution, implementa FOR THE JUDICIARY MAY NOT BE
tion or operation. REDUCED BYTHE LEGISLATURE BELOW
THE AMOUNT APPROPRIATED FOR
THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND, AFTER
In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito,2 APPROVAL, SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY
this Court interpreted a similar prohibition con AND REGULARLY RELEASED.
tained in P.D. No. 605, the law after which P.D.
No. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared 1. Fiscal autonomy.
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance The second sentence of Section 3 states the
of injunctions or restraining orders by courts meaning of fiscal autonomy: "Appropriations
against administrative acts in controversies for the Judiciary may not be reduced bv the
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in legislature below the amount appropriated for
technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the previous year and, after approval, shall be
the courts to judge these matters would disturb automatically and regularly released." Fiscal
Li'iiffy
autonomy is granted to the Supreme Court in
2186 SCRA 704. order to strengthen its independence.
2. Cases. But it is said that the court's independence

is limited to the exercise of Judicial functions
A. Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado and that purchase of property does not belong
86 Phil. 429(1950) to this category. This contention formulates the
respondents' major premise on which the fol
&ifijft
Per Curiam:
lowing discussion will ârgely center.
This is one more case which directly affects This court had occasion to intervene, in
this court but which it cannot avoid. From ne Province of Tarlac, etc. v. Gale (26 Phil. 338), in
'§$&
cessity, we are forced, to our regret, to proceed a conflict between a judge of first instance and
in deciding it, there being no other tribunal au provincial officers over the disposition of the
thorized to act. The question refers to the pur courthouse and other equipment. As that case is
chase and installation charges, totaling P585, of analogous to the case at bar in its fundamental
a Webster Teletalk, Model 206 MA, and Webster and animating features, it will be appropriate
Telephone speakers. to quote at length from it. The court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Moreland, said:
Under date of January 7,1949, the Clerk of
the Supreme Court certified that the purchase "2. DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERN
of this apparatus and its installation on the MENT; JUDICIARY. — The judiciary be
second and third floor of the Malacanan Annex, ing one of the coordinate branches of the
which houses the Supreme Court, were of urgent government, its preservation in its integrity
character and-necessary to public service. On and effectiveness is necessary in the present
January 10, 1949, C.L. Dacanay, Chairman of form of government.
the Property Requisition Committee appointed "3. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE.
by the President, disapproved the purchase and — The three departments of government,
installation as "contrary to the provisions of the. executive, legislative, and judicial, are
jffip paragraph four (4) of Executive Order No. 302, not only coordinate, they are co-equal and
series of 1940, and the policy adopted by the co-important. While interdependent, in the
Cabinet last year, discontinuing open market sense that each is unable to perform its
0
purchases," and "also a violation of the require functions fully and adequately without the
ments of Executive Order No. 298, series of other, they are, nevertheless, in the most
1940." On February.7, 1949, Radiowealth, Inc., important sense independent of each other;
the vendor of the equipment and its accessories, that is to say, one department may not con
took the matter up with the Auditor General trol or even interfere with another in the
with the request that the payment be approved. exercise of its special functions. The quality
Radiowealth, Inc. informed the Auditor General of government consists in their remaining
that treasury warrant No. V-116470 was in the thus independent.
process of issuance to cover this amount but that
"4. POWERS. — Under the acts of the
the auditor for the Supreme Court refused to
Legislature of the Philippine Islands, the
countersign the warrant... judiciary has the power to maintain its exis
tence, and whatever is reasonably necessary
to that end courts constituting the judiciary
The distribution of powers is a fundamental may do or order done. They have power
maxim of constitutional law and essential to the
to preserve their integrity, maintain their
separation of the three branches of government, dignity, and to insure effectiveness in the
separation which, though incomplete, is one of administration of justice.
the chief characteristics of our Constitution. This
principle is too well known to require elucidation. "5. DUTIES OF PROVINCIAL OFFI
It suffices to say that in accordance with this CERS.— The judiciary may not be deprived
principle the Supreme Court is independent of ofany ofits essential attributes and none of
executive or legislative control as the Executive them may be seriously weakened by the act
and the Congress are of the Judiciary. of any person or official. The power to inter-
*f^
fere is the power to control, and the power to "9. ID.; ID.; ID. — If the provincial of
control is the power to abrogate. Officials of ficials furnish to a court a roomwhich, in the
the government who owe a duty to the courts judgment of the court, is clearlyinadequate
under the law cannot deprive the courts of and its use would seriously interfere with
anything which is vital to their functions, the orderly and dignified administration of
nor can such officials by the exercise of any justice, the court may refuse to accept it,
judgment or discretion of their own escape and, on the refusal of the provincial officials
an obligation to the courts which the law to furnish accommodations which the court
lays upon them. considers adequate, it has the power to pro
"6. POWERS OF COURTS OF FIRST cure them either directly by renting or by
INSTANCE; COURTROOM, FURNITURE, order to the officials whose duty it is, under
ETC. — Provincial officials who, by virtue the law, to furnish them. The power lies with
of the statute, are under an obligation to the the judge, and with him alone, to determine
Court of First Instance of their province to ultimately what is really essential for the
furnish court room, furniture, fixtures, sup administration of justice.
plies, equipment, etc., when, in the serious "10. ID.; ID.; IT). — When an adequate
and deliberate judgment ofthe court, they, or court room has once been furnished and is in
many of them, are necessary for the adequate possession of the court, the court has power
administration ofjustice, cannot escape that to prevent its occupation, in whole or in part,
obligation except by permission of the court. by other persons to serious detriment of the
"7. DUTIES OF PROVINCIAL BOARDS court business; and if such occupation occurs,
AND PROVINCIAL OFFICERS. — Section
the court may order the intruders ejected
13 of Act No. 83, which provides that it shall and all partitions which have been erected,
be the duty ofthe provincial board'to provide dividing the court room into parts, removed.
by construction or purchase or renting suit "11. ID.; ID.; ID. — The provincial board
able offices for the provincial officers, and has power to assign a particular room or
a courthouse containing a room or rooms rooms to a Court of First Instance, and may
suitable for the holding court and for offices change the assignment after the same has
for the court officials * * *,' is mandatory been made when such change is reasonably
and imposes upon the provincial board or necessary, provided the new rooms are rea
provincialofficials, as the case may be, a duty sonably adequate for the purposes of the
which they cannot evade at their pleasure. court. The court may, however, refuse to be
dispossessed of its rooms until it has been
"8. ID.; ID.; ID. — While, under said
section, the provincial board may exercise furnished with others reasonably fit and
certain discretion in regulating the size of proper for the due administration ofjustice.
the court room, or the cost of the same, or "12. ID.; ID.; ID. — Section 10 of Act No.
the material of which it is constructed, and 83, which requires the provincial officials to
the kind and quantity of furniture which is furnish to the court such furniture, fixtures
placed therein, nevertheless, the court room and supplies as may be necessary for the
and offices, and the furniture and fixtures proper administration of justice, is manda
therein must be of such a character as to tory; and while a certain discretion lies with
permit the court to exercise its functions in the officialswho furnish the articles referred
a reasonably effective manner, and must not to, such as deals withcolor, form, style, quan
be such as to impede in a material manner tity, etc., that discretion is always subject to
the administration ofjustice. When a conflict the paramount authorityofthe court which,
in judgment arises between the provincial as in thecase ofquarters, is always the final
officials and the court that of the provincial authority determining what is necessary
officials must yield, the court being the only and essential for the proper administration
official which, in thelast analysis, may deter of justice.
mine under the law quoted what isnecessary "13. ID.; ID.; ID.— If the provincial offi
for its efficiency.
cials refuse to furnish the articles mentioned
r
j3?l
r
r
r
r
ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 679
in the statute in sufficient quantity or at the court has to dictate to the executive what, when
proper time, the court has power either to and how to get his.
purchase those things directlyor, by proper
proceedings, tocompel theofficials toperform
the dutyimposed uponthem bylaw. In either B. Bengzon v. Drilon
case, the purchase price of the articles thus G.R. No. 103524, April 15,1992
found necessary will be a legal charge on the
province." (Syllabus.)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
fcfofrl
We reiterate this rule... The issue in this petition is the constitu
Contrary to the respondents' theory, the tionality of the veto by the Presidentofcertain
prerogatives ofthiscourt which theConstitution provisions in the General Appropriations Act for
£&ft) the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of
secures against interference includes notonly the the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the
powers to adjudicate causes but all things that Supreme Courtand the CourtofAppeals.
are.reasonably necessaryforthe administration
'jjjAJ}
ofjustice. So, we believe, it is within its power The petitioners are retired Justices of the
free from encroachment by the Executive to ac Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
quire books and other office equipment reason currentlyreceiving monthly pensions underRe
ably needed to the convenient transaction ofits public Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act
business. These implied, inherent, or incidental No. 1797. Theyfiled the instant petitionontheir
powers are as essential to the existence of the own behalf and in representation of all other
court as the powers specifically granted. With retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the
out the power to provide itself with appropriate Court ofAppeals similarly situated.
instruments for the performance of its duties,
the express powers with which the Constitution
endowsit wouldbecomeuseless. The court could [NOTE: Apparently through misinfor
not maintain its independence and dignityas the mation, PresidentAquino exercised her item
Constitution intends if the executive personally veto power in a mannerwhich had the effect
or through subordinate officials could determine ofvetoing a provision oflaw which had long
for the court what it should have or use in the been in effect and whose validity had been
discharge ofits functions, and when and how it upheld by the Supreme Court. Needless
should obtain them. to say, the Court invalidated her veto and
MP madeadditionalpronouncement aboutfiscal
The court's independence of the legislative autonomy.]
branch with regard to the acquisitionoffixtures,
supplies and equipment is bound up with and
subject to its dependence upon the Congress for II
appropriation. The interrelation between the
court and the Congress in this regard is not so There is a matter of greater consequence
m)
easy to define. (Fortunately thereis noconflict be arising from this petition. Theattemptto usethe
tween the legislature and the court to complicate vetopower toset asidea Resolution ofthis Court
the issues in this case.) But it is our considered and to deprive retirees ofbenefits given themby-
opinion that this courtis supreme and indepen Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitu
dent of the executive in this sphere. In the requi tional grant offiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
sition for fixtures, equipment and supplies both Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
the executive and judicial departments are on the
îJ same footing. They derive their'authority from "Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
the same source and represent the sovereignty in autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
equal degree. It stands to reason that the Chief may not be reducedby the legislaturebelow
Executive has no more authority to encroach on the amount appropriated for the previous
the Supreme Court in the choice of the instru yearand, after approval, shallbeautomati
ments needed to carry on its functions than the cally and regularly released."
We cannot overstress the importance of the proposals to Congress without informing

and the need for an independent judiciary. The the agency of major alterations and mutila
Court has on various past occasions explained tions inflicted on their proposals, and expects
the significance of judicial independence. In each agency to defend in Congress proposals
the case of De la Liana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 not of the agency's making.
[1982]), it ruled:
After the general appropriations bill is
"It is a cardinal rule of faith of our con passed by Congress and signed into law by
stitutional regime that it is the people who the President, the tight and officious control
are endowed with rights, to secure which a by DBM continues. For the release of ap
government is instituted. Acting as it does propriated funds, the Judiciary, Constitu
through public officials, it has to grant them tional Commissions, and Ombudsman are
either expressly or implicitly certain powers. instructed through 'guidelines', how to pre
These they exercise not for their own benefit pare Work and Financial Plans and requests
but for the body politic for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates
and approves these plans and requests and
"A public office is a public trust. That is
on the basis of its approval authorizes the
more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal
release of allotments with corresponding
imperative. The law may vest in a public
notices of cash allocation. These notices
official certain rights. It does so to enable
specify the maximum withdrawals each
them to perform his functions and fulfill his
month which the Supreme Court, the Com
responsibilities more efficiently. . . . It is an
missions, and the Ombudsman may make
added guarantee that justices and judges
from the servicing government bank. The
can administer justice undeterred by any
above agencies are also required to submit
fear of reprisal or untoward -consequence.
to DBM monthly, quarterly, and year-end
Their judgments then are even more likely
budget accountability reports to indicate
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of
their performance, physical and financial
the law and the dictates of their conscience,
operations, and income.
free from the corrupting influence of base
or unworthy motives. The independence of The DBM reserves to itself the power to
which they are assured is impressed with review the accountability reports and when
a significance transcending that of a purely importuned for needed funds, to release ad
personal right." (At pp. 338-339). ditional allotments to the agency. Since DBM
always prunes the budget proposals to below
subsistence levels and since emergency situa
We have repeatedly in the past few years tions usually occur during the fiscal year, the
called the attention of DBM that not only does it Chief Justice, Chairmen of the Commissions,
allocate less than one percent (1%) of the national and Ombudsman are compelled to make pil
budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, grimages to DBM for additional funds to tide
and court personnel all over the country but it their respective agencies over the emergency.
also examines with a fine-toothed comb how we
spend the funds appropriated by Congress based What is fiscal autonomy?
on DBM recommendations. As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
The gist of our position papers and argu autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
ments before Congress is as follows: Service Commission, the Commission on Audit,
the Commission on Elections, and the Office of
"The DBM requires the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
the Constitutional Commissions, and the flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources
Ombudsman to submit budget proposals in with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
accordance with parameters it establishes. require. It recognizes the power and authority to
DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compen
agency to defend its proposals during DBM sation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
budget hearings, submits its own version of by law for compensation and play plans of the
ARTICLE Vm: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 581
government and allocate and disburse such sums from savings in the interest of expediency and
as may be provided by law or prescribed by them efficiency. The Court stated that:
in the course of the discharge of their functions.
"There should be no question, therefore,
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from out that statutory authority has, in fact, been
side control. If the Supreme Court says it needs granted. And once given, the heads of the
100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only different branches* of the Government and
10 typewriters and sends its recommendations those of the Constitutional Commissions are
to Congress without even informing us, the au afforded considerable flexibility in the use of
tonomy given by the Constitution becomes an public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba,
empty and illusory platitude. supra). The doctrine of separation of powers
is in no way endangered because the transfer
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Com
is made within a department (or branch of
missions, and the Ombudsman must have the
government) and not from one department
independence and flexibility needed in the
(branch) to another."
discharge of their constitutional duties. The
sii)
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the The Constitution, particularly Article VI,
manner the independent constitutional offices Section 25(5) also provides:
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy "Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed
and violative not only of the express mandate of authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
the Constitution but especially as regards the however, the President, che President of the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separa Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre
tion of powers upon which the entire fabric of our sentatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
constitutional system is based. In the interest of Court, and the heads of Constitutional Com
comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Con missions may, by law, be authorized to aug
stitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman ment any item in the general appropriations
*$£)
have so far limited their objections to constant law for their respective offices from savings
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners in other items of their respective appropria
that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a tions."
iij meaningless provision. In the instant case, the vetoed provisions
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific which relate to the use of savings for augment
provisions in the General Appropriations Act is ing items for the payment of the pension differ
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its entials, among others, are clearly in consonance
funds should be utilized, which is clearly repug with the above-stated pronouncements of the
nant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief
im
Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's
the funds appropriated for the expenditures of appropriation, in contravention of the constitu
the judiciary, including the use of any savings tional provision on "fiscal autonomy".
from any particular item to cover deficits or short
ages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Ill
Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition Finally, it cannot be denied that the retired
of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations Justices have a vested right to the accrued pen
law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of sions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be The right to a public pension is of statutory
given a free hand on how to augment appropria origin and statutes dealing with pensions have
m
tions where augmentation is needed. been enacted by practically all the states in the
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Ma- United States (State ex rel. Murray v. Riley, 44
caraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld Del 505, 62 Ad 236), and presumably in most
the authority of the President and other key of countries of the world. Statutory provisions for
ficials to augment any item or any appropriation the support of Judges or Justices on retirement
îftj
:MJ
582. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
are founded on services rendered to the state. of this Court on the ground that there should be
Where a judge, has complied with the statutory no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential
prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to treatment" to retired Justices ignores these pro?
retire and draw salary becomes vested and may visions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks
not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. that these Constitutional provisions on special
Whitehorse, 44 So ad 430). protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The
integrity of our entire constitutional system is
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retire
premised to a large extent on the independence
ment laws have been enacted, the purpose of
of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended,
which is to entice competent men and women
(£g£
to preserve that independence. So are the laws
to enter the government service and to permit
on retirement benefits of Justices.
them to retire therefrom with relative security,
not only those who have retained their vigor but, One last point.
^)
more so, those who have been incapacitated by
The Office of the Solicitor General argues
illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly
that:
Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From
^) the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After ". . . Moreover, by granting these ben
the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of efits to retired Justices implies that pubhc
Retirement (190 SCRA 315 [1990]). funds, raised from taxes on other citizens,
;J^J
will be paid off to select individuals who are
already leading private lives and have ceased
The provisions regarding retirement pen performing public service. Said the United
sions of Justices arise from the package of pro States Supreme Court, speaking through
tections given by the Constitution to guarantee Mr. Justice Miller; 'To lay with one hand
and preserve the independence of the Judiciary. the power of the government on the property
The Constitution expressly vests the power of the citizen, and with the other to bestow
iaJ
of judicial review in this Court. Any institution upon favored individuals ... is nonetheless a
given the power to declare, in proper cases, that robbery because it is done under the forms
acts of both the President and Congress are of law . . . .' (Law Association v. Topeka, 20
j&$) unconstitutional needs a high degree of inde Wall. 655)" (Comment, p. 16).
pendence in the exercise of its functions. Our The above arguments are not only spe
jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. cious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are
Neither may it be increased without our advice unbecoming of an Office whose top officials are
and concurrence. Justices may not be removed supposed to be, under their charter, learned in
until they reach age 70 except through impeach the law.
ment. All courts and court personnel are under
the administrative supervision of the Supreme Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Jus
Court. The President may not appoint any Judge tice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
or Justice unless he or she has been nominated Cecilia Munoz-Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad
J^vj by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the
is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no
salaries may not be decreased during our con longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor
tinuance in office. We cannot be designated to General and all lawyers under him who represent
g£)
any agency performing administrative or quasi- the Government before the two courts and whose
judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal predecessors themselves appeared before these
autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent retirees, should show some continuing esteem
of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the and good manners toward these Justiees who
Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article are now in the evening of their years.
VIII and Section 30, Article VI, Constitution). All that the retirees ask is to be given the.
ay
Any argument which seeks to remove spe benefits granted by law. To characterize them as
cial privileges given by law to former Justices engaging in "robbery" is intemperate, abrasive,
pii
foffi)
ARTICLE VTII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 583
and disrespectful more so because the argument MAY BE MODIFIED OR REVERSED EX

is unfounded. CEPT BY THE COURT SITTING ENBANC.
im
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG
1. Cases.
pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that
the then quality of research in that institution A. Fortich v. Corona
has severely deteriorated. G.R. No. 13145% August 19,1999
SEC. 4. (1) THE SUPREME COURT This resolves the pending incidents before us,
SHALL BE COMPOSED OF A CHIEF
namely, respondents' and interveners' separate
JUSTICE AND FOURTEEN ASSOCIATE
motions for reconsideration of our Resolution
JUSTICES. IT MAY SIT EN BANC OR
dated November 17, 1998, as well as their mo
IN ITS DISCRETION, IN DIVISIONS OF
tions to refer this case to this Court en banc.
THREE, FIVE, OR SEVEN MEMBERS. ANY
VACANCY SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN Respondents and intervenors jointly argue,
î
NINETY DAYS FROM THE OCCURRENCE in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17,
THEREOF. 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate
motions for reconsideration of our earlier Deci
(2) ALL CASES INVOLVING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A TREATY, IN sion of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
TERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREE Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively
MENT, OR LAW, WHICH SHALL BE HEARD resolve the said motions for reconsideration in
BY THE SUPREME COURT ENBANC, AND asmuch as the matter should have been referred
ALL OTHER CASES WHICH UNDER THE to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article
RULES OF COURT ARE REQUIRED TO VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
BE HEARD ENBANC, INCLUDING THOSE
INVOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY,
APPLICATION, OR OPERATION OF PRES In their respective motions for reconsidera
IDENTIAL DECREES, PROCLAMATIONS, tion, both respondents and intervenors pray that
^$j ORDERS, INSTRUCTIONS, ORDINANCES, this case be referred to this Court en banc. They
AND OTHER REGULATIONS, SHALL BE contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions
DECIDED WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April
A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS WHO 24,1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIB required number to carry a decision, i.e., three,
ERATIONS ON THE ISSUES IN THE CASE was not met. Consequently, the case should be
AND VOTED THEREON. referred to and be decided by this Court en banc,
(3) CASES OR MATTERS HEARD BY relying on [Article VIII, Section 4(3)].
A DIVISION SHALL BE DECIDED OR RE A careful reading of the above constitutional
SOLVED WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF provision, however, reveals the intention of the
A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS WHO framers to draw a distinction between cases, on
ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DE the one hand, and matters, on the other hand,
LIBERATIONS ON THE ISSUES IN THE such that cases are "decided" while matters,
CASE AND VOTED THEREON, AND IN NO which include motions, are "resolved." Otherwise
CASE, WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF
put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases";
AT LEAST THREE OF SUCH MEMBERS.
while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters",
WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT
applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DE
This is true not only in the interpretation of the
CIDED EN BANC: PROVIDED, THAT NO
above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also
DOCTRINE OR PRINCIPLE OF LAW LAID
of the other provisions of the Constitution where
DOWN BY THE COURT IN A DECISION
RENDERED EN BANC OR IN DIVISION
these words appear.
m)
u£l

y^'i
With the aforesaid rule of construction in a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court
mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the itself. 'The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not
Court en banc for decision whenever the required an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and it
number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the lat
the rule does not apply where, as in this case, ter. Each division of the Court is considered not
the required three votes is not obtained in the a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits
ttSi
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, veritably as the Court en banc itself. The only
the second sentence of the afore-quoted provi constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law
sion speaks only of "case" and not "matter." The laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc
reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, or in division, may be overturned or reversed
Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases only by the Court sitting en banc." Firestone
by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there Ceramics v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. Nos. 127022
is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case and 127245, June 28, 2000. '
then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the
other hand, if a case has already been decided by
C. People v. Ebio
the division and the losing party files a motion
G.R. No. 147750, September 29, 2004
for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting
does not leave the case undecided. There is still PER CURIAM:
the decision which must stand in view of the On October 14, 2002, appellant Gerry Ebio
failure of the members of the division to muster was convicted by this Court of qualified rape and
the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The Public
j$i>
plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion Attorney's Office moved for reconsideration on
for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision the ground that the Court lacked a quorum when
is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed the case was deliberated as it appears that the
affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the _ Decision was signed only by seven (7) justices.
Resolution of November 17, 1998. In a Resolution dated September 7, 2004, the
Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration,
ruling as follows:
xxx
B. People v. Dy
G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 16, 2003 There is no question that the Court's Deci
sion in this case was concurred in by majority
gS)
of the members of the Court who actually took
. . . Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the part in the deliberations. It was in fact unani
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en mously signed by the seven Justices who were
ig)
banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, present during the deliberations. The issue now
five, or seven Members. At present, it is made is whether the seven constitute a quorum of the
up of three divisions. However, the divisions of 14-member Court.
;^J the Supreme Court are not to be considered as
The term "quorum" has been defined as "that
separate and distinct courts. Actions considered
number of members of the body which, when
in any of these divisions and decisions rendered
legally assembled in their proper places, will
therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The
enable the body to transact its proper business,
divisions are not to be considered as separate
or, in other words, that number that makes a
and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and
lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or
the same court.
ba
ordinance or do any other valid corporate act."
Decisions or resolutions of a division of the The question of the number of judges necessary
court are not inferior to an en banc decision. to authorize the transaction of business by a
When concurred in by a majority of its members court is as a general rule to be determined from
tâ
who actually took part in the deliberations on the Constitution or statutory provisions creating
the issues in a case, the decision of a division is and regulating the courts, and as a general rule a
^lf^>
ARTICLE VHI: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 585
majority of the members of a court is a "quorum" IDENTIAL DECREE, PROCLAMATION,

for the transaction of business and the decision ORDER, INSTRUCTION, ORDINANCE,
4ffi» of cases. OR REGULATION IS IN QUESTION.
The" Constitution is clear on the quorum (B) ALL CASES INVOLVING THE
when the Court meets by Division. There should LEGALITY OF ANY TAX, IMPOST, AS
be at least three members present for the Divi SESSMENT, OR TOLL, OR ANY PENAL
sion to conduct its business. This may be deduced TY IMPOSED IN RELATION THERETO.
from paragraph 3 ofSection 4, Article VIII. There
(C) ALL CASES IN WHICH THE JU
Effjfcl is no similar pronouncement, however, when the
RISDICTION OF ANY LOWER COURT
Court meets en banc. The second paragraph of
IS IN ISSUE.
Article VIII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
does not expressly state the number of Justices (D) ALL CRIMINAL CASES IN
required to be present to constitute a quorum of WHICH THE PENALTY IMPOSED IS
the Court en banc. The deliberations of the 1987 RECLUSIONPERPETUA OR HIGHER.
L Constitution are also silent on what constitutes

a quorum when the Court is .composed of only
(E) ALL CASES IN WHICH ONLY
AN ERROR OR QUESTION OF LAW IS
fourteen members. In case of doubt in a crimi INVOLVED.
nal case, especially where the death penalty is
imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor (3) ASSIGN TEMPORARILY JUDGES OF
of the accused. LOWER COURTS TO OTHER STATIONS AS
PUBLIC INTEREST MAY REQUIRE. SUCH
Thus, in this case, considering that the life TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT SHALL NOT
t>m> of the accused is at stake, we deem it wise to EXCEED SIX MONTHS WITHOUT THE
resubmit the case to the Court en banc for re- CONSENT OF THE JUDGE CONCERNED.
deliberation.
(4) ORDER A CHANGE OF VENUE OR
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves to PLACE OF TRIAL TO AVOID A MISCAR
RECALL the Decision dated October 14, 2002 RIAGE OF JUSTICE.
and RESUBMIT the case to the Court en banc
for RE-DELIBERATION. (5) PROMULGATE RULES CON
CERNING THE PROTECTION AND EN
FORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SEC. 5. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL
RIGHTS, PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND
HAVE THE FOLLOWING POWERS:
m PROCEDURE IN ALL COURTS, THE AD
(1) EXERCISE ORIGINAL JURISDIC MISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
TION OVER CASES AFFECTING AMBAS THE INTEGRATED BAR, AND LEGAL AS
SADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS SISTANCE TO THE UNDERPRIVILEGED.
AND CONSULS, AND OVER PETITIONS SUCH RULES SHALL PROVIDE A SIMPLI
FOR CERTIORARI PROHIBITION, MAN FIED AND INEXPENSIVE PROCEDURE
DAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, AND HABEAS FOR THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CORPUS. CASES, SHALL BE UNIFORM FOR ALL
COURTS OF THE SAME GRADE, AND
(2) REVIEW, REVISE, REVERSE, MOD SHALL NOT DIMINISH, INCREASE, OR
IFY, OR AFFIRM ON APPEAL OR CER MODIFY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS. RULES
TIORARI, AS THE LAW OR THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF SPECIAL COURTS
OF COURT MAY PROVIDE, FINAL JUDG AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES SHALL
MENTS AND ORDERS OF LOWER COURTS REMAIN EFFECTIVE UNLESS DISAP
IN: PROVED BY THE SUPREME COURT. -
(A) ALL CASES IN WHICH THE (6) APPOINT ALL OFFICIALS AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY IN
$3
OF ANY TREATY, INTERNATIONAL OR ACCORDANCE WITHTHE CIVIL SERVICE
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, LAW, PRES LAW.
jjg)
'•••$•£
1. Powers ofthe Supreme Court classified. mota. Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil.
516, 522 (1946).
Section 5(1) and (2) are the judicial powers,
and Section 5(3) to (6) are auxiliary administra In Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 209 (1987),
tive powers. although the dispute had already disappeared,
the Court decided the constitutional issue on
Congress may diminish the merely statutory
transfer of funds saying: "But there are also times
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but it may not
when although the dispute has disappeared, as in
diminish the jurisdiction granted by the Consti
this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
tution itself in Section 5.
V^d
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone,
2. Judicial review.
but also for the guidance of and as a restraint
The power of judicial review is the Supreme upon the future." Pp. 212-3, quoting from Javier
Court's power to declare a law, treaty, interna v. COMELEC and Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-
tional or executive agreement, presidential de 81, September 22,1986, which was decided after
cree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, Javier's death and after the Batasan had been
•ajii
or regulation unconstitutional. This power is •dissolved.
explicitly granted by Section 5(2), (a) and (b).
Judicial review does not mean judicial su
The power of judicial review is merely an premacy over the two other departments. Thus,
aspect of judicial power. Hence, the first requisite when the Court reviewed the decision of the Of
for the exercise of judicial review is that there fice of the President ordering a pharmaceutical
must be before the court an actual case calling company to pay separation pay, the Court said:
fe| for the exercise of judicial power. Secondly, the "This does not mean judicial supremacy ... but
question before it must be ripe for adjudication, the performance by this Court of a duty spe
that is, the governmental act being challenged cifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution as
must have had an adverse effect on the person part of a system of checks and balances. Dabuet
challenging it. PACU v. Secretary of Education, v. Roche Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 149 SCRA 386,
97 Phil. 806, 810 (1955); Tan v. Macapagal, 43 394 (1987).
SCRA 678 (1972). Thirdly, the person challenging "In questioning the validity or constitu
the act must have "standing*' to challenge, that is, tionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
he must have "a personal and substantial inter administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
est in the case such that he has sustained, or will administrative remedies before going to court.
siJ sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforce This principle applies only where the act of the
ment." People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 58, 89 (1937). administrative agency concerned was performed
The above are the essential requisites for pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
judicial review. In addition to these essential when the assailed act pertained to its rule
requisites, jurisprudence has also evolved other making or quasi-legislative power. In Association
auxiliary rules. Thus, it was pointed out in People of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine
v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) that "as a general rule, CoconutAuthority, G.R. No. 110526,10 February
the question of constitutionality must be raised 1998, it was held:
at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised The rule of requiring exhaustion of ad
by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised ministrative remedies before a party may
i^J
at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it seek judicial review, so strenuously urged
will not be considered on appeal... But we must by the Solicitor General on behalf of respon
state that the general rule admits of exceptions. dent, has obviously no application here. The
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may resolution in question was issued by the PCA
determine the time when a question affecting in the exercise of its rule-making or legisla
constitutionality of a statute should be pre tive power. However, only judicial review of
sented." Id. at 88. Another rule is that the court decisions of administrative agencies made in
will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is
unless it really is unavoidable or is the very lis subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
•jfA
ARTICLE Vin: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 587
Review ofactions of administrative agencies power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights
"In like manner, the doctrine of primary ju
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
risdiction applies only where the administrative and to determine whether or not there has been
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized dis excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
','M putes, the practice has been to refer the same to or instrumentality of Ae Government. .
an administrative agency of special competence
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC
The courts will not determine a controversy in of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000and its
volving a question which is within the jurisdic Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursu
tion of the administrative tribunal prior to the ant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
resolution of that question by the administrative As such, petitioners were justified in invoking
kai tribunal, where the question demands the exer the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to
cise of sound administrative discretion requiring assail the constitutionality and validity of the
the special knowledge, experience and services of said issuances. . . ." Globe Telecom v. CA, G.R.
'•<-:&} the administrative tribunal to determine techni No. 152063, August 12, 2003.
cal and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity
of ruling is essential to comply with the premises 3. Judicial review: Case and Controversy.
of the regulatory statute administered. The objec
tive of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to
guide a court in determining whether it should A. Marbury v. Madison
1 Cranch 137 (1803)
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until
I after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question MARSHALL, C.J.:
arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable The question, whether an act, repugnant to
jS*)
in the courts and comes into play whenever en the Constitution, can become the law of the land,
forcement of the claim requires the resolution is a question deeply interesting to the United
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has States; but. happily, not of an intricacy propor
been placed within the special competence of an tioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to
administrative body; in such case, the judicial recognize certain principles, supposed to have
process is suspended pending referral of such been long and well established, to decide it.
issues to the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the This original and supreme will organizes
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regula the government, and assigns to different depart
tion issued by the administrative agency in the ments their respective powers. It may either
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the stop here, or establish certain limits not to be
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the transcended by those departments.
same. The determination of whether a specific
rule or set of rules issued by an administrative The government ofthe United States is ofthe
agency contravenes the law or the constitution latter description. The powers of the legislature
is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. are defined and limited; and that those limits
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Consti
judicial review or the power to declare a law, tution is written. To what purpose are powers
treaty, international or executive agreement, limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, committed to writing, if these limits may, at
or regulation in the courts, including the regional any time, be passed by those intended to be re
trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial strained? The distinction between a government
power, which includes the authority of the courts with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished,
to determine in an appropriate action the validity if those limits do not confine the persons on whom
of the acts of the political departments. Judicial they are imposed, and if prohibited and acts al-
u
lowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition garding the Constitution; or conformably to the
too plain to be contested, that the Constitution Constitution, disregarding the law; the court
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, must determine which of these conflicting rules
that the legislature may alter the Constitution governs the case. This is of the very essence of
by an ordinary act. judicial duty.
Between these alternatives there is no If, the courts are to regard the Constitution,
middle ground. The Constitution is either a su and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary
perior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the they both apply.
legislature shall please to alter it.
Those, then, who controvert the principle
If the former part of the alternative be true, that the Constitution is to be considered, in court,'
then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity
is not law: if the latter part be true, then written of maintaining that courts must close their eyes
Constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part on the Constitution, and see only the law.
of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable. This doctrine would subvert the very founda
tion of all written Constitutions. It would declare
Certainly all those who have framed written that an act which, according to the principles
Constitutions contemplate them as forming the and theory of our government, is entirely void, is
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, yet, in practice, completely obligatory- It would
and, consequently, the theory of every such gov declare that if the legislature shall do what is
ernment must be, that an act of the legislature, expressly forbidden,'such act, notwithstanding
repugnant to the Constitution, is void. the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It
This theory is essentially attached to a writ would be giving to the legislature a practical and
ten Constitution, and is, consequently, to be real omnipotence, with the same breath which
considered, by this court, as one of the fundamen professes to restrict their powers within narrow
tal principles of our society. It is not therefore to limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that
be lost sight of in further consideration of this those limits may be passed at pleasure.
subject.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the deemed the greatest improvement on political
Constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding institutions, a written Constitution, would of
its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them itself be sufficient, in America, where written
to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be Constitutions have been viewed with so much
not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as reverence, for rejecting the Constitution. But
if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in the peculiar expressions of the Constitution of
fact what was established in theory; and would the United States furnish additional arguments
seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be in favor of its rejection.
insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more at
The judicial power of the United States is
tentive consideration.
extended to all cases arising under the Constitu
It is emphatically the province and duty of tion.
the judicial department to say what the law is.
Could it be the intention of those who gave
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, this power, to say that in using it the Constitu
must of necessity expound and interpret that
tion should not be looked into? That a case arising
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
under the Constitution should be decided without
courts must decide on the operation of each.
examining the instrument under which it arises?
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitu
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
tion; if both the law and the Constitution apply
to a particular case, so that the court must either In some cases, then, the Constitution must
decide that case conformably to the law, disre be looked into by the judges. And if they can
open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden conflicting claims of authority under the Con
to read or to obey? stitution and to establish for the parties in an
There are many other parts of the Constitu actual controversy the rights which that instru
ment secures and guarantees to them. This is
tion which serve to illustrate this subject.
in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" w^hich properly is the power
of judicial review under the "Constitution.
From these, and many other selection which
might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of Even then, this power of judicial review is
the Constitution contemplated that instrument limited to actual cases and controversies to be
as a rule for the government of courts, as well as exercised after full opportunity of argument by
of the legislature. the parties, and limited further to the constitu
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to tional question raised or the very Us mota pre
take an oath to support it? This oath certainly sented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
applies in an special manner, to their conduct in
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
their official character. How immoral to impose it
on them, if they were to be used as instruments, Narrowed as its functions is in this man
and the knowing instruments, for violating what ner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
they swear to support! of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observa
More than that, courts accord the presumption
tion, that in declaring what shall be the supreme of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
law of the land, the Constitution itself is first
not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the
mentioned; and the laws of the United States
judiciary in the determination of actual cases
generally, but those only which shall be made in
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank.
justice of the people as expressed through their
Thus, the particular phraseology of the representatives in the executive and legislative
Constitution of the United States confirms and departments of the government.
strengthens the principle, supposed to be es
sential to all written Constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the Constitution is void; and that In the case at bar, the National Assembly
courts, as well as other departments, are bound has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
by that instrument. confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to
the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on De
cember 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day
B. Angara v. Electoral for the filing of protests against the election,
Commission returns and qualifications of members of the
63 Phil. 139(1936) National Assembly, notwithstanding the previ
ous confirmation made by the National Assembly
as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
The Constitution is a definition of the powers the resolution of the National Assembly has the
of government. Who is to determine the nature, effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitu Commission to entertain protests against the
tion itself has provided for the instrumentality election, returns and qualifications of members of
of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the National Assembly, submitted after Decem
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional ber 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere sur
over the other departments; it does not in reality plusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but by the respondents, the Electoral Commission
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation has the sole power of regulating its proceedings
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then
the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which which may in the long run prove destructive •
the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the the entire framework? To ask these questior
last day for filing protests against the election, is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, i
returns and qualifications of members of the must we avoid exhaustion in our constitution;
National Assembly, should be upheld. system. Upon principle, reason and authorit
we are clearly of the opinion that upon the a<
Here is then presented an actual controversy
mitted facts of the present case, this court he
involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitu
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission an
tional nature between the National Assembly on
the subject matter of the present controvers
the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on
for the purpose of determining the characte:
the other. From the very nature of the repub
scope and extent of the constitutional grant t
lican government established in our country
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge <
in the light of American experience and of our
all contests relating to the election, returns an
own, upon the judicial department is thrown the
qualifications of the members of the Nation*
solemn and inescapable obligation of interpret
Assembly."
ing the Constitution and defining constitutional
^) boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a con
stitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, C. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
namely to determine all contests relating to G.R. No. 115455, August 25,1994 '
the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although MENDOZA, J.:
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
k*-A
with, when and while acting within the limits
of its authority, it does not follow that it is be We are told, however, that the power of ju
yond the reach of the constitutional mechanism dicial review is not so much power as it is dut
\m> adopted by the people and that it is not subject imposed on this Court by the Constitution an
to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral that we would be remiss in the performance c
Commission is not a separate department of that duty if we decline to look behind the barrier
the government, and even if it were, conflicting set by the principle of separation of powers. Arl
claims of authority under the fundamental law VIII, § 1, par. 2 is cited in support of this view:
between departmental powers and agencies of
the government are necessarily determined by Judicial power includes the duty of th
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. courts of justice to settle actual controversie
Discarding the English type and other European involving rights which are legally demand
types of constitutional government, the framers able and enforceable, and to determin-
of our Constitution adopted the American type whether or not there has been a grave abus«
ksssi
where the written Constitution is interpreted of discretion amounting to lack or exces
and given effect by the judicial department. In of jurisdiction on the part of any branch o
some countries which have declined to follow instrumentality of the Government.
the American example, provisions have been To view the judicial power of review as a dut:
inserted in their Constitutions prohibiting the is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said s«
courts from exercising the power to interpret in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power ii
the fundamental law... In our case, the nature Marbury v. Madison ...
of the present controversy shows the necessity
of a final constitutional arbiter to determine
Justice Laurel echoed this justification ii
the conflict of authority between two agencies 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
V
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline And when the judiciary mediates t<
to take cognizance of the controversy, who will allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were not assert any superiority over the othei
left undecided and undetermined, would not a departments; it does not in reality nullify oi
void be thus created in our constitutional system invalidate an act of the legislature, but onl)
ARTICLEVffl: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 591
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation as stitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider,
1
signed to it by the Constitution to determine discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise
conflicting claims of authority under the Con the present Constitution through the adoption
stitution and to establish for the parties in of a form of government other than the form
an actual controversy the rights which that now outlined in the present Constitution [the
instrument secures and guarantees to them. Convention being]merely empoweredtopropose
This conception of the judicial power has improvements to the present Constitution with
been affirmed in several cases3 of this Court fol out altering the general plan laid down therein."
•'$£} lowing Angara. Sucha pleaofthe utmost seriousnesswassought
o to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke understandable, therefore, why the petition could
this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention hardly be characterized as possessed of merit.
^) in what is essentially a case that at best is not Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this Court is
ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be sued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on
performed in the context of a concrete case or the last day of that month a printed thirty-two
controversy, as Art. VIII, §. 5(2) clearly defines page motion for reconsideration. It is evident that
our justification in terms of "cases," and nothing petitioners took some pains this time, although
but "cases." That the other departments of the the main reliance seems to be on a secondary au
government may have committed a grave abuse thority, American Jurisprudence. [Practitioners
of discretion is not an independent ground for relying on American Jurisprudence, or Corpus
exercising our power. Disregard of the essen Juris Secundum for that matter, would be well-
tial limits imposed by the case and controversy advised not to accept at face value the many
requirement can in the long run only result in American State decisions cited, in the appropri
undermining our authority as a court of law. For, ate footnotes of the text prepared by its editors,
as judges, what we are called upon to render is without reading the opinions therein rendered.
judgment according to what may appear to be Thereby there is likely to be that much needed
the opinion of the day. refinement in the choice ofpersuasive precedents
and the avoidance of indiscriminate lumping to
gether of cases not at all applicable.] The show of
diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality
D. Tan v. Macapagal
is something else. A perusal thereof yields the
43 SCRA 678 (1972)
conclusion that petitioners are oblivious of the
authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction...
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
2. Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with
A five page-petition filed on October 6,1971 the controlling doctrine had the good sense to
by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Roge- wait before filing his suit until after the enact
lio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, ment of the statute [Rep. Act No. 4913 (1967).]
Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief for the submission to the electorate of certain
as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf proposed amendments to the Constitution. [Reso
of themselves and the Filipino people, in assail lutions Nos. 1 and 3 of Congress as a constituent
ing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, body (1967).] It was only then that the matter
[Resolution No. 2127 of the Constitutional Con was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the
vention (1971).] dealing with the range of the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The doctrine
authority ofthe 1971 Constitutional Convention, of separation of powers calls for the departments
would have this Court declare that it is "without being left alone to discharge their duties and
power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Con as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel
emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor
restrain executive [or legislative] action * * *."
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56,94 (1937); Tafiada v. Cuenco,
103 PhU. 1051,1061-2 (1957); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA [Pianos v. Gil, 67 PhU. 62,73 (1939).] The legisla
1, 7-8 (1961). tive and executive branches are not bound to seek
;yj
its advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial and parents of liberty and property without due
L inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile.
It is a prerequisite that something had by then
process of law; B. They deprive parents of their
natural right and duty to rear, their children for
been accomplishedor performed by either branch civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions confer
before a court may come into the picture. At such ring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
a time, it may pass on the validity of what was power and discretion to prescribe rules and
done but only "when * * * properly challenged in standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
an appropriate legal proceeding." [Ibid.] legislative power.
Such a principle applies as well when the A printed memorandum explaining their
inquiry concerns the scope of the competence position iTi extenso is attached to the record.
lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The The Government's legal representative
(Mi judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its respon submitted a mimeographed memorandum
sibility according to its lights. There is to be no contending that, (1) the matter constitutes no
interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable
cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its function necessity of deciding the constitutional ques
well. Such should be the case not only because tions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge
it is a coordinate agency but also because its the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are
powers are transcendent, amounting as it does constitutionally valid.
to submitting for popular ratification proposals
which may radically alter the organization and Petitioners submit a lengthy reply to the
functions of all three departments, including the above arguments.
&!£j
courts. It is therefore much more imperative that Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled,
the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered "An Act making the inspection and recognition
to until the appropriate time comes. of private schools and colleges obligatory for
^M|
More specifically, as long as any proposed the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its
amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no provisions, the Department of Education has,
room for the interposition of judicial oversight. for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated
Only afterit has madeconcrete what it intendsto all private schools in this country apparently
yjtg|
submit for ratification may the appropriate case without audible protest, nay, with the general
be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid acquiescence of the general public and the par
ofjurisdiction. That is the command ofthe Con ties concerned.
stitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless It should be understandable, then, that this
and until such a doctrine loses force by being Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
overruled or a new precedent being announced, it petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law
is controlling. That is implicitin the rule oflaw.
L Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot
aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert,
petitioners suffered no wrong— nor allege any
therefore be sustained. — from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsidera
L tion is denied. No costs.
"It must be evident to any one that the
power to declare a legislative enactmentvoid
is one which the judge, conscious of the fal
E. Pacu v. Secretary of Education libility of the human judgment, will shrink
97 Phil 806 (1955) . from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty
BENGZON, J.:
and official oath decline the responsibility."
Mi
(Cooley Constitutional Limitations, SthEd.,
Thepetitioning colleges and universities re Vol. I, p. 332.)
questthat Act No. 2706 as amended byAct No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180be declared When a law has long been treated as
unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive own constitutional and important rights have
ers of schools and colleges as well as teachers become dependent thereon, the Court may
refuse to consider an attack on its validity. troversies. The authority to pass on the va
(C.J.S. 16, p. 204.) lidity of statutes is incidental to the decision
As a general rule, the constitutionality of such cases where conflicting claims under
of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the Constitution and under a legislative act
the extent that, it is directly and necessarily assailed as contrary to the Constitution are
S*l
involved in a justiciable controversy and is raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort,
essential to the protection of the rights of the and as necessity in the extermination ofreal,
parties concerned. (16 C.J.S.> p. 207) earnest, and vital controversy between liti
gants." (Tanada and Fernando, Constitution
In support of their first proposition petition of the Philippines, p. 1138.)
ers contend that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitu Mere apprehension that the Secretary of
tion, and any law requiring previous govern Education might under the law withdraw permit
mental approval or permit before such person of one of petitioners does not constitute a justi
could exercise said right, amounts to censorship ciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs.
of[sic] previous restraint, a practice abhorrent Winchester Waterworks [Ky.] 197 S.W.2d. 771.)
L to our system of law and government. Petitioner
An action, like this, is brought for a positive
obviously refer to Section 3 of Act No. 2706 as
purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief.
amended which provides that before a private
(Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January,
school may be opened to the public it must first
1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education.
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest
The Solicitor General on the other hand points
out that none of petitioners has cause to present
therein, however intellectually solid the problem
L this issue, because all of them have permits to op may be. This is especially true where the issues
"reach constitutional dimensions, for then there
erate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits. [Courts will not pass upon the validity comes into play regard for the court's duty to
of statute at the instance of one who has availed avoid decision of constitutional issues unless
itself of its benefits. (Fahey vs. Mallone, 322 U.S. avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City,
245; 91,L.ed. 2030; Philippine Scrappers Inc. vs. U.S. Sup.Ct.Adv.Rep., May 23, 1955, Law.Ed.,
Auditor General, 96 Phil., 449.)] And they do not Vol. 99, p. 511.)
assert that the respondent Secretary of Educa
tion has threatened to revoke their permits. They
have suffered no wrong under the terms of the
law — and, naturally need no relief in the form 4. Judicial review: locus standi.
they now seek to obtain.
A. Joya v. PCGG
G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993
liiiiii)
"Courts will not pass upon the consti
tutionality of a law" upon the complaint of BELLOSILLO, J.:
onewho fails to show that he is injured by
*m\
its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U.S. All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special
405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610; Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Coffman vs. Breeze Corp!f 323 U.S. 316-325.) Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Re
straining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential
"The power of the courts to declare a
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from
law unconstitutional arises only when the
proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on
interests of litigants require the use of that
judicial authority for their protection against 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of
actual interference, a hypothetical threat the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th
being insufficient." (United Public Works vs. century silverware seized from Malacanang and
Mitchell, 336 U.S. 75; 91 L.ed. 754.) the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed
in the custody of the Central Bank.
"Bona fide suit. — Judicial power is lim
ited to the decision of actual cases and con
L 594
Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) question which must first be resolved: whether
whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition complies with the legal
the instant petition; (b)whether the Old Masters requisites for this Court to exerciseits powerof
Paintings and antique silverware are embraced judicial review over this case.
in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" The rule is settled that no question involv
which is under the protection of the state pur ing the constitutionality or validity of a law or
suant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural governmental act may be heard and decided by
properties" contemplated under R.A. No. 4846, the court unless there is compliance with the
Mfrl
otherwise known as 'The Cultural Properties legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
Preservation and Protection Act;" (c) whether that the question must be raised by the proper
the paintings and silverware are properties party; that there must be an actual case or con
of public dominion which can be disposed of troversy; that the question must be raised at
SmI
through the joint concurrence of the President the earliest possible Opportunity; and, that the
and Congress; (d) whether respondent PCGG decision on the constitutional or legal question
has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into must be necessary to the determination of the
Sj an agreement with Christie's of New York for case itself. But the most important are the first
the sale of the artworks; (e) whether PCGG has two (2) requisites.
complied with the due process clause and other
statutory requirements for the exportation and On the first requisite, we have held that
sale of the subject items; and, (f) whether the one having no right or interest to protect cannot
petition has become moot and academic.and if invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
so, whether the above issues warrant resolution plaintiffin an action. This is premisedon Sec. 2,
imt from this Court. Rule 3,ofthe Rules of Court which providesthat
every action must be prosecuted and defended
The issues being interrelated, they will be in the name of the real party-in-interest, and
discussed jointly hereunder. However, before that all persons having interest in the subject of
proceeding, we wish to emphasize that we ad the action and in obtaining the relief demanded
mire and commend petitioners' zealous concern shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
to keep and preserve within the country great exercise its power of judicial review onlyif the
worksof art by well-known old masters. Indeed, caseis broughtbefore it by a party who has the
the value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serv legal standing toraise the constitutional orlegal
ingas a creativemedium through which mancan question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
express his innermost thoughts and unbridled substantial interest in the case such that the
emotions while, at the same time, reflecting his
deep-seated ideals,art has become a true expres
party has sustained or will sustaindirect injury
sion of beauty, joy, and life itself. Such artistic as a result ofthe governmental act that is being
creations give us insights'into theartists'cultural challenged. Theterm"interest" is material inter
heritage the historic past of the nation and the est, an interest in issue and to be affected bythe
era to which they belong in their triumphant, decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
glorious, as well as troubled andturbulent years. the question involved, or a mereincidental inter
It must be for this reason that the framers ofthe est. Moreover, the interest ofthe party plaintiff
1987 Constitution mandated in Art. XIV,Sec. 14, mustbe personal and not onebased on a desire
that it is the solemn duty of the state to "foster to vindicatethe constitutional right ofsomethird
m
the preservation, enrichment, anddynamic evo and unrelated party.
lutionofa Filipino national culturebasedonthe There are certain instances however when
principle ofunity in diversity in a climate offree this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on
artistic and intellectual expression." And, in urg legal standing, as when a citizenbrings a case
ingthis Courtto grant their petition, petitioners for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a
invoke this policy of the state on the protection public duty for the fulfillment ofa public right
of the arts. recognized bythe Constitution, and when a tax
But, the altruistic and noble purpose ofthe payer questions the validity ofa governmental
petition notwithstanding, there isthatbasic legal actauthorizing thedisbursement ofpublic funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, requirements of due process and just compensa
taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with tion. If these properties were already acquired by
the preservation and protection of the country's the government, any constitutional or statutory
artistic wealth, they have the legal personality defect in their acquisition and their subsequent'
to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and disposition must be raised only by the proper
PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty parties the true owners thereof whose authority
EM
to conserve the artistic creations as mandated to recover emanates rromtheir proprietary rights
by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, which are protected by statutes and the Consti
Sees. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 tution. Having failed to show that they are the
known as 'The Cultural Properties Preservation legal owners of the artworks or that the valued
and Protection Act," governing the preservation pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners
and disposition of national and important cul do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
tural properties. Petitioners also anchor their question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
git
case on the premise that the paintings and sil
verware are public properties collectively owned
by them and by the people in general to view and Neither can this petition be allowed as a tax
M enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with payer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer
the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art can qualify to challenge the legality of official
pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit
&&i
right to public property without due process of can prosper only if the governmental acts being
law in violation of the Constitution. questioned involve disbursement of public funds
upon the theory that the expenditure of public
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit.
funds by an officer of the state for the purpose
They lack basis in fact and in law. They them
^M
of administering an unconstitutional act consti
selves allege that the paintings were donated by
tutes a misapplication of such funds, which may
private persons from different parts of the world
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obvi
to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Founda
ously, petitioners are not challenging any expen
fel
tion, which is a non-profit and non-stock corpo
diture involving public funds but the disposition
ration established to promote non-Philippine
of what they allege to be public properties. It is
arts. The foundation's chairman was former
worthy to note that petitioners admit that the
First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president
paintings and antique silverware were acquired
was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the
from private sources and not with public money.
ownership of these paintings legally belongs to
the foundation or corporation or the members Anent the second requisite of actual contro
Ssl
thereof, although the public has been given the versy, petitioners argue that this case should
opportunity to view and appreciate these paint be resolved by this Court as an exception to the
ings when they were placed on exhibit. rule on moot and academic cases; that although
%l the sale of the paintings and silver has long been
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the consummated and the possibility of retrieving
pieces of antique silverware were given to the the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and
Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitar importance of the issues raised by the petition
ies from foreign countries on their silver wedding deserve this Court's attention. They submit that
anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the resolution by the Court of the issues in this
the Marcos administration was toppled by the case will establish future guiding principles and
revolutionary government, these paintings and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's
silverware were taken from Malacanang and the priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the
Metropolitan Museum ofManila and transferred benefit of the public as a whole.
to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation
of these properties by the Aquino administra For a court to exercise its power of adjudica
tion however should not be understood to mean tion, there must be an actual case or controversy
that the ownership of these paintings has auto one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
matically passed on to the government without assertion ofopposite legal claims susceptible of
complying with constitutional and statutory judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
IMtl
fefliiA
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar not among those listed in the Cultural Properties
considerations not cognizable by a court of jus Register of the National Museum.
ili)
tice. A case becomes moot and academic when
We agree with the certification of the Di
its purpose has become stale, such as the case rector of the Museum. Under the law, it is the
before us. Since the purpose of this petition for. Director of the Museum who is authorized to
prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials undertake the inventory, registration, designa
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a tion or classification, with the aid of competent
particular date January 1991 which is long past, experts, of important cultural properties and
iiig the issues raised in the petition have become national cultural treasures. Findings of adminis
moot and academic.
trative, officials and agencies who have acquired
At this point, however, we need to empha expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
size that this Court has the discretion to take specific matters are generally accorded not only
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the respect but at times even finality if such findings
requirements of an actual case or legal standing are supported by substantial evidence and are
when paramount public interest is involved. We controlling on the reviewing authorities because
find however that there is no such justification of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of
in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation specialization to which they are assigned.
of the rule. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds
Section 2 of R.A. No. 4846, as amended by no compelling reason to grant the petition. Pe
P.D. No. 374, declares it to be the policy of the titioners have failed to show that respondents
state to preserve and protect the important cul Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their
tural properties and national cultural treasures" functions with grave abuse of discretion or in
of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic excess of their jurisdiction.
value. As to what kind of artistic and cultural
L properties are considered by the State as in
volving public interest which should therefore
B. Macasiano v. National Housing
Authority
be protected, the answer can be gleaned from a G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993
reading of the reasons behind the enactment of
R.A. No. 4846: DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as

fill
Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic
which shall be under the protection of the state Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
are classified as the "important cultural proper Development and Housing Act of 1992.He predi
&B ties" and the "national cultural treasures." "Im cates his locusstandi on his being a consultant of
portant cultural properties" are cultural proper the Department of Public Works and Highways
ties which have been singled out from among (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy
the innumerable cultural properties as having on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and
exceptional historical and cultural significance to Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain
the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstand (executed immediately after his retirement on
ingto merit the classification ofnationalcultural 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National
treasures. On the other hand, a "national cultural Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first,
treasure" is a unique object found locally, pos he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain
sessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve
and/or scientific value which is highly significant as drawback" to his "tasks and dutiesvregard
and important to this country and nation. This ing demolition of illegal structures"; because of
Court takes note of the certification issued by the the said sections, he "is unable to continue the
Director of the Museum that the Italian paint demolitionofillegal structures which he assidu
ings and silverware subjectofthis petition donot ouslyand faithfully carried out in the past." As a
constitute protected cultural properties and are taxpayer, he allegesthat "he has a direct interest
ti^-l
iaHA
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and self-defense and security procedures . . .; (b) to
lawfully disbursed." provide advice to the Secretary and other DPWH
officials regarding prioritization of areas to be
cleared of obstructions and encroachments; (c)
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our juris to conduct field inspection from time to time of
&§i prudence that the constitutionality of an act of areas recommended for clearing; (d) to provide
the legislature will not be determined by the advice in developing appropriate standard and
courts unless that question is properly raised and techniques in cost effective implementation of
Ssi
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary the removal and demolition of obstructions and
to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of encroachments...; and (e) to develop operational
constitutionality must be the very lis mota pre procedures that will institutionalize demolition
sented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a processes." Moreover, the consultancy contract
successful judicial inquiry into the constitution expired on 31 December 1992 and the petitioner
ality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual has not manifested that he obtained a renewal
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal or extension thereof.
rights susceptible ofjudicial determination, (b)
Nor does the petitioner claim-that he is an
the constitutional question must be raised by a
owner of an urban property whose enjoyment
proper party, (c) the constitutional question must
and use would be affected by the challenged
be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the provisions of R.A. No. 7279.
resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case. A proper Although the petitioner likewise anchors his
party is one who has sustained or is in danger locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it
or sustaining an immediate injury as a result of does not mean, however, that in each and every
the acts or measures complained of. instance where such a ground is invoked, this
Court is left with no alternative except to hear
It is easily discernible in the instant case the parties. In Tan vs. Macapagal, we clarified
that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are that "as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this
absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or
petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of not it should be entertained."
the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he
has been actually prevented from performing his
duties as a consultant and exercising his rights
C. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission
as a property owner because of the assertion by
on Elections
other parties of any benefit under the challenged
G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to
determine actual controversies arising between II
adverse litigants."
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the
constitutionality of Section 51, Article X of R.A.
fat
No. 7854. Section 51 states:
The petitioner is not likewise a "proper
party." As a consultant of the DPWH under "Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati.
the "Contract for Consultancy . . .," he is not The present elective officials of the Munici
vested with any authority to demolish obstruc pality of Makati shall continue as the officials
tions and encroachments on properties of the of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
public domain, much less on private lands. The powers and functions until such time that
consultancy contract limits his duties to the a new election is held and the duly elected
following: "(a) to organize and train selected officials shall have already qualified and as
DPWH personnel for the different Engineer sume their offices: Provided, The new city
ing Districts in the NCR in the techniques and will acquire a new corporate existence. The
methods of removing/demolishing illegal struc appointive officials and employees of the
tures/stalls, etc., as well as in crowd control, City shall likewise continue exercising the
•igi
jiijt
functions and duties and they shall be auto conveniently crafted to suit the political ambi
matically absorbed by the city government tions of respondent Mayor Binay.
of the City of Makati." We cannot entertain this challenge to the
They contend that this section collides with constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of before a litigant can challenge the constitution
the Constitution which provide: ality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective the question of constitutionality must be raised
înfjl
local officials, except barangay officials, by the proper party; (3) the constitutional ques
which shall be determined by law, shall be tion must be raised at the earliest possible oppor
three years and no such official shall serve tunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
for more than three consecutive terms. question must be necessary to the determination
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any of the case itself.
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service Petitioners have far from complied with
for the full term for which he was elected. these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events,
XXX XXX XXX
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
Sec. 7. The members of the House of coming mayoralty elections; that he would be
is>
Representatives shall be elected for a term of re-elected in said elections; and that he would
three years which shall begin, unless other seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
wise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth elections. Considering that these contingencies
day of June next following their election. may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose
a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
No member of the House of Representa actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
tives shall serve for more than three con residents ofTaguig (except Mariano) are not also
liî secutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
the office for any length of time shall not be Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a peti
considered as an interruption in the continu tion for declaratory relief over which this Court
§y
ity of his service for the full term for which has no jurisdiction.
he was elected."
Petitioners stress that under these provi
sions, elective local officials, including Members D. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.
of the House of Representatives, have a term of G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving
for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, Section 51 of In a broader sense, this petition bears upon
R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present the right ofFilipinos to a balancedand healthful
lis) municipal elective officials of Makati and dis ecology which the petitionersdramaticallyassoci
regards the terms previously served by them. ate with the twin concepts of"inter-generational
In particular, petitioners point that Section 51 responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
favors the incumbent Makati mayor, respondent Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
Jejomar Binay, who was already served for two the said petitioners have a cause of action to
(2) consecutive terms. They further argue that "prevent the misappropriation orimpairment" of
should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventu Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
feiSfr-) ally win as city mayor in the coming elections, hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support
he can still run for the same position in 1998 systems and continued rape ofMother Earth."
and seek another three-year consecutive term
since his previous three-year consecutive term The controversy has its genesis in CivilCase
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66
petitionersconclude that said section51has been (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
i|s)
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and shows a clear and unmistakable cause of ac
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as tion, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecologi presents a justiciable question as it involves the
cal Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock defendant's abuse of discretion.
and non-profit corporation organized for the pur
pose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued
geared for the protection of our environment and an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.. .
natural resources. The original defendant was
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil
Secretary of the Department of Environment action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitu Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and
tion in this petition by the new Secretary, the set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently the respondent Judge gravely abused his discre
JM ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. tion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are children, but have also joined the latter in this
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, case.
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests."
The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preserva This case has a special and novel element.
tion of said resource but are "so numerous that Petitioners minors assert that they represent
it is impracticable to bring them all before the their generation as well as generations yet un
Court." The minors further asseverate that they born. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
"represent their generation as well as genera can, for themselves, for others of their genera
tions yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for tion and for the succeeding generations, file a
iii) that judgment be rendered: class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, the succeeding generations can only be based on
representatives and other persons acting in the concept of intergenerational responsibility
his behalf to
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as herein
(1) Cancel all existing timber license after expounded, considers the "rhythm and
agreements in the country; harmony of nature." Nature means the created
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, ac world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
cepting, processing, renewing or approving indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
new timber license agreements." disposition, utilization, management, renewal
m
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
other reliefs just and equitable under the
and other natural resources to the end that
premises."
their exploration, development and utilization
be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations. Needless to say, every
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant,
generation had a responsibility to the next to
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
^^
political question which properly pertains to the their right to a sound environment constitutes,
legislative or executive branches of Government. at the same time, the performance of their obli-
&!&*£
gation to ensure the protection of that right for the petitioners the advancement of which may
the generations to come. even be said to predate all governments and con
igj
stitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
The locus standi of the petitioners having
need not even be written in the Constitution for
thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to
they are assumed to exist from the inception of
the merits of the petition.
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned
After a careful perusal of the complaint in in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
question and a meticulous consideration and well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
adduced by the parties, We do not'hesitate to find to health are mandated as state-policies by the
for the petitioners and rule against the respon Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
dent Judge's challenged order for having been continuing importance and imposing upon the
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
to lack of jurisdiction. protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only
ill for the present generation, but also for those to
We do not agree with the trial court's conclu come generations which stand to inherit nothing
sion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with suf but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
ficient definiteness a specific legal right involved
or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading E. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions. G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994
The complaint focuses on one specific fun
damental legal right the right to a balanced and DAVIDE, JR., J.:
healthful ecology which, for the first time in
This is a special civil action for prohibition
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
restraining order and preliminary injunction,
16, Article n of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
which seeks to prohibit and restrain the imple
provides:
mentation of the "Contract of Lease" executed
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
advance the right of the people to a balanced (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
and healthful ecology in accord with the Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on
rhythm and harmony of nature." line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
^jjj
This right unites with the right to health Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOS
which is provided for in the preceding section of BAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic
the same article: corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens,
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
promote the right to health of the people and committed to the cause of truth, justice, and na
instill health consciousness among them." tional renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except
Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tafiada
While the right to a balanced and healthful and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing
ecology is to be found under the Declaration of in their capacities as members of the Board of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and
Bill ofRights, it does not followthat it is less im concerned citizens. Senators Webb and^Tanada
portant than any of the civil and political rights and Representative Arroyo are suing in their
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs capacities as members of Congress and as tax
to a different category of rights altogether for it payers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.
SHU concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by
ARTICLE VTII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 601
...... the public respondents allege that as individuals. This is to conjure the specter
the petitioners have no standing to maintain of the public right dogma as an inhibition
the instant suit, citing our resolution in to parties intent on keeping public officials
Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes staying on the path of constitutionalism. As
Office.4 was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of
private rights is an essential constituent of
public interest and!, conversely, without a
The preliminary issue on the locus standi well-ordered state there could be no enforce
of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in ment of private rights. Private and public
their favor. A party's standing before this Court interests are, both in a substantive and
is a procedural technicality which it may, in procedural sense, aspects of the totality of
the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view the legal order." Moreover, petitioners have
L of the importance of the issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
convincingly shown that in their capac
ity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has
brushed aside this technicality because "the been amply demonstrated. There would be
L transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly
a retreat from the liberal approach followed
in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, tech foreshadowed by the very decision of People
nicalities of procedure. (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully
No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are discussed, if we act differently now. I do not
concerned, this Court had declared that it "is think we are prepared to take that step. Re
not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it spondents, however, would hark back to the
should be entertained,"6 or that it "enjoys an open American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon
discretion to entertain the same or not."6 In De v. Frothingham, with their claim that what
La Liana vs. Alba,7 this Court declared: petitioners possess "is an interest which is
shared in common by other people and is
"1. The argument as to the lack of stand
<M
comparatively so minute and indeterminate
ing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as
as to afford any basis and assurance that
Judge de la Liana is concerned, he certainly
the judicial process can act on it." That is to
falls within the principle set forth in Justice
0f-\ speak in the language of a bygone era. even
Laurel's opinion in People vs. Vera [65 Phil.
in the United States. For as Chief Justice
56 (1937)]. Thus: The unchallenged rule
Warren clearly pointed out in the later case
is that the person who impugns the valid
of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if
ity of a statute must have a personal and
not breached has definitely been lowered."
substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pama-
as a.result of its enforcement [Ibid., 89].' The halaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,B reiterated in
other petitioners as members of the bar and Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
officers of the court cannot be considered as Corporation,9 this Court stated:
devoid of'any personal and substantial inter
"Objections to taxpayers' suits for lack
est' on the matter. There is relevance to this
of sufficient personality standing or interest
excerpt form a separate opinion in Aquino,
are, however, in the main procedural mat
Jr. v. Commission on Elections [L-40004,
ters. Considering the importance to the pub
January 31,1975,62 SCRA 275]: Then there
lic of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the
is the attack on the standing of petitioners,
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
as vindicating at most what they consider a determine whether or not the other branches
public right and not protecting their rights of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws
4G.R. No. 78716, September 22,1987. and that they have not abused the discretion
«Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
6Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333
(1976). 8163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
7112 SCRA 294, 314-315 (1982). 9197 SCRA 52, 60 (1991).
given to them, this Court has brushed aside The Federal Supreme Court of the United
technicalities of procedure and has taken States of America has also expressed its dis
•jgg) cognizance of these petitions." cretionary power to liberalize the rule on locus
standi. In United States v. Federal Power Com
and in Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Ihc. v. Secretary of Agrarian mission and Virginia Rea Association v. Federal
Power Commission,12 it held: •
Reform,10 it declared:
"With particular regard to the requirement "We hold that petitioners have standing.
of proper party as applied in the cases before us, Differences of view, however, preclude a
we hold that the same is satisfied by the petition single opinion ofthe Court as to both petition
ers. It would not further clarification of this
ers and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an im complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction,
mediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
the solution of whose problems is in any
Jjgy)
event more or less determined by the specific
complained of. [Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633]. And
even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by circumstances of individual situations, to
set out the divergent grounds in support of
the definition, it is still within the wide discre
$£$J standing in these cases."
tion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and In line with the liberal policy of this Court
resolving the serious constitutional questions on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
raised. Congress, and even association of planters, and
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, or
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to
dinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
initiate and prosecute actions before this Court
question the constitutionality of several execu
to question the constitutionality or validity of
tive orders issued by President Quirino although
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of vari
ous government agencies or instrumentalities...
they were invoking only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public. The
Court dismissed the objective that they were not
proper parties and ruled that the transcendental F. Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.
importance to the public of these cases demands G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995
3&J that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of pro QUIASON, J.:
cedure. We have since then applied this exception
in many other cases." This is a petition under Rule 65 of the Re
jtyfrl
vised Rules of Court to prohibit respondents
In Daza v. Singson,11 this Court once more from further implementing and enforcing the
said: "Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease
:ms
"... For another, we have early as in the and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for
Emergency Powers Cases that were serious EDSA" dated April 22, 1992, and the "Supple
constitutional questions are involved, 'the mental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised
iî transcendental importance to the public of and Restated Agreement To Build, Lease and
these cases demands that they be settled Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA"
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if dated May 6, 1993.
we must, technicalities of procedure.' The Petitioners Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Os-
same policy has since then been consistently mena and Rodolfo G. Biazon are members of the
followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Com Philippine Senate and are suing in their capaci
mission on Elections [21 SCRA 774] " ties as Senators and as taxpayers. Respondent
Jesus B. Garcia,, Jr. is the incumbent Secretary
of the Department of Transportation and Com
munications (DOTC), while private respondent
^>
,0175 SCRA 343, 364-365 (1989).
"80 SCRA 496, 502 (1988). 12345US 153, L ed 918, 735 Ct 609.
ffi&A
ARTICLE VDJ: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 603
EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. is a private corpo For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
ration organized under the laws of Hong kong. locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice
but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of
petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present
In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light action.
railway transit line along EDSA, a major thor
oughfare in Metropolitan Manila, which shall
traverse the cities of Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluy- MENDOZA, J., concurring:
ong and Makati. The plan, referred to as EDSA
I concur in all but Part III of the majority
Light Raii Transit III (EDSA LRT III), was opinion. Because I hold that petitioners do not
intended to provide a mass transit system along
have standing to sue, I join to dismiss the peti
EDSA and alleviate the congestion and growing
tion in this case. I write only to set forth what I
transportation problem in the metropolis.
understand the grounds for our decisions on the
doctrine of standing are and, why in accordance
with these decisions, petitioners do not have the
II
•ifM> right to sue, whether as legislators, taxpayers
In their petition, petitioners argued that: or citizens. As members of Congress, because*'
they allege no infringement of prerogatives as
"(1) THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 22,1992,
legislators.13 As taxpayers because petitioners
AS AMENDED BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL
allege neither an unconstitutional exercise of the
AGREEMENT OF MAY 6, 1993, INSOFAR
taxing or spending powers of Congress (Art. VI,
AS IT GRANTS EDSA LRT CORPORATION,
§§ 24-25 and 29)14 nor an illegal disbursement
LTD., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, THE
of public money.15 As this Court pointed out in
OWNERSHIP OF EDSA LRT III, A PUBLIC-
Bugnay Const. andDev. Corp. v. Laron,16 atparty
UTILITY, VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
suing as taxpayer "must specifically prove that
AND, HENCE, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
he has sufficient interest in preventing the ille
<ji$&
gal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury as a result
Secretary Garcia and private respondent
of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
filed their comments separately and claimed
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely
that:
a general interest common to all members of the
(1) Petitioners are not the real parties-in- public." In that case, it was held that a contract,
interest and have no legal standing to institute whereby a local government leased property to
igj
the present petition; a private party with the understanding that
the latter would build a market building'and at
the end of the lease would transfer the building
HI to the lessor, did not involve a disbursement of
public funds so as to give a taxpayer standing
Respondents claimed that petitioners had to question the legality of the contract. I see
no legal standing to initiate the instant action. no substantial difference, as far as the stand
Petitioners, however, countered that the action ing of taxpayers to question public contracts is
was filed by them in their capacity as Senators concerned, between the contract there and the
and as taxpayers. build-lease-transfer (BLT) contract being ques
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits tioned by petitioners in this case.
are to allow taxpayers to question contracts en
tered into by the national government or govern ,3Philconsav. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994);Gonzales
ment-owned or controlled corporations allegedly v. Macaraig, 191SCRA452 (1990);Tolentino v. Comelec, 41
in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. SCRA 702 (1971).
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disal "Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968),
cited in Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980).
low the same when only municipal contracts are 15Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
jyi
involved (Bugnay Construction and Development (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA333 (1976).
Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989]). 16176 SCRA 240, 251-2 (1989).
Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
suit as citizens. In the cases17 in which citizens action.22 As the U.S. Supreme Court has held:
were authorized to sue, this Court found stand
ing because it thought the constitutional claims Typically, . . . the standing inquiry
requires careful judicial examination of a
pressed for decision to be of "transcendental
L importance," as in fact it subsequently granted
relief to petitioners by invalidating the chal
complaint's allegation to ascertain whether
the particular plaintiff is entitled to an ad
judication of the particular claims asserted.
lenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus Is the injury too abstract, or otherwise not
i$*l
in the Lotto case18 relied upon by the majority for appropriate, to be considered judicially cog
upholding petitioners' standing, this Court took nizable? Is the line of causation between the
into account the "paramount public interest" in illegal conduct and injury too attenuated?
volved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social, Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the
economic, and moral well-being of the people . . injury as a result^ of a favorable ruling too
. and the counter-productive and retrogressive speculative? These questions and any others
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system."19 relevant to the s/anding inquiry must be an
Accordingly, the Court invalidated the contract swered by reference to the Art. Ill notion that
for the operation of lottery. federal courts may exercise power only "in
the last resortj and as a necessity," Chicago
But in the case at bar, the Court precisely & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 US
finds the opposite by finding petitioners' sub 339, 345, 36 L Ed 176, 12 S Ct 400 (1892),
stantive contentions to be without merit. To and only when adjudication is "consistent
the extent therefore that a party's standing is with a system of separated powers and [the
affected by a determination of the substantive dispute is one] traditionally thought to be
merit of the case or a preliminary estimate capable of resolution through the judicial
thereof, petitioners in the case at bar must be process," Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83, 97, 20
held to be without standing. This is in line with L Ed 2d 947, 88 S Ct 1942 (1968). See Valley
our ruling in Lawyers League for a Better Philip Forge, 454 US, at 472-473, 70 L Ed 2d 700,
pines v.Aquino20 and In re Bermudez21 where we 102 S Ct 752.M
dismissed citizens' actions on the ground that Today's holding that a citizen, qua citizen,
petitioners had no personality to sue and their has standing to question a government contract
petitions did not state a cause of action. The unduly expands the scope of pubhc actions and
holding that petitioners did not have standing sweeps away the case and controversy.require-
(m
followed from the finding that they did not have ment so carefully embodied in Art. VIII, § 5 in
a cause of action. defining the jurisdiction of this Court. The result
is to convert the Court into an office of ombuds
In order that citizens' actions may be allowed man for the ventilation ofgeneralized grievances.
a party must show that he personally has suf Consistent with the view that this case has no
fered some actual or threatened injury as a result merit. I submit with respect that petitioners, as
ofthe allegedly illegal conduct of the government; representatives of the public interest, have no
standing.
"Emergency Powers Cases {Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84
Phil. 368 [1949]),Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n. v. Fe-
liciano, 121 Phil. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phil.
894 (1965); CLUv. Executive Secretary, 194SCRA317 (1991)
"Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
"Id. at 139.
^G-R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and 73990, May 22, 1986.
(Questioning the legitimacy of the Provisional Government
of President Aquino). 22Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S.
21145 SCRA 160 (1986).(Questioning whether President 464, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982); Bugnay Const, and Dev. Corp.
Aquino and Vice President Laurel were the "President and v. Laron, supra, note 4.
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election" "Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556,
within the meaning of Art. XVIII, §5 of the Constitution.) 170 (1984).
^J
G. Kilosbayan v. Morato On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed

G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995 seeking to declare the ELAinvalid on the ground
as the Contract of Leases nullified in the first
MENDOZA, J.: case.
A a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375

(Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 The PCSO and PGMC filed separate com
SCRA 110 [1994]) invalidating the Contract of ments in which they question the petitioners'
Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweep standing to bring suit. They maintain Q) the
stakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming ELA is a different lease contract with none of
Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it the vestiges of a joint venture in the Contract
had been made in violation of the charter of the
of Leases nullified in the prior case; (2) that the
PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for ELA did not have to be admitted to a public bid
a new agreement that would be "consistent with
ding because it fell within the exception provided
the latter's [PCSO] charter... and conformable
in E.O. No, 301, § 1(e); (3) that the power to de
to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
termine whether the ELA is advantageous to the
On January 25, 1195 the pasties signed an government is vested in the Board ofDirectors of
Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called the PCSO; (4) that for the lack of funds the PCSO
F&&>
ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equip
equipment and accessories to the PCSO in con ment and has had to enter into a lease contract'
sideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3% ofthe (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in
gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO this suit is to further their moral crusade and
from the operation of the lottery which in no case political agenda, using the Court as their forum.
shall be less than an annual rental computed
at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Op For the reason set forth, we hold that peti
eration. The rental is to be computed and paid tioners have no cause against respondents and
bi-weekly. In the vent the bi-weekly rentals in therefore their petition should be dismissed.
any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed I. PETITIONERS' STANDING
L rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay
the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization
ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2) described in its petition as "composed of civic-
spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from leaders who are committed to the cause of truth,
the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A.
justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are
1169, § [B])
also suing in their individual and collective ca
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, com pacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens."
mencing from the start of commercial operation The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen.
of the lottery equipment first delivered to the Wigberto Tafiada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are
lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3) members of the Congress suing as such and as
"taxpayer and concerned citizens."
In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is
to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is respon Respondents question the right of petitioners
sible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment to bring this suit on the ground that, not being
from any cause and for the cost of their mainte parties to the contract of lease which they seek
nance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) to nullify, they have no personal and substantial
interest likely to be injured by the enforcement
Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO
of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand
has the option to purchase the equipment for the
contend that the ruling in the previous case sus
sum of P25 million.
taining their standing to challenge the validity
L A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court
by the PGMC in accordance with its manifesta
of the first contract for the operation of lottery is
now the "law of the case," and therefore the ques
tion in the prior case. tion of their standing can no longer be reopened.
Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that by an appellate court. Thus in People v. Pinuila,
of "law of the case," nor that of conclusive of 103 Phil. 992, 999 (1958), it was stated:
judgment poses a barrier to a determination of
petitioners' right to maintain this suit. "Law of the case' has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in specifically, it means that whatever is once ir
rial
this case, concern for stability in decisional law revocably established as the controlling legal
does not call for adherence to what has recently rule of decision between the same parties in
been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling the same case continues to be the law of these
sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself case, whether correct on general principles
be considered a departure from settled rulings or not, so long as the facts on which such
on "real parties in interest" because no consti decision was predicated continue to be facts
tutional issues were actually involved. Just five of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)
years before that ruling this Court had denied
standing to a party who, in questioning the "It may be stated as a rule of general
validity of another form of lottery, claimed the application that, where the evidence on a
right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen second or succeeding appeal is substantially
and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v. Philippine the same as that on the first or preceding ap
Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Septem peal, all matters, questions* points, or issues
ber 22,1987) Only recently this Court held that adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of
members of Congress have standing to question the case on all subsequent appeals and will
the validity of presidential veto on the ground not be considered or re-adjudicated therein.
that, if it true, the illegality of the veto would (5 C.J.S. 1267)
impair their prerogative as members of Congress. "In accordance with the general rule
Conversely if the complaint is not grounded stated in Section 1821, where after a defi
on the impairment of the powers of Congress, nite determination, the court has remanded
legislators do not have standing to question the the cause for further action below, it will
validity of any law or official action (Philippine refuse to examine question other than those
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA arising subsequently to such determination
506 [1994]) and remand, or other than the propriety of
the compliance with its mandate; and if the
There is an additional reason for a reexami
court below has proceeded in substantial
nation of the ruling on standing. The voting on
conformity to the directions of the appellate
petitioners' standing in the previous case was a
court, its action will not be questioned on a
narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining
second appeal....
petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petition
ers' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus "As a general rule a decision on a prior
a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained appeal of the same is held to be the law of
in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there the case whether that decision is right or
have been changes in the members of the Court, wrong, the remedy of the party deeming
with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin himself aggrieved to seek a rehearing. (5
and the appointment of the writer of this opinion C.J.S. 1276-77)
and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly "Questions necessarily involved in the
tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling decision on a former appeal will be regarded
as to petitioners' standing. as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal,
Petitioners argue that inquiry into their although the questions are not expressly
j,{ii,j| right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine treated in the opinion of the courtâs the
of 'law of the case." We do not think this doctrine presumption is that all the facts in the case
is applicable considering the fact that while this bearing on the point decided have received
case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its due consideration whether all or none of
continuation: The doctrine applies only when a them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S.
case is before a court a second time after a ruling 1286-87)"
?Mi
As this Court explained in another case. "The city to sue. Although all three requirements are
law of the case, as applied to a former decision directed towards ensuring that only certain par
of an appellate court, merely expresses the ties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what require a partial consideration of the merits, as
has been decided. It differs from res judicata in well as broader policy concerns relating to the
that the conclusive of the first judgment is not proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE ANl) MILLER, CIVIL
generally, if not universally, not final, It relates PROCEDURE 328 [1985])
entirely to questions of law, and is confined in
&frj
Standing is a special concern in constitution
its questions of law, and is confined in its opera
tion to subsequent proceedings in the same case
al law because in some cases suits are brought
not by parties who have been personally injured
.. . ." (Municipality ofDaet v. Court of Appeals,
by the operation of a law or by official action
93 SCRA 503, 521 [1979])
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
It follows that since the present case is not voters who actually sue in the pubhc interest.
the same one litigated *by the parties before in 'Hence the question in standing is whether such
G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any parties have "alleged such a personal stake
sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
parties are the same but the cases are not. that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult con
The question whether the petitioners have stitutional questions." (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
standing to question the Equipment or ELA is 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962])
a legal question. As will presently be shown,
Accordingly, in Valmonte v. Philippine Char
the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare
ity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Septem
invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different
ber 22,1987, standing was denied to a petitioner
from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by
who sought to declare a form of lottery known
the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determina
as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the
tion in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the
Court held,
petitioner had standing to challenge the validity
of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen,
not preclude determination of their standing in lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3)
the present suit. minor children. But nowhere in his petition
does petitioner claim that his rights and
Not only is petitioners' standing a legal is privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been
sue that may be determined again in this case. directly and personally injured by the opera
It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this tion of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest
case, since standing is a concept in constitutional of the person assailing the constitutionality
law and here no constitutional question is actu of a statute must be direct and personal.
ally involved. The issue in this case is whether He must be able to show, not only the law
petitioners are the "real parties in interest" is invalid, but also that he has sustained or
within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of is in immediate danger of sustaining some
Court which requires that "Every action may be direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real and not merely that he suffers thereby in
party in interest." some indefinite way. It must appear that the
The difference between the rule on stand
person complaining has been or is about to
ing and real party in interest has been noted be denied some right or privilege to which
by'authorities thus: "It is important to note ... he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to
that standing because of its constitutional and be subjected to some burdens or penalties \>y
public policy underpinnings, is very different reason of the statute complained of.
from questions relating to whether a particular We apprehend no difference between the pe
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capa titioner urValmonte and the present petitioners.
608 CONSTITUTIONALSTRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
Petitioners do not in fact show what particular These are not, however, self executing provi
ized interest they have in bringing this suit. It sions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
does not detract from the high regard for peti cause ofaction in the courts. They do not embody
tioners as civic leaders to say that their interest judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
falls short of that required to maintain an action guidelines for legislation.
under the Rule 3, §2.
Thus, while constitutional policies are in
It is true that the present action involves not voked, this case involves basically questions of
a mere contract between private individuals but contract law. More specifically, the question is
vM
one made by a government corporation. There whether petitioners have legal right which has
is, however, no allegation that the public funds been violated.
are being misspent so as to make this action a
In action for annulment of contracts such as
public one and justify relaxation of the require
ment that an action must be prosecuted in the this action, the real parties are those who are
name of the real party in interest. (Valmonte v. parties to the agreement or are bound either
PCSO, supra; Bugnay Const, and Dev. Corp. v. principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in
Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989]) their rights with respect to one of the contract
ing parties and can show the detriment which
On the other hana\ the question as to "real would positively result to them from the contract
party in interest" is whether he is "the party who even though they did not intervene in it (Ibanez
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572
or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit."' [1912]), or who claim a right to take part in a
(Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. public bidding but have been illegally excluded
:s»l 125, 131 [1951]) from it. (See De la Lara Co., Inc. v. Secretary of
Petitioners invoke the following Principles Public Works and Communications, G.R. No.
and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Con L-13460, November 28, 1958)
L stitution: These are parties with "a present substan
The maintenance of peace and order, the tial interest, as distinguished from a mere ex
protection of life, liberty, and property, and pectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or
L the promotion of the general welfare are es consequential interest.... The phrase 'present
sential for the employment by all the people substantial interest' more concretely is meant
of the blessings of democracy. (§5)] such interest of a party in the subject matter of
the action as will entitle him, under the substan
The natural and primary right and duty tive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient,
of the parents in the rearing of the youth for or that he has the legal title to demand and the
civic efficiency and the development of moral defendant will be protected in a payment by
character shall receive the support of the him." (MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES
Government. (§12)
OF COURT 154-155 [1979]) Thus, in Gonzales
The State recognizes the vital role of the v. Hechenova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963), petitioner's
youth in nation building and shall promote right to question the validity of a government
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, contract for the importation of rice was sustained
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in because he was a rice planter with substantial
the youth patriotism and nacionalism, and production, who had a right under the law to sell
encourage their involvement in public and to the government.
civic affairs.
But petitioners do not have such present
The state shall give priority to education, substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle
science and technology, arts, culture, and them to bring this suit. Denying to them the right
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, to intervene will not leave without remedy any
accelerate social progress, and promote total perceived illegality in the execution of govern
human liberation and development. (§17) ment contracts. Question as to the nature or
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7) validity of public contracts or the necessity for a
ARTICLE .VHI: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 609
public bidding before they may be made can be the same. To my knowledge, the first proposition
mml raised in an appropriate case before the Com has never been of concern to or questioned by
mission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. The any member of this Court throughout its hegira
Constitution requires that the Ombudsman and from the first lotto case,24 then to the jai alai
his deputies, "as protectors of the people shall controversy,25 and now this so-called sequel to
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or the lottery dispute. Theisecond is a constitutional
manner against public officials or employees of tenet so hoary with age that for the majority to
the government, or any subdivision, agency or still belabor the same would somehow reflect
JjoHil instrumentality thereof including government- unfavorably upon the dissenting members.
owned or controlled corporations." (Art. XI, §12)
Upon the other hand, the Court may even
In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized
be misunderstood as adopting an adjudicative
to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be
pattern designed against transparency of and
thought that a government corporation, like the
inquiry into public affairs. The misperception
PCSO, has offended against its corporate charter
could very well be that it is glossing over the va
or misused its franchise. (Rule 66, §2 [al[d])
lidity of the lottery contract by seeking refuge in
their cause of action. the rule of locus standi, and suppressing concern
over societal mores on gambling by invoking the
doctrine of non-justiciability.
î
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition,
Coming to the real task at hand, we have
Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare
this resuscitation of the nagging question of locus
the Equipment Lease Agreement between the
standi. In the first lotto case, the Court excepted
atl Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and petitioners from the traditional locus standi
Philippine Gaming Management Corp. invalid proscription because the issues raised on the
is DISMISSED.
indiscriminate operation of a nationwide on-line
SO ORDERED. lottery system are of paramount public interest
and of a category higher than those involved in
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Fran former cases wherein the application of that rule
cisco, J J., concur.
was sustained. Respect for that holding was ac
Narvasa, C.J., took no part. cordingly observed and enjoined in Tatad, et al.
v. Garcia, etc., et al.26
batl
That the Court acted correctly in the original
REGALADO, J., dissenting: case, instead of clinging to the hidebound consti
tutional dictum of indeterminate vintage, has
I am constrained to respectfully dissent been demonstrated in the various opinions filed
from the majority opinion premised on the con in the jai alai case with illustrations of the fre
stitutional and procedural doctrines posed and quent reexamination of constitutional precepts
interpreted in tendem therein. I also regret that in the courts of the United States itself from
I have to impose on the majority with this virtual which they originated. Thus, creating exceptions
turno en contra when I could have indicated my to said doctrines and even rejecting the same in
disaccord by just joining Mr. Justice Davide in the interest of justice are not unusual, and this
his commendably objective presentation of the Court has likewise done so presumably since
minority position. I feel, However, that certain it agrees that one ought not to be more popish
views that have been advanced require a rejoin than the Pope.
der lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous
precedents.
Preliminary, there is no need to emphasize "Kilosbayan, Inc.,etal. v. Guingona, Jr., etc.,etal, G.R.
that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable No. 113375, May 5,1994, 232 SCRA 110.
^Lim, etc., etal. v. Pacquing, etc., et al., G.R. No. 115044,
M*< issue, and that this Court should not rule on and Guingona, Jr., et al. v. Reyes, et al, G.R. No. 117263,
the wisdom of the policy thereon but only on the jointly on January 27, 1995.
power of the corresponding authorities to adopt 26G.R. No. 114222, April 6,1995.
M
&fafcl
Withal, the relaxation of the locus standi It may be conceded that, in the context of the
doctrine in the first lotto case is impugned and cited cases wherein this doctrine was applied, two
lamented in the second one now at bar. Yet, with "appeals" are generally involved and the issue
regard to the "law of the case" doctriner during resolved in the first appeal cannot be reexamined
the deliberations the majority submitted, and I, in the second appeal. If so, then what is necessar
am borrowing their authority therefor, that "(d) ily challenged in the first recourse to the higher
octrine is merely a rule of procedure and does court is either an interlocutory order of the court
not go to the power of the court, and will not be a quo elevated on an original action for certiorari
adhered to where its application will result in or an appealable adjudication which nonetheless
iM)
an unjust decision.271 feel that here the majority did not dispose of the entire case below because
is thus ignoring the adage about the proverbial it was either a special proceeding or an action
sauce being for both the goose and the gander. admitting of multiple appeals.
In the first lotto case, the minority therein That is the present reglementary situation
rested its position entirely on procedural in the Philippines which, unfortunately, does
grounds, that is, by merely challenging the legal not appear to have been taken into account
Js^jA standing of petitioners but without any com when the double-appeal procedure involved in
ment on the merits of the contract in question. one particular American concept was cited as
Since the case at bar is in truth a reprise of the authority in the majority opinion. No attempt
first. I had excepted that this case would now was made to ascertain whether in Lhe American
be decided purely on the merits of the putative cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or
expanded lease agreement. Indeed, to make the even substantial counterparts of our procedural
Court's judgment here turn again on technical remedies of review by a higher court on either an
procedural grounds, by hiding within the shroud appeal by certiorari or writ of error, or through
of the locus standi mystique, does not strike me an original action of certiorari, prohibition or
as a decisive and conclusive adjudication. While mandamus. Yet on such unverified premises,
the contract involved is not of centennial dura and without a showing that the situations are in
tion, its legal impact on and the social cost to the pari materia, we are told that since the case at
country should warrant more than an androgy bar does not possess the formatted sequence of
nous solution.
an initiatory action in a lower court, an appeal
Be that as it may, since the majority opinion to a higher court, a remand to the lower court,
has now evolved other adjective theories which and then a second appeal to the higher court, the
are represented to be either different from or "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply. I have
(ivjiii).
ramifications of the original "standing to sue" ob perforce to reject that submission as I cannot
jection raised in the first lotto case. I will hazard indulge in the luxury of absolutes espoused by
my own humble observations thereon. this majority view.
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the I fear that this majority rule, has unduly
adoption of the "law of the case" doctrine in the constricted the factual and procedural situa
original majority ponencia. It is contended that tions where such doctrine may apply, through
this doctrine requires, for its applicability, an its undue insistence on the remedial procedure
issue involved in a case originating from a lower involved in the proceedings rather than the
court which is first resolved by an appellate court, juridical effect of the pronouncement of the
that case being then remanded to the court of higher court. Even in American law, the "law of
origin for further proceedings and with the prior the case" doctrine was essentially designed to
resolution by the higher court of that issue being express the practice of courts generally to refuse
the "law of the case" in any other proceeding in to reopen what has been decided28and, thereby,
or a subsequent appeal from the same case. It is to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of
insinuated that said doctrine exists only under the highest court is a final determination of the
such a scenario.
"People v. Medina, Cal., Cal. Rptr. 630, 635, 492 P. 2d 28White v. Higgins, C. C.A.Mass., 116 F. 2d 312; Fleming
686, cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 887. v. Cambell, 148 Kan. 516,83 P. 2d 708.
rights of the parties.29 That is the actual and ises. More importantly, however, the blemish in
basic role that it was conceived to play in judicial its new blueprint is that the defense of lack of a
determinations, just like the rationale for the right of action is effectively the same as lack of
doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of locus standi, that is, the absence of the remedial
judgment. right to sue. As the commentators of Castille
would say, the objectioB under the new terminol
Accordingly, the 'law of the case" may also ogy is "lo mismoperro con distinto collar." That
arise from an original holding of a higher court re-christened ground, as we shall later see, has
on a writ of certiorari,30 and is binding not only already been foreclosed by the judgment of the
in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same Court in the first lotto case.
case, but also in a subsequent suit between the
same parties.31 What I wish to underscore is that It is true that a right of action is the right
•JMl where, as in the instant case, the holding of this or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its
highest Court on a specific issue was handed purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the
down in an original action for certiorari, it has standard concept of a real party in interest based
the same binding effect as it would have had if on his possession of a cause of action. It could not
promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, have failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses
since in our jurisdiction an original action for to concede, that the concept of a cause of action
certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse in public interest cases should not be straitjack-
of official discretion can be commenced in the eted within its usual narrow confines in private
Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that interest litigations.
for its ruling therein to constitute the law of the Thus, adverting again to American jurispru
SiiJ case, there must first be a remand to a lower dence, there is the caveat that "the adoption of
court which naturally could not be the court of provision requiring that an action be prosecuted
origin from which the postulated second appeal in the name of the real party in interest does not
should be taken. solve all questions as to the proper person or
2. Obviously realizing that continued reli persons to institute suit, although it obviously
ance on the locus standi bar to petitioner's suit simplifies procedures in actions at law... There
is not an ironclad guaranty against it, the ma is no clearly defined rule by which one may deter
jority position has taken a different tack. It now mine who is or is not real party in interest, nor
invoked the concept of and the rules on a right of has there been found any concise definition of the
action in ordinary civil actions and, prescinding term. Who is the real party in interest depends
from its previous positions, insists that what is on the peculiar facts of each separate case, and
supposedly determinative of the issue of repre one may be a party in interest and yet not be the
sentation is contract law and not constitutional sole real party in interest."32
law. On the predicate that petitioners are not The majority opinion quotes the view of a
parties to the contract, primarily or subsidiarily, foreign author but unfortunately fails to put the
they then are real parties in interest, and for proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I
lack of cause of action on their part they have no believe should be that which should correctly be
right of action. Ergo, they, cannot maintain the stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce:
present petition.
It is important to note. . . that stand
As a matter of a conventional rule of proce ing because of its constitutional and public
dure, the syllogism of the majority can claim the policy underpinnings, is very different from
merit oflogicbut, even so, only on assumed prem- questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
MAtchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cali the capacity to sue. Although all three re
fornia, 209 Cal. 460, 288 P. 775. quirements are directed towards ensuring
^Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 147 Fla. 415, 2 So. 2d 723; that only certain parties can maintain an
Atlanric Coast Line R. Co. v. Sperry Flour Co., 63 GA. App.
611, 11 S.E. 2d 809.
"Oglethorpe University v. City ofAtlanta, 180Ga. 152, 3259 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, 249, citing State v. Estate of
178 S.E. 156. Frankel, 94 Misc. 2d 105, 404 NYS2d 954.
iiii)
action, standing restrictions require a par the Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in
tial consideration of the merits, as well as of the first lotto case. A previous judgment of the
t&sft
broader policy concerns relating to the proper Court may, of course, be revisited but if the os
role of the judiciary in certain areas.33 tensible basis is the change of membership and
known positions of the new members anent an
Indeed, if the majority would have its way
iîiij issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not
in this case, there would be no available judicial
sit well with the public as a judicious policy. This
remedy against irregularities or excesses in gov
would be similar to the situation where a judg
ernment contracts for lack of a party with legal
ment promulgated by the Court is held up by a
standing or capacity to sue. This legal dilemma
motion for reconsideration an,d which motion,
or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a
just because the present Rules do not provide
suggestions submitted in the majority opinion,
a time limit for the resolution thereof, stays
to wit:
îiiiiii
unresolved until the appointment of members
Denial to petitioners of the right to sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms
intervene will not leave without remedy of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" lev
•&mA any perceived illegality in the execution of elled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to
government contracts. Questions as to the this Court.
nature or validity of public contracts or the
I hold the view that the matter of the right
necessity for a public bidding before they
of petitioners to file and maintain this action —
may be made can be raised in an appropriate
whether the objection thereto is premised on lack
complaint before the Commission on Audit
of locus standi or right of action — has already
~ or before the Ombudsman. : . In addition,
been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto
the Solicitor General is authorized to bring
case, G.R. No. 113375. If the majority refuses, to
an action for quo warranto if it .should be
recognize such right under the "law of the case"
thought that a government corporation . . .
principle, I see no reason why that particular
has offended against its corporate charter or
issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of
misused its franchise. . .
the doctrinal effects of res judicata.34
The majority has apparently forgotten its
It is undeniable that in that case and the one
own argument that in the present case petition
at bar. There is identity of parties, subject matter
ers are not the real parties, hence they cannot
and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in
avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or
G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a court ofcom
suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the
petent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the
Commission on Audit would deign to deal with
merits, and has long become final and executory.
those whom the majority says are strangers to
There is, to be sure, an attempt to show that the
the contract. Again, should this Court now sus
subject matter in the first action is different from
tain the assailed contract, of what avail would
that in the instant case, since the former was the
be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman?
original contract and the latter is the supposed
Finally, it is a perplexing suggestion that peti
expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the
tioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a quo
proffered distinction.
warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex
relatione, not only because one has to contend The removal and replacement of some
with that official's own views or personal inter objectionable terms of a contract, which
ests but because he is himself the counsel for nevertheless continue to operate under the same
respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy
must take into account not only the legalities in
the case but also the realities of life. "11. Since this is Philippine case, I am using the term
"resjudicata" and, hereafter, "conclusiveness of judgment"
3. The majority believes that in view of the in the Philippine setting and as understood in our jurisdic
retirement and replacement of two members of tion. The importation of the alluring but variegated concepts
thereof in American law for application in this case would
compound the confusion, especially if considered along with
33CitingFRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL the rule on collateral estoppel, whether by judgment or ver
PROCEDURE, HORNBOOK SERIES, 1985 eds., 328. dict, as understood in U.S. procedural law.
ARTICLE VHI: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 613
fajffifr
basis, with on the property, for the same purpose, 4. I repeat what I said at the outset that
and the same contracting parties does not suffice this case should be decided on the merits and
to extinguish the identity of the subject matter on substantive considerations, not on dubious
in both cases. This would be to exalt form over technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry
substance. Furthermore, respondents themselves into the validity of the supposed amended lease
admitted that the new contract is actually the contract. The people are .entitled to the benefit
same as the original one, with just some variants of a duly clarified and translucent transaction,
in the terms of the latter to eliminate those just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and
which were objected to. The contrary assumption should even by themselves primarily seek, to
now being floated by respondents would create be cleaned of any suspicions or lingering doubts
chaos in our remedial and contractual laws, open arising from the fact that the sponsors for jai alai
the door to fraud, and subvert the rules on the and, now, of lotto are different.
iliaiJ
finality of judgments.
On the merits, to obviate unnecessary repli
Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi cation I reiterate my concurrence with the find
that the amended terms in the expanded lease ings and conclusions of Mr. Justice Davide in
agreement created a discrete set of litigable viola
this dissenting opinion, the presentation whereof
tions of the statutory charter of the Philippines
is completely devoid of strained or speculative
Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively
premises, and moreover has the virtue of being
resulting in a disparate actionable wrong or
based on his first-hand knowledge as a legislator
delict, that would merely constitute at most a
of the very provisions of the law now in dispute.
difference in the causes of action in the former
and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule In this instance and absent any other operative
39 of the Rules of Court, we would still have a data. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and
situation of collateral estoppel, better known in highly meritorious analysis of the controversy
this jurisdiction as conclusiveness of judgment. on the contract.
Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the One concluding point. I am not impressed by
prior judgment shall be conclusive between the their stance of the majority that our taking cogni
parties in the case now before us and that defi zance of this case and resolving it on the merits
nitely includes at the very least the adjudgment will hereafter invite others to unduly overburden
therein that petitioners have the locus standi this Court with avoidable importunities. This
or the right to sue respondents on the contracts sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since the Court
concerned.
lilliiJ
has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections
In their case — whether of res judicata, on grounded on judge-made constitutional theories
which I insist, or of conclusiveness of judgment, only under cogent reasons of substantial justice
which I assume arguendo — what is now being and paramount public interest.
primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to
On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience
sue, aside from the postulated invalidity of the
contract for the government-sponsored lottery to the beguiling locus standi or right of action
system. It does seem odd, if not arcane, that doctrines posited by the majority in this case
petitioners were held to have the requisite locus would only not be an abdication ofa clear judicial
standi or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the
and, for that matter, were likewise so recognized people of recourse to us from dubious government
in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case,35 contracts through constitutionally outdated or
but are now mysteriously divested of the "place procedurally insipid theories for such stultifica
of standing" allegedly due to, for legal purposes, tion. This is a contingency which is not only pos
a compelling need for re-examination of the doc sible, but probable under our oligarchic society
trine, and, for economic reasons, an obsession for in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant
autarky of the nation. within a just regime of law still in posse.
im
"Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.,

G.R. No. 115781, August 25,1994, 235 SCRA 630.
H. TELEBAP v. Comelec In those cases in which citizens were autho

G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998 rized to sue, this Court upheld their standing in
view of the "transcendental importance" of the
MENDOZA, J.: constitutional question raised which justified the
granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar,
In Osmena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, as will presently be shown, petitioners' substan
decided March 31,1998, we upheld the validity of tive claim is without merit. To the extent, there
§11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 which prohibits the sale fore, that a party's standing is determined by the
or donation of print space or air time for politi substantive merit of his case or a preliminary
cal ads, except to the Commission on Elections estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be
under §90, of B.P. Big. 881, the Omnibus Election held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will
Code, with respect to print media, and §92, with be allowed to raise a constitutional question only
Es^j
respect to broadcast media. In the present case, when he can show that he has personallysuffered
we consider the validity of §92 of B.P. Big. 881 some actual or threatened injury as a result of
against claims that the requirement that radio the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
and television time be given free takes property the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged ac
without due process of law; that it violates the tion; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
eminent domain clause of the Constitution which favorable action. Members of petitioner have not
provides for the payment of just compensation; shown that they have suffered harm as a result
that it denies broadcast media the equal protec of the operation of §92 of B.P. Big. 881.
tion of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP
the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA
have an interest as registered voters since this
Network, Inc. case does not concern their right of suffrage.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broad Their interest in §92 of B.P. Big. 881 should be
cast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an precisely in upholding its validity.
organization of lawyers of radio and television Much less do they have an interest as taxpay
broadcasting companies. They are suing as citi ers since this case does not involve the exercise
zens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A
petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show
and television broadcasting stations throughout that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the
the Philippines under a franchise granted by illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
Congress. and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of the questioned statute.
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on
the ground (1) that it takes property without due Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELE
process of law and without just compensation; BAP have standing to assert the rights of radio
^jjj
(2) that it denies radio and television broadcast and television broadcasting companies. Stand
companies the equal protection of the laws; and ing's tertii will be recognized only if it can be
(3) that it is in excess of the power given to the shown that the party suing has some substan
jjpi COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation tial relation to the third party, or that the third
of media of communication or information during party cannot assert his constitutional right, or
the period of election. that the right of the third party will be diluted
unless the party in court is allowed to espouse
The Question of Standing the third party's constitutional claim. None of
At the threshold of this suit is the question these circumstances is here present. The mere
of standing of petitioner Telecommunications fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. the broadcast industry does not entitle them to
(TELEBAP). As already noted, its members as bring this suit in their name as representatives
sert an interest as lawyers of radio and television of the affected companies.
broadcasting companies and as citizens, taxpay Nevertheless, we have decided to take this
ers, and registered voters. case since the other petitioner, GMA Network,
ARTICLE Vm: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 615
Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to study and recommend proposed amendments
bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the
iiiiiii
operates radio and television broadcast stations manner of implementing the same." Petitioner
in the Philippines affected by the enforcement.of disputes die constitutionality of the PCCR on
§92 of B.P. Big. 881 requiring radio and televi two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public
sion broadcast companies to provide free air time office which only thefclegislature can create by
to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for way of a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that by
campaign and other political purposes. creating such a body the President is intervening
in a process from which he is totally excluded
jgfr) NOTE: The ban on media advertising has
by the Constitution — the amendment of the
already been repealed.
fundamental charter.
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect

I. Gonzales v. Narvasa
to the PCCR, this case has become moot and
G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000
academic. We agree.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: An action is considered "moot" when it no lon
In this petition for prohibition and man ger presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead.
damus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner
Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed
and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999.
creation of the Preparatory Commission on Con However, on February 19, 1999, the President
stitutional Reform (PCCR) and of thepositions of issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70),
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. which extended the time frame for the completion
of the commission's work.
Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers and The PCCR submitted its recommendations to
m
assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin the President on December 20,1999 and was dis
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from solved by the President on the same day. It had
enforcing their advice and recommendations. In likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the
addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commis PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison
fljijrt
sion on Audit from passing in audit expenditures d'etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the
for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays
for an order compelling respondent Zamora to The staleness of the issue before us is made
furnish petitioner with information on certain more manifest by the impossibility of granting
matters. the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically,
petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR
On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. from acting as such. Clearly, prohibition is an
Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity inappropriate remedy since the body sought to
as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment be enjoined no longer exists...
^j
to the Petition. The rest of the respondents,
who are being represented in this case by the
Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this
In addition to the mootness of the issue,
Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a
petitioner's lack of standing constitutes another
i$$} Consolidated Reply on April 24,2000, whereupon
obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial
this case was considered submitted for decision.
power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.
I. Preparatory Commission on Constitu
^( The question in standing is whether a party
tional Reform
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
The Preparatory Commission on Constitu of the controversy as to assure that concrete
tional Reform (PCCR) was created by President adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
j|0
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Ex issues upon which the court so largely depends
ecutive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order "to for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
^|
tions." In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. released to the Commission upon submission
Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as of requirements for expenditures.
a citizen and taxpayer. A citizen acquires stand
; The appropriations for the PCCR were
ing only i£he can establish that he has suffered
authorized by the President, not by Congress.
some actual or threatened injury as a result of
In fact, there was no appropriation at all.
Waft
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
"In a strict sense, appropriation has been
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged defined 'as nothing more than the legislative
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed authorization prescribed by the Constitution
by a favorable action.... that money may be paid out of the treasury*,
while appropriation made by law* refers to
'the act of the legislature setting apart or
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner assigning to a particular use a certain sum
has not shown that he has sustained or is in to be used in the payment of debt or dues
danger of sustaining any personal injury at from the State to its creditors.' 'The funds
tributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, used for the PCCR were taken from funds
till it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can intended for the Office of the President, in
claim any "injury" in this case since, according the exercise of the Chief Executive's power
to petitioner, the President has encroached upon to transfer funds pursuant to Section 25(5)
the legislature's powers to create a public office of Article VI of the Constitution."
and to propose amendments to the Charter by
forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no In the final analysis, it must be stressed that
the Court retains the power to decide whether or
direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does
not it will entertain a taxpayer's suit. In the case
he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall
taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be
be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a re
allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in
sult of the PCCR's activities. Clearly, petitioner
his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must
has failed to establish his locus standi so as to
establish that he has a "personal and substantial
enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
interest in the case and that he has sustained or
Igsi
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to will sustain direct injury as a result ofits enforce
raise a constitutional issue when it is established ment." In other words, petitioner must show that
that public funds have been disbursed in alleged he is a real party in interest — that he will stand
contravention of the law or the Constitution... to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that
he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. No
where in his pleadings does petitioner presume
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily to make such a representation.
apparent thatthere is no exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was cre J. Del Mar, et al. v. PAGCOR
ated by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000
amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O.
No. 43, the amount of P3 million is "appropriated" PUNO, J.:
for its operational expenses "to be sourced from
the funds of the Office of the President." The
These two consolidated petitions concern the
relevant provision states — issue of whether the franchise granted to the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
Appropriations. The initial amount (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and
of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is operate jai-alai. ^
hereby appropriated for the operational ex
penses of the Commission to be sourced from
mi
funds of the Office of the President, subject On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del
to the usual accounting and auditing rules Mar initially filed in G.R. No. 138298 a Petition
and regulations. Additional amounts shall be for Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR
L
from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or must specifically prove that he has sufficient.
Basque pelota games, by itself or in agreement interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
with Belle Corporation, on the ground that the money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpay
controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of ers are allowed to sue where there is a claim
any basis either from the Constitution or PAG- of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
COR's own Charter. public money is being Reflected to any improper
However, on June 17,1999, respondent PAG purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
COR entered into an Agreement with private respondent from wasting public funds through
respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.
and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator
Corporation (FILGAME) wherein it was agreed In the petitions at bar, the Agreement
'$$) that BELLE will make available to PAGCOR entered into between PAGCOR and private
the required infrastructure facilities including respondents BELLE and FILGAME will show
the main fronton, as well as provide the needed that all financial outlay or capital expenditure for
funding for jai-alai operations with no financial the operation of jai-alai games shall be provided
outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles for by the latter. Thus, the Agreement provides,
the actual management and operation of jai-alai. among others, that: PAGCOR shall manage,
Thus, on August. 10, 1999, petitioner Del operate and control the jai-alai operation at no
Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari cost or financial risk to it (Sec. 1[A][1]); BELLE
questioning the validity of said Agreement onthe shall provide funds, at no cost to PACCOR, for
ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, all capital expenditures (Sec. 1[B][1]); BELLE
{Mi legislative franchise, authority or power to enter shâll make available to PAGCOR, at no cost to
into such Agreement for the opening, establish PAGCOR, the use of the integrated nationwide
ment, operation, control and management of network of on-line computerized systems (Sec.
^t
jai-alai games. 1[B][2]); FILGAME shall make available for
use of PAGCOR on a rent-free basis the jai-alai
fronton facilities (Sec. 1[C][1]; BELLE & FIL
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. GAME jointly undertake to provide funds, at no
£B Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and intervenor cost to PAGCOR, foxpre-operating expenses and
Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing as taxpayers and working capital (Sec. 1[D][1]);and that BELLE &
in their capacity as members of the House of FILGAME will provide PAGCOR with goodwill
Representatives representing the First District money in the amount of P200 million (Sec. 1[D]
of Cebu City, the Lone Congressional District of [2]). In fine, the record is barren of evidence that
Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional Dis the operation and management of jai alai by the
trict of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional PAGCOR involved expenditure of public money.
District of Bukidnon, respectively.
Be that as it may, in line with the liberal
policy of this Court on locus standi when a case
We shall first rule on the important proce involves an issue of overarching significance to
dural issues raised by the respondents. our society, we find and so hold that as members
of the House of Representatives, petitioners
L Respondents also assail the locus standi or
have legal standing to file the petitions at bar.
In the instant cases, petitioners complain that
the standing of petitioners to file the petitions at the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringe
bar as taxpayers and as legislators. First, they ment by PAGCOR of the legislature's exclusive
flljfll allege that petitioners have no legal standing power to grant franchise. To the extent the pow
to file a taxpayer's suit because the operation ers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
of jai-alai does not involve the disbursement of each member thereof, since his office confers a
public funds. right to participate in the exercise of the powers
Respondents' stance is not without oven of that institution, so petitioners contend. The
ready legal support. A party suing as a taxpayer contention commands our concurrence for it is
fej
now settled that a member of the House of Rep that he has actual and material legal interest in
resentatives has standing to maintain inviolate the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested public funds are properly and lawfully used and
by the Constitution in his office. As presciently appropriated, petitioner filed thejnstant petition
stressed in the case of Kilosbayan, Inc., viz.: as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
"We find the instant petition to be of The Court upholds the right of petitioner to
transcendental importance to the public. file the present petition.
|ss)
The issues it raised are of paramount public
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing
interest and of a category even higher than
those involved in many of the aforecited for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
cases. The ramifications of such issues im Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
measurably affect the social, economic, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
moral well-being of the people even in the Purposes," appropriates funds under Section
remotest barangays of the country and the 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental
counter-productive and retrogressive effects budget on the General Appropriations Act of the
of the envisioned on-line lottery system are year of its enactment into law shall provide for
as staggering as the billions in pesos it is the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
expected to raise. The legal standing then Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the
of the petitioners deserves recognition ..." right to restrain officials from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an unconstitu
tional statute. The Court has held that they may
assail the validity of a law appropriating public
funds because expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
K. Matibag v. Benipayo
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
of such funds.
See supra, Art. VII, Sec. 16
The challenged provision of law involves a
L. Tatad v. Secretary of the public right that affects a great number of citi
Department of Energy zens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking
G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867, jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner
November 5, 1997 has seriously and convincingly presented an is
See supra, Art. VI, Sec. 1 sue of transcendental significance to the Filipino
people. This has been explicitly pronounced in
M. Bayan v. Executive Secretary
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
See supra, Art. VII, Sec. 21
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, where the Court held:
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of suf
N. IBP v. Zamora ficient personality standing, or interest are, how
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 ever, in the main procedural matters. Consider
See supra, Art. VII, Sec. 18 ing the importance to the public of the cases at
bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under
O. Macalintal v. Comelec
the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
and the laws and that they have not abused the
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari discretion given to them, the Court has brushed
and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declara cognizance of these petitions.
tion that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of2003) Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming procedural rules as the constitutional right of
suffrage of/a considerable number of FiUpinos incessant clash between government power and
m
is involved. individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal
The question of propriety of the instant peti
tension between law and morality.
tion which may appear to be visited by the vice of
prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings
This Petition under..Rule 45 of the Revised
in any tribunal, board or before a government
official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or min Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the rever
sal of the Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316
isterial functions as required by Rule 65 of the
&i'i
Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity
the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
In Tanada v. Angara, the Court held: Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philip Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
pine Senate on the ground that it contravenes Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establish
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises ments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
Mi a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist
not only the right but in fact the duty of the and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a
thus posed is judicial rather than political. writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial
that the supremacy of the "Constitution is Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as
upheld." Once a "controversy as to the ap defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the
plication or interpretation of constitutional City) represented by Mayor Lim. MTDC prayed
provision is raised before this Court (as in that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
which the Court is bound by constitutional be declared invalid and unconstitutional. ...
mandate to decide."
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White
Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
The need to consider the constitutional issues (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
raised before the Court is further buttressed by Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene
the fact that it is now more than fifteen years and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention
since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
requiring Congress to provide a system for ab their business interests as operators of drive-in-
sentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, hotels and motels in Manila...
strong reasons of public policy demand that the On December 23,1992, the RTC granted the
Court resolves the instant petition and determine motion to intervene.
LaJ whether Congress has acted within the limits of
the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the
discretion entrusted to it.
We must address the threshold issue of
petitioners' standing. Petitioners allege that as
P. White Light Corporation v. owners of establishments offering "wash-up"
City of Manila rates, their business is being unlawfully inter
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009 fered with by the Ordinance. However, petition
ers also allege that the equal protection rights
of their clients are also being interfered with.
TINGA, J.:
Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not
With another city ordinance of Manila these establishments have the requisite stand
also principally involving the tourist district as ing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
subject, the Court is confronted anew with the protection rights.
L
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a American jurisprudence is replete with ex

party to demonstrate to the court sufficient con amples where parties-in-interes't were allowed
nection to and harm from the law or action chal standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental
lenged to support that party's participation in the due process or equal protection .claims of other
case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing persons or classes of persons injured by state
is built on the principle of separation of powers, action. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United
sparing as it does unnecessary interference or States Supreme Court held that physicians had
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions standing to challenge a reproductive health
rendered by its co-equal branches of government. statute that would penalize them as accessories
as well as to plead the constitutional protections
The requirement of standing is a core compo
available to their patients....
nent of the judicial system derived directly from
sfaftj the Constitution. The constitutional component An even more analogous example may be
of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which found in Craig v. Borden, wherein the United
concededly are not susceptible of precise defini States Supreme Court held that a licensed bev
F&&I
tion. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct erage vendor has standing to raise the equal
and personal interest" presents the most obvious protection claim of a male customer challenging
cause, as well as the standard test for a petition a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to
er's standing. In a similar vein, the United States males under the age of 21 and to females under
Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the the age of 18. The United States High Court ex
meaning of the three constitutional standing plained that the vendors had standing "by acting
requirements of injury, causation, and redress- as advocates of the rights of third parties who
ability in Allen v. Wright. seek access to their market or function."
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not
admit of several exceptions such as the over have a relationship with their patrons for the
breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party former to assert the rights of the latter, the over
standing and, especially in the Philippines, the breadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth
doctrine of transcendental importance. analysis, challengers to government action are in
For this particular set of facts, the concept effect permitted to raise the rights of third par
of third party standing as an exception and the ties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine
v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
that: "We have recognized the right of litigants constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case,
to bring actions on behalf of third parties, pro the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes
vided three important criteria are satisfied: the a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of
Itel
litigant must have suffered an "injury-in-fact," their clients. We can see that based on the al
thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete legations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers
interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; from overbreadth.
the litigant must have a close relation to the third We thus recognize that the petitioners have
party; and there must exist some hindrance to a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
the third party's ability to protect his or her own clients to patronize their establishments for a
interests." Herein, it is clear that the business "wash-rate" time frame.
interests of the petitioners are likewise injured
by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage 5. Political Questions.
of their customers for their continued viability
which appears to be threatened by the enforce It is an established rule that courts have no
ment of the Ordinance. The relative silence in jurisdiction to pass upon "political questions."
constitutional litigation of such special interest But what are "political questions"? It is easy
groups in our nation such as the American Civil enough to define political questions in the ab
Liberties Union in the United States may also stract. As Justice Concepcion said in Tanada v.
be construed as a hindrance for customers to Cuenco, L-10520, February 28, 1965, political
bring suit. questions are "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in 6. Political Questions: Cases.

their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated A. Marcos v. Manglapus
to the legislative or executive branch of the 177 SCRA 688 (1989)
government." But the difficult question which (Supra, Section 1)
the Court is frequently called upon to answer
is whether a question is one "in regard to which B. Daza v. Singson
full discretionary authority has been delegated to 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
the legislative or executive branch of the govern (Supra, under Art. VI, 18)
ment." Lengthily argued majority opinions, con
currences, and dissents characterize the cases C. Santiago v. Guingona
where the political questions doctrine has been G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
invoked. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) has See supra, Art. VI, Sec. 16
attempted to formulate some guidelines for de
termining whether a question is political or not:
D. The Davide Impeachment
Prominent on the surface of any case See infra, Art. XI, Sec. 3
held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional com
7. Effect of declaration of unconstitution
mitment of the issue to a political depart
ality.
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the The Supreme Court has rejected the view
impossibility of deciding without an initial that an unconstitutional act confers no rights, im
policy determination of a kind clearly for non poses no duties, and affords no protection what
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a soever. Instead, the Court has adopted the view
court's undertaking independent resolution that before an act is declared unconstitutional it
without expressing lack of the respect due is an "operative fact" which can be the source of
coordinate branches of government; or an rights and duties.
unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the This recognition of an unconstitutional
potentiality of embarrassment from multi statute as an "operative fact" before it is de
farious pronouncements by various depart clared unconstitutional was recently applied
ments on one question. Id. at 217. in de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,
38 SCRA 429 (1971), where the period before a
The new Constitution defines judicial power moratorium law was declared unconstitutional
as including "the duty of courts of justice to was not allowed to toll the prescriptive period of
settle actual controversies involving rights which the right to foreclose a mortgage.
are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave Since the power ofjudicial review flows from
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of judicial power and since inferior courts are pos
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru sessed of judicial power, it may fairly be inferred
mentality of the Government." Has this in effect that the power of judicial review is not a power
nullified the long standing doctrine on political exclusive to the Supreme Court. This same con
questions as being beyond the pale of judicial clusion may be inferred from Article X, Section
power? No. This partial definition of judicial 5(2) which confers on the Supreme Court appel
power made by the new Constitution has for its late jurisdiction over judgments and decrees of
purpose to emphasize that when "grave abuse inferior courts in all cases in which the constitu
of discretion" is committed even by the highest tionality or validity of any treaty, international
executive authority, the judiciary should not hide agreement, law, presidential decree, proclama
behind the political questions doctrine. In other tion, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
words, the most that this definition means is that is in question. As the Court said in J.M. Tuason
the Constitution does not accept everything that and Co. v. Court ofAppeals, 3 SCRA 696, 703-704
is said in the above citation from Baker v. Carr. (1961): "Plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction be reduced to writing but that of the defendant
in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty shall be taken in writing and subscribed by
or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final him.] infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the'
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such Constitution, [now Section 5(5)] The Supreme
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
Considering, however, the qualified majority
vote which is required for the Supreme Court all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
to declare a law unconstitutional, lower courts
must keep in mind "that a becoming modesty of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase
inferior courts demands conscious realization
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
of the position they occupy in the interrelation on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
and operation of the integrated judicial system repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules
iii
of the nation." People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme
cited in Vera v. Area, 28 SCRA 351,361-2 (1969). Court to alter and modiry the same. The National
Moreover, while a declaration of unconstitution Assembly shall have the power to repeal, alter,
sa ality made by the Supreme Court constitutes a or supplement the rules concerning the pleading,
precedent binding on all, a similar decision of an practice, and procedure, and the admission to
inferior court binds only the parties in the case. the practice of law in the Philippines.] It is said
that the rule in question deals with substantive
matters and impairs substantive rights.
8. Rule-making power.
We cannot agree with this view. We are of,
A. Bustos v. Lucero . the opinion that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its
81 Phil. 648(1948) predecessors, is an adjective law and not a sub
stantive law or substantive right. Substantive
TUASON, J.: law creates substantive rights and the two terms
in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, Substantive rights is a term which includes those
we said, citing Dequito and Saling Buhay v. rights which one enjoys under the legal system
Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60
right of an accused to be confronted by the wit C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the
nesses against him does not apply to preliminary law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary or which regulates the rights and duties which
examination be an infringement of his right to give rise to a cause of action; that part of the
confront witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary law which courts are established to administer;
investigation may be done away with entirely as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
without infringing the constitutional right of an prescribes the method of enforcing rights or ob
accused under the due process clause to a fair tains redress for their invasion. (36 C.J., 27; 52
trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough C.J.S., 1026.)
to dispose of the constitutional question pleaded
in the application for certiorari. Heeding the As applied to criminal law, substantive law
:i&&$
wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon is that which declares what acts are crimes and
the subject. prescribes the punishment for committing them,
as distinguished from the procedural law which
It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108
provides or regulates the steps by which one who
of the Rules of Court [Rights ofa defendant after
commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C.J.S.,
arrest. — After the arrest of the defendant and
49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and
his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in
the complaint or information filed against him.
a criminal prosecution.
He shall also be informed of the substance of the
testimony and evidence presented against him, As a rule of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108
and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses is also procedural. Evidence which is "the mode
or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to and manner of proving the competent facts and
do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not circumstances on which a party relies to estab-
ARTICLEVIE: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 623
lish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" thereunder cannot be held to fall within the con
(jjigj)
is identified with and forms part of the method stitutional prohibition.
by which, in private law, rights are enforcedand
redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law While Section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses
refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State in a preliminary investigation, his right to pres
vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.)The entire ent his witnesses remains-unaffected, and his
rules ofevidence have been incorporated into the constitutionalright to be informedofthe charges
Rules of Court. We cannot tear down Section 11 against him both at such investigation and at
&ii
of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
throwing out the whole code of evidence embod proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty
ied in these rules. ofdue process comes into play, he still enjoys to
iii)
the full extent the right to be confronted by and
In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S., 167, 70 Law. to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The
ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court said: degree ofimportanceofa preliminary investiga
tion to an accused may be gauged by the fact that
"Expressions are found in earlier judicial this formality is frequently waived.
opinions to the effect that the constitutional
limitation may be transgressed by altera The distinction between "remedy" and
tions in the rules of evidence or procedure. "substantive right" is incapable of exact defi
And there may be procedural changes which nition. The difference is somewhat a question of
operate to deny to the accused a defense degree. (Dexter v. Edwards, 89 F., 467; Beazell v.
available under the laws in force at the time Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any
of the commission of his offense, or which particular case beyond which legislative power
otherwise affect him in such a harsh and ar .over remedy and procedure can pass without
bitrary manner as to fall within the constitu touching upon the substantive rights of parties
tional prohibition. But it is now well-settled affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary
that statutory changes in the mode of trial by general condition. (State o. Pavelick, 279 P.,
or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the
the accused of a defense and which operate Supreme Court in making rules should step on
3 only in a limited and unsubstantial manner substantive rights, and the Constitution must
to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
statute which, after indictment, enlarges incursion as does not affect the accused in a
the class of persons who may be witnesses at harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of
the trial, by removing the disqualification of a defense, but operates only jn a limited and
persons convicted of felony, is not an expost unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For
factolaw. Nor is a statute which changes the the Court's power is not merely to compile,revise
rules of evidence after the indictment so as or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
to render admissible against the accused evi time of the Constitution's approval. This power
dence previously held inadmissible, or which is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, ,
changes the place of trial, or which abolishes practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating power to adopt a general, complete and compre
a new one in its stead." hensive system of procedure, adding new and
different rules without regard to their source
Tested by this standard, we do not believe and discarding old ones.
that the curtailment of the right of an accused
in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine The motion is denied.
the witnesses who had given evidence for his
arrest is of such importance as to offend against B. In Re Cunanan
the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in 94 Phil. 534(1954)
the beginning, preliminary investigation is not
an essential part of due process of law. It may DIOKNO, J.:
be suppressed entirely,.and if this may be done, In recent years few controversial issues have
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed aroused so much public interest and concern as
Repubhc Act No. 972, popularly known as the revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
"Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of reasons, it is not less certain that only this Court,
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order and not the legislative nor executive department,
that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any
be deemed to have passed his examinations suc of these departments would be'a clear usurpa
cessfully, he must have obtained a general aver tion of its functions as is the case with the law
age of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling in question.
below50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,Sec. That the Constitution has conferred on Con
14,Rules ofCourt). Nevertheless, considering the gress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
varying difficulties of the different bar examina rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning
tions held since 1946 and the varying degree of the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
strictness with which the examination papers argument.. .
were graded, this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an It will be noted tnat the Constitution has
average of only 72 percent in 1946, 69 percent not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal
in 1947, 70 percent in 1948, and 74 percent in equal responsibilities concerning the admission
1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 percent was raised to the practice of law. The primary power and
to 75 percent. responsibility which the Constitution recognizes,
continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
:^J
Believing themselves as fully qualified to found that this Court has not promulgated any
practice law as those reconsidered and passed by rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
this court and feeling conscious of having been which to exercise the power granted to it. Con
discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to gress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who ob promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
tained averages of a few percentage lower than responsibility over the admission, suspension,
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
Wit)
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate law and their supervision remain vested in the
Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
passing general average in bar examinations to supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
70 percent effective since 1946. The President that Congress substitute or take the place of this
requested the views of this court on the bill. Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
Complying with that request, seven members of the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
the court subscribed to and submitted written mean that Congress may admit, suspend, dis
comments adverse thereto, and shortly there bar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
after the President vetoed it. Congress did not determinate group of individuals to the practice
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
i&iiJ
No. 371. embodying substantially the provisions supplement the existing rules on the matter, if
of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this according to its judgment the need for a better
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the service ofthe legal profession requires it. But this
matter, the President allowed the bill to become power does not relieve this Court of its respon
a law on June 21, 1953, without his signature. sibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.
In decreeing that bar candidates who ob
tained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, Being coordinate and independent branches,
a general average of 70 percent without falling the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
below 50 percent in any subject, be admitted in admission to the practice of law and the^concur
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is rent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment may and should be exercised with the respect
revoking those promulgated by this Court during that each owes to the other, giving careful con
the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates sideration to the responsibihty which the nature
concerned; and although this Court certainly can of each department requires. These powers have
ARTICLE Vni: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 625
existed together for centuries without diminution reasons, only this Court and no other may revise
on each part; the harmonious delimination being and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
found in that the legislature may and should Republic Act No. 973 violated the Constitution.
examine if the existing rules in the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public 3. By the disputed law, Congress has ex
interest requires of a Bar endowed with high ceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
virtues, culture, training and responsibility.The supplementrules on Admission to the Bar. Such
legislature may, by means ofrepeal, amendment additionalor amendatory rules are, as they ought
or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiencythat to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
it may find, and the judicial power, which has the promulgation and should tend to improve and
inherent responsibility for a good and efficient elevate the0practice of law, and this Tribunal
shall consider these rules as minimum norms
administration of justice and the supervision of
the practice of the legal profession, should con towards that end in the admission, suspension,
&$/
sider these reforms as the minimum standards

disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
for the elevation of the profession, and see to
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions
it that with these reforms the lofty objective
and is essential to a worthy administration of
that is desired in the exercise of its traditional
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and
are powers which exercised within their proper
may continue in the practice of law according to
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but existing rules.
rather complementary to each other in attaining
$&) the establishment of a Bar that would respond
to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice. C. Javellana v. DILG
G.R. No. 102549, August 10, 1992
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and here GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

by declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconsti
tutional and therefore, void, and without any This petition for review on certiorari involves
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit: the right of a public official to engage in the
practice of his profession while employed in the
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit Government.
810 candidates who failed in the bar examina
tions of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are cer Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was'an elected
tainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as City Council or of Bago City, Negros Occidental.
On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C.
was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid
Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-
years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of
90 against Javellana ...
these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javel
already prepared to become members of the Bar. lana, an incumbent member of the city Council
It obliges the Tribunal to performsomethingcon or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a
trary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional in the practice of law without securing author
responsibility of the Supreme Court. ity for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department ofLocal Government, as required by
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revok DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 ..
ing the resolution of this Court on the petition of
these 810 candidates, without having examined
their respective, examination papers, and al Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again
though it is admitted that this Tribunal may re set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javel
considersaid resolution at any time forjustifiable lana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari
praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. appropriate implementing agency shall initi
80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local ate the expropriation proceedings before the
Government Code (RA 7160) be declared uncon proper court under the following guidelines:
stitutional and null and void because:
Upon the filing of the .complaint, and
(1) [t]hey violate Article VIII, Section 5 after due notice to the defendant, the imple
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: menting agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property the amount equivalent
"SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%)
have the following powers: of the value of the property based on the cur
XXX XXX
rent relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau
XXX
of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the of the improvements and/or structures as
protection and enforcement ofconstitutional determined undehSection 7 hereof;.
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of This runs counter to Rule 67 of the Rules of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance Court which requires only partial deposit before
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall pro entry. May a statue amend a Rule of Court?
vide a.simplified and inexpensive procedure It is possible for a substantive matter to be
tî for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters
shall not diminish, increase, or modify sub of substance. Yet the absorption of the substan
stantive rights. Rules of procedure of special tive point into a procedural rule does not prevent
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain the substantive right from being superseded or
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme amended by statute, for the creation of property
Court." rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on,
&a£l
and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed,
if the position of the Government is sustained,
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of it could very well lead to the absurd situation
the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG wherein the judicial branch of government may
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability
VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution is completely simplyby absorbing the provisions oflaw into the
off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and restored to thejudicial branch of government the
authority to prescribe rules on the practice oflaw. sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning
The Local Government Code and DLG Memoran pleading, practice and procedure, it should be
dum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules understood that such rules necessarily pertain
of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts to points of procedure, and not points of substan
of interest between the discharge of their public tive law. Republic v. Judge Guinguyon, G.R. No.
duties and the private practice of their profes 166429, February 1, 2006.
is)
sion/in those instances where the law allows it.
9. Review of death penalty.
NOTE: Amendment of rules by statute A. People v. Mateo

G.R.Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 oh expropriation
for public infrastructures say: Up until now, the Supreme Court shas as
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation sumed the direct appellate review over all crimi
Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to nal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
acquire real property for the right-of-way or reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment (orlower
location for any national government infra but involving offenses committed on the same oc
structure project through expropriation, the casion or arising out ofthe same occurrencethat
tfoij&£
gave rise to the more serious offense for which Under the Constitution Article VIII, Sec
the penalty of death, reclusionperpetua, or life tion 5, the power to amend rules of procedure is
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court.
justification in the 1987 Constitution -
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court more squarely within the rule-making preroga
siiiii)
shall have the following powers: tive of the Supreme Colirt than the law-making
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or power of Congress. The rule here announce ad
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or ditionally allowingan intermediate reviewby the
the Rules of Court may provide, final judg Court ofAppeals, a subordinate appellate court,
ments and orders of lower courts in: before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court
on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
iigj
"(d) All criminal cases in which the pen
alty imposed is reclusionperpetua or higher." NOTE: Reclusion perpetua.
It is only in cases where the penalty actu
ally imposed is death that the trial court must
While the Fundamental Law requires a
forward the records of the case to the Supreme
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
Court [now Court of Appeals] for automatic
where the penalty imposed is reclusionperpetua,
review of the conviction. Nor may this right of
life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however,
appeal be waived. The right to appeal reclusion
has it proscribed an intermediate review. If
perpetua, however, may be waived. Where the
only to ensure utmost circumspection before
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life petitioner does not file a notice of appeal or other
^J
imprisonment is imposed, the Court-now deems wise indicate a desire to appeal from the decision
it wise and compelling to provide in these cases convicting him of murder and sentencing him to
a review by the Court of Appeals before the case reclusionperpetua, the decision became final and
is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and unappealable. Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 106531,
November 18, 1999,
liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to de
termine his guilt or innocence must be accorded
an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the 10. Bar integration.
'iMU
facts can ever be overdone. A prior determina Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
tion by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the official unification of the entire lawyer popula
factual issues, would minimize the possibility tion of the Philippines. This requires membership
of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could then practice of law and the retention of his name in
yjftfl) render judgment imposing the corresponding the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. In
penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49
from entering judgment and elevate the entire SCRA 25-27, quoting Report of the Commission
iiiiiij) records of the case to the Supreme Court for its on Bar Integration, pp. 3-5, November 30,1972.
final disposition.
The purposes of an Integrated Bar, in gen
Statistics would disclose that within the eral, are:
eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the
death penalty law in 1993 until June 2004, the (1) Assist in the administration of justice;
cases where the judgment of death has either (2) Foster and maintain, on the part of its
been modified or vacated consist ofan astounding members, high ideals of integrity, learning,
71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly professional competence, public service and
elevated before the Court on automatic review conduct;
that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one
(651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants (3) Safeguard the professional interests of
saved from lethal injection. its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
cordiality and brotherhood; rules affecting the IBP, thus:
1^)
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion oflaw, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have
jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice, the following powers:
andprocedure, and the relations ofthe Bartothe XXX XXX XXX
Benchand to the public, and public information
relating thereto; (5) Promulgate rules concerning the
(6) Encourage and fosterlegal education; protection andenforcement ofconstitutional
• §jgj rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal all courts, the admission to the practice of
research in substantive and adjective law, and law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal as
make reports andrecommendations thereon; and sistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
responsibility effectively. Inre Integration ofthe procedure forthe speedydisposition ofcases,
shall be uniform, for all courts of the same
Bar of the Philippines, supra.
m grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantiverights.Rules ofprocedure
A In re: Petition to Disqualify of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
Atty. De Vera shall remain effective unless disapproved by
A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003 the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
TINGA,V.:
Implicit in this constitutional grant is
the power to supervise all the activities of
This is a Petition 1 filed by Attys. Oliver the IBP, including the election ofits officers.
OwenL. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony
Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of The authority of the Supreme Court over
respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitu
elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the tion. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted
16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBF') the Supreme Court the powerto promulgate
jjjffiJ
Regional Governors' elections. Petitioner Garcia rules concerning the admission to the prac
is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chap tice of law. It reads:
ter,while petitioners Ravanera andVelez are the SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall
pastPresident andthe incumbent President, re have the power to promulgate rules concern
spectively, ofthe Misamis Oriental IBPChapter. ing pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
After seeking leave of court, respondent De of the same grade and shall not diminish,
Vera filed on June 9,2003 a Respectful Comment increase, or modify substantive rights. The
on the Petition. existing laws on pleading, practice, and
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
new issues. He argues that this Court has no ju and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to
risdiction over the present controversy, contend the power ofthe Supreme Court toalterand
ing that the election ofthe Officers ofthe IBP, modify the same. The Congress shall have
including the determination ofthe qualification the power to repeal, alter or supplement
of those who want to serve the organization, is the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
purely an internal matter, governed as it is by procedure, andthe admission tothepractice
the IBPBy-Laws and exclusively regulatedand of law in the Philippines.
administered by the IBP...
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987
and 19'35 Constitution and the similarly worded
&ffij
The contention is untenable. Section 5, provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on through all the years have been the sources of
this Court's authority to supervise individual complaint for thealleged falsification ofajudge's
members of the Bar. The term "Bar" refers to the certification submitted to the Supreme Court,
"collectivity ofallpersons whose names appearin and assuming that it can, whether a referral
the Roll ofAttorneys." Pursuant to this power of should be madefirst to the Supreme Court.
supervision, the Court initiated the integration
of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding
1970the Commission on Bar Integration, which Judge ofBranch 12 oftneRegional Trial Court of
wastasked toascertain the advisability ofunify Antique, seeks thereview ofthefollowing orders
ing the Philippine Bar. Not long after, Republic of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
isJ
Act No. 6397 was enacted and it confirmed the dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte
power ofthe SupremeCourtto effect the integra motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
tion ofthe Philippine Bar. Finally, onJanuary 1, petitioner; and(2) the Order dated November 22,
1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsidera
captioned "In the Matter of the Integration of tion and directing petitioner to file his counter-
the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the affidavit and other controverting evidences.
'î) Integration cf the Philippine Bar in accordance In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18,
with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
promulgatedpursuant to our rule-makingpower respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public
under the 1935 Constitution. Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had fal
j'itf
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked sified his Certificate ofService dated February
by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP inde 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal
pendence from the Supreme Court, ironically cases which have been submitted for decision or
recognizes the full range of the power of super determination for a period of 90 dayshavebeen
vision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For determined and decided on or before January
one, Section 77 of the IBP By-Laws vests on the 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner
£s> Courtthe power to amend, modify or repeal the knew that no decision had been rendered in five
IBP By-Laws, either motu proprio or upon rec (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have
ommendation of the Board of Governors of the been submitted for decision. RespondentAbiera
IBP. Also in Section 15, the Court is authorized further alleged that petitioner similarly falsi
to send observers in IBP elections, whether lo fied his certificates of service for the months of
cal or national. Section 44 empowers the Court February, April, May, June, July and August,
to have the final decision on the removal of the all in 1989; and the months beginning January
members of the Board of Governors. up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen
(17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that

SEC. 6. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL he had been granted by this Court an extension
HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned
cases.
OVER ALL COURTS AND THE PER
ijfe>
SONNEL THEREOF. Petitioner also contends that the Ombuds
man has no jurisdiction over said... since the of
1. Supervision of courts. fense chargedarosefromthe judge'sperformance
of his official duties, which is under the control
A. Maceda v. Vasquez
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Fur
G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993
thermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme
NOCON, J.: Court's constitutional duty of supervision over
The issue in this petition for certiorari with all inferior courts.
iy
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction ... A judge who falsifies his certificate of
and/or restraining order is whether the Office serviceis administratively liable to the Supreme
of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal Courtforserious misconduct and inefficiency un-
£S)
L
der Section 1, Rule 140 Of the Rules of Court, and tion had not yet been raised with, much less
criminally liable to the State under the Revised resolved by, this Court. How could the Ombuds
Penal Code for his felonious act. man resolve the present criminal complaint that
requires the resolution of said question?
However, We agree with petitioner that in
the absence of any administrative action taken In fine, where a criminal complaint against a
against him by this Court with regard to his Judge or other court employee arises from their
certificates of service, the investigation being administrative duties, the Ombudsman must de
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into fer action on said complaint and refer the same to
the Court's power of administrative supervision this Court for determination whether said Judge
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of or court employee had acted within the scope of
the doctrine of separation of powers. their administrative duties.
'$$)
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Consti WHEREFORE, themstant petition is hereby
tution exclusively vests in the* Supreme Court GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed
administrative supervision over all courts and to dismiss the complaint filed by public respon
m court personnel, from the PresidingJustice ofthe dent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal same to this Court for appropriate action.
o
trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the B. People v. Gacott, Jr.
judges' and court personnel's compliance with G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
all laws, and take the proper administrative ac
tion against them if they commit any violation
$») REGALADO.J.:
thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul Rebuffed by this Court through the annul
of the doctrine of separation of powers. ment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investi 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a
gation of petitioner on the powers granted to it reprimand and a fineofP10,000.00 forgrossigno
by the Constitution, for such a justification not rance ofthe law, respondent Judge Eustaqirio Z.
gy only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the dated April 1,1995, and a supplemental motion
Supreme Court over all courts and their person for reconsideration dated April 26,1995.
nel, but likewise undermines the independence
*%tf\
' of the judiciary.
. . . Respondent judge questions the com
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the
petence of the Second Division of this Court to
matter ofpetitioner'scertificates ofservice to this
im administratively discipline him
Court for determination of whether said certifi
cates reflected the true status of his pending case His Honor relies on the second sentence of
load, as the Court has the necessary records to Section 11, Article VEIIof the present Constitu
^y make such a determination. The Ombudsman tion which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three shall havethepowerto disciplinejudges oflower
branches of government, to submit its records, courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
•$$ or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, majority of the Members who actually took part
as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
affidavit-complaint. voted thereon.""This provision is an expansion of
iffit The rationale for the foregoing pronounce and was taken from the second sentence of Sec
ment is evident in this case. Administratively, tion 7 Article X of the 1973 Constitution which
the question before Us is this: should a judge, provided: "The Supreme Court shall have the
having been granted by this Court an extension power to discipline judges of inferior court and,
of time to decide cases before him, report these by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
cases in his certificate of service? As this ques dismissal."
tfcji-t
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc" therein." Evidently, in this instance, the admin
!$$fr
in referring to this Court in the quoted provision istrative case must be deliberated upon decided
of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he ar by the full Court itself.
gues that it is only the full Court, not a division
Pursuant to the first clause which confers
^) thereof, that can administratively punish him.
administrative disciplinary power to the Court
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc
as a member of the committee on.the Judiciary resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter
'•$0
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, had No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/
the opportunity to take up that precise matter or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules
with the committee chairman, retired Chief and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
$§) Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out the
equivalent provision in the 1973 Constitution, For said purpose, the following are consid
ered en banc cases:
hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the
"Court," without qualification. It was accordingly XXX XXX XXX
gif}
explained and agreed that insofar as the power
to discipline is concerned, the qualification was 6. Cases where the penalty to be im
not intended to make a difference, as a refer posed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
ence to the Court by itself necessarily means the employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a
Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en lawyer, or either the suspension of any of
banc" there because all internal procedural and them for a period of more than one (1) year
administrative matters, as well as ceremonial or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
functions, are always decided by or conducted xxx XXX XXX
in the Court en banc. On the other hand, where
the reference is to the Court acting through its This resolution was amended on March 16,
divisions, it would necessarily be so specified. i993 and November 23,1993, but the aforequoted
For lack of transcription of the proceedings of provision was maintained.
the committees of said Commission, the writer Indeed, to require the entire Court to delib
has perforce to rely on his recollection and notes, erate upon and participate in all administrative
but he assures this Court of the foregoing facts matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, im-
as they transpired. posable or imposed, would result in a congested
At any rate, the very text of the present docket and undue delay in the adjudication of
Section 11 ofArticle VIII clearly shows that there cases in the Court, especially in administrative
are actually two situations envisaged therein. matters, since even cases involving the penalty
The first clause which states that "the Supreme of reprimand would require action by the Court
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline en banc. This would subvert the constitutional
judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic
grant of that disciplinary power to, and the plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases
determination of the procedure in the exercise or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the
thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing
intended that all administrative disciplinary the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three,
^jj cases should be heard and decided by the whole five or seven members.
Court since it would result in ah absurdity, as Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only
will hereafter be explained.
cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
The second clause, which refers to the second courts are specifically required to be decided by
situation contemplated therein and is intention the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for
ally separated from the first by a comma, declares a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious
on the other hand that the Court en banc can charges against members of the judiciary, it is
"order their dismissal by a vote of a majority only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
of the Members who actually took part in the suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10.000.00, or both, that the administrative aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would
matter may be decided in division. not know of this matter unless he is informed of
it, he should give due respect for and recognition
It must not also be overlooked that as early
of the administrative authority of the Court,
as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated
because in determining whether an administra
Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
tive matter is involved, the Court passes upon
XXX XXX XXX not only administrative liabilities but also other
administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed
2. A decision or resolution of a Division
in the case of Maceda v. Vasquez.
of the Court, when concurred in by a major
ity of its members who actually took part The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind
in the deliberations on the issues in a case the Court, to its findings that a case before it does
and voted thereon, and in no case without or does not have administrative implications. To
tijj
the concurrence of at least three of such do so is to deprive the^ Court of the exercise of its
Members, is a decision or resolution of the administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto
Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned.
1987 Constitution). This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it
does, on judicial independence.
That guideline or rule in the referral to the
court en banc of cases assigned to a division Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its con
thereof rests on the same rationale and applies stitutional power of administrative supervision
with equal force to confute the antithetical theory overalLcourts and court-personnel, from the Pre
of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. siding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the
said respondent to hereafter deal with situations Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' arid
like the one subject of this resolution with more court personnel's compliance with all laws, and
perspicacity and circumspection. take the proper administrative action against
|SS(
them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine
^) C. Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman of separation of powers.
G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001
It appears that the present case involves two SEC. 7. (1) NO PERSON SHALL BE AP
members of the judiciary who were entangled POINTED MEMBER OF THE SUPREME
in a fight within court premises over a piece of COURT OR ANY LOWER COLLEGIATE
office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII COURT UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN
of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. A MEM
which is vested with exclusive administrative BER OF THE SUPREME COURT MUST BE
supervision over all courts and its personnel. AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE, AND
Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman MUST HAVE BEEN FOR FIFTEEN YEARS
,cannot determine for itself and by itself whether OR MORE A JUDGE OF A LOWER COURT
a criminal complaint against a judge, or court OR ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Mi& employee, involves an administrative matter. IN THE PHILIPPINES.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before (2) THE CONGRESS SHALL PRE
it, referred to the Supreme Court for determina SCRIBE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF
tion as to whether an administrative aspect is JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS, BtJT NO
involved therein. This rule should hold true re PERSON MAY BE APPOINTED JUDGE
gardless of whether an administrative case based THEREOF UNLESS HE IS A CITIZEN OF
on the act subject of the complaint before the Om THE PHILIPPINES AND A MEMBER OF
budsman is already pending with the Court. For, THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
km
sffii
* ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 633
ii^\
(3) A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY tice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy
MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COM created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of
(iii!i
PETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The ap
INDEPENDENCE. pointment was reported the following day, May
17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
A. In Re: JBC v. Judge Quitain
JBCNo. 013, August 22, 2007
Petitioners contend that the appointment
It behooves evory prospective appointee to extended to respondent Ong through respondent
the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
of every matter bearing on his fitness for judi
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
cial office1, including such circumstances as may
$jgj
reflect on his integrity and probity. These are
qualifications specifically required of appointees
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is
to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and
Constitution.
incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners at
that he was administratively charged and dis tached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex
missed from the service for grave misconduct "K" to the petition. The birth certificate, petition
per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less ers add, reveals that at the time of respondent
than the former President of the Philippines... Ong's birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
. . . Judge Quitain was removed from office
after investigation and was found guilty of grave The Court required respondents to Comment
misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a on the petition.
L clear proof of his lack of the required qualifica
tions to be a member of the Bench.
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly
filed his Comment, essentially stating that the
appointment of respondent Ong as Associate
B. Kilosbayan v. Ermita Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 by the President pursuant to the powers vested
in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitu
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for tion . . .
L certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners are people's and/or non-govern ' Respondent Executive Secretary added
mental organizations engaged in public and civic that the President appointed respondent Ong
causes aimed at protecting the people's rights to from among the list of nominees who were duly
self-governance and justice. screened by and bore the imprimatur of the
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the
>g)
of the Office of the President and is in charge of Constitution. Said respondent further stated:
releasing presidential appointments including "The appointment, however, was not released,
those of Supreme Court Justices. but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of
respondent Ong's citizenship." To date, however,
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the JBC has not received the referral.
the party whose appointment would fill up the
vacancy in this Court.
Petitioners allege that: The petition has merit.
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive

Secretary, in representation of the Office of the Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case
£^>
President, announced an appointment in favor — is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino
of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Jus citizen?
NOTE: While the case of Ong was being

litigated, he was already a. Justice of the San-
It is clear that from the records of this Court, diganbayan which also requires that a person
respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. be a natural born citizen. On July 9, 2007, Ong
The alleged subsequent recognition of his natu immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court
ral-born status by the Bureau ofImmigration and
(RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the "amend
the DO J cannot amend the final decision of the
ment/correction/ supplementation or annotation
trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father. of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth." Mean
while Ong had already announced that he was
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, not accept appointment to the Supreme Court.
no substantial change or correction in an entry
in a civil register can be made without a judicial While the RTC case was pending the Solici
order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship tor General declined to file a quo warranto case
status is a substantial change.... against Ong.Whereupon private citizen Topacio
filed the case. The Court said: "A quo warranto
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section proceeding is the proper legal remedy to deter
2(3) that a summary administrative proceed mine the right or title to the contested public
ing to correct clerical or typographical errors office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.
in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change It is brought against the person who is alleged
in nationality. Substantial corrections to the to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in held or exercised the public office, and may be
the civil registry should, therefore, be effected commenced by the Solicitor General or a public
through a petition filed in court under Rule 108
prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person
of the Rules of Court.
claiming to be entitled to the publicoffice or posi
The series of events and long string of al tion usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
legedchanges in the nationalities ofrespondent another. A private person suing must show a
fas&i Ong'sancestors,by variousbirths, marriagesand clear right to the contested office. Topacio v. Ong,
deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to G.R. No. 179895, December 15, 2008.
be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so
as to correct the existing records on his birth and SEC. 8. (1) A JUDICIAL AND BAR
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to COUNCIL IS HEREBY CREATED UNDER
show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's THE SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what COURT COMPOSED OF THE CHIEF JUS
still appears in the records ofthis Court. Respon TICE AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, THE
dent Ong has the burden of proving in court his SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND A REPRE
alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship SENTATIVE OF THE CONGRESS AS EX-
under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until
OFFICIOMEMBERS, A REPRESENTATIVE
this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR, A PROFES
appointment to this Court as that would be a
SOR OF LAW, A RETIRED MEMBER OF
violation of the Constitution. For this reason,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND A REPRE
t^gj
he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
SENTATIVE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
as one of injunction directed against respondent (2) THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE
COUNCIL SHALL BE APPOINTED BY
Gregory S. Ong,whois hereby ENJOINED from
accepting an appointment to the position ofAs THE PRESIDENT FOR A TERM OF FOUR
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming YEARS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
the position and dischargingthe functions ofthat COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. OF
office, until he shall have successfully completed THE MEMBERS FIRST APPOINTED, THE
all necessary steps, through the appropriate ad REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTEGRATED
versarial proceedings in court, to show that he BAR SHALL SERVE FOR FOUR YEARS,
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the THE PROFESSOR OF LAW FOR THREE
records of his birth and citizenship. YEARS, THE RETIRED JUSTICE FOR TWO
ARTICLE VHI: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 635
YEARS, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF TINUANCE IN OFFICE, THEIR SALARY

THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR ONE YEAR. SHALL NOT BE DECREASED.
(3) THE CLERK OF THE SUPREME
COURT SHALL BE THE SECRETARY EX- 1. Salary of Justices and judges.
OFFICIO OF THE COUNCIL AND SHALL
A. Nitafan v.kCommission of
KEEP A RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.
Internal Revenue
(4) THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE 152 SCRA 284 (1987)
COUNCIL SHALL RECEIVE SUCH EMOLU
MENTS AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
THE SUPREME COURT. THE SUPREME
COURT SHALL PROVIDE IN ITS ANNUAL Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified
ijgj
BUDGET THE APPROPRIATIONS FOR Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 rind 53,'
THE COUNCIL. respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, Na
tional Capital Judicial Region, all with stations
(5) THE COUNCIL SHALL HAVE THE in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF RECOM enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of In
MENDING APPOINTEES TO THE
ternal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
JUDICIARY. IT MAY EXERCISE SUCH
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
OTHER FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES AS THE
withholding taxes from their salaries.
SUPREME COURT MAY ASSIGN TO IT.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax with
NOTE: The provision providing for a Judi held from their emoluments or compensation as
cial and Bar Council composed of seven mem judicial officersiconstitutes a decrease or diminu
bers among whom is "a representative of the tion of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Integrated Bar" was pointed to by the Court Section 10 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
as a reason why the position of IBP president mandating that *(d)uring their continuance in
attracted so many lawyers to the point of the office, their salary shall not be decreased,' even
excessive politization which took place in 1989 as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent
election of officers thereby moving the Court to judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
nullify the elections. In the Matter of the Inquiry
into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar ofthe It may be pointed out that, early on, the
Philippines, Bar Matter No. 491, October 6,1989. Court had dealt with the matter administratively
in response to representations that the Court
direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SU
withholding of taxes from salaries of members
PREME COURT AND JUDGES OF LOWER
of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court
COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE
en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's direc
PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST
tive as follows:
THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EV "RE: Question of exemption from income
ERY VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS taxation. — The Court REAFFIRMED the
NEED NO CONFIRMATION. Chief Justice's previous and standing direc
FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE tive to the Fiscal Management and Budget
PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE AP Office of this Court to continue with the
POINTMENTS WITHIN NINETY DAYS deduction of the withholding taxes from
FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST. the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme
Court as well as from the salaries of all other
SEC. 10. THE SALARY OF THE CHIEF members of the judiciary."
JUSTICE AND OF THE ASSOCIATE JUS
TICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND That should have resolved the question.
OF JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS SHALL However, with the filing of this petition, the
BE FIXED BY LAW. DURING THEIR CON Court has deemed it best to settle the legal is-
3Mb
sue raised through this judicial pronouncement. Under the 1973 Constitution, the same pro
As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of vision read:
M^
the Constitutional Commission was to delete the
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of
proposed express grant of exemption from pay the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
ment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed
so as to "give substance to equality among the by law, which shall not be decreased during
three branches of Government" in the words of their continuance in office, x x x." [Section
Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the delib 10, Article X] (Emphasis ours).
erations, it was further expressly made clear,
especially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin And in respect of income tax exemption,
G. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amend another provision in the same 1973 Constitution
ment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries specifically stipulated:
of members of the Judiciary would be subject to "No salary or vany form of emolument
the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. of any public officer or employee, including
This intent was somehow and inadvertently constitutional officers, shall be exempt from
Ml
not clearly set forth in the text of the Constitu payment of income tax." [Section 6, Article
tion as approved and ratified in February, 1987 XV, General Provisions]
(infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have The provision in the 1987 Constitution,
been obscured by the failure to include in the which petitioners rely on, reads:
General Provisions a proscription against exemp
tion of any public officer .or.employee, including "The salary of the Chief Justice and of
constitutional officers, from payment of income the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of lower courts'shall be fixed by
tax, the Court since then has authorized the con
law. During their continuance in office, their
tinuation of the deduction of the withholding tax
salary shall not be decreased." [Section 10,
from the salaries of the members of the Supreme
fa Article VIII] (Italics supplied).
Court, as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby The 1987 Constitution does not contain a
makes of record that it had then discarded the provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the
ruling in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia v.David, 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners
infra, that declared the salaries of members of claim that the intent of the framers is to revert
the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income to the original concept of "non-diminution" of
tax and considered such payment as a diminution salaries of judicial officers.
of their salaries during their continuance in of The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
fice. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII,
of Justices and Judges are properly subject to negate such contention.
a general income tax law applicable to income
earners and that the payment of such income The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII,
tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within of the 1987 Constitution read:
the constitutional protection against decrease of
"Section 13. The salary of the Chief
their salaries during their continuance in office.
Justice and the Associate Justices of the
A comparison of the Constitutional provi Supreme Court and judges of the lower
sions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitu courts shall be fixed by law. During their
tion provided: continuance in office, their salary shall not
be diminished nor subjected to income tax.
"x x x (The members of the Supreme Until the National Assembly shall provide
Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive
receive such compensation as may be fixed an annual salary of and each As
by law, which shall not be diminished during sociate Justice pesos." [Record of the
their continuance in office x x x." [Section 9, Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.]
Article VIII] (Italics supplied). (Emphasis ours)
ARTICLE Vni: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 637
During the debates on the draft Article "An example is the exception from in
(Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners come tax, which is a kind of economic immu
presented their objections to the provision on tax nity, which is, of course, denied to the entire
exemption, thus: executive department and the legislative."
"MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of [ibid., at page 467]
exemption from tax of the salary of justices, And during the* period of amendments
does this not violate the principle of the on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Com
uniformity of taxation and the prinoiple of missioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the
equal protection of the law? After all, tax is term "diminished" be changed to "decreased"
levied not on the salary but on the combined and that the words "nor subjected to income
income, such that when the judge receives tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to
a salary and it is comingled with the other equality among the three branches in the
t&j
income, we tax the income, not the salary. government."
Why do we have to give special privileges to
the salary of justices? Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on be
:W> halfof the Committee on the Judiciary, defended
"MR. CONCEPCION. It is the indepen the original draft and referred to the ruling of this
dence of the judiciary. We prohibit the in Court in Perfecto v. Meer [85 Phil. 552 (1950)]
crease or decrease oftheir salary during their
that "the independence of the judges is of far
term. This is an indirect way of decreasing
greater importance than any revenue that could
their salary and affecting the independence
come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner
of the judges.
Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a
"MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up
in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, "in support of an amendment to the amendment
but the special privilege on taxation might,, with the request for a modification of the amend
in effect, be a violation of the principle of ment," as follows:
uniformity in taxation and the equal pro
tection clause. [Record of the Constitutional "FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose
Commission, p. 460] an amendment to the amendments saying
that it is not enough to drop the phrase 'shall
XXX
not be subjected to income tax,' because if
"MR. OPLE. that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he
Im) will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto
XXX
vs. Meer and in Enencia v. David [should be
"Of course, we share deeply the concern Endencia and Jugo v. David, etc., 93 Phil.
expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner 696] which excludes them from income tax,
Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the but rather I would propose that the state
highest respect, to surround the Supreme ment will read: "During their continuance
Court and the judicial system as a whole in office,their salary shall not be diminished
with the whole armor of defense against the BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL
executive and legislative invasion of their INCOME TAX.' In support of this position, I
independence. But in so doing, some of the would say that the argument seems to be that
citizens outside, especially the humble gov the justice and judges should not be subjected
ernment employees, might say that in trying to income tax because they already gave up
to erect a bastion of justice, we might end the income from their practice. That is true
up with the fortress of privileges, an island also of Cabinet members and all other em
of extra territoriality under the Republic of ployees. And I know right now, for instance,
the Philippines, because a good number of there are many people who have accepted
powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary employment in the government involving a
here may not be enjoyed in the remotest de reduction of income and yet are still subject
gree by other employees of the government. to income tax. So, they are not the only citi-
638 • CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREANDPOWERSOF GOVERNMENT
zens whose income is reduced by accepting follows: During their continuance in office,
service in government." their salary shall not be DECREASED'; and
jg&j the phrase 'nor subjected to income tax' is
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed
deleted." [Record of the Constitutional Com
amendment to the amendment. Commissioner
mission, Vol. I, p. 506]
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a
suspension of the session. Upon resumption, The debates, interpellations and opinions
Commissioner Bernas announced: expressed regarding the constitutional provision
in question until it was finally approved by the
"During the suspension, we came to an Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
understanding with the original proponent, framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it,
Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment was to make the salaries of members ofthe Judi
on page 6, line 4 would read: 'During their ciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent
continuance in office,*their salary shall not is but in keeping with tjie fundamental principle
be DECREASED.' But this is on the under of constitutional construction that the intent of
standing that there will be a provision in the framers of the organic law and of the people
the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Ar adopting it should be given effect. [Gold Creek
ticle XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Mining Co. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938)] The
Constitution, which says: primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization
'No salary or any form of emolument
iial
of the purpose of the framers and of the people
of any public officer or employee, including in the adoption of the Constitution. [J M. Tttason
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, No.
payment of income tax.' L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413] It
"So, we put a period(.) after 'DE may also be safely assumed that the people in
CREASED' on the understanding that the ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
salary of justices is subject to tax." by the explanation offered by the framers. [Ta-
nada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
When required about the specific Article in Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21]
the General Provisions on non-exemption from
tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Besides, construing Section 10, Article VIII,
frM
of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is
Bernas replied:
again reproduced hereunder:
"FR. BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of
such an article will be found in the General
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed
period (.) after 'DECREASED,' it is on the
by law. During their continuance in office,
understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto their salary shall not be decreased."(Italics
vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David will not
supplied)
apply anymore."
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes
The amendment to the original draft, as Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
discussed and understood, was finally approved compensation of Justices and Judges but such
without objection. rate must be higher than that which they are
•THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Beng- receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it
zon). The understanding, therefore, is that would be applicable only to those appointed after
there will be a provision under the Article on its approval. It would be a strained construction
General Provisions. Could Commissioner Ro-
to read into the provision an exemption from
sario Braid kindly take note that the salaries
taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
of officials of the government including con
stitutional officers shall not be exempt from With the foregoing interpretation, and as
income tax? The amendment proposed herein stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposi
and accepted by the Committee now reads as tion of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
Silt
&££i
diminution thereof, and so violates the Consti the Philippine Executive Commission or
tution" in Perfecto v. Meer [85 Phil. 552 (1950)] under the government called Philippine
as affirmed in Endencia v. David [93 Phil. 696 Republic may not sit and vote in any case
(1953)] must be declared discarded. The framers brought to that Court under section thirteen
of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the hereof in which the accused is a person who
people, have expressed in clear and unmistak held any office or position under either or
able terms the meaning and import of Section both the Philippine Executive Commission
10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that and the Philippine Repubhc or any branch,
they have adopted. instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to "If, on account of such disqualification,
the intent of the people, through the discussions or because of any of the grounds of disquali
and deliberations of their representatives, in the fication of judges, in Rule 126, Section 1 of
spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot the Rules of Court, or on account of illness,
part of the cost of maintaining the government absence or temporary disability the requisite
and should share the burden of general income number of Justices necessary to constitute
taxation equitably. a quorum or to tender judgment in any case
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Pro is not present, the President may designate
hibition is hereby dismissed. such number of Judges of First Instance,
&ffi)
Judges-at-Large of First Instance, or Cadas
tral Judges, having none of the disqualifi
SEC. 11. THE MEMBERS OF THE SU cation set forth in said section one hereof, as
PREME COURT AND JUDGES OF LOWER may be necessary to sit temporarily as Jus
COURTS SHALL HOLD OFFICE DURING tices of said Court, in order to form a quorum
GOOD BEHAVIOR UNTIL THEY REACH or until a judgment in said case is reached."
THE AGE OF SEVENTY YEARS OR BE
COME INCAPACITATED TO DISCHARGE We propose to approach this question from
3J
THE DUTIES OF THEIR OFFICE. THE the following angles: (a) whether or not the
SUPREME COURT ENBANC SHALL HAVE Congress had power to add to the pre-existing
THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE JUDGES grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the
^li OF LOWER COURTS, OR ORDER THEIR Supreme Court, that provided for in said Sec
DISMISSAL BY A VOTE OF A MAJOR tion 14; (b) whether or not a person may act as a
ITY OF THE MEMBERS WHO ACTUALLY Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been
TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON duly appointed by the President and confirmed
THE ISSUES IN THE CASE AND VOTED by the Commission on Appointments pursuant to
THEREON. the Constitution, even only as a "designee"; and
(c)whether or not by the method of "designation"
1. Security of tenure. created by the aforecited Section 14 of a Judge of
First Instance, Judge-at-Large of First Instance,
A. Vargas v. Rilloraza or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President
liftfrl
80 Phil. 297(1948) under the same section can constitutionally "sit
temporarily as Justice" of the Supreme Court by
HIDALGO, J: virtue thereof.
(a) We start with the principle, well known

Such question of unconstitutionality or re to the legal profession, that no act of the Legisla
pugnancy to the Constitution, however, arises ture repugnant to the Constitution can become
in relation to the disqualification of certain a law (In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37, 45; Marbury
members of the Supreme Court provided for in v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 175). To discover whether
Section 14 of the People's Court Act which says: the above quoted Section 14 of the People's Court
Act is repugnant to the Constitution, one of the
"SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme best tests would be compare the operation of the
Court who held any office or position under pertinent constitutional provisions without said
section, with their operation with the same sec ber of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments
tion if the latter were to be allowed to produce as well as to exercise the other powers and ful
its effects. It is self-evident that before the en fill the other duties of his office, but that he be
actment of the oft-quoted section of the People's left unhampered to exercise all the powers and
Court Act, it was not only the power but the fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all
bounden duty of all the members of the Supreme cases properly coming before his Court under the
Court to sit in judgment in all treason cases duly constitution, again without prejudice to proper
brought or appealed to the Court. That power and cases of disqualification under Rule 126. Any
that duty arise from the above cited sections of statute enacted by the legislature which would
ifii&J
Article VIII of the Constitution, namely, Section impede him in this regard, in the words of this
4, providing how the court shall be composed and Court in In re Guarina, supra, citing Marbury
how it may sit, Section 9, ordaining that they vs. Madison, supra, simply "cannot become law."
shall hold office during good behavior until they
It goes without saying that, whether the mat
reach the age of seventy years, or become inca
ter of disqualification of judicial officers belongs to
pacitated to discharge the duties of their office,
the realm of adjective, or to that of substantively
and the pertinent constitutional and statutory
tyftj law, whatever modification, change or innovation
provisions bearing on the jurisdiction, powers
the legislature may propose to introduce therein,
and responsibilities of the Supreme Court. Con must not in any way contravene the provisions of
cretely referring to the instant case, if Section 14
the constitution, nor be repugnant to the genius
of the People's Court Act had not been inserted
of the governmental system established thereby.
therein, there can be no question-that each and
The tripartite system, the mutual independence
every member of this Court would have to sit in
of the three departments — in particular, the-
judgment in said case. independence of the judiciary —, the scheme
But if said Section 14 were to be effective, of checks and balances, are commonplaces in
such members of the Court "who held any office or democratic governments like this Repubhc. No
>'mi position under the Philippine Executive Commis legislation may be allowed which would destroy
sion or under the government called Philippine or tend to destroy any of them.
Republic" would be disqualified from sitting and Under Article VIII, Section 2(4) of the Con
ifel
voting in the instant case, because the accused stitution the Supreme Court may not be deprived
herein is a person who likewise held an office or of its appellate jurisdiction, among others, over
position at least under the PhilippineExecutive those criminal cases where the penalty may
Commission. In other words, what the Constitu
be death or life imprisonment. Treason may
tion in this respect ordained as a power and a be punished with death or life imprisonment.
duty to be e'xercised and fulfilled by said members Pursuant to Article VIII, Sections 4, 5, 6, and
of the Court, the quoted section of the People's
9 of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the Su
Court Act would prohibit them from exercising
preme Court may only be exercised by the Chief
and fulfilling. What the Constitution directs the
Justice and Associate Justices appointed by the
section prohibits. A clearer case of repugnancy
President with the consent of the Commission
to the fundamental law can hardly be imagined.
•foiil on Appointments, sitting in banc [sic] or in divi
For repugnancy to result it is not necessary sion, and in cases like those involving treason
that there should be an actual removal of the they must sit in banc. If, according to section 4
disqualified Justice from his office for, as above of said Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall
demonstrates, were it not for the challenged be composed" of the Chief Justice and Associ
Section 14 there would have been an uninter ate Justices therein referred to, its jurisdiction
rupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To
Justice and in his exercise of the powers and disqualify any of these constitutional component
fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his of members of the Court — particularly, as in the
fice, saving only proper cases or disqualification instant case, a majority of them — in a treason
under Rule 126. What matters here is not only case, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the
that the Justice affected continue to be a mem Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
fofifri
ARTICLE Vffl: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 641
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge way to the operation of unworthy combinations
is a deprivation of his judicial power. (Diehl vs. or oppressive designs.
Crumb, 72 Okl., 108; 179 Pac, 44). And if that Let it be argued that the Court is the same,
judge is the one designated by the constitution only the membership being different. Because
to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the Article VIII, Sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution
case with the Justices of this Court, the depriva do not admit any composition of the Supreme
tion of his or their judicial power is equivalent to Court other than by the Chief Justice and
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed
itself. It would seem evident that if the Congress
as therein provided. And the infringement is
could disqualify members of this Court to take enhanced and aggravated where a majority of
part in the hearing and determination ofcertain the members of the Court — as in this case —
collaboration cases it could extend the disquali
are replaced by judges of first instance. It is
fication to other cases. The question is not one
distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to
of degree or reasonableness. It affects the very this. And the Constitution provides for only one
heart of judicial independence.
Supreme Court.
From all that has been said above it results
The members affected by the prohibition that the ground for disqualification added by Sec
have heretofore disqualified themselves, partly tion 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those
because they presumed the statute valid and already existing at the time of the adoption of
partly because they would rather have no hand the Constitution and continued by it is not only
in the revision of the appeals, for the purpose of arbitrary and irrational but positively violative
avoiding even a breath of suspicion as to the im of the'organic law.
partiality oftheir actuations. However,realizing
upon a thorough analysis of the matter by coun (b) In the face of the constitutional require
sel on both sides, the far-reaching implications ment (Art. VIII, Section 5) that the members of
whichthe precedent might authorize, imperiling the Supreme Court should be appointed by the
the independenceofonecoordinatebranch ofthe President with the consent of the Commission
Government, they finally cast aside all reluctance on Appointments, we are of the opinion that
to consider the point, and came out with practical no person not so appointed may act as Justice
unanimity to condemn any legislation which im of the Supreme Court and that the "designa
pinges or mightimpinge upon the fundamental, tion" authorized in Section 14 of the People's
independent powers of the judicature. Court Act to be made by the President of any
Judge ofFirst Instance, Judge-at-Large ofFirst
Some of them have no quarrel with Legisla Instance or Cadastral Judge cannot possibly
tive authority to enumerate instances in which be a compliance with the provision requiring
judges may sit. They would even concede that. that appointment. An additional disqualifying
But,they say,let the rules be promulgated before circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of
the event happens or litigation arises. To pro
confirmation by or consent of the Commission
mulgate them after, would enable Congress in
specific situations to orderthat Judge Xshall not on Appointments. Without intending the least
decide the controversy between Y and X or that reflection on the ability, learning and integrity
Justice M shall not sit in the appeal of P.S. and ofanysuch"designee," weare merely construing
soonad infinitum, and thus decisively influence andapplying the fundamental lawofthe land. A
the decision, for or against one party litigant. Judge ofFirstInstance, Judge-at-Large of First
Such legislative power might thus be wielded Instance or Cadastral Judge, under Section 149
to interfere with the functions of the judiciary, of.the Revised Administrative Code, need not
depriving Philippine citizens of their right to be at least forty years of age, nor have for ten
impartial awards from judges selected without years or more been a judge ofa court ofrecord
any reference to the partiesorinterests tobeaf or engaged in the practice oflaw in the Philip
fected. Unnecessary to prove or impute sinister pines (as required by Section 6ofArticle VIII of
motives behind the statutory disqualification. the Constitution), because under said section he
Enough that recognition ofthepower might give need only have practiced lawin the Philippines
for a period of not less than five years or have Article VIII of the Constitution, but it was and
held during a like period within the Philippines is not empowered to alter the qualifications of
an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. So that it •the Justices and the mode of their appointment,
may happen that a "designee" under Section 14 which are matters governed by Sections 5 and
of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute 6 of said Article VIII wherein the clause "unless
Justice of the Supreme Court in particular col otherwise provided by law" does not even exist,
iii>
laboration cases, and participating therein in nor the provision on who shall be the compo
the deliberations and functions of the Supreme nent members of the Court. Such a legislation
Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not was enacted in the form or Commonwealth Acts
WM possess the required constitutional qualifica Nos. 3 and 259, the pertinent provisions ofwhich
tions of a regular member of said Court. Here amended sections 133 and 134 of the Revised
again is another point of repugnancy between Administrative Code. But after liberation, the
the challenged section and the constitution. Chief Executive, by Executive Order No. 40 (41
And if we consider the actual fact that only four Off.Gaz., 187), amended sections 133 and 134 of
of the present ten Justices of this Court are not the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
adversely affected by the disqualification estab section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 and Sec
lished in Section 14 of the People's Court Act, tions 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 259, and
we see that the "designees" constitute a majority repealed all acts or parts ofacts inconsistent with
when sitting with said four Justices, giving rise the provisions of said executive order; and the
to the result that, if the body composed by them same.chief Executive, by Executive Order No. 8G
all should be considered as the Supreme Court, (42 Off.Gaz., 15) further amended section 133 of
it wouldbe composed by four members appointed the Revised Administrative Code, as thus previ
and confirmed pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of ously amended, also repealing all acts or parts
Article VIII of the Constitution and six who have of acts inconsistent therewith. Both by virtue of
not been so appointed and confirmed. The situa Executive Order No. 40 and Executive Order No.
tion would not be helped any by saying that such 86, the number of Justices of the Supreme Court,
compositionofthe Court is only temporary, for no as originally fixed at eleven by the Constitution,
temporary composition of the Supreme Court is was restored.
authorized by the constitution. This Tribunal, as (c) However temporary or brief may be the
established under the organic law, is one of the action or participation of a judge designated
lîii>
permanent institutions of the government. The under Section 14 of the People's Court Act in a
clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found collaboration case of the class therein defined,
in said Section 4 cannot be construed to authorize there is no escaping the fact that he would be
any legislation which would alter the composi participating in the deliberations and acts of
tion of the Supreme Court, as determined by the the Supreme Court, as the appellate tribunal
constitution, for however brief a time as may be jn such a case, and if allowed to do so, his vote
imagined. In principle, what really matters is would count as much as that of any regular Jus
not the length or shortness of the alteration of tice of the Court. There can be no doubt that the
the constitutional composition of the Court, but Chief Justice and Associate Justices required
the very permanence and unalterability of that by Section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution
composition so long as the constitution which to compose the Supreme Court are the regular
ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. We members of the Court — indeed, a "temporary
are furthermore ofopinion that said clause refers member" thereof would be a misnomer, implying
to the number of Justices who were to compose a position not contemplated by the constitution.
the Court upon its initial organization under the Section 5 of the same Article VIII, in requiring
Commonwealth, and the manner of its sitting; the members of the Supreme Court to be ap
that is, that the Legislature, when providing for pointed by the President with the consent of the
the initial organization of the Supreme Court Commission on Appointments, makes it plainly
under the Commonwealth, was authorized to indubitable that the Chief Justice and Associ
fix a different number of Justices than eleven, ate Justices who are to compose the Court and
and determine the manner of the Court's sitting sit therein under Section 4, have to be thus ap
differently from that established in Section 4 of pointed and confirmed.
jp^
ifojjtfl
ARTICLE Vm: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 643
As already adverted to, a mere designation or legislative act in an appropriate case, has to
under section 14 of the People's Court Act does resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality
not satisfy the constitutional requirement of of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, entitled "An Act
appointment, with the additional circumstance Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
that as to such designation the Commission on Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The
(»J Appointments is entirely dispensed with. We task of judicial' review^ aptly characterized as
find absolutely nothing in the context which exactingand delicate,is never more so than when
may soundlybe construed as authorizing, merely a conceded legislative power, that of judicial
by legislation, any change in the constitutional reorganization, may possibly collide with the
composition of the Supreme Court, or the per time-honored principle of the independence ofthe
formance of its functions by any but its constitu judiciary [Cf. Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322
tional members. On the other hand, we have to (1921) and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).] as
gobythe cardinal rule that "usuallyprovisions of protectedand safeguarded by this constitutional
a constitution are mandatory rather than direc provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court
tory, and mandatory provisionsare bindingonall and judges of inferior courts shall hold office
departments ofthe government." (16C.J.S.,120). during good behavior until they reach the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Under Sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Court shall have the power to discipline judges
[1935] Constitution, it is clear that the framers of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
intended the Supreme Court to function through Members,order their dismissal." For the assailed
the members who are therein defined; and by legislation mandates that Justices and judges
section 6 they determined who may be appointed of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
such members. This naturally excludes the in
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants
tervention of any person or official who is not a
of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
member of the Court in the performance of its
Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
functions; and it is self-evident that the "desig
nees"spokenofin Section14ofthe People's Court established by such Act, would be considered sep
Act cannot be such members in view of the fact arated from the judiciary. It is the termination
that they have not been appointed and confirmed of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies
as such pursuant to said Sections 5 and 6. a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Hence, we do not see the way clear to the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
proposition that the "designees" in such a case
can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justices"
of the Supreme Court. Theimportanceofthe crucial questionraised
called for intensive and rigorous study of all the
legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
For the foregoing considerations, it is de deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of
clared and ordered: (a) that Section 14 of the views being supplemented by memoranda from
£i> People's Court Act is unconstitutional in the the members of tfie Court, it is our opinion and
respects specifiedin the body of this resolution;
so hold that Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is not
and (b) that this case be dealt with hencefor
unconstitutional.
ward in pursuance of and in harmony with this
resolution.
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the

B. De La Liana v. Alba
legislative body in the enactment ofBatas Pam
112 SCRA 294 (1982)
bansa Big. 129to demonstrate lack ofgood faith
does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners
FERNANDO, C.J.: should have exercised greater care in informing
This Court, pursuant to its responsibility themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
of passing upon the validity of any executive themselves open to the accusation of reckless
§•<$)
644 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
disregard for the truth. On August 7, 1980, a majorreform in the judicial system. It is worth
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorgani noting that it will be the first of its kind since
zation was organized. This ExecutiveOrder was the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16,
later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A, 1901." [Reportofthe Committeeon Judicial Re
dated September 5 ofthat year. It clearly speci organization, 5-6.] It went on to say: "It doesnot
fied the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee admit of doubt that the last two decades of this
shall formulate plans on the reorganization of century are likely to be attended with problems
the Judiciary which shall be submitted within of even greater complexity and delicacy. New
seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to pro social interests are pressing for recognition in
vide the President sufficient options for the re the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily
organization ofthe entireJudiciary which shall those economically underprivileged, have found
embrace all lower courts, including the Court of legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances
tm Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City previously ignored. Fortunately, the judiciary
and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus
but excluding the Sandiganbayan." [Executive become even more formidable. For so much grist
Order No. 619-A] is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they
are likewise to be quite novel. The need foran in
On October 17,1980, a Report was submitted novative approach is thus apparent. Thenational
by such Committee onJudicialReorganization. It leadership, as is well-known, has beenconstantly
began with this paragraph: "The Committee on on the search for solutions that will prove to be
Judicial Reorganizationhas the honor to submit both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may
the following Report. It expresses at the outset there be continued national progress." [Ibid,
its appreciation for the opportunity accorded 7.] After which comes: 'To be less abstract, the
it to study ways and means for what today is thrust is on development. That has been repeat
a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the edly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are
restructuring of the judicial system. There are gearedto its realization. Nor, unlike in the past,
problems, bothgrave and pressing, that call for was it to be "considered as simply the movement
remedial measures. The felt necessities of the
towards economic progressand growthmeasured
time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of in terms of sustained increases in per capita in
no delay, forif no step be taken and at the earli come and Gross National Product (GNP)." [Ibid,
est opportunity, it is not too much to say that citingthe President's foreword to The Philippine
the people's faith in the administration ofjustice Development Plan, 2.] For the New Society, its
could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
implication goes further than economic advance,
greater efficiency in the disposition ofcases and extending to "the sharing, or taore appropri
that litigants, especially those ofmodest means- ately, the democratization ofsocial and economic
much more so, the poorest and the humblest-can
vindicatetheir rights in an expeditiousand inex opportunities, the substantiation of the true
foffi)
pensive manner. Therectitude and the fairness meaning ofsocial justice." [Ibid.] Thisprocess of
modernization and change compels the govern
in the way the courts operate must be manifest
to all members of the community and particularly ment to extend its field of activity and its scope
to those whose interests are affected by the exer of operations. The efforts towards reducing the
cise of their functions. It is to that task that the •gap between the wealthy and the poorelements
Committee addresses itself and hopes that the in the nation call for more regulatory legislation.
plans submittedcould be a starting pointfor an That way the social justiceandprotection tolabor
institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. mandates of the Constitution could be effectively
The experience of the Supreme Court, which implemented." [Ibid, 8. Thelast sentence ofthis
since 1973 has been empowered to supervise portion of the Report reads: "That is toNachieve
inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the the democratization and humanization of justice
municipal courts, has proven that reliance on in what has been felicitously referred to by the
improved court managementas well as training First Lady as a 'compassionatesociety."'] There
ofjudgesfor more efficient administration does is likelihood then "that some measures deemed
not suffice. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a inimical byinterests adversely affected would be
mi
challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit,
if the question does not go that far, suits may be the attainment of more efficiency in disposal
filed concerning their interpretation and applica of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a
tion.* * * There could be pleas for injunction or revision of procedures which do not tend to the
restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves proper meting out ofjustice. In consultation with,
would not, even so, result in their prompt final and upon a consensus*of the governmental and
disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt
policies embodied in law couldthus be reasonably that some options set forth in the Report be not
expected. That is not conducive to progress in de availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the
velopment." [Ibid, 8-9.] For, as mentioned in such jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court
Report, equally of vital concern is the problem merely to appellate adjudication, the preference
of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is has been opted to increase rather than diminish
one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme assist the Supreme Court. This preference has
Court, through the leadership of both retired been translated into one of the innovations in the
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the°late proposed Bill." ... It may be observed that the
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time volume containing the minutes of the proceedings
supervision of the courts was vested in it under of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages
the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious
and more cases has continued." [Ibid, 9-10.] It that it took considerable time and effort as well
is understandable why. With the accelerated as exhaustive study before the act was signed
economic development, the growth of population, by the President on August 14,1981. With such
the increasing urbanization, and other similar a background, it becomes quite manifest how
factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its
to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness.
what appears to be a crisis situation that calls What appears undoubted and undeniable is the
for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no good faith that characterized its enactment from
choice. It had to act, before the ailment became its inception to the affixing of the Presidential
even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it signature.
did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to
be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting 5. Nothing is better settled in our law
Batas Pambansa Big. 129. than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good
p>
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of
for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr.
Report as "both pressing and urgent." [Ibid, 10.] [L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998] reiter
It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed
ated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged
out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if
by respondents, to be without merit. Noremoval
it were to take place, would be the most thorough
after four generations. The reference was to the
or separation of petitioners, from the service is
basic Judiciary Act enacted in June of 1901, here involved, but the validity of the abolition
amended in a significant way, only twice previous of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for
to the Commonwealth...
the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also
that valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents. * * * And, of
4. After the submission of such Report, Cab course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is
inet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
Batas Pambansa Big. 129, was introduced. After preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the
setting forth the background as above narrated, merits ofthe case. As well-settled as the rule that
its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the the abolition of an office does not amount to an
President's instructions, this proposed legislation illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
has been drafted in accordance with the guide that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
lines of that report with particular attention to made in good faith." [Ibid, 1003
Mgj)
CASE AND SERVED UPON THE PARTIES.

ANY MEMBER WHO TOOK NO PART, OR
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality DISSENTED, OR ABSTAINED FROM A
of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 not having been DECISION OR RESOLUTION MUST STATE
shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs. THE REASON THEREFOR. THE SAME
NOTE: Teehankee dissented on the following REQUIREMENTS SHALL BE OBSERVED
grounds: (1) The express guarantee ofsecurityof BY ALL LOWER COLLEGIATE COURTS.
tenure should prevail over the power to abolish
merely implied from the power to create courts; 1. Certification.
(2)The Act achieves something short ofabolition "Its purpose is to ensure the implementation
and substantial change of the existing system; of the constitutional requirement that decisions
(3) The spirit that ruled the enactment ofthe law of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts,
was not so much a desire for reorganization as suchas the CourtofAppeals, Sandiganbayan and
such but to use reorganization as an instrument Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consul
for a mass purge. tation with the members of the court sitting en
banc or in division before the case is assigned to
tii&
SEC. 12. THE MEMBERS OF THE SU a member thereof for decision-writing.
PREME COURT AND OF OTHER COURTS
"The absence, however, of the certification
ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL NOT BE
wouldnot necessarily mean that the case submit
DESIGNATED TO ANY AGENCY PER
ted for decision had not been reached in consul
FORMING QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMIN
tation before being assigned to one member for
ISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.
the writing of the opinion of the Court since the
NOTE: Where a judge was designated regular performance of duty is presumed [Sec.
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Commit 5(m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court.]. The lack of
certification at the end of the decision would only
tee on Justice by the Provincial Governor whose
serve as evidence of failure to observe certifica
function was to receive complaints and make
recommendations towards the speedy disposition tion requirement and may be basis for holding
of cases of detainees, particularly those who are the officialresponsible for the omission to account
poor, the Court said that the judge should not therefor.[SeeI Record ofthe Constitutional Com
accept the designation. The committee performs mission 460] Such absence of certification would
administrative functions, that is, functions not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
which "involve the regulation and control over Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78272,
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their August 29,1989.
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the SEC. 14. NO DECISION SHALL BE
legislature or such as are devolved upon the RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT
administrative agency by the organic law of its EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND
existence." In reJudge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW
(1988). ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
NO PETITION FOR REVIEW OR MO

SEC. 13. THE CONCLUSIONS OF TION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A
THE SUPREME COURT IN ANY CASE DECISION OF THE COURT SHALL BE
SUBMITTED TO IT FOR DECISION REFUSED DUE COURSE OR DENIED
EN BANC OR IN DIVISION SHALL BE WITHOUT STATING THE LEGAL BASIS
REACHED IN CONSULTATION BEFORE THEREFOR.
THE CASE IS ASSIGNED TO A MEMBER
FOR THE WRITING OF THE OPINION OF 1. "Decisions" and "petitions," "minute
THE COURT. A CERTIFICATION TO THIS resolutions." ,
EFFECT SIGNED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE
SHALL BE ISSUED AND A COPY THEREOF "In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et
ATTACHED TO THE RECORD OF THE al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May
21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional is not to be applied retroactively to this case at
requirement [first paragraph] that a decision bar. Francisco v.Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May
must express clearly and distinctly the facts 12,1989.
and law on which it is based as referring only to
decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall A. Air France v. Carrascoso
under the constitutional provision [second para 18 S£R4 155(1956)
graph] which states that, 'No petition for review.
.. shall be refused due course without stating SANCHEZ, J.:
the legal basis therefore.' When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent
pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions The case is now before us for review on cer
decides to deny due course to the petition and tiorari.
states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision The facts declared by the^Court ofAppeals as
is shown or for some other legal basis stated in "fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with
"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member
the constitutional requirement.
of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
"Minute resolutions need not be signed by Manila for Lourdes on March 30,1958.
the members of the Court who took part in the
"On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air
deliberations of a case nor do they require the
France, through its authorized agent, Philip
certification of the Chief Justice. For to require
pine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first
members of the Court to sign all resolutions is
class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila
sued would not only unduly delay the issuance
to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
of its resolutions but a great amount of their
travelled in 'first class', but at Bangkok,
time would be spent on functions more properly
the Manager of the defendant airline forced
performed by the Clerk of Court..." Borromeo v.
plaintiff to vacate th,e 'first class' seat that
Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 82273, June 1,1990. he was occupying because, in the words of
The purpose of this requirement is to inform the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
the person reading the decision, and especially 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had
the parties, of how it was reached by the court a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to va
after consideration of the pertinent facts and cate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was
examination of the applicable laws. There -are to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
various reasons for this: (1) to.assure the parties Manager that his seat would be taken over
•
that the judge studied the case; (2) to give the los his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
ing party opportunity to analyze the decision and according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, 'many
^2)
possibly appeal or, alternatively, convince the of the Filipino passengers got nervous in
losing party to accept the decision in good grace; the tourist class; when they found out that
(3) to enrich the body of case law, especially ifthe Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion
decision is from the Supreme Court. On the other with the white man [manager], they came
hand, memorandum decisions can also speed all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
up the judicial process, a desirable thing and a Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man'
concern of the Constitution itself. Because of the
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing ofMay 26,1959);
above considerations the rule that should be fol
and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class'
seat in the plane."
lowed is that, where a Memorandum decision is
used, the decision adopted by reference must be 1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now
attached to the Memorandum for easy reference. seeks is that we review "all the findings of the
Nonetheless, the Memorandum decision should respondent Court ofAppeals. Petitioner charges
be sparingly used and used only where the facts that respondent court failed to make complete
as in the main are accepted by both parties and findings of fact on all the issues properly laid
in simple litigations only. However, this ruling before it. We are asked to consider the facts fa-
pi)
jj^jjii
vorable to petitioner, and then to overturn the pellant's side in the controversy as shown by his
appellate court's decision. own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment.
[People v. Maniqgue, 35 O.G., No. 94, pp. 1682,
Coming into focus is the constitutional man
1683, citing Section 133 of the Code of Civil Pro
date that "No decision shall be rendered by any
cedure and Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution,
court of record without expressing therein clearly
supra.] If the court did not recite in the decision
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
the testimony of each witness for, or each item
based." [Section 12, Article VIII, (1935) Consti
of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it
tution.] This is echoed in the statutory demand
does not mean that the court has overlooked such
(«ii that a judgement determining the merits of the
testimony or such item of evidence. [Badger, et
case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts
al. v. Boyd, 65 S.W. (2d), pp. 601, 610.] At any
and the law on which it is based" [Section 1, Rule
rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty
36, Rules of Court. See also Section 2, Rule 120,
has been regularly performed, and that all the
in reference to judgements in criminal cases.];
matters within an issue* in a case were laid down
and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals
before the court and passed upon by it. [Section
shall contain complete findings of fact on all is
5, (m) and (6), Rule 131, Rules of Court.]
îi) sues properly raised before it". [Sec. 4, Rule 51;
Sec. 33(2), Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.]
A decision with absolutely nothing to support
&&S
it is a nullity [Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. 598, B. Valdez v. Court of Appeals
601; Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Ma G.R No. 85082, February 25, 1991
nila, et al, 29 Phil. 183, 191]. The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential An examination of. the decision of the trial
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion court dated April 9,1986 shows that there are no
is drawn [Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465]. A findings of facts to serve as basis for its conclu
court of justice is not hidebound to write in its sions. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
decision every bit and piece of evidence [Id.] pre mandates as follows:
sented by one party and the other upon the issues
raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obli No decision shall be rendered by any
im gation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which, court without expressing therein clearly and
a party "considered as proved" [Aringo v. Arena, distinctly the facts and the law on which it
14 Phil. 263, 266; emphasis supplied]. This is is based.
but a part of the mental process from which the No petition for review or motion for re-,
>gj
Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A deci
consideration .of a decision shall be refused
sion is not to be so clogged with details such that due course or denied without stating the legal
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains
the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also
is no error for said court to withhold therefrom provides clearly as follows:
"any specific finding of facts with respect to the SECTION 1. Rendition ofjudgments. All
evidence for the defense." Because, as this Court
judgments determining the merits of cases
well observed, 'There is no law that so requires"
shall be in writing personally and directly
[Reyes vs. People, 71 Phil. 598, 600]. Indeed,
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
distinctly the facts and the law on which it
contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
is based, signed by him, and filed with the
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold
clerk of the court.
go
the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution." It is in That is the reason why this Court, through
this setting that in Maniqgue, it was held that the Administrative Circular No. I dated January
mere fact that the findings "were based entirely 28,1988, reminded all judges "to make complete
jA$i
on the evidence for the prosecution without tak findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize
ing into consideration or even mentioning the ap closely the legal aspects of the case in the light
fayfr
ARTICLE Vni: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 649
of the evidence presented. They should avoid on how the deed of assignment in favor of respon
the tendency to generalize and form conclusions dent Viernes came about, it is far from complete
ftifti without detailing the facts from which such con and is hardly a substantial compliance with the
clusions are deduced." mandate aforestated.
Of course, when a petition for review or mo As it is now, this Court has before it a chal
$0
tion for reconsideration of a decision of the court lenged decision that failed-to state clearly and
is denied duo course, or is otherwise denied, it distinctly the facts on which it is predicated. This
is not necessary that such findings of facts be Court has said again and again that it is not a
iiiijiJ made. However, the denial must state the legal trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual find
basis thereof. ings of the lower court and the appellate court
which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the
In the present case, the three-paged decision
Court has to wade through the records and make
of the trial court contained in the first two pages
its own findings of facts, rather than further
a statement of the allegations of the pleadings
delay the disposition of the case by remanding
of the parties and enumerates the witnesses
the records for further proceedings.
presented and the exhibits marked during the
trial. Thereafter, the trial court arrived at the
following conclusion:
C. People v. Lizada
After considering the evidence on record,
G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003
this Court finds that plaintiff have failed to
prove their case as against defendant Felicidad
Viernes, but proved their case against defaulted V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
M)
defendants Antes. The Court finds that there is
no sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on
the part of defendant Vierneses, and on the basis "THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
of existing jurisprudence, a third person who in IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
good faith purchases and registers a property OF FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE
cannot be deprived of his title as against plaintiff FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
who had previously purchased same property but HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
'<•$$
failed to register the same.
This is not what is contemplated under the VI. Findings of the Court
Constitution and the Rules as a clear and distinct On the first assignment of error, accused-
<$i
statement of the facts on the basis of which the appellant contends that the decision of the trial
decision is rendered. The foregoing one para court is null and void as it failed to comply with
graph statement constitute a mere conclusion the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of
of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of
without stating the facts which serve as the basis the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that He avers that the court a quo made no findings
petitioners had not registered the sale to them of facts in its decision. The trial court merely
is traversed by the records which show on the summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of
contrary, petitioners earlier registered the sale the prosecution and those of accused-appellant
to them. The court statement in the decision that and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the
a party has proven his case while the other has decretal portion of said decision. The trial court
not,, is not the findings, of facts contemplated by even failed to state in said decision the factual
the Constitution and the rules to be clearly and
and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme
distinctly stated.
penalty of death on him. The Solicitor General,
Unfortunately, the appellate court over on the other hand, argues that there should be no
looked this fatal defect in the appealed decision. mechanical reliance on the constitutional provi
iiii)
It merely adopted the alleged findings of facts of sion. Trial courts may well-nigh synthesize and
the trial court. Although it made some findings simplify their decisions considering that courts
w*
are harassed by crowded dockets and time con relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the
straints. Even if the trial court did not elucidate issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties
the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties must be assured from a reading of the decision
imposed, nevertheless the decision is valid. In of the trial court that they were accorded their
any event, the Solicitor General contends that rights to be heard by an impartial and respon
despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no sible judge. More substantial reasons for the
need to remand the case to the trial court for requirement are:
compliance with the constitutional requirement
'Tor one thing, the losing party must be
as the Court may resolve the case on its merits
given an opportunity to analyze the decision
to avoid delay in the final disposition of the
so that, if permitted, he may elevate what
case and afford accused-appellant his right to a
he may consider its errors for review by a
speedy trial. higher tribunal. For another, the decision if
The contention of accused-appellant is well- well-presented andvreasoned, may convince
taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 the losing party of its merits and persuade
Constitution provides that "no decision shall be" it to accept the verdict in good grace instead
iff)
rendered by any court without expressing therein of prolonging the litigation with a useless
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on appeal. A third reason is that decisions with
which it is based." This requirement is reiterated a full exposition of the facts and the law on
and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the which they are based, especially those com
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, ing from the Supreme Court, will constitute
which reads: a valuable body of case law that can serve as
jS)
useful references and even as precedents in
"SEC. 2. Form and contents of judg the resolution of future controversies."
ment. — The judgment must be written in The trial court is mandated to set out in its
the official language, personally and directly decision the facts which had been proved and
Ml)
prepared by the judge and signed by him its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a resolution on the issues and the factual and legal
statement of the facts proved or admitted basis for its resolution. Trial courts should not
by the accused and the law upon which the merely reproduce the respective testimonies of
judgment is based. witnesses of both parties and come out with its
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall decretal conclusion.
&&aJ
state (a) the legal qualification of the offense In this case, the trial court failed to comply
constituted by the acts committed by the with the requirements under the Constitution
accused, and the aggravating or mitigating and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely
circumstances attending the commission summarized the testimonies of the witnesses
thereof, if there are any; (b) the participa of the prosecution and of accused-appellant on
tion of the accused in the commission of the direct and cross examinations and merely made
•^J offense, whether as principal, accomplice, referral to the documentary evidence of the
or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty parties then concluded that, on the basis of the
imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant
liability or damages caused by the wrongful is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced
act to be recovered from the accused by the him to death, on each count.
offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate The trial court even failed to specifically state,
action has been reserved or waived." the facts proven by the prosecution based on their
evidence, the issues raised by the parties and
The purpose of the provision is to inform its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as
the parties and the person reading the decision well as the legal and factual bases for convicting
on how it was reached by the court after consid accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged.
eration of the evidence of the parties and the The trial court rendered judgment against
accused-appellant with the court declaration in In response, the trial court issued the assailed
the decretal portion of its decision that it did so Order, which held as follows:
liM based on the evidence of the prosecution. The
trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the ". . . [Tjhis Court cannot reconsider,
evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain because what it was asked to do* was only
•x^} in its decision why it believed and gave probative to clarify a Constitutional provision and to
weight to the evidence of the prosecution. Read declare whether acts "are violative thereof.
ing the decision of the trial court, one is apt to •• The Decision did not make a dispositive por
conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence tion because a dispositive portion is required
of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from
bother specifying the factual and legal bases for wrong suffered and the benefit that the pre
its imposition of the supreme penalty of death vailing party wronged should get. The step
on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The that these movants have to take, is direct
trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no. appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The for a conclusive interpretation of the Con
decision of the trial court is a good example of stitutional provision to the Supreme Court."
what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution The Antecedent Proceedings
and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
should not be. On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid
D. Velarde v. Social Justice Society
co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party,
G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004
hm
sought the interpretation of several constitu
PANGANIBAN, J.:
tional provisions, specifically on the separation
of church and state; and a declaratory judgment
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule on the constitutionality of the acts of religious
m 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective of
2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order 3 of the fice, or urging or requiring the members of their
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch flock to vote for a specified candidate.
49).
The subsequent proceedings were recounted
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of in the challenged Decision in these words:
a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice ". . . . Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted,
i<a\
Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano within the original period [to file an Answer],
"Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Execu
tive Minister Erano Manalo and Bro. Mike
Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erano
Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While
Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed
prayed for the resolution of the question "whether a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an
or not the act of a religious leader like any of Answer within the extended period and simi
herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy larly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.
of a candidate for elective office or in urging or All sought the dismissal of the Petition on
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a the common grounds that it does not state a
specified candidate, is violative of the letter or cause of action and that there is no justiciable
spirit of the constitutional provisions ..." controversy. They were ordered to submit a
pleading by way of advisement, which was
Alleging that the questioned Decision did closely followed by another Order denying
not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Ve
portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory larde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive
Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before Minister Erano Manalo moved to reconsider
the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, simi the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L.
larly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum.
mi
Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Corollarily, may they be banned from cam
Order by submitting his Memorandum ... paigning against said candidates?"
". . . the Court denied the Motions to The Court's Ruling
Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsidera The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is
tion filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie meritorious.
Villanueva and Executive Minister Erano
Manalo, which raised no new arguments Procedural Issues: Requisites of Petitions for
other than those already considered in the Declaratory Relief
motions to dismiss ..."
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
After narrating the above incidents, the trial which deals with petitions for declaratory relief,
court said that it had jurisdiction over the Peti provides in part:
tion, because "in praying for a determination as
to whether the actions imputed to the respon
"Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any
dents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only
affected by a statute, executive order or regu
a question oflaw." It then proceeded to a lengthy
lation, ordinance, or any other governmental
discussion of the issue raised in the Petition —
the separation of church and state — even trac regulation may, before breach or violation
ing, to some extent, the historical background of thereof, bring an action in the appropri
the principle. Through its discourse, the court a ate Regional Trial Court to determine any
quo opined at some point that the "[endorsement question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties
ofspecificcandidates in an election to any public
thereunder."
office is a clear violation of the separation clause."
Based on the foregoing, an action for declara
After its essay on the legal issue, however,
the trial court failed to include a dispositive por
tory relief should be filed by a person interested
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
tion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and
Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsidera instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
tion which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by
ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to inter
the lower court.
pret or to determine the validity of the written
Hence, this Petition for Review. instrument and to seek a judicial declaration
of the parties' rights or duties thereunder. The
essential requisites of the action are as follows:
During the Oral Argument, the issues were (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the
narrowed down and classified-as follows: controversy is between persons* whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has
"A. Procedural Issues
a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief issue is ripe for judicial determination.
raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state
a cause of action? Did respondent have any
legal standing to file the Petition for Declara Obviously, there is no factual allegation that
tory Relief? SJS' rights are being subjected to any threatened,
imminent and inevitable violation that should be
"B. Substantive Issues
prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The
"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the judicial power and duty of the courts to settle
tisiiJ
form and substance required by the Constitu actual controversies involving rights that are
tion, the law and the Rules of Court? legally demandable and enforceable cannot be
exercised when there is no actual or threatened
"2. May religious leaders like herein
violation of a legal right.
petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited
from endorsing candidates for public office?
Transcendental Importance statement of the facts proved or admitted

In any event, SJS urges the Court to take by the accused and the law upon which the
cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal stand judgment is based.
ing, considering that "the issues raised are of XXX XXX XXX.
paramount public interest."
In many cases, this Court has time and time

The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument again reminded "magistrates to heed the demand
iad
to determine with certainty whether it could of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution."
resolve the constitutional issue despite the bar The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G.
ren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court ofAppeals, discussed
the abbreviated proceedings in the court below. at length the implications of this provision and
Much to its chagrin, however,, counsels for the strongly exhorted thus:
parties — particularly for Respondent SJS —
made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications "Faithful adherence to the require
that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove ments of Section 14, Article VIII of the
discussed. Hence, even if the Court would ex Constitution is indisputably a paramount
empt this case from the stringent locus standi component of due process and fair play. It
requirement, such heroic effort would be futile is likewise demanded by the due process
because the transcendental issue cannot be re clause of the Constitution. The parties to a
solved anyway. litigation should be informed of how it was
L First Substantive Issue: Fundamental Re decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
quirements of a Decision
of the court. The court cannot simpiy say
The Constitution commands that "[n]o deci that judgment is rendered in favor of X and
sion shall be rendered by any court without ex against Y and just leave it at that without
pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts any justification whatsoever for its action.
and the law on which it is based. No petition for The losing party is entitled to know why he
review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if
of the court shall be refused due course or denied
permitted, should he believe that the decision
without stating the basis therefor."
should be reversed. A decision that does not
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Proce law on which it is based leaves the parties
dure similarly provides: in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who
"Sec. 1. Rendition ofjudgments and final
is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
orders. — A judgment or final order deter
court for review by a higher tribunal. More
mining the merits of the case shall be in
than that, the requirement is an assurance
writing personally and directly prepared by
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
judge did so through the processes of legal
facts and the law on which it is based, signed
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against
by him and filed with the clerk of court."
the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither
the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
as follows: but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
"Sec. 2. Form and contents ofjudgments. prerogative of passing judgment on the life,
— The judgment must be written in the liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
official language, personally and directly judge must ultimately depend on the power
prepared by the judge and signed by him of reason for sustained public confidence in
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a the justness of his decision."
• 654 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
In People v. Bugarin, the Court also ex or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially

plained: in cases in which controversial or novel issues
are involved.
"The requirement that the decisions
of courts must be in writing and that they An introduction may consist of a concise
must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts but comprehensive statement of the principal
and the law on which they are based serves factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases
many functions. It is intended, among other — particularly those concerning public interest;
things, to inform the parties of the reason or or involving complicated commercial; scientific,
i^j reasons for the decision so that if any of them technical or otherwise rare subject matters — a
appeals, he can point out to the appellate longer introduction or prologue may serve to
court the finding of facts or the rulings on acquaint readers with the specific nature of
points of law with which he disagrees. More the controversy and the issues involved. An
than that, the requirement is an assurance epilogue may be a summation of the important
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the principles applied to the resolution of the issues
judge did so through the processes of legal of paramount public interest or significance. It
reasoning " may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law
or guiding principle.
Let us now, again for the guidance of the
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that
'UMi
bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of
the assailed Decision contains no statement of
a good decision.
facts — much less an assessment or analysis
thereof — or of the court's findings as to the 1. Statement of the Case
probable facts. The assailed Decision begins
with a statement of the nature of the action and The Statement of the Case consists of a legal
the question or issue presented. Then follows definition of the nature of the action. At the first
a brief explanation of the constitutional provi instance, this part states whether the action is
sions involved, and what the Petition sought a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of
to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it
incidents before the trial court are tracked. The is a criminal case, this part describes the specific
Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on charge — quoted usually from the accusatory
the nature and the extent of the separation of portion of the information — and the plea of the
church and state. Without expressly stating the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the
final conclusion she has reached or specifying case is being decided on appeal or on a petition
the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number
her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED." in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of
the assailed decision.
Failure to comply with the constitutional In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction
injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amount of the criminal information serves as a guide
ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or in determining the nature and the gravity of
orders issued in careless disregard of the consti the offense for which the accused may be found
tutional mandate are a patent nullity and must culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be con
be struck down as void.
victed of a crime different from or graver than
that charged.
Parts of a Decision
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the infor
In general, the essential parts of a good mation is especially important when there is a
decision consist of the following: (1) statement question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on
of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or whether qualifying and modifying circumstances
assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which have been adequately alleged therein.
each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and
resolved; and, finally; (5) dispositive portion. The To ensure that due process is accorded, it
ponente may also opt to include an introduction is important to give a short description of the
ARTICLE VDI: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT • 655
[I&frl
proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. resolved all factual and legal issues involved may
Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregu partly explain why the reviewing court finds no
larity therein, may render the judgment void, reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of
and further consideration by the appellate court the former. Conversely, the lower court's patent
would be futile. In some instances, especially in misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of
appealed cases, it would also be useful to men the law would aid in £ better understanding of
tion the fact of the appellants' detention, in order why its ruling is reversedVr modified.
to dispose of the preliminary query — whether
or ncft they have abandoned their appeal by ab In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets
'•Mil
sconding or jumping bail. of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues
for resolution usually involve questions of law,
Mentioning the court of origin and the case grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction;
number originally assigned helps in facilitating hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed
the consolidation of the records of the case in both by the parties. With few exceptions, factual is
the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of sues are not entertained in non-criminal cases.
final judgment. Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower
court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced;
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal por
otherwise, the material factual antecedents
tion of the assailed decision informs the reader
should be restated in the words of the reviewing
of how the appealed case was decided by the
magistrate.
court a quo.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court
2. Statement of Facts or body whose decision is under review should
There are different ways of relating the facts be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly
•ipi.i
of the case. First, under the objective or reporto- understand why the lower court ruled in a certain
rial method, the judge summarizes — without way, and why the reviewing court either finds
no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.
comment — the testimony of each witness and
the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the 3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
synthesis method, the factual theory of the plain
tiff or prosecution and then that ofthe defendant Both factual and legal issues should be
or defense is summarized according to the judge's stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors,
best light. Third, in the subjective method, the as mentioned in the appellant's brief, may be
version of the facts accepted by the judge is sim reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as
to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final
ply narrated without explaining what the parties'
%){•}
versions are. Finally, through a combination of decision on the ground that the court failed to
objective and subjective means, the testimony consider all assigned errors that could affect
of each witness is reported and the judge then the outcome of the case. But when the appellant
formulates his or her own version of the facts.
presents repetitive issues or when the assigned
errors do not strike at the main issue, these may
In criminal cases, it is better to present both be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
the version of the prosecution and that of the de
fense, in the interest of fairness and due process. Though not specifically questioned by the
A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties, additional issues may also be included,
parties must follow. The resolution of most crimi if deemed important for substantial justice to be
nal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are
given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal
to a large extent on the factual issues and the
appreciation of the evidence. The plausibility or cases in which the reviewing court is generally
the implausibility of each version can sometimes limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal.
be initially drawn from a reading of the facts. The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction;
questions not raised but necessary in arriving
Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at
its findings and conclusions should be explained. at a just decision on the case; or unassigned
errors that are closely related to those properly
On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision assigned, or upon which depends the determina
of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly tion of the question properly raised.
4. The Court's Ruling form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pre
tentious. At all times, however, the decision must
This part contains a full discussion of the
be clear, concise, complete and correct.
specific errors or issues raised in the complaint,
petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well Second Substantive Issuer Religious Lead
as of other issues the court deems essential to ers' Endorsement of Candidates for Public Office
igij>
a just disposition of the case. Where there are
The basic question posed in the SJS Peti
several issues, each one of them should be sepa tion — WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
rately addressed, as much as practicable. The
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS
respective contentionsof the parties should also IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL — undoubtedly de
be mentioned here. When procedural questions
serves serious consideration. As stated earlier,
are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is
the Court deems this constitutional issue to be
better to resolve the former preliminarily.
of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry,
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion for it concerns the governance of our country and
its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural
In a criminal case, the disposition should
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court,
include a finding of innocence or guilt, the
this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as
specific crime committed, the penalty imposed,
not to leave any doubt that there might be room
the participation of the accused, the modifying
to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on
circumstances if any, and the civil liability and
the merits.
costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the court
must order the immediate release of the ac Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however,
cused, if detained, (unless they are being held to convince the Court that there are enough fac
for another cause) and order the director of the tual and legal bases to resolve the paramount
Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solici
is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten tor General has sided with petitioner insofar as-
tfifti (10) days from notice, the exact date when the there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition
accused were set free. and the assailed Decision.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil

action, the disposition should state whether
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of
the complaint or petition is granted or denied,
Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The as
the specific relief granted, and the costs. The
sailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003
following test of completeness may be applied.
First, the parties should know their rights and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
obligations. Second, they should know how to (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULLAND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition
execute the decision under alternative contingen
cies. Third, there should be no need for further for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure
proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, to state a cause of action.
the case should be terminated by according the Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
proper relief. The "proper relief usually depends Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and
upon what the parties seek in their pleadings'. recommend whether the trial judge may, after
It may declare their rights and duties, command observing due process, be held administratively
the performance of positive prestations, or order liable for rendering a decision violative of the
them to abstain from specific acts. The disposi Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
tion must also adjudicate costs. circulars of this Court. No costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be SO ORDERED.
discussed in sequence. But they should all be
present and plainly identifiable in the decision. NOTE: The rule in military tribunals is
Depending on the writer's character, genre and different. The proceedings in a military tribu
style, the language should be fresh and free- nal terminate with a simple guilty or not guilty
flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed verdict. This does not violate the provision that
foâ
a decision of a court of record "shall clearly and 1. Time frame for decisions.
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
is based" because a military commission is not a A. Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before
court of record within the meaning of this Article. The Sandiganbayan
Fernando, J. in Buscayno v. Enrile, 102 SCRA 7, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 28, 2001
19-20 (January 15, 1982).
Nor does Section 14 apply to the COMELEC, The issues presented are the following: (1)
which is not a court. Mangca v. COMELEC, 112 What is the reglementary period within which
the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases
Vjffl SCRA 273, 277 (February 25, 1982).
falling within its jurisdiction? (2) Are there cases
submitted for decision remaining undecided by
SEC. 15. (1) ALL CASES OR MATTERS
the Sandiganbayan or any of its divisions beyond
FILED AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF
the aforestated reglementary period? (3) Is Su
THIS CONSTITUTION MUST BE DECIDED
preme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094
OR RESOLVED WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR applicable to the Sandiganbayan?
MONTHS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION
«H#S
FOR THE SUPREME COURT, AND, UN Article VIII, Section 15(1) and (2), of the 1987
LESS REDUCED BY THE SUPREME Constitution provides:
COURT, TWELVE MONTHS FOR ALL
"SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters
LOWER COLLEGIATE COURTS, AND filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
THREE MONTHS FOR ALL OTHER LOW
must be decided or resolved within twenty-
ER COURTS.
four months from date of submission to the
(2) A CASE OR MATTER SHALL BE Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
DEEMED SUBMITTED FOR DECISION Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
OR RESOLUTION UPON THE FILING OF collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.
THE LAST PLEADING, BRIEF, OR MEMO
RANDUM REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF "(2) A case or matter shall be deemed
COURT OR BY THE COURT ITSELF. submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memoran
(3) UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE
dum required by the Rules of Court or by the
CORRESPONDING PERIOD, A CERTIFI
court itself."
CATION TO THIS EFFECT SIGNED BY
THE CHIEF JUSTICE OR THE PRESIDING The above provision does not apply to the
JUDGE SHALL FORTHWITH BE ISSUED Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular
AND A COPY THEREOF ATTACHED TO courts of lower collegiate level that in the present
THE RECORD OF THE CASE OR MATTER, hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.
AND SERVED UPON THE PARTIES. THE
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the
CERTIFICATION SHALL STATE WHY A
same level as the Court of Appeals and possess
DECISION OR RESOLUTION HAS NOT
'mi
ing all the inherent powers of a court of justice,
BEEN RENDERED OR ISSUED WITHIN
with functions of a trial court.
SAID PERIOD.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular
DESPITE THE EXPIRATION OF THE court but a special one. The Sandiganbayan
APPLICABLE MANDATORY PERIOD, THE was originally empowered to promulgate its
COURT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SUCH own rules of procedure. However, on March 30,
RESPONSIBILITY AS MAY HAVE BEEN 1995, Congress repealed the Sandiganbayan's
INCURRED IN CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, power to promulgate its own rules of procedure
SHALL DECIDE OR RESOLVE THE CASE and instead prescribed that the Rules of Court
OR MATTER SUBMITTED THERETO FOR promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply
DETERMINATION, WITHOUT FURTHER to all cases and proceedings filed with the San
DELAY. diganbayan.
"Special courts are judicial tribunals exer introduction of evidence by the parties in the
cising limited jurisdiction over particular or cases before it. The Sandiganbayan, in original
specialized categories of actions. They are the cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has
Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the discretion to weigh the evidence of the par
the Shari'a Courts." ties, admit the evidence it regards as credible
i^J and reject that which they consider perjurious
Under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Con
or fabricated.
stitution "Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court." B. Court Administrator v. Quinanola
AM. No. MTJ-99-1216, October 20, 1999
In his report, the Court Administrator would
distinguish between cases which the Sandigan PANGANIBAN, J.:
!ffi&
bayan has cognizance of in its original jurisdic
tion, and cases which fall within the appellate The Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Court to decide cases and matters pending before them
Administrator posits that since in the first class within the period fixed by law. Their failure to
of cases, the Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
court, then for that classification of cases, the administrative sanctions. A heavy case load and
three (3) month reglementary period applies. a poor health may partially excuse such lapses,
iiii
For the second class of cases, the Sandiganbayan only if the judges concerned request reasonable
has the twelve-month reglementary period for extensions. In the present case, however, the
collegiate courts. We do not agree. respondent made no effort to inform this Court
of his reasons for the delay, much less to request
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. any extension. Worse, he signed certifications
No. 1606 is clear on this issue. It provides:
that all cases and motions pending before him
"SECTION 6. Maximum period for had been attended to within the prescribed
termination ofcases — As far as practicable, period.
the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan
once commenced shall be continuous until
terminated and the judgment shall be ren This court has always emphasized the need
dered within three (3) months from the date and the imperative for judges to decide cases
the case was submitted for decision." promptly and expeditiously within the constitu
tionally prescribed 90-day period. Their failure
On September 18,1984, the Sandiganbayan to do so constitutes gross inefficiency, which
promulgated its own rules thus: consequently warrants administrative sanctions.
"SECTION 3. Maximum Period to Decide
Cases — The judgment or final order of
a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be
Taking into account his failing health and
rendered within three (3) months from the
his having already compulsorily retired, Judge
date the case was submitted for decision
Quinanola should be fined in the amount of forty
thousand pesos (P40,000).
(emphasis ours)."
Given the clarity of the rule that does not dis
SEC. 16. THE SUPREME COURT
tinguish, we hold that the three (3)-month period,
not the twelve (12)-month period, to decide cases SHALL, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE
OPENING OF EACH REGULAR SESSION
applies to the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the
Sandiganbayan presently sitting in five (5) divi OF THE CONGRESS, SUBMIT TQ THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS AN
sions, functions as a trial court. The term "trial"
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS
is used in its broad sense, meaning, it allows
AND ACTIVITIES OF THE JUDICIARY.
Article IX
Constitutional Commissions
a. common provisions
SECTION 1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, WHICH SHALL BE INDEPEN

DENT, ARE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
^5 AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT.
1. Independent Commissions. It is only on this question that respondent

COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees
A. Macalintal v. Comelec with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the
is) petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution pro
viding for the independence of the constitutional
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts
of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common that its power to formulate rules and regula
Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: tions has been upheld in Gallardo v. Tabamo,
Jr. where this Court held that the power of the
Section 1. The Constitutional Commis
COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations
sions, which shall be independent, are the
is implicit in its power to implement regula
Civil Service Commission, the Commission
tions under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C 43 of the
on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in
He "submits that the creation of the Joint asserting that as an independent constitutional
Congressional Oversight Committee with the body, it may not be subject to interference by any
power to review, revise, amend and approve the government instrumentality and that only this
Implementing Rules and Regulations promul Court may review COMELEC rules and only in
gated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes cases of grave abuse of discretion.
into the independence of the COMELEC which,
as a constitutional body, is not under the control
of either the executive or legislative departments The Solicitor General takes exception to his
of government; that only the COMELEC itself prefatory statement that the constitutional chal
can promulgate rules and regulations which may lenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner
be changed or revised only by the majority of its that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and uncon
members; and that should the rules promulgated
stitutional on the ground that there is nothing
by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court
in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative
that has the power to review the same via the
Department that would as much as imply that
petition of any interested party, including the
Congress has concurrent power to enforce and
legislators.
659
administer election laws with the COMELEC; controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous

and by the principles oiexclusio unius estexclusio position to decide complex political questions.
alterius and expressum facit cessaretaciturn, the
constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress
circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all By vesting itself with the powers to approve,
others.
review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Over
seas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
The parties are unanimous in claiming that beyond the scope of its constitutional author
Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section 17.1 are ity. Congress trampled upon the constitutional
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
forged on this question raised by petitioner. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual reticence
L^ft
in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The ambit of legislative power under Article
VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is SEC. 2. NO MEMBER OF A CONSTITU
Section 1 ofArticle LX-Aof the 1987 Constitution
TIONAL COMMISSION SHALL, DURING
ordaining that constitutional commissions such HIS TENURE, HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE
as the COMELEC shall be "independent." OR EMPLOYMENT. NEITHER SHALL HE
toi
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 ENGAGE IN THE PRACTICE OF ANY PRO
Constitution providing that there shall be an FESSION OR IN THE ACTIVE MANAGE
independent COMELEC, the Court has held MENT OR CONTROL OF ANY BUSINESS
that "[w]hatever may be the nature of the func WHICH IN ANY WAY MAY BE AFFECTED
tions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is BY THE FUNCTIONS OF HIS OFFICE, NOR
that the framers of the Constitution wanted it SHALL HE BE FINANCIALLY INTEREST
to be independent from the other departments of ED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN ANY
the Government." In an earlier case, the Court CONTRACTWITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE
elucidated: OR PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOV
ERNMENT, ANY OF ITS SUBDIVISIONS,
The Commission on Elections is a con AGENCIES, OR INSTRUMENTALITIES,
stitutional body. It is intended to play a INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED
distinct and important part in our scheme of OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR
government. In the discharge ofits functions, THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.
it should not be hampered with restrictions SEC. 3. THE SALARY t)F THE CHAIR-
that would be fully warranted in the case of 1\IAN ANDTHE COMMISSIONERS SHALL
a less responsible organization. The Com BE FIXED BY LAW AND SHALL NOT BE
mission may err, so may this court also. It DECREASED DURING THEIR TENURE.
should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure SEC. 4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COM
the accomplishment of the great objective MISSIONS SHALL APPOINT THEIR OF
for which it was created — free, orderly and FICIALS AND EMPLOYEES IN ACCOR
honest elections. We may not agree fully DANCE WITH LAW.
with its choice of means, but unless these
are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse 1. Independent.
of discretion, this court should not interfere.
The Civil Service Commission, Commission
Politics is a practical matter, and political on Audit, and the Commission on Elections per
questions must be dealt with realistically - form key functions in the government. In order
not from the standpoint of pure theory. The to protect their integrity, they have been made
Commission on Elections, because of its fact
constitutional bodies.
finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from Because they perform vital functions of gov
actual experience in dealing with political ernment, it is essential that their independence
ARTICLE IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 661
be protected against outside influences and

political pressures. Hence, they enjoy indepen
dent powers of appointment; they enjoy fiscal Aruelo claims that in election contests, the
autonomy; the salary of Commissioners may not COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the re
be diminished during their continuance in office; spondent therein only five days from receipt of
the Commissioners have a fixed term; and they summons within which to file his answer to the
are removable only by impeachment. petition (Part VI, Rule 35; Sec. 7) and that this
five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed
SEC. 5. THE COMMISSION SHALL his answer. According to him, the filing of mo
ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY. THEIR AP tions to dismiss and motionsfor bill ofparticulars
PROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III ofthe
SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGU COMELEC Rules ofProcedure; hence,the filing
LARLY RELEASED. of said pleadings did not suspend the running
of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new
five-day period to file his answer.
1. Automatic release of funds.
We do not agree.
The obligation of the Department of the Bud
get to automatically release amounts appropri Petitioner filed the election protest with the •
ated for offices with fiscal autonomy means that Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are
the DBM may not retain a portion of the amount governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
nor may it program release of such amount. The
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC
"no report, no release" policy of the Commission
on Audit may not be validly enforced against Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceed
offices vested with fiscal autonomy for whom, ings before the regular courts. As expressly man
dated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COM
according to the Constitution, appropriations
must be automatically released. (Civil Service ELEC Rules ofProcedure, the filing of motions to
Commission v. Department of Budget, G.R. No. dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only
158791, July 22, 2005; Civil Service Commis to proceedings brought before the COMELEC.
sion v. Department of Budget, G.R. No. 158791,
L February 10, 2006.)
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC
can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of cer
SEC. 6. EACH COMMISSION EN BANC
tain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
MAY PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
CONCERNING PLEADINGS AND PRAC
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Su
TICE BEFORE IT OR BEFORE ANY OF ITS
preme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
OFFICES. SUCH RULES HOWEVER SHALL
NOT DIMINISH, INCREASE, OR MODIFY
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.
B. Antonio v. Comelec
1. Rules of procedure. G.R. No. 135869, September 22, 1999
m
A. Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993 GONZAGA-REYES, </.:
Is the period to appeal a decision of a munici
QUIASON, J: pal trial court to the Commission on Elections
This is a petition to set aside the Decision of ("COMELEC") in an election protest involving a
the Court of Appeals which ruled that the answer barangay position five (5) days per COMELEC
ti$J
and counter-protest of respondent Danilo F. Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided
Gatchalian was filed timely and ordered the Re for in Republic Act 6679 and the Omnibus Elec
gional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan tion Code? This is the sole issue posed in the
liiiii
to continue with the proceedings in the protest instant petition ...
case filed by petitioner Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr.
iijj'l
662 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OFGOVERNMENT
No less than the 1987 Constitution (Ar TO THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIO-
ticle IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section RARIBY THE AGGRIEVED PARTYWITHIN
3) grants and authorizes this Commission to THIRTY DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF A COPY
promulgate its own rules of procedure as long THEREOF.
as such rules concerning pleadings and practice
do not diminish, increase or modify substantive 1. Judicial review.
rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure A. Cua v. Commission on Elections
promulgated in 1993 as amended in 1994 is no 156 SCRA 582 (1987)
ordinary interpretative oradministrative ruling.
It is promulgated by this Commission pursuant
PER CURIAM:
to a constitutionally mandated authority which
no legislative enactment can amend, revise or In SPC No. 87-454 and SPC No. 87-467, the
iiljji
repeal. First Division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1
decision onAugust10,1987, favoring the herein
petitioner Cua but nevertheless suspended his
... As correctly pointed out by the COM proclamation aswinner inthelone congressional
ELEC, Section 6,Article LX-Aofthe 1987 Consti district of Quirino due to the lack ofthe unani
tution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to mous vote required by the procedural rules in
promulgate its own rules ofprocedure. The 1993 COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2,
COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a 1984....
uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal
consistent with the expeditious resolution of
election-related cases. It would be absurd and Theposition ofthe petitioner is that the 2-1
therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the decision of the First Division was a valid deci
10-day period for barangay election contests. sion of the COMELEC itself despite the above
P^J Hence, Section 3,Rule 22 ofthe COMELEC Rules rule because ofArticle IX-A, Section 7 of the new
of Procedure is not in conflict with any existing Constitution, providing that "each Commission
law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the shalldecide bya majority vote ofall its members
laudable objective ofproviding a uniform period any caseor matter brought before it." He argues
of appeal and defy the COMELEC's constitu that this applies to the votings ofthe COMELEC
tional mandate to enact rules of procedure to both in division and en banc and that the private
expedite disposition of electioncases. respondent himselfrecognized thiswhen hefiled
the motion for reconsideration/appeal with the
COMELEC en banc.
SEC. 7. EACH COMMISSION SHALL

DECIDE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL Fortheir part, the respondentsinsist that no
ITS MEMBERS ANY CASE OR MATTER decision was reached by the First DivisiononAu
BROUGHT BEFORE IT WITHIN SIXTY gust 10, 1987, because the required unanimous
DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SUBMIS vote was not obtained and there was therefore
SION FOR DECISION OR RESOLUTION. nothing to be affirmed on appeal by the COM
A CASE OR MATTER IS DEEMED SUB ELEC en banc and nothing to reconsider either.
MITTED FOR DECISION OR RESOLU Additionally, they argue that in anycase no valid
TION UPON THE FILING OF THE LAST decision was reached by the COMELEC en banc
PLEADING, BRIEF, OR MEMORANDUM because only three votes were cast in favor ofthe
REQUIRED BY THE RULES OFTHE COM petitioner andthese did notconstitute a majority
MISSION OR BY THE COMMISSION IT
of the body.
SELF. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED
BY THIS CONSTITUTION OR BY LAW, After considering the issues and the argu
tpj
ANY DECISION, ORDER, OR RULING OF mentsraisedbythe parties, the Courtholds that
EACH COMMISSION MAY BE BROUGHT the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division
ARTICLE K: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 663
was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section calService Office, Mr. Espirituobviously had no
7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three power whateverto render and promulgate a deci
members who voted to affirm the First Divi sion of or for the Commission. Indeed, even the
sion constituted a majority of the five members Chairman, alone, had not that power. Asclearly
who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and set out in the Constitution then in force, the
their decision is also valid under the aforecited power was lodged in tfie Commission on Audit,
constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation "composed of a Chairman and two Commission
of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions ers." It was the Commission, as a collegial body,
was a valid act that entitles him now to assume which then as now, had the jurisdiction to "(d)
his seat in the House of Representatives. ecide any case brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for resolu
tion," subject to review by the Supreme Court
ii&j
on certiorari.
B. Mison v. Commission on Audit
187 SCRA 445 (1990) Hence, the adoption or ratification of the
Espiritu decision by the Acting COA Chairman
NARVASA,J.: was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate
an act void ab initio because done absolutely
In Customs Case No. 813, the Commissioner without authority. The act has to be done anew
of Customs rendered a decision on August 11, by the person or entity duly endowed with au
1969, declaring illegal the seizure by elements thority to do so.
ofthe Philippine Navy of the M/V"HyojinMaru"
a vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered the
release of the vessel and its-cargo to the claim C. Mateo v. Court of Appeals
ants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung I. Return of the G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995
cargo as thus ordered was effected pursuant to a
directive of the Secretary of Finance dated Febru PUNO, J:
ary 5, 1970. Release of the vessel, however, was
never effected; it sank while yet in the custody
of the Bureau of Customs, and requests by the The main issue in this petition for review is
Bureau to the Philippine Navy and the CADA to whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
refloat or salvage the ship could not be complied has jurisdiction over Sp. Civil Case No. 014-M
with for lack of funds. involving dismissal of an employee of a quasi-
public corporation.
Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a
claim with the Commission on Audit for the pay We hold that it has no jurisdiction.
ment of the value of the vessel. Acting thereon
There is no question that MOWAD is a
"(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr.
Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Ser quasi-public corporation created pursuant to
vice Office of the COA, denied the claim for the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as
reasons set forth in his registered letter to the
the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as
amended. In Davao City Water District v. Civil
claimant's lawyer dated November3, 1977-cap-
Service Commission,1 the Court en banc ruled
tioned "Decision No. 77-142." Another letter,
dated December 9, 1977, this time signed by that employees of government-owned or con
trolled corporations with original charter fall
Acting COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico,
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Com
was also sent to claimants' counsel, Atty. Juan
mission ...
David, enclosing "a copy of Decision No. 77-142
of this Commission, contained in a letter dated
November 3, 1977, which is self-explanatory."
Indeed, the established rule is that the hir
The point cannot be conceded. ing and firing ofemployees of government-owned
In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was
void ab initio. As manager of the COA Techni '201 SCRA 593 (1991).
and controlled corporations are governed by the E. Dumayas, Jr. v. Comelec

provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001
and Regulations.
Issues for resolution:
Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order
No. 292, and Rule II, section 1 of Memorandum ... (3) In view of the retirement of Commis
Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service sioners Gorospe and Guiani before the date of
Commission spell out the initial remedy of pri the promulgation of the assailed resolution on
vate respondent against illegal dismissal. They March 2,2000, should said resolution be deemed
categoricallyprovide that the party aggrievedby null and void for being violative of Article IX-A,
a decision,ruling, order, or action ofan agencyof Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution?
the government involvingtermination ofservices
may appeal to the Commission within fifteen
(15) days... In Jamil v. Commission on Elections, 283
SCRA 349, 371 (1997), we held that a decision
D. Ambil v. COMELEC becomes binding only after its promulgation. If
Mi
G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000 at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member
of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or
registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on
It may be true that the parties received a the decision must automatically be withdrawn
copy ofwhat purports to be the Guiani resolution, or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of Commis
declaring respondent Jose T. Ramirez the victor sioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be
in the case. Such Guiani resolution is admitted considered as withdrawn for the reason that their
by the parties and considered by the Commis retirement preceded the resolution's promulga
sion on Elections as void. The Solicitor General tion. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes
submitted an advice that the same resolution is would be as if they had not signed the resolution
deemed vacated by the retirement of Commis at all and only the votes of the remaining com
sioner Guiani on February 15, 2000. It can not missioners would be properly considered for the
be promulgated anymore for all legal intents purpose of deciding the controversy.
and purposes.
However, unless the withdrawal of the votes
We rule that the so-called Guiani resolution would materially affect the result insofar as votes
is void for the following reasons: for or against a party is concerned, we find no
First: A final decision or resolution becomes reason for declaring the decision a nullity. In the
binding only after it is promulgated and not be present case, with the cancellation of the votes
fore.Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of retired Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani,
of the Commission at the time the final decision the remaining votes among the four incumbent
faffifr or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take commissioners at the time of the resolution's
part in that resolution or decision. Much more promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor ofre
could he be the ponente of the resolution or deci spondent. Noteworthy, these remaining Commis
sion. The resolution or decision of the Division sioners still constituted a quorum. In our view,
must be signed by a majority of its members and the defect cited by petitioner does not affect the
duly promulgated. substance or validity of respondent Commission's
disposition of the controversy. The nullification
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a of the challenged resolution, in our view, would
draftponencia prior to his retirement from office, merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.
but when he vacated his office without the final
decision or resolution having been promulgated,
his vote was automatically invalidated. 48 Before
that resolution or decision is so signed and pro 2. Comelec decisions.
mulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision Howmany votes are needed for the Commis
to speak of. sion en banc to reach a decision? Section 7 says:
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
ARTICLE DC: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 665
of all its members any case or. matter brought BE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
before it within sixty days from the date of its OF THE PREDECESSOR. IN NO CASE
)JM
submission for decision or resolution." The provi SHALL ANY MEMBER BE APPOINTED
sion is clear that it should be the majority vote OR DESIGNATED IN A TEMPORARY Oft
of "all its members" and not only of those who ACTING CAPACITY.
participated and took part in the deliberations. o
(Estrella v. Comelec, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, I. Organization of the Commission.
2004.)
A. Gaminde v. COA
A resolution or decision of the COMELEC is
G.R. No. 14033, December 13, 2000
considered complete and validly rendered or is
sued when there is concurrence by the required
majority of the Commissioners. There is nothing PARDO, J.:
in the Constitution nor in the COMELEC Rules The case is a special civil action of certiorari
of Procedure that requires the submission of a seeking to annul and set aside two "decisions" of
dissenting opinion before a decision can be con the Commission on Audit ruling that petitioner's
sidered validly rendered and complete. (Tan v. term of office as Commissioner, Civil Service
%ma
Comelec, November 20, 2006.) Commission, to which she was appointed on June
II, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set
SEC. 8. EACH COMMISSION SHALL forth in her appointment paper.
PERFORM SUCH OTHER FUNCTIONS AS The Facts
MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
On June 11,1993, the President of the Philip
pines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde,
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Com
mission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993,
SECTION 1. (1) THE CIVIL SERVICE
L SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE CIVIL
after taking an oath of office. On September 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress
SERVICE COMMISSION COMPOSED OF
of the Philippines confirmed the appointment...
A CHAIRMAN AND TWO COMMISSION
ERS WHO SHALL BE NATURAL-BORN However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND, sought clarification from the Office of the Presi
AT THE TIME OF THEIR APPOINTMENT. dent as to the expiry date of her term of office. In
AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, reply to her request, the ChiefPresidential Legal
WITH PROVEN CAPACITY FOR PUBLIC Counsel, in a letter dated April 07,1998 opined
ADMINISTRATION, AND MUST NOT HAVE that petitioner's term of office would expire on
BEEN CANDIDATES FOR ANY ELECTIVE February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.
POSITION IN THE ELECTIONS IMMEDI
ATELY PRECEDING THEIR APPOINT Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner
MENT.
remained in office after February 02, 1999. On
February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G.
(2) THE CHAIRMAN AND THE de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit request
COMMISSIONERS SHALL BE APPOINTED ing opinion on whether or not Commissioner
BY THE PRESIDENTWITH THE CONSENT Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff
OFTHE COMMISSION ONAPPOINTMENTS may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
FOR A TERM OF SEVEN YEARS WITHOUT expiration of their appointments on February
REAPPOINTMENT. OF THOSE FIRST
02,1999.
APPOINTED, THE CHAIRMAN SHALL
HOLD OFFICE FOR SEVEN YEARS, A On February 18,1999, the General Counsel,
COMMISSIONER FOR FIVE YEARS, AND Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the
ANOTHER COMMISSIONER FOR THREE term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on
YEARS, WITHOUT REAPPOINTMENT. AP February 02,1999 as stated in her appointment
POINTMENT TO ANY VACANCY SHALL conformably with the constitutional intent."
666 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
Consequently, onMarch24,1999,CSC Resi The 1973 Constitution introduced the first

dent Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of system ofa regular rotation or cyclein the mem
disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in bership of the Civil Service Commission. The
audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to provision on the 1973 Constitution reads:
petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective "... The Chairman andttie Commission
iffijfil February 02, 1999. ers shall be appointed by the Prime Minister
OnApril 5,1999, petitioner appealed the dis for a term of seven years without reappoint
ment. Of the Commissioners first appointed,
allowance to the Commission on Audit en banc.
one shall hold officefor seven years, another
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit is
for five years, and the third for three years.
sued Decision No. 99-090 dismissing petitioner's
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the for the unexpired portion of the term of the
propriety of the disallowance, holding that the predecessor." ArticleXII, Section1 (1), 1973
issue ofpetitioner's termofoffice may be properly Constitution.
addressed by mere reference to her appointment
paper which set the expiration dateonFebruary Actually, this was a copy ofthe Constitution
02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of alprescription intheamended 1935 Constitution
power to recognize an extension ofher term, not ofa rotational system for the appointment ofthe
even with the implied acquiescence ofthe Office Chairman and members of the Commission on
i&i&t of the President. Elections. The Constitutional amendment cre
ating an independent Commission on Elections
In time,petitionermoved forreconsideration; provides as follows:
however, onAugust 17,1999,the Commission on
Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129. "SECTION 1. There shall be an indepen
dent Commission on Elections composed of a
Hence, this petition. Chairman and two other Members to be ap
The basic issue raised is whether the term pointed bythe Presidentwiththe consent of
of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Com the Commissionon Appointments, who shall
missioner, Civil Service Commission, to which hold office for a term of nine years and may
she was appointed on June 11,1993, expired on not be reappointed. Of the Members of the
February 02,1999, as stated in the appointment Commission first appointed, one shall hold
paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by office for nine years, another for six years,
her.
and the third for three years. The Chairman
and the other Members of the Commission
The Court's Ruling on Electionsmay be removedfrom office only
The term of office of the Chairman and by impeachment in the manner provided in
members of the Civil Service Commission is this Constitution." Article X, Section 1,1935
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: Constitution, as amended.
In Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil. 770(1955).
"SECTION 1 (2). The Chairman and wesaid that "the operation ofthe rotational plan
the Commissioners shall be appointed by requires two conditions, bothindispensable toits
the President with the consent of the Com workability: (1) that the terms of the first three
mission on Appointments for a term ofseven (3) Commissioners should start on a common
%ftl
years without reappointment. Ofthose first date, and, (2) that any vacancydue to death, res
appointed, the Chairman shallhold office for ignation ordisability before the expiration ofthe
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, term should onlybe filled onlyfor the unexpired
and another Commissioner for three years, balance of the term."
without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancyshall be onlyfor the unexpired Consequently, the terms of the first Chair
term of the predecessor. In no case shall men and Commissioners of the Constitutional
any Member be appointed or designated in Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
a temporary or acting capacity." must start on a common date, irrespective of
ARTICLE K: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 667
the variations in the dates of appointments and dit shall continue in office for one year after
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the the ratification of this Constitution; unless
expiration of the first terms of seven, five and they are sooner removed for cause or become
three years should lead to the regular recurrence incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
of the two-year interval between the expiration office or appointed to a new term thereunder.
of the terms. In no case shall ajiy Member serve longer
than seven years including service before the
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case
ratification of this Constitution."
at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point
of the terms of office of the first appointees to What the above quoted Transitory Provisions
the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of the incum
Constitution must be on February 02,1987, the bent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In Commission, the Commission on Elections and
case of a belated appointment or qualification, the Commission on Audit, who "shall continue
the interval between the start of the term and in office for one year after the ratification of this
the actual qualification of the appointee must be Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
!&&i
counted against the latter. cause or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office or appointed to a new term
In the law of public officers, there is a settled
thereunder." The term "unless" imports an excep
distinction between "term" and "tenure." "(T]he
tion to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory
term of an office must be distinguished from the
provisions mean that the incumbent members of
tenure of the incumbent. The term means the
the Constitutional Commissions shall continue
time during the officer may claim to hold office
in office for one year after the ratification of this
&ffil as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
Constitution under their existing appointments
several incumbents shall succeed one another.
at the discretion of the appointing power, who
The tenure represents the term during which the
may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal
incumbent actually holds the office. The term of
from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapaci
office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure
tated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3)
may be shorter than the term for reasons within
or beyond the power of the incumbent."
their appointment to a new term thereunder,
all of which events may occur before the end of
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the the one year period' after the effectivity of the
proper starting point of the terms of office of Constitution.
the first appointees to the Constitutional Com
^J
missions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we However, the transitory provisions do not
considered the plain language of Article IX (B), affect the term of office in Article IX, providing
Section 1 (2), Article IX (C). Section 1 (2) and for a seven-five-three year rotational interval
Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Con for the first appointees under this Constitution.
stitution that uniformly prescribed seven-year At the time of the adoption of the 1987
term of office for Members of the Constitutional Constitution, the incumbent Chairman and
Commissions, without reappointment. In no case members ofthe Civil Service Commission were the
shall any Member be appointed or designated in following: (1) Chairperson Celerina G. Gotladera.
a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need She was initially appointed as OIC Chairman
to expressly state the beginning of the term of on March 19, 1986, and appointed chairman
office as this is understood to coincide with the on December 24, 1986, which she assumed on
effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratifica March 13, 1987. (2) Atty. Cirilo G. Montejo. On
tion (on February 02, 1987). June 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory appointed him Commissioner, without any term.
Provisions, 1987 Constitution provides: He assumed office on July 9, 1986, and served
until March 31,1987, when he filed a certificate
"SECTION 15. The incumbent Members of candidacy for the position of Congressman, 2nd
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commis District of Leyte, thereby vacating his position
sion on Elections, and the Commission on Au as Commissioner. His tenure was automatically
cut-offbythe filing ofhiscertificate ofcandidacy. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMIS

(3) Atty. Mario D. Yango. On January 22,1985, SION, for a term expiring February 2,2001.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos appointed him "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and
Commissioner for a term expiring January 25, enter upon the performance of the duties of
1990. He served until February 2,1988, when his the office, furnishing this Officeand the Civil
term ended in virtue of the transitory provision Service Commission with copies of your oath
referred to. On May 30, 1988, President Aquino of office.
re-appointed him to a new three-year term and
served until May 31, 1991, exceedinghis lawful "(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"
term, but not exceeding the maximum of seven
years, including service before the ratification Second line: Commissioner — Five-year
of the 1987 Constitution. Under this factual term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1992.
milieu, it was only Commissioner Yango who On January 30, 1988, the President nominated
was extended a new term under the 1987 Atty. Samilo N. Barlorigay Commissioner, Civil
Constitution. The period consumed between the Service Commission. On February 17,1988, the
start of the term on February 02, 1987, and his Commission on Appointments, Congress of the
actual assumption on May 30, 1988, due to his Philippines, confirmed the nomination. He as
belated appointment, must be counted against sumed officeon March 04,1988. His term ended
him. on February 02,1992. He served as defactoCom
missioner until March 04,1993.
Given the foregoing common starting point,
wecompute the terms ofthe first appointees and On June 11, 1993, the President appointed
their successors to the Civil Service Commission Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil
under the 1987 Constitution by their respective Service Commission, for a term expiring Febru
lines, as follows: ary 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in
First line: Chairman — seven-year term.
her appointment paper. On^September 07,1993,
the Commissionon Appointments confirmed the
February 02, 1987 to February 01, 1994. On
January 30,1988, the President nominatedMs. appointment. Sheaccepted the appointmentand
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas Chairman, Civil Service assumed office on June 22,1993. She is bound by
Commission. On March 02, 1988, the Commis the term ofthe appointment she accepted, expir
siononAppointments confirmed the nomination. ing February 02, 1999. In this connection, the
She assumed office on March 04,1988. Her term letter dated April 07,1998, of Deputy Executive
ended on February 02, 1994. She served as de Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her
facto Chairman until March 04,1995. On March term wouldexpire on February 02, 2000, was in
05, 1995, the President appointed then Social error. What was submitted to the Commission
Welfare Secretary Corazon Alma G. de Leon, on Appointments was a nomination for a term
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, to a regu expiring onFebruary02,1999.Thus, the term of
lar seven-year term. This term must be deemed her successor must be deemed to start on Febru
to start on February 02,1994, immediately suc ary 02,1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.
ceeding her predecessor, whose term started on Third line: Commissioner — Three-year
the common date of the terms of office of the first term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1990.
appointees under the 1987 Constitution. She Atty. Mario D. Yango was incumbent commis
assumed office on March 22, 1995, for a term sioner at the time of the adoption of the 1987
expiring February 02,2001. This is shownin her Constitution. His extended tenure ended on Feb
appointment paper, quotedverbatim as follows: ruary 02, 1988.In May, 1988, President Corazon
"March 5, 1995
C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission to a new three-year term
"Madam: thereunder. He assumed office on May 30,1988.
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article His term ended on February 02,1990, but served
VII, Section 16, paragraph 2, ofthe Constitu as de facto Commissioner until May 31,1991. On
tion, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, November 26, 1991, the President nominated
ARTICLE EC: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 669
Atty. Ramon P. Ereneta as Commissioner, Civil OR SUSPENDED EXCEPT FOR CAUSE

Service Commission. On December 04, 1991, PROVIDED BY LAW.
the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
(4) NO OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN
nomination. He assumed office on December 12,
1991, for a term expiring February 02, 1997.
THE CIVIL SERVICE SHALL ENGAGE, DI
RECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN ANY ELEC
Commendably, he voluntarily retired on Feb TIONEERING OR PARTISAN POLITICAL
ruary 02, 1997. On February 03,1997, President CAMPAIGN.
Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Jose F. Erestain,
Jr. Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for NOTE: Partisan political activity.
a term expiring February 02, 2004. He assumed
Section 2(4) is intended to keep the Civil
office on February 11, 1997. Service free of the deleterious effects of political
Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy partisanship. Partisan political activity includes
every two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, every form of "solicitation of the elector's vote
for the first Chairman, February 02,1992, for the in favor of a specific candidate.2 It includes
first five-year term Commissioner, and February contribution of money for election purposes
02, 1990, for the first three-year term Commis and distribution of handbills.3 "Electioneering"
sioner. Their successors must also maintain the well describes the prohibited activity. However,
two year interval, namely: February 02,2001, for the provision does not "prevent any officer or
Chairman; February 02,1999, for Commissioner employee from expressing his views on current
Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02,1997, for political problems or issues, or from mentioning
Commissioner Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr. the names of candidates for public office whom
he supports."4 Nor does it prohibit a person from
jivgjj The third batch of appointees would then be voting or from joining civic organizations that are
having terms of office as follows: non-partisan in character.5
First line: Chairman, February 02, 2001 to This rule, however, does not apply to mem
February 02, 2008; Second line: Commissioner, bers of the Cabinet.6 Their positions are essen
February 02, 1999 to February 02, 2006; and, tially political and they may engage in partisan
Third line: Commissioner.. February 02, 1997 to political activity.
t&jjjij)
February 02, 2004, thereby consistently main
taining the two-year interval (5) T]HE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZA
TION SHALL NOT BE DENIED TO GOV
ERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
SEC. 2. (1) THE CIVIL SERVICE EM (6) TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES OF THE

BRACES ALL BRANCHES, SUBDIVISIONS, GOVERNMENT SHALL BE GIVEN SUCH
INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND AGENCIES PROTECTION AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOV LAW.
ERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHAR 1. Scope and purpose of the system.
TERS.
Section 2(1) says that "The civil service
(2) APPOINTMENTS IN THE CIVIL embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumen
SERVICE SHALL BE MADE ONLY AC talities, and agencies of the Government, includ
CORDING TO MERIT AND FITNESS TO BE ing government-owned or controlled corporations
DETERMINED, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, with original charters." Thus, corporations which
AND, EXCEPT TO POSITIONS WHICH are incorporated under the General Corporation
ARE POLICY-DETERMINING, PRIMARILY Law are not included.
CONFIDENTIAL, OR HIGHLY TECHNI
2People v. de Venecia, 14 SCRA 864, 867 (1965).
CAL, BY COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION. 3Id. at 866.
'Section 29, R.A. 2260; Section 45, P.D. 807.
(3) NO OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF SI RECORD 544-545, 573.
THE CIVIL SERVICE SHALL BE REMOVED eSee Santos v. Yatco, 106 Phil. 21 (1959).
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention Succinct and clear is the provision of the
debates, when this provision was first introduced, Constitution in point that all government agen
government-ownedcorporations came under at cies, without exception, are covered by the civil
tack as milkingcows ofa privileged few enjoying service.
salaries far higher than their counterparts in the Petitioner EIIB is a government agency un
various branches of government. It was pointed der the Department of Finance as provided by
out that the capital ofthese corporations belongs Section 17, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the
to the government and that government money 1987 Administrative Code. Therefore, EIIB is
is pumped into them whenever on the brink of within the ambit of the Civil Service Law.
disaster and they should therefore come under
the strict surveillance of the civil service system. The civil service within the contemplation
of the aforecited constitutional provision is
2. Cases.
comprehensive in scope. It embraces all officers
and employees of the government, its branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities. Even em
A. EIIB v. Court of Appeals
ployees of corporations owned or controlled by
G.R. No. 129133, November 25, 1998
the government, with original charters, are
covered thereby.
PURISIMA, J.:
There is merit in the disquisition by the

As culled by the Court of Appeals, the ante Court of Appeals that membership of petitioner
cedent facts that matter are, as follows: EIIB in the intelligence community is of no mo
"In a letter dated October 13, 1988, re ment, insofar as application of the Civil Service
spondent CSCthrough Chairman Patricia A. Law is concerned. The National Bureau ofInves
Sto. Tomas required the Secretary of Finance tigation (NBI), also a member of the intelligence
(isd
to submit to the CSC all appointments in community which performs functions similar to
the Economic Intelligence and Investigation those of EIIB, e.g., intelligence gathering, in
Bureau (EIIB). vestigation, research, etc., submits to the Civil
Service Commission the appointments ofall NBI
Instead of complying with the said letter, personnel, whether belonging to the career or
petitioner Jose T. Almonte, as Commissioner of non-career service. Besides, In Ingles v. Mutuc,
EIIB, wrote a letter dated March 29, 1989, to 26 SCRA 171, this Court ruled that"... one hold
respondent CSC, requesting for confirmation of ing in the Government a primarily confidential
EIIB's exemption from CSC rules and regulations position is 'in the Civil Service'."
with respect to appointments and other person
nel actions invoking as basis for such exemption Equally untenable is petitioner's contention
that because the personnel of EIIB are occupy
PD No. 1458 and LOI No. 71.
ing jobs highly confidential in nature, the EIIB
should not be required to submit the names of
The pivotal issue her is: whether or not the its personnel to the Civil Service Commission.
petitioner, Economic Intelligence Investigation In Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 [1995],
Bureau (EIIB), is embraced by the Civil Service. EIIB was ordered by the Ombudsman to produce
Section 2, subparagraph (1), Article IX, documents relating to personnel services and
paragraph (B)of the 1987 Constitution provides: salary voucher of EIIB employees. The Bureau
pleaded that such documents are classified, arid
sal
"The civil service embraces all branches, knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, agencies Personnel Services Funds and its plantilla will
of the Government, including government- inevitably lead to knowledge of its operations,
owned or controlled corporations with origi movements, targets and strategies, which could
nal charter." destroy the Bureau itself. The Court ruled that
ARTICLE LX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 671
the required documents can be examined by the COR), but without prejudice with the filing of
Ombudsman, explaining that: administrative charges against him if warranted.
Ssii
"... [Tjhere is no claim that military or The records disclose that on October 7,
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the
production of records pertaining to the per PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff
sonnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the
the gathering and evaluation of intelligence Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employ
reports and information regarding 'illegal ment was terminated by the Board of Directors
activities affecting the national economy, of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for
such as, but not limited to, economic sabo loss of confidence, after a covert investigation
tage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting,' conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAG
Consequently, while in cases which involve COR. The summary of intelligence information
fi&A
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged
from the circumstances of the case that there in proxy betting as detailed in the affidavits pur
is reasonable danger that compulsion of the portedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR
evidence will expose military matters with who claimed that they were used as gunners
out compelling production, no similar excuse on different occasions by respondent. The two
can be made for a privilege resting on other polygraph tests taken by the latter also yielded
considerations. corroborative and unfavorable results.
Nor has our attention been called to any On December 23, 1991, respondent Salas
law or regulation which considers personnel submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman
records of the EIIB as classified informa and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, request
ga>
tion. ." ing reinvestigation of the case since he was not
given an opportunity to be heard, but the same
All things viewed in proper perspective, we
was denied. On February 17, 1992, he appealed
are of the opinion, and so hold, that the Court of
to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
Appeals erred not in holding that: which denied the appeal on the ground that, as
"... [Respondent CSC's act of requiring a confidential employee, respondent was not
a) petitioner EIIB to submit to it all appoint dismissed from the service but his term of office
ments in the Bureau, for appropriate action, merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued Reso
is part of its administrative function as the lution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the decision
central personnel agency of the government." of the MSPB.
^}
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DE

NIED; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals On September 14,1995, the Court ofAppeals
in CA-GR SP No. 37720 AFFIRMED, without rendered its questioned decision with the finding
any pronouncement as to costs. that herein respondent Salas is not a confiden
tial employee, hence he may not be dismissed
B. Civil Service Commission v. PAGCOR on the ground of loss of confidence. In so ruling,
G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997 the appellate court applied the "proximity rule"
enunciated in the case of Grifio, et al. v. Civil
REGALADO, J.: Service Commission, et al. ...
The present petition for review on certiorari Hence this appeal, which is premised on and
seeks to nullify the decision of the Court of Ap calls for the resolution of the sole determinative
peals, dated September 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. issue of whether or not respondent Salas is a
SP No. 38319 which set aside Resolution No.
confidential employee.
92-1283 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and ordered the reinstatement of herein private Petitioners aver that respondent Salas,
respondent Rafael M. Salas with full back wages as a member of the Internal Security Staff of
for having been illegally dismissed by the Philip PAGCOR, is a confidential employee for several
pine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAG reasons...
m
672 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF.GOVERNMENT
Hence, according to petitioners, respondent a certain position as primarily confidential

Salas was not dismissed from the service but, or policy-determining, which should not be
instead, his term of office had expired. They the case. The Senator urged that since the
additionally contend that the Court of Appeals Constitution speaks of positions which are
erred in applying the "proximity rule" because 'primarily confidential, policy-determining,
even if Salas occupied one of the lowest rungs in or highly technical in nature,' it is not
the organizational ladder of PAGCOR, he per within the power of Congress to declare.
formed the functions of one of the most sensitive what positions are primarily confidential or
positions in the corporation. policy-determining. 'It is the nature alone
On the other hand, respondent Salas argues of the position that determines whether it is
that it is the actual nature of an employee's pohcy-determining or primarily confidential.'
functions, and not his designation or title, which Hence, the Senator further observed, the
determines whether or not a position is primar matter should be left to the 'proper imple
ily confidential, and that while Presidential mentation of the laws, depending upon the
Decree No. 1869 may have declared all PAGCOR - nature of the position to be filled,' and if
employees to be confidential appointees, such the position is 'highly confidential' then the
-President and the Civil Service Commis
executive pronouncement may be considered as
sioner must implement the law.
a mere initial determination of the classification
of positions which is not conclusive in case of To a question of Senator Tolentino, 'But in
conflict... positions that involved both confidential matters
We find no merit in the petition and conse and matters whichare routine,... whois goingto
quently hold that the same should be, as it is determine whether it is primarily confidential?'
hereby, denied.
Senator Tanada replied:
'SENATOR TANADA: Well, at the first

&$$
instance, it is the appointing power that
At first glance, it would seem that the instant determines that: the nature of the position.
case falls under the first category by virtue of the In case of conflict then it is the Court that
express mandate under Section 16 ofPresidential determines whether the position is primar
Decree No. 1869. An in depth analysis, however, ily confidential or not" (Emphasis in the
of the second category evinces otherwise. original text).
When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on Hence the dictum that, at least since the en
June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that actment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
"the non-competitive or unclassified service shall nature of the position which finally determines
be composed of positions expressly declared by whether a position is primarily confidential,
law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified policy-determining or highly technical. And the
service or those which are policy-determining, court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed that
primarily confidential, or highly technical in na executive pronouncements, such as Presidential
ture." In the case oiPinero, et al. v. Hechanova, Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial
et al, L-22562, October 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 417, determinations that are not conclusive in case
the Court obliged with a short discourse there on of conflict. It must be so, or else it would then he
how the phrase "in nature" came to find its way within the discretion of the Chief Executive to
into the law, thus: deny to any officer, by executivefiat, the protec
"The change from the original wording tion of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], '
of the bill (expressly declared bylaw ... to Article IX-B) of the Constitution. 11 In other
be policy-determining, etc.) to that finally words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869
approved and enacted ('or which are policy- cannot be given a literally stringent application
determining, etc. in nature*) came about be without compromising the constitutionally pro
cause of the observations of Senator Tanada, tected right ofan employeeto security of tenure.
that as originally worded the proposed bill The doctrinal ruling enunciated in Pinero •
gave Congress power to declare by flat of law finds support in the 1935 Constitution and was
|ij
reaffirmed in the 1973 Constitution, as well as "MR. FOZ. Which department of govern
in the implementing rules of Presidential De ment has the power or authority to determine
cree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the whether a position is policy-determining or
Philippines. It may will be observed that both primarily confidential or highly technical?
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contain the FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is
provision, in Section2,ArticleXII-B thereof, that made by the legislative body or by the ex
"appointments in the Civil Service, except as to ecutive department, but the final decision is
those which are policy-determining, primarily done by the court. The Supreme Court has
sia
confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall constantly held that whether or not a position
be made onlyaccordingto merit and fitness, to be is policy-determining, primarily confidential
determined as far as practicable by competitive or highly technical, it is determined not by
examination. "Corollarily, Section 5 of Republic the title but by the nature of the task that is
Ifay Act No. 2260 states that "the non-competitive or entrusted to it. For instance, we might have
unclassified service shall be composed of posi a case where a position is created requiring
tions expressly declared by law to be in the non- that the holder of that position should be a
competitive.or unclassified service or thosewhich member of the Bar and the law classifies this
are policy-determining, primarilyconfidential, or position as highly technical. However, the
highly technical in nature." Likewise, Section 1 Supreme Court has said before that a posi
of the General Rules in the implementing rules tion which requires mere membership in the
of Presidential Decree No. 807 states that "ap Bar is not a highly technical position. Since
pointments in the CivilService, except as tothose the term *highly technical' means something
which are the policy-determining, primarily beyond the ordinary requirements of the
confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall profession, it is always a questionoffact.
be made only according to merit and fitness to
be determined as far as practicable by competi MR. FOZ. Does not commissioner Bernas
tive examination." Let it here be emphasized, as agree that the general rule should be that
jail
we have accordingly italicized them, that these the merit system or the competitive system
fundamental laws and legislative or executive should be upheld?
enactments all utilized the phrase "in nature" FR. BERNAS. I agree that it should be
to describe the character of the positions being the generalrule; that is why we are putting
classified. this as an exception.
The question that may now be asked is MR. FOZ. The declaration that certain
whether the Pinero doctrine — to the effect that positions are pohcy-determining, primarily
notwithstanding any statutory classification to confidential or highly technical has been
the contrary, it is still the nature ofthe position, the source of practices which mount to the
as may be ascertained bythe courtin case ofcon spoils system.
flict, which finally determines whether a position
is primarily confidential, policy-determining or FR. BERNAS. The Supreme Court has
highly technical —is still controlling with the always said that, but if the law of the ad
advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Admin ministrative agency says that a position is
istrative Code of 1987, Book V of which deals primarily confidential whenin fact it is not,
specifically with the Civil Service Commission, we can always challenge that in court. It is
ti'ffrx
considering that from theselater enactments, in not enough that the law calls it primarily
defining positions which arepolicy-determining, confidential to make it such; it is the nature
primarily confidential or highly technical, the ofthe duties which makes a position primar
phrase "in nature" was deleted. ily confidential.
We rule in the affirmative. The matter was MR. FOZ. The effect of a declaration that
clarified and extensively discussed during the a position is policy-determining, primarily
deliberations in the plenary session of the 1986 confidential or highly technical — as an ex'
Constitutional Commission on the CivilService ception —is to take it away from the usual
provisions, to wit: rules andprovisions ofthe Civil Service LaV
lilMJ
and to place it in a class by itselfso that it can "Every appointment implies confidence,
avail itself of certain privileges not available but much more than ordinary confidence is
to the ordinary run of government employees reposed in the occupant of a position that
and officers. is primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude
FR. BERNAS. As I have already said,
of the appointee for the duties of the office
this classification does not do away with the
but primarily close intimacy which ensures
•requirement of merit and fitness. All it says
freedom of intercourse without embarrass
is that there are certain positions which
ment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals
should not be determined by competitive
of personal trust or confidential matters of
examination.
state...." (Emphasis supplied.)
For instance, I have just mentioned a posi
This was reiterated in Pinero, et al. v.
tion in the Atomic Energy Commission. Shall we
Hechanova, et al., supra, the facts of which are
require a physicist to undergo a competitive ex
substantially similar to the case at bar, involv
amination before appointment? Or a confidential
ing as it did employees occupying positions in
secretary or any position in policy-determining
various capacities in the Port Patrol Division of
administrative bodies, for that matter? There are
the Bureau of Customs. The Court there held
other ways of determining merit and fitness than that the mere fact that the members of the Port
competitive examination. This is not a denial of Patrol Division are part of the Customs police
the requirement of merit and fitness" force is not in itself a sufficient indication that
It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether their positions are primarily confidential. After
apparent, that the primary purpose of the fram- quoting the foregoing passage from De los Santos,
ers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the it trenchantly declared:
declaration of a position as policy-determining,
"As previously pointed out, there are no
primarily confidential or highly technical is proven facts to show that there is any such
to exempt these categories from competitive close intimacy and trust between the ap
examination as a means for determining merit pointing power and the appellees as would
and fitness. It must be stressed further that
support a finding that confidence was the
these positions are covered by security of tenure, primary reason for the existence of the posi
although they are considered non-competitive tions held by them or for their appointment
only in the sense that appointees thereto do not thereto. Certainly, it is extremely improbable
have to undergo competitive examinations for that the service demands any such closed
purposes of determining merit and fitness. trust and intimate relation between the ap
In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view pointing official and, not one or two members
as may be gleaned from its questioned resolu alone but the entire Customs patrol (Harbor
tion wherein it stated that "the declaration Police) force, so that every member thereof
of a position is primarily confidential if at all, can be said to hold 'primarily confidential'
merely exempts the position from the civil service posts." (Emphasis supplied.)
eligibility requirement." Accordingly, the Pinero It can thus be safely determined therefrom
doctrine continues to be applicable up to the pres that the occupant of a particular position could
ent and is hereby maintained. Such being the be considered a confidential employee if the
case, the submission that PAGCOR employees predominant reason why he was chosen by the
have been declared confidential appointees by appointing authority was, to repeat, the latter's
operation oflaw under the bare authority of CSC belief that he can share a close intimate relation
Resolution No. 91-830 must be rejected. ship with the occupant which ensures freedom
We likewise find that in holding that herein of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or
private respondent is not a confidential em misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust
ployee, respondent Court of Appeals correctly or confidential matters of state. Withal, where
applied the "proximity rule" enunciated in the the position occupied is remote from that of the
early but still authoritative case ofDe los Santos appointing authority, the element of trust be
v. Mallare, et al., which held that: tween them is no longer predominant.
ARTICLE IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 675
Several factors lead to the conclusion that Board of Directors. Obviously, as the lowest in
private respondent does not enjoy such "close "the chain of command, private respondent does
intimacy" with the appointing authority of not enjoy that "primarily close intimacy" which
PAGCOR which would otherwise place him in characterizes a confidential employee.
the category of a confidential employee, to wit:
3. The position of an ISS member belongs to
1. As an Internal Security Staf£ member, the bottom levelof the Salary scale ofthe corpo
private respondent routinely — ration, being in Pay Class 2 level only, whereas
a. performs duty assignments at the
the highest level is Pay Class 12.
gaming/or non-gaming areas to prevent Taking into consideration the nature of his
irregularities, misbehavior, illegal transac functions, his organizational ranking and his
tions and other anomalous activities among compensation level, it is obviously beyond debate
Miii
the employees and customers; that private respondent cannot be considered
b. reports unusual incidents and.re a confidential employee. As set out in the job
lated observations/information in accordance description of his position, one is struck by the
with established procedures for infractions/ ordinary, routinary and quotidian character of
mistakes committed on the table and in other his duties and functions. Moreover, the modest
areas; rank and fungible nature of the position occupied
by private respondent is underscored by the
c. coordinates with CCTV and/or fact that the salary attached to it is a meager
external security as necessary for the pre P2,200.00 a month. There thus appears nothing
vention, documentation or suppression of to suggest that private respondent's position was
iiiiiiJ any unwanted incidents at the gaming and "highly" or much less, "primarily" confidential
pon-gaming areas; in nature. The fact that, sometimes, private
d. acts as witness/representative of respondent may handle ordinarily "confidential
Security Department during chips inventory; matters" or papers which are somewhat confiden
refills, yields, card shuffling and final shuf tial in nature does not suffice to characterize his
fling; position as primarily confidential.
e. performs escort functions during the
delivery of table capital boxes, refills and WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment
shoe boxes to the respective"tables, or during of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AF
transfer of yields to Treasury. FIRMED in toto.
Based on the nature of such functions of
herein private respondent and as found by C. Canonizado v. Aguirre
&&3
respondent Court of Appeals, while it may be G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000
said that honesty and integrity are primary
considerations in his appointment as a member GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
of the ISS, his position does not involve "such
close intimacy" between him and the appointing The central issue posed before this Court in
authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, the present case is the constitutionality of Re
as would ensure "freedom from misgivings of public Act No. 8551 (RA8551), otherwise known
betrayals of personal trust." as the "Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which
2. Although appointed by the Chairman, petitioners herein, who were all members of the
ISS members do not directly report to the Office National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were
of the Chairman in the performance of their of separatedfrom office. Petitionersclaim that such
ficial duties. An ISS members is subject to the law violates their constitutionally guaranteed
control and supervision of an Area Supervisor right to security of tenure.
who, in turn, only implements the directives of
jpi
the Branch Chief Security Officer. The latter is The NAPOLCOM was originally created
himself answerable to the Chairman and the under Republic ActNo. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled
v^
ffiiÊ
"An Act Estabhshing The Philippine National Commission, while the Vice Chairperson
Police Under A Reorganized Department Of shall act as the executive officer of the Com
The Interior And,Local Government, And For mission.
Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members
Meanwhile, section 8 states that —
ofthe NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula
%) Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms
and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula of office of the current Commissioners are
Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM deemed expired which shall constitute a
a*)
on January 8, 1991 for a six year term. He was bar to their reappointment or an extension
re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another of their terms in the Commission except for
six years. Canonizado was appointed on Janu current Commissioners who have served less
ary 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of an than two3(2) years of their terms of office
other Commissioner which ended on December who may be appointed by the President for
31, 1995. On August 23, 1995, Canonizado was a maximum term of two (2) years.
re-appointed for another six years. Pureza was
appointed on January 2,1997 for a similar term Petitioners argue that their removal from
of six years. Respondent Adiong's appointment office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates
to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23,1996. their security of tenure.
None of their terms had expired at the time the It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein
amendatory law was passed. are members of the civil service, which embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including
According to petitioners, sections 4 and government-owned or controlled corporations
8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional. Section 4, with original charters. As such» they cannot be
amending section 13 of Republic Act No. 6975, removed or suspended. from office, except for
provides — cause provided by law. The phrase "except for
cause provided by law" refers to ". . . reasons
SECTION 13. Creation and Compo which the law and sound public policy recognize
sition. — A National Police Commission, as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal
hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is cause, and not merely causes which the appoint
hereby created for the purpose of effectively ing power in the exercise of discretion may deem
discharging the functions prescribed in the sufficient."
Constitution and provided in this Act. The
Public respondents insist that the express
Commission shall be an agency attached
declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms
to the Department for policy and program
of petitioners' offices are deemed expired dis
coordination. It shall be composed of a Chair
closes the legislative intent to impliedly abolish
person, four (4) regular Commissioners, and the NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursu
the Chief of the PNP as ex-officio member.
ant to a bona fide reorganization. In support of
Three (3)ofthe regular Commissioners shall their theory, public respondents cite the various
come from the civilian sector who are neither
]0i changes introduced by RA8551 in the functions,
active nor former members of the police or composition and character of the NAPOLCOM
military, one (1)ofwhomshall be designated as proof of Congress' intention to abolish the
as vice chairperson by the President. The bodycreated under RA 6975 in order to replace
fourth regular Commissioner shall come from it with a new NAPOLCOM which is more civilian
the law enforcement sector either active or in nature, in compliance with the constitutional
retired: Provided, That an active member of mandate. Petitioners' posit the theory that the
a law enforcement agency shall be considered abolition of petitioners' offices was a result of a
resigned from said agency onceappointed to reorganization ofthe NAPOLCOM allegedly ef
the Commission: Provided, further, That, at fected by RA 8551.
least one (1) of the Commissioners shall be
a woman. The Secretary of the Department The creation and abolition of public offices
shall be the ex-officio Chairperson of the is primarilya legislative function. It is acknowl-
:igj
edged that Congress may abolish any office it thereof from the civil service. Such an act
creates without impairing the officer's right to would constitute, on its face, an infringement
continue in the position held and that such power of the constitutional guarantee of security of
may be exercised for various reasons, such as tenure, and will have to be struck down on
the lack of funds or in the interest of economy. that account. It can not be justified by the
However, in order for the abolition to be valid, professed "need to^roiessionalize the higher
it must be made in good faith, not for political or levels of officialdom invested with adjudica
personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the tory powers and functions, and to upgrade
sip
constitutional security of tenure of civil service their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
employees. emoluments.
An abolition of office connotes an intention This is precisely what RA 8551 seeks to do

to do away with such office wholly and perma — declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by
nently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where declaring that "the terms of office of the current
one office is abolished and replaced with another Commissioners are deemed expired," thei^by re
office vested with similar functions, the abolition moving petitioners herein from the civil service.
liJ
is a legal nullity... Congress may only be conceded this power if it
is done pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the
NAPOLCOM.
We come now to the case at bench. The
question that must first be resolved is whether RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petition
or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a ers' positions. In order to determine whether
valid abolition of their office by Congress. More there has been an implied abolition, it becomes
•$gj
specifically, whether the changes effected by RA necessary to examine the changes introduced
8551 in reference to the NAPOLCOM were so
by the new law in the nature, composition and
functions of the NAPOLCOM.
substantial as to effectively create a completely
new office in contemplation of the law... Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was de
In answer to this query, the case of Mayor scribed as a collegial body within the Department
v. Macaraig, 194 SCRA 672 (1991), is squarely of the Interior and Local Government, whereas
t§y in point. under RA 8551 it is made "an agency attached
to the Department for policy and program coor
In that case, the petitioners assailed the dination." Contrary to what public respondents
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6715 in would have us believe, this does not result in the
m sofar as it declared vacant the positions of the creation of an entirely new office. In Mayor, the
Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and NLRC, prior to the passage of the amendatory
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations law, was also considered an integral part of the
Commission and provided for the removal of the Department of Labor and Employment. RA 6715,
incumbents upon the appointment and qualifi however, changed that by declaring that it shall
cation of their successors. The Court held that instead ". . be attached to the Department of
the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional Labor and Employment for program coordination
since Republic Act No. 6715 did not expressly only. . . ." making it a more autonomous body.
or impliedly abolish the offices of petitioners, The Court held that this change in the NLRC'5
there being no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature was not sufficient to justify a conclusion
nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' that the hew law abolished the offices of the labor
offices under the old law and the new law. Thus: commissioners.
Abolition of an office is obviously not Another amendment pointed out by public

the same as the declaration that office is respondents is the revision ofthe NAPOLCOM'?
vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership
of the legislature to abolish certain offices, of the NAPOLCOM from four to five Commission
it can not be conceded the power to simply ers by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officV>
pronounce those offices vacant and thereby member. In addition, the new law provided that
effectively remove the occupants or holders three of the regular Commissioners shall come
from the civilian sector who are neither active about a substantial change in its functions so as
nor former members of the police or military, and to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new
that the fourth regular Commissioner shall come office has been created.
from the law enforcement sector either active or
Public respondents would have this Court
retired. Furthermore, it is required that at least
believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOL
one of the Commissioners shall be a woman.
COM resulting in the abolition of petitioners'
Again, as we held in Mayor, such revisions do not
offices. We hold that there has been absolutely
constitute such essential changes in the nature
no attempt by Congress to effect such a reorga
of the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied
nization.
abolition of such office. It will be noted that the
'organizational structure ofthe NAPOLCOM, as Reorganization takes place when there is an
provided in section 20 of RA 6975 as amended alteration of the existing structure of government
by section 10 of RA 8551, remains essentially offices or units therein, including the lines of con
the same and that, except for the addition of the trol, authority and responsibility between them.
PNP @hiefas ex-officio member, the composition It.involves.a reduction of personnel, consolida
of the NAPOLCOM is also substantially identi tion of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
^j
cal under the two laws. Also, under both laws, economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally,
the Secretary of the Department shall act as the it may result in the loss of one's position thr8ugh
ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the removal or abolition of an office. However, for a
Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commission reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the
ers designated by the President. test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison.
Finally, the powers and duties of the NA ... As a general rule, a reorganization
<S0 POLCOM remain basically unchanged by the is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
amendments... purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that* event, no dismissal
(in case of a dismissal) or separation actu
Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to ex ally occurs because the position itself ceases
ercise substantially the same administrative, to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudica would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
i^> tory functions. may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for po
Public respondents argue that the fact that litical reasons or purposely to defeat security
the NAPOLCOM is now vested with administra
of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
Mpj'l tive control and operational supervision over the valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
PNP, whereas under RA 6975 it only exercised "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There
administrative control should be construed as
is an invalid "abolition" as where there is
evidence of legislative intent to abolish such of merely a change of nomenclature of positions,
fice. This contention is bereft of merit. Control
or where claims of economy are belied by the
means "the power of an officer to alter or modify existence of ample funds.
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substi It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that
tute the judgment of the former for the that of RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP,
the latter." On the other hand, to supervise is to not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate
oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the and distinct bodies, with one having supervision
execution of or the performance of a thing, or the and control over the other. In fact, it is the NA
movements or work of a person, to inspect with POLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a
authority; it is the power or authority of an of proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Con
'î
ficer to see that subordinate officers perform their gress. As mentioned earlier, the basic structure
duties. Thus, the power of control necessarily of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the
encompasses the power of supervision and add amendatory law. There has been no revision in
ing the phrase "operational supervision" under its lines of control, authority and responsibility,
the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring neither has there been a reduction in its member-
ship, nor a consolidation or abolition ofthe offices On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas,
constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the informed the petitioner ofhis reassignment,
PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission effective October 17, 1994.
does not result in a reorganization.
Petitioner requested respondent Secretary
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOL Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the
i^fij COM having been mandated by Congress, RA latter deniedthe request..The petitionerprepared
8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office a letter dated October 18,1994 to the President
of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration
jpii
herein, as expired and resulting in their removal ofhis reassignment, and furnished a copyof the
from office, removes civil seryice employees from same to the DECS. However, he subsequently
office without legal cause and must therefore be changed his mind and refrained from filing the
struck down for being constitutionally infirm. letter with the Office of President.
^)
Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated
to office. ...
The pivotal issue for resolution here is
whether the reassignment of private respondent
D. Secretary Gloria v. Court of Appeals from School Division Superintendent of Quezon
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000 City to Vocational School Superintendent of
MIST is violative of his security of tenure? Pe
PURISIMA, J.: titioners maintain that there is no violation of
This is a petition for review on certiorariun security of tenure involved. Private respondent
der Rule 45 of the Rules of Court brought by Sec ' maintains otherwise.
retary and the Director for the National Capital In taking favorable action on private re
Region of the Department of Education, Culture spondent's petition for prohibition, the Court of
and Sports (DECS), to question the decision of Appeals ratiocinated:
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35505.
"Notwithstanding the protestations of
The Court of Appeals found the facts as fol counsel for the respondents, the reassign
lows: ment of the petitioner to MIST appears to
"On June 29, 1989, petitioner [private be indefinite. No period is fixed. No objective
respondent herein] was appointed Schools or purpose, from which the temporariness
Division Superintendent, Division of City of the assignment may be inferred, is set.
Schools, Quezon City, by the then President In fact, the recommendation of respondent
Corazon C. Aquino. Secretary Gloria to the President that the
positionofsuperintendent ofMIST'willbest
On October 10, 1994, respondent Secre
tary Gloria recommended to the President
fithis (petitioner's) qualifications and experi
of the Philippines that the petitioner be
ence.'(Exh. 'C-2') implies that the proposed
reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST reassignment will be indefinite."
[Marikina Institute of Science and Technol
ogy], to fill up the vacuum created by the
retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Ban- Aftera careful study, the Court upholds the
naoag F. Lauro, on June 17,1994. finding of the respondent court that the reas
signment ofpetitioner to MIST "appears to be
On October 12, 1994, the President ap indefinite." The same can be inferred from the
proved the recommendation of Secretary Memorandum ofSecretaryGloria for President
Gloria. Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassign
On October 13,1994, a copy of the recom ment of private respondent will "best fit his
mendation for petitioner's reassignment, as qualifications and experience" being "an expert
approved by the President, was transmitted in vocational and technical education." It can
by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
implementation. more than temporary asthe private respondent
has been described as fit for the (reassigned) with grave abuse of discretion and in violation
job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there of their constitutional right to security oftenure.
is nothing in the said Memorandum to show
The facts are undisputed:
that the reassignment of private respondent is
temporary or would only last until a permanent On June 30,1987, former President Corazon
IsB) replacement is found as no period is specified or C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 127
fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part establishing the Economic Intelligence and
ofpetitioners to reassign private respondent with Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the
no definite period or duration. Such feature of the structural organization of ther Ministry of
jrt
reassignment in question is definitely violative of Finance. The EIIB was designated to perform
the security of tenure of the private respondent. [various functions] . . . the following functions:
As held in Bentain:
In a desire to achieve harmony of efforts and
"Security of tenure is a fundamental to prevent possible conflicts among agencies in
and constitutionally guaranteed feature of the course, of their, anti-smuggling operations,
our civil service. The mantle of its protec President Aquino issued Memorandum Order
\m> tion extends not only to employees removed No.^ 225 on March 17, 1989, providing, among
without cause but also to cases of uncon others, that the EIIB "shall be the agency of
sented transfers which are tantamount to primary responsibility for anti-smuggling opera
illegal removals (Department of Education, tions in all land areas and inland waters and
Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals, 183 waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction
SCRA 555; Ibafiez v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA of the Bureau of Customs."
1002; Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).
Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000,
While a temporary transfer or assignment President Joseph Estrada issued Executive
of personnel is permissible even without the Order No. 191 entitled "Deactivation of the Eco
employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when nomic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau."
the transfer is a preliminary step toward his Motivated by the fact that "the designated func
removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from tions of the EIIB are also being performed by the
his permanent position, or designed to indirectly other existing agencies of the government" and
terminate his service, or force his resignation. that "there is a need to constantly monitor the
Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the overlapping of functions" among these agencies,
provision which safeguards the tenure of office former President Estrada ordered the deactiva
of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria tion of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to
v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia v. Lejano, 109 the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau
Phil. 116)." of Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Ex
ecutive Order No. 196 creating the Presidential
E. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Anti-Smuggling Task Force "Aduana."
Secretary
iisi
G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001 Then the day feared by the EIIB employees
came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada
SANDOVAL-GUTIERftEZ, J.: issued Executive Order No. 223 providing that
all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and therein shall be deemed separated from the
mandamus, petitioners Buklod Ng Kawaning service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a
EIIB, Cesar Posada, Remedios Princesa, Benja bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition,
^> min Kho, Benigno Manga and Lulu Mendoza, for redundancy, merger, division, Or consolidation
themselves and in behalf of others with whom
of positions.
they share a common or general interest, seek
the nullification of Executive Order No. 191 and Agonizing over the loss of their employment,
Executive Order No. 223 on the ground that petitioners now come before this Court invoking
they were issued by the Office of the President our power of judicial review of Executive Order
ARTICLE LX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 681
Nos. 191 and 223. They anchor their petition on Surely, there exists a distinction between the
the following arguments: words "deactivate" and "abolish." To "deactivate"
means to render inactive or ineffective or to
"A. Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 break up by discharging or reassigning person
should be annulled as they are unconstitu nel, while to "abolish" means to do away with,
tional for being violative of Section 2(3), Ar to annul, abrogate qr destroy completely. In es
••tfpi
ticle LX-Bof the Philippine Constitution and/ sence, abolition denotes an intention to do away
or for having been issued with grave abuse with the office wholly and permanently. Thus,
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the
jurisdiction. same is not true in deactivation where the office
B. The abolition of the EIIB is a hoax. continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or
Similarly, if Executive Order Nos. 191 and inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and
•y^
223 are considered to effect a reorganization abolition are both reorganization measures.
of the EIIB, such reorganization was made The Solicitor General only invokes the above
in bad faith.
distinctions on the mistaken assumption that
'<&&&
C. The President has no authority to the President has no power to abolish an office.
abolish the EIIB." The general rule has always been that the
Petitioners contend that the issuance of the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a viola legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept
tion of their right to security of tenure: (b) tainted that the power to create includes the power to
with bad faith as they were not actually intended destroy. A public office is either created by the
to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law.
give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions Thus, except where the office was created by the
of which are essentially and substantially the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the
same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of same legislature that brought it into existence.
<Mk
the power of Congress to decide whether or not The exception, however, is that as far as
to abolish the EIIB. bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive de
Arguing in behalf of respondents, the So partment are concerned, the President's power
licitor General maintains that: (a) the President of control may justify him to inactivate the func
enjoys the totality of the executive power pro tions of a particular office, or certain laws may
vided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the grant him the broad authority to carry out reor
Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue ganization measures. The case in point is Larin
Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997). In
executive orders were issued in the interest of this case, it was argued that there is no law which
national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and empowers the President to reorganize the BIR.
^J
to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; In decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the
and (c) the EIIB was not "abolished," it was only following legal basis, thus:
"deactivated."
'Initially, it is argued that there is no law
The petition is bereft of merit. yet which empowers the President to issue
E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
We do not agree.
At first glance, it seems that the resolution
of this case hinges on the question — Does the , XXX XXX XXX
"deactivation" of EIIB constitute "abolition" of an
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
'|pil
office? However, after coming to terms with the
prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are certain 'SECTION 48. Scaling Down and Phase
that the ultimate queries should be — a) Does Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Ex
the President have the authority to reorganize ecutive Branch. — The heads ofdepartments,
the executive department? and, b) How should bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby
the reorganization be carried out? directed to identify their respective activities
which are no longer essential in the delivery existing structure of government offices or units
L of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased out or abolished, subject to
therein, including the lines of control, authority
and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a
. civil service rules and regulations... Actual bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
scaling down, phasing out or abolition of It falls under the Office of the President. Hence,
L the activities shall be effected pursuant to it is subject to the President's continuing author
Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose ity to reorganize.
by the Office of the President.' It having been duly established that the
Said provision clearly mentions the acts President has the authority to carry out reorga
of"scaling down, phasing out and abolition" nization in any branch or agency of the executive
ofofficesonly and does not cover the creation department, what is then left for us to resolve is
of offices or transfer of functions. Neverthe whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this
less, the act of creating and decentralizing jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded
is included in the subsequent provision of as valid provided they are pursued in goodfaith.
Section 62 which provides that: Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it
{a>
is for^he purpose of economy or to make bureau
'SECTION 62. Unauthorized organi
cracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act
zational charges. — Unless otherwise cre No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which
ated by law or directed by the President of may be considered as evidence of bad faith in
the Philippines, no organizational unit or
the removal of civil service employees made as a
changes in key positions in any department
result ofreorganization, to wit:(a) where there is
or agency shall be authorized in their respec
a significant increase in the number of positions
fe,
tive organization structures and be funded
in the new staffing pattern of the department or
from appropriations by this Act.' (emphasis
agencyconcerned; (b) where an office is abolished
ours)
and another performing substantially the same
The foregoing provision evidently shows that functions is created; (c) where incumbents are re
the President is authorized to effect organiza placedby those less qualified in terms ofstatus of
tional changes including the creation of offices appointment, performance and merit; (d) where
in the department or agency concerned. there is a classification of offices in the depart
ment or agency concerned and the reclassified
officesperform substantially the same functions
But of course, the list of legal basis authoriz as the original offices; and (e) where the removal
ing the President to reorganize any department violates the order of separation.
or agency in the executive branch does not have
Petitioners claim that the deactivation of
to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
EIIB was done in bad faith because four days
source of the power — that which constitutes
after its deactivation, President Estrada created
an express grant of power. Under Section 31,
the Task Force Aduana.
Book ni of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the We are not convinced.
President, subject to the policy in the Executive
An examination of the pertinent Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and
and efficiency,shall have the continuing author
the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in
ity to reorganize the administrative structure
good faith. It was not for the purpose ofremoving
of the Office of the President." For this purpose,
the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate
he may transfer the functions of other Depart
purpose ofE.O.No. 191, which is economy. While
ments or Agencies to the Office of the President.
Task Force Aduana was created to take the place
In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that reorga
of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to
nization "involves the reduction of personnel,
the government.
toil
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions." Firstly, there is no employment of new
It takes place when there is an alteration of the personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196
provides that the technical, administrative and additional authority to conduct investigation of
special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not
who are already in the public service, they being expressly granted to the EIIB.
employees of other existing agencies. Their ten
Consequently, it cannot be said that there
ure with the Task Force would only be temporary,
is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil
i.e., only when the agency where they belong is
ServiceCommission, we ruled that a reorganiza
called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their
tion in good faith is one designed to trim the fat
employment with the Task force is only by way
off the bureaucracy and institute economy and
of detail or assignment, they retain their employ
greater efficiency in its operation.
ment with the existing agencies. And should the
need for them cease, they would be sent back to Lastly, we hold that petitioners' right to se
the agency concerned. curity of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better
' settled in our law than that the abolition of an
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have
office within the competence of a legitimate body
a small group of military men under the direct
if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.
control and supervision of the President as base
Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
of the government's anti-smuggling campaign.
separation of the incumbents...
Such a smaller base has the necessary powers
1) to enlist the assistance of any department,
bureau, or office and to use their respective per
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute
sonnel, facilities and resources; and 2) "to select
right to hold office. Except constitutional offices
and recruit personnel from within the PSG and
which provide for special immunity as regards
ISAPP for assignment to the Task Force." Obvi salary and tenure, r o one can be said to have any
&fcJ
ously, the idea is to encourage the utilization of vested right in an office or its salary.
personnel, facilities and resources of the already
existing departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., in While we cast a commiserating look upon
stead of maintaining an independent office with the plight of all the EIIB employees whose lives
a whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB perhaps are now torn with uncertainties, we
had proven itselfburdensome for the government cannot ignore the unfortunate reality that our
because it maintained separate offices in every government is also battling the impact of a plum
region in the Philippines. meting economy.. .
And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly

budget appropriation of the government that the
creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially F. Dimayuga v. Benedicto II
intended to lessen EIIB's expenses. Tracing from G.R No. 144153, January 16, 2002
the yearly General...
r&tf-l
DE LEON, JR.,*/.:
While basically, the functions of the EIIB
have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we
find the latter to have additional new powers. The
On October 26,1992, then Secretary of Public
Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements
from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and
Works and Highways Jose P. de Jesus issued a
Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philip permanent appointment in favor of petitioner
pines (ISAFP), has the essential power to effect Chona M. Dimayuga as Executive Director II
searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not of the Toll Regulatory Board ("Board"). As its
have this power. The Task Force Aduana has the highest-ranking working official, petitioner exer
power to enlist the assistance of any department, cised powers of control and supervision over the
bureau, office, or instrumentality of the govern Board's three (3) divisions, namely its Finance
ment, including government-owned or controlled and Administrative Division, the Technical Di
corporations; and to use their personnel, facili vision and the Engineering Division- She also
ties and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have oversaw the Board's build-operate-and-transfer
this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the ("BOT") projects, such" as the Metro Manila
Skyway Project and the Manila-Cavite Tollway tion of P.D. No. 1096, otherwise known as the
Project, and likewise participated in the negotia National Building Code of the Philippines," and
tions for the Manila-Subic Expressway Project other cases that may be assigned to her. As a ges
and the South Luzon Tollway Extension Project. ture of protest, petitioner files a leave of absence
At the time, the position of Executive Director until September 30, 1998 rather than assume a
II was not deemed part of the career executive position which she considered a demotion.
service, that is, until June 4, 1993, when it was
In the meantime, responding to a letter dated
included therein.
December 1, 1998 from petitioner requesting a
s^j On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Com clarification on her status, the Career Executive
mission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21. Service Board ("CESB") replied in a letter dated
Section 4 of the Memorandum states: December 15, 1998, to wit:
a-i
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
4. Status of Appointment of Incum It has always been the stand of the CES
bents of Positions Included Under the Cov Board, even before the issuance of MC 21
erage of the CES. Incumbents of positions by the CSC, to respect or honor the appoint
which are declared to be Career Executive ment status of an official appointed to a
Service positions for the first time pursuant position which is subsequently included in
to this Resolution who hold permanent ap • the CES, such that if the appointment was of
pointment thereto shall remain under per a permanent status or nature, the inclusion
manent status in their respective positions. of the position in the CES is not deemed to
However, upon promotion or transfer to other have changed the status of the appointee to
Career Executive Service (CES) positions, the position. . .
these incumbents shall be under temporary
On September 28, 1998, while she was on
status in said positions until they qualify.
leave, petitioner received a letter dated Septem
XXX XXX XXX ber 22, 1998 from respondent Vigilar informing
her that then President Joseph E. Estrada had
Petitioner alleges that during her tenure,
appointed respondent Mariano E. Benedicto II in
she became the subject of several administrative
•>M her stead as Executive Director II of the Board.
and criminal complaints designed to coerce her
The letter cited a Memorandum dated June 30,
removal. On the strength of these complaints,
1998 issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
respondent former Department of Public Works
B. Zamora addressed to all heads of departments,
and Highways ("DPWH") Secretary Gregorio R.
agencies, and offices, as follows:
Vigilarissued a first ninety-day suspension order
against petitioner on November 28, 1997. Upon 1. Pursuant to existing laws and ju
the expiration of the first suspension, a second risprudence, non-career officials/personnel
ninety-day suspension order dated March 26, or those occupying political positions are
1998 was issued against petitioner, this time by deemed co-terminous with the outgoing Ad
then Executive Secretary Alexander Aguirre. ministration.
iSj
On the expiration of the second suspension 2. Accordingly, they shall vacate their
order, petitioner re-assumed her duties on June positions effective 01 July 1998 and turnover
25, 1998. However, respondent Vigilar issued their offices to the highest ranking career of
on the following day Department Order No. 85, ficials, unless otherwise specifically retained
series of 1998, by virtue of which petitioner was by the Department Heads concerned pr ex
"temporarily detailed" at the Office of the Secre tended new appointments by the President,
tan I tary of the DPWH. Concurrently, he addressed a
XXX XXX XXX
Memorandum dated June 26,1998 to petitioner
directing her to report to the Legal Service of Since she had been effectively removed from
the Department "to assist in the evaluation cf her position, petitioner filed on September 6,
appealedcases and preparation ofcorresponding 1999 a petition for quo warranto before the Court
decisions thereon involving the implementa of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54733.
L
On July 25, 2000, the appellate court rendered Moreover, if We were to espouse petitioner's
the assailed decision dismissing petitioner's suit. depthless construction of Section 4 of MC 21, un
The appellate court held that: qualified government employees would arrogate
to themselves the right to decide to stay perma
xxx XXX XXX
nently in their respective posts. This would leave
In the case at bar, petitioner was ap the appointing authority.helpless in exercising
pointed in a permanent capacity to the his power of appointment that also includes the
position of Executive Director H of the TRB power of removal.
in 1992. At that time, said position was
excluded from the coverage of the CES, so Thirdly, petitioner's claim to security of ten
petitioner was able to occupy said position al ure must be rejected.
though she was not a career service executive This Court has repeatedly held that this
officer (CESO). The subsequent inclusion of guaranty is available only to permanent appoin
her position under the CES, however, did not tees [citation omitted].
automatically qualify her for the said posi
tion as she lacked the required eligibility. At Under the Administrative Code of 1987, a
most, the permanent status accorded to her permanent appointment shall be issued to a per
appointment would only allow her to occupy son who meets all the requirements for the posi
said position until the appointing authority tion to which he is being appointed, including the
would replace her with someone who has the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance
required eligibility therefor. with the provisions of law, rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof.
The CSC, in issuing MC 21, could not
have intended to unwittingly permit non- Petitioner is not a CESO. Without the re
career service officers to hold on defiantly and quired eligibility for a career service position,
in a permanent character to career service petitioner cannot be considered a permanent
positions by virtue of their permanent ap appointee under the law. As stated, a permanent
^}
pointments. Such a preposterous interpre appointment is extended to a persons possessing
tation characterized by (1) entrance based the requisite qualifications, including the ehgibil
on merit and. fitness to be determined as far ity required, for the position, and thus protected
as practicable by competitive examination, by the constitutional guaranty of security of ten
or based on highly technical qualifications; ure. Since petitioner does not have the prescribed
(2) security of tenure; and (3) opportunity CES eligibility for the position concerned, she
for advancement to higher career positions. can be removed from office anytime because she
•ii&i
Moreover, such an unthinkable interpre does not have security of tenure.
tation would lead to an absurd situation Likewise, she cannot complain that her re
wherein an incumbent could hold on to his moval was not "for cause provided by law." The
\mj post adamantly for as long as he wants by phrase "for cause provided for law" is a guarantee
reason of his permanent appointment, and of both procedural and substantive due process.
even without qualifying for said position. This right proceeds form one's entitlement to
xxx xxx xxx
security of tenure which herein petitioner does
not have due to her ineligibility for the position
Secondly, petitioner may not claim any concerned.
proprietary right to her post as Executive
Director II of the TRB because this would Aggrieved by the dismissal of her petition
encroach upon the executive powers of the for quo warranto, petitioner comes to us via the
President. Such obstinate refusal by peti instant petition for review on certiorari, urging
tioner to vacate said position run counter the reversal of the appellate court's decision ...
to the wide latitude given to the appointing
authority or to the President, in this mat
ter, in exercising his power of appointment ... In the doctrinal case of Cuevas v. Bacal,
in accordance with the provisions of the G.R. No. 139382 promulgated December 6,2000
Constitution. the object of controversy was the title of Chief
Pubhc Attorney in the Public Attorney's Office, 22, 2001, is more appropriate and applicable to
which requires a CES Rank Level The claimant, tne case at bar. The private respondent therein,
respondent Atty, Josefina Bacal, who possessed a like herein petitioner Dimayuga, was not a
CESO III rank, was appointed as such in Febru career executive service officer, yet he was is
ary 1998 by then President Fidel V. Ramos. In sued a permanent appointment as Department
July 1998, she was "transferred" and appointed Legal Counsel which is a career executive ser
Regional Director. Designated in her stead by vice position. A dispute arose when the private
former President Joseph E. Estrada as "Chief respondent therein was reassigned as "Director
Public Defender" was Atty. Carina J. Demaisip. III (Assistant Regional Director)" of Region LX.
As Demaisip was not a CES eligible, Bacal filed We subsequently rendered judgment in that
a quo warranto suit before the Court ofAppeals case of De Leon finding that the therein private
questioning the former's appointment. The Court respondent's security of tenure was not violated.
r&l
of Appeals rendered judgment in Bacal's favor In sustaining his reassignment, we held that:
which, however, we reversed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to
In that case of Bacal this Court emphasized the Career Service does not automatically
MMI
two (2) salient points, to wit: confer security of tenure on its occupant even
First, in order to qualify, an appointment if he does not possess the required qualifica
as permanent, the appointee must possess tions. Such right will have to depend on the
the rank appropriate to the position. Failure . nature of his appointment, which in turn de
in this respect will render the appointment pends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person
merely temporary. In Atty. Bacal's case it who doesnot have the requisite qualifications
was ruled that she did not acquire tenure for the position cannot be appointed to it in
since she had only a CESO III rank; and that the acting capacity in the absence of appro
she was not appointed CESO I which was the priate eligibles. The appointment extended to
requisite eligibility for the position of Chief him cannot be regarded"as permanent even
iii] Public Attorney. if it may be so designated.
Second, security of tenure in the career

G. Miranda v. Carreon
executive service ("CES") is thus acquired
G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003
with respect to rank, and not to position. The
guaranty of security of tenure to members of
the career executive service does not extend SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
to the particular positions to which they may In the early part of 1988, ViceMayor Amelita
be appointed—a concept which is applicable Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the
only to first and second-level employees in City of Santiago because of the suspension of
the civil service — but to the rank to which Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed the above named
they are appointed by the President. respondents to various positions in the city gov
Wereiterate those points here if onlyto serve ernment. Their appointments were with perma
as a contradistinction to petitioner's arguments. nent status and based on the evaluation made
If a career executive officer's security of tenure by the City Personnel Selection and Promotion
pertains only to his rank and not to his position, Board (PSPB) created pursuant to Republic Act
with greater reason then that petitioner herein, No. 7160. The Civil Service Commission (CSC)
who is not even a CESO eligible, has no security approved the appointments.
of tenure with regard to the position of Executive When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his
Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board which post on March 5, 1998 after his suspension, he
was earlier classified on June 4, 1993 as part of considered the composition of the PSPB irregular
the career executive service or prior to the issu since the majority party, to which he belongs,
ance of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21 dated
was not properly represented. He then formed
May 31,1994.
a three-man special performance audit team
I'liini On ruling in the fairly recent case of De Leon composed of Roberto C. Bayaua, Antonio AL.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, January Martinez and Antonio L. Santos, to conduct a
ARTICLE LX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 687
personnel evaluation audit of those who were want of capacity anytime before the expira
previously screened by the PSPB and those on tion of the probationary period: Provided,
probation. After conducting the evaluation, the thai such action is appealable to the Com
audit team submitted to him a report dated June mission.'
8,1998 stating that the respondents were found
"wanting in (their) performance." "It is, however, clear from the forego
ing quoted provision that an employee on
On June 10, 1998, or three months after probation status may be terminated onlyfor
Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued an unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity.
order terminating respondents' services effective In this case, the services ofthe complainants
June 15, 1998 because they "performed poorly" were terminated on the ground ofpoorperfor
during the probationary period. mance ... Although poor performance may
Respondents appealed to the CSC, contend come near the concept ofwant ofcapacity, the
ing that being employees on probation, they can latter, as held by this Commission, 'implies
be dismissed from the service on the ground of opportunity on the part of the head of office
poor performance only after their probationary to observe the performance and.demeanor
period of six months, not after three (3) months. of the employee concerned' (Charito Pandes,
They also denied that an evaluation on their CSC Resolution No. 965592). At this point,
performance was conducted, hence, their dis considering that Mayor Jose Miranda reas
missal from the service violated their right to sumed his post only on March 5,1998 after
due process. serving his suspension, it is quite improbable
On October 19, 1998, the CSC issued Reso that he can already gauge the performance
lution No. 982717 reversing the order of Mayor of the complainants through the mere lapse
Miranda and ordering that respondents be rein of three months considering that the date of
stated to their former positions with payment of the letter of termination is June 10,1998 and
backwages, thus: its effectivity date June 15,1998." (emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, the COMELEC disqualified

"Granting that the complainant-employ
Mayor Jose Miranda as a mayoralty candidate in
ees (now respondents) indeed rated poorly,
the 1998 May elections. His son Joel G. Miranda,
the question that remains is whether they
herein petitioner, substituted for him and was
can be terminated from the service on that
ground. proclaimed Mayor of Santiago City. He then filed
a motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolu
xxx xxx xxx tion No. 982717 (in favor of respondents) but it
was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 990557
"..., at the time of their termination the
jfoliA
complainants have not finished the six (6) dated March 3, 1999.
months probationary period. . . ., they may Petitioner then filed with the Court of Ap
be terminated even before the expiration of peals a petition for review on certiorari,docketed
the probationary period pursuant to Section as CA-G.R. SP No. 36997. On May 21,1999, the
26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the Court ofAppeals rendered a Decisionaffirming in
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Said fcoto the CSC Resolution No. 982717. Forthwith,
Section provides: petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
'All such persons (appointees who meet before it could be resolved by the Court of Ap
all the requirements of the position) must peals, several events supervened. This Court, in
serve a probationary period of six months fol G.R. No. 136351, "Joel G. Miranda v. Antonio M.
lowing their original appointment and shall Abaya and the COMELEC," set aside the proc
undergo a thorough character investigation lamation of petitioner as Mayor of Santiago City
in order to acquire a permanent civil service for lack of a certificate of candidacy and declared
status. A probationer may be dropped from Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro as City Mayor by
the service for unsatisfactory conduct or for operation of law.
On December 20,1999, Mayor Navarro filed It is clear from the above Rule that when
with the Court ofAppeals a "Motionto Withdraw petitioner ceased to be mayor of Santiago City,
fcjf&l
the Motion for Reconsideration" (previously sub the action may be continued and maintained by
mitted by former Mayor Joel G. Miranda). hisj successor, Mayor Amelita Navarro, if there
is substantial need to do so.
On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals de
nied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of Mayor Navarro, however, found no substan
its Decision. tial need to continue and maintain the action of
her predecessorin light ofthe CSC Resolutionde
On June 11, 2000, the Court of Appeals claring that respondents' services were illegally
granted Mayor Navarro's "Motion to Withdraw terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In
the Motion for Reconsideration." In effect, the fact, she filed with the Court of Appeals a "Mo
CSC Resolution reinstating respondents to their tion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration"
positions stays. (lodged bypetitioner). She likewise reinstated all
In this petition, petitioner Joel G. Miranda the respondents to their respective positions and
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in af approved the paymentoftheir salariei.
firming the CSC Resolution declaring that the -Petitioner insists though that as a taxpayer,
termination of respondents' services is illegal he is a real party-in-interest and, therefore,
and ordering their reinstatement to their former should continue and maintain this suit. Such
positions with payment of backwages. contention is misplaced. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
same Rules provides:
In their comment, respondents claim that
since petitioner ceased to be Mayor of Santiago "Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real
i£iiJ
City,he has no legal personality to file the instant party in interest is the party who stands to
petition and, therefore, the same shouldbe dis be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
missed. They insist that they were not actually suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
evaluated on their performance. But assuming suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
there was indeed such an evaluation, it should these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
have been done by their immediate supervisors, or defended in the name of the real party in
not by those' appointed by former Mayor Jose interest." (emphasis supplied.)
Miranda. Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand
In his reply, petitioner contends that as a "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
taxpayer, he has a legal interest in the case at the suit." Not every action filed by a taxpayer
bar, hence, can lawfully file this petition. can qualify to challenge the legality of official
acts done by the government. It bears stressing
Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil that "a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the
Procedure, as amended, provides: act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds from taxation."
"Sec. 17.. Death or separation of a party The issue in this case is whether respondents'
who is a public officer. — When a public services were illegally terminated. Clearly, it
officer is a party in an action in his official does riot involve the illegal disbursement of
capacity and during its pendency dies, re public funds, hence, petitioner's action cannot
signs or otherwise ceases to hold office, the be considered a taxpayer's suit.
kw> action may be continued and maintained
by or against his successor if, within thirty At any rate, to put to rest the controversy
(30) days after the successor takes office or at hand, we shall resolve the issue of whether
such time as may be granted by the Court, respondents' services were illegally terminated
it is satisfactorily shown by any party that by former Mayor Jose Miranda.
there is substantial need for continuing or The 1987 Constitution provides that "no
maintaining it and the successor adopts or officer or employee of the civil service shall be
L continues or threatens to.adopt or continue removed or suspended except for cause provided
the action of his predecessor." by law."Under the RevisedAdministrative Code
of 1987, a government officeror employee may be tain sufficient information which shall enable
removed from the service on two (2) grounds: (1) the employee to preparean explanation."
unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity. (emphasis supplied.)
While the Code does not Refine and delineate the.
concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Respondents vehemently assert that they
Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as were never notified in writing regarding the
amended) provides specific grounds for dismiss status of their performance, neither were they
ing a government officer or employee from the warned that they will be dismissed from the
service. Among these grounds are inefficiency service should they fail to improve their perfor
||ffift and incompetence in the performance of official mance. Significantly, petitioner did not refute
duties. In the case at bar, respondents-were respondents' assertion. The records show that
dismissed on the ground of poor performance. what respondents received was only the termina
Poor performance falls within the concept of inef tion order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously,
iii$J
ficiency and incompetence in the performance of respondents' right to due process was violated.
official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are Moreover, respondents contend thjat the
grounds for dismissing a government official or only reason behind their arbitrary dismissal
employee from the service. was Mayor Jose Miranda's perception that they
But inefficiency or incompetence can only were not loyal to him, being appointees of then
be determined after the passage of sufficient Acting Mayor Navarro. This contention appears
time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) to be true considering that all those who were
months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able accepted and screened by the PSPB during the
to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incumbency of Acting Mayor Navarro were rated
incompetent requires enough time on the part of to have performed poorly by an audit team whose
his immediate superior within which to observe three members were personally picked by Mayor
his performance. This condition, however, was Jose Miranda.
not observed in this case. As aptly stated by the The Constitution has envisioned the civil
CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor Jose Mi service to be a career service based on merit and
randa could finally determine the performance rewards system that will truly be accountable
of respondents for only the first three months of
and responsive to the people and deserving of
the probationary period.
their trust and support. These noble objectives
Not only that, we find merit in respondents' will be frustrated if the tenure of its members is
claim that they were denied due process. They subject to the whim of partisan politics. A civil
\m cited Item 2.2 (b), Section VI of the Omnibus servant who lives in ceaseless fear of being ca
Guidelines on Appointments and Other Person priciously removed from office every time a new
nel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, political figure assumes power will strive to do
Series of 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum anything that pleases the latter. In this way, he
Circular No. 12, Series of 1994) which provides: will hardly develop efficiency, accountability and
a sense of loyalty to the public service. Such a
"2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance climate will only breed opportunistic, inefficient
xxx xxx xxx and irresponsible civil servants to the detriment
of the public. This should not be countenanced.
b. An official or employee who, for one
evaluation period, is rated poor in perfor In fine, we hold that petitioner, not being
mance, may be dropped from the rolls after a real party in interest, has no legal personal
due notice. Due notice shall mean that the ity to file this petition. Besides, his motion for
officer or employee is informed in writing of reconsideration was validly withdrawn by the
%$pi
the status of his performance not later than incumbent Mayor. Even assuming he is a real
the fourth month of that rating period with party in interest, we see no reason to disturb
sufficient warning that failure to improve his the findings of both the CSC and the Court of
performance within the remaining period of Appeals. The reinstatement of respondents who,
iî
the semester shall warrant his separation unfortunately, were victims of political bicker
from the service. Such notice shall also con ings, is in order.
ijggji
iMA
H. Seneres v. Comelec and Robles officer in the civil service to directly or indirectly
G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009 xxx engage in any partisan political activity."
This contention lacks basis and is far from
In 1999, private respondent Robles was being persuasive. The terms "electioneering"and
elected president and chairperson of BUHAY, "partisan political activity" have well-established
a party-list group duly registered with COM meanings in the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
ELEC. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a
three-year term for all its party officers, without Section 79. xxx
re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and (b) The term 'election campaign' or
2004 elections, with Robles as its president. All 'partisan political activity' refers to an act
the required Manifestations ofDesire to Partici designed to promote the election or defeat
pate in the said electoral exercises,includingthe of a particular candidate or candidates to a
Certificates of Nomination of representatives, public office which shall include:
carried the signature of Robles as president of
BUHAY. On January. 26, 2007, in connection (1) Forming organizations, associations,
with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again clubs, committees, or other groups of persons
filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate vfor the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
in the Party-List System of Representation. As undertaking any campaign for or against a
in the past two elections, the manifestation to candidate;
participate bore the signature of Robles as BU (2) Holding political caucuses, confer
HAY president. ences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and similar assemblies, for the purpose of solicit
filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY's ing votes and/or undertaking any campaign
nominees for the 2007 elections containing the
or propaganda for or against a candidate;
following names: (i) Rene M. Velarde, (ii) Ma. (3) Making speeches, announcements
Carissa Coscolluela, (hi) William Irwin C. Tieng, or commentaries, or holding interviews for
(iv) Melchor R. Monsod, and (v) Teresita B. Vil- or against the election of any candidate for
larama. Earlier, however, or on March 27,2007, public office;
petitioner Hans Christian Seneres, holding him
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign
self up as acting president and secretary-general
literature or materials designed to support
of BUHAY, also filed a Certificate of Nomination
or oppose the election of any candidate; or
with the COMELEC, nominating: (i) himself,
(ii) Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, (iii) Antonio R. (5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes,
Bautista, (iv) Victor Pablo C. Trinidad, and (v) pledges or support for or against a candidate.
Eduardo C. Solangon, Jr.
The foregoing enumerated acts if per
formed for the purpose of enhancing the
Petitioner Seneres contends that Robles,
chances of aspirants for nominations for
acting as BUHAY President and nominating of candidacy to a public office by a political
party, agreement, or coalition of parties
ficer, as well as being the Administrator of the
shall not be considered as election cam
LRTA, was engaging in electioneering or parti
paign or partisan election activity.
san political campaign. He bases his argument
on the Constitution, which prohibits any officer Public expression of opinions or discus
or employee in the civil service from engaging, sions of probable issues in a forthcoming
directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or election or on attributes of or criticisms
tift^ partisan political campaign. He also cites Sec. 4 against probable candidates proposed to be
of the Civil Service Law which provides that "no nominated in a forth coming political party
officeror employee in the Civil Service xxx shall convention shall not be construed as part of
iSJ
engage in any partisan political activity."Lastly, any election campaign or partisan political
he mentions Sec. 26(i) of the Omnibus Election activity contemplated under this Article.
Code which makes it "an election offense for any (Emphasis supplied.)
iijg)
ARTICLE DC: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 691
Guided by the above perspective, Robles' act The non-competitive positions are those
of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY can which by their nature are policy-determining,
not, without more, be considered electioneering primarily confidential, or highly technical.
or partisan political activity within the context
Early jurisprudence on this subject estab
of the Election Code. First of all, petitioner did
lished that it is the nature and not just the label
not aver that Robles committed any of the five
of the position whichynakes it non-competitive.
(5) acts defined in the aforequoted Sec. 79(b) of
Thus "much more than ordinary confidence is
the Code, let alone adduce proof to show the fact
reposed in the occupant of a position that is pri
of commission.
marily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not
Second, even if Robles performed any of the only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee
previously mentioned acts, Sec. 79 of the Code is for the duties of the office but primarily close
nonetheless unequivocal that if the same is done intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse
^frl only for the "purpose of enhancing the chances without embarrassment or freedom from misgiv
of aspirants for nominations for candidacy to ings or betrayals of personal trust on confidential
a public office by a political party, agreement, matters of state." De los Santos v. Mallare, 87
gsi
or coalition of parties," it is not considered as Phil. 289,298 (1950). A policy-determining posi
a prohibited electioneering or partisan election tion is one charged with the duty to "formulate a
activity. method of action for the government or any of its
subdivisions." Id. A position is highly technical
From this provision, one can conclude that as
if the occupant is required "to possess a techni
long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 pertain
cal skill or training in the supreme or superior
to or are in connection with the nomination of a
degree." Id.
candidate by a party or organization, then such
are treated as internal matters and cannot be What determines whether a position is "pri
considered as electioneering or partisan politi marily confidential" or not is the nature of the
cal activity. The twin acts of signing and filing office; that is, the nature of the office must be
a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal such as to require close intimacy between the ap
processes of the party or organization and are pointee and appointing authority which insures
not designed to enable or ensure the victory of freedom of intercourse without embarrassment,
the candidate in the elections. The act of Robles or freedom from misgiving of betrayal of personal
of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde trust on confidential matters of state. Executive
and others was merely in compliance with the pronouncements as to the nature of the office
COMELEC requirements for nomination of can be no more than initial determination of the
party-list representatives and, hence, cannot be nature of the office. Borres v. Court of Appeals,
treated as electioneering or partisan political ac 153 SCRA 120 (1987).
tivity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. LX(B) A position may be considered "primarily
of the Constitution for civil servants. confidential" in two instances: (1) When the
Moreover, despite the fact that Robles is a President, upon recommendation of the Civil
nominating officer, as well as Chief of the LRTA, Service Commission, has declared the position
petitioner was unable to cite any legal provision to be primarily confidential, and (2) when the
that prohibits his concurrent positions of LRTA position, by its nature, is primarily confidential.
President and acting president of a party-list Salazarv. Mathay, Sr., L- 44061, September 30,
organization or that bars him from nominating. 1976. In every case, however, the ultimate test is
the nature of the responsibilities of the position,
3. Competitive and non-competi,tive posi not the administrative or legislative description
tions. that is given to the position.
Appointment to a competitive position must 'l The Civil Service Code (P.D. 807) classifies
be made according to merit and fitness as de positions in the Civil Service into two classes of
termined, as far as practicable, by competitive positions:
examination. Appointments to non-competitive a. Career Service characterized by (1)
positions are not determined by competitive ex entrance .based on merit and fitness to be de
aminations. termined as far as practicable by competitive
jffftit
examinations, or basedonhighlytechnical quali porations, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies

fications; (2) security oftenure; and (3) opportu from the 1973 Constitution, upon which National
nityfor advancement tohigher career positions. Housing Corporation v. Juco is based. Under the
1973 Constitution, it was provided that:
b. Non-career Service characterized by (1)
entrance on bases other than those of the usual "The civil service embraces every branch,
gsj
tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of
service; (2) tenure which is limited to a period the Government, including every govern
specified by law, or which is coterminous with ment-owned or controlled corporation, xxx"
that ofthe appointing authority orsubject tohis [Constitution, 1973, Art. II-B, Sec. 1(1).]
pleasure, orwhich islimited tothe duration of a On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution
particular project for which purpose employment provides that:
was made. -,
'The civil service embraces all branches,
The classification above and the classifica subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
tion in-Section 2(2) are not mutually exclusive. " of the Government, including government-
Rather, theyoverlap andcomplement each other. owned or controlled corporations with
The classificationin the Code is for purposes of original character."[Constitution (1987), Art.
determining tenure.The classification inSection IX-B, Sec. 2(1).] (Italics supplied)
2(2) is for purposes of determining the manner
of testing merit and fitness.
Where a personhas acquiredsecurityoften Theproceedings in the 1986 Constitutional
ure, hemay removed only "for cause provided by Commission also shed light on the Constitutional
law." Thisis a guaranteeofboth procedural and intent and meaning in the use ofthe phrase"with
substantive due process. Hence, not only must original charter." Thus:
removal or suspension be in accordance with MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I
the procedure prescribed by law, but also they am amending my original proposed amend
can only be made on the basis of a valid cause ment to now read as follows: "including
provided by law. The phrase "for cause" has government-owned or controlled corpora
acquired a well-defined meaning in Philippine tions WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS." The
jurisprudence: purpose ofthisamendment istoindicate that
It means forreasons whichthe law and sound government corporations such as the GSIS
public policy recognize as sufficient for removal, and SSS, which have original charters, fall
that is,legal cause, andnotmerely causes which within the ambit of the civil service. How
theappointing power in theexercise ofdiscretion ever, corporations which are subsidiaries of
may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers these chartered agenciessuch as the Philip
may not be removed at the mere will of those pineAirlines, ManilaHotel and Hyatt are ex
vested with the power of removal, or without cluded from the coverage of the civil service.
cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tre-
effect the administration of the office, and must nas). What does the Committee say?
be restricted to something ofa substantial nature
directly affecting the rights arid interests ofthe MR. FOZ.Just one question, Mr. Presid
public. Delos Santos v. Mallare, supra. ing Officer. By the term "original charters,"
what exactly do we mean?
4. Cases. MR. ROMULO. We mean that they were
createdby law, by an act of Congress, or by
A. NASECO v. National Labor Relations special law.
Commission
168 SCRA 122 (1988) MR. FOZ. And not under the general
corporation law.
.... In the matter of coverage by the civil MR. ROMULO. That is correct. Mr. Pre
service of government-owned or controlled cor siding Officer.
MR. FOZ. With that understanding and Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and
clarification, the Committee accepts the distinct positions. While both individuals may be
amendment. [Record of the Constitutional called "secretary," nevertheless, oneis certainly
Commission, Vol. I, pp. 583-585.] of higher category and rank than the other with
On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitu the added distinction that a Secretary must
Ma) tion that governs the instant case because it is enjoy the confidence of the Mayor. However, the
the Constitution in place at the time of decision position of Assistant Secretary being of a lower
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord re rank, need not carry the requisites attaching to
lief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the primarily confidential position of the actual
3s>
the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the Secretary to the Mayor.
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled Moreover, if it was the intention ofCongress
corporation without original charter. to include the Assistant Secretaries within the
purview of Section 5(f) of R.A. No. 2260, as
amended, so that Assistant Secretaries are also
B. Samson v. Court of Appeals embraced in the non-competitive service, the law
145 SCRA 654 (1986) could have been easily worded "secretaries and
their assistants."
ALAMPAY, J:
Petitioners also contend that an assistant
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is secretary is also a secretary and thus included
the legality of Administrative Order No. 3, is in the general term "secretaries" as provided for
sued on January 10, 1972, by the then mayor in Section 5(f) in the above-quoted provision.
Marcial F. Samson, of Caloocan City, one of the From this premise, the conclusion drawn by
petitioners herein, whereby petitioner mayor petitioners is that the position of Assistant Sec
summarily terminated the services of the private retary to the mayor should be considered as in
respondent, Feliciano C. Talens, who held the the non-competitive service and that the tenure
%?'\ position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, on of assistant secretary lasts only as long as the
the ground of "lack and loss of confidence" and Mayor's confidence in him remains. Petitioners'
appointing in place of the latter Hermogenes Li- submission is that the assistant secretary is no
wag, a co-petitioner in this case. Cited in support less a secretary to the mayor.
of the challenged administrative order is section
5(f) of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known We are not disposed to agree with petition
as the Civil Service Act of 1959, as amended. ers. What petitioners fail to consider is that an
The above-cited provision declares the position "assistant secretary," although described as
of secretaries to city mayors non-competitive and secretary, technically differs in function from the
this was interpreted by herein petitioner Mayor "Secretaries." An "assistant" merely helps, aids
as to include the position of Assistant Secretary or serves in a subordinate capacity to the person
to the Mayor. who is actually clothed with all the duties and
responsibilities of "secretary." Needless to say,
the functions strictly attributable to a "secretary"
Although the position of assistant secretary and which would repose on such person the trust
to the city mayor is not among those expressly and confidence of the employer, is not automati
declared in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, cally vested or transferred to an "assistant sec
as amended, to be within the non-competitive retary," because the latter simply assists or aids
service, petitioners, however, argue that an as the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
sistant secretary is also a secretary, and thus
comprised within the general term "secretaries"
as provided for in Section 5(f).
C. Hernandez v. Villegas
We are not persuaded and find unacceptable 14 SCRA 544 (1965)
such submission of the herein petitioners...
ixjfi
It should be stressed that the position of It is to be understood of course that officials
Secretary to the Mayor and that of Assistant and employees holding primarily confidential
jigj
positions continue onlyfor so long as confidence security of tenure on its occupant even if he
in them endures. The termination of their official does not possess the required qualifications.
relation can be justified on the ground of loss of Such right will have to depend on the nature of
confidence because in that case their cessation his appointment, which in turn depends on his
from office involves no removal but merely the eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not
expiration of the term of office — two different have the requisite qualifications for the position
causes for the termination of official relations cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only
recognized in the Law of Public Officers. (See, as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to
e.g., Corpusv. Cuaderno, supra; Alba v. Evange- it merelyin an acting capacity in the absence of
im
lista, 53 O.G. 1452; Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. appropriate eligibles.7 Theappointmentextended
No. L-18878, March 30,1963. Contra, Hojilla v. to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if
Marino, G.R. No. L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965.) But it may be so designated.
the point is that as long as confidence in them
endures-and it has [not] been shown that it has The purpose of an acting or temporary ap
been lost in this case — the incumbent is entitled pointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge
to continue in office.
of official functions "oy authorizing a person to
:*jjyt discharge the same pending the selection of a
NOTE: The position of a provincial attor permanent or another appointee.8 The person
ney, like that of city legal officer, is primarily named in an acting capacity accepts the position
confidential. However, the positions of the legal unpler the condition that he shall surrender the
staff are not. Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280 office once he is called upon to do so by the ap
[1986]\Grvno v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. pointing authority.
91602, February 26,1991.
D. Achacoso v. Macaraig
E. Briones v. Qsmena
G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991
104 Phil. 588 (1988)
CRUZ, J.:
REYES, J.B.L., J:
The petitioner invokes security of tenure
against his claimedremovalwithoutlegalcause. This is an action for mandamus with dam
The respondents assert he is not entitled to the ages, to declarethe abolitionofpetitioners' posi
guarantybecause he is nota careerofficial. These tions void and to order the respondent City Mayor
are the legal issues. The facts are as follows: to reinstate them to their former positions.
It is settled that a permanent appointment On February 14,1956, the Municipal Board

/pi
can be issued only "to a person who meets all the in its ResolutionNo. 187,series of 1956,approved
requirements forthe position to which he isbeing Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 15 positions in the
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility CityMayor's office and 17 positions in the Office
prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, there ofthe Municipal Board, or a total of 32 positions
fore, his appointment couldbe regarded only as in both offices. Among the positions abolished
temporary. And being so, it couldbe withdrawn in the Office of the City Mayor were those oc
at will by the appointing authority and "at a cupied by petitioners. (Exh. "H,"pp. 23-24.) The
moment's notice," conformably to established Ordinance was approved by the City Mayor on
jurisprudence. February 20,1956.
The Court, having considered these submis Pursuant to said Ordinance No. 192, the City
sions and the additional arguments of the parties Mayor, onFebruary 23s 1956, wroteseparate let
in the petitioner's Reply and the Solicitor-Gen ters to petitioners notifyingthem ofthe abolition
eral's Rejoinder, must find for the respondents.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the 7Cuadra v. Cordova, 103 Phil. 391.
Career Service does not automatically confer "Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780.
L
of their positions and advising them of the ter The decision appealed from is affirmed, with
mination of their services "effective at the close costs against respondents in both instances. So
of business hours on March 15, 1956." (Exhs. I ordered.
and 1-1, Records, pp. 25-26). In reply thereto,
petitioners Briones and Rosagaran, respectively,
F. Mayor v. Macaraig
wrote in March 1956 separate letters to the re
G.R. No. 872m, March 5, 1991
spondent City Mayor (1) acknowledging receipt
his [sic] letters of separation, (2) protesting the
abolition of their positions, and (3) informing NARVASA, J:
him that they will not relinquish their positions
"until otherwise determined by higher competent
authorities or courts." (Exhs. J and J-l, Records, A number of issues have been raisegi and
i&fti pp. 27-28.) ventilated by the petitioners in their separate
pleadings. They may all be reduced to one basic
As the respondent City Mayor persisted in question, relating to the constitutionality of the
terminating their services, added to the fact that provisions of Republic Act. No. 6715 DECLAR
^
the respondents City Treasurer and City Audi ING VACANT "all positions oj the Commis
tor refused to pay their salaries after March 16, sioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
r ?
1956, petitioners filed the instant petition for Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations
reinstatement, back salaries, moral damages Commission,'9 according to which the public
and attorney's fees. respondents —
1) considered as effectively separated from
.. Our review of the evidence on record con the service inter alia, all holders of said positions
vinced us that the reasons given for the abolition at the time of the effectivity of said Republic Act
of the positions of the appellees (alleged to be No. 6715, including the positions of Executive
economy and efficiency) are untrue, and consti Director and Deputy Executive Director of the
tute a mere subterfuge for the removal without Commission, and
cause of the said appellees, in violation of Civil 2) consequently, thereafter caused the ap
Service tenures as provided by the Constitution. pointment of other persons to the new positions,
ml
Considering that the appellees have served specified in said statute: of Chairman, Com
missioners, Executive Clerk, Deputy Executive
in the office of the Mayor of Cebu, since Common
Clerk, and Labor Arbiters of the reorganized
wealth days, before the war; that their efficiency
National Labor Relations Commission. The old
and merit has been attested by repeated and
positions were declared vacant because, as the
constant promotions and increases in salary;
statute states, of "the need to professionalize
that petitioner Rosagaran was even proclaimed
L "Model Employee" as recently as 1955; and that
the higher levels of officialdom invested with
adjudicatory powers and functions, and to up
just a short time before the abolition of their posi
grade their qualifications, ranks and salaries or
tions, the respondents had created,for the same
emoluments."
office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new posi
tions calling for an outlay of P68,100 per annum, As everyone knows, security of tenure is a
almost P6.000 a month, the excuse of promoting protected right under the Constitution. The right
efficiency and economy is most transparent and is secured to all employees in private as well as in
unimpressive. A decent respect for the Civil public employment. "No officer or employee in the
Service provisions of our Constitution dictates civil service," the Constitution declares, "shall
that civil service eligibles, like petitioners herein be removed or suspended except for cause pro
who have rendered long and honorable services, vided by law."10 There can scarcely be any doubt
should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles
given positions of recent creation, nor should 9Sec. 35; SEE footnote 1 and related text.
10ART. IX, B, Sec. 2(3); and as regards private employ
they be left at the mercy of political changes.., ment, ART. XII, Sec. 3 inter alia provides that all workers
"shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
or work, and a living wage. * *"
that each of the petitioners — commissioner, therefore should be whether or not RA 6715
administrative officer, or labor arbiter — falls has worked such an abolition of the petitioners'
t&il within the concept of an "officer or employee in offices, expressly or impliedly. This is the only
the civil service" since the civil service "embraces mode by which, under the circumstances, the
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, petitioners' removal from their positions may be
and agencies of the Government, including gov defended and sustained.
ernment-owned or controlled corporations with It is immediately apparent that there is no
original charters."11 The Commissioners thus had express abolition in RA 6715 of the petitioners'
the right to remain in office until the expiration positions. So, justification must be sought, if
of the terms for which they had been appointed, at all, in an implied abolition thereof; i.e., that
unless sooner removed "for cause provided by resulting from an irreconcilable inconsistency
law.'.' So,too, the Executive Director and Deputy between the nature, duties and functions of the
Executive Director, and the Labor Arbiters had petitioners' offices under the old rules and those
the right to retain their positions until the ageof corresponding thereto under the new law.
compulsory retirement, unless sooner removed » ... . *
"forcause providedby law." None ofthem could An examination of the relevant provisions of
<M
be deemed to be serving at the pleasure of the RAJ5715, with a view to discovering the changes
President. thereby effected on the nature, compositions,
powers, duties and functions of the Commission
Now, a recognized cause for removal or and the Commissioners, the Executive Director,
termination of employment of a Government the Deputy Executive Director, and the Labor
officer or employee is the abolition by law of his Arbiters under the prior legislation, fails to dis
office as' a result of reorganization carried out close such essential inconsistencies.
by reason of economy or to remove redundancy
of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional
mandate for such termination of employment.12
iiiM
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as G. Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.
the declaration that that office is vacant. While it G.R. No. 92008, July 30,1990
is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to
abolish certain offices, it cannot be conceded the
CRUZ, J.y
i2>i
power simply to pronounce these offices vacant
and thereby effectively remove the occupants of In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon
holders thereoffrom the civil service. Such an act P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office
would constitute, on its face, an infringement of of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
the constitutional guarantee of security oftenure, Authority from which he claims to have been
and will have to be struck down on that account. removed without just cause in violation of his
It can not be justified by the professed "need to security of tenure.
professionalize the higher levels of officialdom The petitioner bases his claim on the fol
invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, lowing communication addressed to him by the
and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986:
&aj
salaries or emoluments."
The Constitution does not, of course, ordain MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BI
the abolition of the petitioners' positions or their NAMIRA
removal from their offices; and there is no claim You are hereby designated General Man
that the petitioners' separation from the service ager of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
is due to a cause other than RA 6715. The inquiry
effective immediately.
"ART. DC, B, Sec. 2(1), 1987 Constitution. By virtue hereof, you may qualify and
"Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954 (and G.R. Nos. 81967, enter upon the performance of the duties of
82023,83737,85310,85335 and 86241), Aug.8,1989, citing
Ginsonv. Municipality of Murcia, 157 SCRA 1; de la Liana the office.
v. Alba, 112SCRA 294; Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA998; see (Sgd.) JOSE ANTONIO GONZALES
also Manalang v. Quitoriano.
Minister of Tourism and randum, the petitioner filed this action against
Chairman, P. T. A. Board him toquestionhis title. Subsequently,whilehis
original petition was pending, Binamira filed a
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed supplemental petition alleging that on April 6,
office on the same date. 1990, the" President of the Philippines appointed
Jose A. Capistrano as Qeneral Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was
Binamira claims that since assuming office, impleaded as additional respondent.
JJ.Tfl he had discharged the duties of PTA General The issue presented in this case is starkly
Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Di simple.
rectors and had been acknowledged as such by
various government offices, including the Office Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the
of the President. Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as fol
lows:
He complains, though, that on January 2,
1990, his resignation was demanded by respon SECTION 23-A. General Manager —
dent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tour Appointment and Tenure. — The General
ism. Binamira's demurrer led to an unpleasant Manager shall be appointed by the President
exchange that led to his fifing of a complaint of the Philippines and shall serve for a term
fci^J against the Secretary with the Commission on of six (6) years unless sooner removed for
Human Rights. But that is another matter that cause; Provided. That upon the expiration
does not concern us here. of his term, he shall serve as such until his
What does is that on January 4,1990, Presi successor shall have been appointed and
dent Aquino sent respondent Garrucho the fol qualified. (As amended-by P.D. 1400)
lowing memorandum, copy furnished Binamira: It is not disputed that the petitioner was not
appointed by the President of the Philippines
4 January 1990 but only designated by the Minister of Tourism.
MEMORANDUM TO: Hon. Peter D. Gar There is a clear distinction between appointment
rucho, Jr. and designation that the petitioner has failed to
consider.
Secretary of Tourism.
Appointment may be defined as the selection,
It appearing from the records you have by the authority vested with the power, of an
submitted to this Office that the present Gen individual who is to exercise the functions of a
eral Manager of the Philippine Tourism Au given office.13 When completed, usually with its
thority was designated not by the President, confirmation, the appointment results in secu
as required by P. D. No. 564, as amended, rity of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are his office. Designation, on the other hand, con
hereby designated concurrently as General notes merely the imposition by law of additional
Manager, effective immediately, until I can duties on an incumbent official,14 as where, in the
appoint a person to serve in the said office case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is desig
in a permanent capacity. nated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Please be guided accordingly. Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO Court are designated by the ChiefJustice to sit in
cc: Mr. Ramon P. Binamira the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House
Philippine Tourism Authority
Manila
"Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1989 ed., p. 178; Gonzales,
Garrucho having taken over as General Man Neptali A., Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and
Election Law, 1961 ed., p. 146.
ager of the PTA in accordance with this memo uIbid., Gonzales, p. 153.
698 • CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
ofRepresentatives.15 It is saidthat appointment his place has been given to him, he cannot
is essentially executive while designation is leg delegate his duties to another.17
islative in nature. Indeed, even on the assumption that the
Designation may also be loosely defined as power conferred on the President could be val
an appointment because it likewise involves idly exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot
iifofll
the naming ofa particular person toa specified accept that the act ofthe latter, as an extension
public office. That is the common understand orwprcgection" ofthe personality ofthePresident,
ing of the term. However, where the person made irreversible the petitioner's title to the
is merely designated and not appointed, the position in question. The petitioner's conclusion
implication is that he shall hold the office only that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the
in a temporary capacity and may bereplaced at act ofPresident Aquinois based onlyonhalf the
will by the appointing authority. In this sense, doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel
the designation is considered only an acting or stated that doctrine°clearly in the landmark case
temporary appointment, which does not confer of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior,™ where he
security oftenure on the person named. described the relationship of the President of
the Philippines andthe members ofthe Cabinet
Evenifso understood, that is, as an appoint
as follows:
ment, the designation of the petitioner cannot
sustain his claim that he has been illegally x x x all executive and administrative
removed. The reason is that the decree clearly organizations are adjuncts ofthe Executive
provides that the appointment of the General Department, the heads ofthe various execu
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority tive departments are assistants and agents
shallbemade bythe Presidentofthe Philippines, of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
not by any other officer. Appointment involves where the Chief Executive is required by the
the exercise of discretion, which because of its Constitution or the law to act in person or
nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it the exigencies ofthe situation demand that
wasnotpossible forMinisterGonzales to assume heactpersonally, the multifarious executive
the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of and administrative functions of the Chief
the President. The appointment (ordesignation) Executive are performed byand throughthe
ofthepetitioner was not a merely mechanical or executive departments, and the acts of the
ministerial act that could be validly performed secretaries of such departments, performed
by a subordinate even ifhe happened as in this .and promulgated in the regular course of
case to be a member of the Cabinet. business, are, unless disapproved or repro
An officer to whom a discretion is en batedbythe Chief Executive, presumptively
trusted cannot delegate it to another, the pre the acts of the Chief Executive.
sumption being that he waschosen because Thedoctrine presumes the acts ofthe Depart
he was deemed fit and competent to exercise ment Head to be the acts of the President of the
that judgment anddiscretion, andunless the Philippines when "performed and promulgated in
power tosubstitute another in his place has the regular course of business," which was true
been given to him, he cannot delegate his ofthe designation made byMinister Gonzales in
duties to another.16 favor ofthe petitioner. Butit also addsthat such
In those cases in which the proper execu acts shall be considered valid only if hot "disap
tion of the office requires, on the part of the proved orreprobated by the Chief Executive," as
officer, the exercise of judgment or discre also happened in the case at bar.
tion, the presumption is that he waschosen
because he was deemed fit and competent The argument that thedesignation made by
to exercise that judgment and discretion, Minister Gonzales was approved by President
and, unless power to substitute another in Aquino through her approval ofthecomposition
of the Board of Directors of the PTA is not per-
15Sec. 14, P.D. 564, Sec. 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
16State v. Patterson, 34 N. 567; 46 Corpus Juris, 1033; "State v. Patterson, 34 N. 163.
Mechem, Lawof PublicOfficers, p. 567. •867 Phil. 451.
•foifcl

sj
suasive. It must be remembered that Binamira to attest to the appointment in accordance with
was included therein as Vice-Chairman only be the Civil Service Laws.
cause of his designation as PTA General Manager
by Minister Gonzales. Such designation being
merely provisional, it could be recalled at will, as Indeed, the approval is more appropriately
in fact it was recalled by the President herself, called an attestation,,$hat is, of the fact that the
through the memorandum she addressed to Sec appointee is qualified for the position to which
retary Garrucho on. January 4, 1990. he has been named. As we have repeatedly held,
such attestation is required of the Commissioner
sj
With these rulings, the petitioner's claim
of Civil Service merely as a check to assure com
of security of tenure must perforce fall to the
pliance with Civil Service Laws.19
ground. His designation being an unlawful
Ml encroachment on a presidential prerogative, Appointment is an essentially discretionary
he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the power and must be performed by the officer in
position in question. Even if it be assumed that it which it is vested according to his best fights, the
could be and was authorized, the designation sig only condition being that the appointee should
ial
nified merely a temporary or acting appointment possess the qualifications required by law. If he
that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
in fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In the ground that there are others better qualified
either case, the petitioner's claim of security of who should have been preferred. This is a politi
tenure must be rejected. cal question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
fl. Luego v. Civil Service Commission It is different where the Constitution or the
143 SCRA 327 (1986) law subjects the appointment to the approval of
another officer or body, like the Commission on'
CRUZ, J.: Appointments under 1935 Constitution.20 Ap
pointments made by the President of the Philip
pines had to be confirmed by that body and could
The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil not be issued or were invalidated without such
Service Commission authorized to disapprove confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the Com
a permanent appointment on the ground that mission on Appointments was then considered
another person is better qualified than the ap part of the appointing process, which was held
pointee and, on the basis of this finding, order complete only after such confirmation.21
his replacement by the latter?
. . . The appointment of the petitioner was It is understandable if one is likely to be
not temporary but permanent and was there misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article
fore protected by Constitution. The appointing V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the
authority indicated that it was permanent, as Commission has the power, to "approve" and
tel
he had the right to do so, and it was not for the "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided
respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse therein that the Commission shall have inter
him and call it temporary. alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether
original or promotional, to positions in the
The Civil Service Commission is not empow
civil service, except those presidential ap
ered to determine the kind or nature of the ap
pointees, members of the Armed Forces of the
pointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements "Ibid.; Villanueva v. Bellalo, 9 SCRA 407-411; Said
of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is Benzar Ali v. Teehankee, 46 SCRA 728, 730-731; Santos v.
Chico, 25 SCRA 343; City of Manila v. Subido, 17 SCRA 231.
qualified and all the other legal requirements 20Article VII, Section 10(3) and (7), 1935 Constitution.
are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but "Lacson v. Romero, 84 SCRA 740, 745.
Phihppines, police forces, firemen, and jail- the promotional appointment of petitioner Nar-
guards, and disapprove those where the ap ciso Y. SANTIAGO, Jr., from Collector of Cus
pointees donotpossess appropriate eligibility toms I to Collector of Customs III and directing
orrequired qualifications, (italics supplied) instead the appointment of private respondent,
Leonardo A. JOSE, to the same position, is
However, a full reading of the provision, sought to be reviewed and reversed herein.
especially of the underscored parts, will make
it clear that all the Commission is actually On 18 November 1986, #ien Customs Com
allowed to do is check whether or not the ap missioner Wigberto E. Tanada extended a per
pointee possesses the appropriate civil service manent promotional appointment, as Customs
eligibility or the required qualifications. If he Collector III, to petitioner SANTIAGO, Jr. That
does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is appointment was approved by the Civil Service
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by Commission(CSC). National Capital Region Of
law to be employed by the Commission when it fice. Prior thereto, SANTIAGO held the position
acts on — or as the Decree says, "approves" or of Customs Collector I.
"disapproves" — an appointment made by the . .... . ♦
proper authorities. On 26 November 1986, respondent JOSE, a

Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Mer
Significantly, the Commission on Civil it SystemsPromotion Board(the Board, forshort)
Service acknowledged that both the petitioner against SANTIAGO'S promotional appointment
tiij) and the private respondent were qualified for mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank
the position in controversy. That recognition to the position of Collector of Customs III.
alone rendered it functus officio in the case and
prevented it from acting further thereon except Pursuant to Section 19(6) of Presidential De
to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appoint cree No.807 (the CivilService Decree), the Board
ment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke referred the protest to CommissionerTanada for
the said appointment simply because it believed appropriate action.
that the private respondent was better qualified In reply, said official upheld SANTIAGO'S
for that would have constituted an encroachment
promotional appointment on the grounds, among
on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
others, that: (1)the next-in-rank rule is no longer
mandatory; (2) the protestee is competent and
There are apparently no political overtones qualified for the position and such fact was not
in this case, which looks to be an honest conten questioned by the protestant; and (3) existinglaw
!*£>
tion between two public functionaries who each and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discre
sincerely claims to be entitled to the position in tion to the appointing authority provided there
dispute.This is gratifyingfor politics shouldnev is no clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
er be permitted to interfere in the apolitical or or fraud.
ganization ofthe Civil Service, which is supposed
to serve all the people regardless of partisan On 29 December 1986, respondent JOSE ap
considerations. This political detachment will be pealedto the Board(MSB CaseNo. 1410), which,
impaired if the security of tenure clause in the on 17 March 1987, decided to revoke petitioner
Constitution is emasculated and appointments SANTIAGO'S appointment and directed that re
in the Civil Service are revoked and changed at spondent JOSE be appointed in his stead.
will to suit the motivations and even the fancies
On 15 July 1987, the Board resolved to deny
of whatever party may be in power. SANTIAGO'S Motion for Reconsideration for lack
I. Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service of merit.
Commission On 28 December 1987, respondent Commis
178 SCRA 733 (1989) sion affirmed the Board Resolutions in its own
Resolution No. 87-554. The Commission ruled
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are
Resolution No. 87-554 of the Civil Service qualified forthe position ofCustoms Collector III,
Commission, dated 28 December 1987, revoking respondentJOSE has far better qualifications in
terms of educational attainment, civil service eli but who possesses superior qualifications
gibilities, relevant seminars and training courses and competence compared to a next-in-rank
^g)
taken, and holding as he does by permanent employee who merely meets the minimum
appointment a position which is higher in rank requirements for the position.
and salary range. It added that the Commission
is empowered to administer and enforce the
merit system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987
The power to appoint is a matter of discre
Constitutions and to approve all appointments,
tion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of
whether original or promotional, to positions in
*&J
choice as to who is best qualified for the position
the civil service, subject to specified exceptions,
(Ocampo v. Subido, L-28344, August 27, 1976,
pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (h), Section 9 of
72 SCRA 443). To apply the next-in-rank rule
the Civil Service Law.
peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on
Hence, this Certiorari Petition filed by SAN the appointing power contrary to the policy of the
TIAGO. law that among those qualified and eligible, the
appointing authority is granted discretion and
prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for
After considering the pleadings filed, the appointment (Pineda v. Claudio, L-29661 May
constitutional and statutory provisions invoked, 13, 1969, 28 SCRA 34).
the jurisprudence cited and legal arguments ad
duced, we are constrained to reverse. The case oiMeram v. Edralin (L-71228. Sep
tember 24, 1987,154 SCRA 238) is inapplicable
We need only lecall our previous ruling in to the factual situation herein. In said case, we
Taduran v. Civil Service Commission (L-52051, affirmed the appointment of the next-in-rank
31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 66) stating that there is because the original appointee's appointment
"no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in was made in consideration of political, ethnic, re
the (Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank ligious or blood ties totally against the very pur
are entitled to preference in appointment. What pose behind the establishment of professionalism
it does provide is that they would be among the in the civil service.
first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified,
and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the True, the Commission is empowered to
same shall be filled by transfer or other modes approve all appointments, whether original or
of appointment." promotional, to positions in the civil service and
disapprove those where the appointees do not
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to prefer
possess the appropriate eligibility or required
ential consideration for promotion to the higher
qualification (paragraph [h], Section 9, P. D. No.
vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that
807). However, consistent with our ruling in Lu-
he and no one else can be appointed. The rule
ego v. CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986,143 SCRA
neither grants a vested right to the holder nor
327), "all the commission is actually allowed to do
imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
is check whether or not the appointee possesses
Efaj&l
authority to promote such person to the next
higher position. As provided for in Section 4, CSC the appropriate civil service eligibility or the re
Resolution No. 83-343:
quired qualifications. If he does, his appointment
is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other
Section 4. An employee who holds a next- criterion is permitted by law to be employed by
in-rank position who is deemed the most the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree
competent and qualified, possesses an ap says, 'approves' or 'disapproves' an appointment
propriate civil service eligibility, and meets made by the proper authorities, x x x To be sure,
the other conditions for promotion shall be it has no authority to revoke the said appoint
promoted to the higher position when it be ment simply because it believed that the private
comes vacant. respondent was better qualified for that would
However, the appointing authority may have constituted an encroachment on the discre
promote an employee who is not next-in-rank tion vested solely (in the appointing authority)."
All told, we fail to see any reason to disturb dum dated April 11,1989, the Secretary of For
SANTIAGO'S promotional appointment. The eign Affairs recommended to the President the
iiii)
minimum qualifications and the standard of termination of Astraquillo's services as ambas
merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied sador. The recommendation was "APPROVED
as found by the appointing authority. The latter by authority of the President." Astraquillo was
has not been convincingly shown to have com then notified (on April 18,1989) of the termina
mitted any grave abuse of discretion. tion of his services effective immediately, arid
(on May 8,1989) of the designation of Counsellor
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, Donato Felicio as Charges D'affaires effective
Iffii we find no necessity to delve into the other is May 17,1989.
sues raised.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 87-554 of the

tpi Civil Service Commission is SET ASIDE and pe Alunan Glang was appointed by President
titioner's promotional appointment as Customs Aquino on September 11, 1986 as Ambassador
Collector III is hereby UPHELD. The Temporary Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of
Restraining Order heretofore issued, enjoining Mission (Class I) to Kuwait, and assumed his
respondents from enforcing CSC Resolution No. post on January 11, 1987.
87-554, is hereby made permanent. Two years afterwards, or on May 27, 1989,
SO ORDERED. he received a telex message from the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs informing him that his services
J. Astraquillo, et al. v. Mangla*pus as ambassador and chief of mission to Kuwait
G.R. No. 88183, October 3, 1990 had been terminated and directing him to vacate
iil^
his post "on or before June 30, 1989." The mes
sage further advised that the termination ofhis
NARVASA, J.: services was "explicit in a Memorandum dated
As the caption indicates, this decision deals 18May 1989" a copyofwhich wouldbe furnished
with five cases. The cases have been consolidated him by telefax. The memorandum referred to
and jointly considered because they all turn was one signed by Secretary Raul Manglapus
upon a common legal issue, i.e., the validity of recommending the "recall and subsequent ter
the termination, by authority of the President mination of the services of Ambassador Alunan
of the Philippines, of the petitioners' appoint C. Glangas Ambassador to the State ofKuwait,"
ments as "political" or "non-career" members of which was approved by Executive Secretary
the country's Foreign Service. Stated otherwise, Catalino Macaraig, Jr. "BY AUTHORITY OF
the common issue is whether or not their service THE PRESIDENT."
as Philippine diplomats was under the circum
stances, at the pleasure of the president, ter
minable without cause or need of investigation. Alejandro Melchor, Jr. was also appointed
Astraquillo was appointed by the President of by President AquinoAmbassador Extraordinary
the Philippines on July 22,1986 as Ambassador and Plenipotentiary on June 27, 1986. On July
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of 3, 1986, Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel,
Mission (II) to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). then Foreign Affairs Minister, assigned him to
After he had occupied the post for two years or so, Moscow, U.S.S.R. This post Melchor assumed on
a confidential memorandum was filed with the September 4, 1986, after which he received an
Home Office by Atty. Roy Seneres, the Philippine other appointment from the President on October
Labor Attache to the United Arab Emirates, ac 15,1986 as Chief of Mission, Class 1.
cusing Astraquillo, his wife and cousin-in-law of
improper interference with his (Seneres') func
tions. On instructions of the Board of Foreign It appears, however, that the Secretary
Service Administration (BFSA) the matter was ofForeignAffairshad submitted a Memorandum
^J
investigated byAmbassador Pacifico Castro from to the President recommending the termination
March 28 to 31, 1989. Thereafter, by Memoran of the services of Melchor — described as "a
jiiljj
pohtical (non-career) Ambassador" —- "as Chief (1)Open Career positions for appointment
of Mission and as Ambassador" to the U.S.S.R., to which prior qualification in an appropriate
and that he "should vacate his post by 30 June examination is required;
1989." This was "APPROVED by authority of
(2) Closed Career positions which are
the President" on June 13, 1989 by Executive
scientificor highly technical in nature; these
Secretary Macaraig. include the faculty and academic staff of
The petitioners,submit the following common state colleges and universities and scientific
contentions: and technical positions in scientific or re
search institutions which shall establish and
1) that the removals from the service maintain their own merit systems;
were not made by the President personally
and directly; (3) Positions in the Career Executive
ln^
Service, namely: Undersecretary, Assistant
2) that the removals did not state a cause Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bu
explicitly prescribed by the Foreign Service reau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Act or the Civil Service Law; Regional Director, Chief of Department Ser
3) that the removals were effected with vice and other officers of equivalent rank as
out due process; may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
4) the petitioners were appointed right the President;
after the so-called "EDSA Revolution," and
when Vice-President Laurel was Minister of (4) Career officers, other than those in
Foreign Affairs; and the Career Executive Service, who are ap
pointed by the President, such as theForeign
5) all were appointed Chief of Mission Service Officers in the Ministry of Foreign
Class I (except Astraquillo, who was named Affairs;
^jj Class II Chief) and came into Foreign Service
"through lateral entry." (5) Commissioned officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces which shall main
The Civil Service Law, Presidential Decree tain a separate merit system;
No. 807, classifies employment in Government
into "career" and "non-career service." It iden (6) Personnel of government-owned or
tifies the peculiar characteristics of each cat controlled corporations, whether performing
egory, and enumerates the positions falling ' governmental or proprietary functions, who
under each class.
do not fall under the non-career service; and
Thus, Section 5 of said PD No. 807 states that (7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled,
the "career service " is characterized by: semi-skilled, or unskilled.
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness, The "Non-Career Service," on the other hand,
to be determined as far as practicable by according to Section 6 of the same PD 807, shall
competitive examinations, or based on highly be characterized by:23
technical qualifications; (1)entrance on bases other than those of
(2) opportunity for advancement to the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for
higher career positions; and the career service; and
(3) security of tenure. (2) tenure which is limited to a period

specified bylaw, or whichis coterminous with
Section 5 then enumerates the particular that of the appointing authority or subject
positions falling under the Career Service, in to his pleasures, or which is limited to the
cluding, as will be noted, those in the Foreign duration of a particular project for which
Service. They are the following:22 purposes employment was made.
"Italics supplied. "Italics supplied.
^>
ItyMil
And the officials and employees listed under he has passed such competitive examinations as
the Non-Career Service include: the Board of Foreign Service examination may
prescribe to determine his fitness and aptitude
(1) Elective officials and their personal for the work of the service and has demonstrated
or confidential staff; his loyalty to the Government"of the Republic
(2) Department Heads and other of of the Philippines and his attachment to the
ficials of Cabinet rank who Jiold positions principles of the Constitution."24 Those who thus
at the pleasure of the President and their qualify are "certified by the Secretary of Foreign
personal or confidential staff(s); Affairs as eligible for appointment as Foreign
Service Officer(s)," and it is exclusively from
(3) Chairman and members of commis these officers so certified that the President "shall
sions and boards with fixed terms of office
appoint Foreign Service Officers."25
liiiiii
and their personal or confidential staff;
Now, there are those, like the petitioners,
(4) Contractual personnel or those who are appointed to the Foreign Service, with
whose employment in the government is in out having qualified in the manner just indicated
accordance with a special contract to under and consequently without having been certified
take a specific work or job, requiring special by \he Foreign Affairs Secretary as eligible for
or technical.skills not available in the em
appointment as Foreign Service Officers.26 In
ploying agency, to be accomplished within a view of the provisions of law just cited, they cer
specific period, which in no case shall exceed tainly do not and cannot be deemed embraced in
one year, and performs or accomplishes the the Career Service Corps. They can only be re
specific work or job, under his own respon garded then as "non-career officers" or "political
sibility with a minimum of direction and appointees" who, as already pointed out, have a
supervision from the hiring agency; and "tenure ** coterminous with that of the appoint
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. ing authority or subject to his pleasures.''
i^&j
By these statutory standards, it seems plain
that all three (3) petitioners: Isabelo J. Astra
quillo, Alunan C. Glang, and Alejandro Melchor, K. Social Security System v.
&&}
Jr., pertained to the Non-Career Service. Their Court of Appeals
appointments to the Foreign Service were made 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
on "bases other than those of the usual test of
merit and fitness utilized for the career service;"
CORTES, J.:
their entrance was not "based on merit and fit
ness determined by competitive examinations, Primarily, the issue raised in this petition
or based on highly technical qualifications." This is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can
being so, their "tenure (was) coterminous with enjoin the Social Security System Employees
that of the appointing authority or subject to his Association (SSSEA) from striking and order
pleasures."
"Sec. l.
"Sec. 3.
The same distinction between career and 26See Opinion No. 82, S. 1954 of the Department of
non-career officers may be derived by implication Justice, cited in the Reply dated Nov. 6, J989, Rollo, pp.
from the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 258-260, sustaining the proposition that "the President may
also appoint Foreign Affairs Officers without complying with
1952, R. A. No. 708, as amended. the eligibility requirements under Republic Act No. 708,"
and pointing out that it is with regard to the Foreign Affairs
Part B, Title III of said Foreign Service Officers composing the so-called "career service" that "the
Act deals with the "Career Service Corps com law meticulously prescribes the manner and qualifications"
posed of Foreign Service Officers appointed by for their appointment as such, but no provision "limits or
the President upon the recommendation of the restricts the power of the President to appoint ambassadors,
public ministers and consuls in accordance with the Constitu
Secretary," and declares that "(n)o person shall tion, even without complying with the "manner and quali
be eligible for appointment (in such corps) unless fications"for appointment of officers in the "career service."
the striking employees to return to work. Col strikes by employees in the Government, in
laterally, it is whether or not employees of the cluding instrumentalities exercising governmen
Social Security System (SSS) have the right to tal functions, but excluding entities entrusted
strike. with proprietary functions:
m
Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in
the Government. —The terms and conditions
I
of employment in the Government, including
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on So any political subdivision or instrumentality
cial Justice and Human Rights, provides that the thereof, are governed by law and it is de
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers clared to be the policy of this Act that employ
to self-organization, collective bargaining and ees therein shall not strike for the purpose
ggjjji negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, of securing changes or modification in their
including the right to strike in accordance wjth terms and conditions of employment. Such
law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3]. employees may belong to any labor organiza
By itself, this provision would seem to rec tion which does not impose the obligation to
strike or to join in strike: Provided, however,
ognize the right of all workers and employees,
That this section shall apply only to employ
including those in the public sector, to strike. But
ees employed in governmental functions and
the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm
Wii} not those employed in proprietary functions
this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil
of the Government including but not limited
Service Commission, it provides, after defining
to governmental corporations.
the scope of the civil service as "all branches,
g£j
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of No similar provision is found in the Labor
the Government, including government-owned Code, although at one time it recognized the right
or controlled corporations with original char of employees of government corporations estab
ters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall lished under the Corporation Code to organize
not be denied to government employees" [Art. and bargain collectively and those in the civil
IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (5)]. Parenthetically, the Bill service to "form organizations for purposes not
of Rights also provides that '[t]he right of the contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment
people, including those employed in the public by B. P. Big. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of em
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall ployment of all government employees, including
(ggj
not abridged" [Art. Ill, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there employees of government owned and controlled
is no question that the Constitution recognizes corporations, shall be governed by the Civil
the right of government employees to organize, Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art.
it is silent as to whether such recognition also 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent
includes the right to strike. as to whether or not government employees may
strike, for such are excluded from its coverage
Resort to the intent of the framers of the or [Ibid ]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P. D.
m) ganic law becomes helpful in understanding the No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
meaning ofthese provisions. A reading ofthe pro
ceedings of the Constitutional Commission that On June 1, 1987, to implement the consti
drafted the, 1987 Constitution would show that tutional guarantee of the right of government
in recognizing the right of government employees employees to organize, the President issued E.
to organize, the commissioners intended to limit 0. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the
the right to the formation of unions or associa exercise of the right to organize of government
tions only, without including the right to strike. employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided
that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the govern
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace ment service shall be observed, subject to any
Act (R. A. No. 875), which was repealed by the legislation that may be enacted by Congress."
Labor Code (P. D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned The President was apparently referring to
706 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil candidates for public office whom he supports."
Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 Section 29,R.A. 2260. This is also the sense under
gj
which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of the new Constitution. Moreover, the prohibition
applicablelaws concerning strike by government does not apply to members of the Cabinet. See
employees . . . enjoins under pain of adminis Santos v. Yatco, 106 Phil. 21 (1959).
trative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from stagingstrikes,demonstrations, L. Aquino v. Civil Service Commission
mass leave's, walk-outs and other forms ofmass G.R. No. 92403, April 22, 1992
action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service." The air was MEDIALDEA, J.:
thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the
absence of any legislation allowing government
employees to strike,recognizing theirrighttodo Two (2) interrelated issues on the extent of
so,orregulatingthe exercise ofthe right, theyare authority ofthe CivilService Commissionto pass
prohibited from striking, byexpress provision of upon the contested appointments wereraised by
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in petitioner which could be simplified into whether
E. 0. No. 180. [Atthis juncture, it must bestated or ndt public respondent Civil Service Commis
that the validity ofMemorandum Circular No. 6 sion committed grave abuse of discretion in
is not at issue]. revoking the appointment ofpetitionerVictor A.
^jjjg)
But are the employeesofthe SSS covered by Aquino as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division
the prohibition against strikes? of San Pablo City as it found private respondent
Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.
The Court is of the considered view that they
are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitu In assailing the two (2) CSC Resolutions
tion *[t]he civil service embraces all branches, revoking his appointment, ^petitioner invokes
subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the ruling of this Court in the case of Santiago
^jj v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 81467,
the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters" October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 733 and Galurav.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. 85812, June 1,
[Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); seealsoSec. 1ofE. 0. No.
180 where the employees in the civil service are 1989 (EnBanc resolution) that the Civil Service
denominated as "government employees"] and Commission has no authority to revoke an ap
that the SSS is one such government-controlled pointment on the ground that another person
corporation withan original charter, having been is more qualified for a particular position for
that would have constituted an encroachment
created under R. A. No. 1161, its employees are
part ofthe civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G. on the discretion vested solely in the appointing
R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and authority...
are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibitingstrikes. Thisbeingthe
case, the strike staged by the employees of the We have consistently applied the above
SSS was Ulegal.
doctrine in many cases with similar factual cir
$&!
cumstances, but we see no compelling reason to
NOTE: Partisan political campaign. apply the same in the instant case. In the cases
Partisan political activity, which is the phrase cited above, We ruled that the Civil Service
used in previous Constitutions, includes "every Commission has no authority to revoke an ap
form of solicitation of the elector's vote in favor pointment simply because it (CSC) believed that
of a specific candidate. People v. de Venecia, 14 another person is better qualified than the ap
SCRA 864, 867 (1965). It includes contribution pointee forit would constitute an encroachment
of money for electionpurposes and distribution on the discretion solelyvested on the appointing
of handbills. Id. at 866. However, the provision authority. The situation is different as in the
does' not "prevent any officer or employee from instant case, where the Civil Service Commis
expressing his views on current political prob sion revoked the appointment of the successful
lems or issues, or from mentioning the names of protestant, petitioner herein, principallybecause
ffc^
the right to security of tenure of the prior appoin his choice in the selection and appointment of
tee, private respondent herein, to the contested qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil
position had already attached (see CSC decision, service, we cannot, however, give a stamp of
pp. 28-29, Rollo). It must be noted that public approval to such a procedural irregularity in
respondent CSC did not direct the appointment extending appointments, as in the instant case,
of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored to the prejudice of the right .to security of tenure
the appointment of private respondent who was of the incumbent to the position.
first appointed to the contested position.
ip>
M. PNOC v. NLRC
It is well-settled that once an appointment is
G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993
issued and the moment the appointee assumes
a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely eq NARVASA, C.J.:
uitable right (to the position), which is protected
The applicability to private respondent
not only by statute, but also by the Constitution,
Manuel S. Pineda of Section 66 of the Election
and cannot be taken away from him either by
Code is what is chiefly involved in the case at
revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
bar. Said section reads as follows:
except for cause, and with previous notice and
hearing (Mitra v. Subido, G.R. No. L-21691, Section 66. Candidates holding appoint-
September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127. ' ive office or position. Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, includ
1ipj There is also authority for the rule that when
ing active members of the Armed Froces of
the appointing power has once acted and the ap
the Philippines, and officers and employees
pointee has accepted the office and done what is
in government-owned or controlled corpora
required of him upon its acceptance, his title to
E|$j tions, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
the office becomes complete, and he can then be
from his office upon the filing of his certificate
removed only in the regular way (Mechem, Law
of candidacy.
of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 461, p. 294,
citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch [U.S.] 137). Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the
The appointing power can not effect his removal Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Develop
indirectly by rescinding or revoking his appoint ment Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the
ment after it is complete. Philippine National Oil Co., from September 17,
1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26,
There is thus reasonable ground for the rule
that the moment the discretionary power of ap-
1989, when his employment was terminated. The
poinment has been exercised and the appointee events leading to his dismissal from his job are
S^jjJ
assumed the duties and functions of the position, not disputed.
the said appoinment cannot be revoked by the In November, 1987, while holding the posi
appointing authority on the ground merely that tion of Geothermal Construction Secretary, En
the protestant is more qualified than the first gineering and Construction Department, at Ton-
appointee, subject however to the condition that gonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Pineda
the first appointee should possess the minimum decided to run for councilor of the Municipahty of
qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled
security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX- in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding
B, Section 2, par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution certificate of candidacy for the position....
would be rendered meaningless if the appointing
authority is allowed to flip-flop in exercising its
discretionary power of appoinment. In the comment required of him by the Court,
the Solicitor General expressed agreement with
the respondent Commission's holding that Man
While it is true that the appointing author uel Pineda had indeed been illegally separated
ity has a wide latitude of discretion in making from his employment in the PNOC-EDC; in other
words, that his running for public office and his employees in government-owned or controlled
election thereto had no effect on his employment corporations, even those organized under the
with the PNOC-EDC, a corporation not embraced general laws on incorporation and therefore not
within the Civil Service. having an original or legislative charter, and
even if they do not fall under the Civil Service
(a*) Law but under the Labor Code. In other words,
Section 2 (1), Article LX of the 1987 Constitu Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination
tion provides as follows: of employment in addition to those set forth in
the Labor Code, as amended.
:i0
The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-
Hgi owned or controlled corporations with origi N. Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission
nal charters. G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991
Implicit in the provision is that government- CRUZ, J.: '
i^j owned or controlled corporations without original
charters i.e., organized under the general law, vThe issue raised in this case has been cat
the Corporation Code are not comprehended egorically resolved in a long line of cases that
within the Civil Service Law. So has this Court should have since guided the policies and actions
liiijij
construed the provision. of the respondent Civil Service Commission. Dis
regard of ourconsistent ruling on this matter has
needlessly imposed on the valuable time of the
The basic question is whether an employee in Court and indeed borders on disrespect for the
a government-owned or controlled corporations highest tribunal. We state at the outset that this
without an original charter (and therefore not conduct can no longer be countenanced.
covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls
within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus
We declare once again, and let us hope for
Election Code,.. .
the last time, that the Civil Service Commission
iofi)
has no power of appointment except over its own
personnel. Neither does it have the authority to
Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the
review the appointments made by other offices
Court that a government-owned or controlled
except only to ascertain if the appointee possess
tî corporation does not lose its character as such es the required qualifications. The determina
because not possessed of an original charter but tion of who among aspirants with the minimum
organized under the general law. If a corpora statutory qualifications should be preferred
jj^J
tion's capital stock is owned by the Government, belongs to the appointing authority and not the
or it is operated and managed by officers charged Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an
with the mission of fulfilling the pubhc objectives appointment because it believes another person
for which it has been organized, it is a govern is better qualified and much less can it direct the
ment-owned or controlled corporation even if appointment of its own choice.
organized under the Corporation Code and not
under a special statute; and employees thereof,
even if not covered by the Civil Service but by The Court believes it has stated the foregoing
the Labor Code, are nonetheless "employees in doctrine clearly enough, and often enough, for
government-owned or controlled corporations," the Civil Service Commission not to understand
and come within the letter of Section 66 of the them. The bench does; the bar does; and we see
Omnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso no reason why the Civil Service Commission does
facto resigned from ... office upon the filing of. not. Kit will not, then that is an entirely different
.. (their) certificate of candidacy." matter and shall be treated accordingly.
isj
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the We note with stern disapproval that the Civil
Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and Service Commission has once again directed the
iyli
appointmentofits ownchoice in the case at bar. AND COURTESY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.
We musti;herefore make the following injunc IT SHALL STRENGTHEN THE MERIT AND
tions which the Commission must note well and REWARDS SYSTEM, INTEGRATE AIX HU
follow strictly. MAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PRO
GRAMS FOR ALL LEVELS AND RANKS,
Whatever the reasons for its conduct, the AND INSTITUTIONALIZE A MANAGE
Civil Service Commission is ORDERED to desist MENT CLIMATE cdNDUCIVE TO PUBLIC
from disregarding the doctrine announced in ACCOUNTABILITY. IT SHALL SUBMIT TO
Luego v. Civil Service Commission and the sub THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS AN
sequent decisions reiterating such ruling. Up to ANNUAL REPORT ON ITS PERSONNEL
this point, the Court has leniently regarded the PROGRAMS.
attitude of the public respondent on this matter
as imputable to a lack ofcomprehension and not 1. Mass appointments.
to intentional intransigence. But we are no lon
ger disposed to indulgethat fiction. Henceforth, Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio
departure from the mandate of Luego by the B. Remollo sought re-election in the May 14,
Civil Service Commission after the date of the 2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor
promulgation ofthis decision shallbeconsidered Agustin R. Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7,
contempt of this Court and shall be dealt with and 11,2001, outgoing Mayor Remollopromoted
^fol severely, in view especially of the status of the 15 city hall employees, and regularized another
contemner.
74 city hall employees, including the herein 52
petitioners.
l^fo*
Director Abucejo invalidated the appoint
NOTE: Temporary appointees. ments as the same were done in violation of CSC
Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001, the
The constitutional rule is that temporary pertinent portions of which provide:
appointees maybe removed anytime even with
out cause. Decano v. Edu, 99 SCRA 410, 416 On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly
(L-30070, August 29, 1980). However, the new announced at the flag raising ceremony at the
Constitution now says: "Temporary employees Dumaguete City Hall grounds that he would
*&£)
of the Government shall be given such protec not honor the appointments made by former
tion as may be provided by law." Obviously the Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed
provision is not self-executory. Moreover, it was the City Administrator, respondent Dominador
approvedin lieu ofa proposal to make temporary Dumalag, Jr., to directrespondent CityAssistant
appointees permanentafterthe lapseofa certain Treasurer Erlinda C. Tumongha (nowdeceased),
period of time. to refrain from making any cash disbursements
for payments of petitioners' salary differentials
NOTE: Reduction in rank. based on their new positions.
An assignment which involves reduction in It is true that there is no constitutional pro

rank is invalid ab initio. Hence, failure to report hibition against the issuance of "mass appoint
to the new assignment cannot a be a ground for ments" by defeated local government officials
dismissal. He must be reinstated. Yenko and prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly,
Mayor Estrada v. Gungon, G.R. No. 165450, this is not the same as a "midnight appointment,"
August 13, 2009. proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to
those appointments made within two months
SEC. 3. THE CIVIL SERVICE COM immediately prior to the next presidential elec
L MISSION, AS THE CENTRAL PERSON tion. But The Civil Service Commiszsion Com
mission, as the central personnel agency of the
NEL AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT,
SHALL ESTABLISH A CAREER SERVICE government, has statutoryauthority toestabhsh
AND ADOPT MEASURES TO PROMOTE rules and regulations to promote efficiency and
MORALE, EFFICIENCY, INTEGRITY, professionalism in the civil service. Presidential
RESPONSIVENESS, PROGRESSIVENESS, Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of
(s»J
the Philippines, provides for the powers of the January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a monthly
Commission, including the power to issue rules salary of P26,953.80.
%i
and regulations and to review appointments. On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad
Nazareno, et al. v. City of Dumaguete, G.R. No. and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando
181559, October 2, 2009. and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Office of the
SEC. 4. ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS AND Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint
EMPLOYEES SHALL TAKE AN OATH OR was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and
S*)
AFFIRMATION TO UPHOLD AND DEFEND the following Information dated March 19,2002
THIS CONSTITUTION. charging the two with violation of Article 244
SEC. 5. THE CONGRESS SHALL PRO of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the
VIDE FOR THE STANDARDIZATION OF Sandiganbayan . . .
COMPENSATION OF GOVERNMENT OF
FICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING
THOSE IN GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR * Thus, this petition by the Office of the Om
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH budsman, through the Officeofthe Special Prose
ORIGINAL CHARTERS, TAKING INTO AC cutor, representing the People ofthe Philippines.
COUNT THE NATURE OF THE RESPON
SIBILITIES PERTAINING TO, AND THE
QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED FOR THEIR The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held
POSITIONS.
that the qualifications for a position are pro
vided by law and that it may well be that one
SEC. 6. NO CANDIDATE WHO HAS who possesses the required legal qualification
LOST IN ANY ELECTION SHALL, WITHIN for a position may be temporarily disqualified
ONE YEAR AFTER SUCH ELECTION, BE for appointment to a public position by reason
km APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE IN THE of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing
GOVERNMENT OR ANY GOVERNMENT- candidates. However, there is no violation of
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPO Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a
RATIONS OR IN ANY OF ITS SUBSIDIA person suffering from temporary disqualification
RIES. be appointed so long as the appointee possesses
all the qualifications stated in the law.
A. People v. Sandiganbayan .
There is no.basis in law or jurisprudence
G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008
for this interpretation. On the contrary, legal
The facts culled from the records are as fol disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised
lows: Penal Code simply means disqualification un
gsi der the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article DC of the
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villa- 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
pando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing can
Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a didates within one year after such election to be
relative of Villapando's wife, ran for Municipal appointed to any office in the government or any
Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Vil- government-owned or controlled corporations or
lapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on in any of their subsidiaries.
July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of
San Vicente, Palawan. A Contract of Consultancy Villapando's contention and the Sandigan
dated February 8, 1999 was executed between bayan, Fourth Division's interpretation of the
the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article
Tiape whereby the former employed the services 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circum
ofTiape as MunicipalAdministrative and Devel scribedlexically. Legal disqualificationcannot be
^)
opment Planning Consultant in the Office ofthe read as excluding temporary disqualification in
Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
\m
I
under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitu appointed as the chairman and chief execu
tion and Section 94(b) of the Local Government tive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis
Code of 1991. supplied).
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers,
employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic,
Zambales, and officers.and members of the
SEC. 7. NO ELECTIVE OFFICIAL
Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S.
SHALL BE ELIGIBLE FOR APPOINTMENT
Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the
OR DESIGNATION IN ANY CAPACITY TO proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted
ANY PUBLIC OFFICE OR POSITION DUR
in italics infringes on the following constitutional
ING HIS TENURE. and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art.
UNLESS OTHERWISE ALLOWED BY IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "fn]o
•ffiffil
LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
OF HIS POSITION, NO APPOINTIVE OF designation in any capacity to any public officer
FICIAL SHALL HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE orposition during his tenure,"'because the City
^£
OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective officialand
OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY OR IN the subject posts are public offices;...
STRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUD
ING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CON
TROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR The principal question is whether the proviso
SUBSIDIARIES. in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states,
"Provided, however, That for the first year of its
'*<&&
A. Flores v. Drilon and Gordon operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993 mayor of the Cityof Olongapo shall beappointed
as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority,"violates the constitutional
BELLOSILLO, J.:
proscription against appointment or designation
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of of elective officials to other government posts.
R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Con-
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution
vertion and Development Act of 1992," under
provides:
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and No elective official shall be eligible for
Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metro appointment or designation in any capacity
politan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this to any public office or position during his
original petition with prayer for prohibition, tenure.
preliminary injunction and temporary restrain
ing order "to prevent useless and unnecessary Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
expenditures of public funds by way of salaries the primary functions of his position, no ap
and other operational expenses attached to the pointive official shall hold any other office or
office . .." Paragraph (d) reads: employment in the Government or any sub
division, agency or instrumentality thereof,
(d) Chairman administrator The Presi including government-owned or controlled
dent shall appoint a professional manager as corporations or their subsidiaries.
administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board The section expresses the policy against
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the concentration of several public positions in
Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman one person, so that a pubhc officer or employee
of the Board and who shall serve as the chief mayserve full-time with dedicationand thus be
executive officer of the Subic Authority: efficient in the delivery of pubhc services. It is
Provided, however, That for the first year of an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
its operationsfrom the effectivity of this Act, job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be the head of an executive department described
L
\m
in Ciui7 Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality
G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative
Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as act can prevail over the fundamental law of the
Secretary ofAgrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815,"27 land. Moreover, since the constitutionahty of
. . should be allowed to attend to his duties Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that
and responsibilities without the distraction of section sought to be declared unconstitutional,
other governmental duties or employment. He we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as
•ft&i
attention and energy among too many positions authority for its validity.
ofresponsibility, which may result in hazardriess In any case, the view that an elective official
and inefficiency . . ." may be appointed to another post if allowed by
•î Particularly as regards the first paragraph law or by the primary functions of his office, ig
of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to prevent a nores the clear-cut difference in the wording of
situation where a local elective official will work the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, ofthe
for his appointment in an executive position in Constitution. While the second paragraph autho
rffii
government, and thus neglect his constituents rizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
"28 official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the .first paragraph ap
In the case before us, the subject proviso di pears to be more stringent by not providing any
rects the President to appoint an elective official, exception to the rule against appointment or
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other govern designation of an elective official to the govern
ment posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief ment post, except as are particularly recognized
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precise in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as
ly what the constitutional proscription seeks to head of the economic and planning agency;30the
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination Vice-President, who may be-appointed Member
to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, of the Cabinet;31 and, a member of Congress
first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, who may be designated ex officio member of the
the fact that the expertise of an elective official Judicial and Bar Council.32
may be most beneficial to the higher interest of
The distinction between the first and second
kl-ifri
the body politic is of no moment.
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not acciden
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Govern tal when drawn, and not without reason. It was
ment Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitu
local elective official to another post if so allowed tion as shown in their deliberation, thus
by law or by the primary functions of his office.29
MR. MONSOD. In other words, what
But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94'of the
then Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding
Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict
K194 SCRA 317 (1991).
KI RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMIS with respect to elective officials, there may
SION 546. be a law that will allow them to hold other
^Sec. 94.Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local positions.
Officials; Candidates Who Lost in an Election. - (a) No elective
or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment MR. Foz. Yes. I suggest we make that
or designation in"anycapacity to any public office or position difference, because in the case of appointive
during his tenure.
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no elective or appointive local offi ^Sec. 9. Art. XII.
cial shall hold any other office or employment in the govern 31Sec. 3, second par., Art. VII, of the Constitution.
ment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, 32Sec. 8, par. (1), Art. VIII, of the Constitution. This par
&&^
including government-owned or controlled corporations or ticular provisionwas approved in anticipation ofa unicameral
their subsidiaries. legislature. However, as it turned out, we adopted instead a
"(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, bicameral form ofgovernment so that the seat allocatedtothe
no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one (1) representative of Congress has to be split between a member
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the of the Senate and a member of the House of Representative.
government or any government-owned or controlled corpo Each being entitled to one-half vote in the deliberations of
rations or in any of their subsidiaries." the Judicial and Bar Council.
L
officials, there will be certain situations ment by the President, Vice-President, Members
where the law should allow them to hold of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
some other positions.33 during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art.
VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend
The distinction being clear, the exemption additional duties and functions required by the
tsiiJ
allowed to appointive officials in the second para primary functions of tjhe officials concerned, who
graph cannot be extended to elective officials who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as
are governed by the first paragraph. provided by law, without receiving any additional
It is further argued that the SBMA posts compensation therefor.
ill
are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor This argument is apparently based on a
of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circum wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate
stance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or
Secretary** where we stated that the prohibition automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
against the holding of any other officeor employ- of Olongapo City without need of appointment.
The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestion
aiiiiiJ
M5 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMIS ably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
SION 156. 'appointive and not merely adjunct to the post
Section 4 of the Proposed Resolution No. 468, the precur
sor of the first paragraph of Sec. 7, read: "Unless otherwise
of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the leg
provided by law, no elective official shall be eligible for ap islative intent to make the subject positions ex
pointment, or designation in a temporary or acting capacity officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the
to any public office or position during his term" (Record of word "appointed" and, instead, "exofficio" would
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 524).
The following were reactions on the floor: have been used.
"FR. BERNAS. On page 3, Section 4, line 5, the provi
sion begins with the phrase 'Unless otherwise provided by
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Sena
law' which does not exist in the 1973 Constitution. This was tors were fully aware that subject proviso may
inserted in a 1981 amendment. We know the reason why contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
this was put here. It practically renders the provision useless nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have
because the whole matter becomes discretionary with the leg
islature. It is one of those instances in the 1973 Constitution,
the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed,
as amended and constantly reamended, where they threw in the Senators would not have been concerned with
the phrase 'Unless otherwise provided by law* precisely to the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they consid
give the President a free hand in his decree-making power. ered the SBMA posts as ex officio.
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. FOZ. As presently worded now, the provision Cognizant of the complication that may arise
would allow the legislature to really provide otherwise,
meaning, to allow an elective official to be appointed to an from the way the subject proviso was stated,
executive office. (Ibid., Vol. I, p. 539.) Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the
xxx xxx xxx Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall
"MR. COLAYCO The way I understand this is that be the Chairman" then that should foreclose
we are giving the legislature the power to authorize the ap
pointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity the issue. It is a legislative choice." The Senator
of an elective official to any public office or position during took a view that the constitutional proscription
his term. Am I right? against appointment of elective officials may
"MR. FOZ. If a law is passed regarding this matter, then
such law may reverse this provision as worded, but we have
have been sidestepped if Congress attached the
said earlier that we will entertain suggestions from the floor. SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City in
"MR. COLAYCO. Personally, I find the policy estab stead of directing the President to appoint him to
lished in this provision meritorious. It make it a firm policy, I the post. Without passing upon this view of Sena
suggest that we delete the prefatory phrase "Unless otherwise
provided by law.'
tor Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress
"MR. FOZ. We agree with the Commissioner" (Ibid., intended the post to be appointive, thus nibbling
Vol. I, p. 549). in the bud the argument that they are ex officio.
As revised, known later as Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 10,
and approved on third reading, the subject section read: "No The analogy with the position of Chairman
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designa of the Metro Manila Authority made by respon
tion in any capacity to any public office or position during
his tenure" (Ibid, at 788).
dents cannot be applied to uphold the constitu
**Supra, at 335. tionality of the challenged proviso since it is not
put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent,
the argument that if no elective official may be an elective official remains ineligible for appoint
appointed or designated to another post then ment to another pubhc office.
Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon,
him to receive double compensation35 would be
an incumbent elective official was, notwithstand
useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not af ing his ineligibility, appointed to other govern
fect the constitutionality of the subject proviso.
ment posts, he does not automatically forfeit
In any case, the Vice-President for example, an his elective office nor remove his ineligibility
elective official who may be appointed to a cabi
pffil imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary,
net post under Sec. 3, Art. VII, may receive the
since an incumbent elective official is not eligible
compensation attached to the cabinet position if to the appointive position, his appointment or
specifically authorized by law. designation thereto cannot be valid in view of
his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This
provision should not be confused with Sec. 13,
Since the ineligibility of an elective official Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator
for appointment remains all throughout his ten or Member of the House of Representatives may
ure or during his incumbency, he may however hold any other office or employment in the Gov
resign first from his elective post to cast off the ernment . . . during his term without forfeiting
constitutionally-attached disqualification before
ffi^l his seat..." The difference between the two pro
he may be considered fit for appointment. The visions is significant in the sense that incumbent
deliberation in the Constitutional Commission
national legislators lose their elective posts only
is enlightening: after they have been appointed to another gov
MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line ernment office, while other incumbent elective
8, I propose the substitution of the word officials must first resign their posts before they
"term" with TENURE. can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing
the elective post as well as not being appointed
MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineli
amendment is to make possible for one to gibility is not directly related with forfeiture of
resign from his position. office."... The effect is quite different where it is
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that expressly provided by law that a person holding
prerogative. one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a
provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent
L^t MR. FOZ. Resign from his position to of an office from accepting or holding a second
accept an executive position. office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 283
MR. DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in Ala. 445,-218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v. Neal, 130
a given case that because of, say, incapacity, Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or
he may leave the service, but if he is prohib appointment to the latter office void (State ex
ited from being appointed within the term for rel. Childs v. Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262.
which he was elected, we may be depriving Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v
the government of the needed expertise of State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941)."37
an individual.36 "Where the constitution, or statutes declare that
persons holding one office shall be ineligible for
election or appointment to another office, either
MSec. 8, Art. IX-B, provides: "No elective or appointive generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by first office to hold the second so that any attempt
law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any
to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van
foreign government. Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258,283 Ala 445)."38
"Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as ad
ditional, double, or indirect compensation."
36I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMIS 3763 AM. JUR. 2D 678-679.
SION 591. M67 CJS 295.
As incumbent elective official, respondent. some and heavy responsibility, we cannot

Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the posi do it because of the constitutional prohibi
Sil tion of Chairman of the Board and Chief Execu tion which is very clear. It says: No elective
tive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto official shall be appointed or designated to
pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the another position'in any capacity.
Constitution cannot be sustained. He however For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts immovable, like a mountain amidst the strife of
as SBMA official are not necessarily null and storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of
void; he may be considered a defactoofficer, "one the waves." One of the characteristics of the Con^
whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, stitution is permanence, i.e., "its capacity to resist
the law, upon principles of policyand justice, will capricious or whimsical change dictated not by
hold valid so far as they involve the interest of legitimate needs but only by passing fancies,
the public and third persons, where the duties of temporary passions or occasional infatuations of
the office were exercised under color of a known the people with ideas or personalities ... Such a
election or appointment, void because the officer Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered
was not eligible, or because there was a want of with to suit political expediency, personal ambi
power in the electing or appointing body, or by tions or ill-advised agitation for change."40
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exer
cise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon
being unknown to the public ... [or] under color has a choice. We have no choice.
of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec.
a public unconstitutional law, beforethe same is 13, ofR.A. 7227, which states: "... Provided, how
adjudged to be such (State v. Carrol, 38 Conn., ever, Thatfor the first year of its operationsfrom
499; Wilcox u. Smith, 5 Wendell,. [N.Y.], 231; 21 the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City
Am. Dec. 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, of Olongapo shall beappointedas the chairman
23Am.Rep.,323).'?39 andchiefexecutive officer of theSubicAuthority,"
Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liber is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the
ties Union, any and all per diems, allowances appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of
and other emoluments which may have been Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon,
received by respondent Gordon pursuant to his is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
appointment may be retained by him.
The illegality of his appointment to the
SEC. 8. NO ELECTIVE OR APPOINTIVE
SBMA posts being now evident, other matters
affecting the legality of the questionedprouiso as PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE SHALL
well as the appointment ofsaid respondent made RECEIVE ADDITIONAL, DOUBLE, OR IN
pursuant thereto need no longer be discussed. DIRECT COMPENSATION, UNLESS SPE
CIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW, NOR
In thus concluding as we do, we can only ACCEPT WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF
share the lament of Sen. Sotero Laurel which he THE CONGRESS, ANY PRESENT, EMOLU
expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648, MENT, OFFICE, OR TITLE OF ANY KIND
precursor ofR.A. 7227, when he articulated FROM ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.
. . (much) as we would like to have the PENSIONS OR GRATUITIES SHALL
present MayorofOlongapo Cityas the Chief NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ADDITIONAL,
Executive of this Authority that we are creat DOUBLE,OR INDIRECT COMPENSATION.
ing; (much) as I, myself, wouldlike to because
I know the capacity, integrity, industry and 1. Additional or double compensation.
dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much) as we Thepurposeofthe prohibition is to manifest
would like to give him this terrific, burden a commitment to the fundamental principle that
39Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De losAngeles,No.12647,
26 November 1917, 37 Phil. 186,191 (italization supplied). «°CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
a public office is a public trust. It is expected dictum in the later case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,
of a government official or employee that he 98 Phil 705 (1956); approves of a more liberal
lial keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public and perhaps administratively more rational ap
welfare. He is there to render public service. He proach. The Court said: Id. at 709-710.
is of course entitled to be rewarded for the per According to law, under certain circum
formance of the functions entrusted to him, but stances, the President may authorize double
that should not be the overriding consideration. compensation in some cases, such as govern
While the terms "additional" and "double" ment officials acting as members with com
compensation are used interchangeably, it is, pensation in government examining boards
perhaps, best to draw a distinction between the like the bar examinations, or department
two. There is additional compensation when for secretaries acting as members of Board of
one and the same office for whicn a compensation Directors of government corporations, and
has been fixed there is added to such fixed in such cases the prohibition against double
compensation an extra reward in the form, for compensation is not observed. If the Presi-
instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the * dent approves trie double compensation, well
absence of a law specifically authorizing such ex and good. The appointee whose appointment
tra reward. Thus, where an officer's pay provided ^may then be regarded as valid from the be
by law was a fixedper diem, the Supreme Court ginning could receive extra compensation. If
disallowed additional compensation in the form it is disapproved, then the appointment will
of cost of living allowances as well as incentive ' have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless
and Christmas bonuses. Peralta v. Mathay, 38 of course, the appointee was willing to serve
SCRA 256, 258 (1967). The Court, however, was without compensation, in which case there
careful to point out that when a per diem or an could be no valid objection. .
allowance is given as reimbursementfor expenses 2. Case.
incident to the discharge of an officer's duties, it
is not an additional compensation prohibited by A. Santos v. Court of Appeals
&"i
the Constitution. Id. at 260-262. G.R. No. 139792, November 22, 2000
Double compensation more properly refers to
two sets ofcompensation for two different offices DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
held concurrently by one officer. In the instances
when holding a second officeis allowed, when an On 18 January 1983, petitioner was ap
officer accepts a second office, he can draw the pointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, and
salary attached to such second office only when he thereafter assumed office. After the military-
he is specifically authorized by law to receive backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed
double compensation. See Quimson v. Ozaeta, to the same position.
98 Phil. 705 (1956).
On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally re
What is the meaning of the phrase "specifical tired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as
ly authorized by law?" Sadueste v. Municipality amended, and received his retirement gratuity
ofSurigao, 72 Phil. 485 (1941), explained it thus: under the law for his entire years in the govern
The authority required by the Con ment service; and five years thereafter he has
been regularly receiving a monthly pension.
stitution to receive double or additional
compensation is a specific authority given to On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered
a particular employee or officer of the Gov the government service. He was appointed Di
ernment because of peculiar or exceptional rector III of the Traffic Operation Center of the
reasons warranting the payment of extra or MMA. His appointment was approved by the
additional compensation. Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The above interpretation of the constitu On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No.
tional provision seems to be too strict. It seems in 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed
effect to require a special law for every instance it as Metropolitan Manila Development Author
of additional or double compensation. An obiter ity (MMDA). Section 11 thereof reads:
SECTION 11. Transitory Provisions. of his separation benefits under RA No. 7924.
— To prevent disruption in the delivery of The Assistant Manager for Finance of the MMDA
basic urban services pending the full imple referred the Position Paper to the Regional Office
mentation of the MMDA's organizational oftheCSC-NCR.
structure and staffing pattern, all officials
and employees ofthe interim MMA shall con On 7 October 1996, Director IVNelson Acebe-
tinue to exercise their duties and functions
do of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that
and receive their salaries and allowances the payment of petitioner's separation pay must
until they shall have been given notice of be in accordance with Civil Service Resolution
change of duties and functions, and of being No. 92-063, pertinent portions of which read:
transferred to another office or position. [Tjhe payment ofseparation/[retirement]
xxx xxx xxx benefits cannot be subject to the prohibi
tion against the [sic] double compensation
The civil service laws, rules and regula in cases when officers and employees who
tions pertinent to the displacement of per were previously granted said benefits are
sonnel affected by this Act shall be strictly rehired or reemployed in another govern
enforced.'The national government shall ment Agency or Office. Thus; there is no
provide such amounts as may be necessary need for separated employees to refund the
to pay the benefits accruing to displaced em separation/retirement benefits they received
ployees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1 when subsequently reemployed in another
1/4) month's salary for every year of service: government agency or office.
Provided, That, if qualified'for retirement un
der existing retirement laws, said employees . . . This being so, while an employee
may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. who was paid separation/retirement ben
efits is not required to refund the same once
On 16 May 1996, the President of the Phil reemployed in the government service, as
ippines issued Memorandum Order No. 372 ap aforestated, for reasons of equity however, it
proving the Rules and Regulations Implementing would be proper and logical that said separa
R.A. No. 7924. Pursuant thereto, the MMDA
tion/retirement benefits should nevertheless
issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which,
be deducted from the retirement/fseparation]
inter alia, authorized the payment of separation
pay to be received by the employee concerned.
benefits to the officials and employees of the for Moreover, in this instance, the employee
mer MMA who would be separated as a result of
concerned has the option either to refund his
the implementation of R.A. No. 7924.
separation/retirement benefits and claim his
On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a gross retirement/separation pay without any
Memorandum to petitioner informing him that deduction corresponding to his separation
in view of his 'Voluntary option to be separated pay received, or not [to] refund his separa
from the service" his services would automati tion/retirement pay but suffer a deduction
cally cease effective at the close of office hours of his retirement/separation gratuity for
on 15 September 1996, and that he would be the total amount representing his previous
entitled to "separation benefits equivalent to one separation/retirement pay received.
and one-fourth (1 1/4) monthly salary for every
His motion for reconsideration having been
year of service as provided under Section 11 of
denied, petitioner elevated the opinion of Direc
the MMDA Law."
tor Acebedo to-the CSC.
In view of some doubt or confusion as to the
On 21 October 1997, the CSC promulgated
extent of his separation benefits, petitioner sub
Resolution No. 97-4266 affirming the opinion
mitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that
of Director Acebedo and dismissing petitioner's
since the retirement gratuity he received under
appeal....
R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an additional
or double compensation, all the. years of his gov The case at bench is not, strictly speaking,
ernment service, including those years in the about 'double pension.' It is, however, about the
Judiciary, should be credited in the computation interpretation of a gratuity law, viz., Section,11
Kjiliffj
of Republic Act No. 7924 which awards separa Term of Office ofthe President of Chartered State
tion pay to those government employees who Universities and Colleges, and for Other Pur
were displaced by the reorganization ofthe MMA poses, commonly known as the Higher Education
into the MMDA, which should be construed to Modernization Act of 1997. Pursuant to Section 4
preclude a government employee from receiving (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of BSU
double gratuity for the*same years of service. passed and approved Board Resolution No. 794
on October 31, 1997, granting rice subsidy and
... We agree with the Court ofAppeals and
health care allowance to BSU's employees. The
the Civil Service Commission that for the pur
sums were taken from the income derived from
pose of computing or determining petitioner's
separation pay under Section 11 ofR.A.No. 7924, the operations of BSU and were given to the
his years of service in the Judiciary should be employees at different periods in i998.
excluded and that his separation pay should be
solely confined to his services in the MMA.
BSU's contention that it is authorized to
grant allowances to its employees is based on
Indeed, the retirement benefits which peti Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292.
tioner had received or has been receiving under What is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No.
R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute 8292 cited by BSU as legal basis of its claim
double compensation. He could continue receiv as well as from its implementing rules is that
ing the same even if after his retirement he had income generated by the university may be dis
been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as bursed by its Governing Board for "instruction,
Director III thereof. This is but just because said research, extension, or other programs/projects
retirement benefits are rewards for his services
of the university or colleges."
as MeTCJudge, while his salary was his compen
sation for his services as Director III of the MMA. BSU theorizes that thephrase "other pro
grams/projects of the university or college" in
However, to credit his years of service in the
Judiciary in the computation of his separation Section 4 (d) covers all projects and programs of
pay under RA. No. 7924 notwithstanding the the university, including those designed to uplift
fact that he had received ov has been receiving
the economic plight of the employees. It is not
the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as limited to those programs which the university
amended, would be to countenance double com may specifically undertake in pursuance of its
pensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his primary objective to achieve quality education,
services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter contrary to the interpretation of the COA.
to the policy of this Court against double com We disagree.
pensation for exactly the same services.7 More
important, it would be in violation of the first Under the principle of ejusdem generis,
paragraph ofSection8 ofArticleIX-B ofthe Con where a statute describes things of a particular
stitution, which proscribes additional, double, class or kind accompanied by words of a generic
or indirect compensation. Said provision reads: character, the generic word will usually be lim
ited to things of a similar nature with those
No elective or appointive public officeror em particularly enumerated, unless there be some
ployee shallreceive additional, double, orindirect thing in the context of the statute which would
kgfl
compensation, unless specifically authorized by repel such inference. The COA correctly ruled
law.... that the "other programs/projects" under R.A.
No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be
B. Benguet State University v. COA of the same nature as instruction, research, and
G.R. No. 169637, June 8, 2007
extension. In BSUs case, the disbursements were
On July 6, 1997, Congress passed Republic forrice subsidyand health care allowanceswhich
Act No. 8292 entitled An Act Providing for the are, in no way, intended for academic programs
E$ivj)
Uniform Composition and Powers of the Gov similar to instruction, research, or extension.
erning Boards, the Manner ofAppointment and Section 4 (d) cannot, therefore, be relied upon
by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the grant ofboth retirement benefits andseparation
allowances.
pay. Section 9 provides:
C. Herrera v. National Power Corporation xxx Unless also separated for cause,
G.R. No. 166570, December 18, 2009 all officers and employees, who have been
separated pursuant to reorganization shall,
The sole issue in this case is whether or if entitled thereto, be paid the appropri
not NPC employees who were separated from ate separation nav and retirement nnH
the service because of the reorganization ofthe other benefits under existing laws within
electric ppwer industry and who received their ninety (90) days fromthe date ofthe effectiv-
separation pay under RA No. 9136 are still en ity oftheir separation or fromthe date ofthe
titled to receive retirement benefits under CA receipt of the resolution oftheir appeals as
No. 186, as amended. the case may be. Provided, That application
The question at the heart of this case is for clearance has been filed and no action
whether petitioners, former employees of the thereon has been made by the correspond
National Power Corporation (NPC) who were ing department or agency. Those who are
separated from service due to the government's not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
initiative ofrestructuring the electric power in separation gratuity in the amountequivalent
to one (1) month salary for every year of
dustry, are entitled to their retirement benefits
sendee. Such separation pay and retirement
in addition tothe separation paygranted bylaw. benefits shall have priority of payment out
Absent explicit statutory authority, we of the savings of the department or agency
cannot provide cur imprimatur to the grant of concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
separation pay and retirement benefits from Unfortunately for the petitioners, their in
one single act ofinvoluntary separation from the terpretation has little legal precedent. The CSC
service, lest there be duplication ofpurpose and has previously ruled that employees similarly
depletion of government resources. Within the situated to petitioners herein were not entitled
context of government reorganization, separa to both separation pay and retirement benefits;
tionpayand retirementbenefits arising from the instead, the concerned employee must either
jjiiiiij
same cause, are in consideration of the same ser avail of the separation benefit or opt to retire if
vices and granted forthe same purpose. Whether qualified under existing laws.
denominated as separation pay or retirement
benefits, these financial benefits rewardgovern 3. Prohibited compensation.
ment service and provide monetary assistance to Bonuses given to one whose compensation
employees involuntarily separated due to bona under the law is merely a per diem violates the
fide reorganization. rule against additional compensation. Cabili v.
Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution CSC, G.R. No. 156503, June 22, 2006.
provides that "[n]o elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
double, or indirect compensation, unless spe
cifically authorized by law." In prior decisions, SECTION 1. (1) THERE SHALL BE A
we have ruled that there must be a clear and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMPOSED
OF A CHAIRMAN AND SIX COMMISSION
unequivocal statutory provision to justify the
ERS WHO SHALL BE NATURAL-BORN
grant of both separation pay and retirement
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND,
benefits to an employee.Here, absent an express
AT THE TIME OF THEIR APPOINTMENT,
provision of law, the grant of both separation
AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE,
and retirement benefits would amount to double
HOLDERS OF A COLLEGE DEGREE, AND
compensation from one single act of separation
MUST NOT HAVE BEEN CANDIDATES
from employment.
FOR ANY ELECTIVE POSITION IN THE
Petitioners claim that Section 9 of RA No. IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTIONS.
6656 amounts to sufficient statutory basis for the HOWEVER, A MAJORITY THEREOF, IN-
CLUDING THE CHAIRMAN, SHALL BE dent Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor
MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE BARWHO General as acting member of the Commission on
HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE Elections and the Court revoked the designation
OF LAW FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS. as contrary to the Constitution...
(2) THE CHAIRMAN AND THE COM The petitioner contends that the choice of the
MISSIONERS SHALL BE APPOINTED Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections
BY THE PRESIDENT WITH THE CON is an internal matter that should be resolved by
SENT OF THE COMMISSION ON AP the members themselves and that the intrusion
POINTMENTS FOR A TERM OF SEVEN of the President of the Philippines violates their
YEARS WITHOUT REAPPOINTMENT. OF independence. He cites the practice in this Court,
THOSE FIRST APPOINTED, THREE MEM where the senior Associate Justice serves as
BERS SHALL HOLD OFFICE FOR SEVEN Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief
YEARS, TWO MEMBERS FOR FIVE YEARS, Justice. No designation from the President of the
AND THE LAST MEMBERS FOR THREE Philippines is necessary.
YEARS, WITHOUT REAPPOINTMENT. AP
. In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues
POINTMENT TO ANY VACANCY SHALL
that no such designation is necessary in the case
BE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF
of the Supreme Court because the temporary
THE PREDECESSOR. IN NO CASE SHALL
succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of
ANY MEMBER BE APPOINTED OR DES
§™)
the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found
IGNATED IN A TEMPORARY OR ACTING
in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals.
CAPACITY.
There is no such arrangement, however, in the
case of the Commission on Elections. The desig
1. Cases. nation made by the President of the Philippines
should therefore be sustained for reasons of "ad
A. Brillantes v. Yorac ministrative expediency," to prevent disruption
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990 of the functions of the COMELEC.
DECISION Expediency is a dubious justification. It may
also be an overstatement to suggest that the op
CRUZ, J.:
erations of the Commission on Elections would
The petitioner is challenging the designation have been disturbed or stalemated if the Presi
by the President of the Philippines of Associate dent of the Philippines had not stepped in and
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chair designated an Acting Chairman. There did not
man of the Commission on Elections, in place seem to be any such problem. In any event, even
of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that
named chairman of the fact-finding commission "onlythe President (could) act to fill the hiatus,"
to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat as the Solicitor General maintains.
attempt.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution
The qualifications of the respondent are con expressly describes all the Constitutional Com
ceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in missionsas "independent." Although essentially
this case. What is is the power ofthe President of executive in nature, they are not under the con
the Philippinesto make the challenged designa trol of the President of the Philippines in the
tion in view of the status of the Commission on discharge of their respective functions. Each of
Elections as an independent constitutional body these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
and the specific provision ofArticle IX-C, Section under the applicablelaws and its own rules and
i (2) ofthe Constitution that "(I)n no case shall in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions,
any Member (of the Commission on Elections) orders and rulings are subject only to review on
be appointed or designated in a temporary or certiorari by this Court as providedby the Con
acting capacity." stitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
Thepetitioner invokes the case ofNational- The choice of a temporary chairman in the
ista Party v. Bautista, 85Phil. 101, where Presi absence of the regular chairman comes under
that discretion. That discretion cannot be exer Elections foremost among which is the security
cised for it, even with its consent, bythe Presi oftenure of its members. That guaranty is not
dent of the Philippines.
available totherespondent asActing Chairman
• A designation as Acting Chairman is byits of the Commissions on Elections by designation
very terms essentially temporary and therefore ofthe President ofthe Philippines.
revocable at will. No cause need be established WHEREOF, the designation bythe President
to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, ofthePhilippines ofrespondent Haydee B. Yorac
the designation of the respondent as Acting as Acting Chairman ofthe Commission on Elec
%> Chairman of the Commission on Elections may tions is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and
be withdrawn by thePresident ofthe Philippines the respondent is hereby ordered to desistfrom
at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. serving as such. This is without prejudice tothe
It isdoubtful iftherespondent, having accepted incumbentAssociate Commissioners ofthe Com
such designation, will not beestopped from chal mission on Elections restoring her to the same
lenging its withdrawal. position if they so desire, or choosing another
It is true, as the Solicitor General points member intier place, pending the appointment
out, that the respondent cannot be removed at ofa permanent Chairman bythe President ofthe
will from her permanent position as Associate Philippines with the consent of the Commission
Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that on Appointments.
shecanbereplaced as Acting Chairman, withor SO ORDERED.
without cause, and thus.deprivedof the powers
and perquisites of that temporary position.
B. Cayetano v. Monsod
Thelackofa statutory rule covering the situ G.R. No. 100113, September 3,1991
ation at bar is no justification for the President of
the Philippines to fill the void by extending the
PARAS, J.:
temporary designation in favorofthe respondent.
This is still a government oflaws and not ofmen. We are faced here with a controversy offar-
The problem allegedly soughttobecorrected, ifit reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
existed at all, did not call for presidential action. issues are involved, the Court's decision in this
The situation could have been handled by the case would indubitably have a profound effect
members of the Commission on Elections them on the political aspect of our national existence.
selves without the participation ofthe President,
fyiifrt however well-meaning. The 1987Constitution provides in Section 1
(1), Article IX-C:
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the
members of the Commission on Elections would There shall be a Commission on Elec
most likely havebeen guided bythe seniority rule tions composed of a Chairman and six Com
as theythemselveswouldhave appreciatedit. In missioners who shall be natural-born citizens
any event, that choice and the basis thereof were of the Philippines and, at the time of their
for them and not the President to make. appointment, at least thirty-five years ofage,
holders ofa collegedegree, and must not have
The Court has not the slightest doubt that been candidates for any electiveposition in
the President of the Philippines was moved the immediately preceding elections. How
only by the best of motives when she issued the
ever, a majority thereof, including the Chair
challenged designation. Butwhile conceding her man, shall be members ofthe Philippine Bar
goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it
who have been engaged in thepractice oflaw
conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as
forat least tenyears. (Emphasis supplied)
this Court revoked the designation in the Bau-
tista case, so too must it annul the designation
in the case at bar.
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
The Constitution provides for many safe jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
guards to the independence of the Commission on lawas a legal qualificationto an appointiveoffice.
Sijil
Black defines "practice of law" as: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
The rendition of services requiring the embraces the preparation of pleadings and
knowledge and the application of legal prin other papers incident to actions and special
ciples and technique to serve the interest of proceedings, the management of such actions
another with his consent. It is not limited to and proceedings on behalf of clients before
appearing in court, or advising and assisting judges and courts, and in addition, convey
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the ing. In general, all advice to clients, and all
preparation of pleadings, and other papers action taken for them in matters connected
incident to actions and special proceedings, with the law. incorporation services, assess
conveyancing, the preparation of legal in ment and condemnation services contemplat
struments of all kinds, and the giving of all ing an appearance before a judicial body, the
jffifl legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
to clients and all actions taken for them in creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
matters connected with the law. An attorney * proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
engages in the practice oflaw by maintaining attachment, and in matters of estate and
an office where he is held out to be-an attor v guardianship have been held to constitute
ney, using a letterhead describing himself as . law practice, as do the preparation and
an attorney, counseling clients in legal mat drafting of legal instruments, where the
ters, negotiating with opposing counsel about work done involves the determination by the
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
trained legal mind of the legal effectof facts
fees for services rendered by his associate.
and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
(Emphasis supplied)
The practice of law is not limited to the con
Practiceof law under modern conditions con
duct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
sists in no small part of work performed outside
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23,193 N.E.
650.) A person is also considered to be in the of any court and having no immediate relation
to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyanc
practice of law when he:
ing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
... for valuable consideration engages in of subjects, and the preparation and execution
the business of advising person, firms, as of legal instruments covering an extensive field
sociations or corporations as to their rights of business and trust relations and other af
under the law, or appears in a representa fairs. Although these transactions may have no
tive capacity as an advocate in proceedings direct connection with courtproceedings, theyare
pending or prospective, before any court, always subject to become involved in litigation.
commissioner, referee, board, body, com Theyrequirein many aspects a high degreeofle
mittee, or commission constituted by law or gal skill,a wideexperiencewith men and affairs,
authorized to settle controversies and there, and great capacity for adaptation to difficultand
in such representative, capacity performs complex situations.Thesecustomaryfunctions of
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
or defending the rights oftheir clients under relation to the administration of justice by the
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a rep courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
resentative capacity, engages in the business the questionset forth in the order, can be drawn
of advising clients as to their rights under between that part ofthe work ofthe lawyerwhich
the law, or while so engaged performs any involves appearancein courtand that part which
act or acts either in court or outside of court involves advice and drafting of instruments in
forthat purpose, is engagedin the practiceof his office. It is ofimportance to the welfare ofthe
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.Dudley public that these manifold customary functions
and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852.) be performed by persons possessed of adequate
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers learning andskill, ofsound moral character, and
liiiJ
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) acting at all times under the heavytrust obliga
stated:
tions to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
ARTICLEK: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 723
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 up onthe floor sothat this interpretation may
[1953ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the be made available whenever this provision
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode on the qualifications as regards members of
Is. Bar Assoc, v.Automobile ServiceAssoc. [R.I.] the PhilippineBar engaging in the practice
179 A. 139,144.) (Emphasis ours.) of law for at least ten years is taken up.
M£ The University of the Philippines Law Cen MR.OPLE. Will CommissionerFozyield
ter in conducting orientation briefing for new to just one question.
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advo MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
•$&}
cacy, counselling and public service. MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that
service in the COAby a lawyer is equivalent
to the requirement of a law practice that is
The following records of the 1986 Constitu set forth in the Article on the Commission
tional Commissionshow that it has adopted a lib on Audit?
eral interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, the work of COA, although it is auditing,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot will necessarily involve legal work; it will
to do during our review of the provisions on involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers
the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed who are employed in COA now would have
to make a very brief statement? the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
Jamir).
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
The Commissioner will please proceed. MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction
^1 MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifi given to this is that this is equivalent to the
cations of the members of the Commission on practice of law.
Audit. Among others, the qualifications pro MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
vided for by Section I is that 'They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting MR. OPLE. Thank you.
from the provision "who have been engaged
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Consti
in the practice of law for at least ten years."
tution, provides, among others, that thq Chair
To avoid any misunderstanding which man and two Commissioners of the Commission
would result in excluding members of the on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
Bar who are now employed in the COA or accountants with not less than ten years of audit
Commission on Audit, we would like to ing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
make the clarification that this provision on who have been engaged in the practice of law for
qualifications regarding members of the Bar at least ten years, (emphasis supplied)
does not necessarily refer or involve actual Corollary to this is the term "private practi
practice of law outside the COA We have to tioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
interpret this to mean that as long as the law with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
yers who are employed in the COA are using lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
their legal knowledge or legal talent in their still a fact that the majority oflawyers are private
respective work within COA, then they are practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in
qualified to be considered for appointment as Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois],
members or commissioners, even chairman, [1986], p. 15.)
of the Commission on Audit.
At this point, it might be helpful to define
This has been discussed by the Com private practice. The term, as commonly un
mittee on Constitutional Commissions and derstood, means "an individual or organization
Agencies and we deem it important to take it engaged in the business of delivering legal
l&jj
services." (Ibid.) Lawyers who practice alone non-litigation work also know that in most cases
are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of they find themselves spending more time doing
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually what [is] loosely desccribefd] as business counsel
a partnership and members of the firm are the ing than in trying cases. The business lawyer has
partners. Some firms may be organized as pro been described as the planner, the diagnostician
fessional corporations and the members called and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not
shareholders. In either case, the members of the [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, should be avoided where internal medicine can
there are younger or more inexperienced salaried be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.) Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
The test that defines law practice by looking In the course of a working day the average
to traditional areas of law practice is essentially general practitioner will engage in a number of
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of legal tasks, each involving different legal doc
law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wol trines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institu
fram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: tions, clients; and other interested parties. Even
is) Minnesota, 1986], p. 593).oThe practice of law the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
is defined as the performance of any acts ... in practice will usually perform at least some legal
or out of court, commonly understood to be the services outside their specialty. And even within
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,140 A.2d 863, wili shift from one legal task or role such as ad
870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, vice-giving to an importantly different one such
128 Conn. 325,22 A.2d 623,626 [1941]). Because as representing a client before an administrative
lawyers perform almost every function known in agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687.)
the commercial and governmental realm, such By no means will most of this work involve
a definition would obviously be too global to be litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the rela
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit). tively rare types a litigator who specializes in this
work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in
work will require the lawyer to have mastered
behalf of a client is at once the most publicly fa
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
'$$$ miliar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation
spend their entire practice without litigating a are both effective for many clients and a source
case. (Ibid., p. 593.) Nonetheless, many lawyers
of employment. (Ibid.)
do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's
role colors much of both the public image and Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation
the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.) legalworkor in htigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so
In this regard thus, the dominance of liti as to remove from it some of the salient features
gation in the public mind reflects history, not of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles,
iyi
reality. (Ibid.) Why is this so? Recall that the the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once somelawyers' work the constraints are imposed
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a both by the nature of the client and by the way
business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
in which the lawyer is organized into a social
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept unit to perform that work. The most common of
of an attorney is one who principally tries cases these roles are those of corporate practice and
before the courts. The members of the bench and
government legal service. (Ibid.)
bar and the informed laymen such as business
men, know that in most developed societies to In several issues of the Business Star, a
day, substantially morelegalworkis transacted business daily, herein below quoted are emerg
in law offices than in the courtrooms. General ing trends in corporate law practice, a departure
practitioners of law who do both litigation and. from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly an early introduction to multi-variable deci

may be called a revolutionary transforma sional context and the various approaches
tion in corporatelaw practice. Lawyers and for handling such problems. Lawyers, par
other professional groups,in particular those ticularly with either a master's or doctor
members participating in various legal- ate degree in business administration or
policy decisional contexts, are finding that management, functioning at the legal policy
understanding the major emerging trends level of decision-making now have some ap
in corporation law is indispensable to intel preciation for the concepts and analytical
ligent decision-making. techniques of other professions which are
tfe)
Constructive adjustment to major corpo currentlyengaged in similartypesofcomplex
rate problems of today requires an accurate decision-making.
understanding ofthe nature and implications Truth to tell, many situations involving
of the corporate lav/ research function accom corporatefinanceproblemswould require the
panied by an accelerating rate ofinformation services of an astute attorney because of the
accumulation. The recognition of the need complex legal implications that arise from
im for such improved corporate legal policy for each and every necessary step in securing
mulation, particularly "model-making" and and maintaining the business issua raised.
"contingency planning,"has impressedupon (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
!Ajflfr
us the inadequacy of traditional procedures Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4.)
in many decisional contexts.
In our litigation-prone country, a corpo
In a complex legal-problem the mass of rate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
information to be processed, the sorting and "abogado decampanilla." Heis the "big-time"
weighing of significant conditional factors, lawyer, earning big money and with a clien
the appraisal ofmajortrends, the necessityof tele composed of the tycoons and magnates
estimating the consequences ofgiven courses of business and industry.
fo^
of action, and the need for fast decision and
Despite the growing number of corpo
response in situations of acute danger have rate lawyers, many peoplecouldnot explain
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
of information flow theory, operational one, the number of attorneys employedby a
analysis, automatic data processing, and single corporation willvary with the size and
electronic computing equipment. Under type of the corporation. Many smaller and
standably, an improved decisional structure some large corporations farm out all their
• fta^
must stress the predictive component of the legal problems to private law firms. Many
policy-making process, wherein a "model,"of others have in-house counsel only for cer
the decisional context or a segment thereof tain matters. Other corporation have a staff
is developed to test projected alternative large enough to handle most legal problems
courses of action in terms of futuristic effects in-house.
flowing therefrom.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and
iîl Although members of the legal profes purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
sion are regularly engaged in predicting and affairs of a corporation. His areas of con
projecting the trends ofthe law, the subject of cern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate finance law has received relatively corporate legal research, tax laws research,
little organized and formalized attention in acting out as corporate secretary (in board
the philosophy of advancing corporate legal meetings), appearances in both courts and
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary other adjudicatory agencies (including the
approach to legal research has become a vital Securities and Exchange Commission), and
necessity. in other capacities which require an ability
to deal with the law.
• Certainly, the general orientation for
productive contributions by those trained At any rate, a corporate lawyer may as
primarily in the law can be improvedthrough sume responsibilities other than the legal
&jj|)
>sfi
affairs of the business of the corporation he to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
is representing. These include such matters to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a
as determining policyand becominginvolved corporate counsel's management responsi
in management. bilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.
In a big company, for example, one may
have a feeling of being isolated from the ac These three subject areas may be
tion, or not understanding how one's work thought of as intersecting circles, with a
actually fits into the work of the organiza shared area linking them. Otherwise known
Mi tion. This can be frustrating to someone who as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence,"
needs to see the results of his work first hand. it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimesof counsel's total learning.
fered this fortune to be more closely involved
Some current advances in behavior and
in the running of the business.
policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services that majtter, thecorporate lawyerreviews the
may sometimes be engaged by a multina globalization process, including the result-
tional corporation (MNC). Somelarge MNCs dng strategic repositioning that the firms he
provide oneofthe few opportunities available provides counsel for are required to make,
to corporate lawyers to enter the interna and the need to think about a corporation's;
tional law field. After all, international law strategy at multiple levels. The salience of
is practiced in a relatively small number of the nation-state is being reduced as firms
companies and law firms. Because working deal both with global multinational enti
in a foreign country is perceived by many ties and simultaneously with sub-national
<y>
as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by governmental units. Firms increasingly
corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, collaborate not only with public entities but
the overseas jobs go to experienced attor with each other often with those who are
neys while the younger attorneys do their competitors in other arenas.
"international practice" in law libraries.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's par
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
ticipation in decision-making within the
May 25,1990, p. 4.)
i^») corporation is rapidly changing. The modem
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To stakeholder in some cases participating in
fe)
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer the organization and operations of gover
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is nance through participation on boards and
one who fails to spot problems, a good law other decision-making roles. Often these new
yeris onewho perceives the difficulties, and patterns develop alongsideexistinglegalin
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts stitutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance These trends are complicated as corporations
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4.) organize for global operations.
' ffifel Today, the study of corporate law prac The practising lawyer oftodayis familiar
tice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to as well with governmental policies toward
speak. Nolongerare wetalking ofthe tradi the promotion and management of technol
tional law teaching method of confining the ogy. New collaborative arrangements for
subject study to the Corporation Code and promoting specific technologies or competi
the Securities Code but an incursion as well tiveness more generally require approaches
into the intertwining modern management from industry that 'differ from older, more
F-jtiffii
issues. adversarial relationships and traditional
Such corporate legal management issues forms of seeking to influence governmental
deal primarily with three (3) types oflearn policies. And there are lessons tobe learned
jjjjp
ing: (1) acquisition of insights into current from other countries..In Europe, Esprit, Eu
advances which are of particular significance reka and Race are examples of collaborative
ARTICLE IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS - 727
efforts between governmental and business all lands of negotiations. All integrated set
Japan's MITI is world famous. of such tools provide coherent and effective
Followingthe conceptofboundary span negotiation support, including hands-on on
ning, the office of the Corporate Counsel instruction in these techniques.Asimulation
comprises a distinct group within the mana caseofan internationaljointventuremaybe
gerial structure of all kinds oforganizations. used to illustrate^he point.
Effectiveness of both long-term and tempo [Be this as it may,] the organizationand
rary groups within organizations has been management of the legal function, concern
jgsk found to be related to îdentifiable factors three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of Preventive Lawyering. Planning bylaw
the environment coordinating work with yers requires special skills that comprise a
%jjb
outsiders, promoting team achievements major part of the general counsel's respon
within the organization. In general, such ex sibilities. They differ from those of reme
ternal activities are better predictors ofteam dial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned
performance than internal group processes. with minimizing the risks of legal trouble
and maximizing legal rights for such legal
In a crisis situation, the legal manage entities at that time when transactional or
rial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis similar facts are being considered and made.
a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken
ways both to anticipate effectivemanagerial those activities of the firm to which legal
ijya
procedures and to understand relationships consequences attach. It needs to be directly
of financial liability and insurance consid
supportive of this nation's evolvingeconomic
erations.
and organizational fabric as firms change to
Regarding the skills to apply by the stay competitive in a global, interdependent
corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
First System Dynamics. The field ofsys relationships needed in trying to make a
•xyi tems dynamics has been found an effective global economy work.
tool for new managerial thinking regard
ing both planning and pressing immediate Organizationand Functioningofthe Cor
problems. An understanding of the role of porate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates has emerged in the last decade as'one of the
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
of systematic problems physical, economic, The corporate counsel bear responsibility
managerial, social, and psychological. New for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues,
programming techniques now make the including structuring its global operations,
system dynamics principles more accessible managing improved relationships with an
to managers including corporate counsels. increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creat
Second Decision Analysis. This enables ing new and varied interactions with public
users to make better decisions involving decision-makers, copinginternally with more
complexity and uncertainty. In the context complex make or by decisions.
of a law department, it can be used to ap
praise the settlement value of litigation, aid This whole exercise drives home the
in negotiation settlement, and minimize the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio enough to make one a good general corporate
of cases. counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate activities.
Third Modeling for Negotiation Man And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is
agement. Computer-based models can be not the understanding of all of the law's ef
used directly by parties and mediators in fects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
the management issues if only to be able to Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
or makeup ofthe modemcorporation. "Busi involved getting acquainted with the laws of
ness Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April member-countries negotiating loans and coor
10, 1991, p. 4.) dinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
The challenge for lawyers (both ofthe bar 1970,he worked with the Meralco Group,served
and the bench) is to have more than a pass
as chief executive officer of an investment bank
ing knowledgeoffinancial law affectingeach and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
aspect oftheir work.Yet, many would admit and since 1986, has rendered services to various
to ignoranceofvast tracts ofthe financial law companies as a legal and economic consultant
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
ofprofessional security: Will the lawyerad General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)
mit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will of NAMFREL.. Monsod's work involved being
he feign understanding and risk exposure? knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," NARJFREL in its accreditation hearings before
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4.) the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in
Respondent Christian Monsod was nomi his personalcapacityand as former Co-Chairman
nated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the ofthe BishopsBusinessmen's Conferencefor Hu
position ofChairman ofthe COMELEC in a letter man Development, has worked with the under
received by the Secretariat of the Commission privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner poorgroups,in initiating, lobbyingfor and engag
opposed the nomination because allegedly Mon ing in affirmativeaction for the agrarian reform
sod does not possess the required qualification lawand lately the urban land reformbill.Monsod
ofhaving been engaged in the practice oflaw for also made use ofhis legal knowledge as a member
p^j
at least ten years. of theDavide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and
On June 5,1991, the Commission on Appoint as a member of the Constitutional Commission
ments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Chairmanofthe cdMELEC. OnJune 18,1991, Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he was cited by the President of the Commission,
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma for "innumerable
Challenging the validity of the confirmation amendments to reconcile government functions
bythe Commission onAppointments ofMonsod's with individual freedoms and public account
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, ability and the party-list system for the House
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Pro of Representative, (pp. 128-129 Rollo.)
hibition praying that said confirmation and the Just a word about the work of a negotiating
consequent appointment ofMonsod as Chairman team ofwhich Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
of the Commission on Elections be declared null
and void. In a loan agreement, for instance, a ne
gotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the adequately constituted to meet the various
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examina contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
tions of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been Besides top officials of the Borrower con
a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of cerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
has also been paying his professional license fees operationsofficer (suchas an official involved
as lawyer for more than ten years, (p.124,Rollo.) in negotiating the contracts) who comprise
"
After graduating from the College of Law the members of the team. (Guillermo V.
(U.P.)and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
worked in the law office of his father. During Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Pa-
per No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, the recourse open to either party when the
Manila, 1982, p. 11.) other fails to discharge an obligation. For
After a fashion, the loan agreement is
a compleat debt restructuring represents
like a country's Constitution; it lays down
a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign
the law as far as the loan transaction is con
loan agreements-an adherence to the rule
cerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agree
of law in domestic and international affairs
ment can be compartmentalized into five
of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
(5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms;
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They
(2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions
carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of
where they are, men learn that bustle and
default. (Ibid., p. 13.)
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and se
igj In the same vein, lawyers play an impor rene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, 'The
tant role in any debt restructuring program. Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
For aside from performing the tasks of legis Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol.
lative drafting and legal advising, they score 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
national development policies as key factors 1977, p. 265).
in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
Interpreted in the light of the various defini
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled tions of the term Practice of law", particularly the
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Develop modern concept of law practice, and taking into
ing Nations." submitted by L. Michael Hager, consideration the liberal construction intended
regional legal adviser of the United States by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Mon
Agency for International Development, dur sod's past work experiences as a lawyer-econo
ing the Session on Law for the Development mist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace ând a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
Through Law Center on August 26-31,1973.) poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
Loan concessions and compromises, requirement that he has been engaged in the
perhaps even more so than purely renegotia practice of law for at least ten years.
tion policies, demand expertise in the law Besides in the leading case oiLuego v. Civil
of contracts, in legislation and agreement Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a said:
sovereign lawyer may work with an interna
tional business specialist or an economist in Appointment is an essentially discre
the formulation of a model loan agreement. tionary power and must be performed by
Debt restructuring contract agreements the officer in which it is vested according
contain such a mixture of technical language to his best lights, the only condition being
that they should be carefully drafted and that the appointee should possess the quali
signed only with the advise of competent fications required by law. If he does, then
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of the appointment cannot be faulted on the
adequate technical support personnel. (See ground that there are others better qualified
International Law Aspects of the Philippine who should have been preferred. This is a
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, political question involving considerations of
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321.) wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide.
A critical aspect of sovereign debt re
structuring/contract construction is the set of No less emphatic was the Court in the case
ksl
terms and conditions which determines the of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
contractual remedies for a failure to perform SCRA 744, where it stated:
one or more elements of the contract. A good It is well-settled that when the appoin
iSJ
agreement must not only define the respon tee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
sibilities of both parties, but must also state other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would re
to the appointment in accordance with the quire generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
L^pi
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no practised two or three times a week and would
authority to revoke an appointment on the outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ground that another person is more quali ten consecutive years. Clearly, .this is far from
fied for a particular position. It also has no the constitutional intent.
authority to direct the appointment of a Upon the other hand, the separate opinion
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
encroachment on the discretion vested upon opinion, I made use of a definition oflaw practice
t&H
the appointing authority. An appointment is which really means nothing because the defini
essentially within the discretionary power of tion says that law practice "... is what people
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I
condition that the appointee should possess cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
the qualificationsrequired by law. (Emphasis evident from my statement that the definition of
supplied.) law practice by "traditional areas oflaw practice
' $&?\ The appointing process in a regular appoint is essentially.tautoiogous" or defining a phrase by
ment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a that since the law covers almost all situations,
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission most individuals, in making use of the law, or
by the Commission on Appointments oHts cer in advising others on what the law means, are
tificate of confirmation, the President issues the actually practicing law. In that cense, perhaps,
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,1949; Gonzales, Bar, who has been practising law for over ten
Law on Public Officers, p. 200.) years. This is different from the acts of persons
The power of the Commission on Appoint practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
ments to give its consent to the nomination of Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elec Court can even disqualify an elected President
tions is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
Article IX of the Constitution which provides: lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
The Chairman and the Commisioners
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
shall be appointed by the President with the or petition be brought against the President?
consent of the Commission on Appointments
And even assuming that he is indeed disquali
for a term of seven years without reappoint
fied, how can the action be entertained since he
ifo&l is the incumbent President?
ment. Of those first appointed, three Mem
bers shall hold office for seven years, two We now proceed.
Members for five years, and the last Members
The Commission on the basis of evidence sub
for three years, without reappointment. Ap
mitted during the public hearings on Monsod's
pointment to any vacancy shall be only for
confirmation, implicitly determined that he pos
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
sessed the necessary qualifications as required by
no case shall any Member be appointed or
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate is beyond judicial interference except only upon
opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
notion of law practice, as distinguished from VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution.) Thus, only where such
the modern concept of the practice of law, which grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
modern connotation is exactly what was intended the Court interfere with the Commission's judg
by theeminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. ment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
llffifl
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since (1) ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL
no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO
that would amount to. lack or excess of jurisdic THE CONDUCT OF AN ELECTION, PLEBI-
tion and would warrant the issuance of the writs ° SCITE, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
prayed, for has been clearly shown. RECALL.
Additionally, consider the following: (2) EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL

(1) If the Commission on Appointments JURISDICTION OVERALL CONTESTS RE
rejects a nominee by the President, may the Su LATING TO THE ELECTIONS, RETURNS,
preme Court reverse the Commission, and thus AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ALL ELECTIVE
in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND CITY OF
answer is in the negative. FICIALS, AND APPELLATE JURISDIC
TION OVER ALL CONTESTS INVOLVING
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS DE
the nominee, whom the Commission has con CIDED BY TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL
firmed? The answer is likewise clear.
JURISDICTION, OR INVOLVING ELEC
fiiflj
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the TIVE BARANGAY OFFICIALS DECIDED
confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides BY TRIAL COURTS OF LIMITED JURIS
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be DICTION.
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
DECISIONS, FINAL ORDERS, OR RUL
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
INGS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELEC
Finally, one significant legal maxim is: TION CONTESTS INVOLVING ELECTIVE
a1^
MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY OFFICES
We must interpret not by the letter that SHALL BE FINAL, EXECUTORY, AND NOT
killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. APPEALABLE.
ta Take this hypothetical case of Samson and (3) DECIDE, EXCEPT THOSE INVOLV
Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked ING THE RIGHT TO VOTE, ALL QUES
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in TIONS AFFECTING ELECTIONS, INCLUD
capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition ING DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER
that '"
AND LOCATION OF POLLING PLACES,
No blade shall touch his skin; APPOINTMENT OF ELECTION OFFICIALS
AND INSPECTORS, AND REGISTRATION
No blood shall flow from his veins.
OF VOTERS.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah)
(4) DEPUTIZE, WITH THE CON
was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
CURRENCE OF THE PRESIDENT,
tiiSI burning white-hot two or three inches away
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded
AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE
the man. Upon hearing of what had happened
to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE ARMED
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOR THE
the procurator of reneging on his word. The EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF ENSURING
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL,
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS.
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not (5) REGISTER, AFTER SUFFICIENT
the spirit of the agreement. PUBLICATION, POLITICAL PARTIES,
In view of the foregoing, this petition is ORGANIZATIONS, OR COALITIONS
hereby DISMISSED. WHICH, IN ADDITION TO OTHER
REQUIREMENTS, MUST PRESENT THEIR
SEC. 2: THE COMMISSION ON ELEC PLATFORM OR PROGRAM OF GOV
TIONS SHALL EXERCISE THE FOLLOW ERNMENT; AND ACCREDIT CITIZENS'
ING POWERS AND FUNCTIONS: ARMS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELEC-
TIONS. RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF EACH

AND SECTS SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED. ELECTION, PLEBISCITE, INITIATIVE.
THOSE WHICH SEEK TO ACHIEVE REFERENDUM, OR RECALL.
THEIR GOALS THROUGH VIOLENCE
OR UNLAWFUL MEANS, OR REFUSE TO 1. Nature of COMELEC powers.
UPHOLD AND ADHERE TO THIS CON
Like the Civil Service Commission, the Com
STITUTION, OR WHICH ARE SUPPORTED
mission on Elections is an administrative agency.
BY ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHALL
As such, therefore, the powers it possesses are
LIKEWISE BE REFUSED REGISTRATION.
executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative.
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM This includes being judge with exclusive origi
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR nal jurisdiction over "all contests relating to the
AGENCIES TO POLITICAL PARTIES, election, returns, and qualifications of all elec
ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS, OR CAN tive regional, provincial, and city officials, and
DIDATES RELATED TO ELECTIONS CON appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
STITUTE INTERFERENCE IN NATIONAL elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
AFFAIRS, AND,WHEN ACCEPTED, SHALL of general jurisdiction, or involving elective ba-
BE AN ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR THE rahgay officials decided by trial courts of limited
CANCELLATION OF THEIR REGISTRA jurisdiction."
TION WITH THE COMMISSION, IN ADDI
The developments since Nacionalista Party
TION TO OTHER PENALTIES THAT MAY
v. Comelec, 85 Phil. 149 (1949) until 1965 was
BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
summed up by Ututalan v. Comelec, 15 SCRA
(6) FILE, UPON A VERIFIED COM 465, 469 (1965) by saying that the "functions
PLAINT, OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, of the Commission under the Constitution are
PETITIONS IN COURT FOR INCLUSION essentially executive ('enforcement') and ad
OR EXCLUSION OF VOTERS; INVES ministrative ('administration') in nature." Abes
TIGATE AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, v. Commission on Elections, L-28348, December
PROSECUTE CASES OF VIOLATIONS 15, 1967, could say that there "has been neither
OF ELECTION LAWS, INCLUDING ACTS deviation nor retreat" from this doctrine.
OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUTING ELEC
Subsequent decisions, however, showed that
TION FRAUDS, OFFENSES, AND MAL the characterization of the Comelec's power by
PRACTICES. the Nacionalista Party case as being "preven
(7) RECOMMEND TO THE CONGRESS tive only and not curative also" was, perhaps,
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO MINIMIZE less than accurate. The Supreme Court, in ac
ELECTION SPENDING, INCLUDING knowledging the broad sweep of the Comelec's
LIMITATION OF PLACES WHERE PRO constitutional power to insure free, orderly, and
PAGANDA MATERIALS SHALL BE POST honest elections, recognized in the Commission
ED, AND TO PREVENT AND PENALIZE a power which already partook of the "curative"
ALL FORMS OF ELECTION FRAUDS, power to nullify improperly made canvass. Thus,
OFFENSES, MALPRACTICES, AND NUI a divided Court in Lagumbay v. Comelec, 16
SANCE CANDIDACIES. SCRA 175 (1966), upheld the Commission's au
thority to exclude what the Court characterized
(8) RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT as statistically improbable returns. In Antonio,
THE REMOVAL OF ANY OFFICER OR Jr. v. Comelec, 32 SCRA 319 (1970), the Court
EMPLOYEE IT HAS DEPUTIZED, OR THE upheld the power of the Cdmelec to exclude re
IMPOSITION OF ANY OTHER DISCIPLIN turns which were the product of coercion even
ARY ACTION, FOR VIOLATION OR DIS if they be clean on their face. Finally, Usman v.
REGARD OF, OR DISOBEDIENCE TO ITS Commission on Elections, 42 SCRA 667 (1971)
DIRECTIVE, ORDER, OR DECISION. upheld the authority of the Comelec to entertain
(9) SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND the testimony of handwriting experts as proof of
THE CONGRESS A COMPREHENSIVE the falsity of the returns.
At the core of most of these cases, and other December 30, 1982. Moreover, in the case of
similar cases, was the problem of determining municipal offices, even if the case began with the
lii-infit
where the jurisdiction of the Commission ended Comelec before proclamation, if there should be
and where the authority of the Electoral Tri proclamation before the controversy is resolved,
bunals and the courts began. Under the 1973 it ceases to be a pre-proclamation controversy
Constitution, this aspect of the problem largely and becomes a contes| cognizable by the Court
disappeared because aside from its administra of First Instance. E.g., Arcenas v. Comelec, su-
tive power of deciding all cases relative to the xpra; Faderanga v. Comelec, supra. In a series
'•ii&i
conduct of election, the Commission then was of cases, however, both the Supreme Court and
given the judicial power of being "the sole judge the Comelec have followed an erratic course in
of all contests relating to the elections, returns, this matter by sometimes recognizing continu
and qualifications of all members of the Bata- ing COMELEC jurisdiction over municipal cases
sang Pambansa and elective provincial and city even after proclamation. Singco v. Comelec, 101
officials." Article XII, C, Section 2(2), 1973 Con SCRA 420 (November 28, 1980); Gonzales v.
stitution. The problem of conflict of jurisdiction Comelec, 101 SCRA 752 (December 19, 1980);
iftj could then arise only in the election of municipal Omar v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 6y. (February 3,
and other minor elective officials. This problem 1981); Olfato v. Comelec, 103 SCRA 741 (March
will continue under the new Constitution be 31, 1981); Santos v. Comelec, 103 SCRA 628
cause the Commission on Elections continues to (March 31,1981); Sandalo v. Comelec, 107 SCRA
have original jurisdiction over election contests 132 (August 31, 1981). However, in cases where
involving regional, provincial, and cit> officials, the Court of First Instance has actually assumed
and appellate jurisdiction over municipal and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has invariably,
barangay officials. Moreover, with the return i.e., twice excluded the COMELEC. Mogueis v.
.of jurisdiction over election contests involving Comelec, 104 SCRA 576 (May 26,1981); SeviUaje
members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunals, v. Comelec, 107 SCRA 141 (August 31, 1981).
the problems under the 1935 Constitution will What is the difference between the juris
also return. diction of the COMELEC before proclamation
and its jurisdiction after proclamation? Or, put
More specifically, who decides problems
differently, what is the difference between the
involving "elections, returns, and qualifica
jurisdiction of the Comelec over a pre-proclama
tions" of candidates? Before proclamation,
tion controversy and its jurisdiction over a "con
such problems are resolved by the Comelec in
test?" Its jurisdiction over a pre-proclamation
a "pre-proclamation" proceeding. [IX, C, 2(1)].
:Mi controversy is administrative or quasi-judicial
After proclamation, when the controversy has
and is governed by the less stringent require
become a "contest" in the technical sense (i.e., a
ments of administrative due process (although
defeated candidate seeks to oust the proclaimed
the Supreme Court has insisted that question
winner and claims the seat), the neat rule, fol
on "qualifications" should be decided only after
lowing earlier jurisprudence, should be that the
a full-dress hearing) whereas its jurisdiction
COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over "contests" is judicial and is governed by the
over contests for regional, provincial, and city requirements of judicial process. Hence, even in
officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests the case of regional or provincial or city offices, it
involving municipal and barangay officials, with does make a difference whether the COMELEC
lower courts having original jurisdiction over will treat it as a pre-proclamation controversy
iiiiJ
the latter. Venezuela v. Comelec, 98 SCRA 790
or as a contest. The practice in this matter has
(July 25, 1980); Villegas v. Comelec, 99 SCRA also been erratic.
582 (September 4, 1980); Potencion v. Comelec,
99 SCRA 595 (September 4, 1980); Arcenas v. The theoretical justification for this erratic
Comelec, 101 SCRA 437 (November 28, 1980); course is the fact that Section 2(1) gives to the
Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 1 (January 5, COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and
1981); Mitmug v. Comelec, 103 SCRA 455 (March administer all laws and regulations relative
24,1981); Faderanga v. Comelec, 105 SCRA 123 to the conduct of election . . ." The business of
(June 26, 1981); Disini v. Comelec, G.R. 52502, proclaiming candidates, which is the dividing
L
line between pre-proclamation controversy and "MR. FOZ. So, the amendment is to de
a contest, is itself subject to election laws which lete the word 'inappealable."
the COMELEC is bound to administer. Hence,
MR. REGALADO. Before that, on page
it has broad discretion to examine the validity
26, line 26, we should have a transposition
of proclamations and to nullify or approve them
because decisions are always final, as dis
according to its findings. If it nullifies the proc
lamation, the subsisting controversies should be
tinguished from interlocutory orders. So,
it should read: "However, decisions, final
deemed as "pre-proclamation" in nature. This,
I believe, partly at least, lies behind the "flip- orders or rulings," to distinguish them-from
flopping" of COMELEC decisions so vigorously interlocutory orders,'... of the Commission
bewailed by Teehankee and Abad Santos. on Elections on municipal and barangay
officials shall be final and IMMEDIATELY
ffiffi
2. Cases. executory.'
Xhat would be my proposed amendment.
A. Galido v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991 MR. FOZ. Accepted, Mr. Presiding Of
ficer.
V
MR. REGALADO. It is understood, how

In the present case, after a review of the ever, that while these decisions with respect
trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC to barangay and municipal officialsare final
found that fifteen (15) ballots in the same pre and immediately executory and, therefore,
cinct containing the letter "C" after the name not appealable, that does not rule out the
"Galido" are clearly marked ballots. May this possibility of an original special civilaction
COMELEC decision be brought to this Court by for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as
a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party the case may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules
(the herein petitioner)? of Court.
Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Consti MR. FOZ. That is understood, Mr. Pre
tution, which petitioner cites in support of this siding Officer.
petition, it is stated: "(U)nlessotherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, MR. REGALADO. At least it is on record.
order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Com Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer."41
mission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty We do not, however, believe that the re
days from receipt of a copy thereof." spondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
On the other hand, private respondent relies discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdic
on Article IX, (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 2 of tion in rendering the questioned decision. It is
the Constitution which provides that decisions, settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is
final orders, or rulings of the Commission on to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the
Elections in contests involving elective municipal bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and committing a grave abuse of discretion amount
not appealable. (Emphasis supplied.) ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We resolve this issue in favor of petitioner.
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of
the Commission on Elections in contests involv
ing elective municipal and barangay officials
are final, executory and not appealable, does
not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a
special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings
in the Constitutional Commission on this matter "Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
are enlightening. Thus — 562.
B. People v. Hon. Delgado rari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
fe'iftlA G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990 from receipt of a copy thereof.
In Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop
GANCAYCO, J.:
v. Ferrer, [135 SCRA 25, 32 (1985)] this Court
The authority of the Regional Trial Court held that "what is contemplated by the term 'final
(RTC) to review the actions of the Commission orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC
on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court
and prosecution of election offenses filed in said as provided by law are those rendered in actions
court is the center of controversy of this petition. or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the
On March 16,1990 the COMELEC Prosecu decisions of the COMELEC on election contests
tor filed a motion for reconsideration and oppo or administrative questions brought before it
sition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging are subject to judicial review only by this Court.
therein that it is only the Supreme Court that o
may review the decisions, orders, rulings and However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C
resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied of the Constitution, the COMELEC may "inves
in an order dated April 5, 1990 whereby the re tigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
spondent trial court upheld its jurisdiction over of violations of election laws, including acts or
the subject matter.
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses
and malpractices." Under Section 265 ofthe Om
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, nibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its
mandamus and prohibition wherein the follow duly authorized legal officers,"have the exclusive
ing issues are raised: powerto conduct preliminary investigation ofall
election offenses punishable under this Code, and
"(a) Whether or not the respondent court
to prosecute the same."
has the power or authority to order the Com
mission on Elections through its Regional Section 268 of the same Code provides that:
Election Director of Region VII or its Law "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive
£$$
Department to conduct a reinvestigation of original jurisdiction to try and decide any crimi
Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234; nal action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the' offense of
tiiiii) failure to register or failure to vote which shall
The main thrust of the petition is that in be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
asmuch as the COMELEC is an independent municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
flffij
constitutional body, its actions on election mat courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
ters may be reviewed only on certiorari by the
From the foregoing provisions of the Consti
Supreme Court. [Citing Section 7,Article IXand
tution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear
section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution.]
that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
On. the other hand, the respondents con power of the COMELEC to decide election con
tend that since the cases were filed in court by tests and administrative questions, it is also
the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
in the exercise of its power to decide election exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
contests, the trial court has authority to order a investigation and the prosecution of election
reinvestigation. offenses punishable under the Code before the
competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC,
through its duly authorized law officer, conducts
As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the the preliminary investigation of an election of
Constitution, unless otherwise provided by law, fense and upon a prima faciefinding ofa probable
any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC cause, files the information in the proper court,
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certio said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
t2aj£)

a&ftiil
case. Consequently, all the subsequent dispo has deleted in its Section 2, Article HI, the
sition of said case must be subject to the approval phrase 'and such other responsible officer as
of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a may be authorized by law' in the equivalent
reinvestigation of the case without the authority section and article of the 1973 Constitution."
of the court or unless so ordered by the court. (Rollo, p. 24.)
The petition is impressed with merit.
We emphasize important features of the con
NOTE: What may be prosecuted by
i*vti> stitutional mandate that "x x no search warrant
Comelec.
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon prob
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution able cause to be determined personally by the
vests in the COMELEC the power to "investigate judge x x." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution.)
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
First, the determination of probable cause
violations of election laws, including acts or omis
is_ a function of the.Judge. It is not for the Pro
sions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
vincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election
ElMffl
malpractices." The phrase "[w]here appropriate" Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the
leaves to the legislature the power to determine Judge alone makes this determination.
the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC
shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a
other prosecuting arms of the government. Banat Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009. assists him to make the determination of prob
able cause. The Judge does not have to follow
[j^^
C. People v. Judge Inting what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself,
187 SCRA 788(1990) the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause
is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J: transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecu
Does a preliminary investigation conducted tor's certification which are material in assisting
by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving the Judge to make his determination.
election offenses have to be coursed through
the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecu And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike
tor, before the Regional Trial Court may take should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
cognizance of the investigation and determine determines probable cause for the issuance of a
whether or not probable cause exists? warrant of arrest from the preliminary inves
tigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released.
The respondent trial court justifies its stand Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
on the ground that the COMELEC through its course of one and the same proceeding, there
Provincial Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction should be no confusion about the objectives. The
^)
to determine the existence of probable cause in determination of probable cause for the warrant
an election offense which it seeks to prosecute of arrest is made by the Judge. The prehminary
in court because:
investigation proper — whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
"While under Section 265 of the Omnibus is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore,
Election Code approved on December 3,1985 whether or not he should be subjected to the
duly authorized legal officers of the Commis expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is
sion on Elections have the exclusive power the function of the Prosecutor.
to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
election offenses and to prosecute the same,
it is doubtful whether said authority under We reiterate that preliminary investigation
the auspices of the 1973 Constitution, still should be distinguished as to whether it is an
subsists under the 1987 Constitution which investigation for the determination of a sufficient
ground for the filing of the information or it is an ure of which would result in the frustration of
investigation for the determination of a probable the true will of the people and make a mere
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of
The first kind of preliminary investigation is ex every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
ecutive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's COMELEC of the authority to investigate
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation and prosecute offenses committed by public
which is more properly called preliminary exami officials in relation to their office would thus
nation is judicial in nature and is lodged with seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving
the judge. It is in this context that we address this clear constitutional mandate.
the issue raised in the instant petition so as to
From a careful scrutiny of the constitu
give meaning to the constitutional power vested
tional provisions relied upon by the Sandi-
in the COMELEC regarding election offenses.
ganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor
Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm,
provides: the Tanodbayan, of the authority to inves
tigate, prosecute and hear election offenses
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections
committed by public officers in relation to
shall exercise the following powers and
their office as contradistinguished from the
functions:
clear and categorical bestowal of said author
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and ity and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and
regulations relative to the conduct of an the courts of first instance under Sections
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election
and recall. Code of 1978.
xxx xxx xxx An examination of the provisions of the

Constitution and the Election Code of 1978
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or
reveals the clear intention to place in the
on its own initiative, petitions in court for
COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investi
inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate
gate and prosecute election offenses commit
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
ted by an}' person, whether private individ
violation of election laws, including acts or
ual or public officer or employee, and in the
omission constituting election frauds, offens
latter instance, irrespective of whether the
es, and malpractices. (Emphasis supplied.)
offense is committed in relation to his official
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates duties or not. In other words, it is the nature
the COMELEC not only to investigate but also of the offense and not the personality of the
to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. offender that matters. As long as the offense
This means that the COMELEC is empowered is an election offense jurisdiction over the
to conduct preliminary investigations in cases same rests exclusively with the COMELEC,
involving election offenses for the purpose of in view of its all-embracing power over the
helping the Judge determine probable cause and conduct of elections." (Corpus v. Tanodbayan,
for filing an information in court. This power is 149 SCRA 281 [1987].)
exclusive with COMELEC.
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, as
"The grant to the COMELEC of the sumes no role in the prosecution of election
power, among others, to enforce and admin offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an infor
ister all laws relative to the conduct of mation charging an election offense or prosecutes
election and the concomittant authority to a violation of election law, it is because he has
investigate and prosecute election offenses is been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not
not without compelling reason. The evident do so under the sole authority of his office. . .
constitutional intendment in bestowing this
power to the COMELEC is to insure the free,
orderly and honest conduct of elections, fail
D. Corpus v. Tanodbayan tion to their office as contradistinguished

149 SCRA 281 (1987) from the clear and categorical bestowal of
said authority and jurisdiction upon the
RESOLUTION COMELEC and the courts of first instance
under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of
CORTES, J.: the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Con

In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. Peo stitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals
ple (No. L-61998, February 28,1983,1205CRA the clear intention to place in the COMELEC
760) this Court dealt with the followingquestion exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and pros
of first impression relative to the rival claim of ecute election offenses committed by any person,
jurisdiction over election offenses committed by whether private individual or public officer or
public officials:
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective
of whether the offense is committed in relation
Which of these entities have the power to his official duties or not. In other words, it is
;ijs£)
to investigate, prosecute and try election of the nature of the offense and not the personality
fenses committed by a public officer in rela of the offender that matters. As long as the of
tion to his office — the Commission on Elec fense is an election offense jurisdiction over the
ii^ tions and the Court of First Instance (now same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in
the regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan view of its all-embracing power over the conduct
and the Sandiganbayan? of elections.
This Court rejected the assertion that no

tribunal other than the Sandiganbayan has juris
diction over offenses committed by public officers E. Tan v. Commission on Elections
;icj
and employees in relation to their office, thus: G.R. No. 112093, October 4,1994
The grant to the COMELEC of the power,
among others, to enforce and administer all VITUG, J.:
laws relative to the conduct of election and
the concomittant authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is not without Petitioner contends that the COMELEC has
compelling reason. The evident constitu committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
&&£
tional intendment in bestowing this power to without jurisdiction in continuing to take action
the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly on the administrative case, he argues that
and honest conduct of elections, failure of
1) Petitioner is the City Prosecutor of Davao
iîijj which would result in the frustration of the
City. His office belongs to the executive branch
true will of the people and make a mere idle of the government, more particularly to the
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of Department of Justice. As such, he is under the
every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the administrative jurisdiction of the said depart
COMELEC of the authority to investigate
ment and not of respondent COMELEC.
and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus 2) The Civil Service Law provides that de
iiaii)
seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving partment heads "shall have jurisdiction to inves
this clear constitutional mandate. tigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers under their jurisdiction"
From a careful scrutiny of the con
(Section 47[b], P.D. 807).
stitutional provisions relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither ex 3) Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitu
plicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecut tion which authorizes respondent COMELEC to
ing arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority deputize public officersbelonging to the executive
to investigate, prosecute and hear election department is for the purpose of insuring free,
offenses committed by public officers in rela orderly and honest elections. It does not include
ARTICLE IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 73?
and comprehend administrative disciplinary election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor.
jurisdiction over officials belonging to the execu The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority
tive branch of government. That jurisdiction over to exercise direct and immediate supervision and
deputized executive officerscannot be deemed to control over national and local officials or employ
include such powers as would allow encroach ees, including members of any national or local
ment into the domain of the executive branch law enforcement agenfcy and instrumentality of
under guise of administering laws relative to the government, required by law to perform du
elections. ties relative to the conduct of elections. In order
is»l
4) Section 38 of P.D. 807 cited by respon to help ensure that such duly deputized officials
dents COMELEC and Ilagan as basis for their and employees of government carry out their re
authority to investigate petitioner (Annex G) spectiveassigned tasks, the law has alsoprovided
ffhtt
offers no help to said respondents. The said than upon the COMELEC'srecommendation, the
provision merely lays down the procedure for corresponding proper authority (the Secretary
administrative cases against non-presidential of the Department of Justice in the case at bar)
appointees. Petitioner here, the city prosecutor shall take appropriate action, either to suspend
for Davao City is a presidential appointee. or remove from office the officer or employee
who may, after due process, be found guilty of
We find ourselves being unable to sustain violation of election laws or failure to comply
the petition. with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of
The COMELEC's authority under Section the COMELEC.
2(6-8), Article IX, ofthe Constitution is virtually Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to
all-encompassing when it comes to election mat- making its recommendation, must first satisfy
tars. In respect particularly to sanctions against itself that there indeed has been an infraction
election offenses, we quote: of the law, or of its directives issued conform
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections ably therewith, by the person administratively
shall exercise the following powers and func charged. It also stands to reason that it is the
tions:
COMELEC, being in the best position to assess
howits deputized officials and employeesperform
xxx xxx xxx
or have performed in their duties, that should
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that
on its own initiative, petitions in court for the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate charges ofelectionoffensescommitted by officials
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of and employeesofgovernment outside the regular
violations of election laws, including acts employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly
e)
or omission constituting election frauds, of deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such
fenses, and malpractices. recommendatory power and, perhaps more than
xxx
that, even a possible denial of due process to the
xxx xxx
official or employee concerned.
(8) Recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC
deputized or the imposition of any other merelymayissue a recommendationfordisciplin
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard ary action but that it is the executive department
of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or to which the charged official or employee belongs
decision.
which has the ultimate authority to impose the
disciplinary penalty. The law then does not de
tract from, but is congruent with, the general
It should be stressed that the administra administrative authority of the department of
tive case against petitioner, taken cognizance of government concerned over its own personnel.
by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in
relation to the performance of his duties as an
F. Reyes y. Regional Trial Court Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the

G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995 Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
First. The Solicitor General, in behalf of The Commission on Elections may be
the COMELEC, raises a fundamental question. sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
He contends that the filing of the present peti promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
tion, without petitioner first filing a motion for expedite disposition of election cases, includ
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, ing pre-proclamation controversies. All such
violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the Constitution because election cases shall be heard and decided in
under this provision only decisions of the COM division, provided that motions for reconsid
ELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme eration of decisions shall be decided by the
Court on certiorari.
Commission en banc.
This is correct. It is now settled that in
Conformably to those provisions of the
providing that the decisions, orders and rulings
Constitution all election cases, including pre-
of COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme
proclamation controversies, must be decided by
Court on certiorari? the Constitution in its Art.
the COMELEC in division. Should a party be
LX, A, §7 means the special civil action of certio
dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a mo
rari under Rule 65,1. Since a basic condition for
tion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
bringing such action is that the petitioner first
en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or
file a motion for reconsideration, it follows that
ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accor
petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsid
dance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the
eration of the decision of the First Division of the
Supreme Court on certiorari"
COMELEC is fatal to his present action.
Petitioner argues that this requirement may
be dispensed with because the only question
G. Kilosbayan v. Comelec
raised in his petition is a question of law. This
G.R. No. 128054, October 16, 1997
is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner
involve the interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions in light of the facts of this
case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not It would not be amiss to state here in pass
pure questions of law. ing that well-enshrined is the rule that the
complainant must submit evidence to prove his
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration case. IN THE INSTANT CASE. COMPLAINANT
before the COMELEC en banc is required for the KILOSBAYAN DID NOT SUBMIT EVIDENCE
filing of a petition for certiorari is clear from the TO PROVE ITS CASE. IT POSTULATES THE
following provisions of the Constitution: THEORY THAT SINCE IT IS THE CONSTI
Art. LX, C, §2. The Commission on Elections TUTIONAL POWER OF THE COMMISSION
shall exercise the following powers and functions: TO ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS
AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE
CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS, IT IS INCUM
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdic BENT TO USE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POW
tion over all contests relating to the elections, ER TO SECURE THE NEEDED EVIDENCE.
returns, and qualifications of all elective THIS POSITION OF THE KILOSBAYAN IS
regional, provincial, and city officials, and ap PATENTLY ERRONEOUS AS IT IS NOT ONLY
pellate jurisdiction over all contests involving ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION BUT ALSO ITS
elective municipal officials decided by trial MORAL DUTY TO SUBMIT ITS EVIDENCE
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving TO PROVE ITS COMPLAINT...."
elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
H. Buac and Bautista v. COMELEC been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to

fri^ G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004 lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
PUNO, J.: According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, "the first
part of the authority represents the traditional
This is a petition for certiorari and man concept of judicial power involving the settle
damus filed by petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac ment of conflicting rights as conferred by law."
and Antonio Bautista assailing the October 28, The case at bar assailing the regularity of the
2002 en banc Resolution of the Commission on conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the
Elections (COMELEC) which held that it has no kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction over controversies involving the con power. It does not involve the violation of any
duct of plebiscite and the annulment of its result. legally demandable right and its enforcement.
There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at
bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of
Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and An the vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they
tonio Bautista reiterate their submission that approve or disapprove the conversion of their mu
jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is nicipality to a highly urbanized city. There is no
constitutionally vested with the COMELEC.... invocation of a private right conferred by law that
Respondents contend that there is no such has been violated and which can be vindicated
action as a plebiscite protest under the Constitu alone in our courts of justice in an adversarial
tion, the laws and the COMELEC rules as they proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar
provided only for election protests; the quasi- is the determination of the sovereign decision
liij
judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC over elec of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose of this
tion contests extends only to cases enumerated determination is more to protect the sovereignty
in Section 2(2), Article IX (C) of the Constitution, of the people and less to vindicate the private
which does not include controversies over plebi interest of any individual. Such a determination
scite results; and, even if the petition to annul does not contemplate the clash of private rights
of individuals and hence cannot come under the
plebiscite results is akin to an election protest,
traditional jurisdiction of courts.
it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over election
protests involving municipal officials, and the
COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction in
Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over
said cases.
petitions to annul plebiscite results can lead to
The petition is impressed with merit. jumbled justice. Consider for instance where the
plebiscite is national as it deals with the ratifica
First. The key to the case at bar is its nature.
tion of a proposed amendment to our Constitu
The case at bar involves the determination of
tion. Snap thinking will tell us that it should be
whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor
the COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over
of, or against the conversion of the municipality
a petition to annul its results. If jurisdiction is
pi) ofTaguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebi
given to the regular courts, the result will not
scite conducted for the purpose. Respondents
submit that the regular courts of justice, more
enhance the orderly administration of justice.
specifically, the Regional Trial Court, has the ju Any regional trial court from every nook and
risdiction to adjudicate any controversy concern corner of the country will have jurisdiction over
ing the conduct of said plebiscite. We hold that a petition questioning the results of a nationwide
the invocation of judicial power to settle disputes plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdic
^jvjj
involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. tion of these courts is limited only within their
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines respective judicial regions, the difficulties that
judicial power as including "the duty of the courts will attend their exercise of jurisdiction would
of justice to settle actual controversies involving be many if not unmanageable.
rights which are legally demandable and enforce Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution
able and to determine whether or not there has and related laws will reveal that only contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifica Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara,
tions of elected officials are subject to the exercise or his authorized representative may endorse
of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial the certificate of candidacy of the parly's official
power of our administrative agencies, thus: (a) candidates. The same Manifestation stated
contests involving elective municipal officials that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary
are tried and decided by trial courts of general General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on
jurisdiction, while those involving barangay of "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Am
ficials are tried and decided by trial courts of bassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated
limited jurisdiction; in both cases, however, the Acting Secretary General. The Manifestation
COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b) concluded with this prayer:
contests involving all elective regional, provincial
and city officials fall within the exclusive original A. The Honorable Commission recogniz
iiftj
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of es [sic] only those Certificates of Candidacy
to which are attached Certificates of Nomi
its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests involving
members of the House of Representatives fall nation execute/! by LDP Party Chairman
within the exclusive original jurisdiction ofthe Edgardo J. Angara or by such other officers
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in of the LDP whom he may authorize-in writ
the exercise of quasi-judicial power; (d) contests ing, and whose written authorizations shall
involving members of the Senate fall within the be deposited with the Honorable Commission
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Senate Elec by the LDP General Counsel.
toral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial B. The Honorable Commission declares
power; and, (e) contests involving the President [sic] as a nullity, denies [sic] due course or
and the Vice President fall within the exclusive cancels [sic] all Certificates of-Candidacy not
original jurisdiction ofthe Presidential Electoral endorsed by LDP Party Chairman Angara
Tribunal, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial or by such other LDP officials as may be
power. authorized by him:
' C. The Honorable Commission takes
-Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., please see [sic] note of the designation of Ambassador
dissenting opinion. (Omitted) Enrique 'Tke" A. Zaldivar as Acting Secretary
General of the LDP, and for the Honorable
I. LDP v. COMELEC
Commission to honor and recognize the of
ficial acts, to the exclusion of everyone, of
G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004
Ambassador Zaldivar for and in behalfofthe
LDP as Secretary General.
TINGA, J:
i^l) On December 16,2003, Rep. Aquino filed his
The Bible tells the story of how two women Comment, contending that the Party Chairman
came to King Solomon to decide who among does not have the authority to impose disciplin
them is the baby's true mother. King Solomon, in ary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the
forj;l his legendary wisdom, awarded the baby to the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel
woman who gave up her claim after he threat has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC
ened to split the baby into two. to disregard the same.
It is fortunate that the two women did not
On December 17,2003, the parties agreed to
ask the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) file a joint manifestation pending which the pro
to decide the baby's fate; otherwise, it would ceedings were deemed suspended. On December
have cut the baby in half. For that is what the 22,2003, however, only the LDP General Counsel
COMELEC exactly did in this case. filed an Urgent Manifestation reiterating the
On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel contents of the December 8,2003 Manifestation.
iS) of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), The COMELEC also received a Letter from Rep.
a registered political party, informed the COM Aquino stating that the parties were unable to
ELEC by way of Manifestation that only the arrive at a joint manifestation.
^
^j)
The next day, the LDP General Counsel filed confusion and disunity projected by the
a Second Urgent Manifestation disputing news pronouncements and acts of some officers
paper accounts that Rep. Aquino had suspended -> and members to the general membership
Sen. Angara as Party Chairman. of the LDP and the electorate, such as the
one taken by the Regional Committee for
p&i On December 26, 2003, the COMELEC is
Region VI (Western Visayas) on December
sued an Order requiring the parties to file a veri
6,2003; the enforcement of order in the LDP
fied petition. It turned out that, two days before,
through the voice of a central leadership in
Sen. Angara had submitted a verified Petition, in
Ci!) command in an otherwise extraordinary and
essence, reiterating the contents of its previous
Manifestations. Attached to the Petition was a
emergency situation^ such as the one taken
Resolution adopted by the LDP National Execu by Party Chairman Angara on December 6,
tive Council, stating: 2003; the filing of the Manifestation with the
COMELEC on the matter of the authorized
WHEREAS, on September 25, 2003, the signatories for the nominations and, the
National Executive Council of the Laban ng adoption of resolutions by the regional com
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) convened and mittees affirming their trust and confidence
unanimously passed a resolution granting in Chairman Angara, and authorizing him to
full authority to Party Chairman Edgardo choose the presidential standard bearer for
J. Angara to enter, negotiate and conclude a the May 10, 2004 elections; NOW THERE
coalition agreement with other like-minded FORE, BE IT
opposition parties, aggrupations and interest
groups with the sole purpose of uniting the RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RE
political opposition and fielding a unity ticket SOLVED, By the National Executive Coun
for the May 10, 2004 elections; cil, to ratify and confirm the Covenant of
National Unity, the Declaration of Unity
WHEREAS, on December 3, 2003, the
entered into by Party Chairman Edgardo
LDP, together with the Puwersa ng Masang
J. Angara, and all acts and decisions taken
Pilipino (PMP) and the Partido Demokratiko
by him to enforce and implement the same;
ng Pilipinas—LABAN (PDP-LABAN)forged
a coalition to form the Koalisyon ng Nagka- RESOLVED, FURTHER, To ratify and
kaisang Pilipino (KNP); confirm all other acts and decisions of Chair
WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of man Angara and other governing bodies to
the KNP subsequently adopted its resolution preserve the integrity, credibility, unity and
entitled: "Resolution Choosing Mr. Fernando solidarity of the LDP; and,
Poe, Jr. as the Standard Bearer of the Ko RESOLVED, FINALLY, To reiterate the
alisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) for vote of confidence of the National Executive
President of the Republic of the Philippines Council in, and support to, the continued
in the May 10, 2004 National Elections;" efforts of Chairman Angara to unite the
xxx xxx xxx political opposition.
WHEREAS, the process of unification of Rep. Aquino filed his Answer to the Petition
the political opposition and the actions taken on December 30,2003. The COMELEC heard the
in connection therewith by Chairman Angara parties on oral arguments oh the same day, after
and by other governing bodies of the LDP which the case was submitted for resolution.
required the taking ofimmediate and forceful
action by them to preserve and protect the Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomina
tion of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for
integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity
of the LDP, and ensure the attainment of President was filed with-the COMELEC. The
unification of the political opposition; Certificate of Nomination was signed by Rep.
Aquino as LDP Secretary General.
WHEREAS, such immediate and force
ful action include those that have to do with On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC came
pre-emptive efforts to diffuse the chaos, to a decision.
L
The Commission identified the sole issue as

«
and denominated as a Dormant [sic] Minor
"who among the [LDP] officers [are] authorized ity Party under the Election Laws. The two
to authenticate before tjie Commission that the LDP "Wings" are further entitled to and be
person filing the certificate of candidacy as party accorded the rights and privileges with cor
nominee for a certain position is the official can responding legal obligations under Election
didate of the party chosen in accordance with its Laws.
Constitution."
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco,
The COMELEC recognized that it "has the Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and
authority to act on matters pertaining to 'the Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. concurred in the Reso
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political lution authored by Commissioner Rufino S.B.
party and its legitimate officers " In the same Javier. Chair Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., joined
breath, however, it held that "internal party by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, submitted
matters and wranglings [sic] are purely for the dissenting opinions.
party members to settle among themselves and
' Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition
any unsettled controversy should be brought to
for Certiorari assailing the COMELEC Resolu
the proper forum with jurisdiction." The "ques
tion- for having been issued with grave abuse of
tion of who was suspended by whom" was thus
discretion.
left for such proper forum to resolve. Noting that
lapl
"the intramurals in the LDP as an internal party • Thereafter, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment.
matter seems to be irreconcilable for the present
The Office of the Solicitor General submit
when the filing of Certificate of Candidacy and
ted a Manifestation and Motion praving for the
Certificate of Nomination are about to reach the
granting of the Petition. The COMELEC thus
deadline," the COMELEC disposed of the Peti
filed a separate Comment to the Petition.
tion in the following fashion:
The COMELEC correctly stated that "the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ascertainment of the identity of [a] political
the petition is GRANTED with LEGAL party and its legitimate officers" is a matter
EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor. that is well within its authority. The source of
The candidates for President down to the last this authority is no other than the fundamental
Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the
and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. power and function to enforce and administer
Angara are recognized by the Commission all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
as official candidates of LDP "Angara Wing." of an election. In the exercise of such power and
The candidates from President down to the in the discharge of such function, the Commis
last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nomi sion is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and
nated and endorsed by LDP Secretary Gen "considerable latitude in adopting means and
eral Agapito "Butz" Aquino are recognized methods that will ensure the accomplishment
as official candidates of LDP "Aquino Wing." of the great objectives for which it was created
Consequently, each faction or "Wing" is to promote free, orderly and honest elections."
entitled to a representative to any election Thus, in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections,
committee to which it may be entitled as (G.R. No. 80218, November 5, 1987) which in
created by the Commission for the May 10, volved the leadership fight in the Liberal Party,
2004 elections. For the copies of the election this Court held:
returns, the "Angara Wing" will be entitled
to the copies corresponding to odd number . . . that the respondent [COMELEC]
of precincts, that is, Precinct Nos. 1, 3, 5, has jurisdiction to hear and decide SP Case
etc., and for the "Aquino Wing" to the even No. 85-021 [involving a petition to prohibit
number of precincts, that is Precinct Nos. Eva Estrada Kalaw "from usurping or us
2, 4, 6, etc. This is on the assumption that ing the title or position of President of the
the LDP or as a party within a registered Liberal Party"] in view of its powers under
Political Coalition becomes a recognized Article IX-C, Section 2, of the Constitution
£si
ig&J
aiwt
to, among others, enforce and administer Court, in resolving the issue as to who between
all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the factions of a political party was entitled to
decide all questions affecting elections, regis nominate election inspectors, necessarily settled
ter and regulate political parties, and insure claims to the party's leadership. Both cases were
orderly elections. These powers include the decided without question on the COMELEC's
determination ofthe conflicting claims made power to determine ouch claims. In conformity
in SP Case No. 85-021, which are likely to with jurisprudence, this Court did not identify
cause confusion among the electorate if not the COMELEC's jurisdiction as an issue when
cat
resolved. Additionally, the COMELEC is this case was heard on oral argument.
mandated by the Election Code to inter alia
There is no inconsistency between the above
require candidates to specify their political
cases on the one hand and this Court's more
party affiliation in their certificates of candi
recent ruling in Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896
dacy, allow political parties to appoint watch
(1999), on the other. In the latter case, this
ers, limit the expenditures of each political
Court held:
party, determine whether or not a political
m
party shall retain its registration on the basis A political party has the right to identify
of its showing in the preceding elections, etc. the people who constitute the association and
These matters include the ascertainment to select a standard bearer who best repre
fa'ol of the identity of the political party and its sents the party's ideologies and preference.
legitimate officers responsible for its acts and Political parties are generally free to con
the resolution of such controversies as the, duct their internal affairs free from judicial
one now before it where one party appears supervision; this common-law principle of
to be divided into two wings under separate judicial restraint, rooted in the constitution
leaders each claiming to be the president of ally protected right of free association, serves
the entire party.... [Emphasis supplied.] the public interest by allowing the political
gill
Likewise in Palmares v. Commission on

processes to operate without undue interfer
Elections (G.R. Nos. 86177-78, August 31,1989) ence. Thus, the rule is that the determination
to which the assailed Resolution made reference of disputes as to party nominations rests with
a*J
and which involved the Nacionalista Party, this the party, in the absence of statutes giving
Court ruled
the court's [sic] jurisdiction.
Quintessentially, where there is no con
... that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
trolling statute or clear legal right involved,
over the issue of leadership in a political par
the court will not assume jurisdiction to
ty. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is
determine factional controversies within
empowered to register political parties [Sec.
a political party, but will leave the matter
2(5), Article IX-C] Necessarily, the power to
for determination by the proper tribunals
act on behalf of a party and the responsibility
of the party itself or by the electors at the
for the acts of such 'political party must be
polls. Similarly, in the absence of specific
fixed in certain persons acting as its officers.
In the exercise ofthe power to register politi
constitutional or legislative regulations de
fining how nominations are to be made, or
cal parties, the COMELEC must determine
who these officers are. Consequently, if there
prohibiting nominations from being made in
is any controversy as to leadership, the COM certain ways, political parties may handle
ELEC may, in a proper case brought before such affairs, including nominations, in such
it, resolve the issue incidental to its power
manner as party rules may establish. [Em
to register political parties. phasis supplied.]
This Court then proceeded to quote from Sinaca, unlike previous cases, did not involve
Kalaw, supra. the question of party identity or leadership;
hence, it was not necessary for the COMELEC to
The two cited decisions find support in delve therein. None ofthe candidates involved in
Sumulong v. Commission on Elections and that case were claiming to be the political party's
Sotto v. Commission on Elections, where this sole candidate.
In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, spend more per voter than a candidate without
•ffii^
purporting to represent the LDP., contends that a political party.'
under the Party Constitution only he or his It is, therefore, in the interest of every politi
representative, to the exclusion ofthe Secretary cal party not to allow persons it had not chosen
General, has the authority to endorse and sign to hold themselves out as representatives ofthe
party nominations. The Secretary General vigor .party. Corollary to the right of a political party
ously disputes this claim and maintains his own "to identify the people who constitute the asso
Imi
authority. Clearly, the question of party identity ciation and to select a standard bearer who best
or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC represents the party's ideologies and preference"
is to ascertain whether the candidates are legiti
is the right to exclude persons in its association
mate party standard bearers or not. and to not lend its name and prestige to those
The repercussions of the question of party which it deems undeserving to represent its ide
identity and leadership do not end at the va als. Acertificate ofcandidacy makes known tothe
lidity of the endorsement of the certificates of COMELEC that the'person therein mentioned
candidacy of persons claiming to be the party's has been nominated by a duly authorized politi
standard bearer. The law grants a registered cal group empowered to act and that it reflects
political party certain rights a,nd privileges, accurately the sentiment ofthe nominating body.
which, naturally, redound to the benefit of its A candidate's political party affiliation is also
candidates. It is also for this significant dimen printed followed by his or her name in the certi
sion that Sinaca is not applicable in this case. fied list of candidates. A candidate misrepresent
As conceded in Sinaca itself, the Court will have ing himself or herself to be a party's candidate,
to assume jurisdiction to determine factional therefore, not only misappropriates the party's
controversies within a political party where a name and prestige but foists a deception upon the
controlling statute or clear legal right is involved. electorate, who may unwittingly cast its ballot
Verily, there is more than one law, as well as a for him or her on the mistaken belief that he or
number of clear legal rights, that are at stake in she stands for the party's principles. To prevent
the case at bar. this occurrence, the COMELEC has the power
fe&i^
and the duty to step in and enforce the law not
The law accords special treatment to po only to protect the party but, more importantly,
litical parties! The dominant majority party, the the electorate, in line with the Commission's
dominant minority party as determined by the broad constitutional mandate to ensure orderly
Ml COMELEC, for instance, is entitled to a copy of elections.
the election returns. The six (6) accredited ma
jor political parties may nominate the principal Having revisited and clarified the jurisdic
watchers to be designated by the Commission. tion of COMELEC to rule upon questions of
The two principal watchers representing the party identity and leadership as an incident to its
ruling coalition and the dominant opposition enforcement powers, this Court cannot help but
coalition in a precinct shall, if available, affix bebaffled bythe COMELEC's, rulingdeclining to
their signatures and thumbmarks on the elec inquire into which party officer has the authority
tion returns for that precinct. Three (3) ofthe six to sign and endorse certificates of candidacy of
accredited major political parties are entitled to the party's nominees.
receive copies ofthe certificate of canvass. Regis The only issue in this case, as defined by
tered political parties whose candidates obtained the COMELEC itself, is who as between the
at least ten percent (10%) ofthe total votes cast Party Chairman and the Secretary General has
in the next preceding senatorial election shall the authority to sign certificates of candidacy of
each have a watcher and/or representative in the official candidates of the party. Indeed, the
the procurement and watermarking of papers to petitioners' Manifestation and Petition before
be used in the printing of election returns and the COMELEC merely asked the Commission
official ballots and in the printing, numbering, to recognize only those cef tificates of candidacy
storage, and distribution thereof. Finally, a can signed by petitioner Sen. Angara or his autho
didate and his political party are authorized to rized representative, and no other.
fel
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC Petitioner argues that the motion for recon
need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It sideration filed with the Former Second Division
need not go so far as to resolve the root of the of the COMELEC "has thrown the whole case
conflict between the party officials. It need only wide open for review as in a trial de novo in a
resolve such questions as may be necessary in criminal case," yet the COMELEC en banc failed
the exercise of its enforcement powers. to conduct a thorougji review of the contested
ballots.
This argument has no basis. Section 2 (2)

::Ml WHEREFORE, the assailed COMELEC
of Article IX-C ofthe Constitution provides the
Resolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is
GRANTED IN PART. Respondent Commission COMELEC with quasi-judicial power to exercise
on Elections is directed to recognize as official exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
candidates of the Laban ng Demokratikong relating to the elections, returns, and qualifi
Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candi cations of all elective regional, provincial, and
dacy are signed by LDP Party Chairman Sena city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
tor Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized contests involving elective municipal officials
representative/s. decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided
NOTE: Ascertainment of officers by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions,
final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
The COMELEC correctly stated that "the election contests involving elective municipal
ascertainment ofthe identity of [a] political party and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
ffiffij and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well and not appealable. Section 3 thereof states the
within its authority. The source of this author
administrative power of the COMELEC, either
ity is no other than the fundamental law itself,
en banc or in two divisions, to promulgate its
which vests upon the COMELEC the power and
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition
function to enforce and administer all laws and
of election cases, including pre-proclamation con
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
troversies. All such election cases shall be heard
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need
only to turn to the Party Constitution. Liberal and decided in division, provided that motions
Party (Drilon) v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174992, April for reconsideration of decisions shall ba decided
17, 2007. by the Commission en banc.
Clearly, from the decision of the trial court,
J. Manzala v. Comelec the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction
G.R. No. 176211, May 8, 2007 to review, revise, modify, or even reverse and set
aside the decision ofthe former and substitute it
Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala seeks to an
with its own decision. In the exercise of its adju
nul the resolution, dated August 24, 2006, of
the Former Second Division of the Commission
dicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitu
on Elections (COMELEC), declaring private re tion also mandates the COMELEC to hear and
spondent Juhe R. Monton to be the duly elected decide cases first by division and upon motion
Municipal Mayor ofMagdiwang, Romblon in the for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.
May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections, and Election cases cannot be treated in a similar
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, dated manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal
January 24, 2007, denying petitioner's motion from a conviction by the trial court, the whole
for reconsideration and affirming the Resolution case is thrown open for review and the appellate
of August 24, 2006 with modification as to the court can resolve issues which are not even set
number of votes obtained by both parties after forth in the pleadings. In the present case, the
re-appreciation. COMELEC en banc had thoroughly reviewed
the decision of its Former Second Division and
L affirmed the findings thereofwith modification as
[After a series of reversals petitioner made to the number of votes obtained by both parties
the following plea:] after re-appreciation, that is, private respondent
obtained 2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over NOTE: Power .to call special elections.
petitioner's 2,475 votes.
COMELEC may call for the "holding or con
tinuation of the election as soon as practicable."
This should be construed to include the calling
NOTE: As early as Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 of a special election in the event of a failure to
SCRA 435, this Court has held that: elect. Otherwise, the COMELEC could not be
truly effective in the discharge of its functions.
"The fact that the candidate who obtained In fact, Section 8 of the Election Code allows
the highest number ofvotes is later declared the COMELEC to call a special election for the
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created
to which he was elected does not necessarily position. There should be no reason therefore
entitle the candidate who obtained the for not allowing it to call a special election when
second highest number ofvotes to be declared there is failure to elect. It does not matter if the
the winner of the elective office. The votes acts or events which frustrated the election took
cast for a dead, disqualified or non-eligible place after the.votes had been cast; the practical
person may not be valid to vote the winner effects the same whether the acts or events oc
into office or maintain him there. However, curred after the votes are cast. To make such a
in the absence of a statute which clearly distinction is to unduly circumscribe the powers
asserts a contrary political and legislative of the COMELEC. Again it must be said that reli
policies on the matter, if the votes were cast ance cannot be had on decisions to the contrary
in the sincere belief that the candidate was under the 1935 Constitution because the COM
alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not ELEC now has more extensive powers. Sanchez
be treated as stray, void or meaningless." v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 55513, June 19,1982.
NOTE: COMELEC non-powers.

NOTE: Power to annul.
There are certain powers which even under
It may be true that there is no specificprovi
the new Constitution still clearly do not belong
sion vesting in the COMELEC the power to an
to the Commission. Thus, it is not empowered
nul an entire municipal election on the ground
to decide questions "involving the right to vote."
ofpost-election terrorism; but there is no doubt Article IX, C, Section 2(3). The power to deter
that the body has extensive powers given by mine whether or not a person can exercise or is
the new Constitution under the general rubric precluded from exercising the right of suffrage
of its authority to "enforce and administer all is a judicial question, Pungutan v. Abubakar,
laws relative to the conduct of elections" under 43 SCRA1,12 (1972), and the power to resolve
Article DC, C, 2(1). Moreover, Section 185 of the such question has been excluded from the Com
1978 Election Code accords it exclusive charge mission's power to be judge of election contests.
of the enforcement and administration of all Finally, while the Commission may punish for
laws relative to the conduct of elections for the contempt, such power may not be exercised in
purpose ofinsuringfree, orderly and honest elec connection with its purely executive or ministe
tions. Election returns which are coerced returns rial functionsbut only in furtherance ofits quasi-
are no returns at all and the COMELEC has judicial and now also judicial functions. Guevara
thepower toreject them. True, earlier decisions v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay
under the 1935 Constitution denied this power to v. Comelec, 6 SCRA 27 (1962).
the COMELEC. E.g., Abes u. Comelec, 21SCRA
1252 (1967); but the new Constitution has ex NOTE: Registration of political parties.
panded the powers ofthe COMELEC. Biliwang Generally,all political parties and organiza:
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 55642, June 19,1982. Here tionswhich present their platformor program of
the COMELEC had found that it was impossible government and whichsatisfy requirements pre
to distinguish the illegal from the validreturns. scribed bylaw may register. However, religious
(Note also that theCOMELEC annulled the elec denominations and sects, and organizations
tions after proclamation.) whichseek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means or refuse to uphold and adhere COMELEC en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503.
to the Constitution, or which are supported by Petitioners cite Sarmiento v. Comelec and Za-
foreign governments, may not be registere.d. The rate v. Comelec to support their stand that the
ban on religious organizations and sects, how COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or
ever, does not extend to lay organizations with with grave abuse of discretion when it assumed
religious affiliations or to political parties which original jurisdiction aver the case without first
derive their principles from religious beliefs. The referring the same to any of its divisions. In
ban is only on religious denominations and sects, Sarmiento and Zarate, the Court similarly held
such as the Catholic Church, or the Anglican that "election cases must first be heard and
Church, or the Iglesia ni Kristo, or the Muslim decided by a Division of the Commission," and
denomination. This prohibition is made in the that the "Commission, sitting en banc, dpes not
spirit of separation of Church and State and is have the authority to hear and decide the same
intended to prevent churches as churches from at the first instance."
wielding political power.
In its Comment for the COMELEC, the
SEC. 3. THE COMMISSION ON ELEC Solicitor General points out that the rulings in
TIONS MAY SIT EN BANC OR IN TWO Sarmiento and Zarate were clarified in Canicosa
DIVISIONS, AND SHALL PROMULGATE v. COMELEC, 282 SCRA 512 (1997) to mean
ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ORDER that —
TO EXPEDITE DISPOSITION OF ELEC
"[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudica
TION CASES, INCLUDING PRE-PROCLA- tory or quasi-judicial powers that the COM
MATION CONTROVERSIES. ALL SUCH
ELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases
ELECTION CASES SHALL BE HEARD AND
first by division and then, upon motion fo'r
DECIDED IN DIVISION, PROVIDED THAT
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
This is when it is jurisdictional."
DECISIONS SHALL BE DECIDED BY THE
COMMISSION EN BANC. The Solicitor General contends that the
conduct of a preliminary investigation before
A. Baytan v. Comelec the filing of an information in court does not in
G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003 any way adjudicate with finality the rights and
liabilities of the parties investigated. A prelimi
CARPIO, J.: nary investigation does not make any pronounce
ment as to the guilt or innocence of the party
involved. Hence, a preliminary investigation
Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en cannot be considered a judicial or quasi-judicial
banc's assumption of original jurisdiction over proceeding required to be heard by the Division
the case violated the Constitution. in the first instance.
Petitioners rely on Section 3. Article IX-C of On the other hand, petitioners countered
the 1987 Constitution which states: that in Cruz v. People, 233 SCRA 439 (1995) the
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections
Court held that the conduct of a preliminary
maysit en bancor in two divisions, and shall investigation "is a judicial or quasi-judicial pro
promulgateits rules ofprocedure in order to ceeding since there is opportunity to be heard
expedite disposition ofelection cases, includ and for the production and weighing of evidence
ingpre-proclamation controversies. All such and a decision is. rendered thereon."
election cases shall be heard and decided in Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
division, provided that motions forreconsid Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
eration of decisions shall be decided by the administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Commission en banc" COMELEC's administrative powers are found
Petitioners assert that this constitutional in Sections (i), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9)
provision serves as basis to nullify the pro of Article LX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not
ceedings conducted and orders issued by the prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise
fall 750 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
its administrative powers, whether en banc or directly approve the recommendation of its Law
in division. The Constitution merely vests the Department to file the criminal information
COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Com for double registration against petitioners in
mission on Elections," while providing that the the instant case. There is no constitutional
t-1-.foy
COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." requirement that the filing of the criminal
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly information be first decided by any of the
on matters falling within its administrative divisions of the COMELEC.
powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3,
the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not
Constitutions.
applicable in administrative cases, like the in
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi- stant case where the COMELEC is determining
judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of whether probable cause exists to charge petition
Article IX-C, to wit: ers for violation of the provision of the Election
Code prohibiting double registration.
"Section 2. The Commission on Elec
tions shall exercise the following powers
and function:
B. Balindong v. Comelec
xxx XXX xxx
. G.R. Nos. 153991-92, October 16, 2003
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdic
tion over all contests relating to the elections, TINGA, J.:
returns, and qualifications of all elective
Before us is a petition where the petitioner,
regional, provincial, and city officials, and ap
pellate jurisdiction over all contests involving Anwar Balindong ("Anwar"), a candidate for
Mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, seeks to set
elective municipal officials decided by trial
aside the Resolution dated July 4, 2002 of the
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc
elective barangay officials decided by trial
ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers
courts of limited jurisdiction.
(MBC) to immediately reconvene, totally exclude
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the from canvass the election return for a certain
Commission on election contests involving precinct and count eighty-eight (88) votes in the
elective municipal and barangay officesshall election return for another precinct, not in favor
be final, executory, and not appealable." ofAnwar but another mayoralty candidate, by the
name of Amir-Oden Balindong.
The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judi
cial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C
which expressly requires that all election cases,
The issues in this case are the following:
including pre-proclamation controversies, shall
be decided by the COMELEC in division, and 1) Whether the COMELEC en banc had
the motion for reconsideration shall be decided jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies
by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held at the first instance;
by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC
is mandated to decide cases first in division, and
then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, The first issue is both constitutional and
only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi- jurisdictional.
judicial powers.
The 1987 Constitution, in Section 3, Article
The COMELEC is empowered in Section IX-C thereof, has established the two-tiered
2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to organizational and functional structure of the
"prosecute cases of violations of election laws." COMELEC.The provision requires that election
The prosecution ofelection law violators involves cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative should be heard and decided first at the division
powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can level. It reads, thus:
"SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections rari. However, where a division of the Comelec
may sit en bancor in two divisions, and shall decides a motion for reconsideration in violation
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to ofArticle IX, C, 3, the division's rulingis a com
expedite disposition of election cases, includ plete nullity and may be brought to the Court on
ing pre-proclamation controversies. All such certiorari. Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140,
election cases shall be heard and decided in June 30. 2009. %
division, provided that motions for reconsid
eration of decisions shall be decided by the However, while a motion to reconsider an in
Commission en banc." [Emphasis supplied.] terlocutory order of a division should be resolved
by the division which issued the interlocutory
This Court has consistently ruled that the order, it may be referred to the Comelec en banc
requirement mandating the hearing and deci if all the membersofthe divisionagree. Soriano,
sionofelectioncases, including pre-proclamation et al. v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2,
controversies, at the first instance by a division 2007.
ofthe COMELEC, and not by the poll bodyas a
wholeP is mandatory and jurisdictional. Indeed, If a case which should go to the Comelec en
as the above-quoted Constitutional provision banc is erroneously filed with a division, it may
is couched in simple language and yields to no automatically be elevated to the Comelec en banc.
otherinterpretation than what its plain meaning This is not provided for in the Comelec Rules of
presents, it is imperative for this Court to enforce Procedure, but such action is not prohibited. Mu-
its indelible import and spirit to the fullest, any tilan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 1712468,April 2,2007.
decision, resolution or proceeding of the COM
However, it is only in the exercise of its
ELECwhichruns counter to it notwithstanding.
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the
In the definitive case of Sarmiento v. COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide
COMELEC, this Court explicitly held that the cases first by division and then, upon motion for
COMELEC en banc does not have the requisite reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. The
authority to hear and decide pre-proclamation conduct ofa preliminary investigation before the
controversies at the first instance. The Court filing of an information in court does not involve
declared: the exercise of adjudicatory function.42
"It is clear from the abovequoted provi
sion of the 1987 Constitution that election SEC. 4. THE COMMISSION MAY, DUR
cases include pre-proclamation controver ING THE ELECTION PERIOD, SUPERVISE
sies, and all such cases must first be heard OR REGULATE THE ENJOYMENT OR
and decided by a Division of the Commission. UTILIZATION OF ALL FRANCHISES
The Commission sitting en banc, does not ORPERMITS FOR THE OPERATION OF
have the authority to hear and decide the TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER PUBLIC
same at the first instance. UTILITIES, MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION
OR INFORMATION, ALL GRANTS, SPE
xxx xxx xxx
CIAL PRIVILEGES, OR CONCESSIONS
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY
acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMEN
of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of TALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOV-
petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases ERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
without first referring them to any of its Divi CORPORATION OR ITS SUBSIDIARY.
sions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and SUCH SUPERVISION OR REGULATION
void and must be set aside. Consequently, the SHALL AIM TO ENSURE EQUAL OPPOR
appeals are deemed pending before the Commis TUNITY, TIME, AND SPACE, AND THE
sion for proper referral to a Division." RIGHT TO REPLY, INCLUDING REASON
ABLE, EQUAL RATES THEREFOR, FOR
NOTE: Certiorari.
The rule is that only decisions of the Comelec

"Baytan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 153945, February 4,2003;
en banc may be brought to the Court on certio Balindong v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 153991-92, October 16,2003
752 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
' &jfliil
PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS and on plebiscite day, no mass columnist,

AND FORUMS AMONG CANDIDATES IN commentator, announcer or personality shall
CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECTIVE use his column or radio or television time
OF HOLDING FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, to campaign for or against the plebiscite
PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS. issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision

1. Supervision of media and public utili is void and unconstitutional because it violates
ties. the constitutional guarantees of the freedom
of expression and of the press enshrined in the
A. Sanidad v. COMELEC Constitution.
181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Unlike a regular newsreporter or news cor
MEDIALDEA, J.: respondent who merely reports the news, peti
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the tioner maintains that as a columnist, his column
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Reso obviously and necesearily contains and reflects
lution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates his opinions,, view and beliefs on any issue or
the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of subject about whichhe writes. Petitioner believes
that said provision of COMELEC Resolution
expression and of the press.
No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press
6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN and further imposes subsequentpunishment-for
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AU those who may violate it because it contains a
TONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. penal provision, as follows:
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and
"Article XIII, Section 122, Election Of
the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces
fenses and Banned Actsx)r Activities.-Except
of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
to the extent that the same may not be ap
and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cor
dillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in plicable to a plebiscite, the banned acts/ac
a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic tivities and offenses defined in and penalized
givii) Actoriginally scheduledlast December 27,1989 by the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 261,
which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 262,263 and 264, ArticleXXII, B.P. Big.881)
by virtueofComelec Resolution No. 2226 dated and the pertinent provisions ofR.A. No. 6646
shallbe applicable to the plebiscite governed
December 27,1989.
by this Resolution."
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of
the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Petitioner likewise maintains that if media
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A.6766 practitioners were allowed toexpress theirviews,
and other pertinent election laws, promulgated beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a
ResolutionNo.2167,to govern the conductofthe plebiscite, it would in facthelpin the government
plebiscite onthesaid Organic Act for theCordil drive and desire to disseminate information, and
lera Autonomous Region.
hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, On November 28, 1989, We issued a tem
herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims porary restraining order enjoining respondent
tobea newspaper columnist ofthe"OVERVIEW" Commission on Elections from enforcing and
forthe BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly implementing Section 19ofResolution No. 2167.
newspaper circulated in the City ofBaguio and We also required the respondent to comment on
the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality the petition.
of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Respondent Comelec has reliedmuch onAr
which provides: ticle IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section
"Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, 11 ofR.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation
Jijiii
commentators or announcers. — During the ofthe questioned Section 19ofComelec Resolu

plebiscite campaign period, on theday before tion 2167.
ARTICLE K: CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSIONS • 753
provide a forum for expression but they do not

jjjtjfc) guarantee full dissemination of information to
the public concerned because they are limited
However, it is clear from Art. LX-Cof the 1987 to either specific portions in newspapers or to
Constitution that what was granted to the Com specific radio or television times.
elec was the power to supervise and regulate the
use and enjoyment offranchises, permits or other ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is
grants issued for the operation of transportation GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
or other public utilities, media of communication No. 2167 is declared null and. void and un
constitutional.
or information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including NOTE: The power to regulate media during
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public infor "election period" also extends to the period of a
mation campaigns and forums among candidates plebiscite or referendum. Of essence to plebiscite
are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by and referenda is "fair submission." Moreover, the
this provision is the possibility that a franchise formulation of the Constitution is more impor
L holder may favor or give any undue advantage tant in a sense than the choice of men who will
to a candidate in terms of advertising space or implement that charter. Evidently, therefore,
radio or television time. This is also the reason regulatory power during the period of plebiscite
why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or or referendum, is also intended. (Unido v. Com
personality, who is a candidate for any elective elec, 104 SCRA 17, 39, L-56515, April 3, 1981.)
office is required toi;ake a leave of~absence from
his work during the campaign period (2nd par.
Section lljb] R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid B. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
that a columnist or commentator who is also a COMELEC
candidate would be more exposed to the voters to G.R. No. 13348, January 28, 2000
viiPE the prejudice of other candidates unless required
to take a leave of absence. PANGANIBAN, J.:
However, neither Article IX-C of the Consti The holding of exit polls and the dissemina
tution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of RA 6646 can tion of their results through mass media consti
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also tute an essential part of the freedoms of speech
been granted the right to supervise and regulate and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban
the exercise by media practitioners themselves them totally in the guise of promoting clean,
of their right to expression during plebiscite honest, orderly and credible-elections. Quite the
periods. Media practitioners exercising their contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and
freedom of expression during plebiscite periods publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating
the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly
are neither the franchise holders nor the candi
tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by
dates. In fact, there are no candidates involved
the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the
in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls,
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
without transgressing in any manner the funda
mental rights of our people.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public- con
The Issues
cern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or
make a decision would be better served by ac not the Respondent Commission acted with grave
••& cess to an unabridged discussion of the issues, abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess
including the forum. The people affected by the of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of
issues presented in a plebiscite should not be a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or
mi
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum any [other group], its agents or representatives
where the right to expression may be exercised. from conducting exit polls during the . . . May
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may 11 elections."
t&&)
fejfcjfri
The Court's Ruling of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of

the Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the
The Petition is meritorious. constitutionally protected freedoms invoked
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey by petitioner "are not immune to regulationby
conducted by qualified individuals or group of the State in the legitimate exercise of its police
individuals for the purpose of determining the power," such as in the present case.
probable result of an election by confidentially Thesolicitor general,in supportofthe public
asking randomly selected voterswhom theyhave respondent, addsthat the exitpolls pose a "clear
voted for, immediately after they have officially and present danger ofdestroying the credibility
cast their ballots. The results of the survey are and integrity ofthe electoral process," consider
announced to the public, usually through the ing that they are not supervised by any govern
lijiij mass media,to givean advance overview ofhow, ment agency and can in generalbe manipulated
in the opinion ofthe pollingindividuals or orga easily. He insists that these polls would sow
nizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral confusion among the voters and would under
history, exitpolls had not been resorted to until mine the official tabulation of votes conducted
the recent May 11,1998 elections. by the Commission, as well as the quick count
undertaken by the Namfrel.
In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation maintains that it is a responsible Admittedly, nolaw prohibitsthe holding and
member of the mass media, committed to re the reporting ofexitpolls. Thequestion canthus
port balanced election-related data, including be more narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in
"the exclusive results of Social Weather Station the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls?
lii) (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen administra In answering this question, we need to review
tive regions." quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of
speech and of the press.
It argues that the holding of exit polls and
the nationwide reporting of their results are
valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. It submits that, in precipitately and Comelec Ban on Exit Polling
unqualifiedly restrainingthe holding and the re In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its
porting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused assailed Resolution as having been issued pursu
its discretion and grossly violatedthe petitioner's ant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free,
constitutional rights. orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election.
Public respondent, on the other hand, vehe While admitting that "theconduct ofan exitpoll
mently denies that, in issuingthe assailedReso and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] an
lution, it gravely abusedits discretion. It insists exercise ofpressfreedom," it arguesthat "[p]ress
that the issuance thereof was "pursuant to its freedom may becurtailed if the exercise thereof
constitutional and statutory powers to promote a creates a clear and present danger to the com
clean, honest,orderlyand credible May11,1998 munity or it has a dangerous tendency." It then
elections;" and "toprotect, preserveand maintain contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to
thesecrecy andsanctity oftheballot." It contends sow confusion considering the randomness of
that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly selecting interviewees, which further make[s]
confuse and influence the voters," and that the the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability
surveys were designed "to condition the minds that the results of such exit poll may not be in
ofpeople andcause confusion as to who are the harmony with the official count made by the
winners and the [losers] in the election," which Comelec is everpresent.In otherwords, the exit
in turn may result in "violence and anarchy." poll has a clear and present danger ofdestroy
ing the credibility and integrity of the electoral
Public respondent further arguesthat "exit process."
surveys indirectly violate the constitutional
principle topreserve thesanctity of theballots," Such arguments are purely speculative and
as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of
of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V a survey, the interviewees or participants are
igip
selected at random, so that the results will as erly conducted and publicized — can be vital
much as possible be representative or reflective of tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful
the general sentiment or view of the community and credible elections; and for the elimination
or group polled. Second, the survey result is not of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.
meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion Violation of Ballot Secrecy
of the polling group as to who the electorate in The contention of public respondent that exit
general has probably voted for, based on the polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the
limited data gathered from polled individuals. secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real is-
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and s'ue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots
the integrity of the elections, which are exercises cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is
that are separate and independent from the not at issue here. „
exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the
results of exit polls cannot undermine those of The reason behind the principle of ballot
the elections, since the former is only part of the secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from
indicative of the other. exhibiting the contents of their official ballots
to other persons, from making copies thereof,
The Comelec's concern with the possible non or from putting distinguishing marks thereon
iiiil)
communicative effect of exit polls — disorder so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding
and confusion in the voting centers — does not out the contents of the ballots cast by particular
justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate
assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is
application is without qualification as to whether forbidden is the association of voters with their
the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that
Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive the votes have been cast in accordance with the
Isnij
behavior around the voting centers. There is no instructions of a third party. This result cannot,
showing, however, that exit polls or the means however, be achieved merely through the voters'
to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
Neither has any evidence been presented proving whom they have voted for.
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an
election precinct tends to create disorder or In exit polls, the contents of the official bal
confuse the voters. lot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally pre not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
vents the collection of exit poll data and their use choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed,
for any purpose. The valuable information and narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
ideas that could be derived from them, based on prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or
the voters' answers to the survey questions will suppress incidental problems in the conduct of
forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless exit polls, without transgressing the fundamen
the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, tal rights of our people.
social scientists and the electorate in general
would be deprived of studies on the impact of
current events and of election-day and other C. Social Weather Stations v. Comelec
factors on voters' choices. G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:
With the foregoing premises, we conclude Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc.
that the interest of the state in reducing disrup (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social
tion is outweighed by the drastic abridgment research institution conducting surveys in vari
of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the ous fields, including economics, politics, demog
iiiiJ
media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, raphy, and social development, and thereafter
instead of disrupting elections, exit polls — prop processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting
sgj
tip)

mi)
the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner election day without causing confusion among
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the voters and that there is neither empirical
&ffifc
the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general nor historical evidence to support the conclusion
circulation, which features newsworthy items of that there is an immediate and inevitable dangei
information including election surveys. to the voting process posed by election surveys
They point out that no similar restriction is im
Petitioners brought this action for prohibi posedon politicians from explaining their opinior
tion to enjoin the Commission on Elections from or on newspapers or broadcast media from writ
enforcing §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election ing and publishing articles concerning political
Act), which provides: issues up to the day ofthe election. Consequently,
Surveys affecting national candidates they contend that there is no reason for ordinary
shall not be published fifteen (15) days be voters to be denied access to the results of election
'fjsiik
fore an election and surveys affecting local surveys which are relatively objective.
candidates shall not be published seven (7) Respondent Commissionon Electionsjusti
days before an election. fies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as
The term "election surveys!' is defined in §5.1 necessary to prevent the manipulation and cor
of the law as follows: ruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous
and erroneous surveys just before the election. 11
Election surveys refer to the measure
contends that (1) the prohibition on the publica
ment of opinions and perception ofthe voters
tion of election survey results during the period
as regards a candidate's popularity, qualifi proscribed by law bears a rational connectiontc
cations, platforms or a matter of public dis
the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention o:
cussion in relation to the election, including
the debasement of the' electoral process resulting
voters' preference for candidates or publicly
from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect
discussed issues during the campaign period
and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored
(hereafter referred to as "Survey").
to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and
To implement §5.4,Resolution 3636, §24(h), (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is
dated March 1,2001, of the COMELEC enjoins — minimal, the restriction being limited both ir
$$) Surveys affecting national candidates duration, i.e.,the last 15 days beforethe national
shall not be published fifteen (15) days be election and the last 7 days before a local elec
fore an election and surveys affecting local tion, and in scope as it does not prohibit elec
candidates shall not be published seven (7) tion survey results but only require timeliness
days before an election. Respondent claims that in National Press Clul
v. COMELEC, a total ban on political advertise
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to con ments, with candidates being merely allocated
duct an election survey throughout the period of broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC
the elections both at the national and local levels space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this
and release to the media the results of such sur Court. In contrast, according to respondent, ii
veyas well as publish them directly. Petitioner states that the prohibition in §5.4 of R.A. No
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other 9006 is much more limited.
hand, states that it intends to publish election
surveyresults up to the last day ofthe elections For reasons hereunder given, we hold thai
on May 14, 2001. §5.4ofR.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitu
tional abridgment of freedom of speech, expres
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the sion, and the press.
publication ofelection survey resultsconstitutes
a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of To be sure, §5.4 lays a prior restraint or
speech withoutany clear and present danger to freedom ofspeech, expression, and the press b3
justify suchrestraint. They claim that SWS and prohibiting the publication of election survej
other pollsters conducted and published the re results affecting candidates within the prescribed
sults ofsurveys prior to the 1992,1995, and 1998 periods offifteen (15) days immediately preced
elections up to as close as two days before the inga national election and seven (7) days before
jsiftg)
a local election. Because of the preferred status Instead, MR. JUSTICE KAPUNANpurports
of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, . to engage in a form of balancing by .^weighing
lilsii) and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a and balancing the circumstances to determine
weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, "any whether public interest [in free, orderly, hon
system of prior restraints of expression comes to est, peaceful and credible elections] is served
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
its constitutional validity. . . . The Government rights" (page 7). After canvassing the reasons
'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justifica for the prohibition, i.e., to prevent last-minute
tion for the enforcement of such restraint."' There pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of effect to favor candidates, misinformation, the
validity that inheres in every legislation. "junking" of weak and "losing" candidates by
their parties, and the form of election cheatirig
Nor may it be argued that because of Art.
called "dagdag-bawas" and invoking the State's
IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, which gives the
power to supervise media of information during
COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the
the election period (pages 11-16), the dissenting
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the
opinion simply concludes:
operation of media of communication, no pre
sumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like Viewed in the light of the legitimate and
§5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining significant objectives of Section 5.4, it may be
the ban on media political advertisements, the seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free
grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX- speech and of the press is not unduly repressive
C, §4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere restriction,
time, space, and the right to reply" as well as not an absolute prohibition, on the publication
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the of election surveys. It is limited in duration; it
use of such media facilities for "public informa applies only during the period when the voters
tion campaigns and forums among candidates." are presumably contemplating whom they should
iipj This Court stated: elect and when they are most susceptible to such
unwarranted persuasion. These surveys may be
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4)
published thereafter. (Pages 17-18.)
of the Constitution may be seen to be that
no presumption of invalidity arises in respect The dissent does not, however, show why, on
of exercises of supervisory or regulatory au balance, these considerations should outweigh
thority on the part of the COMELEC for the the value of freedom of expression. Instead, reli
purpose of securing equal opportunity among ance is placed on Art. LX-C, §4. As already stated,
candidates for political office, although such the purpose of Art. IX-C, §4 is to "ensure equal
supervision or regulation may result in some opportunity, time, and space and the right of
limitation of the rights of free speech and reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor
free press. for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates." Hence the validity of the
MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He re
ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that
jects as inappropriate the test of clear and pres
R.A. No. 9006, §14 has lifted the ban and now
ent danger for determining the validity of §5.4.
allows candidates to advertise their candidacies
Indeed, as has been pointed out in Osmena v.
in print and broadcast media. Indeed, to sustain
COMELEC, this test was originally formulated
the ban on the publication of survey results would
for the criminal law and only later appropriated
sanction the censorship of all speaking by candi
for free speech cases. Hence, while it may be use
dates in an election on the ground that the usual
ful for determining the validity of laws dealing
bombast and hyperbolic claims made during the
with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it
campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase
may not be adequate for such regulations as the
the electoral process.
one in question. For such a test is concerned with
questions of the gravity and imminence of the In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a
danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which balancing at the margin. This form of ad hoc
is not the case of §5.4 and similar regulations. balancing predictably results in sustaining the
challenged legislation and leaves freedom of NOTE: Political parties; registration.

speech, expression, and the press with little "Section 80 of the 1965 Election Code and
^)
protection. For anyone who can bring a plausible Section 22 of the 1971 Election Code defined a
justification forward can easily show a rational political party as 'an organized group of persons
connection between the statute and a legitimate
pursuing the same political ideals in a govern
governmental purpose. In contrast, the balancing
ment and includes its branches, and divisions.'
of interest undertaken by then Justice Castro in
The 1978 Election Code adopted the aforequoted
Gonzales v. COMELEC, from which the dissent
in this case takes its cue, was a strong one result
definition by providing in Section 199 that 'any
ing in his conclusionthat §50-BofR.A.No. 4880, other group of persons pursuing the same politi
which limited the period of election campaign cal ideals in government may register with the
and partisan political activity, was an unconsti Commission and be entitled to the same rights
W
tutional abridgment of freedom of expression. and privileges.'"(Geronimo v. Comelec, 107SCRA
614, 627, L-52413, September 26,1981.)
Nor can the ban on election surveys be justi
fiedon the ground that there are other countries * For the purpose of the Interim Batasang
^p^
— 78, according to the Solicitor General, while Pambansa elections in April 1978, the KBL was
the dissent cites 28 — which similarly impose not considered a political party but merely as
restrictions on the publication of election surveys. "an umbrella organization." Laban v. Comelec,
At best this survey is inconclusive. It is notewor 82 SCRA 196 (March 25, 1978). After the 1978
thy that in the United States no restriction on elections, however, the KBL became a party as
the publicationofelectionsurvey results exists. It shown by the actuations of its members, e.g., in
cannot be argued that this is because the United the Interim Batasang Pambansa. (Hence, since
iffi&fr
States is a mature democracy. Neither are there that time, affiliation with or departure from it
laws imposing an embargo on survey results, became covered by Section 10 of the 1973 Con
even for a limited period, in other countries. As stitution on "turncoatisnf.") Sevillaje v. Comelec,
pointed out by petitioners, the United Kingdom, 107 SCRA 141, 156, L-52793 & 53504, August
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 31, 1981; Geronimo v. Comelec, 107 SCRA 614,
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Macedonia; the 626, L-52413, September 26, 1981.)
Netherlands, Norway. Sweden, and Ukraine, The importance of registration of a politi
some of which are no older nor more mature than cal party consists in that (1) it confers juridical
the Phihppines in political development, do not personality on the party; (2)it informs the public
restrict the publication ofelection survey results. of the party's existence and ideals; and (3) it
identifies the party and its officers for purposes
of regulation by the COMELEC. To register for
ffifoj
NOTE: These two last cases are discussed purposes of the electoral process, however, an
again under Article III, Section 4. organization need not be a political party. See
Section 2(5).
SEC. 5. NO PARDON, AMNESTY, PA The conceptofaccreditation, as distinguished
jp)
ROLE, OR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE
from registration, no longer appears in the new
FOR VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS,
Constitution. For purposes of the electoral pro
RULES, AND REGULATIONS SHALL BE
cess, all parties, organizations and coalitions are
GRANTED BY THE PRESIDENTWITHOUT
considered equal.
THE FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION
OF THE COMMISSION.
SEC. 7. NO VOTES CAST IN FAVOR OF
jj-jgl SEC. 6. A FREE AND OPEN PARTY SYS A POLITICAL PARTY, ORGANIZATION, OR
TEM SHALL BE ALLOWED TO EVOLVE COALITION SHALL BE VALID, EXCEPT
ACCORDING TO THE FREE CHOICE OF FOR THOSE REGISTERED UNDER THE
ip> THE PEOPLE, SUBJECT TO THE PRO PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AS PROVIDED IN
VISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. THIS CONSTITUTION.
£ijiJ
ARTICLE LX:CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 759
tyf'b
SEC. 8. POLITICAL PARTIES, OR in the voters' registration boards of election in

ORGANIZATIONS OR COALITIONS REG spectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
ISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYS bodies.However,they shall be entitled to appoint
TEM, SHALL NOT BE REPRESENTED IN poll watchers in accordance with law." Thus,
THE VOTERS' REGISTRATION BOARDS there is again a leveling of all political parties.
OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, BOARDS In fact, the purpose oj Section 8 and Section 7
OF CANVASSERS, OR OTHER SIMILAR is to allow the growth of a multi-party system.
BODIES. HOWEVER, THEY SHALL BE EN
TITLED TO APPOINT POLL WATCHERS
SEC. 9. UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
BY THE COMMISSION IN SPECIAL CASES,
NOTE: The two-party system. THE ELECTION PERIOD SHALL COM
MENCE NINETY DAYS BEFORE THE DAY
The 1935 Constitution and the 1971 Election
OF ELECTION AND SHALL END THIRTY
Code both gave a preferred position to the two
DAYS THEREAFTER.
major political parties. The 1935 Constitution
ffijJ
gave proportional representation in the Com SEC. 10. BONA FIDE CANDIDATES FOR
mission on Appointments to the various par ANY PUBLIC OFFICE SHALL BE FREE
ties — proportional, that is, to the membership FROM ANY FORM OF HARASSMENT AND
strength of the parties in the Senate and House DISCRIMINATION.
of Representatives. In both the Senate and House
SEC. 11. FUNDS CERTIFIED BY THE
Electoral Tribunals, only the two major parties
COMMISSION AS NECESSARY TO DE
enjoyed representation. Since there was no Com
FRAY THE EXPENSES FOR HOLDING
mission on Appointments or Electoral Tribunal
REGULAR AND SPECIAL ELECTIONS,
in the 1973 Constitution, these constitutional
PLEBISCITES, INITIATIVES, REFEREN
advantages enjoyed by the two major parties
DA, AND RECALLS, SHALL BE PROVIDED
were absent in that Constitution. Under the
IN THE REGULAR OR SPECIAL APPRO
new Constitution, representation is given not
PRIATIONS AND, ONCE APPROVED,
just to the two major parties but to all parties
SHALL BE RELEASED AUTOMATICALLY
proportionally.
UPON CERTIFICATION BY THE CHAIR
jjfijj^
Under the 1971 Election Code, only the two MAN OF THE COMMISSION.
major parties had representation in the Registra
tion Board, in the Board of Election Inspectors, in
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
jjjfoi) the Committee on Printing of Official Ballots, and
in the provincial body charged with the duty to SECTION 1. (1) THERE SHALL BE A
verify the official ballots sent to the provinces by COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMPOSED OF
the Bureau of Printing. These advantages disap A CHAIRMAN AND TWO COMMISSION
peared with the adoption in 1973 of Section 9(2): ERS, WHO SHALL BE NATURAL-BORN
"No party or candidate shall have membership in CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND,
the registration board, board of election inspec AT THE TIME OF THEIR APPOINTMENT,
'$0 tors, board of canvassers, or other similar bod AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE,
ies." The 1981 Amendments, however, restored CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
the preferred position of the top two political WITH NOT LESS THAN TEN YEARS OF AU
parties, if accredited, at least in registration DITING EXPERIENCE, OR MEMBERS OF
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of THE PHILIPPINE BAR WHO HAVE BEEN
canvassers, other similar bodies. Moreover, such ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
accredited parties "may by law be granted other FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS, AND MUST
rights or privileges." Under the new Constitution NOT HAVE BEEN CANDIDATES FOR ANY
the concept of accreditation and the consequent ELECTIVE POSITION IN THE ELECTIONS
advantages of accredited parties disappeared. IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THEIR AP
1'$$£
Moreover, Section 8 now says: "Political parties, POINTMENT AT NO TIME SHALL ALL
or organizations or coalitions registered under MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION BE
the party-list system, shall not be represented LONG TO THE SAME PROFESSION.
(2) THE CHAIRMAN AND THE COM THE DEFICIENCIES. IT SHALL KEEP THE
MISSIONERS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY GENERAL ACCOUNTS OF THE GOVERN
THE PRESIDENT WITH THE CONSENT OF MENT AND, FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS BE PROVIDED BY LAW, PRESERVE THE
FOR A TERM OF SEVEN YEARS WITHOUT VOUCHERS AND OTHER SUPPORTING
REAPPOINTMENT. OF THOSE FIRST AP PAPERS PERTAINING THERETO.
POINTED, THE CHAIRMAN SHALL HOLD (2) THE COMMISSION SHALL HAVE
OFFICE FOR SEVEN YEARS, ONE COM EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY, SUBJECT TO
MISSIONER FOR FIVE YEARS; AND THE THE LIMITATIONS IN THIS ARTICLE,
OTHER COMMISSIONER FOR THREE
TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF ITS AUDIT
YEARS, WITHOUT REAPPOINTMENT. AP AND EXAMINATION, ESTABLISH THE
POINTMENT TO ANYVACANCY SHALL BE
TECHNIQUES AND METHODS REQUIRED
ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED PORTION
THEREFOR, AND PROMULGATE AC
OF THE TERM OF THE PREDECESSOR.
COUNTING AND AUDITING RULES AND
IN NO CASE SHALL ANY MEMBER BE
REGULATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE FOR
APPOINTED OR DESIGNATED IN A TEM
THE PREVENTION AND DISALLOWANCE
PORARY OR ACTING CAPACITY.
OF IRREGULAR, UNNECESSARY, EXCES
SEC. 2. (1) THE COMMISSION ON AU SIVE, EXTRAVAGANT, OR UNCONSCIO
DIT SHALL HAVE THE POWER, AUTHOR NABLE EXPENDITURES, OR USES OF
ITY, AND DUTY TO EXAMINE, AUDIT, AND GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND PROPER
SETTLE ALL ACCOUNTS PERTAINING TO TIES.
THE REVENUE AND RECEIPTS OF, AND
EXPENDITURES OR USES OF FUNDS AND 1. Functions of the COA.
PROPERTY, OWNED OR HELD IN TRUST
BY, OR PERTAINING TO, THE GOVERN It is generally the function of the Commission
MENT, OR ANY OF ITS SUBDIVISIONS, on Audit to examine the accuracy of the records
AGENCIES, OR INSTRUMENTALITIES, kept by accountable officers and to determine
INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND whether expenditures have been made in con
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH formity with law. It is therefore through the
ORIGINAL CHARTERS, AND ON A POST- Commission on Audit that the people can verify
AUDIT BASIS: (A) CONSTITUTIONAL whether their money has been properly spent.
BODIES, COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES They may be classified thus: (1) to examine
THAT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FISCAL AU and audit all forms of government revenues; (2)
TONOMY UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION; to examine and audit all forms of government
(B) AUTONOMOUS STATE COLLEGES expenditures; (3) to settle government accounts;
AND UNIVERSITIES; (C) OTHER GOVERN (4) to promulgate accounting and auditing rules
MENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPO "including those for the prevention and disal
RATIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES; lowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
AND (D) SUCH NON-GOVERNMENTAL EN extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures,"
TITIES RECEIVING SUBSIDY OR EQUITY, and (5) to decide administrative cases involving
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FROM OR expenditures of public funds.
THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH
ARE REQUIRED BY LAW OR THE GRANT The Commission's power to "settle accounts"
ING INSTITUTION TO SUBMIT TO SUCH means the power to settle liquidated accounts,
AUDIT AS A CONDITION OF SUBSIDY that is, those accounts which may be adjusted
OR EQUITY. HOWEVER, WHERE THE simply by an arithmetical process. It does not
Iff} INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE include the power to fix the amount of an un
AUDITED AGENCIES IS INADEQUATE, fixed or undetermined debt. Compania General
THE COMMISSION MAY ADOPT SUCH de Tabacos v. French and Unson, 39 Phil. 34,
L MEASURES, INCLUDING TEMPORARY
OR SPECIAL PRE-AUDIT, AS ARE NECES
42 (1919). Another way of looking at this power
was stated by Guevara v. Gimenez, 6 SCRA 807,
SARY and Appropriate to correct 813 (1962) thus:
Under our Constitution, the authority tember 1986 disallowing petitioner's claim for
of the Auditor General, in connection with reimbursement of payments he had advanced
expenditures of the Government is limited for services rendered on "pakyao" basis in the
to the auditing of expenditures of funds or renovation and improvement of the Bureau of
property pertaining to, or held in trust by, Treasury, Iloilo City.
the Government or the provinces or mu Petitioner, Atty. fYaxedio P. Dingcong, was
nicipalities thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the former Acting Regional Director of Regional
the Constitution). Such function is limited Office No. VI of the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo
to a determination of whether there is a law City, until his retirement on 17 January 1984.
appropriating funds for a given purpose;
whether a contract, made by the proper of On three occassions — June 1982, Sep
ficer, has been entered into in conformity tember 1982 and February 1983 — petitioner,
£%ffij
with said appropriation law; whether the after public bidding, contracted, admittedly on
goods or services covered by said contract an "emergency labor basis," the services of one
have been delivered or rendered in pursu Rameses Layson, a private carpenter and elec
ance of the provisions thereof, as attested to
trician on "pakyao" basis for the renovation and
improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office,
by the proper officer; and whether payment
Iloilo City. Layson submitted the lowest bids so
therefor has been authorized by the officials
that the contracts were awarded to him ...
of the corresponding department or bureau.
If these requirements have been fulfilled, it
is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General Subsequently, Layson was hired as a casual
to approve and pass in audit the voucher and employee in the Bureau of Treasury Office in
treasury warrant for said payment. order to do away with the hiring of a private
It should be noted, however, that whereas carpenter and electrician.
under Article XI, section 2, of the 1935 Consti When petitioner retired on 17 January 1984,
tution the Auditor General could not correct "ir among the items disallowed by the Resident Au
regular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant" ditor was the amount of P6,574.00 from the labor
expenditures of public funds but could only contracts with Layson, by reducing the latter's
>$Sst\
"bring [the matter] to the attention of the proper daily rate from P40.00 per day to P18.00 daily.
administrative officer," under the 1973 and 1987
Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the
Constitutions the Commission on Audit may
Commission on Audit, who affirmed the disal
"promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
to lowances as being "excessive and disadvanta
regulations including those for the prevention of geous to the government," but increased Layson's
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant daily rate to P25.00 thereby reducing the total
expenditures or uses of funds and property." amount disallowed to P4,276.00. Despite peti
Hence, since the Commission on Audit must tioner's request for reconsideration, respondent
ultimately be responsible for the enforcement Commission remained unmoved, hence, the
of these rules and regulations, it is submitted instant appeal.
feî that failure to comply with these regulations can
be a ground for disapproving the payment of a On 8 April 1987, we resolved to give due
proposed expenditure. course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda, which
î
2. Cases.
they have done.
Petitioner assails the disallowances as in
A. Dingcong v. Guingona, Jr.
valid for being a usurpation of a management
ii^j 162 SCRA 782 (1988)
function and an impairment of contract.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: We reject petitioner's submission.
An appeal on Certiorari seeking to annul and Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA)
set aside the decision of respondent Commission vested with the power and authority, but it is
on Audit (COA) in its 7th Indorsement of 1 Sep also charged with the duty, to examine, audit
&iiiiJ
and settle all accounts pertaining to x x x the Indeed, the criteria for a daily wage rate
expenditures or uses of funds xxx owned xxx contract can hardly be applied to "pakyao" ar
by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of rangements, the two being worlds apart. In
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities "pakyao" a worker is paid by results. It is akin
(Article LX[D], Section 2[1], 1987 Constitution). to a contract for a piece of work whereby the
That authority extends to the accountsofall per contractor binds himself to execute a piece of
sons respecting funds or properties received or work for the employer, in consideration of a cer
held by them in an accountablecapacity(Section tain price or consideration. The contractor may
26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its juris-' either employ his labor or skill, or also furnish
diction, it determines whether or not the fiscal the material (Article 1713, CivilCode). Not soin a
responsibility that rests directly with the head contract on a daily wage basis, where what is paid
ofthe government agency has beenproperly and for is the labor alone. Under the "pakyao" sys
effectively discharged (Section 25[1], Ibid.), and tem, payment is made in lump sum; the laborer
whether or not there has been loss or wastage makes a profit for himself, which is justified by
of government resources. It is also empowered the fact that any loss would also be borne byhim.
to review and evaluate contracts (Section 18[4], On the other hand, no profit inures to the daily
Ibid.). And, after an audit has been made, its wage worker and no materials are furnished by
auditors issue a certificate of settlement and him. The "pakyao" arrangement is not without
each officer whose account has been audited and its advantages. The tendency to dilly-dally on
settled in whole or in part, stating the balances the work, generally experienced in a daily wage
found due thereon and certified, and the charges
contract, is hardly present in labor on a "pakyao"
or differences arising from the settlement by
basis. The latter can also be more flexible, with
reason of disallowances, charges or suspensions
the need for supervision reduced to a minimum.
(Section 82, Ibid.).
It is not necessarily frowned upon. In fact; it
Viewed in this light, the disallowance made is recognized in the Labo? Code (Article 101),
by COA is neither illegal nor a usurpation of a and even in the Revised Manual of Instructions
management function. The authority of the pe to Treasurers, which provides that êxcept in
titioner, as agency head, to enter into a contract construction or repairs requiring technical skill
is not being curtailed. What COA maintains is such as upon buildings, bridges, water works
that the "pakyao"contract has proveddisadvan structures, culverts, etc., when the total cost of
tageous to the government. the work does not exceed P3,000.00, the same
Addressing this issue now, the payments may be performed under the 'pakyao' contract
for the "pakyao"labor contract were disallowed x x x" (Section 750). In this case, each contract
on the ground that the cost of that contract was with Layson did not exceed P3.000.00.
excessive and, therefore, disadvantageous to the Recourse to a "pakyao" labor contract, there
government in that the rate appliedbypetitioner fore, is not necessarily disadvantageous. In this
was P40.00/day when the prevailing rate at that
case, it was entered into only after public bid
time was only P25.00/day for casuals.
ding pursuant to existing regulations through
We find ourselves in disagreement. canvass among three qualified "bidders." Since
The labor contract entered into by peti Layson submitted the lowest price, each contract
tioner was on the "pakyao" basis. On the other was awarded to him. The Court also notes that
hand, the transaction was audited on a daily Layson was subsequently hired as a casual in
minimum wage rate basis. The result was that the Bureau of Treasury Office in order to do
the emergency nature of the contract was over away with the hiring of a carpenter and electri
looked, a different cost of labor for casuals was cian, thereby exhibiting an awareness on the
imposed, the assistance of two other carpenters petitioner's part of government interests and
who worked with Layson even on Saturdays was a positive effort to avail of cost-cutting options.
disregarded, and Layson's additional skill as WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Commis
an electrician and plumber was not adequately sion on Audit is hereby SET ASIDE.
considered.
I<"tf*>
B. Danville Maritime, Inc. v. COA under the implementing rules of P.D. 1594 which
175 SCRA 701 (1989) governs infrastructure projects to be applicable
in the disposition of government assets.
GANCAYCO, J.:
There is no doubt that awards of public con
tracts thru public bidding is a matter of public
policy as can be gleaned from Section 4 of P.D.
The principal question in this petition is
. 1594 which provides that construction projects
whether or not the public respondent COA com
shall generally be undertaken by contract after
ia> mitted a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
"competitive public bidding." Section 79 of P.D.
that there was a failure of bidding when only one
1445 likewise requires public auction to be the
bid was submitted and subsequently ordered a
primary mode of disposal of public assets. By its
re-bidding.
'iOii very nature and characteristic, a competitive
Petitioner's argument is as follows: The COA public bidding aims to protect the public interest
was in grave error in its perception that when by giving the, public the best possible advantages
Site)
there is only one actual bid submitted, there thru open competition.43 Another self-evident
is consequently no competition and thus there purpose of public bidding is to avoid or preclude
is a "failure of bidding." Competition as an es suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the in
sential element of public bidding merely means the execution of public contracts.44 Public bidding
that the bidding be conducted fairly and openly, of government contracts and for disposition of
with equal opportunity among potential bidders government assets have the same purpose and
to submit bids without being stifled by factors objectives. Their only difference, if at all, is that
Mi
other, than those* contained in properly promul in the public bidding for public contracts the
gated guidelines. In the bidding conducted on award is generally given to the lowest bidder
September 15, 1988, every potential bidder was while in the disposition of government assets the
given a fair and equal opportunity to bid. The award is to the highest bidder.
fact that it was only petitioner which submitted
a bid does not affect the validity of the bidding It must be in this light, that the COA de
conducted, more so, since it was conducted in clared the subject public bidding to be a failure
the presence of and without objections from the in this case, applying the same policy as in gov
ernment infrastructure contracts.
COA representative.
The phrase "public auction" or "public bid
ding" imports a sale to the highest bidder with
We see no reason to disturb the interpreta absolute freedom for competitive bidding.46 Com
tion given by the COA to the term "public bid petitive bidding requires that there be at least
ding" and what constitutes its "failure." No less two (2)bidders who shall compete with each other
than the Constitution has ordained that the on an equal footing for winning the award. If
COA shall have exclusive authority to define there is only one participating bidder, the bidding
the scope of its audit and examination, establish is non-competitive and, hence, falls short of the
the techniques and methods required therefore, requirement. There would, in fact, be no bidding
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules at all since, obviously, the lone participant cannot
and regulations, including those for the preven compete against himself.46
tion and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expen
ditures, or use of government funds and proper
43Fernandez, B.A. Treatise on Government Contracts
ties. [Art. IX, D. Sec. 2(2), 1987 Constitution of Under Philippine Law, page 63; See also Law on Public
the Philippines.! Bidding and Government Contracts, 1961 Ed., Cobacha and
Lucenario, page 6.
The COA, realizing that the applicable law "Supra, Fernandez, page 64; Cobacha, pages 8 to 9.
and rules and regulations as to be disposal of 'Tantuico, Jr., F.S. State Audit Code Philippines An
government assets failed to provide for a clear notated, page 415 citing Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th
ed.; Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., page 119.
definition of "failure of public bidding," of govern "Fernandez, B.A. Treatise on Government Contracts
ment assets, properly considered the definition Under Philippine Law, page 63.
^M)
No doubt a one bidder situation tends to stifle C. Ramos v. Aquino

fair competition. The requirement of having at 39 SCRA 256 (1971)
:&&i
least two bidders prevents any such conduct, ar
tifice, agreement or combinationthat jeopardizes FERNANDO, J.:
the integrity of the bidding. A constitutional question with an element
Well settled is the rule that the construction of novelty is raised in this appeal from a lower
by the office charged with implementing and court order dismissing an action for certiorari and
enforcing the provisions of a statute should be prohibition against the then respondent Fiscal
L given controlling weight.47 In the absence oferror of Rizal, Benjamin H. Aquino, to prevent him
or abuse of power or lack ofjurisdiction or grave from conducting a preliminary investigation. It is
abuse of discretion already conflicting with either whether there is an encroachment on the consti
iiil the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment tutional prerogatives of the Auditor General if,
creating or charging a governmentalagency with after the final approval of certain vouchers by
the administration and enforcement thereof, the him without an appeal being made, an inquiry by
a provincialfiscal to determine whether criminal
action of the agency would not be disturbed by
liability for malversation through falsificationof
the judicial department.48 public,official and commercial documents based
In the case at bar, there is no showing that thereon could lawfully be conducted. The lower
the COA committed grave abuse of discretion. court answered that it could validly be under:
COAhas clearly shown its position to the PNOC taken. We agree that a prosecutor could, without
in its questioned letter-directive advising the offending the constitutional grant of authority to
latter of its misgivings as to why the award was the Auditor General, do so. We therefore affirm.
given to the lone bidder inspite of regulations In the certiorari and prohibition proceeding
previously made known to PNOC and to top it filed with the lower court on June 6, 1967, peti
all, whythe PNOCperfunctorily rejected a much tioners, now appellants, assailed the jurisdiction
|jj£i
higher bid which appears to be more beneficial of respondent Benjamin Aquino, then Provin
to the corporation. Rather than condemn the cial Fiscal of Rizal, to conduct the preliminary
COA as petitioner proposes, the COAshould be investigation of the alleged commission of mal
commended for its zeal and care in insuring that versation through falsification of public, official
the disposition ofthe subject vessel wouldbe in a and commercial documents imputed to them by
manner most advantageous to the government. A the other respondent, then the Commanding
rebidding removes any suspicion that may arise General, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio,Rizal,
out of the sale of the vessel to petitioner under Romeo Espino. The basis for such a petition was
present circumstances. that under the Constitution, the Auditor General
is not onlyvested with the duty to examine or au
The Court holds that a second public bidding dit all expenditures of funds of the Government,
is ordained so that all government transactions but also to audit or investigate and "bring to the
would be competitive and above board. attention of the proper administrative officer
expenditures of funds or property which in his
opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or
extravagant." It is their contention that under
the above, it is incumbent on the Auditor General
to determine whether criminal responsibility for
the anomalydiscoveredin the course ofhis audit
or examination ofthe accounts lies. It was further
•"Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner ofCus contended that the decisions of the Auditor Gen
toms,29SCRA 617(1969), and Ramas v. CourtofIndustrial
Relations, 21 SCRA 1281 (1969). eral on the correctness of the vouchers on which
48Sagun, et al. v. People's Homesite and Housing Cor the alleged offenses were based having become
poration, G.R. No. L-44738, June 22, 1988; Guardiano v. final and irrevocable, not even the courts could
Encarnacion, 29 SCRA 326 (1969); Alvarez v. Board of substitute its findings. Otherwise the provision
Liquidators, 4 SCRA 195(1962); Grandev. Santos,98Phil.
61 (1965).
of law that vouchers, claims or accounts "once
finally settled shall in no case be opened or by the government as well as the provinces or
j-iftfol
reviewed except as herein provided" would be municipalities thereof. That is one thing. The
meaningless if the army authorities and respon ascertainment of whether a crime committed
dent Fiscal were permitted to proceed with the and by whom is definitely another.
preliminary investigation to determine whether
There is thus a manifest failure on the part
criminal cases could be filed.
of appellants to appreciate correctly the consti
tutional objective in the conferment of authority
on the Auditor General. It is based on the fun
After an opposition was filed by petitioner to
damental postulate that in the division of pow
the aforesaid motion to dismiss on November 21,
ers, the control over the purse remains with the
1967, the lower court, in an order of December
legislative branch. There is the explicit require
20, 1967, dismissed the petition. In support of
ment then that there be no expenditure of public
such an order, it was set forth in such order of
funds except in pursuance of an appropriation
dismissal: 'The Provincial Fiscal is only studying
made by law. There is need, therefore, for an en
whether or not, as complained of, from the these
accounts or vouchers which have already been
actment to permit disbursement from the public
passed in audit by the Auditor General or his treasury. Nor does fidelity to this constitutional
representatives more than three years ago, there mandate end there. There must be compliance
is a crime to be prosecuted in which the petition with the terms of the statute. If it were not so,
ers are answerable." It was further emphasized: to the extent that there is a deviation, there is
"Were the theory of the petitioners to prevail, a frustration of the legislative will. It is obvious
then the Auditor General will be arrogating that Congress itself is not in a position to over
unto himself duties which pertain to the judicial see and supervise the actual release of each and
branch of the government." The last ground on every appropriation. That is where the Auditor
which the plea that the petition be dismissed General comes in. It is the responsibility of his
was sustained is the principle that one "cannot office to exact obedience to any law that allows
i^sii
restrain the Fiscal, by means of injunction from the expenditure of public funds. He serves as
prosecuting [this] case." the necessary check to make certain that no
department of the government, especially its
The matter was duly elevated on appeal to
main spending arm. the Executive, exceeds the
this Court on January 3, 1968. The brief for pe
statutory limits of the appropriations to which it
titioners as appellants was filed on March 6 of
is entitled. That is the purpose and end calling
that year. With the submission of the brief for
for the creation of such an office, certainly not
respondents as appellees on May 3, 1968 the
the enforcement of criminal statutes.
appeal was deemed submitted. As set forth at
the outset, there is no legal ground for reversing So it has been made clear by the then Del
the lower court. egate, later President, Manuel Roxas in the
1. Appellants, in their brief, reiterate their Constitutional Convention of 1934, To the ques
tion as to the method or means to determine
principal argument that the order of the lower
court dismissing their petition and thus allow whether public funds are spent in accordance
ing their investigation by respondent Fiscal to with the congressional will, this was his answer:
proceed, did amount to an encroachment on "The only means provided in our Constitution,
the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor as in the constitutions in other countries, is the
ip^l
General. Such a contention lacks merit. It be office of the auditor; therefore, if the auditor is
trays on its face a lack of understanding of the a check on the Executive, it is not wise to make
constitutional provision relied upon. The Auditor the auditor depend on the Executive. For another
General, as noted, is vested with the power to ways, the Executive, if he is able to influence the
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertain auditor, may prevent the proper checking of the
ing to the revenues and receipts from whatever expenditures of the public money."49 For such a
source, and to audit, in accordance with law and
administrative regulations, all expenditures of 49V. Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional
funds or property pertaining to or held in trust Convention, 636 (1967).
dignitary to live up to such grave responsibihty, be opened or reviewed except as herein pro
he must, according to Delegate Roxas, be in vided." The paragraph immediately preceding
&&J
dependent,not onlyofthe President but even of should have disabused the minds of appellants
Congress, evenifhe werein a true and vital sense of any cause for optimism. All that it provides
fulfilling a task appertaining to it. Thus: "In the for is that in case any settled account "appears
United States, while the auditor is appointed to be infected with fraud, collusion or error of
by the President with the advice and consent of calculation or when new and material evidence
the United States Senate, the office is kept as is discovered, the Auditor General may, within
an independent office — independent [of] the three years after original settlement, opensuch
Executive and independent [of] the Legislature, account, and after a reasonable time for his
because he has not only to check the accounts reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new
of the Executive, but also the accounts of the balance." The official given the opportunity for
iikftj
Legislature."50 a reply or appearance is the provincial auditor,
It could be that appellants were not com for under the first paragraph of this particular
pletelyoblivious to the force ofthe observations. section, the Auditor General at any time before
They therefore did seek to lend plausibility to the expiration of three years after the making
their contention with the reminder that there is of any settlement by a provincial auditor, may,
likewise included in the constitutional provision of his own motion, review and revise the same
in question the task incumbent on the Auditor' and certify a new balance. Nowhere does it ap
General to "bring to the proper administrative pear that such a statutory grant of authority
officer expenditures of funds or property which, of the Auditor General to open revised settled
in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, exces accounts carries with it the power to determine
sive,or extravagant." From which,by a processof who may be prosecuted in the event that in the
construction rather latitudinarian in character, preparation thereofa crimehas beencommitted.
they would imply that on the Auditor General The conclusive effect of the finality of his deci
§£\ alone rests the determination of whether or not sion on the executive branch of the government
criminal liability is incurred for any anomaly thus relates solely to the administrative aspect
discovered in the course of his audit or exami of the matter.
nation. Such a conclusion is at war with the
From the constitutional, no less than the
controlling doctrine. As construed in Guevara v.
Gimenez,51 at most such a duty goes no further statutory standpoint then, this claim of appel
then requiring him to call the attention of the lants finds no support. It has nothing but nov
proper administrative officer of the existence elty to call for any attention being paid to it. It
of such a situation but does not even extend to is singularly unpersuasive. To repeat, it would
the power "to refuse and disapprove payment be to stretch to unwarranted limits the consti
of such expenditures, * * *." Much less then tutional power thus conferred on the Auditor
could it justify the assertion devoid of any legal General to accede to such a plea. Nothing is bet
justification that even the ascertainment of any ter settled than that, broad and comprehensive
as it is, it does not include a participation in the
L possible criminal liability is likewise a part and
parcel of such constitutional competence of the investigation ofcharges to determine whether or
Auditor General. How, then, can it be said that not a criminalprosecutionshouldbe instituted.62
their plea is thereby strengthened? Thus, the first two errors ofthe appellants which
wouldimpugn the order ofdismissal for reaching
There is likewise an invocation by appellants
a similar conclusion are disposed of.
of alleged statutory support for their untenable
view. It is likewise in vain. All that appellants
&Mi"
have to go on is the concluding paragraph of
section 657 of the Revised Administrative Code:
"Accounts once finally settled shall in no case
52Cf. Guevara v. Gimenez, L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962, 6
"Ibid, p. 637. SCRA 807; Villegas v. Auditor General, L-17888, Oct. 29,
"L-17115, Nov. 30,1962, 6 SCRA 807. 1968, 25 SCRA 754.
lfeM>
D. Mamaril v. Domingo As can be gleaned from the foregoing pro

G.R. No. 100284, October 13, 1993 visions of the Constitution, state audit is not
limited to the auditing ofthe accountable officers
QUIASON, J.: and the settlement of accounts, but includes
accounting functions and the adoption in the
aifej
audited agencies of internal controls to see to it,
Petitioner contended that he could not be among other matters, that the correct fees and
held liable on the audit disallowances because he penalties due the government are collected.
was not an accountable officer within the mean
ing of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445 (1978) since:
(a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he did not E. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela
come into possession of any money or property G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992
for which he is now asked to pay; and (c) he did
not act in bad faith or with gross negligence. He PARAS, J.:
further contended that Decision No. 1614 itself
advised the agency concerned to take necessary
measures towards the collection of the under Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as
collections the delinquent partiesJliable for the not vahd. It contends that the contract ofsale has
payment of the fees and penalties (Petition, pp. not been perfected between the Province of Isa
2-4; Rollo, pp. 6-8). bela and petitioner but delivery has been made
by it with the corresponding partial payment
The Court is asked to define the scope
by the Province of Isabela. Thus, it is allegedly
of the power of the Commission on Audit under incumbent upon COA to authorize the payment
the 1987 Constitution. of the balance because to act otherwise will con
The responsibility for state audit is vested stitute an impairment of contract.
by the Constitution on the Commissionon Audit. We reject petitioner's contention.
Under the Constitution, the COA "shall In the exercises of the regulatory power vest
have the power, authority, and duty to examine, ed upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
audit, and settle all accounts, pertaining to the on Audit adheres to the policy that government
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses funds and property should be fully protected and
of funds and property, owned or held in trust conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, exces
by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of sive or extravagant expenditures or uses*>f such
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, funds arid property should be prevented. On the
.... However, where the internal control system proposition that improper or wasteful spending
jiiiai)
of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Com of public funds or immoral use of government
mission may adopt such measures, including property, for being highly irregular or unneces
temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary sary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant,
and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves
shall keep the general accounts of the Govern the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto.
ment and, for such period as may be provided by (Tantuico, State Audit CodePhilippines, p. 235)
law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto." (Art. LX-D, Sec. 2, In the cases of Danville Maritime, Inc. v.
par. 1). Commission on Audit, 175 SCRA 701 (1989)
and DM. Consuji, Inc. v. Commission onAudit,
Section 2(2) of the above article states that 199 SCRA 549 (1991), We defined the role ofthe
the COAis given the "exclusive authority, subject COA in this wise:
to the limitations in this Article to define the
scopeof its audit and examination, establish the ... No less than the Constitution has
technique and methods required therefor, and ordained that the COA shall have exclusive
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and authority to define the scope ofits audit and
regulations,..." examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate FOUR HUNDRED NINETEEN THOUSAND

accounting and auditing rules and regula AND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P5,419,180.00)
tions, including those for the prevention PESOS, specifically "for the construction of Cebu
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary City Abbatoir (sic)." After a public bidding, H.
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable Franco Construction Company, Inc. (HFCCI)
expenditures or use of government funds was awarded to do the construction of the abat
and properties. (Art. IX D, Sec. 2[2], 1987 toir. Thus, the City of Cebu, through its Mayor,
Constitution of the Philippines.) Ronald R. Duterte, entered into a contract with
•>
HFCCI,....
Indeed, not only is the Commission on Audit
(COA) vested with the power and authority, but
is also charged with the duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to... the expen-' On March 13, 1986, Sen. John H. Osmena,
diture or uses of funds ... owned by or pertaining then Officer-In-Charge of the City of Cebu, or
to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, dered the suspension of the project and review of
agencies or instrumentalities (Article IX [D-l] the contract by the GOA. He also wrote HFCCI
Section 2[1], 1987 Constitution). That authority asking them to account for the value of their
extends to the accounts of all persons respecting progress. On April 24,1986, HFCCI claimed the
funds or properties received or held by them in amount of TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED
^•jfol any accountable capacity.(Section 26, P D. No. FORTY TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it de SIXTY FOUR AND 29/100(P2,142,964.29) PE
termines whether or not the fiscal responsibility SOS as the value of the work accomplished.
that rests directly with the-head of the govern Unable to collect the said amount after so
ii)
ment agency has been properly and effectively many demands, HFCCI instituted a civil action,
discharged (Section 25 [1] Ibid), and whether or dated May 21, 1987 against the City of Cebu, for
not there has been loss or wastage of government recovery of investment and aamages.
resources. It is also empowered to review and
evaluate contracts.(Section 18 [4], Ibid.) And, In its answer dated June 5, 1987, the City
after an audit has been made, its auditors issue a of Cebu, while admitting having entered into a
certificate of settlement to each officer whose ac contract with HFCCI, alleged that the contract
count has been audited and settled in whole or in it entered into was null and void as declared by
part, stating the balances found due thereon and the Commission on Audit in its 2nd Indorsement
certified, and the charges or differences arising dated September 4, 1986. Therefore whatever
from the settlement by reason of disallowances, amount is due to HFCCI is to the sole liability
charges or suspensions. (Sec. 82, Ibid.) (Dingcong of the officer or officers who entered into the said
v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782) contract.
VIEWED in this light, the disallowance made Nevertheless, on December 15,1988, the City
by the respondent Commission on Audit is not of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas R. Osmena,
without any Constitutional and legal basis. We, entered into a compromise agreement, approved
therefore, affirm the same. by the court, to the effect that as a full and final
settlement to the claim of HFCCI, the City of
Cebu shall pay the amount of ONE MILLION
F. Osmena v. Commission on Audit FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (Pl,500,000.00)
G.R. No. 98355, March 2, 1994 PESOS.
On the strength of the Court's Order dated

NOCON,J.:
March 3, 1989 the Provincial Deputy Sheriff,
Sometime in 1985 the City of Cebu decided RTC, Branch 5, Cebu City was ordered on March
to construct a modern abattoir. For this project, 8, 1989, to serve a writ of execution against
the City Treasurer, Ricardo Pestano, issued a the City of Cebu through its Mayor, Tomas R.
certificate of availability of funds dated April Osmena. Thus, the amount of Pl,500,000.00
30, 1985, in the amount of FIVE MILLION and P15,052.00, as lawful fees, were garnished
•iîfr*
tiijjii)
from the City's funds deposited in the Philippine Petitioner argues that the decision of COA
National Bank. invalidating the contract between the City of
Cebu and HFCCI was void since it was already
jiiiii) The trial court's judgment based on the com
executed and fulfilled. Petitioner further stresses
promise agreement was referred to the COA's
that COA has no authority to declare a contract
Regional Director, who in turn indorsed the same alreadyexecuted void. £nd since the 2ndIndorse
to the Chairman of the COA. In its 3rd Indorse
t^j ment is a nullity, it never attained finality.
ment dated May 2,1989, the COA ruled that:
The petition is devoid of merit.
It may not be disputed that the contract
for the construction of the Cebu City Abat The Commission on Audit has the power,
'$0
toir was declared void in a 2nd Indorsement authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
dated September 4,1986, ofthis Commission. all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of
And since no appeal appears to have been and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
taken thereon, said decision became final. owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies
Consequently, "if a compromise is based or instrumentalities.
upon an antecedent claim which is undisput-'
edly and undoubtedly illegal, the compromise The Auditing Code of the Phihppines (P.D.
may be considered invalid on the ground of 1445) further provides that no contract involving
illegality as well as lack of consideration." the expenditure of public funds shall be entered
^^
(Sec. 29,15 Am. Jur 2d) Besides the compro: into unless there is an appropriation therefor
mise agreement entered into by the City of and the proper accounting official of the agency
Cebu with H. Franco Construction Co., Inc., concerned shall have certified to the officer enter
after the contract by and between them had ing into the obligation that funds have been duly
&> been declared void by this Commission, is a appropriated for the purpose and the amount
• circumvention of the constitutional provision necessary to cover the proposed contract for the
that the party aggrieved by any decision, or current year is available for expenditure on ac
der or ruling of the Commission may within count thereof. Any contract entered into contrary
thirty (30)days from receipt ofa copythereof to the foregoing requirements shall be VOID.
appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court
(Sec. 2-2, Art. XII-D,1973 Constitution; Sec. Clearly then, the contract entered into by the
7, Art, IX-A, 1987 Constitution). former Mayor Duterte was void from the very
beginning since the agreed cost for the project
Under the circumstances, this Commis- (P8,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropri
.sion concurs in the view expressed by that ated amount (P5.419,180.00) as certified by the
Office that the expenditure involved would CityTreasurer. Hence, the contract was properly
,be the personal'liability ofthe officer directly declared void and unforceable in COA's 2nd In
responsible for its incurrence (Sec. 103,P.D. dorsement, dated September 4, 1986. The COA
No. i445). declared and we agree, that:
Petitioner's request for reconsideration ofthe
above ruling was denied in COA's 5th Indorse
ment dated January 23,1991, hence this petition, Petitioner cannot hide behind the argument
with the following arguments: that the payment was made in compliance with
the trial court's judgment. As correctly stated by
1) the decision ofthe Public Respondent the Solicitor General:
as contained in the 2nd Indorsement dated
September 4,1986 is null and voidfor having Since petitioner and HFCCI knew of the
been made without, in excess of jurisdiction absolute invalidity of said Abattoir Contract,
or with grave abuse of discretion; the Compromise Agreement relative to the
2) that Public Respondent's decision petitioner's obligation resulting from said
has never become final because it was made Abattoir contract is also void and inexistent
without, in excess of jurisdiction, or with and the decision based on said Compromise
grave abuse of discretion. Agreement is unenforceable against the
j^)
City of Cebu. (Art. 1422, Civil Code of the Hence this petition.
Phihppines.)
The issue to be resolved is whether such
The trial court's decision based on the com denial to give due course to the appeal of herein
promise agreement could not have ratified a petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion
contract which is void ab initio. Consequently the amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
settlement of the supposed obligation of the City
Grave abuse of discretion implies such ca
of Cebu arising out of a void contract becomes
pricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
a personal liability of petitioner who is directly
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other
$0 responsible therefor. words where the power is exercised in an arbi
trary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent
G. Bustamante v. Commission on Audit and gross as tc amount to an evasion of positive
G.R. No. 103309, November 27, 1992 duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.53
CAMPOS, JR., J.: It is beyond dispute that the discretion
This petition for Certiorariwith Preliminary exercised in the denial of the appeal is within
Injunction seeks to annul and set aside the De the power of the Commission on Audit as it is
cision of the respondent Commision on Audit provided in the Constitution:
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission),
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall
dated February 5,1991 which denied due course
have the following powers and functions:
to the appeal of petitioner from the disallowance
by Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian "(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in ac
of petitioner's claim for transportation allowance cordance with law and regulations, all
for the period covering the month of January accounts pertaining titTthe revenues and
1989 in the amount of Pl.250.00. receipts of, and expenditures or uses offunds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or
Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
Northern Luzon Region Center covering the
including government-owned or controlled
provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was
corporations; keep the general accounts of
issued a government vehicle with plate number
the Government and, for such period as may
SCC 387. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected
be provided by law, preserve the vouchers
in the Board Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing
pertaining thereto; and promulgate ac
the monthly disbursement of transportation
counting and auditing rules and regulations
allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use
including those for the prevention of irregu
of Government vehicle, claimed his transporta
lar, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant
tion allowance for the month of January 1989.
expenditures or uses of funds and property.
On May 31, 1990, the petitioner received an
..." (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.)
Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17,
1990 from respondent Regional Auditor Martha In the exercise of such power it promulgated
Roxana Caburian disallowing Pl,250.00 repre COA. Circular No. 75-6 dated November 7,1975,
senting aforesaid transportation allowance. regulating the use of government motor vehicles,
In a letter to the said Regional Auditor dated aircrafts and watercrafts, which, among others,
June 18, 1990, the petitioner moved for recon provides: *
sideration of the disallowance of the claim for
transportation allowance. The Regional Auditor
denied petitioner's motion in a letter dated June "Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 265 (1979);
27, 1990. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Alhambra Cigar Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc. v. National Admin
Commission on Audit at Quezon City, which istrator of Regional Office No. 2, Dept. of Labor, 14 SCRA
1019 (1965); Hamoy v. Hon. Sec. of Agriculture & Natural
denied it due course. Resources, et al., 106 Phil. 1046 (1960).
£££)
"VI. Prohibition Against Use of Govern The factual finding of the Commission that
ment Vehicles by Officials provided with petitioner was indeed assigned a government
jgi)
transportation allowance. vehicle is conclusive upon this Court. The pe
titioner faults respondent Regional Auditor for
"No official who has been furnished motor
relying on her serious doubts as to the nature of
transportation allowance by any government
aiiil the use of the vehicle^ assigned to petitioner as
corporations or other office shall be allowed basis for the disallowance. We hold, however,
to use motor vehicle transportation operated that such issue is immaterial in the case at bar
and maintained from funds appropriated in for the COA circular, in prohibiting the use of mo
the abovecited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D. 733)." tor vehicles by officials receiving transportation
The petitioner takes exception from the allowance, is categorical. The use of government
coverage of said circular contending that such motor vehicle and the claim for transportation
M)
circular did not mention the NPC as one of the allowance are mutually exclusive. It is on this
corporations/offices covered by it. We do not agree basis that the Pl,250.00 transportation allow
with him for it is very patent that the circular is ance was disallowed.
addressed, among others, to managing heads of Construed in the light of the applicable law
Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, and rules on the matter, the decision of the Com
the NPC being held under such category ofcorpo missioner on Audit disallowing the petitioner's
rations. Petitioner goes on to argue that existing claim for transportation allowance does not
NPC policy grants transportation allowance to indicate a grave abuse of discretion which will
employees in the likes of petitioner. Under the warrant setting aside and nullifying the said
NPC Charter, R.A. 6395, petitioner contends that COA ruling.
the NPC has the power to formulate and adopt
policies and measures for the management and WHEREOF, the instant petition is hereby
operation of the NPC, Pursuant thereto, NPC DISMISSED for lack of merit. With costs against
passed Resolution No. 81-95 dated April 20, the petitioner.
1981 authorizing the monthly reimbursement
of representation and transportation allowance.
This was implemented by Circular 81-11 dated
H. Orocio v. Commission on Audit
April 22, 1988. He then contends that the COA
G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992
Circular Nos. 75-6 and 75-6A should be limited
in their application to the NPC.
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's con The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987
tention that the Commission, in the exercise of Constitutions, is a collegial body. It must re
its power granted by the Constitution, usurped solve cases presented to it as such Its General
ri'M>\
the statutory functions of the NPC, Board of Counsel cannot act for the Commission for he is
Directors for it leads to the absurd conclusion not even a Commissioner thereof. He can only
that a mere Board of Directors of a government- offer legal advice or render an opinion in order
owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a to aid the COA in the resolution of a case or a
resolution, can put to naught a constitutional legal question.
provision which has been ratified by the majority
of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Thus, Nepomuceno's 5th indorsement can
Commission's power and duty to examine, audit not, by any stretch of the imagination, be con
and settle accounts pertaining to this particular sidered as a "decision" of the COA. If the same
expenditure or use offunds and property, owned were to be so considered, it would be void ab
or held in trust by this government-owned and initio for having been rendered by one who is
controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be ren not possessed with any power or authority. In
dering inutile this Constitutional Bodywhichhas Mison v. Commission on Audit, this Court held
been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in that a so-called decision, denominated as Deci
safeguarding the proper use ofthe government's, sion No. 77-142 by the Manager of the Technical
and ultimately, the people's property. Service Office of the COA, "by authority of the
[tjnf
L 772
acting chairman" is "substantively void ab initio," in declaring that petitioner cannot avail of the
because it was rendered without jurisdiction. 'It right to offset any amount that it may be required
fe)
had an essential inherent defect that could not under the law to remit to the OPSF against any
be cured or waived." amount that it may receive by way of reimburse
ment therefrom are sufficient to bring this peti
What Mr. Nepomuceno should have done was tion within Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and,
te$i
to render the opinion precisely sought for in the considering further the importance of the issues
preceding 4th indorsement of respondent Ursal raised, the error in the designation of the remedy
dated 30 May 1985, and submit the same to the pursued will, in this instance, be excused.
Commission for the latter's guidance in resolving
the motion for reconsideration. The issues raised revolve around the OPSF
created under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 137
I. Caltex Philippines v. COA
G.R. No. 92585, May 8, 1992
iMi As to the power of the COA, which must first
DAVIDE, JR., J: be resolved in view of its primacy, We find the
This is a petition erroneously brought under theory of petitioner that such does not extend to
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court 1 questioning the the disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, ex
sy)
authority of the Commission on Audit (COA) in cessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expendi
disallowing petitioner's claims for reimburse tures, or use of government funds and properties,
ment from the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
but only to the promulgation of accounting and
auditing rules for, among others, such disallow
(OPSF) and seeking the reversal of said Commis
ance — to be untenable in the light of the provi
sion's decision denying its claims for recovery of
sions of the 1987 Constitution and related laws.
financing charges from the Fund and reimburse
Mill ment of underrecovery arising from sales to the Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the
National Power Corporation, Atlas Consolidated 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS)
SECTION 2. (1). The Commission on Au
and Marcopper Mining Corporation (MARCOP-
dit shall have the power, authority, and duty
PER), preventing it from exercising the right to
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
offset its remittances against its reimbursement
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
vis-a-vis the OPSF and disallowing its claims
expenditures or uses of funds and property,
&f\
which are still pending resolution before the Of owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
fice of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the Department the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
of Finance (DOF). agencies or instrumentalities, including
Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, any government-owned and controlled corpora
decision, order or ruling of the Constitutional tions with original charters, and on a post-
Commissions may be brought to this Court on audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, com
y^&i certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty missions and offices that have been granted
(30) days from receipt of a copy thereof. The cer fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
tiorari referred to is the special civil action for autonomous state colleges and universities;
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
Considering, however, that the allegations such non-governmental entities receiving
that the COA acted with: (a) total lack of ju subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly,
risdiction in completely ignoring and showing from or through the government, which are
absolutely no respect for the findings and rulings required by law or the granting institution
of the administrator of the fund itself and in to submit to such audit as a condition of sub
disallowing a claim which is still pending reso sidy or equity. However, where the internal
\m
lution at the OEA level, and (b) "grave abuse of control system of the audited agencies is
discretion and completely without jurisdiction" inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
ARTICLE Dfc CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 773
measures, including temporary or special lations, all expenditures of funds or property

pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate . pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the
to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the Auditor General to bring to the attention of
general accounts, of the Government and, the proper administrative officer expendi
for such period as may be provided by law, tures of funds or property which, in his opin
%J preserve the vouchers and other supporting ion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
papers pertaining thereto. or extravagant. He shall also perform such
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive other functions as may be prescribed by law.
u0 authority, subject to the limitations in this As clearly shown above, in respect to irregu
Article, to define the scope of its audit and lar, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expen
examination, establish the techniques and ditures or uses of funds, the 1935 Constitution
methods required therefor, and promulgate did not grant the Auditor General the power to
accounting and auditing rules and regula issue rules and regulations to prevent the same.
tions, including those for the prevention His was merely to bring that matter to the atten
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, tion of the proper administrative officer.
i&0
excessive, extravagant, or, unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds The ruling on this particular point, quoted
and properties. by petitioner from the cases of Guevarra v. Gi
menez54 and Ramos v. Aquino,55 are no longer
These present powers, consistent with the controlling as the two (2) were decided in the
declared independence of the Commission, are light of the 1935 Constitution.
broader and more extensive than that conferred
by the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the There can be no doubt, however, that the
Commission was empowered tc: audit power of the Auditor General under the
1935 Constitution and the Commission on Audit
Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance under the 1973 Constitution authorized them to
with law and regulations, all accounts per disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of
taining to the revenues, and receipts of, and funds and property. Our present Constitution
expenditures or uses of funds and property, retains that same power and authority further
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
strengthened by the definition of the COA's gen
the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
eral jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government
agencies, or instrumentalities including gov
Auditing Code of the Philippines56 and Admin
ernment-owned or controlled corporations;
istrative Code of 1987. Pursuant to its power to
keep the general accounts of the Government
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
and, for such period as may be provided by
regulations for the prevention of irregular, un
law, preserve the vouchers pertaining there
necessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures
to; and promulgate accounting and auditing
igi or uses of funds,57 the COA promulgated on 29
rules and regulations including those for the
March 1977 COA Circulation No. 77-55. Since
prevention of irregular, unnecessary, exces
sive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of
the COA is responsible for the enforcement of
funds and property. (Art. IX. A. Sec. 1.) the rules and regulations, it goes without say
ing that failure to comply with them is a ground
Upon the other hand, under the 1935 Con for disapproving the payment of the proposed
stitution, the power and authority of the COA's expenditure. As observed by one of the Commis
precursor, the General Auditing Office, were, un sioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
fortunately, limited; its very role was markedly Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas:58
passive. Section 2 of Article XI thereof provided:
%i
SECTION 2. The Auditor General shall "6 SCRA 807 (1962).
examine, audit, and settle all accounts per M39 SCRA 641 (1971).
taining to the revenues and receipts from MP.D. No. 1445.
67The 1987 Constitution adds one (1) more category of
whatever source, including trust funds
such expenditure —unconscionable.
derived from bond issues; and audit, in ac "BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
cordance with law and administrative regu OF THE PHILIPPINES 372 (1988).
'Mtfi
It should be noted, however, that where 1. Provide services on administrative and

as under Article XI, Section 2, of the 1935 legal matters.
Constitution the Auditor General could not
correct 'irregular, unnecessary, excessive or 2. Facilitate, coordinate between the Office
extravagant' expenditures of public funds of the Project Director and the Project Manager,
but could only Taring [the matter] to the at and the Office of the Regional Legal Counsel and
tention of the proper administrative officer,' other NPC Offices, Local Government Units and
under the 1987 Constitution, as also under Agencies of Government involving administra
the 1973 Constitution, the Commission on tive cases and legal problems..
if!
Audit can 'promulgate accounting and audit 3. Provide direction, supervision, coordina
ing rules and regulations including those for tion and control of right-of-way activities in the
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, project.
ijp) unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures o uses of gov 4. Perform other pertinent services as may
ernment funds and properties.' Hence, since be assigned him by the Project Director and
the Commission on Audit must ultimately Project Manager from time to time.
tet>\
be responsible for the enforcement of these The contract provided that in consideration
rules and regulations, the failure to comply for services rendered, Satorre would receive a
with these regulations can be a ground for monthly salary P21,749.00 plus representation
disapproving the payment of a proposed and transportation allowance of P5,300.
expenditure.
On 12 January 1995, Unit Auditor Alexander
Indeed, when the framers of the last two A. Tan, NPC-VRC, Cebu City issued Notice of
i^sfj (2) Constitutions conferred upon the COA a Disallowance No. 95-0001-135-94 for the pay
more active role and invested it with broader ment of the services rendered by Atty. Satorre
and more extensive powers, they did not intend for the period covering March to December 1995
(g&j
merely to make the COA a toothless tiger,, but in the total amount of P283.763.39. The following
rather envisioned a dynamic, effective, efficient reasons were cited for said disallowance:
and independent watch dog of the Government.
1) The contract for services did not have
the written conformity and acquiescence of the
Solicitor General or the Corporate Counsel and
J. Polloso v. Gangan & COA concurrence of the Commission on Audit as
G.R. No. 140563, July 14, 2000 required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated
April 2,1986.
KAPUNAN, J.:
2) The contract was not supported with
Before this Court is a petition1for review from Certificate of Availability of Funds as required
iitfi
the decision of the Commission On Audit (COA), under Sec. 86 of P.D. 1445.
dated 28 September 1999 of herein petitioner
Dante M. Polloso, from the disallowance by the 3) The contract was not submitted to the
COA Unit Auditor of the amount of P283,763.39 Civil Service Commission for final review and
representing payment of legal services rendered was not forwarded to the Compensation and
by Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre to the National Position Confirmation and Classification Bureau,
Power Corporation (NPC). DBM for appropriate action as required in CSC
MC # 5 Series of 1985.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Accordingly, the following were held to be
In 1994, the National Power Corporation personally liable for the amounts due to Atty.
(NPC), represented by its-President Dr. Francisco Satorre: Dr. Francisco Viray, NPC contracting
L. Viray entered into a service contract with Atty. party; Manolo C. Marquez, for certifying the
Benemerito A. Satorre. Under said contract, claim as necessary, lawful and authorized; An
Satorre was to perform the following services for drea B. Roa and Romeo Gallego, for verifying
the Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection the supporting documents to be complete and
Projects of the NPC: proper; Jesus Alino, for reviewing the support-
ARTICLE K: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • ^775
tiiJ
ing documents to be complete and proper; Dante NANT TO SEC. 5, ARTICLE Vn OF THE 1987
M. Polloso, Project Manager II, Leyte-Cebu PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
Interconnection Project (LCIP), National Power III. DOES SECTION 38, CHAPTER 9,
Corporation-Visayas Regional Center, for ap BOOK I OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292,
proving the claim; and Benemerito Satorre, as OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ADMINISTRA
the payee.
TIVE CODE OF 1987 APPLY TO PETITIONER
On 27 January 1995, only petitioner Dante FOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND
Polloso submitted a letter-explanation refuting WITHOUT MALICE AND MERELY IMPLE
ij^jj the alleged violation contained in the Notice of MENTED A VALID CONTRACT ENTERED
Disallowance and sought reconsideration thereof. INTO BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATION
This was denied by the Unit Auditor in,a resolu AL POWER CORPORATION?
tion, dated 30 March 1995.
IV. DOES THE PRINCIPLE OF "QUAN
On 10 October 1995, petitioner appealed TUM MERUIT' APPLY TO THE SERVICES
the denial of the Unit Auditor to the Regional RENDERED BY ATTY. SATORRE WHICH
Director, COARegional Office No.VH;the latter BENEFITED THE NATIONAL POWER COR
denied the same. PORATION?
On 29 June 1998, a petition for review was The petition is without merit.
filed before the Commission Proper, Commission
on Audit, Central Office. On 29 October 1999, In the main, petitioner posits that the phrase
the COA issued the decision assailed before this "handling of legal cases" should be construed to
Court. The dispositive portion thereof, reads: mean as conduct of cases or handling of court
cases or litigation and not to other legal mat
Thus, it is crystal clear from the aforequoted ters, such as legal documentation, negotiations,
provision oflawandregulations that tfie service counseling or right of way matters.
contract entered into by and between the Na
tional Power Corporation and Atty. Satorre is To test the accuracy of such an interpreta
in contravention thereof. tion, an examination of the subject COACircular
is in order:
Upon the foregoing considerations, the in
stant appeal ofMR. DANTE M. POLLOSO, has SUBJECT: Inhibition against employ
to be, as it is hereby denied. Accordingly, the ment by government agencies and instru
disallowance of P283,763.39 is hereby affirmed. mentalities, including government-owned or
Hence, this appeal, petitioner raising the controlled corporations, of private lawyers to
handle their legal cases.
following issues:
It has come to the attention of this Com
I. DOES THE PROHIBITION UNDER
COA CIRCULAR NO. 86-255 DATED APRIL 2, mission that notwithstanding restrictions or
1986 AND SEC. 212 OF THE GOVERNMENT prohibitions on the matter under existing
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING MANUAL laws, certain government agencies, instru
IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT AGENCIES mentalities, and government-owned and/or
FROM HIRING PRIVATE LAWYERS "TO controlled corporations, notably government
HANDLE THEIR LEGAL CASES" APPLY TO A banking and financing institutions, persist
LAWYER HIRED BY VIRTUE OF A SERVICE in hiring or employing private lawyers or
CONTRACT BUT WHO ACTUALLY HANDLE law practitioners to render legal services for
PURELY RIGHT-OF-WAY MATTERS (EX them and/or to handle their legal cases in
CLUDING HANDLING OF COURT CASES)? consideration of fixed retainer fees, at times
in unreasonable amounts, paid from public
II. WILL COA CIRCULAR NO. 86-255 funds. In keeping with the retrenchment
DATED APRIL 2, 1986 AND SEC. 212, VOL policy of the present administration, this
UME I OF THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT Commission frowns upon such a practice.
ffi&t
ING AND AUDITING MANUAL OPERATE
TO RESTRICT THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW Accordingly, it is hereby directed that,
PROFESSION AND THEREFORE REPUG- henceforth, the payment out of public funds
of retainer fees to private law practitioners perform." To give such a technical interpretation
who are so hired or employed without the to the term "retainer fees" would go against the
prior written conformity and acquiescence purpose of the circular and render the same inef
of the Office of the Solicitor General or the fectual. In his resolution, Unit Auditor Alexander
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case Tan expounded on the purpose of the circular, as
maybe, as well as the written concurrence of enunciated therein:
the Commission on Audit shall be disallowed
On the claim that COA Circular 86-255 is
in audit and the same shall be a personal
not applicable in this case because the inhibi
liability of the officials concerned.
tion provided for in said Circular relates to
What can be gleaned from a reading of the the handling of legal cases of a government
above circular is that government agencies and agency and that the contractor was not hired
instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of in that capacity but to handle legal matters
private lawyers to render legal services or handle (sic) involving right-of-way, it is maintained
their cases. No public funds will be disbursed that the contracted service falls within the
for the payment to private lawyers unless prior scope of the inhibition which clearly includes
to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written "the hiring or employing private lawyers or
conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor law practitioners to render legal services for
General or the Government Counsel. them and/or to handle their legal cases ..."
.Moreover, it is important to mention that
Contrary to the view espoused by petitioner, the intention of said Circular is to curb the
the prohibition covers the hiring of private law observed and persistent violation of existing
yers to render any form of legal service. It makes laws and regulations, including CSC MC # 5
no distinction as to whether or not the legal series of 1985 pertaining to the employment
services to be performed involve an actual legal of private lawyers on a contractual basis in
controversy or court litigation. Petitioner insists government agencies which involves the
that the prohibition pertains only to "handling disbursement of public funds by subjecting
of legal cases," perhaps because this is what is the same to the conformity and concurrence
stated in the title of the circular. To rely on the requirements of said Circular. Being so, the
title of the circular would go against a basic rule manner of agreed payment or consideration,
in statutory construction that a particular clause whether termed as a fixed retainer basis or
should not be studied as a detached and isolated a fixed contract price patterned after exist
expression, but the whole and every part of the ing salary scale of existing and comparable
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning positions in NPC-VRC is immaterial as both
of any of its part. Petitioner, likewise, insists that still involve the outlay of public funds and
the service contract in question falls outside the also the contractual employment/hiring of a
ambit of the circular as what is being curtailed private lawyer.
is the payment of retainer fees and not the pay
ment of fees for legal services actually rendered. Hence, while the circular uses the phrase "re
tainer fees," such should not be given its technical
A retainer fee has. been defined as a "pre- interpretation but should mean any "fee"paid for
hminary fee to an attorney or counsel to insure any legal service rendered. As pointed out by the
and secure his future services, and induce him Officeof the Solicitor General, any interpretation
to act for the client. It is intended to remuner of subject circular to the contrary would open
ate counsel for being deprived, by being retained the floodgate to future circumventions the NPC
by one party, of the opportunity of rendering entered into. No dictum is more fundamental in
services to the other and of receiving pay from statutory interpretation than that the intent of
him, and payment of such fee, in the absence the law must prevail over the letter thereof, for
of an express understanding to the contrary, is whatever is within the spirit of the statute is
neither made nor received in payment of the ser within the statute, since adherence to the letter
vices contemplated; its payment has no relation would result in an absurdity, injustice and con
£&)
to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney tradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
for the services for which he has retained him to purpose of the statute.
It bears repeating that the purpose of the the service contract, we find the same to be un-
circular is to curtail the unauthorized and un meritorious. This is because petitioner's liability
necessary disbursement of public funds to private arose from the fact that as project manager, he
lawyers for services rendered to the government. approved the said claim. In addition, his asser
This is in line with the Commission on Audit's tion that a refusal on his part to certify payment
constitutional mandate to promulgate account of the same would subject him to criminal and
ing and auditing rules and regulations including civil liabilities cannot hold water simply because
those for the prevention and disallowance of ir it was his duty not to approve the same for pay
regular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or ment upon finding that such was irregular and
unconscionable expenditures or uses of govern in contravention of COA Circular No. 86-255,
ment funds and properties. Having determined dated 2 April 1986.
the intent of the law, this Court has the impera We cannot grant the prayer of the petitioner
tive duty to give it effect even if the policy goes that Atty. Satorre should be compensated based
beyond the letter or words of the statute. on the principle of quantum meruit, on the
Hence, as the hiring of Atty. Satorre was ground that the government will be unjustly
clearly done without the prior conformity and enriched at the expense of another. We do not
acquiescence ofthe Office ofthe Solicitor General denythat Atty. Satorre has indeed rendered legal
or the Government Corporate Counsel, as well services to the government. However to allow
as the written concurrence of the Commission on the disbursement of public funds to pay for his
Audit, the payment of fees to Atty: Satorre was services, despite the absence of requisite con
correctly disallowed in audit by the COA. sent to his hiring from the OSG or OGCC would
precisely allow circumvention of COA Circular
Thus being said, it is no longer necessary No. 86-255. In any event, it is not Atty. Satorre
to delve into whether or not the hiring of Atty. who is liable to return the money already paid
Satorre is in accord with the rules of the Civil him, rather the same shall be the responsibility
f$pt Service Commission. of the officials concerned, among whom include
Petitioner's claim that the Circular is uncon herein petitioner.
stitutional for being an invalid restriction to the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DE
practice ofthe law profession, is clearlybereftof NIED for lack of showing that the respondents
any merit. The Government has its owncounsel, committed reversible error.
which is the Office ofthe Solicitor General headed
ipi
by the Solicitor General, while the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) acts as K. DBP v. COA
the principallaw office ofthe government-owned G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002
or controlled corporations. It is only in special
CARPIO, J.:
cases where these government entities may en
gage the services of private lawyers because of The Case
their expertise in certain fields. The questioned
COAcircular simply sets forth the prerequisites
This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the letter-decision of the Chairman of the Com
for a government agency instrumentality in hir
mission on Audit ("COA" for brevity) and the let
ing a private lawyer, whichare reasonable safe
ter-decision of the COA en banc, prohibiting the
guards to prevent irregular, unnecessary, exces
Development Bank ofthe Philippines ("DBF' for
sive,extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
brevity) from hiring a private external auditor.
or uses ofgovernment funds andproperties. We
fail to see how the restrictions contained in the
Thispetition raises a questionoffirst impression,
whether or not the constitutional power of the
COA circular can be considered as a curtailment
COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive
on the practice of the legal profession.
and precludes a concurrent audit of the DBP by
Anent petitioner's argument that he can a private external auditor.
not be held liable for effecting payment of the
disallowed amount because he is not privy to
L
f;fo£
The Issues and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,

excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
The DBP's petition raises the following is expenditures, or uses of government funds
sues:
and properties." The COA vigorously asserts
1. Does the Constitution vest in the COA that under the first paragraph of Section 2,
the sole and exclusive power to examine and the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power
audit governmentbanks so as to prohibitconcur to examine and audit all government agen
rent audit by private external auditors under any cies, including the DBP. The COA contends
circumstance? this is similar to its sole and exclusive au
thority, under the second paragraph of the
2. Is there an existing statute that prohibits same Section, to define the scope of its audit,
government banks from hiring private auditors promulgate auditing rules and regulations,
L in addition to the COA? If there is none, is there
an existing statute that authorizes government
including rules on the disallowance of unnec
essary expenditures of government agencies.
banks to hire private auditors in addition to the *The bare language of Section 2, however,
COA? shows that the COA's power under the first
H)
3. If there is no legal impediment to the paragraph is not declared exclusive, while

hiring by government banks ofa private auditor, its authority under the second paragraph
was the hiring by the DBP ofthe private auditor is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a
in the case at bar necessary, and were the fees significant reason for this marked difference
paid by DBP to the private auditor reasonable, in language.
under the circumstances? During the deliberations of the Constitution
The Court's Ruling: The DBP's petition is al Commission, Commissioner Serafin Guingona
meritorious. proposed the addition of the word "exclusive" in
the first paragraph ofSection 2, thereby granting
L First Issue: Power of COA to Audit under
the Constitution
the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine
and audit all government agencies. However, the
The resolution of the primordial issue of Constitutional Commission rejected the addition
L whether or not the COA has the sole and exclu
sive power to examine and audit government
of the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of
Section 2 and Guingona was forced to withdraw
banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, his proposal. Commissioner Christian Monsod
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This Sec explained the rejection in this manner:
tion provides as follows:
"MR. MONSOD. Earlier Commissioner
"Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit Guingona, in withdrawing his amendment to
shall have the power, authority, and duty to add "EXCLUSIVE" made a statement about
j&&J
examine, audit, and settle all accounts per the preponderant right of COA.
taining to the revenue and receipts of, and "For the record, we would like to clarify
expenditures or uses of funds and property, the reason for not including the word. First,
owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, we do not want an Article that would consti
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, tute a disincentive or an obstacle to private
agencies, or instrumentalities, including investment. There are government institu
government-owned or controlledcorporations tions with private investments in them,
with original charters,... and some of these investors — Filipinos, as
"(2)The Commission shall have the ex well as in some cases, foreigners — require
clusive authority, subject to the limitations the presence of private auditing firms, not
in this Article, to define the scope of its audit exclusively, but concurrently. So this does
and examination, establish the techniques not take away the power of the Commission
and methods required therefore, and promul on Audit. Second, there are certain instances
gate accountingand auditing rules and regu where private auditing may be required, like
lations, including those for the prevention the listing in the stock exchange. In other
l&aA
words, we do not want this provision to be an sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
unnecessary obstacle to privatization ofthese government agencies.
companies or attraction of investments." In sharp contrast, the Constitutional Com
Shortly thereafter, Commissioner Guingona mission placed the word "exclusive" to qualify the
attempted to resurrect his amendment by propos authority of the COAunder the second paragraph
ing the following provision: of the same Section 2>in the 1935 and 1973 Con
stitutions. There is no dispute that the COA's
"Private auditing firms may not examine authority under the second paragraph of Section
or audit accounts pertaining to the revenue 2 is exclusive as the language of the Constitution
receipts of, and expenditures or uses offunds admits of no other meaning. Thus, the COA has
and property owned or held in trust by or the exclusive authority to decide on disallowance
pertaining to the Government or any of its ofunnecessary government expenditures. Other
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities." government agencies and their officials, as well
Guingona argued that a private audit in as private auditors engaged by them, cannot in
addition to the COA audit would be a useless any way intrude into this exclusive function of
duplication and an unnecessary expense on the the COA.
part of government. The qualifyingword"exclusive" in the second
The Constitutional Commission also rejected paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the
this proposed provision, after Commissioner first paragraph which is another sub-section of
Monsod made the following explanation: Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to refer
only to the phrase to which it is immediately as
"MR. MONSOD. . . But it is also a fact sociated, and net to a phrase distantly located in
that even government agencies, instrumen another paragraph or sub-section. Thus, the first
talities and subdivisions sometimes borrow paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it
money from abroad. And if we are at all going appears, without the word"exclusive," signifying
to preclude the possibility of any concurrent that non-COA auditors can also examine and
auditing, if that is required, and insist that it audit government agencies. Besides, the fram-
is only exclusively the government whichcan ers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the
audit, we may be unnecessarily tying their word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section
hands without really accomplishing much 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private
more than what we want. As long as the external auditors.
COA is there, and the COA's power cannot ? The clear and unmistakable conclusion from
sffifr
be eliminated by law, by decree or anything a reading ofthe entire Section2 is that the COA's
of that sort, then the government funds are power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On
protected. the other hand, the COA's authority to define the
As far as the question of fees is con scope ofits audit, promulgate auditing rules and
cerned, this is always negotiable. Besides, regulations, and disallow unnecessary expendi
if one talks about auditing fees, these are tures is exclusive.
governed by certain regulations within the Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated
auditing profession beyond which auditing auditor of all government agencies, the COA's
firms cannot go. Furthermore, the govern findings and conclusions necessarily prevail
ment can always refuse to pay unconscio over those of private auditors, at least insofar as
nable fees. So, that matter really is not that government agenciesand officials are concerned.
relevant.But I think what we want to insist The superiority or preponderance of the COA
on is that there should be some flexibility audit over private audit can be gleaned from
so that a procedural requirement does not the records of the Constitutional Commission,
impede a substantive transaction as long as as follows:
COA is there."
"MR. GUINGONA. Madam President,
The rejection of Guingona's second proposal after consultation with the honorable mem
put an end to all efforts to grant the COA the bers of the Committee, I have amended my
780 • CONSTTTUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
proposed amendment by deleting the word In these instances the government enters
EXCLUSIVE because I was made to under the marketplace and competes with the rest of
ffiflj stand that the Commission onAudit willstill the world in attracting investments or loans.
have the preponderant power and authority To succeed, the government must abide with
to examine, audit and settle." the reasonable business practices of the mar
ketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will
k&i
The findings and conclusions ofthe private do business with the government, frustrating
auditor may guide private investors orcreditors government efforts to attract investments or
who require such private audit. Government secure loans that may be critical to stimulate
Kltyi agencies and officials, however, remain bound by moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shat
thefindings and conclusions oftheCOA, whether tered national economy as in the case at bar. By
the matter falls under the first or second para design the Constitution is flexible enough tomeet
graph ofSection 2, unless ofcourse such findings these exigencies. Any attempttonullify thisflex
and conclusionsofthe COA, whether the matter ibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar
falls under the first or second paragraph ofSec instances, will be ultfa vires, in the absence of
tion 2, unless ofcourse such findings and con a statute limiting or removing such flexibility.
clusions are modified or reversed by the courts.
The deliberations ofthe Constitutional Com
The power ofthe COA to examine and au mission reveal eloquently the intent of Section
dit government agencies, while non-exclusive, 2,Article LX-D ofthe Constitution. Asthis Court
cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, has ruledrepeatedly, the intent ofthe lawis the
Article IX-D ofthe Constitution mandates that: controlling factor in the interpretation ofthelaw.
If a law needs interpretation, the most dominant
"Sec. 3. Now law shall be passed ex
influence is the intent of the law. The intent of
empting any entity ofthe Government orits the law is that which is expressed in the words
subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any
investment ofpublic funds, from the jurisdic ofthe law, which shouldbe discovered withinits
four corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative
tion of the Commission on Audit."
history. In the case ofSection 2, Article IX-D of
The mere fact that private auditors may au the Constitution, the intent ofthe framers ofthe
dit government agencies does not divest the COA Constitution is evident from the bare language
liiijij ofits power to examine and audit the same gov of Section 2 itself. The deliberations of the Con
ernment agencies. TheCOA is neither by-passed stitutional Commission confirm expressly and
nor ignored since even with a private audit the even elucidate further this intent beyond any
i&fti
COA willstill conduct its usual examination and doubt whatsoever.
audit, andits findings andconclusions will still There is another constitutional barrier to the
bind government agencies and theirofficials. A
COA'sinsistence of exclusive power to examine
concurrent private auditposes nodanger whatso
ever ofpublic funds orassetsescaping the usual and audit all government agencies. The COA's
claim clashes directly with the Central Bank's
scrutiny of a COA audit.
constitutional power of"supervision" overbanks
Manifestly, the expresslanguageofthe Con under Section 20, Article VII ofthe Constitution.
stitution,and the clearintent ofits framers, point This provision states as follows:
to only one indubitable conclusion —the COA
doesnot have the exclusive powerto examine and "Sec. 20. The Congress shall establish
audit government agencies. The framers ofthe an independent central monetary author
Constitutionwere fullyaware ofthe need to allow ity, the members ofwhose governing board
independent private audit ofcertain government must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of
agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when known probity, integrity, and patriotism,
there is a private investment in a government- the majority of whom shall come from the
controlled corporation, or when a government private sector. They shall also be subject
corporation is privatized orpublicly listed, or as to such other qualifications and disabilities
in the case at bar when the government borrows as may be prescribedby law. The authority
money from abroad. shall provide policy direction in the areas
ARTICLEDC: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS • 781
of money, banking, and credit. It shall have 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who
supervision overthe operationsofbanks and loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
ifipi exercise such regulatory powers as may be from the retired list and his retirement benefits
provided bylawover the operations offinance terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
companies and other institutions performing Petitionerrequestedfor reconsideration but the
similar functions." (Emphasis supplied.) JudgeAdvocate General of the AFP denied the
request.
Historically, the Central Bank has been
conducting periodic and special examination Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for
and audit of banks to determine the soundness the continuance of his monthly pension.
taj
oftheir operationsand the safety ofthe deposits In its 9 January 2003 Decision, the COA
of the public. Undeniably, the Central Bank's denied petitioner's claim forlackofjurisdiction.
power of "supervision" includes the power to The COA ruled:
examine and audit banks, as the banking laws
have always recognized this power of the Cen It becomes immediately noticeable that
tral Bank. Hence, the COA's power to examine the resolution of the issue at hand hinges
^j and audit government banks must bereconciled upon the validity of Section 27 of P.D. No.
with the Central Bank's power to supervise the 1638, as amended. Pursuant to the mandate
same banks. The inevitable conclusion is that of the Constitution, whenever a dispute
the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent involves the validity of laws, "the courts,
jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to examine as guardians of the Constitution, have the
and audit government banks. inherent authority to determine whether a
statute enacted bythe legislature transcends
However, despite the Central Banks concur the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
rent jurisdiction over government banks, the Where the statute violates the Constitution,
COA's audit still prevails over that of the Cen it is notonly the right but the dutyofthejudi
tral Bank since the COAis the constitutionally ciary to declare suchact as unconstitutional
mandated auditor of government banks. And in and void." (Tatad v. Secretary of Depart
matters falling under the second paragraph of ment of Energy, 281 SCRA 330) That being
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the so, prudence dictates that this Commission
COA's jurisdiction isexclusive. Thus, theCentral defer to the authority and jurisdictionofthe
Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow judiciary to rule inthefirst instance upon the
expenditures of government banks since this constitutionality ofthe provision in question.
function belongs exclusively to the COA. Premises considered, the request is denied
for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
L. Parrefio v. COA Claimant is advised to file his claim with the
G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007 propercourt oforiginal jurisdiction.
Salvador Parreiio (petitioner) served in the Petitioner filed a motion for reconsidera
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 tion. Petitioner alleged that the COA has the
years. On 5January 1982, petitioner retired from power and authority to incidentally rule on the
thePhilippine Constabulary with therankof2nd constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received pay amended....
ment, ofa lump sumpension equivalent tothree Hence, the petition before this Court.
years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving
his monthly pension amounting to P13,680. Petitioner raises tfie following issues:
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a

naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, 2. Whether the COA has jurisdiction to
the AFP stopped petitioner's monthly pension rule onthe constitutionality ofSection 27of
in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential PD 1638, as amended; and
Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD The petition has no merit.
Petitioner filed his money claim before the SEC. 3. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED
COA. Amoney claim is "ademand for payment of EXEMPTING ANY ENTITY OF THE GOV
|pl
a sumofmoney, reimbursement orcompensation ERNMENT OR ITS SUBSIDIARY IN ANY
arisingfrom law or contract due from or owing GUISE WHATEVER, OR ANY INVEST
toa government agency." Under Commonwealth MENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS, FROM THE
Act No. 327, as amendedby Presidential Decree JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION
No. 1445,moneyclaims against the government ON AUDIT.
shall be filed before the COA. SEC. 4. THE COMMISSION SHALL
SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS, WITHIN THE TIME FIXED
The jurisdiction of the COA over money BY LAW, AN ANNUAL REPORT COVER
p%l
claims against the government does notinclude ING THE FINANCIAL CONDITION AND
the power to rule on the constitutionality orva OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, ITS
lidity oflaws. The 1987 Constitution vests the SUBDIVISIONS, AGENCIES, AND INSTRU
power ofjudicial review or the power to declare MENTALITIES, INCLUDING GOVERN
unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or MENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED COR
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, PORATIONS, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court ENTITIES SUBJECT TO ITS AUDIT, AND
and in all Regional Trial Courts RECOMMEND MEASURES NECESSARY
TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
AND EFFICIENCY. IT SHALL SUBMIT
SUCH OTHER REPORTS AS MAY BE RE
QUIRED BY LAW.

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CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Notes and Cases

JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

Article I: The National Territory 7

1. The Philippine Territory 7

Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies 10

A. TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD 257

A. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V COURT

Article VII: The Executive Department 339

Article VII: The Executive Department 339

2. Martial law 473

Sec. 22. Budget preparation 566

Article VIII: The Judicial Department 567

I. GONZALES V. NARVASA 615

10. Bar integration 627

Sec. 8. Judicial and Bar Council 634

A. VARGAS V. RILLORAZA 639

L Article IX: Constitutional Commissions 659

1. Automatic release of funds 661

A. CUA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 662

B. MISON V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 663

3. Competitive and non-competitive positions 691

A. NASECO V. NLRC 692

B. SAMSON V. COURT OF APPEALS 693

D. CORPUS V. TANODBAYAN >, 738

E. SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA 767

Article X: Local Government 783

GENERAL PROVISIONS 783

Sec. 11. Funds .' 759

1. Functions of the COA 760

Sec. 11. Metropolital political subdivisions '. 853

Article XI^Accountability of Public Officers • 870

Article XII: National Economy: and Patrimony 898

Article XVI: General Provisions 1089

NOTE: The Integrated National Police 1118

Article XVII: Amendments or Revisions 1120

Article XVIII: Transitory Provisions 1171

Section 1. First elections 1171

1. Early Organic Acts.

hId. at 150. 81 Public Laws [of the Philippines] lxiii, February 2,

4. The Freedom Constitution. President Aquino could have made herself

I. Notes on the Preamble.

The National Territory

SECTION 1. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY COMPRISES THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPEL

1. The Philippine Territory.

An archipelago is a body of water studded unilateral assertions in a constitution, which is

SECTION 1. THE PHILIPPINES IS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE

1. A "democratic and republican state."

lSee IV RECORD OP THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 768 and 580.

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 19

C. Republic v. Sandiganbayan search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of

22 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT

The Second Pattern: Assembly

Of all patterns of constitutional-democratic Parliamentarism, in its various applications,

Theinspirationofthis provision onrenuncia ifit isincorporated intomunicipal law. What the

In the national interest andofinternational

"IV RECORD 772. MV RECORD 246.

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 35

allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a SEC. 5. THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE