UNIT 1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Contents

1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Philosopher‟s Look at Reality
1.3 Knowledge in Indian Context
1.4 Philosophy and Life
1.5 Let Us Sum Up
1.6 Key Words
1.7 Suggested Readings and References
1.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

1.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objectives of this unit are:

 to dispel certain misconceptions about Indian philosophy held mainly by western scholars
and certain other misconceptions held by some Indian scholars. In order to grasp Indian
philosophy in proper perspective it is necessary that these misconceptions are erased;
 to distinguish philosophy from religion in the Indian context. This unit shows that, taken
in the strict sense of the term, philosophy is not the same as religion. Some key
philosophical issues developed in Indian context on very different lines when compared
with western thought;
 to project the essence of Indian thought.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In Indian context, philosophy is taken to mean darshana or tattva. We shall consider how the
etymological meaning of „philosophy‟ correlates itself with darshana or tattva. „Drisyate anena
iti darshanam‟ - the one through which it is seen. The word seen can be understood either
literally or philosophically. Though the difference is irrelevant, let us consider only the latter.
To „see‟ in philosophic sense means to „realise‟. Darsana, therefore, means to realise. Again,
the verb „realise‟ is a transitive verb. We always realise „something‟ whenever we realise. To
say that we realise „nothing‟ is to admit that there is no realisation at all. If we recollect
whatever that was said about „know‟, then it becomes clear that to a great extent „to realise‟
corresponds to „to know‟, and hence realisation corresponds to knowledge. This correspondence
is nearly one-to-one; i.e., it is nearly isomorphic. This aspect unfolds itself in due course.
Before proceeding in this direction, we should know what „tattva’ stands for.

The word tattva is derived from two words „tat‟ and „tva‟. Tat means it or that and tva means
„you‟. Therefore tattva, etymologically, means „you are that‟. What is important is to know
what tat stands for in Indian thought. It means reality or „ultimate‟ reality. This is also what one

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division of philosophy, i.e., metaphysics talks about. The word „it‟, which appears in the
meaning of darshana stands for tat, i.e., ultimate reality. Since darshana , is knowing reality, it
involves not only an important metaphysical component but also an important epistemological
component. Hence, the summation of these two components more or less satisfactorily
completes the description of philosophy as darshana in Indian context.

There is yet, another component that remains to be understood. Obviously, „you‟ (tva) stands for
knower, i.e., the epistemological subject and by identifying the epistemological subject with
reality, we arrive at an important corollary. Indian thought did not distinguish between reality
and the person or epistemological subject and hence etymologically, knowledge in Indian
thought became inward (however, it must be emphasized that it outgrew the etymological
meaning in its nascent stage itself). But what is of critical importance is the philosophical
significance of the above mentioned corollary. Wherever man is involved, directly or indirectly,
value is involved. So axiology surfaces. When man is identified with reality, it and the whole
lot of issues related to reality gain value-overtones. Hence, in Indian context, value is not merely
a subject matter of philosophy, but philosophy itself comes to be regarded as „value‟.
Consequently, the very approach of Indian thinkers to philosophy gains some distinct features.

1.2 PHILOSOPHER’S LOOK AT REALITY

Indian thought is essentially pluralistic as regards arguments which give an exposition of reality.
First, we can begin with types of reality and this can be done from two different angels

Table 1:
Theories
of Reality

Secular Spiritual

Non- Non-
Physical Theistic
Physical theistic

Table 2:
Theories
of Reality

Non-
Monistic Dualistic Pluralistic
Dualistic

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Let us try to understand what Table 1 says. But before doing so, it is better to answer the
question; what is reality? Indeed, this is the most difficult question to answer. To start with,
„reality‟ can be defined as the one which is the ultimate source of everything and itself does not
have any source. It also can be taken to mean that which is independent. This definition itself is
hotly debated in philosophical circles. If we take this as a working definition of reality, then we
find to our surprise that ancient Indians offered various answers resulting in „proliferation of an
ocean of theories‟, to use the phrase used by Feyerabend. Contrary to widespread belief
prevailed in the past, all Indian thinkers did not recognize reality as spiritual. Nor did they
unanimously regard it as secular. A complex discipline like philosophy does not allow such
simple division. Surely, some thinkers accepted only spiritual reality and on the contrary, some
other thinkers accepted only „secular‟ reality. However, in many cases, these two divisions
crossed and the result is that in those cases we discover that reality has two faces, secular and
spiritual. An upshot of this conclusion is that thinkers in India neglected neither this world nor
the „other‟ (if it exists). This is a significant aspect to be borne in mind.

Curiously, at Level 2, the divisions of secular and spiritual theories are mutually exclusive and
totally exhaustive, i.e., physical and non-physical, on the one hand and theistic and non-theistic,
on the other. Though within secular range (and similarly within spiritual range) the divisions
exclude each other any division of secular theory can go with any division of spiritual theory
without succumbing to self-contradiction. Accordingly, we arrive at four combinations which
are as follows:
1. Physical – Theistic
2. Physical – Non-Theistic
3. Non-Physical – Theistic
4. Non-Physical – Non-Theistic

Now let us get to know the meaning of these terms. A theory which regards the independence of
physical world is physical. Likewise, a theory which regards the independence of any other
substance than physical world is non-physical. The former need not be non-theistic. A theory of
reality can accord equal status to this world and god. Surely, it does not involve any self-
contradiction. The Dvaita and the Vaisesika illustrate the former, whereas charvaka illustrates
the latter. A diagram illustrates the point.

Physical Theistic
(A) (C)

Non- Physical Non-theistic

(B) (D)

What is to be noted here is that A and B lack connectivity; and so also C and D. In western
tradition, the term „mind‟ replaces the term non-physical. However, in Indian context such usage
is inaccurate because, at least, some schools regard mind as sixth organ. The Sankhya is one
school which regards mind as an evolute of prakriti. Hence, it is as much physical as any other

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sense organ. The Vaisheshika is another school which has to be bracketed with the Samkhya in
this regard. At this stage, we should get ourselves introduced to two key metaphysical terms,
realism and idealism; the former with all its variants regards the external world as ultimately real,
whereas the latter with all its variants regards external world as a derivative of mind. Of course,
here mind is not to be construed as sixth organ. The Yogachara, a later Buddhistic school is one
system which subscribes to idealism.

Now it is clear that (A) and (B) are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive. Under (D) there
are two sub-divisions; atheistic and agnostic. (C) on the one hand, and atheistic and agnostic on
the other hand are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive. Since, atheistic and agnostic
doctrines are philosophically different, 2nd and 4th types are further split into two each. So,
instead of 4, we will have six theories. Each theory differs from every other theory. The
differences are, sometimes gross and some times subtle.

It is, now, more than obvious that Indian philosophy does not lend itself to simple and easy
categorization. Complexity and variety must be regarded as salient features of Indian thought.
This aspect is further compounded when table 1 and table 2 intersect. Before considering such
intersection we should first elucidate table 2.

Table 2 explicates theories of reality and distinguishes theories on the basis of number, i.e., the
number of substances, which are regarded as real, becomes the criterion to make any distinction.
Monism asserts that reality is one. The assertions of dualistic and pluralistic theories can be
ascertained without difficulty, since they stand for „two‟ and „more than two‟ respectively. Non-
dualistic theory, i.e., The Advaita is unique. It does not make any assertion about number, but
only negates dualism (if dualism is inadmissible, then pluralism is also inadmissible). The
Upanisads are monistic and The Vaisesika is pluralistic.

Now we shall integrate table 1 and table 2. An integration of this sort yields in all twenty four
systems. This is not to imply that twenty-four systems dominated the scene. But majority of
them did flourish at one time or the other.

Consideration of questions in respect of reality should make it clear that no qualitative difference
can be discerned between the Indian and the western traditions. Questions are alike; because
problems are alike. But the same set of questions may elicit different answers from different
minds at different times and places. Always, spatio-temporal factor plays a major role in
determining solutions. The last aspect becomes clear after we consider issues in respect of
knowledge.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Show how the key terms Darshana and Tattva can be integrated into the etymological
meaning of philosophy.

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 2. How do you explain that ultimate reality is knowing reality?

1.3 KNOWLEDGE IN INDIAN CONTEXT

Desire to know is not an extraordinary quality of man. This is an instinct which can be discerned
in any animal. However, differences lie elsewhere. The extent of knowledge acquired or
capable of being acquired varies from species to species. This is one difference. Second, man‟s
motive to acquire knowledge and his concept of knowledge differ from culture to culture.
Previous statement, surely, does not imply ranking of culture. It only shows that the concept of
knowledge is relative to culture. The essence of philosophy consists in these two principal
factors; motive and idea.

Indian and western concepts, whether ancient or modern, are best understood when they are
compared and contrasted. Ancient Greeks believed in the principle „knowledge for the sake of
knowledge‟, which gave impetus to birth and growth of pure science. In contrast, post-
renaissance age heralded the contrary principle „knowledge is power‟. This dictum propagated
by Bacon changed for ever the very direction of the evolution of science. However, ancient
Indians exhibited a very different mindset. While medicine and surgery developed to meet
practical needs, astronomy and mathematics developed for unique reason, neither purely spiritual
nor purely mundane, in order to perform yagas to meet practical ends and yajnas to achieve
spiritual gain. At any rate, ancient Indians never believed in Greek dictum. Nor did they,
perhaps, think of it. If we regard knowledge as value, then we have to conclude that it was never
regarded as intrinsic. On the other hand, it was mainly instrumental. The only exception to this
characterization is the Charvaka system which can be regarded as the Indian counterpart of
epicureanism.

In a restricted sense, the Indian philosophy of knowledge comes very close to the Baconan
philosophy of knowledge. Truly, Indians regarded knowledge as power because for them
knowledge (and thereby, philosophy) was a way of life and this is the reason why for them
knowledge was never intrinsic. But, then, it is absolutely necessary to reverse the connotation of
the word „power‟. While the Baconan „power‟ was meant to experience control over nature, the
Indian „power‟ was supposed to be the instrument to subjugate ones own self to nature. This is
the prime principle which forms the cornerstone of early vedic thought. This radical change in
the meaning of the word „power‟ also explains the difference in world view which can be easily
discerned when the belief-systems and attitudes of Indians and Europeans (for our purpose
„west‟ means Europe only) are compared and contrasted. Post-Baconian Europe believed that
this universe and everything in it is meant to serve the purpose of man because man is the centre
of the universe. (The spark of this thought did characterize a certain phase in the development of
vedic thought, only to be denounced at later stage). On the other hand, ancient Indian believed in
identifying himself with nature.

We should carry further our analysis of Baconian „power‟ vis-à-vis the Indian „power‟. The
repetition of what was said earlier is only to reinforce the critical importance of consequences.
Knowledge was not only „power‟ but became a powerful weapon for the westerners to address
their economic and political agenda. At no point of time did westerners look upon knowledge as
a means to achieve anything even remotely connected to spiritual goal. Just as the charvaka is

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an exception in Indian context, Socrates and Spinoza can be regarded as exceptions in western
context. Indians, however, did not regard worldly pleasure as ultimate. For them there was
something more important and enduring and therefore the conquest of nature never mattered.
Precisely, this attitude has generated lot of needless controversy. This characterization, which,
no doubt, is true, was grossly misunderstood and, consequently, it was argued that the Indian
thought rejects altogether this world and present life as totally irrelevant and insignificant. This
argument, which stems from total misunderstanding, is altogether unwarranted. To say that x is
more important than y is not to say that y is insignificant. If something is more important, then it
means that something else is „less‟ important. In other words, Indian tradition, surely, includes
the „present‟ life, but it is not restricted to it; goes beyond it. This point becomes clear in the
third chapter.

Evidently, Indian tradition maintains a certain hierarchy of values unlike western tradition.
Knowledge, as a way of life, encompasses not only all sorts of values but also it changes one‟s
own perspective. Accordingly, the so-called spiritual goal in life can be attained only by one
who has acquired knowledge. It points to the fact that ignorance or avidya is a hindrance to attain
spiritual goal in particular and any other goal in general. One who has acquired true knowledge
or knows truly, acts and thinks, very differently, different from ignorant, a characteristic Socratic
thought in Indian attire. However, this characteristic is conspicuous by its absence in western
tradition. It was not necessary that personal life of a philosopher should match his philosophy, in
the sense that a philosopher‟s life need not be a role model for lesser mortals to emulate. While
Socrates and Spinoza are at one end of the thread, Bacon and Heidegger are at the opposite end.
The point is that in Indian tradition, philosophy and value are inseparable, whereas in the west it
is not so. A philosopher, in the west, can be (not that there are) worse than a hardened criminal.
But in Indian context it is inconceivable.

This sort of emphasis upon values led to a hermeneutic blunder. Without batting his eye lid the
critic, just like protagonist, argued that in Indian philosophy was never distinct from religion.
Hence in India there was no philosophy at all worth the name according to critics. That there
was no religion in India (with the exclusion of tribal religion) is a different story. The so-called
Hindu dharma cannot be mistaken and ought not to be mistaken for religion. This confusion
arose because many scholars mistakenly identified religion with spirituality. An analogy may
clear the mist surrounding Indian philosophy. Western philosophy is not divided into Christian
philosophy and Jewish philosophy, though all western philosophers (excluding Greek
philosophers) in loose sense are either Christians or Jews. Likewise, it is highly inappropriate to
talk about „Hindu philosophy’, though majority of Indian philosophers were „committed‟ Hindus.
It is true that a few philosophers in India became the heads of religious groups or sects (eg.
Ramanuj or Madhva). But then we have St. Augustine, St. Aquinas, etc. in the west also. But
nobody characterizes their philosophy as Christian philosophy. But surely, we have Buddhist or
Jaina philosophy because neither Buddhism nor Jainism is a religion in the strict sense of the
term. At this point, a pertinent question arises, if there is Buddhist philosophy, then why not
Hindu philosophy? To believe that there is such philosophy amounts to putting the cart in front
of the horse. Philosophy in India did not originate from Sanatana dharma – or Hindu dharma as
it is popularly known as – but it is the other way round.

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Therefore, in sharp contrast to western tradition, Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual. When
it was said earlier that in India also knowledge is regarded as power, what was meant was that
knowledge was regarded as spiritual power; spiritual which is totally non-religious in its nature.

It is an error to assume that spiritual overtones can be discerned only in knowledge. The concept
of reality and aesthetic values also are endowed with spirituality. The Upanisadic or Advaitic
notion of Brahman is a classic example. It is spiritual because it is neither worldly (physical)
nor religious. If knowledge is spiritual, then its prama (object) also must be spiritual. „Raso vi
saha’ (that is, indeed, rasa) is an example for spiritual status of aesthetic value. In this case
„that‟ according to, at least one interpretation means „Para Brahma’ or highest reality and Rasa
may be taken to mean beauty. The metaphysical or spiritual element involved in philosophy
must have been hijacked by religions to formulate their notions of gods (and perhaps to counter
their rivals).

Let us return to knowledge again. Indian philosophy recognizes knowledge at two levels; Para
Vidya (higher knowledge) and Apara vidya (lower knowledge). Since knowledge is spiritual,
only the former is true knowledge, whereas the latter is not knowledge at all in the strict sense of
the term. Though the Upanisads subscribe to this view, subsequent systems, (with the exception
of Purva Mimamsa) which are supposed to be commentaries on the Upanishads, regarded
perception, for example, as a way of knowledge. Upamana is another pramana. Not only lower
knowledge, but also erroneous knowledge was seriously considered as species of knowledge
(e.g., akhyati) by systems of philosophy. Therefore even Apara Vidya retained its place.Does
Indian philosophy integrate spiritual life with worldly affairs? If the claim, that upholding of the
former is not tantamount to the rejection of the latter, then it does not. The truth is that the former
does not entail the latter. Therefore these two had to be fused and it was achieved in a
remarkable manner; purusartha scheme clarifies that only through Dharma, i.e., righteous
means, man should acquire artha (wealth) and satisfy kama (any sensuous desire), the very same
means to attain moksha (liberation). The law of parsimony is very well adhered to as regards the
questions of social philosophy and moral philosophy.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Explain briefly that theories of reality can be understood from two different angles, that is,
from spiritual and secular angles.

2. Do you agree with some Indian schools that regard mind as sixth organ?

1.4 PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE

Earlier, it was said that in India philosophy itself was regarded as a value and also that value and
human life are inextricably blended. What is the aim of life? Against this backdrop, it is easy to

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discover solution to this quest in Indian philosophy. It is not so easy to reach the same in
western tradition (it is true that existentialism attempted the same, but it remained a sort of island
and was obliterated by analytic tradition). The aim of life according to Indian tradition is to make
a pilgrimage from „misery to happiness‟. This is a single thread which runs through the whole
gamut of Indian philosophy. At one point of time, vertical split occurred in philosophical
tradition leading to the birth of orthodox and heterodox schools of thought. However, they
concur on one issue, i.e., the aim of life. (It is a commonplace practice to regard them as vedic
and non-vedic schools though it is not very satisfactory to regard so). The dispute between these
two poles did not prevent them from embracing a common goal. In what sense is this goal a
philosophical issue? This is one question which arises in this context; how can two opposing
schools of thought have a common denominator? This is another. Answer to the first question
can be construed as follows. Knowledge as value is unique by itself. If the instrument which
gives thrust to the quality of lifestyle has any economic value, then from a different perspective,
if any, knowledge which reforms lifestyle also must possess value. Therefore knowledge
became „the‟ value in Indian thought. A Jnani in Socratic sense perceives not only routine life,
but also the world in which he lives, differently because knowledge changes his world view.
This type of change carries with it moral value. It means that the aim of life becomes an ethical
issue. In this sense it becomes a philosophical issue. Answer to second question is still simpler.
All schools of philosophy unanimously admit that the pursuit of happiness is the sole aim and
unanimity stops there. But these two poles differ when they specify what happiness is. An
example may make the point clear. All political parties, in their election manifesto, proclaim that
their sole aim is uplifting the downtrodden. But the mechanism of doing so differs from one
party to the other. Now the position is clear. Orthodox and heterodox schools differ on what
happiness is and on what constitutes happiness. Even within heterodox system the idea of
happiness differs. The Charvaka school maintains that happiness consists in pleasure whereas
the Buddhism asserts that happiness consists in nirvana if happiness is to be construed as
elimination of misery.

Earlier, it was mentioned that spirituality is the essence of Indian philosophy. Against this
background, let us analyse what happiness is. Neither this physical world nor earthly pleasure is
permanent. Nor are they ultimate. Hopefully, no one entertains the illusion that this world is
eternal. However, not many care to think whether or not everlasting peace or happiness is
possible within the bounds of finite world. Indian philosophy is characterized by this thought.
The desire to attain eternity is common to the Greek and the Indian traditions. However, in the
latter case this desire takes a different form. Hence eternity is tantamount to permanent
liberation from misery. A permanent liberation from misery is tantamount to attainment of
permanent happiness and this it eternity. It is variously designated as moksha, nirvana, etc. In
its ordinary sense vairagya means renouncing happiness. But in real sense what has to be
renounced is not happiness, but pleasure. Vairagya in conjuction with knowledge leads to
eternal happiness. Hence in Indian context vairagya is „renounce worldly pleasure and attain
eternal happiness‟. It is possible that the very idea of renunciation invites strong objections. But
in one definite sense such a renunciation is desirable. Vairagya should be construed as
elimination of greed and inclusion of contentment in life. This is the hidden meaning of
vairagya. What happened, in course of time, was that both dimensions were wrongly interpreted
leading to the conclusion that vairagya is not only negative but also is the sign of pessimism. It
did not stop at this stage, but extended to the whole of Indian philosophy.

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At this point, it is necessary to digress; In the twentieth century, westerners believed that in India
there was noting like philosophy, but only myth and casuistry in the garb of philosophy. While
the western scholars argued that in India, philosophy was totally corrupted by religion, some
Indian scholars under the influence of Marxism failed to separate philosophy from custom and
tradition afflicting Indian society. The merits and demerits of their arguments and
counterarguments are not relevant presently. But the sense, in which the world religion has to be
construed, if it has to be regarded as philosophically constructive, is important. If the word
religion is taken to mean tribal religion, then its association with philosophy spells doom to the
latter. In India, philosophy was not influenced by religion in this sense. On the other hand,
various religious sects, which grew later, were influenced by philosophy.

But the criticisms of those scholars, who admit that in ancient India there was philosophic
movement, merit our considerations. According to one criticism, Indian thought prompted
negative outlook and therefore, is self-destructive only because it negates the reality of physical
world. This criticism can be rebutted in two stages. In the first place, Indian philosophy does
not deny the physical world in absolute terms. A particular system of philosophy does not
become a negative doctrine just because it regards the world as impermanent and that what is
impermanent is regarded as not ultimately real. No scientist has ever dared to say that the
universe is eternal. If the critic‟s argument is admitted, then Plato‟s philosophy also becomes
negative in character. Indian philosophers, like Plato, admitted something permanent.
Impermanence and permanence are relative terms; relevance of any one of them demands the
relevance of another. Secondly, what is relative is always relative to something different. There
is noting like absolute relativity. The last two statements which, actually, explicate the essence
of the theory of relativity holds good here also.

Now let us consider the second stage of refutation. Is it legitimate to categorize any doctrine as
negative? Refutation is an important step in arguments. But it is not final. If science can be
„characterized as satisfying a negative requirement such as falsifiability‟ (Karl Popper, 1959,
p.41), then philosophy, whether Indian or western, also is entitled to the same benefit or status.
To a great extent Indian philosophy followed the principle of „Assertion through refutation‟.
Precisely this principle was upheld by Popper.

Second criticism is as follows; it is pessimistic. Any theory, which negates this world and life in
absolute sense, ought to be pessimistic. The very fact that this criticism draws support from two
sources of error shows the degree of misunderstanding. First, the desire to escape from misery
was misconstrued as the desire to escape from external world. Second, it discourages earthly
pleasure. Let us consider the second source first. Negation of earthly pleasure is not tantamount
to the negation of happiness because pleasure and happiness are, evidently, different. Moksha is
simply Sanskrit version of happiness. Pleasure is not only momentary but also is not pure in the
sense that pleasure always comes with pain. If we consider Bentham‟s criteria, then these
criteria satisfy not pleasure but happiness. Duration, intensity and purity do not, in reality,
characterize pleasure but happiness. Perhaps proximity alone satisfies pleasure. If so, even from
practical standpoint any philosophy which regards moksha as ideal ceases to be pessimistic.

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Now let us turn to the first source. Desire to escape from this world describes the mindset of an
escapist. There are references to rebirth. Rebirth may only be a myth and something beyond
verification. But when attainment of moksha is regarded as a possibility during the lifespan of an
individual (this is what is called jivanmukti), there is no reason to regard the external world as an
evil. It is, however, true that not only critics, but also the votaries of Indian philosophy
misunderstood the concept of moksha and it led to the cardinal mistake of treating external world
as evil.

One more objection can be raised to moksha. Is moksha a meaningful ideal? In the first place
moksha must be possible, and secondly, its realisation must be humanly possible. In the absence
of either of them does it not cease to be meaningful? Let us assume that it is humanly possible to
attain moksha. Then it remains an ideal. But then nothing is lost. If we pursue an unattainable
ideal, then we progress towards that ideal. What matters is progress. Plato‟s Utopia is an
example which comes very close to the ideal of moksha in this respect. Progress in right
direction is true progress. Therefore, knowing fully well that it is humanly impossible to achieve
a goal like moksha, man pursues moksha. Thereby man progresses from lower level to higher
level. This is a singular advantage of accepting something like moksha as an ideal.

In the western tradition only Greeks believed in the immortality of soul. It became totally alien
to modern western philosophy, though it found favour with Christianity. The paradox is that
immortality of soul is a common theme to Christianity and Indian philosophy, whereas it ought
to have been a common to western philosophy and Christianity because west happens to be the
mainland of Christianity. It illustrates one crucial factor. Religion does not determine
philosophy. On the other hand, philosophy has the required potential at least to influence
religion, if not determine the same.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1.What do you understand by the belief that „knowledge is power‟ in the Western and Indian
context?

2.Do you agree with the view that Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual?

1.5. LET US SUM UP

Philosophy is derived from two Greek words which mean love of knowledge or wisdom. In
Indian tradition philosophy means Darshana or tattva. Indian outlook is essentially different
from western outlook. In terms of problems there is no difference between Indian and western
philosophical traditions. Indians perceived knowledge as power in a different perspective. Bacon
regarded knowledge as the means to establish authority over external world. On the other hand,
Indians regarded knowledge as essential to establish control over ones own self. Indians

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recognized philosophy itself as a value. Therefore philosophy, in India, was accepted as a way of
life. With the sole exception of the Charvaka, all other systems of philosophy in India accepted
liberation in one or the other sense. Moksha, is one such ideal. Philosophy is independent of
religion. However, religion may or may not be independent of philosophy.

1.6 KEY WORDS

Yagas and Yajnas: Yagas amd Yajnas are sacared rituals done to appease God, performed
during the Vedic period.

Pessimism: Pessimism, from the Latin „pessimus‟ (worst), is a painful state of mind which
negatively colours the perception of life, especially with regard to future events. Value
judgments may vary dramatically between individuals, even when judgments of fact are
undisputed.

1.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agarwal, M.M. “Nothingness and Freedom: Sartre and Krishnamurti”. Journal of Indian Council
of Philosophical Research. Vol. IX, No. 1 (September-December, 1991).
Aleaz, K.P. The Relevance of Relation in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta. Delhi: Kant Publications,
1996.
Balasubramanian, R. The Metaphysics of the Spirit. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical
Research, 1994.
Bagchi, Kalyan Kumar. “Ontological Argument and Ontology of Freedom”. Journal of Indian
Council of Philosophical Research. Vol. X, No. 1 (September-December, 1992).
Bharthakur, J.K. “A Journey Towards Essence of Mandukya Upanishad for a Theory of Time”.
Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. XXV, No.1 (January, 1998).
-------------------. “A Theory of Time”. Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. XXII, No.4
(October, 1995). Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. XXIV, No.2 (April, 1997)
Brown, Jason W. “Microgenesis and Budhism: The Concept of Momentariness”. Philosophy
East and West. Vol. 49, No.3 (July, 1999).
Chadha, Monima. “Perceptual Cognition: A Nyaya-Kantian Approach”. Philosophy East and
West. Vol.51, No.2 (April, 2001).

Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London: Unwin Publishers, 1973.

Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Thachil, J. An Initiation to Indian Philosophy. Alwaye: Pontifical Institute of Philosophy and
Theology, 2000.

1.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

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1) In Indian context philosophy is understood as „darsana‟ -to see or to realize. This
realization corresponds to that of knowledge. When we say that we are realizing a thing, it
amounts to say that we have some sort of knowledge. This correspondence relationship is one to
one and it is nearly isomorphic. Tattva stands for two words „tat’ and „tva’. The etymological
meaning of this word is „you are that‟. This mainly refers to the Ultimate reality in Indian
philosophy. The word darsana stands for the ultimate reality and it is a knowing reality thus
involving both metaphysical and epistemological component and satisfactorily explaining the
description of darsana in Indian context.

2) The word „darsana‟ comes from the word tattva – the ultimate reality. This ultimate
reality is the knowing reality. It not only describes about metaphysical component but also
epistemological component. However, the summation of both the components is necessary in
describing darsana. Epistemological component is very important, since it involves in knowing
the ultimate reality. In the initial stage there was no distinction between reality and epistemic
subject. Epistemologically knowledge became inward. In the course of time human related
oneself to value and identified with the reality. So in Indian context, value is not regarded only to
the subject matter of philosophy but philosophy itself is regarded as value.

Check Your Progress II

1) Theories of realities can be understood in two different angles, that is, from spiritual and
secular angles. First of all, reality is defined as the ultimate source of everything but that
itself does not have any source. Feyerabend comments that this sort of definition failed to
recognize reality as neither spiritual nor secular. However complex discipline like
philosophy does not allow such divisions. Obviously, we discover that reality has both
spiritual and secular face which are mutually exhaustive and totally exclusive, that is,
physical and non-physical. We arrive at four combinations. They are 1) physical theistic,
2) physical non-theistic, 3) non-physical theistic, 4) non-physical non-theistic. The theory
which regards the independence of the physical world is physical while the theory which
regards the independence of any other substance other than the physical world is non-
physical.

2) In Indian context, some schools regard mind as sixth organ. Samkhya is one school which
regards mind as evolutes of prakrti. Hence, it is as much physical as any other sense or
another organ. Vaisesika is another school which has to be bracketed with Samkhya in
this regard. At this stage, we should get ourselves introduced to two key metaphysical
terms, realism and idealism; the former with all its variants regards the external world as
ultimately real, whereas the latter with all its variants regards external world as a
derivative of mind. Of course, here mind is not to be costumed as sixth organ.
Yogacara, a later Buddhistic school, is one system which subscribes to idealism.

Check your progress III

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1) In post-renaissance age Bacon propagated the famous dictum „knowledge is power‟. This
principle changed for ever the very direction of the evolution of science. But the ancient
Indians never believed in this dictum. On the contray, they performed yagas to meet
practical ends and yajnas to achieve spiritual gain.

But in a strict sense, Indians regarded knowledge as power because for them knowledge
was a way of life and this is the reason why for them knowledge was never intrinsic.
However, it is necessary to look into the connotation of the word power. The Baconan
„power‟ was necessary to experience control over nature, but the Indian „power‟ was
supposed to be the instrument to subjugate ones own self to nature. This is the prime
principle which forms the cornerstone of early vedic thought. This radical change in the
meaning of the word „power‟ also explains the difference in worldview which can be
easily discerned when the belief-systems and attitudes of Indians and Europeans are
compared and contrasted.

2) Unlike western tradition, Indian tradition maintains a hierarchy of values. In Indian

context, spiritual goal in life can be achieved by the one who has acquired knowledge.
However this type of characteristics is absent in western tradition. Many times Hindu
Dharma was mistaken to be religion. This confusion made many to identify religion with
spirituality. Philosophy in India did not originate from sanatana dharma – or Hindu
dharma. Therefore, in sharp contrast to western tradition, Indian philosophy is essentially
spiritual. When it was said earlier that in India also knowledge is regarded as power,
what was meant was that knowledge is spiritual power, spiritual which is totally non-
religious in its nature. Indian philosophy recognizes knowledge at two levels; Para
Vidya (higher knowledge) and apara vidya (lower knowledge). Since knowledge is
spiritual, only the former is true knowledge; whereas the latter is not knowledge at all in
the strict sense of the term.

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