Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal
Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal
Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal
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Nira Wickramasinghe
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Routledge Handbook of South Asian politics : India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 38
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. South Asia—Politics and government. I. Brass, Paul R., 1936– 41
JQ98.A58R68 2009 42
320.954—dc22 2008047362 43
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ISBN 0-203-87818-3 Master e-book ISBN
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6 Sri Lanka’s independence
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Shadows over a colonial graft
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13 Nira Wickramasinghe
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19 Introduction domination, and monetarization of exchanges.
20 However, this depth should not be over-
21 Sri Lanka’s independence process is generally estimated: family structures, the caste system,
22 described as “the conversion of a colony into and Buddhism were maintained, especially in
23 an independent state by peaceful means”1 or the center of the island where foreign
24 as a “transfer of power” from British admini- domination was resisted for three centuries.
25 stration to the representatives of the new Traditions were transformed by reshaping or
26 independent state of Ceylon, a phrase that adapting to features of modernity.4
27 implies considerable continuity with a There are many ways of reading the
28 colonial era that lasted 400 years.2 Portuguese moment of the foundation of the state of
29 and Dutch rule left an imprint but not as Ceylon on 4 February, 1948: few would see
30 marked as the British (1796–1948), the first it as a fundamental disjuncture from colonial
31 power to conquer the entire island. The rule, the image of a continuum or a nexus
32 British attempted to intervene at the level of being more suitable. When reflecting on this
33 what Eric Stokes calls “society itself.”3 The critical moment one needs, however, to go
34 exceptional depth of the colonial impact on beyond the conventional reading of Ceylon
35 Ceylon, particularly in the coastal areas, in 1948 as a “satellite of Britain,”5 or as the
36 radically modified the social and economic theater of a consensual transition to inde-
37 structures of the island. In some respects, pendence. What I hope to provide in this
38 the colonial impact oriented the economy chapter is a more shadowy picture of a state
39 outward, overturned traditional streams of whose legitimacy was weak as it derived
40 trade, and distorted links with India, while neither from a political body bound by
41 introducing into society new elements of nationalist sentiment nor from a nationalist
42 heterogeneity: Christianity, the languages struggle against colonial autocracy in the
43 of the conqueror, new communities such as name of deeply felt democratic principles.
44 the Burghers (mixed European and native The transfer of power, occurring, as it did,
45 descent) and, later, Indian immigrant planta- in two stages (1931 and 1948) took place
46 tion workers. It also imposed unifying factors: within the institutional framework of a
47 modern modes of communication, a unified dominion. This chapter will first look at the
48 administrative system, a common language of years immediately before independence that
41
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E
paved the way for independence and wit- drawn up and published. Instead of the 1
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nessed the nurturing of leaders for the new expected cabinet system, a scheme for exe- 2
state. It will then analyze the institutional cutive committees modeled on those of the 3
continuities in practice between the British League of Nations and the London County 4
colonial state and the newly founded state. Council was proposed. The Executive 5
Finally, it will address the legacies of unsolved Council was abolished. Instead of a ministry 6
issues—dominion status, citizenship, ethnic and an opposition, the unicameral legislature, 7
mistrust—that persisted into the following the State Council would divide into seven 8
decades. committees, each of which would be con- 9
cerned with a particular public department. 10
The main recommendation of the com- 11
Towards independence: The mission was the abolition of communal repre- 12
democratic graft of 1931 sentation and the extension of the franchise 13
to all males over 21 and females over 30 14
The two decades that preceded independence domiciled in Ceylon. Eventually universal 15
constitute a formative period for the future suffrage was adopted, with some restrictions. 16
statesmen of independent Ceylon: they gained The abolition of communal representation 17
experience in statecraft in the state councils and the adherence to the principle of equality 18
and introduced important and lasting legisla- between individuals signified—in effect— 19
tion in areas where power was delegated: Sinhalese rule.The aim of the commissioners, 20
namely agriculture, industry, education, in accord with the view prevailing at the 21
health care, and local administration. Colonial Office, was most probably to ensure 22
a gradual and limited transfer of power to 23
the moderates of the Ceylon National 24
The Donoughmore experience in
Congress,7 while keeping a strong minority 25
self-rule
group which was apprehensive of any more 26
Since 1915, the year of violent intercommunal advances towards self-government as a safety 27
riots, the island had been enjoying a relative valve against any potential radical moves by 28
calm, unlike its larger neighbor. In the decades the majority. It was also a way of reinforcing 29
that followed, the island’s westernized elite the power of the conservative leaders of the 30
was introduced to the ideals of parliamentary Ceylon National Congress, many of whom 31
debate within the confines of a system similar were rural notables, at the expense of the 32
to that of India, with limited franchise and labor leader A. E. Goonesinha who, the British 33
communal representation. In 1926, Sir Hugh felt, was gaining too much prominence in 34
Clifford, Governor of Ceylon, sent a dispatch the political life of the country. The project 35
to the Colonial Office that contributed to exceeded the demands of the Ceylonese 36
convincing the Under-Secretary of State of elites, who had asked for less democracy, but 37
the urgency for sending a small royal com- more autonomy. However, Britain retained 38
mission to examine on the spot the actual authority over finance, justice, law and order, 39
effect of the constitutional changes already and foreign relations. 40
granted.6 The arrival of the Donoughmore During the Donoughmore period the 41
Commission had the effect of stimulating transfer of power to a moderate Ceylonese 42
political activity in the country and spawned leadership was accompanied by a similar 43
a number of new associations based on transfer of power in the administration. The 44
region, caste, and community as well as period of the second State Council from 45
yearnings for greater political participation. 1936 onwards saw the near completion of a 46
Within a year following the sittings of the program of Ceylonization of the admini- 47
Donoughmore Commission, a report was stration There was no formal policy of 48
42
S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T
classes could challenge the social values of to a line of wealthy landowners from the 1
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foreign Christian rulers and British rule as a Colombo region was a more virulently Sin- 2
whole. The social and religious reformers, halese nationalist organization. Bandaranaike 3
Anagarika Dharmapala and Walisinha had received an English and Protestant 4
Harischandra, led a campaign to protect places education, but learnt Sinhala and converted 5
of Buddhist worship. They were also leaders to Buddhism on his return from Oxford.The 6
of the temperance movement.This endeavor, Lanka Sama Samaja Party, a Marxist organ- 7
which peaked first in 1903–05 and, more ization formed in 1935, was nonsectarian in 8
importantly, in 1911–14, had a dual purpose: nature and led by members of the Sinhalese 9
first to reassert Buddhist strictures against elite. Minority groups were represented by 10
alcohol, which amounted to the renewed vocal individuals such as G. G. Ponnambalam. 11
assertion of the validity and relevance of There was, however, no united front of 12
Buddhist values in general after years of minorities to combat the increasingly majori- 13
acquiescence in the values of foreign rulers; tarian features of the State Council era. In 14
second, on the political plane, to attack excise 1944, the minority coalition was restricted 15
duties as an important source of British to the Ceylon Tamils and Ceylon Indians 16
revenue. The impact of this movement was (plantation Tamils, often referred to as Estate 17
not confined to the urban intelligentsia, but Tamils). 18
spread to the rural middle class and urban On the whole, the state councils saw an 19
workers. Dharmapala appealed to the middle under-representation of minority communi- 20
classes when he stressed the doctrinal tradition ties. In 1931, a Tamil boycott of the elections 21
and rejected peasant religiosity, especially the instigated by a Tamil radical group called the 22
worship of deities. After severe Sinhalese– Youth Congress further aggravated the 23
Muslim rioting in a number of locations in situation.This was rectified in 1934 with the 24
1915, the British colonial authorities clamped entry of four northern members.The relations 25
down on men associated with the temperance between communities soured further when, 26
movement, arbitrarily arresting many mem- in 1936, all seven ministers elected were 27
bers. Subsequently, the pattern of political Sinhalese. From then on, minority leaders 28
agitation underwent a distinct change. The presented their own solutions for political 29
shift started with the death of W. Harischandra reform—such as balanced representation for 30
in 1913 and was consolidated by the exile of minorities—quite separately from the reform 31
Anagarika Dharmapala to India. From this demands which the State Council, under the 32
time, the constitutional reform movement leadership of D. S. Senanayake, were crafting. 33
adopted a secular outlook and religion D. S. Senanayake was heir to a rich family 34
became of secondary importance. whose fortune came from graphite mines and 35
coconut plantations. He was very popular 36
with the peasant class, to whom he distributed 37
Reform and state councils, lands as Minister of Agriculture after 1931, 38
1931–36 as well as with the upper classes who were 39
reassured by his social conservatism. The 40
During the 1930s and until the mid-1940s, British saw him as an ideal ally. 41
the political space was occupied by a multi- It would be incorrect to suggest, however, 42
ethnic elite group that belonged to a variety that the political space was limited to the 43
of political formations: the Ceylon National conservative native elite in the State Councils. 44
Congress was essentially a Sinhalese moderate Many young village monks, who had studied 45
movement with a few minority Muslim and at seats of monastic learning such as Vidyoda 46
Tamil members; the Sinhala Maha Sabha Pirivena and Vidyalankara Pirivena, returned 47
created by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the heir to their villages with high ideals of uplifting 48
44
S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T
1 the lot of the peasants. In the 1947 elections of the constitutional scheme formulated in
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majority, the Ceylon Tamil and Ceylon Indian paid workers reached another climax. The 1
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2 who believed socialism was not alien to the tea and coconuts in the 1880s, and rubber
3 spirit of Buddhism as the sangha was a com- in the 1900s. The plantation structure
4 munity in which private property was remained, based on the exploitation of an
5 non-existent. Indian labor force in vast plantations of several
6 The election results were a disappointment hundred hectares, overseen by a British
7 for the UNP, which secured only 42 of managerial class, and with well-established
8 95 seats. The LSSP won ten seats, the BLP commercial networks: “Over 40 percent of
9 five seats, the CP three seats and Labour one the Gross Domestic Product in 1948 came
10 seat. Left-wing parties, which secured 20.5 from agriculture and the share of tea, rubber
11 percent of the votes, dominated the low and coconut in the agricultural output was
12 country, from Colombo to the southwestern over 60 percent.”15 The smallholding sector
13 coast to Matara at the southern tip. At the produced mainly for the domestic market
14 time, the success of the left was explained as at relatively low levels of productivity. At
15 a consequence of the post-war economic Independence, economic indicators were
16 slump. There was also a caste dimension to largely favorable. The balance of payments
17 the Marxist power base.The coastal fringe of recorded a sizeable current account surplus
18 the country contained a heavy concentration while external reserves were sufficient to
19 of the Karava, Salagama, and Durava castes, finance imports for about one year.16 The
20 castes that occupied an intermediate place in standard of living, owing to well-entrenched
21 the social hierarchy dominated by the welfare policies in education, health, and food,
22 majority Goyigama (farmer) caste. The left was among the highest of the South and
23 did not make any headway in non-Sinhalese Southeast Asian countries.
24 areas.13 Interestingly, the northern part of the Although legislation passed in 1949
25 country was the only area where the LSSP authorized the creation of the Royal Ceylon
26 won fewer votes than its Marxist rivals. Army, Royal Ceylon Navy and Royal Ceylon
27 Clearly the nonsectarian language of the LSSP Air Force and although, in the years that
28 was not attractive to the Tamil voter. followed, an independent military force was
29 Independents had secured 21 seats while established, the organization of the armed
30 the Tamil Congress and Ceylon Indian forces in existence during colonial times did
31 Congress gained seven and six seats respec- not change. Most officers continued to be
32 tively.As the UNP had not secured a majority, trained in military academies in Britain. The
33 anti-UNP forces gathered to try to form a basic structure of the colonial forces was
34 government at what is known as the Yamuna retained, as were the symbolic trappings—the
35 Conference.14 But no agreement was reached flags, banners, and regimental ceremonies. At
36 and D. S. Senanayake lured enough inde- that time, the army served a purely ceremonial
37 pendents in support to form a cabinet. The function and took up less than 4 percent of
38 left parties would never come closer to the national budget.17
39 forming a government. The Ceylon Civil Service had been
40 Ceylonized to the extent of 90 percent by
41 1949, but a small minority of administrative
42 Economy, bureaucracy, army officers remained as a vestige of colonialism
43 and social privilege.After independence, its 200
44 At Independence, the island remained heir members continued to enjoy special advant-
45 to a colonial system in which the economy ages and status. The new middle classes
46 was tied to the export of tropical goods and continued to feed into the Ceylon Civil service
47 the import of food products such as rice. First for another decade and a half.This anomalous
48 established with cinnamon, the export trade status would last until 1963 when the Ceylon
47
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E
Civil Service was incorporated into a unified qualifying date for completion of residence. 1
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1 The trade unions that represented the had been minor instances of discriminatory
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2 Estate Tamils in the late 1940s and early action by the Sinhalese. However, the report
3 1950s—the Ceylon Workers Congress on discrimination concluded that there was
4 (CWC) and the Democratic Workers’ Con- no substantial indication of a general policy
5 gress (DWC)—issued conflicting instructions on the part of the government of Ceylon to
6 to members. Tales of application forms that discriminate against minority communities.
7 were requested but never arrived because of Apart from remaining closed to the
8 the connivance of postmasters, and of a political demands of the minorities, the British
9 climate of suspicion and fear on the part of played a role in the process of Sinhalese
10 illiterate workers, are part of the collective national affirmation which was not negligible.
11 memory of plantation labor workers.21 The During the 1930s and 1940s, the colonial
12 result was that most estate workers became rulers participated in defining what they
13 stateless. thought was the uniqueness of Sinhalese
14 The citizenship acts spelled the end of civilization.The study, preservation, translation
15 any sort of trust between the Estate Tamils and publication of Sinhalese texts were
16 and the Jaffna Tamils. Indeed, the leader of encouraged. State sponsorship was given to
17 the Tamil Congress, representing the Jaffna indigenous systems of medicine. Thus, in the
18 Tamils, accepted a ministry in the UNP last decades of British rule, a “divide and rule”
19 government that had just disenfranchised policy designed to suppress nationalism by
20 nearly one million Tamil plantation workers. fostering ethnic tensions was more mythic
21 The stand taken on behalf of the Estate than real.The urgency was on another plane:
22 Tamils by the newly created federal party left-wing parties such as the LSSP were
23 leader, S. J.V. Chelvanayakam, did not create fomenting social unrest and threatening the
24 much of an impact among the isolated Estate old order. The British policy of alliances was
25 Tamils. The relative isolation of the Indian one supporting moderates against “extrem-
26 Tamils from the rest of society, whether ists.”The main concern of the British was to
27 Ceylon Tamil or Sinhala, as well as their low hand over power peacefully. The near com-
28 caste status and poverty, ensured their lack pletion of the program of Ceylonization of
29 of political representation and mobilization the administration was motivated by the same
30 and their rapid marginalization in national concern.
31 politics.
32
33 Dominion status: A flawed
34 Ethnic issues: Divide and rule? independence
35
36 The reconquest of political power by the On 18 June, 1947 the British government
37 Sinhalese majority was supported by the made the official announcement that Ceylon
38 British and excesses on their part did not would receive “fully responsible status within
39 lead the British government to adopt a more the British Commonwealth of Nations.”22
40 conciliatory attitude towards minority Contemporaries as well as scholars in the
41 demands. This was in keeping with the decades that followed have debated whether
42 Colonial Office preference for gradualism. dominion status meant the continuation of
43 An overview of the Soulbury Report’s colonial rule under another name. Among
44 treatment of minority grievances issued in the main critics of dominion status in the
45 1945 is revealing. On the whole, it appears 1940s were supporters of the leftist parties of
46 that the Soulbury Commission felt the Ceylon. On Independence Day they made
47 minorities were exaggerating the precarious- sure that black flags were displayed in various
48 ness of their situation.They agreed that there parts of the island as a protest against the Rs
49
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E
800,000 allegedly spent on the celebrations. of the 1950s would not disappoint its 1
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The leftist newspaper Nidahasa (freedom) proponents: it would be the most conservative 2
recalled occasions when students were caned and pro-western regime Sri Lanka ever would 3
by their teacher for refusing to participate in know. 4
Independence Day festivities or to bring flags 5
to schools.23 Historians of the immediate 6
post-independence decades took positions on Conclusion 7
the issue, although today few people would 8
feel it is something worth debating. K. M. In 1948 the colonial power departed Ceylon, 9
de Silva, for instance, argued that D. S. but left behind real and important traces.The 10
Senanayake’s emphasis on moderation and transfer of power within the framework of a 11
pragmatism was tactical and that Sri Lanka dominion allowed the country to avoid the 12
only followed the constitutional approach of necessity or human costs of struggling for a 13
memoranda and talks that had brought national cause, but it also denied its ruling class 14
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to a founding myth comparable to that which 15
independence status without the bloodshed accompanied the birth of the Indian Union 16
that, he argued, had occurred in India where and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. For a founding 17
independence was said to have been won by myth, politicians would look back to a much 18
a mass-based nationalist movement.24 It was, more distant past that did not embody 19
however, the Defense Agreement signed by democratic ideals but conjured up images of 20
Ceylon and Britain in 1948 that was most violence, exclusiveness, and parricide. The 21
criticized by the leftists, who called D. S. Sinhala myth of Vijaya and the people of the 22
Senanayake a traitor for allowing the British Lion would fill the symbolic void created by an 23
to continue to maintain naval, air, and land ineffective nationalist movement. 24
forces on the island and use naval bases, The vestiges of colonialism remained in 25
airports, and other facilities.25 Leftists also the army, the civil service, the constitution, 26
regarded the agreements as “badges of and the Anglicized middle class, whose 27
inferiority” and “checks on full sovereignty members continued to rule in all walks of 28
in external affairs.”26 By this agreement the life. The island’s dominant political models 29
government of Sri Lanka and the government and idioms, including Marxism in its most 30
of the United Kingdom would give each intellectual form, were also imported from 31
other “military assistance for the security of the west. The absence of legitimacy of 32
their territories, for defense against external politicians, who cut themselves away from the 33
aggression and for the protection of essential culture of the rural people, led to the institu- 34
communications.” Wriggins makes the tionalizing of a system of vote catching that 35
important point, however, that Ceylon re- emphasized dynastic loyalty with regard to 36
tained the right to terminate the arrange- the Senanayake and Bandaranaike clans. In 37
ment.27 Further, Jennings notes that D. S. the next decade, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike 38
Senanayake signed the Defense Agreement would ride the rising wave of dissatisfaction 39
rather as an inducement to Britain to hasten of the common man with a regime from 40
Sri Lanka’s independence than for any which he felt alienated and leaders for whom 41
military purpose.28 These agreements that he had little regard. 42
gave credibility to the argument made by 43
Marxists that Sri Lanka’s independence was 44
flawed must be understood as an integral part Notes 45
of the independence package of the British 46
that aimed at keeping Sri Lanka free from 1 W. Ivor Jennings, “The Dominion of Ceylon,” 47
Soviet influences as far as possible.The regime Pacific Affairs,Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1949), p. 1. 48
50
S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T
1 2 See the mainstream historical works on the 16 Godfrey Gunatilleke, Development and
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2 British period, especially K. M. de Silva (ed.), Liberalisation in Sri Lanka. Trends and Prospects
3 History of Ceylon,Vol. III (Colombo: Colombo (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1993), pp. 5–6.
4 Apothecaries, 1973); Robert N. Kearney, The 17 http//ieweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cs.
Politics of Ceylon (Ithaca, NY, and London: 18 James Jupp, “Constitutional Development in
5
Cornell University Press, 1973); Howard Ceylon since Independence,” Pacific Affairs,
6 Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1968), pp. 169–83;
7 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1960). Robert N. Kearney, “Ceylon: A Year of
8 3 David Scott, Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Consolidation,” Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 2
9 Postcoloniality (Princeton, NJ: University Press, (1964), pp. 729–34.
10 1999), citing Eric Stokes, The English 19 A. Aziz, CIC President, Hindu Organ, 18 May,
11 Utilitarians and India (New Delhi: Oxford 1948.
12 University Press, 1989). 20 See the excellent analysis of Amita Shastri,
13 4 Eric Meyer makes this point very convincingly “Estate Tamils, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of
in his latest book, Sri Lanka: Entre Particularisme 1948 and Sri Lankan politics,” Contemporary
14
et Mondialisation (Paris: La Documentation South Asia, 8, 1 (1999), pp. 65–86. For more
15 Française, 2001). conventional approaches, see I. D. S.
16 5 See, for example, S. Arasaratnam, review of Sri Weerawardena, “The Minorities and the
17 Lanka: From Dominion to Republic, by Lucy M. Citizenship Act,” Ceylon Historical Journal, 1, 3
18 Jacob, in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter (1951); S. U. Kodikara, Indo–Ceylon Relations
19 1974–75), pp. 567–68. Since Independence (Colombo: Colombo
20 6 Command papers 3131. 1928. Ceylon: Report Apothecaries, 1965).
21 of the Special Commission on the Constitution of 21 E.Valentine Daniel, Charred Lullabies: Chapters
22 Ceylon, July 1928 (London: His Majesty’s in an Anthropography of Violence: Sri Lankans,
23 Stationery Office, 1928), pp. 11–12. Sinhalas, and Tamils (Princeton, NJ: University
7 The Ceylon National Congress formed in Press and New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
24
1919 was constituted by notables belonging 1997), pp. 110–13.
25 to all ethnic and religious communities of 22 See K. M. de Silva (ed.), British Documents on
26 Ceylon to push for reforms of the constitution. the End of Empire. Sri Lanka. Part II. Towards
27 See Michael Roberts (ed.), Documents of the Independence (series B Volume 2) 1945–1948
28 Ceylon National Congress and Nationalist Politics (London: Institute for Commonwealth Studies,
29 in Ceylon 1929–1950, 4 vols (Colombo: 1997), pp. 350–51.
30 Department of National Archives, 1977). 23 Nidahasa, 25 February, 1948.
31 8 Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern 24 K. M. de Silva, “Ivor Jennings and Sri Lanka’s
32 Age: A History of Contested Identities (London: passage to Independence,” in K. M. de Silva
C. Hurst 2006), pp. 306–307. (ed.), Sri Lanka’s Troubled Inheritance (Kandy:
33
9 Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka, p. 306. ICES, 2007), p. 106.
34 10 Nira Wickramasinghe, “Politics of Nostalgia: 25 For the full text of the defense requirements
35 The Citizen as peasant,” Delhi School of Economics of the British government, see K. M. de Silva
36 Occasional Paper, (New Series), No. 2, 2005. (ed.), British Documents, pp. 299–305; H. S. S.
37 11 H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: New Nissanka, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy—A Study
38 Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of in Non-Alignment (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984),
39 Chicago Press, 1999). pp. 9–11.
40 12 Cited in The Hindu Organ (a daily English- 26 K. M. de Silva, “Sri Lanka—D. S. Senanayake
41 language paper published in Jaffna). and the Passage to Dominion Status,
42 Seneviratne, pp. 228–43. 1942–1947,” Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences,
13 Seneviratne, pp. 228–43. Vol. 3, No. 2 (December 1980), p. 14.
43
14 N. Sanmugathasan, Political Memoirs of an 27 Howard Wriggins, Ceylon, p. 385.
44 Unrepentant Communist (Colombo: Colombo 28 Cited in Shelton Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri
45 Apothecaries, 1989), p. 70. Lanka: A Third World Perspective (Delhi:
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47 Lanka, Marga Research. Studies No. 2.
48 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1974), pp. 1–2.
51