52 Ateneo LJ918

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Mar 5 07:39:54 2021
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.

Yvanna D. L. Maalat & Monica T. Liwag, Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as an Anti-Corruption Strategy, 52 ATENEO L.J.
918 (2008).
ALWD 6th ed.

Maalat, Y. D.; Liwag, M. T., Curbing corruption through gendered lens: Utilizing
feminist curb-cutting theory as an anti-corruption strategy, 52(4) Ateneo L.J. 918
(2008).
APA 7th ed.

Maalat, Y. D., & Liwag, M. T. (2008). Curbing corruption through gendered lens:
Utilizing feminist curb-cutting theory as an anti-corruption strategy. Ateneo Law
Journal, 52(4), 918-953.
Chicago 17th ed.

Yvanna D. L. Maalat; Monica T. Liwag, "Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as an Anti-Corruption Strategy," Ateneo Law
Journal 52, no. 4 (2008): 918-953
McGill Guide 9th ed.

Yvanna D L Maalat & Monica T Liwag, "Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as an Anti-Corruption Strategy" (2008) 52:4
Ateneo LJ 918.
AGLC 4th ed.

Yvanna DL Maalat and Monica T Liwag, 'Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as an Anti-Corruption Strategy' (2008) 52(4)
Ateneo Law Journal 918.
MLA 8th ed.

Maalat, Yvanna D. L., and Monica T. Liwag. "Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as an Anti-Corruption Strategy." Ateneo Law
Journal, vol. 52, no. 4, 2008, p. 918-953. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.

Yvanna D L Maalat and Monica T Liwag, 'Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as an Anti-Corruption Strategy' (2008) 52
Ateneo LJ 918
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information
Curbing Corruption through Gendered Lens:
Utilizing Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory as
an Anti-Corruption Strategy
Yvanna D. L. Maalat*
Monica T. Liwag**
I. INTRODUCTION...........................................919
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY.. .......................... 920
III. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM VIEWED
THROUGH LEGAL LENS .................................... 922
A. Local Laws
B. ConstitutionalAnti-Corruption Bodies
IV. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM VIEWED
THROUGH Soclo-CULTURAL LENS............ ............. 930
V. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM VIEWED
THROUGH THE POLITICAL SCIENCE LENS ..... ................ 933
A. Defining Corruption through Notions of Public and Non-Public
B. Current Philippine Anti-Corruption System Evaluated
VI. THE THREE-FOLD ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK:
FUSING DYNAMISM, INTEGRATION, AND GLOBALIZATION........937
VII. VIEWING CORRUPTION WITH GENDERED LENS.......................941
A. The Sex-Gender Distinction
B. Gender and CorruptionInvolve Abuse of Power
C. Gender and Corruption as Development Issues
D. Situating Gender within the Three-Fold Anti-Corruption Framework
VIII. UTILIZING FEMINIST CURB-CUTTING THEORY AS AN
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ...................... ...... 95'
A. Defining the Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory
B. Feminist Curb-Cutting within the Three-Fold Anti-Corruption Framework
* '07 J.D., second honors, Ateneo de Manila University School of Law. The author
graduated 4 th in her class. She was also a Member of the Board of Editors (2005-
2007) of the Ateneo Lawjournal. She is likewise the author of A Return to the Principle
of Non-Refoulement: Re-Examining and Reconciling the Principle and its Exceptions, 51
ATENEo L.J. 1120 (2007).
** '07 J.D., Ateneo de Manila University School of Law.
This is an abridged version of a joint paper submitted by the authors for their
Gender and the Law class under the instruction of Attys. Gilbert V. Sembrano
&
Amparita de los Santos-Sta. Maria.
Cite as 52 ATENEo L.J. 9i8 (2008).
Digitized from Best Copy Available

2008] FEMINIST CURB-CUTTING THEORY 919
I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a virulent and debilitating social disease that manifests itself in

many forms. The terms corruption and poor governance have been used
almost interchangeably, although corruption should be more clearly defined
as an outcome, a consequence of weak or bad governance. Poor governance
can lead to lack of transparency, weak accountability, monopoly of power,
wide discretion, and inefficiency, subsequently resulting in corruption, a
term which has oftentimes baffled scholars and escaped rigid academic
definition. A simple solution to corruption has proven itself elusive, while
the effects of corruption have been pervasive.
In addressing this social pandemic, a dynamic, integrated, and globalized
approach is necessary to combat its adverse effects on the marginalized. The
United Nations Convention against Corruption' in its Preamble states that
"corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that
affects all societies and economies, making international cooperation to
prevent and control it essential."2 The Convention likewise affirms that "a
comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach is required to prevent and
combat corruption effectively."3
This Paper recognizes that corruption inherently involves unequal
power relations, and in order to be truly responsive to the needs of the
powerless, providing solutions to corruption issues requires a gender-
sensitive perspective. This need is highlighted by the fact that studies have
revealed the "disproportionate impact of corruption on women as the
majority of the poor population."4 Thus, the World Bank has declared that
"gender mainstreaming" (the demand for socio-economic and political
equality between the genders), is key to "poverty reduction."5
Due to the need for an interdisciplinary and integrated anti-corruption
strategy, this piece aims to utilize the feminist curb-cutting theory in order
to mainstream gender within the Philippine anti-corruption framework.
Feminist curb-cutting replicates the model used for people with disabilities
i. United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 4 (LVII), U.N.

Doc. A/RES/ 5 8/ 4 (2003) [hereinafter UNCAC].
2. Id., Preamble, ¶ 4.
3. Id. ¶ 5.
4. Bianca Schimmel, et al., Corruption and Gender: Approaches and
Recommendations for TA, available at http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-
corruption-and-gender.pdf (last accessed Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Corruption
and Gender].
5. Wendy McElroy, Gender Feminisms Global Blackmail, Apr. 16, 2002.

920 ATENEO LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 52:4
and uses their experience to benefit not only those with disabilities, but
anyone who may need the curb-cutting structural design. The principle
emanating from feminist curb-cutting is that a principle designed to benefit
one marginalized group concurrently benefits others.
According to Ackerly, a human rights scholar, the feminist curb-cutting

theory
-
begins with the experience of those whose capabilities fall outside the norm
and involves them in the design of the solution for existing infrastructure
and the design of future structures such that the full range of capabilities
inform their design. While designed with attention to those in wheelchairs,
the curb cuts, access ramps, automatic doors, multiple access points, and
clearly indicated wheelchair accessible routes enhance the mobility of
others as well. Those pushing strollers and delivery dollies, those carrying
lots of books, and those recovering from an injury for example are all able
to move more freely. Beginning with those most affected, all are able to see
and understand a broad range of mobility challenges and to design solutions
that enable greater freedom of movement for all. Further, the ramifications
of improved mobility are felt far beyond the initial focus on freedom of
movement for those whose mobility is most challenged. For example, in
the United States, with reliable and predictable wheelchair access, parents
with children whose age or ability require them to be in strollers are able to
bring their children to museums (and a range of other venues) to further
their children's and their own education. Older people are afforded similar
opportunities for continued learning despite declining mobility.6
In mainstreaming gender within the proposed anti-corruption strategy, it

is hoped that a gender-sensitive approach furthers the goals of both gender
equality and good governance. Addressing issues of gender and corruption is
indispensable to achieving the goals of formal and substantive gender
equality, in terms of the gender perspective, and transparent and accountable
governance, in terms of the corruption perspective. Both goals are significant
in their own right, but should likewise be addressed with a view to their
intersectionality.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Given its aim of providing a gendered, interdisciplinary anti-corruption

strategy, this Paper discusses each of the perspectives indispensable to
combating corruption in the Philippines.
Part III focuses on the Philippine legal framework; it presents the

pertinent laws and anti-corruption bodies designed to combat corruption and
6. BROOKE ACKERLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF

DIFFERENCE 136 (2006).

analyzes whether these laws and mechanisms are adequate and effective in
curbing corruption.
Part IV discusses the socio-cultural framework; it introduces socio-
anthropology principles that may be utilized in formulating an anti-
corruption strategy. It presents the socio-cultural definition of corruption,
and works with several assumptions concerning corruption: that the socio-
cultural matrix influences the politico-legal system; that the politico-legal
system in turn influences the socio-cultural matrix; and that practices
favoring corruption and practices against corruption are influenced by the
interplay between the politico-legal system and the socio-cultural matrix.
This section also distinguishes between the public and the private sphere, and
establishes the proposition that a strong sense of public community in the
Philippines can forestall corrupt practices.7 It proposes that an increase in
transparency and accountability in governance can curb corruption.
Part V presents the political science framework; it discusses the definition
of corruption from a political science perspective, distinguishes between
notions of the public and non-public spheres, and likewise proposes that a
viable anti-corruption strategy invariably requires the minimization of
discretion and increase in accountability.
Part VI integrates the three above-mentioned perspectives, underscoring
their particularities and resemblances, to formulate a three-pronged anti-
corruption strategy.
Part VII is devoted to the gender perspective and is divided into four
sections. The first section explains the sex-gender distinction. The second
section illustrates the intersectionality of gender and corruption by showing
how both gender and corruption involve abuse of power. The third section
discusses how both corruption and gender are development issues and must
be addressed in their own right in order to achieve the goals of formal and
substantive gender equality, and transparent and accountable governance.
Finally, the fourth section situates gender within the three-fold anti-
corruption framework discussed in Parts III to V.
Part VIII highlights how the feminist curb-cutting theory can be utilized
as an anti-corruption tool. This is because it addresses the need for a
dynamic, integrated, and global approach towards combating corruption.
The chapter likewise discusses that the problems involved in gender and
corruption must be addressed simultaneously, while acknowledging the
7. Dr. Fernando Zialcita, A Lecture on Corruption: A Socio-Cultural Perspective

(Jan. 12, 2007).

significance of each in furthering the goals of substantive gender equality and

good governance.
III. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM

VIEWED THROUGH LEGAL LENS
A. Local Laws
Philippine initiatives against corruption have taken the form of law and anti-
graft bodies created by the Constitution. In addition to the State, other
institutions have been active in the fight against graft and corruption.
i. Anti-Corruption Laws
Accountability of public officials is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, as it

was in the 1898 Malolos Constitution, the 1935 Commonwealth
Constitution, and the 1973 Constitution of the Martial Law period. Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, entitled "Accountability of Public Officers,"
states the fundamental principle of public office as a public trust.8 This
requires full accountability and integrity among public officers and
employees. The President, Vice-President, members of the Supreme Court,
members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
impeached for violations of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, and for betrayal of public trust. 9 Other public
officials committing such acts can be investigated and prosecuted through the
regular judicial process provided by law.
The Philippine government is directed to maintain honesty and integrity
in the public service, and to take action against graft and corruption.' 0 It is
also directed to give full public disclosure of all transactions involving the
public interest." This provision finds its counterpart in the Bill of Rights,
which gives people the right to information on matters of public concern,
including official records, documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions, and to government research data used as the basis
for policy development. 12
8. PHIL. CONST. art XI, 5 i.

9. PHIL. CONST. art XI, 5 2.
io. PHIL. CONST. art II, 5 27.
ii. PHIL. CONST. art II, 528.
12. PHIL. CONST. art III, 5 7.

In 1960, Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act,'3 was enacted. Considered as landmark legislation at that time, it defines
what are considered corrupt practices by a public officer, declares them
unlawful, and provides the corresponding penalties of imprisonment,'4
perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture of
unexplained wealth in favor of the government. In addition, it mandates the
submission by all government personnel of a statement of assets and liabilities
every two years.' 5
2. Laws of the Re-Democratization Period (1986 to the present)

Immediately after former President Corazon Aquino's assumption to office,
she promulgated the "Freedom Constitution" which, among other
provisions, declared all government positions vacant unless otherwise
identified.' 6 This Freedom Constitution was the basic law of a revolutionary
government and was superseded by the 1987 Constitution. Six new anti-
corruption laws emerged under its operation.
The Administrative Code of 1987'7 incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional, and procedural principles and rules of
governance. It reiterates public accountability as the fundamental principle of
governance.
In 1989, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees was passed.' It promotes a high standard of ethics and
requires all government personnel to make an accurate statement of assets
and liabilities and to disclose net worth and financial connections.' 9 It also
13. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 3Q19 (1960).
14. An Act Amending Sections Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen of
Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Nineteen, Otherwise Known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 (1982).
15. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 5 7.
16. See, 1986 PHIL. FREEDOM CONST. 5 3 (superseded 1987).
17. An Act Instituting the Administrative Code of 1987 [ADMINISTRATIVE CODE],
Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
i8. An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials And Employees, to Uphold the Time-Honored Principle of Public
Office Being a Public Trust, Granting Incentives and Rewards for Exemplary
Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts and Transactions and Providing Penalties
for Violations Thereof and for Other Purposes [CODE OF CONDUCT AND
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES], Republic Act
No. 6713 (1989).
19. Id. 5 8.

requires new officials to divest ownership in any private enterprise within 30

days from assumption of office to avoid conflict of interest.20
The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Republic Act No. 6770,2' provides the
functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
Republic Act No. 8249,22 the law further defining the jurisdiction of
Sandigabayan, the latter was designated as a special court on the same level as
the Court of Appeals.23
B. Constitutional Anti-Corruption Bodies

The 1987 Constitution established special independent bodies to support the
principles of honesty, integrity and public accountability. These special
independent bodies are:
(i) the Office of the Ombudsman as the people's protector and
watchdog;
(2) the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency;
(3) the Commission on Audit as the supreme body responsible for

auditing the government's expenditures and performance; and
(4) the Sandiganbayan as a special court that hears cases of graft and
corruption.
To ensure that these organizations and their commissioners can fulfill
their duties without fear of reprisal from other agencies of the government,
the Constitution grants them fiscal autonomy. 24 Their actions are appealable
only to the Supreme Court. 5 2
The Office of the Ombudsman was created to investigate and act

promptly on complaints filed against public officials and employees, and to
serve as the people's watchdog of the government. It is an institution with
20. Id. 5 9.
21. An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes [The Ombudsman Act of 1989],
Republic Act No. 6770 (1989).
22. An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for
the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 16c6, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes, Republic Act No. 8249 (.1997)
23. Id. 5 i.
24. PHIL. CONST. art VIII, 5 2.
25. See, Republic Act No. 8249, 5 7, ¶ 3; 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, rule
64, § 2.

the biggest responsibility to prevent graft and corruption. It provides for a

Deputy Ombudsman for the military, and at least one Deputy each for the
geographical divisions of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.2 6
The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency tasked to
promote efficient and responsive public service delivery, to establish a career
service, strengthen the merit system and human resource development,
promote public accountability and enforce the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.27 It undertakes anti-corruption
functions, such as values orientation workshops and employee voluntarism.
The Commission on Audit, while primarily regarded as an evaluator of
the government's performance in handling funds, also conducts audits on the
income and revenues of government. Aside from ensuring financial
accountability, the Commission may also inquire into the effectiveness and
impact of programs, as well as inquire into the economy, efficiency, or the
legality and regularity of government operations.
The Sandiganbayan, literally "the pillar of the nation," is a special court
with jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.28
i. Presidential Anti-Corruption Bodies

All post-war Philippine presidents have come out with their own statutory
creations to provide citizens with an informal and accessible avenue of
redress that will guarantee them fair and equitable treatment under the law.
The first of such offices was created in 1950 by President Elpidio
Quirino. Called the "Integrity Board," 29 the body received and investigated
complaints against officials of the executive branch for corruption and
dereliction in the performance of duty. It was empowered to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimonies, receive evidence, gather
26. See, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, 5 12.

27. CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, 54 (B).
28. JOSE Y. FERIA & MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, CIVIL PROCEDURE
ANNOTATED 105 (2o01).
29. Office of the President, Executive Order No. 318 (May 25, 1950).

information, and examine documents and papers pertinent to its

investigation. 30
As his first executive act, President Ramon Magsaysay replaced
Quirino's Integrity Board with his "Presidential Complaint and Actions
Commission" (PCAC).31 Its duty was to investigate complaints against
executive departments and agencies and to recommend the appropriate
action to take on such complaint.32
President Carlos P. Garcia followed suit with the establishment of an
agency he called the "Presidential Committee on Administration
Performance Efficiency" (PCAPE).33 Garcia also formed a group known as
the "Presidential Anti-Graft Committee" (PAGCOM)34 to implement
Republic Act No. 1379,35 tasked with inquiring into, investigating,
determining, and verifying any and all unlawfully acquired properties of
government officials and employees and obtaining the needed evidence to
establish such unlawful acquisitions while they were in public office. In less
than a year, Garcia abolished the PAGCOM.3 6
For his part, President Diosdado Macapagal resurrected the PCAPE and
called it the "Presidential Anti-Graft Committee." 37 The group was charged
with the enforcement of the Anti-Graft Law and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In 1966, President Ferdinand Marcos set up the "Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations" (PARGO) and placed it directly
under his office.3 8 The Agency later became the "Complaints and
Investigation Office."39 With a member of the Cabinet as head, PARGO
acted as a central clearing-house through which the general public and all
30. An Act Amending the Administrative Code [REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

OF 1917], Act No. 2711, 5 71, 580 (1917).
31. Office of the President, Executive Order No. i (Dec. 30, 1953).
32. Office of the President, Executive Order No. 19 (Mar. 17, 1954).
33. Office ofthe President, Executive Order No. 306 (July 15, 1958).
34. Office ofthe President, Executive Order No. 378 (Feb. 18, 1960).
35. An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee, Republic Act
No. 1379 (11955)
36. Office of the President, Executive Order No. 457 (Dec. 29, 1961).
37. Office ofthe President, Executive Order No. 4 (Jan. 18, 1962).
38. Office ofthe President, Executive Order No. 4 (Jan. 7, 1966).
39. Office ofthe President, Executive Order No. 208 (Feb. 8, 1970).

government officials and employees may transmit inquiries, air grievances,

and lodge complaints of graft and corruption against public officials, and in
the proper instances, file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency. Within the year it was created, PARGO was replaced by
the "Presidential Complaints and Action Office" (PCAO). On 2 October
1967, PARGO was revived and in 1970, was renamed the "Complaints and
Investigation Office" (CIO).40
Presidential Decree No. 6 entitled Amending Certain Rules on

Discipline of Government Officials and Employees,4' which took effect six
days after the imposition of Martial Law, was the purported legal basis for the
purge of almost 8,ooo officials and employees in the first year of the
dictatorship. The provision for summary proceedings was reiterated in
Presidential Decree No. 807,42 the Civil Service Act of the period and was
repealed by the Aquino administration.
All other anti-graft presidential decrees remain in effect. These include:
(i) Presidential Decree No. 4643 (1972), making it unlawful for
government personnel to receive, and for private persons to give,
gifts on any occasion including Christmas, regardless of whether the
gift is for past or future favors. It also prohibits entertaining public
officials and their relatives.
(2) Presidential Decree No. 67744 (1975), requiring the statement of
assets and liabilities to be submitted every year.
(3) Presidential Decree No. 74945 (197S), granting immunity from

prosecution to givers of bribes or other gifts and to their accomplices
40. Id.
41. Amending Certain Rules on Discipline of Government Officials and
Employees, Presidential Decree No. 6 (1972).
42. Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance
with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and
for Other Purposes, Presidential Decree No. 807 (1975).
43. Making it Punishable for Public Officials and Employees to Receive, and for
Private Persons to Give Gifts, on Any Occasion, Including Christmas,
Presidential Decree No. 46 (1972).
44. Amending Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3ol9, as Amended, Otherwise

Known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Presidential Decree No.
677 (1975).
45. Granting Immunity from Prosecution to Givers of Bribes and Other Gifts and
to Their Accomplices in Bribery and Other Graft Cases Against Public Officers,
Presidential Decree No. 749 (1975).

in bribery charges if they testify against the public officials or private

persons guilty of these offenses.
In 1971, President Marcos created a three-member body known as the
"Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee" (PAAC).4 6 Headed by
the Undersecretary of Justice, it acted as "a grievance committee to
investigate and act on abuses in the implementation of the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus." Letter of Implementation No. 42 dated ii
December 1976 provided for the automatic abolition of the CIO upon the
creation of the Tanodbayan. President Marcos, however, issued Presidential
Decree No. 15ol on ii June 1978 retaining the CIO.
Unlike her predecessors, President Corazon Aquino did not put up an

anti-graft body. Instead, she organized members of her Cabinet into a
"Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability." The body reflected the
idea that corruption can be tackled by management actions that increase its
risks and decrease its benefits.47
President Fidel V. Ramos, established the "Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption" (PAGCC).4 8 Its duties included the
investigation of administrative complaints against presidential appointees in
the Executive department, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, charged with graft and corruption. It may refer to
the Office of the Ombudsman "when guaranteed and necessary, any case
calling for the investigation and/or prosecution of the party or parties
concerned."
When his turn came, President Joseph Estrada replaced the PAGCC
with the "National Anti-Corruption Commission."4 9 The new body
absorbed the functions and jurisdiction of the PAGCC. Composed of a full-
time Chairman and four full-time Commissioners with the rank of Cabinet
Secretary and Undersecretary, respectively, the Commission was empowered
to investigate or hear, motu proprio or on complaint filed in any form or
manner, charges, reports, or information involving the possible violation of
graft and corrupt practices at all levels in government by public officers and
private persons alike. After investigation, it may endorse graft and corruption
46. Office of the President, Executive Order No. 333 (Aug. 26, 1971).
47. Nelson N. Moratalla, Graft and Corruption: The Philippine Experience,

available at http://www.unpani.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents
/APCITY/UNPANoi 9 i22.pdf (last accessed Mar. 21, 2008).
48. Office of the President, Executive Order No. 151 (Jan. 11, 1994).
49. Office of the President, Executive Order No. 268 (July 18, 2000).

cases to the Office of the Ombudsman or the Department of Justice for

prosecution.
In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC).5 0 The three-man Commission, acting as a
collegial body, may, on its own or on complaint, investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints involving the possible violation of any of
five laws dealing with graft and corruption, and their implementing rules and
regulations. It was also authorized to investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any
of its agencies or instrumentalities (including members of the governing
board of any instrumentality, regulatory agency, chartered institution and
directors or officers appointed or nominated by the President to
government-owned or controlled corporations or corporations where the
government has a minority interest or who otherwise represent the interests
of the government), occupying the positions of assistant regional director, or
an equivalent rank, and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade "26" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.' In
the same manner, the Commission may investigate a non-presidential
appointee who acted in conspiracy or may have been involved with the
presidential appointee or ranking officer mentioned earlier. The
Commission, however, has no jurisdiction over members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.
According to legal scholar Carlota, the Executive Ombudsmen created
by Philippine presidents "were doomed to failure at the very moment of
their creation primarily because they were not free from political pressures.
There was, to begin with, no leeway for political independence. Being
creations of the Chief Executive, they were completely under his control
and he could abolish them at his own will."52 It would not be reasonable to
expect them to criticize the actions of the agencies that are under the control
and supervision of the President. Political commentator Robles opined that,
more often than not, these institutions became a "spawning ground for
political prot&g&s and partisan activities. It came about that the very ills
sought to be remedied by the creation were the same ones which plagued
50. Executive Order No. 12 (Apr. 16, 2001). President Arroyo earlier issued
Executive Order No. 268 (July IS, 2000) abolishing the Presidential
Commission against Graft and Corruption and replacing it with the National
Anti-Corruption Commission. However, the latter body was never activated.
51. An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System
in the Government and for Other Purposes, Republic Act No. 6758 (1989).
52. Salvador T. Carlota, The Ombudsman: Its Effectivity and Visibility Amidst
Bureaucratic Abuse and Irregularity, 65 PHIL. L.J. 21 (1990).

and doomed them to failure."53 This failure indicates that the mere creation
of anti-corruption legislation alone is inadequate to effectively prevent and
punish corruption, particularly when such legislation is incompatible with
the socio-cultural landscape.
IV. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM

VIEWED THROUGH Soco-CULTURAL LENS
Most anthropologists define culture as the set of learned behaviors, beliefs,

attitudes, values, and ideals that are characteristic of a particular society or
population.54 Corruption is said to occur within a context defined by its
cultural surroundings and by its interaction with the State. Thus, analyzing
corruption through a socio-cultural perspective entails working with several
assumptions concerning corruption: that the socio-cultural matrix influences
the politico-legal system; that the politico-legal system in turn influences the
socio-cultural matrix; and that practices favoring corruption and practices
against corruption are influenced by the interplay between the politico-legal
system and the socio-cultural matrix. 55
As it exists today, the State is a relatively new phenomenon, with its

roots usually traced to the 16th century. The Modern State is a political
organization consisting of governmental institutions which are capable of
maintaining order and implementing rules or laws over a given population
and within a given territory.5 6 To fully understand the State as it is presently
known requires a short summary of the three types of polities identified by
socio-culturalists: the Modern State grew from the Pre-Modern State, which
in turn evolved from the Non-State, composed of primitive social units.
The Pre-Modern State is characterized by the feudal kingdoms of

Europe. Each kingdom was divided into sections controlled by dukes,
counts, and other members of the nobility, who, although they had sworn
allegiance to a king, were accustomed to act independently. With control of
57
the land came political power.
Sociologists and anthropologists generally agree that the first social unit
was the family, headed by a parent, that a later and larger unit was the clan of
53. Del. Rodolfo D. Robles, The Ombudsman and You, PHILIPPINE PANORAMA,
Feb. II, 1973, at ii.
54. CAROL EMBER & MELVIN EMBER, ANTHROPOLOGY 172 ( 9 d ed. 1999).
55. Zialcita, supra note 7.
56. ROBERT J. JACKSON & DOREEN JACKSON, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION
TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 34 (1998).
57. G.A. JACOBSEN & M.H. LIPMAN, POLITICAL SCIENCE II (1964).

related families headed by a single chieftain or by a council, and that a still

broader unit was the tribe of families connected by ancestry, by friendship,
and by a realization of advantages to be obtained through cooperation under
some common head.5 8 For these units, bonds of cohesion consisted of a
"sense of common ancestry, common language, and common religion, a
realization of common military and economic interests, and geographic
proximity."59 These bonds of cohesion or kinship ties on which the non-
state community was based continue to be found in the Modern State,
contrary to the sense of the public essential to the idea of the Modern State. It
is a weakening of this sense of the public and the ascendancy of the private and
social sphere that is the chief source of corruption.
In Concepcion Alfiler's analysis, she found it "fundamental to present a
characterization of the components of bureaucratic corruption as a social
phenomenon." 60 Alfiler identifies three functions of the bureaucracy that are
most susceptible to corruption: revenue-raising, revenue-spending, and
regulation. The causes for the vulnerability of these agencies to corruption,
Alfiler suggests, may be viewed on three levels: the individual level, the
organizational level, and the societal level. On the individual level, the low
morality of the persons involved is pinpointed as the main reason for
corruption. Organizational reasons include inadequate or unrealistic
compensation levels, inadequate controls, and lack of explicit standards of
performance. Lastly, societal values, norms, and practices are also viewed as
causes of corruption due in part to legal formalism, which creates high
statutory standards incongruent with social norms; a difficulty of establishing
guilt in court; societal tolerance; particularism; and a lack of political will
against corruption. 61 To assess bureaucratic vulnerability to corruption, the
Development Academy of the Philippines developed a concept that helps to
understand the inherent weaknesses in a government agency that make it
vulnerable to corrupt activities. Three areas were targeted in the assessment:
general control environment; inherent risk of corruption; and adequacy of
existing safeguards. 62
58. Id. at 7
.
59. Id. at 8.
6o. MA. CONCEPCION ALFILER, THE PROCESS OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
IN ASIA: EMERGING PATTERNS. BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN ASIA:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROLS 26 (Ledivinia V. Carifio ed. 1986).
61. Id. at 65-66 (emphasis supplied).
62. World Bank, Combating Corruption in the Philippines: An Update, Philippine
Country Management Unit East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, Report No.
2 3 68 7 -PH, Sep. 30, 2001, at 27 [hereinafter World Bank].

Rance Lee has argued that the "incongruence of legal norms and folk
norms" motivates Asian bureaucrats, specifically those in Hong Kong, South
Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, to engage
in corrupt practices such as graft, nepotism, and bribery. The universalism of
legal norms and the particularismof folk norms are incompatible. On the one
hand, "to maintain justice among different groups of people, legal norms are
bound to be impersonal and are supposed to be applied uniformly in all
situations and to all persons concerned." 63 On the other hand, the
particularism of folk norms requires loyalty to and special concern for insiders
or kith and kin.
This is not to say that the strength of folk norms and the prevalence of
corruption are simply proportional. According to Jocano, Filipino
personalism includes personalization or the special way of dealing with
another as a fellow person. 64 It is thus a complicated matter to distinguish
bribes from gift giving in such an environment since, according to De
Sardan, "there is a continuum rather than a gulf between bribing someone
and thanking them for services rendered." 65 However, Lee finds that "[t]he
incongruence of legal and folk norms does not necessarily make people
behave according to folk rather than legal norms. Under certain conditions,
however, people may have greater wants and/or opportunities to let folk
norms take precedence over legal norms, i.e., to commit corrupt acts as
defined by law." 66
These conditions include: (i) the socio-economic status of the
bureaucrats, especially low salaries, perceived relative poverty, and the
inconsistency of wealth with power and prestige; (2) the structures and
functioning of the bureaucracy, particularly bureaucratic dominance such as
the elitism of the bureaucrats, the idealism of the legal framework, and the
imbalance between supply and demand of government resources, and the
lack of institutional control on the performance of the bureaucrats such as
the great discretion power of the bureaucrats, the inadequacy of the internal
checking mechanisms, and the lack of extra-bureaucratic control; and (3) the
63. RANCE P.L. LEE, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN EAST ASIA: THE

PROBLEM OF INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN LEGAL FORMS AND FOLK NORMS.
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN ASIA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
CONTROLS 77 (Ledivinia V. Carifio ed. 1986).
64. F. LANDA JOCANO, TOWARDS DEVELOPING A FILIPINO CORPORATE
CULTURE 171-72 (rev. ed. 1999).
65. J.P. OLIVIER DE SARDAN, A MORAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA?
EXPLAINING CORRUPTION 492 (Williams ed. 2000).
66. LEE, supra note 63, at io6.

2008] FEMINIST CURB-CUTTING THEORY
social reactions to the bureaucracy, particularly the situations where a) the

government is regarded as politically illegitimate, b) the leadership is
considered immoral, c) the society is relatively unstable, d) people are
ignorant of the laws, or e) the government is applying discriminative policies
toward different ethnic groups. 67
Lee proposes that even where there is an incongruence between legal
and folk norms, bureaucrats may choose to conform to the legal norms if the
following negative conditions are effectively addressed: (i) unrealistic salary
scales; (2) monopoly power, unclear discretion, and lack of accountability of
bureaucrats; and (3) adverse social reactions to the bureaucracy owing to
situations like political illegitimacy or social instability.
Alfred McCoy describes the Philippines as a "weak post-colonial state"
where "the interaction between powerful rent-seeking families and a
correspondingly weak Philippine state has been synergistic." 68 Even among
ordinary citizens, clannishness or tribalism is much stronger than patriotism
such that "[m]uch of the passion, power, and loyalties diffused in First World
societies are focused upon family within the Philippines. It commands an
individual's highest loyalty, defines life chances, and can serve as an
emotional touchstone." 69 These deep-seated socio-cultural ties are
inextricably bound to the politics that take place within any given society. As
previously pointed out, the socio-cultural matrix is reciprocally influenced
by the political matrix. Politics, rooted as it is in relations of power, is
omnipresent and cannot be excised from any interaction, even the most
personal. Thus, the personal is political because, as esteemed philosopher
Michel Foucault put it: "power is everywhere."7o
V. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM

VIEWED THROUGH THE POLITICAL SCIENCE LENS
A. Defining Corruption through Notions of Public and Non-Public

Political science has been defined in various ways: as the study of life in an
organized community, as the study of the state, and as the study of power
relationships between individuals and groups, or what we call "politics,"
67. Id. at io6.

68. ALFRED McCoy, AN ANARCHY OF FAMILIES: STATE AND FAMILY IN THE
PHILIPPINES 19 (1994).
69. Id. at 8.
70. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 93 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed.
11995) (11997).

commonly defined as "who gets what, when, and how."7' In the study of
political science, much emphasis has been placed on the modern national
state - its institutions, laws, and processes. In the same way, the main locus
of corruption is customarily regarded as the state and government, and for
this reason both invariably involve public officials.
The most common definition of corruption is "the abuse of public
power for private gain."72 Rose-Ackerman gives a definition that is suited
mostly to bribes: "an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit
that may or may not be deserved in the absence of payoffs."73 Nye presents a
classical and oft-quoted definition of corruption - that of "behavior which
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding
(personal, close, family, private clique), pecuniary, or status gains; or violates
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence,"74
which definition was endorsed by Hutchcroft in his analysis of the
interrelated nature of rent seeking, corruption, and clientelism.75 De Sardan
broadened the notion of corruption into a "corruption complex," or a
notion "beyond corruption in the strict sense of the word, to include
nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and various forms of
misappropriation, influence-peddling, prevarication, insider trading and
abuse of the public purse."7 6 Neild defines corruption as "the breaking by
public persons, for the sake of private financial or political gain, of the rules
of conduct in public affairs prevailing in a society in the period under
consideration. "77
The conceptual definitions derived from a political science perspective
demonstrate that any precise definition of corruption must necessarily
71. CARLTON CLYMER RODEE, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

17 (1977).
72. World Bank, supra note 62, at i.
73. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Corruption and the Global Economy, in CORRUPTION

AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1998).
74. J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, in

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 966 (Arnold J. Heidenheiner, et al.
eds. 1989).
75. Paul Hutchcroft, The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption,
and Clientelism on Third World Development, POLITICAL STUDIES XLV (3),
SPECIAL ISSUE 639-58. See, DE SARDAN, supra note 65.
76. DE SARDAN, supra note 65, at 483.

77. ROBERT NEILD, PUBLIC CORRUPTION: THE DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 213 (2002).

contain a notion of the public. Williams concludes that "the public office and
public interest definitions of corruption share the understanding that the
common good is best served when officials adhere to 'the formal duties of
public roles' and do not lapse into conduct designed to secure 'private
regarding gains,"' causing "all definitional roads [to] lead back to the notion
of public office."78
Incentives to commit corrupt acts exist because individuals holding
public office have the discretionary latitude to allocate scarce resources and
impose costs. 79 Corrupt officials distort public choices and decisions to
generate profits for themselves, resulting in inefficient and inequitable public
policies and programs. Klitgaard's formula recognizes that the existence of a
monopoly over discretion results in corruption in the absence of the
counteractive effect of accountability.s8 The intensity of political contests
over control of state resources are often brought about by the fact that the
government has at its disposal a significant amount of resources accompanied
by a wide sphere of discretion.
Such discretion has cemented the role of the government as a shadow
donor in the financing of political campaigns. Considering that political
campaigns are often costly, with expenses exceeding the normal and legal
sources of funding, politicians resort to tapping into government resources as
an alternative source of funding. The use of discretionary or secret resources
for the campaigns of government party candidates has been shown to be
directly proportional to the size of any discretionary or secret resources that
may be used by the government without being held accountable. This lack
of accountability and transparency has created "cracks between state sectors"
within which political finance corruption works.8
'
B. Current Philippine Anti-Corruption System Evaluated

The World Bank reports that "the last fifteen years ha[ve] shown that
progress can be made by reducing the discretion in government decision
78. Robert Williams, New Concepts for Old?, 20 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 503
(1999).
79. AMADO M. MENDOZA, The Industrial Anatomy of Corruption: Government
Procurement, Bidding and Award of Contracts in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CORRUPTION: STUDIES IN TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE
GOVERNANCE 2 (2000).
80. Robert Klitgaard, Subverting Corruption, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, June

2000, at 37.
81. Delia Ferreira Rubio, The Government as Shadow Donor: The Case of Argentina in
2 DEMOCRACY AT LARGE, NEWS, ANALYSIS, AND DEBATE 20-21 (2006).

making and increasing competition, transparency, and civil society

monitoring of public and private sector governance." 82
In 2000, the World Bank identified two broad categories of positive
developments in the environment of Philippine governance. The first
category includes anti-corruption interventions that improved specific
instruments and programs of anti-corruption activities. The other category
covers anti-corruption interventions consisting of a formation of stronger
alliances within the government, the private sector, civil society and the
donor community. Specifically, the progress made as to anti-corruption
interventions were in the areas of: legislative and administrative reforms;
strengthening of anti-corruption agencies; procurement reforms; financial
management reforms; public sector reforms; judicial sector reforms; anti-
corruption strategy; inter-agency coordination; corporate governance;
information and communications technology; and investigative journalism. 83
Progress was also made in the area of anti-corruption alliances with regard to
the transparent accountable governance project; transparency and
accountability network; Philippines governance forum; corruption
vulnerability assessment; and donor alliance.
The Philippines now has a comprehensive set of laws that may have
ascertained all the possible instances of graft and corruption achievable.
Numerous anti-corruption agencies have been given ample power to
identify and punish offenders. Incidentally, due to the vast network of
government institutions with essentially the same mandate, the World Bank
cautions that "overlapping responsibilities may act as disincentives to
progress." 84 The direct correlation of power to corruption is duly
recognized, with special agencies mandated to give priority to high-profile
cases or catching the "big fish" and grave offenses, over the acts of lower
ranking personnel. Point number six of the Ten-PointJumpstartAction Program
of the Development Academy of the Philippines is the fast tracking of high-
profile cases. 85 Corruption is addressed in both a preventive and punitive
way, using a strategy of coordination for greater effectiveness.
The State recognizes that the task is not only that of the government; it
has also enlisted civil society in the struggle. Citizens, for their part, have
volunteered, in cooperation with state agencies or by themselves, in fighting
corruption. The World Bank recommends that "a partnership (coalition)
82. World Bank, supra note 62, at 35.

83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 22.
85. Development Academy of the Philippines, National Anti-Corruption Plan for
the Philippines (Feb. 2001).

with several citizens, business, professional associations and donor alliances

coalesce to fight corrupt practices in the Philippines." 8 6 It is acknowledged,
however, that despite these efforts, corruption remains an impregnable
component of the Philippine governance environment.
VI. THE THREE-FOLD ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK:

FUSING DYNAMISM, INTEGRATION, AND GLOBALIZATION
For an issue as intricate and densely woven as corruption, it is important to

have an integrated and global perspective in order to navigate within the
labyrinth of proffered anti-corruption strategies. To this end, three diverse
theoretical frameworks have been consulted, all having fundamental
interconnections. It must be noted that the basic distinction between
"private regarding gains" and the "public interest" is implicit in and is the
starting point for any discussion on corruption, whether from a legal, socio-
cultural, or political science perspective. Ultimately, it is the delicate act of
balancing and reconciling the essential incompatibilities between public and
private interests that forms the foundation of any anti-corruption strategy.
Each perspective discussed above offers its own brand of anti-corruption
medication to cure what is now accepted as a virulent and debilitating social
and political disease. Whatever the scholars of each field of study may
propose in their commentaries and treatises on corruption, there is a
discernible, although not immediately apparent, agreement on the nature of
corruption, the reasons behind it, and how it should be treated.
While Nye and those of the revisionist persuasion of the late 196os
evaluated the costs and benefits of corruption and found that "corruption
could, at least occasionally and sometimes systematically, have a beneficial
impact on a range of important goals: 'nation-building,' economic
development, administrative capacity, and democratization," 7 there is a
general consensus that corruption is more harmful than beneficial,
particularly when viewed from a developmental standpoint. Nye himself
acknowledges that those who do not support the idea that corruption may
be constructive argue that it is "economically wasteful, politically
destabilizing, and destructive of governmental capacity."89
The legal approach evidently does not share Nye's view that corruption
may be beneficial. In fact, the law views corruption as destructive and
86. World Bank, supra note 62, at 35.
87. Hutchcroft, supra note 75, at 643.

88. Id. at 646.
89. Nye, supra note 74, at 421.

counter-productive on every occasion, a view made manifest by the

numerous legal weapons that have been unleashed against corruption by the
government. The comprehensiveness of these laws is probably because, as
James Scott put it, "the possibilities for corruption are greater in a modern
state where government actions touch more facets of its citizens' lives than in
a traditional order where state activity is limited."9o This may be particularly
true in the Philippines, which is a country undergoing rapid modernization
and must, as a result, have as a key policy the reining in of corruption. 9 1
The legal viewpoint, while acknowledging the impact of society,
culture, and politics on corruption, notably does not take into account the
socio-cultural nature of corruption in its anti-corruption strategy, which
consists mainly of the enforcement of anti-corruption laws through the
prosecution of corrupt public officials and private citizens. Both the context
within which corruption occurs and the motivations of those who engage in
it are of no import in the prosecution of offenses, due to the principle of
universalism inherent in government, which seeks to ensure that justice
prevails and that the law is applied equally and uniformly to all concerned in
every situation.92 Social context is sporadically taken into account only in the
creation of the law itself and in the definition of offenses. Once enacted,
anti-corruption laws do not permit compromise in light of the contextual
situation within which the corrupt acts occurred. The focus of the law is on
the act itself instead of on the actors. Lee argues that this incongruence of
legal norms and folk norms may even be increasing the incidence of
corruption instead of reducing it.93 In Lee's view
-
... the occurrence of corruption is not due to the lack of anti-corruption

laws and procedures. A basic source of the problem could be the conflict
between legal norms (including anti-corruption rules and other formal
rules) required by the government bureaucracy and the folk norms shared
by the various groups of people in the society. Should the folk norms be
incongruent with the legal norms, people would be motivated or even
94
forced to deviate from the legal requirements.
On the other hand, although the political science perspective focuses on

power struggles and the dynamics of power relations in its analyses of
corruption, there is frequent acknowledgment of the importance of informal
alliances, or what Lee calls "personal primary networks," and the significance
90. LEE, supra note 63, at 78.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 77.
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id.

of attitudes towards and perceptions of corruption within a country.

Hutchcroft writes: "the tendency [of the best of the literature on corruption]
to focus on how issues of politics and political power are played out among
major social forces ... can be seen as a welcome relief in an era in which the
realm of macro-politics is often no longer the premier consideration of
political economy."95
Many parallels may be drawn between what the political science and
socio-cultural perspectives identify as the causes for corruption. In his
analysis of the interaction of power and authority within bureaucracies and
parties, Hutchcroft points out that "the stronger the formal authority relative
to informal networks the less prevalent will be the incidence of
corruption. "96
De Sardan's analysis of Africa's "moral economy of corruption" may be

applied by analogy to the Philippines' own situation. He takes note of "[t]he
youthfulness of these states and of their apparatus, as well as the traumatizing
experience of colonialism, [which] are to some degree responsible [for
corruption]." He also claims that in Africa, there is a "scarcity of an 'ethic of
the public service"' and that "[t]he lack of enthusiasm manifested by the
political elites of all types, which have succeeded each other since
independence, for the promotion of such an ethic, illustrated by their own
example, bears a part - a great part - of the responsibility."97 Such an
emphasis on the need for strong figures of authority or "leaders by example"
is similarly made by the socio-cultural framework, particularly by Bhargava
and Bolongaita. In their analytical framework for improving anti-corruption
effectiveness, they stress the need for "authoritative and accountable
leadership and management structures of anti-corruption relevant to a
country's governance and operating environment."98 In the same vein, De
Sardan claims that "the change to democracy seems ... merely to have
introduced the possibility of openly attacking practices ... without modifying
them; those who criticize them today, when in opposition or without
power, will adopt them tomorrow when in power or possessing
influence."99
95. Hutchcroft, supra note 75, at 645.

96. Id. at 647.

98. VINAY BHARGAVA & EMIL BOLONGAITA, CHALLENGING CORRUPTION IN
ASIA: CASE STUDIES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 242 (2004).

94o0 ATENEO LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 52:4
Having discussed the anti-corruption strategies proposed by scholars in

various academic fields, the proponent of this paper has formulated a three-
fold anti-corruption strategy that fuses the legal, socio-cultural, and political.
The government recognizes that corruption cannot be eliminated in one

fell swoop; it requires a "patient, constant, steady disinfecting, scraping and
cleansing."oo However, it must be kept in mind that "actions are needed
now to match the rhetoric and fulfill expectations by reducing opportunities
and motivation for corruption through appropriate policy and regulatory
reforms. It should make corruption a high-risk and low-reward activity
through actions designed to reduce incentives for corruption and increase
the success rate in enforcement of sanctions."'o' This need to increase the
risks for corruption and lower its rewards is echoed by Alfiler in her
observation that "[i]n most countries where bureaucratic corruption is a low-
risk activity it also tends to be recurring and systemic."102 However, she
warns that "increased regulation mandated without careful study of the
capacity of government to enforce it seriously may only end up in more legal
formalism, a condition that abets the growth of corruption."o3 Lee similarly
notes that "law is not always in line with local custom" and that such
0
incongruence "becomes a potential source of social disorder." 4
In addition to the need to make corruption a high risk and low reward
activity by effectively enforcing anti-corruption laws, there are other
recurring threads that run through each one of the frameworks, such as: i)
Increasing competition, fairness, impartiality, efficiency, accountability,
simplification, and the flow of information; 2) Civil society monitoring of
public and private sector governance; 3) Minimizing discretion in decision
making; 4) Reinforcing media independence and citizen participation; S)
Enhancing effectiveness and accountability of independent oversight
institutions; 6) Building the capacity and independence of prosecutorial
agencies and the judiciary with appropriate checks and balances for holding
them accountable to the public; 7) Strengthening of the political will; 8)
Forging broad-based anticorruption coalitions; and 9) Eliminating
administrative opportunities for corruption.
oo. World Bank, supra note 62, at 35.

ioi. Id.
102. ALFILER, supra note 6o, at 64-65.
103. Id. at 68.

104. LEE, supra note 63, at 107.

VII. VIEWING CORRUPTION WITH GENDERED LENS
This chapter is divided into four sections and aims to achieve the following:
first, explain the sex-gender distinction; second, illustrate the intersectionality
of gender and corruption by showing how both gender and corruption
involve abuse of power; third, discuss how both corruption and gender are
development issues and must be addressed in their own right in order to
achieve the goals of formal and substantive gender equality, on the one hand,
and transparent and accountable governance, on the other; and finally,
situate gender within the three-fold anti-corruption framework outlined in
the three previous chapters.
A. The Sex-Gender Distinction

Much scholarly ink has been devoted to the sex-gender distinction. Stated
succinctly, gender defines the roles of men and women as constructed in a
particular social context, while sex refers to biological distinction.o5 Feminist
author Oakley distinguishes between the two terms in this manner:
'Sex' is a biological term: 'gender' a psychological and cultural one.
Common sense suggests that they are merely two ways of looking at the
same division and that someone who belongs to, say, the female sex will
automatically belong to the corresponding [feminine] gender. In reality this
is not so. To be a man or a woman, a boy or a girl, is as much a function of
dress, gesture, occupation, social network and personality, as it is of
possessing a particular set of genitals.o6
While the sex/gender system is considered useful as a starting point for

the discussion of gender issues as it helps "identify and contest expectations,
opportunities and forms of oppression,"o7 it has been criticized as untenable
due to the implicit assumption that the needs of all women are
homogenous.o 8
105. See, VALERIE BRYsON, FEMINIST DEBATES: ISSUES OF THEORY AND

POLITICAL PRACTICE 46 (1999) ("[s]ex is equated with the biological
characteristics of males and females, and is contrasted with gender, which refers
to the socially produced attributes of masculinity and femininity and the social
arrangements based upon them."). See also, ANN OAKLEY, SEX, GENDER,
&
SOCIETY 158 (1972); Corruption and Gender, supra note 4, at 5.

io6. OAKLEY, supra note 105, at 158.
107. BRYSON, supra note 105, at 49.
io8. Id. at 58 ("[w]omen do not constitute an economic group united by their role
in social production or reproduction and that it is not therefore appropriate to
conceptualize them as a class.").

In analyzing corruption with a gendered lens, studies consider the

"disproportionate impact of corruption on women as the majority of the
poor population."o9 Likewise, due to their socialization, women enjoy less
personal security and are constrained to rely on the government for support.
Women are thus more adversely affected by corruption in education, health,
and other social sectors."i 0 Within the legal and judicial spheres, moreover,
women are particularly affected,"' first, due to their socialization as spouses
of the disappeared, and second, as victims of gender-based violence.12
With respect to their socialization as keepers of the home, women are
constrained to rely on their spouses for support; when their spouses are gone
- either as victims of forced disappearances or extrajudicial killings
-
women become further prone to acts of impunity." 3 Within the context of
coping with a spouse's death and tending to the financial needs of the family,
a woman's fight for justice receives scant importance: "Their quest for justice
as regards the fate of their spouses become[s] merely secondary in their list of
priorities.""'4
With respect to women's vulnerability to violence, it is noted that acts of
violence perpetrated upon women are gender-based; acts of violence against
women take specific forms such as rape and sexual harassment, and are
perpetrated upon them particularly because they are women." 5 CEDAW
General Recommendation No. 19 has defined gender-based violence as "a
form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights
and freedoms on the basis of equality of men" and holds the State
"responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or investigate and punish acts of violence, and for
providing compensation."" 6 Within the context of State responsibility,
gender and corruption show possibilities for integration, as the adverse effects
of impunity are felt in both spheres.
1o9. Corruption and Gender, supra note 4, at 7.

iio.Id. at 8.
III. Id. at i0.
112.Amparita S. Sta. Maria, Images of Women in Impunity, in HUMAN RIGHTS

TREATISE ON THE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF IMPUNITY, CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED ARTICLES III (2001).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
ii6.Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. i9, U.N. Doc. No. A/ 4 7 / 3 8, ¶ 9 (1992).

B. Gender and CorruptionInvolve Abuse of Power

Gender and corruption are intrinsically linked with concepts of power."z 7
Power is derived from the Latin verb potere, which means "to be able.","
The pervasiveness of power is unquestionable, and political scientists begin
their exposition on accurately describing the concept:
One cannot hold power, touch it or even see it, yet almost everybody
wants it. It is present wherever there is politics, in all social relations, no
matter how small the group or society. Individuals have it, so can
institutions and states .... [P]olitics involves making common decisions for a
group or groups of people, and ... the exercise of power in making those
decisions can range from influence to coercion. In its broadest sense, power
is being able, physically and intellectually, or a combination of both, to
achieve what one wants.' 19
Politics, rooted as it is in relations of power, is omnipresent and cannot

be excised from any interaction, even the most personal. Although a variety
of definitions have been proposed to delineate acts of corruption as discussed
in previous chapters, corruption has generally been defined as "an abuse of
public power for private gain that hampers the public interest,"120 while the
shaping of gender roles necessarily involves dynamics of power.' 2 ' According
to Bryson, "[g]ender is not simply about individual attributes; radical feminist
analysis has shown that it is also a basic principle of social organization. In
societies as they exist today, this means that it is about power: to learn
masculinity or femininity is therefore to learn about subordination and
domination; it may also entail learning about resistance."122
Characteristics ascribed to males and females are also accorded different

values, with the consequence that male characteristics are considered more
important than female characteristics. A woman's reproductive role, for
instance, is always at the core of female gender, while maleness is defined
based on its difference from female. Thus, while being a woman is equated
117. See, BRYSON, supra note 105, at 46; JENNY CHAPMAN, THE FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE 96 (David Marsh & Gerry Stoker eds. 1995).
[I8. JACKSON & JACKSON, supra note 56, at 9.
119. Id. at 8-9.
120. Global Dynamics of Corruption, The Role of the United Nations Helping
Member States Build Integrity to Curb Corruption 2 (2002).
121. See, CHAPMAN, supra note 117, at 97.
122.BRYSON, supra note 105, at 46-47.

with childbearing and lactation, being a man means competition, self-

assertion, and achievement.123
The terminology employed in contemporary gender studies referring to
the sexual division of labor is the production-reproduction distinction,
which ascribes to women "the primary responsibility for caring for children
and the home, and to men ... the task of providing the income on which
their families live."124 Author Dionisio ascribes to the view that society
accords greater significance to male productive labor rather than female
reproductive labor:
Production ... refers to social production, or the production of
commodities: that is, goods and services for exchange rather than for
immediate consumption. Participants in social production usually get a wage or
fee in returnfor their labor or the product they produce. Production is viewed as
men's sphere.
Reproduction includes not just biological reproduction, but also the other
tasks associated with it: childrearing, the maintenance of other members of
the family, and the maintenance of the dwelling-activities indispensable to
survival, but assigned no economic value. This is viewed as women's sphere. 125
The view recognizing the imbalance between values and roles accorded
to males and females is supported by other feminist scholars. According to
Chapman, "[g]ender is not just a dichotomy of male and female, but a
hierarchy of male over female ... . [C]aring and nurturing values and activities
are devalued, while competition and achievement, along with the inequality
they inevitably produce among men as well as between sexes, are prized
highly."12 6
Gender studies likewise entail an analysis of theories on sexism - the
assumption of male superiority, and patriarchy - a term that feminists use
for referring to the system of oppression premised on male power and
politics.127 These concepts interact and support the proposition that speaking
of gender invariably means speaking of power.
The abuse of power relations permeating corruption and gender are

highlighted when a public officer abuses his power to pursue private
purposes, thus resulting in hampered national, social, economic, and political
123.See, CHAPMAN, supranote 117, at 96.

124.ELEANOR R. DIONISIo, MORE ALIKE THAN THE SAME: WOMEN, MEN
&
GENDER AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 2 (1993).

125. Id. (emphasis supplied).
126. CHAPMAN, supra note 117, at 96.
127. Id. at 98.

progress,12 8 while in gender, power relations among men and women are
abused by the assertion of male dominance over females. The assertion of
male dominance invariably results in discrimination against women, which
impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their fundamental human
rights and freedoms.129
Further intersectionality between gender and corruption is evident in the

unequal access to the same resources and positions of power by men and
women, which increase opportunities for corruption. Thus, studies
conclude:
[i]t will ... not be sufficient to rely on simply raising women quotas for a
'quick fix' in anti-corruption. Instead, what is needed are sustainable
impacts through raising the substantive participation of women,
supplemented by additional measures to prevent and combat corruption
that help curb and control power.130
C. Gender and Corruption as Development Issues
Both gender and corruption are considered development issues. Studies have
concluded that "the more widespread the corruption, the worse the
macroeconomic figures, particularly per capita income, and that poor
sections of the population - and hence women in particular - are
disproportionately affected."'31 In acknowledgment of this reality, the World
Bank has declared that "gender mainstreaming" (the demand for socio-
economic and political equality between the genders), is key to "poverty
reduction."I32
Within the context of gender, scholars have generally classified the

development of gender studies into three phases: Women in Development
(WID), Women and Development (WAD), and Gender and Development
(GAD).'33
128. See, Global Dynamics of Corruption, supra note 120, at 5.

129. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 193, U.N. Doc. A/ 34 / 4 6,
art. 3, entered into force Sep. 3, 1981.
130. Corruption and Gender, supra note 4, at 24.
131. Id. at 8.
132. McElroy, supra note 5.
133. Celestine Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries? 41 HARV. INT'L L. J.
381, 383-90 (2000).

WID, the first phase, is primarily based on the principles of liberal

feminism and aims at eliminating formal inequality. It seeks to address the
issues facing Third World women such as their invisibility in the workforce,
the lack of importance ascribed to household work, and the prevailing
traditional notions of women adversely affecting their social status.1 34
WAD, the second phase, is based on the principles of Marxist feminism
and is focused on poverty alleviation of Third World women. Due to its
Marxist perspective, this phase highlights class consciousness and proposes
that women's reproductive labor is exploited by men in the same manner as
the capitalist exploits the productive labor of the working class.135
Finally, GAD is based on the principles of difference and post-modern
feminism.13 6 It highlights the cultural construction of gender and "gives
attention to the social system that defines gender roles differently for men
and women."37 GAD likewise "focuses on gender relations and questions
the validity of differentiated gender roles and the social and political
institutions that shape these roles."3 8 The GAD phase is averse to meta-
theories and grand narratives, thus focusing on the public and private
spheres, while rejecting the dichotomy between the two.1 39
The active participation of women in achieving national development
goals should be given primacy. Their increased participation can be achieved
by ensuring their incorporation within the political system, as politics
involves participation in the decision-making process in all spheres of
society, hence ensuring women's attainment of de facto equality.140 Several
arguments have been advanced in favor of women's increased participation
in politics. First, the inclusion of women in politics furthers democracy and
egalitarianism. Second, women's under-representation can be dangerous for
the legitimacy of democratic systems because it gives rise to public distrust. If
women are distanced from the representative body, they cannot expect that
134. Id. at 384.

135. Id. at 386.
136. Id. at 387.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Nyamu, supra note 133, at 387.
140. See, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 25, art. 4, ¶ 4, A/ 5 9 / 3 8 Part I; CEDAW/C/200 4
/I/WP.,/Rev.1 (2004). This further discusses the concept of defacto, as well as
de jure, equality of women with men in the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.

their interests will be adequately addressed. Third, since political

participation involves articulating, providing, and defending interests,
women are better able to press for their own needs through their
participation in government. Fourth, women are a necessary factor in
initiating transformative politics through the enlargement of its scope:
women not only focus on improving infrastructure, but also emphasize the
necessity for improving the social structure of the community through
education and health care. Finally, including women within the political
sphere ensures the efficient use of human resources, and allows women to
exercise their agency.
Viewed with an interdisciplinary corruption perspective, the significance
of corruption as a development issue is emphasized by its adverse effect on
the poor. According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
"[c]orruption hurts the poor disproportionately - by diverting funds
intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide
basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign
investment and aid."'4' The adverse consequences wrought by corruption
have also been described as "subversive of stable economic structures, good
governance, just and predictable legal systems and other critical social
structures. "42 In developing countries more particularly, "public resources
are allocated inefficiently, competent and honest citizens feel frustrated, and
the general population's level of distrust rises."43
Corruption likewise impairs the economic development of poorer
countries because large sums of money are transferred in the opposite
direction from where such funds are direly needed: instead of applying funds
for legitimate purposes such as aid and investment, these flow back to the
accounts of corrupt officials, oftentimes diverted to banks in already
developed countries.44
The necessity of an integrated approach towards gender and corruption
is highlighted by their nature as development issues. Addressing both issues is
141. See, United Nations, Office of the Under-Secretary-General - Statements,

Statement by Mr. Jos& Antonio Ocampo Under-Secretary-General for
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, available at
http://www.un.org/ esa/desa/ousg/statements/2005/20050925_devcmtt.html
(last accessed Mar. 21, 2008); Transparency International, Fighting Global
Corruption, available at http://www.transparency-usa.org/intro.html (last
accessed Mar. 21, 2008).
142. Global Dynamics of Corruption, supra note 120, at 5.

143. Id.
144. Id.

indispensable to achieving the goals of formal and substantive gender

equality, in terms of the gender perspective, and transparent and accountable
governance, in terms of the corruption perspective. Both goals are significant
in their own right, but should likewise be addressed with a view to their
intersectionality: "[t]he idea that oppressions are interconnected but that
none can be assumed to have causal primacy, also means that each system
must be tackled directly and in its own right, rather than assuming that it will
disappear as a by-product of change elsewhere."45
D. Situating Gender within the Three-Fold Anti-Corruption Framework

As previously discussed in Chapters One to Three of this work, the three-
fold anti-corruption framework is composed of the legal, socio-cultural, and
political science perspectives. The aim of this section is to situate gender
within these three perspectives and determine how the cumulative anti-
corruption strategies proposed within the framework can further gender
issues.
There has been no current effort at mainstreaming gender within
Philippine anti-corruption laws, although one particular law can be analyzed
as an anti-corruption tool notwithstanding its primary anti-discrimination
purpose: Republic Act No. 7877,146 the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995. The law can be viewed as an anti-corruption tool as it addresses sexual
corruption in bureaucracies and organizations. Women are
frequently subordinated in a hierarchy who are forced to render sexual
services by male superiors who decide on their employment, remuneration,
career, or dismissal. This conduct can be interpreted analytically as
corruption since the superiors fail to respect their duty to take personnel
decisions based on technical and functional criteria and abuse their position
of power for private purposes. 147
It is notable that such corrupt behavior is precisely penalized by the law

when it defines sexual harassment as being committed
-
In a work-related or employment environment when:

(i) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
145. BRYSON, supra note 95.

146. An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education
or Training Environment, and for Other Purposes [Anti-Sexual Harassment Act
of 1995], Republic Act No. 7877 (1995).

terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the

sexual favor results in limiting, segregating, or classifying the employee
which in anyway would discriminate, deprive, or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees' rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment for the employee.148
The gender-based form of corruption explicit in sexual harassment is

perpetuated by the discretionary powers accorded supervisors and higher
officers within the bureaucracy, as well as lack of both transparency and
accountability.149 The emphasis on the necessity of minimizing discretion
and increasing transparency and accountability are recurrent themes that flow
among the three-fold anti-corruption framework.
Studies have also been undertaken in the macro, meso, and micro levels
that correlate representation of women with the severity of corruption in the
national and public/private sector institutions, as well as gender-specific
attitudinal differences towards corruption. 50 While these studies are highly
contested, some authors propose that increasing the percentage of women in
the areas mentioned ensure lower levels of corruption.'5' In order to justify
this conclusion, authors assert that "women are less tolerant of soliciting
bribes and that policies that increase women's role in public life reduce
graft."152 This position has been criticized, as the responses given by women
may also be due to their lack of participation in decision-making policies,
53
thus, they are less exposed to opportunities for corruption.1
For instance, Working Paper No. 232 authored by Swamy, Knack, Lee,
and Azfar, which advocates the increase of women's participation in public
life, shows:
(a) in hypothetical situations women are less likely to condone corruption,
(b) women managers are less involved in bribery, and (c) countries which
have greater representation of women in public life have lower levels of
corruption. This evidence, taken together, provides some support for the
148. Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, 5 3 (a).

150. Id. at 15-16, i8.
151. Id. at 15.
152. Id. at 18 (citing Knack/Azwar with reference to their study with Swamy in the
Global Corruption Report 2003).
153. Id. at 20.

idea that, at least in the short run, increased presence of women in public
life will reduce levels of corruption.' 5 4
The proposition that women are intrinsically less likely to assent to

corrupt acts is purportedly due to their socialization and other diverse factors:
[i]t is ... important for us to clarify that we do not claim to have discovered
some essential, permanent, or biologically determined differences between
men and women. Indeed, the gender differences we observe may be
attributable to socialization, or to differences in access to networks of
corruption, or in knowledge of how to engage in corrupt practices, or to
other factors.'ss
Women are supposedly brought up to be more honest and risk-averse,

dedicated to child-rearing, and therefore the repositories of model virtues.
They are also more community-oriented and have high levels of self-control,
as well as more obliged to follow rules because of their reliance on the
protection of the law. According to Dollar, et al., "[n]umerous behavioral
studies have found women to be more trust-worthy and public-spirited than
men ... . [R]esults suggest that women should be particularly effective in
promoting honest government ... . [T]he greater the representation of
women in parliament, the lower the level of corruption.",5 6 These
assertions, while arguing in favor of greater representation of women in the
public sphere, may oftentimes rely on gender stereotypes to further women's
needs. It has thus been observed that "invoking gender stereotypes as proof
of higher ethical standards amongst women is also presumably more harmful
than beneficial to gender equality goals."I57
This Paper does not adhere to the conclusion that a mere quantitative
increase in women's representation in politics ensures the rapid minimization
of corrupt practices within the government. Rather, the authors subscribe to
the view that anti-corruption measures seeking to include women should be
more sustainable and aimed at long-term results. Working Paper No. 232
authored by Swamy, et al., supports this view, as the researchers were careful
to note that while the increase in women's participation in public life may be
beneficial in the short-term, the authors implicitly acknowledge that other
154.Anand Swamy, et al., Gender and Corruption, Center for Institutional Reform
and the Informal Sector, Working Paper No. 232, at 1-2, Nov. 1999.
1155. Id. at 2.
156.David Dollar, et al., Are Women Really the "Fairer" Sex? Corruption and
Women in Government, Policy Research Report on Gender and
Development, Working Paper Series No. 4, Oct. 1999.

measures are needed to achieve sustainable results.5s Thus, the study

concludes:
[a]lthough some objection can be raised to each of our diverse pieces of
evidence, we maintain that the most parsimonious interpretation is that
gender-based differences in corrupt behavior exist and that increasing
women's presence in public life can reduce levels of corruption, at least in
the short run. We are agnostic regarding whether these differences are
attributable to socialization, biology, access to networks of corruption,
knowledge of corrupt practices, or other factors, and whether they are
temporary or permanent. Overall, our findings provide some support for
the view that policies to increase the role of women in politics and
commerce-usually proposed with gender-equity or poverty-alleviation
goals in mind-can be useful tools in combating corruption. 59
It is imperative that an integrated approach towards gender and

corruption is formulated. This may be achieved by addressing the recurrent
themes that flow among the three-fold anti-corruption framework, namely,
minimizing discretion, increasing accountability, and maximizing
transparency. Thus, a gender-sensitive approach to curbing corruption
requires "strengthen[ing] accountability and transparency in decentralization
and promot[ing] municipal self-governance with substantive participation of
female representatives of poor sections of the population in the political
process and in administrative operations.",6o
VIII. UTILIZING FEMINIST CURB-CUTTING THEORY

AS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
A. Defining the Feminist Curb-Cutting Theory

There is a need for a dynamic, integrated, and global approach to curbing
corruption. This need has been highlighted by the United Nations
Convention against Corruption when it acknowledged that "a
comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach is required to prevent and
combat corruption effectively."' 6
'
In response to this necessity, this Paper proposes the utilization of

feminist curb-cutting theory as an anti-corruption strategy. Feminist curb-
cutting replicates the model used for people with disabilities and uses their
experience to benefit not only those with disabilities, but anyone who may
158. Swamy, et al., supra note 154, at 20.
159. Id. at 20.

16o. Corruption and Gender, supra note 4, at 25.
161.UNCAC, supra note i, Preamble, ¶ 5.

need the structural curb-cutting design. The principle emanating from

feminist curb-cutting is that a principle designed to benefit one marginalized
group concurrently benefits others. Thus, the feminist curb-cutting theory
begins with the experience of those whose capabilities fall outside the norm
and involves them in the design of the solution for existing infrastructure
and the design of future structures such that the full range of capabilities
inform their design. While designed with attention to those in wheelchairs,
the curb cuts, access ramps, automatic doors, multiple access points, and
clearly indicated wheelchair accessible routes enhance the mobility of
others as well. Those pushing strollers and delivery dollies, those carrying
lots of books, and those recovering from an injury for example are all able
to move more freely. Beginning with those most affected, all are able to see
and understand a broad range of mobility challenges and to design solutions
that enable greater freedom of movement for all.1 6 2
Placed within a general framework, curb-cut feminists begin with

gender analysis of political, social, and economic conditions and processes.
These analyses aim at revealing the ways in which the different political,
social, and economic contexts exclude or marginalize women. Curb-cut
feminist epistemology yields the following conclusions:
i) when the conditions of the 'differently' oppressed are identified and
analyzed, greater insights than those possible from positions of relative
privilege are possible, 2) those who are 'differently' oppressed may not be
visible to the theorist, to the relatively powerful, or to those who are
oppressed differently, 3) the oppression of those 'differently' oppressed than
the inquirer may not be visible to the inquirer, and 4) identifying the
'differently' affected is a political dimension of this methodology that is
6
itself an important subject of critical attention.1 3
B. Feminist Curb-Cutting within the Three-Fold Anti-Corruption Framework

Curb-cut feminism emphasizes the importance of mainstreaming gender
within anti-corruption policies and identifies how women are excluded from
current gender insensitive anti-corruption policies. Such curb-cut feminism
acknowledges that women are in less powerful positions to challenge
corruption; that women face gendered forms of corruption, such as sexual
corruption in the workplace; and that corruption disproportionately affects
women as majority of the poor population.
Thus, in employing curb-cut feminism as an anti-corruption tool, the

strategy utilized aims to achieve intersecting beneficial results: substantive
gender equality, on the one hand, and good governance, on the other. The
162. ACKERLY, supra note 6, at 136-37.

163. Id. at 137.

conclusion reached by Dollar, et al., may be seen as one aspect of achieving

these two goals, although it must be clearly noted that the increase of
women's representation in government is only one among the many
methods of furthering gender equality and good governance, and must not
be premised on existing gender stereotypes. According to Dollar, et al.,
[i]ncreasing the presence of women in government may be valued for its own
sake, for reasons of gender equality. However, our results suggest that there
may be extremely important spinoffs stemming from increasing female
representation: if women are less likely than men to behave
opportunistically, then bringing more women into government may have
significant benefits for society in general.1 64
In sum, a gender-sensitive, dynamic, and integrated approach to
corruption entails ensuring the substantive and sustainable participation of
women in anti-corruption measures, such as: i) Increasing competition,
fairness, impartiality, efficiency, accountability, simplification, and the flow
of information; 2) Civil society monitoring of public and private sector
governance; 3) Minimizing discretion in decision making; 4) Reinforcing
media independence and citizen participation; S) Enhancing effectiveness
and accountability of independent oversight institutions; 6) Building the
capacity and independence of prosecutorial agencies and the judiciary with
appropriate checks and balances for holding them accountable to the public;
7) Strengthening of the political will; 8) Forging broad-based anticorruption
coalitions; and 9) Eliminating administrative opportunities for corruption.
The crafting of these anti-corruption measures, however, must likewise
be informed by the heterogeneity of women's interests, and must be
predicted on solidarity rather than an undifferentiated unity, as "the social
distinction of women (and their interests) ... [is] also ... important, as
ignoring it can result in equally corrupt 'elite women' in related
positions." 6 5
It is thus hoped that viewing corruption with gendered lens through the
utilization of the feminist curb-cutting theory promotes the goals of gender
equality on the one hand, and transparent and accountable governance on
the other, with the illuminating recognition that both goals are significant in
their own right, but should likewise be addressed with a view to their
intersectionality.
164.Dollar, et al., supra note 156, at 6 (emphasis supplied).


52 Ateneo LJ918

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

52 Ateneo LJ918

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

52 Ateneo LJ918

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Mar 5 07:39:54 2021

SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline

Bluebook 21st ed.

ALWD 6th ed.

APA 7th ed.

Chicago 17th ed.

McGill Guide 9th ed.

AGLC 4th ed.

MLA 8th ed.

OSCOLA 4th ed.

Amparita de los Santos-Sta. Maria.

Cite as 52 ATENEo L.J. 9i8 (2008).

Digitized from Best Copy Available

Corruption is a virulent and debilitating social disease that manifests itself in

i. United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 4 (LVII), U.N.

Digitized from Best Copy Available

According to Ackerly, a human rights scholar, the feminist curb-cutting

In mainstreaming gender within the proposed anti-corruption strategy, it

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Given its aim of providing a gendered, interdisciplinary anti-corruption

Part III focuses on the Philippine legal framework; it presents the

6. BROOKE ACKERLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF

Digitized from Best Copy Available

7. Dr. Fernando Zialcita, A Lecture on Corruption: A Socio-Cultural Perspective

Digitized from Best Copy Available

significance of each in furthering the goals of substantive gender equality and

III. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM

Accountability of public officials is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, as it

8. PHIL. CONST. art XI, 5 i.

12. PHIL. CONST. art III, 5 7.

Digitized from Best Copy Available

2. Laws of the Re-Democratization Period (1986 to the present)

Digitized from Best Copy Available

requires new officials to divest ownership in any private enterprise within 30

B. Constitutional Anti-Corruption Bodies

(3) the Commission on Audit as the supreme body responsible for

The Office of the Ombudsman was created to investigate and act

Digitized from Best Copy Available

the biggest responsibility to prevent graft and corruption. It provides for a

i. Presidential Anti-Corruption Bodies

26. See, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, 5 12.

Digitized from Best Copy Available

information, and examine documents and papers pertinent to its

30. An Act Amending the Administrative Code [REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Digitized from Best Copy Available

government officials and employees may transmit inquiries, air grievances,

Presidential Decree No. 6 entitled Amending Certain Rules on

(3) Presidential Decree No. 74945 (197S), granting immunity from

44. Amending Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3ol9, as Amended, Otherwise

Digitized from Best Copy Available

in bribery charges if they testify against the public officials or private

Unlike her predecessors, President Corazon Aquino did not put up an

47. Nelson N. Moratalla, Graft and Corruption: The Philippine Experience,

Digitized from Best Copy Available

cases to the Office of the Ombudsman or the Department of Justice for

Digitized from Best Copy Available

IV. CURRENT PHILIPPINE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM

Most anthropologists define culture as the set of learned behaviors, beliefs,

As it exists today, the State is a relatively new phenomenon, with its