7.vertudes vs. Bureau of Immigration

1/29/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 478
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vertudes vs. Buenaflor
*
G.R. No. 153166. December 16, 2005.
1
TERESITA L. VERTUDES, petitioner, vs. JULIE
BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to Cross-examination;

Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.—We
have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a
vital element of due process as follows: The right of a party to
confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a
fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the
right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the
right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-
examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
Same; Same; It is well-settled that the essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.—It is well-settled that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. This was clearly satisfied in the case at
bar. Records show that petitioner not only gave her sworn written
explanation of the charges against her during the initial stage of
the investigation, she also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit
refuting the charges against her, with all the attached annexes as
evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a Motion
for Reconsideration and/or New Trial with the BI; d) an Appeal to
the CSC; e) a Motion
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
1 Also spelled as “Vertudez” in some parts of the records.
211
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 211
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for Reconsideration with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a

Motion for Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant
petition for review.
Same; Same; What due process demands is for the chief of the
bureau to personally weigh and assess the evidence which the
subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the
recommendation of said investigating officer.—There is nothing
essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the
recommendation of a subordinate. Section 47, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief of bureau or office or
department the power to delegate the task of investigating a case
to a subordinate. What due process demands is for the chief of the
bureau to personally weigh and assess the evidence which the
subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the
recommendation of said investigating officer.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; It is settled that only questions of
law are entertained in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court; Findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, like the Bureau of Immigration (BI) and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), are accorded not only respect but even finality
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.—It is
settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court, in a petition under Rule 45, to
scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence all over again. Well-settled
is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like
the BI and the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might
conceivably opine otherwise.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Glenn G. Hao for petitioner.
Horacio R. Makalintal, Jr. for respondent.
212

PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules
2
of Court, seeking
3
to review and set aside
the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and dismissing her from government service.
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint
examiner at the Alien Registration Division 4
of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter dated July 27,
1998, a certain Peng Villas, a news editor of the Philippine
Weekly Newspaper, referred to then BI Commissioner
Rufus Rodriguez the complaints of private respondent Julie
Buenaflor, Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against
petitioner.
According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor

complained of having been convinced by petitioner into
paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the
processing of her visa, passport and other travel documents
for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner
Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in
the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively,
and cash worth P29,000.00. However, no visa was
delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner
return her money, to no avail.
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the
complaint of Lao who allegedly told him that he paid
P60,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa and
a passport for Taiwan. Likewise, Villas referred Cosino’s
complaint that the latter collected from Virginia
Dumbrique, Jaime Santos Flores and Mariano Evangelista,
the amounts of P20,000.00 each, upon petitioner’s word
that they would be in exchange for tourist visas. Both Lao
and Cosino claimed that the prom-
_______________
2 Dated February 12, 2002; Rollo, pp. 37-45.

3 Dated April 16, 2002; Id., at pp. 46-47.
4 Id., at pp. 48-49.
213
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 213

ised passport and visas did not materialize and despite

many requests for the return of the amounts paid to
petitioner, she refused to comply. Allegedly, “Vertudez
threatened them that they cannot force her to pay back the
said amount as she has the back up [of] higher BID
officials.”
Acting upon Villas’5 letter, Commissioner Rodriguez
issued a memorandum, directing the petitioner to submit a
sworn written 6
explanation. In her sworn written
memorandum, petitioner assailed the credibility of Villas.
She alleged that Villas was not a member of the National
Press Club as he claimed to be. She averred that the sum of
P50,000.00, as evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797 and
0014798, was extended to her by private respondent
Buenaflor as a loan. She was constrained to borrow money
from private respondent and other close friends when her
brother became seriously ill. However, she claimed that she
had fully settled her obligation to private respondent
through installment. She also claimed that private
respondent was the one engaged in illegal recruitment
through the use of falsified or forged passports. Private
respondent was allegedly using petitioner’s name in
dealing with some immigration officials and employees to
expedite the processing of the documents of her (private
respondent’s) clients. Petitioner allegedly informed said
officers and employees that she was not connected to
private respondent in any way. Private respondent
allegedly resented this “abrupt disassociation.” Also, her
repeated refusal to “escort” private respondent’s clients
who were leaving for abroad using falsified travel
documents allegedly led private respondent to threaten her
that she could easily use SB Check Nos. 0014797 and

0014798 as evidence to file charges against petitioner by
making it appear that she (private respondent) gave the
money because of petitioner’s promise to facilitate her
travel to Japan. Petitioner denied having received the sum
of P29,000.00 from private respondent, contending that
such
_______________
5 Dated July 31, 1998; CSC Records, p. 26.

6 Rollo, pp. 50-54.
214

claim is “pure falsehood because of the absence of document

to prove the alleged receipt.” As regards the complaints of
Lao and Cosino, petitioner denied having met or known
said persons.
Finding petitioner’s explanation “unsatisfactory and
[her] defense weak,” Commissioner 7
Rodriguez issued
Personnel Order No. RBR 98-60, preventively suspending
her for sixty (60) days pending the investigation of the case.
The instant case was assigned to Special Prosecutor
8
Norberto dela Cruz, who issued a subpoena ordering
private respondent and petitioner to appear before him on
October 15, 1998 for the formal investigation of the case. It
appears that in the meantime, Villas died and private
respondent personally took on the instant complaint with
the BI for Grave Misconduct against petitioner, docketed as
Administrative Charge No. 0004. 9
Lao and Cosino filed their
respective complaint-affidavits with the BI which became
the subject 10
of another administrative case against
petitioner.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Re:11
Personnel Order No. RBR-98-60) with
Motion to Dismiss. On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed
a Manifestation
12
with Urgent Prayer to Resolve Motion to
Dismiss, averring that the complaint instituted by Villas
in behalf of private respondent was a harassment case
against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the instant
action on the ground that in addition to the instant
administrative case, private respondent had personally
filed her complaint-affidavit “of similar nature and
character” with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office,
docketed as 98-H-44000-1, and with the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-98-1701.
_______________
7 Dated August 5, 1998; Id., at p. 55.

8 CSC Records, p. 39.
9 Id., at pp. 41-43.
10 Id., at pp. 45-47.
11 Rollo, pp. 56-60.
12 Id., at pp. 61-64.
215
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 215

Private respondent13 narrated the pertinent events in her

complaint-affidavit as follows:
1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of

the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in the middle part of
1996;
2. That from that time on, we became friends because
we come from the same region and that she used to
tell us that she is capable of deploying job
applicants to Japan;
3. That during one of those times that I dropped by
her office, she intimated to me that a group of
Immigration Officers are scheduled to leave for
Japan for training and that she was the one who
received a call from a Japanese Consul;
4. That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am
interested in going to Japan because she will find a
way to accommodate me and I told her that I am
deeply interested but my problem was that my
passport was left in Bacolod City and she
volunteered to work-out [and] facilitate the
processing of my passport and visa and that [all] I
need to do is give her my picture which I did;
5. That she even added that she has a brother in
Japan who could also help me find a job and I will
be going there along with her son, Jimmy
V[e]rtudes Santos. She showed to me her son’s
passport and application for a Visa, copies of which
are attached and marked as Annexes “A,” “B” and
“C”;
6. That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a
salary of one lapad per day as a factory worker and
that should I accept to her offer, all that will be
required of me is to give her the amount of
P80,000.00;
7. That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received
from me Security Bank Check No. 0014797 in the
amount of P30,000.00 which she was able to encash
and likewise Security Bank Check No. 0014798 in
the amount of P20,000.00 x x x Annexes “D” and
“E”;
8. That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence
and persistence that I should deliver the balance of
P30,000.00 to her so that I could leave in a week’s
time, I was forced to produce the said amount by
requesting a friend to pawn my jewelry in the
amount of P29,000.00 and the aforesaid amount
was handed to Ms. Vertudes in
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 119-120.
216
the presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her office in

(BID), Intramuros, Manila;
9. That after that last payment, I have been asking
her as to when I am suppose[d] to leave because I
was already prepared to leave and have in fact told
my relatives and friends that I will be leaving soon
for Japan but she did not stop making promises;
10. That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to
know once and for all whether I could still leave, I
requested my lawyer to write a letter to Ms.
Vertudes for her to refund the sums of money which
I delivered to her in the total amount of P79,000.00
for the processing of my Passport and Visa for job
deployment abroad but she did not even answer the
letter and neither called up my lawyer to explain
her side; letter is attached as Annex “E”;
11. That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes’ failure to make
good her promise to deploy me after receiving the
amount of P79,000.00 in consideration of a job
placement in Japan, I hereby charge her for the
crime of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa; x x x
Annexed to private respondent’s complaint-affidavit14 were:

a) the affidavit of a certain Jessilyn Gutierrez who
attested that she accompanied private respondent in going
to the office of petitioner and she was with private
respondent when the latter delivered to petitioner the
checks amounting to P50,000.00 and cash worth
P29,000.00 for private respondent’s job placement to
Japan; b) copies of the passport and application for a visa of
petitioner’s son, to prove that petitioner showed these
documents to her so she would believe that she would be
going to Japan with petitioner’s son; c) copies of SB Check
Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, to prove petitioner’s receipt of
the total amount of P50,000.00 from private respondent;
and d) letter of private respondent’s counsel to petitioner
demanding the refund of P79,000.00 from petitioner.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her
counsel, and private respondent appeared before Special
Prosecu-
_______________
217
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 217

15
tor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the case. The
second hearing took place on October 27, 1998, 16
during
which, petitioner submitted her Counter-Affidavit and the
affidavits of her witnesses. Her version was:
4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I

was still assigned at the General Services Division
of the Bureau of Immigration;
4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that

she was connected with a travel agency assigned to
process/facilitate documents of their clients in the
Bureau of Immigration;
4.3. Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making
follow-ups of documents in the different
Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of
Immigration similar to what were being done by the
representatives of other travel agencies transacting
business therewith;
4.4. During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became
close friends because she frequently visited me in
my office at General Services Division and would
even stay thereat while processing documents and
waiting for their release. In fact, she often took her
lunch and merienda with me and sometimes, with
the other employees of our division;
4.5. Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I
was informed by my relatives in our hometown that
my brother, Mariano “Dido” Vertudes was seriously
ill and was thereafter confined on December 22,
1997 at Gingoog General Hospital located at
Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental;
4.6. The type of illness of my brother required extensive
treatment and medication; and for this reason, they
requested for financial assistance to defray the
expenses therefor;
4.7. Since I was then in financial distress, I was
constrained to borrow money with interests from
Ms. Buenaflor and other close friends of mine. As a
kind gesture on the part of Ms. Buenaflor she
extended to me a loan in the total amount of
P50,000.00 as represented by Security Bank check
nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective
amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 (citation
omitted);
_______________
15 Id., at p. 323.
16 Annex “J”; Rollo, pp. 67-74.
218

4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the

amount of P50,000.00 with the additional amount
of P10,000.00 representing the interests therefore
for a total of P60,000.00;
4.9. We further agreed that I would pay my financial
obligation to Ms. Buenaflor on or before the last day
of May 1998 from December 1997 on installment
basis;
4.10. With the aforementioned amount of P50,000.00
loaned to me by Julie Buenaflor and the other
amounts x x x from other friends, I was able to
contribute the total amount of P100,000.00 for the
treatment and hospitalization of my brother. It was,
however, to no avail because my brother died on

January 6, 1998;
4.11. Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms.
Buenaflor on installment basis the total amount of
P60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the
following dates:
DATE AMOUNT
February 28, 1998 P15,000.00
March 31, 1998 15,000.00
April 30, 1998 15,000.00
May 30, 1998 15,000.00
4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at

my residence on the dates earlier enumerated in
the presence of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and
Jocelyn Reyes; x x x
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented

to her (petitioner’s) son, Jimmy Santos, Jr., that she
(private respondent) would facilitate his travel to and
employment in Japan. She also assailed the credibility of
private respondent by accusing her of using several
passports under different names. Attached to petitioner’s
counter-affidavit were: a) a copy of a passport application
in the name of Honna Sumadia Araneta showing the
photographs of private respondent; b) referral slip of the
Pasay City Police Station and the sworn statement of a
certain Armando Gambala charging 17
private respondent
with Estafa and Illegal Recruitment; c) affidavits
_______________
17 Id., at p. 75.
219
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 219

18
of petitioner’s son, Jimmy Santos, Jr., and a certain
Enrico Tuazon, showing that they likewise filed a case for
Estafa and Illegal Recruitment against private respondent;
and d) a copy19
of the Certificate of Business Name and
Certification issued by Prudential Bank, to prove that
private respondent misstated the address of her business
establishment. Petitioner also submitted to Special
Prosecutor
20
dela Cruz the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay of her two housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn
Reyes, to prove that she had fully paid her obligation to
private respondent. Likewise, 21she submitted the
handwritten joint sworn statement of Ernesto V. Cloma
and Jhun M. Romero, media practitioners, to prove that
Villas asked for petitioner’s forgiveness before he died,
admitting that he only sent his letter dated July 27, 1998
to Commissioner Rodriguez in consideration of the amount
given by private respondent.
On the same hearing, the 22
parties agreed to submit the
instant case for resolution.
23
Thus, in his Resolution dated
No-vember 12, 1998, Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended her

dismissal from the service.
Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent
with the Office of the Ombudsman was referred to the
Office of the City Prosecutor, thus:
“After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed

against the respondent are not office related and that the
administrative aspect of the case had already been undertaken by
the Bureau of Immigration.
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 121-124.

19 Id., at p. 76.
20 Id., at pp. 78-79.
21 Id., at p. 81.
23 Id., at pp. 150-151.
220

In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant

complaint be referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila for appropriate
24
action.
SO ORDERED.” (emphases supplied)
25
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open with the BI,
contending that the finding of the Ombudsman that “the
charges imputed against [petitioner] are not office related”
clearly shows that she is not administratively liable for
grave misconduct. She moved for the re-opening of the case
“to allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on
the findings of the Ombudsman.”
26
The motion, however, was
denied for lack of merit.
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued
an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela
Cruz, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found

liable for grave misconduct under PD No. 807 and the
Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is ordered
dismissed from the service effective immediately with forfeiture of
all benefits under the law, with prejudice to her reinstatement in
this Bureau and all27its branches.
SO ORDERED.”
The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special

Prosecutor dela Cruz’s resolution, viz.:
“After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the

complainant and the respondent, this Office is more incline[d] to
give credence to complainant’s declarations that she was indeed
duped by the respondent into parting with the hard-earned money
of P79,000.00 on the promise of the respondent that she would
secure a passport and visa for the complainant to Japan.
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 82-83.
25 Id., at pp. 84-85.

26 Memorandum dated January 12, 1999; Id., at p. 90.
27 Id., at p. 93.
221
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 221

Respondent’s alibi that the said amount was a loan from the
complainant, who is her friend, is highly unbelievable.
Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who would so
easily part with such big amount of money without any security
without any hope or assurance of being re-paid.
The fact that complainant paid P79,000.00 to the respondent so
she could get a passport and a visa to work in Japan as a factory
worker clearly showed that she was desperately in need of a job.
For her to give such amount to the respondent as an unsecured
loan is extremely incredulous.
Respondent’s claim that the present complaint is pure
harassment by the complainant is completely bereft of credence.
What benefit or advantage would the complainant achieve in
fabricating charges against the respondent?
If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she was
wronged by the respondent.
Likewise, respondent’s allegation that the P50,000.00 she
received from the complainant was a loan because she
(respondent) was then in a financial distress and she needed
money to help her sick brother in the province was belied by her
own son, Jimmy V. Santos, Jr., who declared in his Affidavit that
sometime in December 1997, he gave P50,000.00 to the
complainant so that the latter could obtain a tourist visa for him
to Japan. Why should the respondent bother to get a P50,000.00
loan from the complainant to assist her ailing brother when she
could readily obtain this amount from her own son?
As to respondent’s assertion that she was able to pay the
P50,000.00 to the complainant, there is nothing to support such
payment. The statements of her two (2) maids—Eliza C[o]mpo
and Jocelyn Reyes—in their Sinumpaang Salaysay that
respondent paid to the complainant the total amount of
P60,000.00 during the months of February 1998 to May 1998
cannot be believed. Being the housemaids of the respondent, it is
but natural and to be28
expected of these persons to come to the aid
of their employe[r].”
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 92-93.
222

Petitioner
29
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial, reiterating her argument
30
in her Motion to Re-open.
Again, the motion was denied. Subsequently, the assailed
order of dismissal was affirmed31 by then Department of
Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas. 32
Petitioner appealed to the CSC, raising the issues of
lack of due process and lack of substantial evidence. On
November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner’s appeal.

It held, in part, that:
“A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of

appellant reveals that the requirements of due process have been
duly observed in the proceedings had in this case.
xxx
As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial
evidence to prove that respondent receive[d] money in exchange
for her services in facilitating the issuance of passport and visa of
Julie Bernardo (sic).
The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in part
as follows: x x x
In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part of
the witness to foist said charges on respondent, the Commission is
inclined to give credence to the statements of witness Bernardo
(sic). In fact Vertudez has admitted that she received money from
Buenaflor but argued that the money was a mere loan. However,
if this were true, Buenaflor should have demanded for a
collateral, considering the amount involved. Vertudez failed to
present any evidence that she gave any security in return
33
for said
loan which makes her version highly incredible. x x x”
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 94-103.

30 Order dated February 8, 1999; Id., at p. 107.
32 Id., at pp. 464-501.
33 Resolution No. 992569; Rollo, pp. 111-113.
223
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 223

34
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CSC’s
Resolution, to no avail. The CSC held:
“In so far as Vertudez’[s] illegal recruitment activities are

concerned, the Commission finds the existence of clear substantial
evidence to establish the same. Evidence presented all point to
the fact that Vertudez solicited money from BI clients in return
for a visa to Japan. The witnesses against Vertudez include Peng
Villas (Deceased), Julie Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia
Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores. The affidavits
of said witnesses all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at
the BI, where she approaches BI clients and offers them a visa,
passport and an employment contract in exchange for
P120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie Buenaflor, she testified
that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in
Japan for a fee of P80,000.00 and that Vertudez after getting paid
failed to fulfill her promise.
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility of
witness Buenaflor by implying that the former has a pending case
for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records, however, show that
the charges against witness Buenaflor all came up after Vertudez
was formally charged by the BI and that such charges have no
reasonable connection with her administrative case pending
before the Commission. In this regard, “There being nothing in
record to show that witnesses were actuated by any improper
motive, their testimony shall be35entitled to full faith and credit.”
(People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31)”
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the

CA, raising the issues of: a) whether or not the BI and CSC
violated petitioner’s right to due process; b) whether or not
respondents erred in finding that the alleged illegal
recruitment activity of the petitioner had a direct relation
to and connected with the performance of her duties and
responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c) whether or
not there is substantial evidence to support the finding that
petitioner
_______________
34 CSC Records, pp. 6-14.

35 Resolution No. 000993; Rollo, p. 117.
224

is an illegal recruiter,
36
thus, warranting her removal from
public service.
On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. The CA found that “petitioner was given
more than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and
disprove the charges leveled against her, 37
hence, there can
be no denial of her right to due process.” Moreover, it held
that “there is more than substantial evidence proving
38
the
charge of grave misconduct against petitioner.” The CA
ratiocinated that:
“In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner,

indeed, received and encashed the two (2) checks given by private
respondent in the total amount of Php50,000.00. This fact,
therefore, gives credence to the claim of private respondent that
she gave petitioner two (2) checks in consideration of the latter’s
promise to facilitate her employment abroad. This being the case,
the burden was shifted to petitioner to refute this established fact
through equally weighty and competent evidence.
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed, the
two checks from private respondent but offered the excuse that
the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside from her testimony
and that of her household helpers to prove this assertion, no other
independent and unbiased evidence was offered to prove the fact
of loan. As it is, her theory of loan stands on flimsy ground and is
not sufficient enough to overthrow the fact established by
complainant. This considering that it is highly improbable and
even contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge
amount of money as Php50,000.00 without any document
evidencing such loan nor a collateral to secure its payment. Note
even that the two checks were made payable to “cash,” a bearer
instrument, and was not even crossed on its face, hence, can be
encashed by any person holding the negotiable instrument. If,
indeed, private respondent gave the two checks to petitioner as a
clean loan (without any collateral) without any separate
document embodying their loan agreement, the latter should have
at least been made the payee of the checks and a memo-
_______________
36 CA Rollo, p. 41.
37 Rollo, p. 43.
38 Id., at p. 45.
225
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 225

randum written at the back of the check to the effect that it is

being extended as a loan, in order to protect the interest of the
lender. This is conventional business practice which is altogether
absent in the case at39bar, hence, petitioner’s theory of loan must
necessarily crumble.”
40
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contending
that the CA failed to resolve the issue of whether
petitioner’s alleged illegal recruitment activities are
directly connected with her duties and responsibilities as41 a
Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This motion was denied.
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up
the issues as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-
G.R. SP NO. 58766;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
RESOLVED THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED IN
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE
IT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE
MISCONDUCT;
4. WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO
FACILITATE EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER
ABROAD CONSTITUTES GRAVE
MISCONDUCT[;]
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS
ACCORDED DUE PROCESS;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING
GRAVE MISCONDUCT MUST HAVE A DIRECT
RELATION TO THE FUNCTION OF THE
PUBLIC OFFICE HELD BY RESPONDENTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT
COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER IS
DIRECTLY RELATED TO ANY OF HER
_______________
39 Id., at pp. 44-45.

40 CA Rollo, pp. 265-270.
41 Resolution dated April 16, 2002; Supra note 3.
226

FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT 42
EXAMINER AT THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.
The petition is denied.
We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner

contends that the essential requirements of due process as 43
laid down in Ang Tibay v. 44Court of Industrial Relations
and Doruelo v. COMELEC were violated in the case at
bar. First, she contends that she was denied of her right to
a full hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against her, as provided
under Section 48, par. 5, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. She 45
allegedly raised this
issue in her appeal before the CSC.
The argument is unmeritorious.
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-
examination as a vital element of due process as follows:
“The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing

witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature,
or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due
process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on
direct examination of46the witness will be received or allowed to
remain in the record.” (emphasis supplied)
_______________
42 Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 209-210.

43 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
44 133 SCRA 376 (1984).
45 Memorandum for the Petitioner; Rollo, pp. 224-225.
46 Fulgado v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 81, 87 (1990), citing Savory
Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawa, 62 SCRA 253, 263-267 (1975).
227
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 227

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was

deprived of due process simply because no cross-
examination took place. Nothing on record shows that
petitioner asked for cross-examination during the formal
investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.
Notably, two hearings were conducted, during which, both
private respondent and petitioner appeared. During the
hearing dated October 27, 1998, both parties agreed to
submit the case for resolution after petitioner submitted
her counter-affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses. In
fact, when petitioner filed her Motion to Re-open the case
with the BI, she did not question the lack of cross-
examination during the investigation proceedings. She
merely based her motion on the order of the Office of the
Ombudsman finding the charge against her as “not office
related.” In the same pleading, she admitted that “[a]s
early as October 27, 1998, the instant administrative action
has been submitted for resolution after the contending
parties have submitted their respective evidence” and that
her move for the re-opening of the administrative case was
merely “to allow her to adduce further evidence mainly
based on the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

Again, in her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial
of Commissioner Rodriguez’s order of dismissal, she merely
reiterated her arguments in her Motion to Re-open. She
never complained that she was deprived of her right to
cross-examination during the investigation of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz. The right to cross-examination being
a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived
this right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and
not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before the
BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of
due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of
228

47
the action or ruling complained of. This was clearly
satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner
not only gave her sworn written explanation of the charges
against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she
also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the
charges against her, with all the attached annexes as
evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial with the BI;
d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for Reconsideration
with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for
Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant petition
for review.
Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner
Rodriguez violated the principle that “the tribunal or body
or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision” when his denial of her Motion to Re-open and
his order finding her guilty of grave misconduct were based
exclusively
48
on the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela
Cruz.
This argument is likewise unavailing.
There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a
bureau adopting the recommendation of a subordinate.
Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
gives the chief of bureau or office or department the power
to delegate 49 the task of investigating a case to a
subordinate. What due process demands is for the chief of
the bureau to personally weigh and assess the evidence
which the subordinate has gathered and
_______________
47 Velasquez v. Hernandez, 437 SCRA 357, 368 (2004), citing Adiong v.

Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 373 (2001) and Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Abille,
352 SCRA 691 (2001).
48 Memorandum for the Petitioner; Rollo, p. 223.
49 Said provision states that “[a]n investigation may be entrusted to a
regional director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report
and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or department.”
229
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 229

not merely to rely 50

on the recommendation of said
investigating officer.
In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez
enjoys the disputable presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed. That his decision quotes the
resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz does not
necessarily imply that he did not personally examine the
affidavits and evidence presented by the parties.
Petitioner’s bare assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez
did not personally examine the evidence, without more, is
not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have
basis in finding: a) that the affidavits of “Peng Villas
(Deceased), Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia
Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores x x x all
speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI” as
these affidavits were not submitted to the CSC; and b) that
petitioner “solicited money from BI clients” inasmuch as
private respondent never alleged that she was a BI client.
Moreover, the CSC’s finding that private respondent
“testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport
and a job in Japan for a fee of P80,000.00 and that
Vertudez, after getting paid, failed to fulfill her promise” is
not supported by the complaint-affidavit of private
respondent which merely stated that petitioner
“volunteered to work-out and facilitate the processing of
[private respondent’s] passport and visa” and that
petitioner “has a brother in Japan
51
who could also help
[private respondent] find a job.” Petitioner also assails the
failure of the BI and CSC to consider the handwritten joint
sworn statement of media practitioners Cloma and Romero
and the joint affidavit
52
of the housemaids of petitioner,
Compo and Reyes.
Again, these arguments fail to impress.
_______________
50 Mollaneda v. Umacob, 358 SCRA 537, 548 (2001).

51 Memorandum for the Petitioner; Rollo, pp. 221-223.
52 Id., at p. 225.
230

It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in

petitions 53for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. It is not the function of this Court, in a petition
under Rule 45, 54
to scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence
all over again. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the BI and the CSC, are
accorded not only respect but even finality if55 such findings
are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally

56
reasonable minds might
conceivably opine other-wise.
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner’s
stance, the affidavits
57
of Lao and Cosino do appear in the re-
cords of the CSC. In any case, the affidavits of Villas,
Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and Flores are of little relevance to
the case at bar. If any, they are merely corroborating
evidence. Note that it was only in the CSC’s resolution on
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration that said affidavits
were mentioned. These affidavits were not used as basis for
the decision rendered by the BI, the main decision of the
CSC denying the appeal of petitioner and the decision of
the CA. We find the unanimous finding of guilt of the BI,
the CSC and the CA amply supported by the following
evidence on record: a) the complaint-
_______________
53 See Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

54 Villalon v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 530, 536 (1999), citing
Estonina v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 627, 635 (1997); Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 606, 612
(1995); De los Santos v. Reyes, 205 SCRA 437, 445 (1992); Philippine
National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 183 SCRA 133, 139 (1990).
55 Rosario v. Victory Ricemill, 397 SCRA 760, 766 (2003), citing Felix v.
Enertech Systems Industries, Inc., 355 SCRA 680 (2001).
56 Bagong Bayan Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
178 SCRA 107 (1989), citing Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
57 CSC Records, pp. 41-44.
231
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 231

affidavit of private respondent; b) the affidavit of Jessilyn

Gutierrez; c) copies of the passport and application for a
visa of petitioner’s son; d) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797
and 0014798; and e) letter of private respondent’s counsel
to petitioner demanding from petitioner the refund of the
P79,000.00 that private respondent paid to petitioner.
As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to
the self-serving quotations of petitioner from the
complaint-affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-
affidavit categorically alleged that petitioner told private
respondent that the latter would “be receiving a salary of
one lapad per day as a factory worker and that should [she]
accept [petitioner’s] offer, all that [would] be required of
[her was] to give [petitioner] the amount of P80,000.00.”
Private respondent also categorically alleged that she was
charging petitioner for her “failure to make good her
promise to deploy [her] after receiving the amount of
P79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan.”
Thus, contrary to petitioner’s stance, the assailed findings
of the CSC are supported by private respondent’s
complaint-affidavit.
Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate
court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence
and the credibility of the witnesses. Administrative
decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled
to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse
of discretion, fraud or error

58
of law. None of these vices has
been shown in this case.
We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether
petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct warranting her
removal from government service. 59
Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok, petitioner contends that
“[m]isconduct, warranting removal from office of a public
_______________
58 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 429 SCRA 284, 299-300 (2004), citing

Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, 223 SCRA 747 (1993).
59 155 SCRA 646 (1987).
232

officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with

the performance of official duties, amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and
failure to discharge the duties of the office.” Since the BI is
a government agency principally responsible for the
administration and enforcement of immigration,
citizenship and alien admission and registration laws, “by
no stretch of imagination” can there be a direct relation
between the function of a fingerprint examiner and the
alleged promise to 60
facilitate private respon-dent’s
employment abroad. Petitioner also capitalizes on the
allegation of private respondent in her complaint-affidavit
that she and petitioner “became friends” to contend that
the acts being61
imputed against her are personal and not
officerelated.
These arguments lack merit.
The allegations in private respondent’s complaint-
affidavit indicate that petitioner used her position as a BI
employee to assure private respondent that she could
facilitate petitioner’s deployment to Japan. Private
respondent alleged that “during one of those times that
[she] dropped by [petitioner’s] office, [petitioner] intimated
to [her] that a group of Immigration officers [were]
scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that
[petitioner] was the one who received a call from a Japanese
Consul.” Petitioner “asked [private respondent] if [she was]
interested in going to Japan because [petitioner] will find a
way to accommodate [her].”
Even petitioner’s own admissions show that her position
as an employee of the BI may be utilized in connection with
illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner
Rodriguez, as reiterated in her counter-affidavit, petitioner
alleged that private respondent was engaged in illegal
recruitment and “was using [petitioner’s] name in her
dealings with some immigration officials and employees,
presumably to
_______________
60 Rollo, p. 227.
61 Id., at p. 222.
233
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 233

expedite the processing of the documents belonging to her

clients.” Petitioner likewise claimed that she “declined
[private respondent’s] proposal that [she] ‘escort’ some of
[private respondent’s] clients who would be leaving for
foreign countries but with falsified travel documents.”
Private respondent even told her that the “proposed
scheme could easily be done because being an employee of
this Bureau, [petitioner has] several connections not only at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) but also in
Mactan International Airport.”
That her position is designated as “fingerprint
examiner” is not determinative of the issue of whether the
charge against her is work-related. The allegations in the
complaint against petitioner and her own admissions show
that her duties go beyond her job title and that the charge
against her is connected with her position as an employee
of the BI.
Finally, petitioner contends that “a promise to find a
way to accommodate private respondent and a
representation that petitioner has a brother who could help
private respondent find a job are not misconduct
warranting the dismissal of petitioner from office” but, “[a]t
most,” only “entitle[s] private respondent to civil
indemnity.” Petitioner contends that the CA’s finding that
petitioner merely made a “promise to facilitate” private
respondent’s employment abroad, as distinguished from
the CSC’s finding that petitioner committed “shameful
illegal recruitment activities,” practically absolved
petitioner from the charge of grave misconduct.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or 62
standard of behavior, especially by a government official.
As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must
_______________
62 Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578, 599 (2004),

citing Maguad v. De Guzman, 305 SCRA 469 (1999) and Lacson v. Roque,
92 Phil. 456 (1953).
234

63
be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption,
as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another
64
person, contrary to duty and the
rights of others. An act need not be tantamount to a crime
for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact,
crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate
65
ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the
charges against her. Whether the charges against
petitioner satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to

make her criminally liable for such crime is not the issue at
bar. At the very least, petitioner was found to have taken
advantage of her position as an employee of the BI to
falsely promise, for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of
private respondent’s travel to Japan, including the
processing of her passport, visa and other travel
documents. Worse, she was found to have refused to
reimburse the amounts paid to her by private respondent
even when the promised passport, visa, and travel
documents did not materialize. Undoubtedly, these acts
involve “corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule.” Under Section 23(c),
Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, these acts constitute a grave offense for which
petitioner must suffer the penalty of dismissal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated February 12, 2002 and
Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766
are AFFIRMED.
_______________
63 Id., citing Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486; 301
SCRA 560 (1999).
64 Id., citing Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 345.
65 See Section 46(b)(10), Book V.
235
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 235

Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Castro
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—The essence of due process in administrative

proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
(Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 [2003])
——o0o——
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1/29/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 478

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to Cross-examination;

1 Also spelled as “Vertudez” in some parts of the records.

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 211

Vertudes vs. Buenaflor

for Reconsideration with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule

According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor

2 Dated February 12, 2002; Rollo, pp. 37-45.

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 213

ised passport and visas did not materialize and despite

that she could easily use SB Check Nos. 0014797 and

5 Dated July 31, 1998; CSC Records, p. 26.

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

claim is “pure falsehood because of the absence of document

7 Dated August 5, 1998; Id., at p. 55.

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 215

Private respondent13 narrated the pertinent events in her

1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of

13 Id., at pp. 119-120.

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vertudes vs. Buenaflor

the presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her office in

Annexed to private respondent’s complaint-affidavit14 were:

14 CSC Records, p. 256.

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 217

4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I

4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the

however, to no avail because my brother died on

4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at

Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 219

petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended her

“After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed

18 Id., at pp. 121-124.

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant

“WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found

The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special

“After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the

24 Rollo, pp. 82-83.

25 Id., at pp. 84-85.

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 221

28 Id., at pp. 92-93.

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner’s appeal.

“A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of

29 Id., at pp. 94-103.

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 223

“In so far as Vertudez’[s] illegal recruitment activities are

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the

34 CSC Records, pp. 6-14.

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED