The Six Day War - Read The Following Case Study and Give Your Analysis On The Stated Questions

THE SIX DAY WAR –
Read the following case study and give your analysis on the stated questions
The six war of June 5 to 10, 1967 was a war between Israel and an alliance of its neighboring
Muslim states comprising Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The Arab states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria also contributed troops and arms. At the war’s end Israel
had gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights, in short it was a complete disaster for the Alliance partners and the whole Arab
world in general. All this, despite the fact that the Arab Alliance had numerical superiority in all
areas, soldiers, ammunition, tanks, air crafts etc. In terms of quality of arms and ammunition, it
enjoyed superiority in few aspects while parity in others, in no single area of armory were its
armies inferior to the Israeli forces, thanks to vital support by USSR (RUSSIA).
What then, were the key behind Israel’s remarkable success? Let us probe and see if at least
some, if not all the answers can be found within the structural dimensions of the two competing
armies.
Training
James Reston, writing in the New York Times on 23 May 1967, noted, “In discipline, training,
morale, equipment and general competence his (Jamal Nasser’s) army and the other Arab forces
are no match for the Israelis”.
While Israel always maintained a high priority for carrying out exercises and even off-battle
training of its troops, which resulted in bringing new, innovative practices inside its folds, the
Arab armies always relied more on the status quo procedures for achieving operational
effectiveness.
Selection
Selection to key positions in all Arab armies is, and has always been, a matter of choosing the
person based on his perceived loyalty to the regime in power rather than professional
competency. This invariably resulted in encouragement of mediocrity for incumbents at key
positions, stilting the impact of charismatic characters who, more often than not, were seem as
threats to principal power wielders. This mode of thinking has always negatively affected morale
down the ranks.
Command & Control Structure
At this point it is also important to understand the structure of the Israeli Army, called the Israeli
defense force (IDF), it was not really an army in the conventional sense of the term, but designed
more like a paramilitary force. This however, should not be taken to mean that it lacked
anywhere in terms of professional excellence and competency.
The IDF was more than a fighting force; it was an ethos. Underlining, it were deeply held
notions of volunteerism, of officers leading their men into battle (with the cry AHARAI meaning
–“After me”) and social/religious responsibility. In addition to the regular soldiers, for civilians,
women were required to serve 18 months regular duty, and men at least two years, followed be
weeks of annual reserve training till the age of 52. This turned Israeli civilians akin to permanent
soldiers on temporary leave.
Highly informal, saluting and marching were rare – the IDF placed its emphasis on speed,
improvisation, and a flexibility of command in which even junior officers could make on-the-
spot, far reaching decisions. The assumption was always that Israel would have no choice but to
fight a war of its survival, as it had done before, being surrounded by Muslim countries all along
its border,
In direct contrast to the IDF, were the Arab armies. Bureaucratic to the bone, they relied on
centralized command where the GOC’s or OIC had little or no discretion while taking decisions
on the battle field. They were instructed to seek orders from the GHQ before taking any major
decision, which often resulted in a number of vital delays even after their forces had seized the
initiative: a phenomenon seen in the Six Day War as well. In some cases, even retreat, a decision
designed to cut losses in most cases, was delayed at great expense for want of authorization by
the general headquarters (GHQ).
Added to all this was the lack of mutual coordination between the armies of three countries
concerned: Egypt, Syria and Jordan. This was partly a result of mistrust between the leadership
of the three countries especially with respect to the Egyptian president JAMAL NASIR whom
the other leaders perceived to be using the war to get absolute power in the Middle East, and
partly a matter of simple ineffective communication as, throughout the period of crisis leading to
the war and right up to the start of hostilities, the Alliance failed to set up a joint command center
for issuing vital communiques. In effect, the three armies forming the Alliance fought like three
separate armies rather than one outfit.
Questions from the given assignment
1- Compare and contrast the structural dimensions of Centralization and Formalization

within the Arab Alliance and the IDF. Explain how these inherent differences may have
affected the outcome of the war?
2- Do you think the element of complexity was higher in the Arab Alliance as compared to
IDF? If yes, critically analyze the factors causing complexity that ultimately resulted in
disaster for the Alliance.

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THE SIX DAY WAR –

Command & Control Structure

Questions from the given assignment

1- Compare and contrast the structural dimensions of Centralization and Formalization

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