Lim Yao v. CID, 41 SCRA 292

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU

YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants , vs. THE COMMISSIONER
OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Sol. Gen. Frine C . Zaballero and
Solicitor Sumilang V . Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G)

THEREOF, NOT APPLICABLE TO ALIEN WHO LEGITIMATELY BECOMES
FILIPINO. — Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who
after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become
Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality
naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently
or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration
authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
2. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; EFFECTS. — The naturalization of an
alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring
upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being
entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority
of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its
very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for
aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LANGUAGE OF STATUTE IS
SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIONS, THAT WHICH CARRIES OUT OBJECT
PREVAILS. — A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest
object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will
carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the
former construction. A construction will cause objectionable results should
be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction
which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions
construing statutes, a construction will not result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will
prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as
well as a construction which will result in absurd consequences.
4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDED IF INCONSISTENT WITH
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. — So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if
the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has
been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility,
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redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the
court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce
mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature
an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to confer an illusory right.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; POLICY OF
SELECTIVE ADMISSION, EXPLAINED. — The avowed policy of "selective
admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought to
be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the
courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who
are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or
rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application is
cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the
courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming
citizenship by operations of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies
the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he
is a citizens of the Philippines.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING FILIPINO IPSO FACTO
BECOME CITIZEN PROVIDED NOT DISQUALIFIED BY LAW. — We now hold, all
previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that
under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, NOT REQUIRED.
— Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered
as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense
and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat
them differently.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF. — The Constitution itself recognizes as
Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law"
(Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization,
under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in
accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also
those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation
of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW;
PURPOSE. — The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer
Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a
legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons
who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship
of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with thefact of
citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is for said person
to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used
does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine
citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens
also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto
become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such
status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is
the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such
citizenship commences.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WIFE DEEMED A CITIZEN IF SHE MIGHT
HERSELF BE NATURALIZED. — The legislature could not have intended that
an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she
proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law
states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if
she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she
must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition
precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or
a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum,
i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used
in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine
citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself
under the laws then in force.
11. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO RULINGS THEREON.
— Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
12. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; PROCEDURES FOR ALIEN WIFE TO
ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — Regarding the steps that should be
taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring
her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of
the groups disqualified by the cited Section from becoming naturalized
Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WOMAN
MARRIED TO FILIPINO MUST PROVE QUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3. —
Our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the
positive qualifications under Section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction
as to candidates for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under
Section 4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha
case (Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, L-21332 March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that
those not disqualified under Section 4 would not necessarily qualify under
Section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other
words, by giving to Section 15 of our Naturalization Law the effect of
excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under Section 3
could result in admitting to citizenship woman that Section 2 intends to
exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why American interpretation of
the words who might herself be lawfully naturalized should be considered
hinding in this jurisdiction.
DECISION
BARREDO, J : p
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of

Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The
Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the
factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of
injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, 'restraining the
latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau
Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and
deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so.'
"The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the

complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the merits and
the parties submitted their respective evidence.
"The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by

the Solicitor General are these:
'On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a

passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
(grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits
'1,' '1-a,' and '2'). She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00
to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of
her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period
as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit '4'). On January 25,
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration
of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for
a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law.'
"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered

opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be
sustained for the same reasons set forth in the Order of this Court,
dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:
'First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
"'Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any

woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal

and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly
expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause 'who might herself be
lawfully naturalized' incontestably implies that an alien woman may be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a
Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit
requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay,
Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855).
However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
"'3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth,
who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not
being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino
citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung

while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that
she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally
because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March
13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite
length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec.
2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
'Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be

deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a
Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the
Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself
is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
'Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor,
whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions
thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-
plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before
the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was
effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending
compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be
permitted.
'Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
"'5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been
admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and
stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa,
cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently
without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised."
(Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R.
No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9,
last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well

buttressed, not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the
point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9,
sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which
reads:
" 'An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot
remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent
admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to
some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo
examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is
added by Republic Act 503).'" (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
'And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged
with the administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com.
Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien
immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide
discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to
him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-
R, Dec 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed
unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.'
"It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung,
while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English,
she admitted that she cannot write either language."
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could
have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the
brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the government's brief, that "in
the hearing . . . , it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for
naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter,
it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower
court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau
Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by
her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a
quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE 'WHO
MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED' (OF SECTION 15,
REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN
ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY
VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE
POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN
FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS
FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL
CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL
WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE,
MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH
BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION
OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED
TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH
WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION
OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF
THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN
THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO
LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN
THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-
41, RECORD ON APPEAL).
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the

above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor
General to the petition in the court below, viz:
"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one
month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956;
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16,
1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
"That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife
must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino
citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan
Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec.
25, 1959)"
It is obvious from the nature of these objections that their proper resolution
would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of
error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I.
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters
dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not
require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems evident that the
Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the
Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he
voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure
thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by
Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the
appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume
that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner
had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino
husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section
9(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of
Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing:
"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in
the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act."
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary
visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship.
Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in
the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to
reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor
confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehement]y expressed
disapproval of convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their status
from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the
procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in
Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein,
thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun
vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 Phil. 785, said:
". . . It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will
enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a
temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on
his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from
the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the
guise of 'change' or 'correction', for the law makes no distinctions, and
no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our
previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false
pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might
then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim
should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money
and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien
really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the
meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his
return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do
when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-
evident."
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien
who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile
become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a
foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the
process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such
right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his
assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag been
conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor
children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become
ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can
be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that
they may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to
have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a
rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice,
already ruled thus:
". . . (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly
Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her
marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act 613 provides that 'in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the be
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative.'" (At. pp. 462-463) In other words, the applicable
statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien
visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring
upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being
entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of
authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only
because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration
Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the
Philippines. In the sense thus discussed, therefore, appellants' second
and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II.
Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the
trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya
Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did
not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that
she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record
that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for
naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473,
even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly
concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that
appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the
law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the
respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to
submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what
used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang,
etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil.,
706, 713, 1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252
which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the
pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman
who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for
naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised
Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that
she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the
law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby
like any other applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet
part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is
still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their
first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to
even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing
rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly
Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman
of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay
was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely
departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her
authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On
March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of
said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason
of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of
acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon
her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her
bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained
her contention that she had no obligation to leave because she had become
Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner
appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion,
our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
"The next and most important question for determination is
whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the
aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or
before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners
alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also,
a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it
would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been
naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from
would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No.
613 provides that 'in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine
citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the
bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the
depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to
whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines
follows ipso facto his political status.
"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,

upon which petitioners rely, reads:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a

citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may be
lawfully naturalized.' As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of
Justice (O.p. No. 52, series of 1950), * this limitation of section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under
section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
'(a) Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
'(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas;
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of

polygamy;
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
'(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or

incurable contagious diseases;
'(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in
the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
'(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the . . .
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than

the United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right
to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.'
"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the
pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes
disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite
her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in
the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners
have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from
alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out,
therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.

"Considering, however, that neither in the administrative
proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that
there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may 'be lawfully
naturalized,' and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we
are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties
herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they
have any, on said issue." (At pp. 462-464.).
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt

was left in the above decision as regards the following propositions:
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a
Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes
from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from
being naturalized under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be
presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner
of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina;
and
5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law,
the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to
qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnoted
several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the
Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:
"Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now
section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that 'any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.' A similar provision in the naturalization law of
the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the
case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of
the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col.
1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215
F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec.
Jose Abad Santos.)
"In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the
clause 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', should be construed
as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
"Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the
Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a
citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the
marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she
possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband."
(Op. No. 176, v. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the

only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If
he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily
James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473,
which reads in part as follows:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a

citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"The phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', as
contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is
married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified
classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec.
of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941: Nos. 79 and
168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs.
Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes
mentioned in the law.
"It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was
born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as
a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that
an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally
recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s.
1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura
must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage
(Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec.
Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must
have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in
Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952,
but it turned out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a
warrant was issued for her arrest for purposes of deportation. Later, on
December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said
marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a
review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners
insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the husband
filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the
petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other
hand, that:
"Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the
recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of
a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship
upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the
alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she
'might herself be lawfully naturalized' as a Filipino citizen. As construed
in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman
who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the
Naturalization Law.
"No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption
of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to
petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error
in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she
can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of
Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian
passport." (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G.
R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied]
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court
expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they
were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the
need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated,
therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on
the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that
she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such
marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any
naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference
to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved,
but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to
mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then
Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member
of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok
Ha, the most illustrative of which held:
"At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she 'might herself
be lawfully naturalized' in order to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating
to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial
proceedings, is not necessary (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27
Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No.
111, s. 1953.
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang

et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the
Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the
Naturalization Law, held that 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may he
lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15 excludes,
from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from
being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words, disqualification for any of
the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor
that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to
acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
"Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups ?

The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely
predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of
deportation for 'overstaying' is pending against the petitioner.
"We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds
for disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the
law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to
become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife
of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law.
(Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius)" (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice
Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship,
the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached
CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition." (Op. No. 38, B. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang

et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the
Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised
Naturalization Law, held that 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may be
lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15 excludes
from the benefits of naturalization by marriage those disqualified from
being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words, disqualification for any of
the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor
that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to
acquire Philippine citizenship." (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
"The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly

Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that under paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No.
52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28,
s. 1950, 'this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act
No. 473." (Op. 134, B. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the
above construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee
Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
"Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26
March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to
present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt
of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated (Annex 1). For failure
of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955
the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated
(Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in
forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must
enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be
given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory
reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered
against the bondsman, (section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil.
1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in
the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the
terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the
Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions
thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government." (In the
meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino,
were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included
Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua,
ruled thus:
"The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino
citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond.
The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms
and conditions of; the undertaking in the bond — failure to depart from
the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary
stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the
Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice —
were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a
Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possesses the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization. ** There
is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization."
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the

one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the
footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization"
makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also
to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok
Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was
clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated
that the clause 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', should be
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of
residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be
naturalized." (Op. Na. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant
modification of the construction of the law, it could be said that there was
need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The
occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs.
The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963,
penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo
Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing
no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in
issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan
Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than
obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15
of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only
if she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' so that the fact of marriage to a
citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court
has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v.
Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no
evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of
appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already
pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together
Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications
and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what
seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala
fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In La San Tuang v. Galang,
G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply
these: 10 San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1,
1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She
married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry
date at her permit, and when she was refused to leave after her authority to
stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina
by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating
explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated
in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached
the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not
having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San
Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral
character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law.
Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not
the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown
apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the
Court, reasoning out thus:
"It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for
citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard
v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held
that it was only necessary that the woman 'should be a person of the
class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in
respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions,
being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for
citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen.' (In explanation of its
conclusion, the Court said: 'If, whenever during the life of the woman or
afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding,
the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a
citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman
then possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming
naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory,
if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the facts may have existed
at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises
upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.')
"In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she
was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in
order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the
rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was
presumed to be qualified.
"Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of
persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it
provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that
law provided:
'Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens . —
Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the
Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b)
natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of
the United States may become citizens of said country if residing
therein.
'Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following
cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed
to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d)
persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e)
persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United
States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war.
'Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in
subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to
acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one
years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
'The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said
section one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one
years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all
and each of the following qualifications:
'First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous

period of not less than five years, except as provided in the next
following section;
'Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and

irreproachable manner during the entire Period of their residence
in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which they are
living;
'Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth

not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have
some known trade or profession; and
'Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some
native tongue.
'In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall,

besides, declare in writing and under oath his intention of
renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to
the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a
native, citizen or subject.'
"Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to

our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the
Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be
either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under
the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United
States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if
residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3
of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents
and purposes.
"But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since
discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of
applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in
eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the
existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the
Caucasian} and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are
related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all
nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in
Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase 'who
might herself be lawfully naturalized' must be understood in the
context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in
which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.
"The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial
consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase
'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood as
referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to
become citizens of the Philippines.
"There is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who
might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood as
requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of
disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A
person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a
citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats 'qualifications' and
'disqualifications' in separate sections. And then it must not be lost
sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it
was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under
Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if
the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in
order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband:
What that case held was that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of
persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization — the
assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.
"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of

the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of
the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.
Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the
qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a
Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her
affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become
a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the
same being self-serving."
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong V. Commissioner of

Immigration, G.R. No L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding
administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking
of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision
granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was
contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
"In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration
(G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31,
1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized
citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the
Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In
this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-
wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the
fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition
of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a
citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay."
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27,
1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing
particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok
Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking
oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice Consul at Taipeh,
Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she
came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-
year residence in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under
discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy
King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy
King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959
and took the oath on January 31 of the same year, Choy King Tee first came
to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and
Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on
February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration,
as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the
request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial
court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications,
Justice Makalintal not on]y reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716,
June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the
decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition
against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife,
while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization,
had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications
therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes
took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating
with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of
disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30,
1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is
widowed during the pendency of the naturalization proceedings of her
husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must,
aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530,
show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the
decision to such effect discussed above, 1 1 even as he impliedly reversed
pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2
SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the
assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the
same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act
473, providing that:
"SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. —
Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the
time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines
at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine
citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently
in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to
be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of
his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one
year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he
resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is

married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a
Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the
qualifications required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken line from Lee
Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is
obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable,
specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for
decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy
and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were
decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if
not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a
substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of
those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members,
Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely,
according to them, because they wanted to leave the point now under
discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views
and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the
motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curiae
13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored,
since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical
angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the
light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who
have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have
always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long
standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative
authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these
circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the
views of the five justices who took no part in Ga Im Ty (including the writer
of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all,
the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee
and the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok
Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this
case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still
bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal
provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization
Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American
counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a
reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves
this beyond per adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the
Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of March 26,
1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris,
our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill
of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later
the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to
express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the
Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration
only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it
practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or
orientation of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:
"SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight."
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress
of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:

"SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight
and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions
of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein."
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic
laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an
alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship,
Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of
sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always
followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision
regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien upon the citizenship of his
alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born
Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although
Section 13 thereof provided thus:
"SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have
died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has
been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448,
amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the above
Section 13:
"SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted
between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine
hundred and Twenty-seven:
'SEC. 13 (a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands.
'SEC. 13 (b). Children of persons who have been duly
naturalized under this law, being under the age of twenty-one
years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if
dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
'SEC. 13 (c). Children of persons naturalized under this
law who have been born in the Philippine Islands after the
naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens
thereof.' "
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was

enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which
has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section
13(a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first
paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to
Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this
legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the
decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed
above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first
Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino
to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization
proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such
marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being
made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof
need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of
qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San
Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the
qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by
the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala
was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United States, our
Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become
citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as
Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact
the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to
remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the
only logical deduction . . . is that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized' must now be understood as referring to those who under
Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and
"there is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself
be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood as requiring merely that the
alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for
ready reference may be quoted:
"The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court
in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove
that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law
before she may he deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-
19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30,
1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784,
December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27,
1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to
the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of
the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which
Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was
section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on
November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine
Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26,
1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine
citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the
Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other
insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may
become citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference
in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American Citizens is
restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were
concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization
laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to accord here
persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the
statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying
American citizens.
"This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to
exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions
have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No.
3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress
chose to retain the said provision — that to be deemed a Philippine
citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one 'who might herself be
lawfully naturalized,' the reference is no longer to the class or race to
which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial,
but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as
enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the
requirement that the woman 'might herself be lawfully naturalized'
would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of
statutory construction.
"The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases
heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of
selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a
privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not
indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a
man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions.
"Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the
qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the
disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine
citizen."
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in
favor of the same conclusion thus:
"On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that:
(1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of
at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13. t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can
speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.)
"While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that
the words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law
requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must
possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not
being disqualified under any of the eight ('a' to 'h') subheadings of
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our
citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its
second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that
the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
"At the time the present case was remanded to the court of
origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not
conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in
Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the
effect that:
'The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She
must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.'
"Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court
has firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman
married to a citizen should be one who 'might herself be lawfully
naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications
enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the
qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San
Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of
Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136,
Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King
Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration,
L-16829, June 30, 1965).
"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications

prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a
Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be
that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the
policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of

polygamy; and
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude,'
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy
houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would not be
thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such
person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section
2 that an applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral character.'
"Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in
racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the
right to vote exclusively by certain 'herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in
the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not
be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not 'opposed to
organized government,' nor affiliated to groups 'upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments', nor 'defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas.' Et sic de
caeteris.
"The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking
into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in
the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
"As to the argument that the phrase 'might herself be lawfully
naturalized' was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994)
and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to
it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San
Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee
v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965."
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing

rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot but reveal certain relevant
considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are
predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely
unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1
of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose
of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove
the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of
Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of
Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note,
to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1
of Act 2927 which reads thus:
"SECTION 1. Who may become Philippines citizens. —
Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines
who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may
become citizens of said country if residing therein."
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was
there any mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for
Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it
reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-
Commonwealth American regime to the understandable limitations flowing
from our status as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to
express authority, without which it could not have been done, granted by an
amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act
of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted
as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have
already been quoted earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our
legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine
Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not
purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our
Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our
Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other
words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects
rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the
reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may
become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of
certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact
import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision
was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three
classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the
United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under
her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring
aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more
accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of
1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the
naturalization laws of the United States already provided for the following
disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed
to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition
to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer
or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized
government, because of his or their official character, or who is a
polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United
States."
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine
citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be
Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which
was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the
United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to
Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among those expressly repealed
by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (c)
of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion
necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United
States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem
that the nationalization in the quoted decisions predicated on the theory that
the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was
purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our
naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent
reason, why the construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should
not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy,
deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States as it stood before it repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a
definite unmistakable construction uniformly followed in all courts of the
United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore,
must be considered as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite
to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its
unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting
verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the
provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American
courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all
administrative authorities charged with the implementation of the
naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo,
77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v.
Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering
v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p.
32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the
American courts and administrative authorities is contained in United Stats
of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of
Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R.
1316 as follows:
"Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. § 3948, 2 Fed.
Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: 'Any woman who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.'
"Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act

of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which
in its second section provided 'that any woman, who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to
a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a
citizen.'
"And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the

earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, . . . 16, 1844, which
provided that 'any woman married, or who shall be married, to a
natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken
to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a
natural born subject.'
"The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021,

chap. 411, Comp. Stat. § 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255),
being 'An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married
Women,' in § 2, provides 'that any woman who marries a citizen of the
United States after the passage of this Act, . . . shall not become a
citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage . . .'
"Section 6 of the act also provides 'that . . . 1994 of the Revised

Statutes . . . are repealed.'
"Section 6 also provides that 'such repeal shall not terminate
citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections, . . .'
meaning § § 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no
application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the
relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends
upon the meaning to be attached to § 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
"In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498,
19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855
as follows: 'The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only
required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free
white person," and not an alien enemy.'
"This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens

who belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully naturalized,
and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization
laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of
the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
"In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge
Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that 'any woman who
is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States,
and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.'
He held that 'upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity,
of the case,' the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that
an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully
naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the
United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it
should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications
at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.
"In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting
in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien
woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married
here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of
Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a
citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of
the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He
added: 'There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L.
ed. 283.' The alien 'belonged to the class of persons' who might be
lawfully naturalized.
"In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an
alien woman came to the United States from France and entered the
country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities
took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of
deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas
corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a
naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth
circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be
discharged from custody. The court declared: 'The rule is well settled
that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled
her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her
husband, . . . and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil
became her domicil.'
"In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re
Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband for
his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife
was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground
that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease.
Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's
naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of
that contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the
husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait
until it was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He
placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect of
naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he
expressed his opinion that the husband's naturalization would not
effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become
lawfully naturalized. 'Her own capacity (to become naturalized),' the
court stated, 'is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself
lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her.'
Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views
expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they
can be regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with
all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.
"In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed,

626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject
of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting
Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be excluded,
although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the
immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion,
if she had not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into
this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184
Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they
might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: 'Even if we assume
the contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will
not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our
immigration laws, it does not affect these relators.'
"We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as
aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law
that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The
distinction between that case and the one now before the court is that,
in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of
exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated
after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a
court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the
circumstances that existed at the time the order of exclusion was
made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried into
effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion
should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted
with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to
appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely
recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not
be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order
of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in
good faith marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of
her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under international law
and under § 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and
ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost
their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and
not to citizens.
"In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed.

694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman under the
following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being
an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody
by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in
October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as
to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her
counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was
afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her
entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the
woman had married a citizen of the United States pending the
proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable
to believe that a marriage under such circumstances 'is capable of
having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown.' He held that it
was no part of the intended policy of § 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of
the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that
an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from
admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of
that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the
Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
"In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed.
449, construed § 1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to
deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married
to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was
not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her
marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose
of evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such
fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the
appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
"It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the
language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney
General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of
February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for the
period required by the naturalization laws was not necessary in order
to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of
the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United
States, she and her husband having continued to reside abroad after
the marriage.
"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act

of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney General
Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of
age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a
town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months
after her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by
way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L.
898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. § 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637)
for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for
the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house
of prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing.
It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United
States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the
Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen
of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage
an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with
her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of
life had been, but professed to believe in her good intentions. The
question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim being
advance that by her marriage she had become an American citizen and
therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against
the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held
that the words, 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' refer to a
class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance
with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.
27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
"Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not

escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration
Act of 1917, co as to provide, in § 19, 'that the marriage to an
American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes . . . shall
not invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of
such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the
commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this
act.'
"Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above

change in the law:
"(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women
of the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of
marrying an American citizen.
"(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American
citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded classes, either
before or after her detention should not confer upon her American
citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention
would have been expressed, and § 19 would not have been confined
solely to women of the immoral class."
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the,

subject and We have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised
Status was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some
decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to
give such impression. The case of Kelly v. Owen, supra, which appears to be
the most cited among the first of these decisions 19 simply held:
"As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship
upon women married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the
class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress
provide. The terms 'married' or 'who shall be married,' do not refer, in
our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is
celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a
woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of
marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of
the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes,
by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers,
under the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would
restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are
citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as
we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow
her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of
any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the
object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested.
"The terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws,' only limit the application of the law to free white women. The
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the
person applying for its benefits should be 'a free white person,' and not
an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
"A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of
Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one
which gives the widest extension to its provisions"
Note that while the court did say that "the terms, 'who might lawfully
be naturalized under existing laws' only limit the application to free white
women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing
at the time, . . . required that the person applying for its benefits should be
(not only) a 'free white person' (but also) . . . not an alien enemy." This is
simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time
the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been
removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding
footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the
race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other
non-racial requirement or no more alien-enemy disqualification at the time;
and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear
that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement
in addition to race. This is important, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165
Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen)
the terms 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws' only limit
the application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the
application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then
existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife
marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race
and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other
disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the
naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the
second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the inference that because Section 1 of
Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it. follows that in place
of the said eliminated section, particularly its subdivision (c), being the
criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what
should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under
Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in
Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence
to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak
and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages,
education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect,
said Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of
Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come
to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have
already examined above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can
be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather,
what is definite is that Section 15 an exact copy of Section 1994 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of
Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American
courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American
decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of
the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States,
(Section 1994, which was taken from the Act of February 10, 1855) all
authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the
qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the
Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only
eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the
subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21
In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was
made thus:
"The phrase, 'shall be deemed a citizen,' in section 1994 Rev.
St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, 'shall be deemed and taken
to be a citizen,' while it may imply that the person to whom it relates
has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual
way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper
application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that
account practically any the less a citizen. The word 'deemed' is the
equivalent of 'considered' or 'judged'; and, therefore, whatever an act
of Congress requires to be 'deemed' or 'taken' as true of any person or
thing, must, in law, he considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect
accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman
shall, under certain circumstances, be 'deemed' an American citizen,
the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed."
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory

construction that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an
American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction
already given to such statute before its being copied constitute part of our
own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different
connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have
already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be
based on inaccurate factual premises related to the real legislative
background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2
of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of
Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no
question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less
substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of
Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2
of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448,
referred to the so called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act,
without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the
elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3,
when precisely, according to the American jurisprudence, which was
prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such
qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their
counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be
taken into account and that what should be considered only are the
requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a
meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and
administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said
phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted
in 1928. By that time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act
of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of
alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to
regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than
those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the
phrase in question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite
construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said
phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be
naturalized judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our
lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to
adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the
other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial
naturalization, and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no
alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous
American law on the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from
the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American
law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the
U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the
language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the
legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the
Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now
contended to be the construction that should be given to the phrase in
question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an
American statute before the American courts had given it a construction
which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be
possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the
Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the
phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is
more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the
American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these
circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of
Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and
selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the
previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances here
and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a
statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the
demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to
emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so-called racial requirements,
whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been
considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in
Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More
accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the
sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be
lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the
disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to
those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter.
22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will surely get after going
over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest
USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of
this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with
approval the opinions of the Secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case,
that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as
disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the
law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a
subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such
elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered
as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be
the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to
be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding
the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the
legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who may be lawfully
naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the
qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated,
under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be
naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under
Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to
Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of
increasing, rather than decreasing the disqualifications that used to be
before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such
elimination could have converted qualifications into disqualifications,
specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications
clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications
and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had
never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be
lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the
status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was
merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal
provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there
are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As
aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-
appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v.
Republic, supra:
"Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove 'qualifications
—
"There is one practical consideration that strongly militates
against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien
wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the
qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a
citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes
unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult.
The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:
"1. One of the qualifications required of an applicant for

naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant
'must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of
not less than ten years.' If this requirement is applied to an alien
wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of
ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of
her husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country
whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she
automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of
her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at
least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired
continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no
guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in
which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of
time.
"2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the
applicant for naturalization that he 'must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession,
or lawful occupation.' Considering the constitutional prohibition
against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien
wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have
to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful
trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has
been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the
one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct.
27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li
Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In other
words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession
or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have
gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law,
recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband,
imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former. (Art.
291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is
an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary
duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is
not to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a
lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?
"3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for
naturalization 'must have enrolled his minor children of school
age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by
the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire
period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.' If
an alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to
another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor
children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her
period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for
naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason
behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in
recognized educational institutions is that they follow the
citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666,
March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian
Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177,
May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950).
Considering that said minor children by her first husband
generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for
such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
"4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous
residence prescribed by Section 2 'shall be understood as
reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a
Filipino woman.' It is absurd that an alien male married to a
Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five years in the
Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman
married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten years.
"Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more

difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to
become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And
yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first
paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by
reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to
other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No.
3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law),
there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of
Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to
remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No.
3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in
1941 is enlightening:
'It is true that under Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code,
the wife follows the nationality of the husband; but the
Department of State of the United States on October 31, 1921,
ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino
citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case
of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17
to 27 of the Civil Code being political have been abrogated upon
the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States.
Accordingly, the stand taken by the Attorney-General prior to the
enactment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to
Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this
country.' (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928).
'To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 5448 was
enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2997 which
provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands.' (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours)
"If Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law were to be
interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that the alien
wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege
granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that such
a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute,
must be rejected.
'A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest
object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions,
one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest
object, it should receive the former construction.' (In re National
Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S.
333, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911];
U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910]).
'. . . A construction which will cause objectionable results
should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the
statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in
accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction
which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will
also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public
interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as
a construction which will result in absurd consequences.'
'So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the
result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as
has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would
result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated
by the legislature; and the court should adopt that construction
which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly
shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an
interpretation which would render the requirements of the
statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will
not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right .
. .' (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632)."
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid
on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national
policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may
be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the
legislature contemplated to make it more difficult, if not practically
impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to
become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just
been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that
Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by
marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their
fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country,
"for better or for worse." Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the
personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may
motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to
be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not
farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family, the alien woman is
somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos
among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one
should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be
considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the
law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the
following observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King
Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:
"We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national
policy begs the question. The avowed policy of 'selective admission'
more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be
acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the
courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those
who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice between
accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy
finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by
operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or
reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves
in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the
courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a
Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, 'irrespective of his
moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino
ideals, customs, and traditions.' A minor child of a person naturalized
under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the
Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative
income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with
an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that
she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to
establish her citizenship status as a fact.
"A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be
overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously
deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in
extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113
Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also 'Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary.' UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be
satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as head of
the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the
family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and
solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of
State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus,
it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic
identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from
the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De
la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because
of the theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the
husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of the
wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as
the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed.
839, held: 'The status of the wife follows that of the husband, . . . and
by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became her
domicile.' And the presumption under Philippine law being that the
property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of
conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also
that of the other.
"It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of
family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the
wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be
different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens
should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the
wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the
benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare
instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it
should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law."
(Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in

the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law
be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when
the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute
from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the
American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course, in
the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of
Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization
laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the
United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the
world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion
cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence
should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be
sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of
pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the
undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local
origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from
American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of
statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the
work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the
opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in
that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans
cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization
proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of
August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes
of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying
Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization
proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special
qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals
and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any
of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law.
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it,
doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to
take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious
marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that
just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should
be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant
considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of
discovering such undesirable practices and every case can be dealt with
accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of
the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial
naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be
considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was
submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go
Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it.
The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications,
her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her
undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain her
claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things
stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may
she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this
question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however,
the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending
with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds
worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the
reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion
as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
"We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a
Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefore
by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or
official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife
of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null
and void.
"3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or,

in the words of law, a 'petition for citizenship'. This is as it should be.
Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were
made to act forth therein. and to prove afterwards, compliance with
Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself
apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in
fact, declared petitioner 'a citizen of the Philippines.'"
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman

marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that
she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none
of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all
these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization,
apparently from declaration of intention to oath-taking, before she can
become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of
no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she
remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance
before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her
husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for
naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence,
gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property
or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her
husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application
for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good
moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is
rendered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will
she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines.
Briefly; she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of, the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious,
on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that
the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the)
wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch
as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some
effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in
any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard
look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have
overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from
that contained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave
importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons
affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to
avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any
adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the
national policy it seeks to enforce.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their
number and standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for
intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive
resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum
they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the
decision therein thus:
"The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first
time in the present case — that an alien woman who marries a
Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen
but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization
proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all
administrative actions 'certifying or declaring' such woman to be a
Philippine citizen are 'null and void' — has consequences that reach far
beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more people are
affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The
newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to
Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These are
women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish,
British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on.
These members of the community, some of whom have been married
to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and
privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have
acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen
husbands, real property, and they will have sold and transferred such
property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in
which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or
officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for
which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by
law. All these married women are now faced with possible divestment
of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in
reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has
been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very
agencies of government charged with the administration of that law.
We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit
such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and
mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and re-
examination."
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in
Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401—
when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
"The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and
Delgado cases — although referring to situations the equities of which
are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar — may have
contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in
other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe,
although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.
"Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under

consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment
thereon, but, also, to state 'how many cases there are, like the one at
bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice
of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the
Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28,
1950' (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) 'to
May 29, 1957' (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) 'and (b) from May
29, 1957 to November 29, 1965' (when the decision in the present
case was rendered).
"After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons
adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the reply
thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the
latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui
case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization
issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957."
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court
had to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the
law made in a previous decision 24 which had already become final, to serve
the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that
far. As already observed, the decision in Burca is still under reconsideration,
while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and other that
followed them have at the most become the law of the case only for the
parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is
to re-examine the said rulings and clarify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
"Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children .—
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be consider citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the
time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippines citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of
his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one
year after reaching the age of minority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he
resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance."
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute,

the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole is to
establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the of the
status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After having out such a procedure,
remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against
the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it
carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an
alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon members of his
immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain
terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the
Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if
born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such
naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born
in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization,
are also "deemed citizens" of this country provided that they shall lose said
status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before
becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the
Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino
citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos
at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and
take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to
the point that the minor children, failing within the conditions of place and
time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with
Philippines citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself
and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192
SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily
connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because
the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after
she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of
any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in
B u r c a is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative
naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats
the wife differently and leaves her out for ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the
constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest
citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42
L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines
152 [1961 ed.] ) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two
foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for
classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the
members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether
native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not
the legislature has done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respected
authorities on political law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection
thus: " A special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with
respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a
Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the
classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws" (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is
substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua , supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated at this juncture, that in construing
the provision of the United States statutes from which our law has been
copies, 28a the American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In
the Revised Statutes the words 'and taken' are omitted. The effect of this
statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States
becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization,
and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.],
citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct.
106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.)
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first
enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927
by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that , in turn, and paragraph was
copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among
the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under
such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such
marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the
marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings,
provided that it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was
not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the
discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily
make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be
reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States,
the American Congress, recognizing the uniform construction of Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable
to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22,
1922 explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial
naturalization, albeit under more liberal terms than those for other
applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippines Legislature,
instead of following suit and adopting a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on
November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994
of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preferences to adopts the
latter law and its settled constitution rather than the reform introduced by
the Act of 1992.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court
may feel that as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an
improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to
discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry
without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding,
as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit
of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines adopt a
similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has
enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for
Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the
American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation
which it is not constitutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this
Court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative
intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it
seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under
Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant
for naturalization who dies during the proceeding do not have to submit
themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the
benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides:
"SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have
died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has
been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383 this
Court held:
"Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-
appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor
children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not
substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the
original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and
minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the
petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the
judgment becomes executory.
"There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the
second sentence of said Section 16 contemplates the fact that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry,
for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in the
case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life
of the petitioner.' This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to
continue the proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical
petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it effected the widow and the
minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared
that a dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath
of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow
prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the
deceased. IN the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she
be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased
husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased,
but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits
of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to
take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of
the legal provision that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children
of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.' (Section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee
Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning
widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa
filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all
born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the P)etition of Lee
Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI,
Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference for Chua
case is, therefore, premature."
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the

widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in
order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the
wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain
common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in
the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree
with the following views of counsel:
"It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of
who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition
too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to
prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire
citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by
legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890
[1898]; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippine
citizens ed.]). The constitutional itself recognizes as Philippines citizens
'Those who are naturalized in accordance with law' (Section 1[5],
Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this
provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance
with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those
who acquire citizenship by 'derivative naturalization' or by operation of
law, as. for example, the 'naturalization' of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a
citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit supra , at 152 172; Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]: 1 Paras, Civil
code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law
3).
"The phrase 'shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines found in

Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent
to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S.
naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994) , American courts have
uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman
becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if
she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the
subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the
US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 402], July 20, 1909 [27
Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 209]
and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398] ).
'The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen, " in Section 1994
Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091 1268) or as it was in the
Act of 1855 910 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen", while it may imply that the
person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by
the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a
competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does
not follow that such person is on that account practically any the
less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any
person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly
adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and
have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress
declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances,
be "deemed" an American to her being naturalized directly by an
Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.' (Van
Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.] ;
italics ours).
"That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature
when it enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization provision. In its entirely, Section 15 reads:
(See supra)
The phrases 'shall be deemed,' shall be considered,' and 'shall
automatically become,' as used in the above provision , are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision
was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain
classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood
affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines.
Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the
provision concurs related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso
facto citizens of the Philippines. 'Ipso facto' as here used does not
mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens,
from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens
also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso
facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to
acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of
those persons numerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of
the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the
points of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the
second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized
under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a
citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs
with the fact of a citizenship of his parent, and the time when child
became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to
prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some
25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the
Philippines and should, therefore, be 'considered' a citizen thereof. It
does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later
time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may
be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps,
because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship
status became in question), that she is one who 'might herself be
lawfully naturalized.' It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired
Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she 'might herself
be lawfully naturalized.'
"The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting
the very phraseology of the law , the legislature could not have
intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen
unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized' is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of
citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to
establish her citizenship as a factum probandum i.e., as a fact
established and proved in evidence. The word 'might,' as used in that
phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to a
Philippine citizen, the alien woman 'had (the) power' to become such a
citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191
[1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, power long after her marriage does not
alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
"(This Court has held) that 'an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may
not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized' (Decision, pp. 3-4).
Under this view, the acquisition' of citizenship by the alien wife
depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is,
she is not a lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law
that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that deemed
(by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the 'uniform' decisions
cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the
alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her
qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the
alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and
therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [1957], the case was remanded to the
lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to
citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government,
'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' for the purpose of 'proving her
alleged change of political status from alien to citizen' (at 464). In Cua
v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported,
claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This
Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified
under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: 'No such
evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine
citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is
untenable.' (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by
this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives 'might (themselves) be
lawfully naturalized' did not necessarily imply that they did not
become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos.
What the decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish
their claim to that status as a proven fact.
"In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of
law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with
the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus,
even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status
is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for
instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to
factually establish his claim to citizenship. *** His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is
established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien
woman who might herself be a lawfully naturalized becomes a
Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not
at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by
showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is
no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed
a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a
declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the
Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by
operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth;
the later ipso facto upon marriage.
"It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has
established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said that
on account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If her
citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she
obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a
case, the presumption of law should be what she claims to be. (U.S. v.
Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905] : Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955] ).
There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been
made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738
A. 369, 111 ME. 321)."
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the

foregoing views is, what substitute is there for naturalization proceeding to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The
ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but
such is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the
date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may
be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial
or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered
a s res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice
Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra.
Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring
into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons
concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if
these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good
starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public records may
be kept in order the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958,
of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as
the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties.
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship,
the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached
CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition."
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as

an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino
citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance
and vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have
passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive
in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all
now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court aquo
dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the
Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is
permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the
confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal J ., reserves his separate concurring opinion.
Fernando, J ., concurs except as the interpretation accorded some
American decisions as to which he is not fully persuaded.
APPENDIX
The following review of all naturalization statutes of the United States
from 1790 to 1970 ravel: (1) that aside from race, various other
disqualifications have also been provided for in the said statutes from time
to time, although it was only in 1906 that the familiar and usual grounds of
disqualification, like not being anarchists, polygamists, etc. were
incorporated therein, and (2) that qualifications of applicants for
naturalization also varied from time to time.
A — DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. In the first naturalization statute of March 26, 1790, only a "free
white person" could be naturalized, provided he was not "proscribed" by any
state, unless it be with the consent of such state. (Chap. V. 1 Stat. 103)
2. In the Act of January 29, 1795, to the same provisions was added
the disqualification of those "legally convicted of having joined the army of
Great Britain, during the late war." (Chap. XX, 1 Stat. 414).
3. In the Act of June 18, 1798, Section 1 thereto provided:
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen of the
United States, or of any state, unless in the manner prescribed by the
act, entitled 'An Act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and
to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject, 'he shall have
declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, five
years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at the time of his
application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the satisfaction of the
court having jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the
United States fourteen years, at least, and within the state or territory
where, or for which such court is at the time held five years, at least,
besides conforming to the other declarations, renunciations and proofs,
by the said act required, any thing therein to the contrary hereof
notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the
limelights, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the
twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-
five, may, within one year after the passing of this act—and any alien
who shall have made the declaration of his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, in conformity to the provisions of the act,
entitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to
repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject,' may, within four
years after having made the declaration aforesaid, be admitted to
become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by the said act, upon his
making proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the limits,
and under the jurisdiction of the United States: And provided also, that
no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation
or state with whom the United States shall be at war, at the time of his
application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United
States."
There is here no mention of "white persons." (Chap. LIV, 1 Stat. 566).

4. In the Act of April 14, 1802, mentioned in Kelly v. Owen, supra,
reference was made again to "free white persons," and the same enemy
alien and "state-proscribed" disqualifications in the former statutes were
carried over. (Chap. XXVIII, 2 Stat. 153.)
5. The Act of March 26, 1804 provided in its Section 1 thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That any alien, being
a free white person, who was residing within the limits and under the
jurisdiction of the United States, at any time between the eighteenth
day of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, and the
fourteenth day of April one thousand eight hundred and two, and who
has continued to reside within the same, may be admitted to become a
citizen of the United States, without a compliance with the first
condition specified in the first section of the act, entitled 'An act to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts
heretofore passed on that subject.' "
In its Section 2, this Act already provided that:

"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That when any alien who
shall have complied with the first condition specified in ,the first section
of the said original act, and who shall have pursued the directions
prescribed in the second section of the said act, may die, before he is
actually naturalized, the widow and the children of such alien shall be
considered as citizens of the United States, and shall be entitled to
rights and privileges as such, upon taking the oaths prescribed by law."
(CHAP. XLVII, 2 Stat. 292)
6. In the Act of July 30, 1813, the disqualification of enemy aliens

was removed as follows:
"CHAP. XXXVI. — An Act supplementary to the acts heretofore
passed on the subject of an uniform rule of
naturalization. (a)
United States of America in Congress assembled, That persons resident
within the United States, or the territories thereof, on the eighteenth
day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve, who
had before that day made declaration according to law, of their
intention to become citizens of the United States, or who by the
existing laws of the United States, were on that day entitled to become
citizens, without making such declaration, may be admitted to become
citizens thereof, notwithstanding they shall be alien enemies at the
times and in the manner prescribed by the laws heretofore passed on
that subject: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be taken or
construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension and removal,
agreeably to law, of any alien enemy at any time previous to the actual
naturalization of such alien." (Chap. XXXVI, 3 Stat. 53)
7. Neither the Act of March 22, 1816 nor those of May 26, 1824 and
May 24, 1828 made any change in the above requirements. (Chap. XXXII, 3
Stat. 258; Chap. CLXX-XVI, 4 Stat. 69; and Chap. CXVI, 4 Stat. 310).
8. Then the Act of February 10, 1855, important because it gave
alien wives of citizens ,the status of citizens, was enacted providing:
"CHAP. LXXI. — An Act to secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of
Citizens of the United States born out of the Limits thereof.
United States of America in Congress assembled, That persons
heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the
time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and
considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States:
Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to
persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who
shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall loyal be deemed
and taken to be a citizen." (Chap. LXXI, 10 Stat. 604.)
9. The Act of July 14, 1870 mainly provided only for penalties for
certain acts related to naturalization, as punished thereby, but added in its
Section 7 "that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of
African nativity and to African descent." (Chap. CCLIV, 16 Stat. 254.)
10. The Act of February 1, 1876 contained no relevant amendment.
(Chap. 5, 19 Stat. 2.)
11. When the statutes of the United States were revised on June 22,
1874, the naturalization law of the country was embodied in Sections 2165-
2174 of saddle Revised Statutes. This contained no racial disqualification. In
fact, it reenacted ;Section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 as its Section
1994 thereof, thus:
"SEC. 1994. Any person who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." (18 Stat. 351.)
12. The Act of May 6, 1882 provided expressly that no State court
or court of the United State shall admit Chinese to citizenship. (Chap. 126,
Sec. 14, 22 Stat. , 61.)
13. The Act of August 9, 1888 extended the benefits of American
citizenship to Indian woman married to Americans thus:
"CHAP. 818. — An Act in relation to marriage between white men and
Indian women.
"Be it enacted, That no white man, not otherwise a member of
any tribe of Indians, who may hereafter marry, an Indian woman,
member of any Indian tribe in the United States, or any of its Territories
except the five civilized tribes in the Indian Territory, shall by such
marriage hereafter acquire any right to any tribal property, privilege,
or interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled.
"SEC. 2. That every Indian woman, member of any such tribe
of Indians, who may hereafter be married to any citizen of the United
States, is hereby declared to become by such marriage a citizen of the
United States, with all the right, privileges, and immunities of any such
citizen, being a married woman:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall impair or in
any way affect the right or title of such married woman to any tribal
property or any interest therein.
"SEC. 2. That whenever the marriage of any white man with
any Indian woman, a member of any such tribe of Indians, is required
or offered to be proved in any judicial ,proceeding, evidence of the
admission of such fact by the party against whom the proceeding is
had, or evidence of general repute, or of cohabitation as married
persons, or any other circumstantial or presumptive evidence from
which the fact may be inferred, shall be competent. (Aug. 9, 1888) "
[25 Stat. 392, Suppl. 1.]
14. The Act of April 19, 1900 extended American citizenship to all
citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898 as well as the laws of
the United States to said Republic, including, of course, those on
naturalization. (Chap. 339, Sec. 4, 31 Stat. 141.)
15. On June 29, 1906. "An Act to establish a Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization, and to provide a uniform rule for the naturalization of
aliens throughout the United States" was approved. No reference was made
therein to "free white persons''; it merely provided in its Section 7 that:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieve in or who is opposed
to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition
to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer
or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized
government, because of his or their official character, or who is a
polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United
States." (36 Stat. 598)
Incidentally, the 6th paragraph of its Section 4 provided:

"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become
a citizen of the United States dies before he is actually naturalized the
widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the
other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any
declaration of intention." (36 Stat. 598)
16. By the Act of March 2, 1907, alien women who acquired

American citizenship by marriage retained said citizenship, if she continued
to reside in the United States and did not renounce it, or, if she resided
outside of the United States by registering with the U.S. Consul of her place
of residence. (CHAP. 2534, Sec. 4, 34 Stat. 1229.)
17. Since United States legislation treats naturalization and
citizenship per se separately, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes remained
untouched. In the Act of February 24, 1911 it was provided:
United States of America in Congress assembled, That when any alien,
who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United
States, becomes insane before he is actually naturalized, and his wife
shall thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws of the
United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the
other provisions of the naturalization laws be naturalized without
making any declaration of intention." (36 Stat. 929.)
18. The Act of August 11, 1916 merely validated entries filed in
certain countries. (CHAP. 316, 39 Stat. 926.)
19. In the Act of May 9, 1918, the U.S. Congress amended the
naturalization laws to make possible the admission of Filipino navy
servicemen, and understandably, because of the war then, it provided:
"Seventh. Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years
and upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the
United States Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and
who, after service of not less than three years, may be honorably
discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge with
recommendation for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto Rican not
a citizen of the United States, . . . ." (40 Stat. 542.)
20. On September 22, 1922, "An Act Relative to the Naturalization

and citizenship of married women" was appareled repeating Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes and otherwise adopting a different attitude as regards
the citizenship and naturalization of married women thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate cleaned House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right
of any woman to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall
not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because she is a
married woman.
"Sec. 2. That any woman who marries a citizen of the United
States after the passage of this Act, or any woman whose husband is
naturalized after the passage of this Act, shall not become a citizen of
the United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if
eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete
compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws, with
the following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the
United States and the one-year period of residence within the State or
Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided
continuously in the United States Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
"Sec. 3. That a woman citizen of the United States shall not
cease to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage
after the passage of this Act, unless she makes a formal renunciation of
her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of
aliens; Provided, That any woman citizen who marries an alien
ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen of the United States.
If at the termination of the marital status she is a citizen of the United
States she shall retain her citizenship regardless of her residence. If
during the continuance of the marital status she resides continuously
for two years in a foreign State of which her husband is a citizen or
subject, or for five years continuously outside the United States, she
shall thereafter be subject to the same presumption as is a naturalized
citizen of the United States under the second paragraph of section 2 of
the Act entitled "An Act in reference to the expatriation of citizens and
their protection abroad," approved March 2 1907. Nothing herein shall
be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of Revised Statutes
1999 or of section 2 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 with reference to
expatriation.

"Sec. 4. That a woman who, before the passage of this Act,
has lost her United States citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided by section
2 of this Act: Provided, That no certificate of arrival shall be required to
be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital status
she; shall have resided within the United States. After her
naturalization she shall have the same citizenship status as if her
marriage had taken place after the passage of this Act.
"Sec. 5. That no woman whose husband is not eligible to
citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital
status.
"Sec. 6. That section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and
section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 are repealed. Such repeal
shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such
sections nor restore citizenship lost under section 4 of the Expatriation
Act of 1907.
"Sec. 7. That section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1901 is
repealed. Such repeal shall not restore citizenship lost under such
section nor terminate citizenship resumed under such section. A
woman who has resumed under such section citizenship lost by
marriage shall, upon the passage of this Act, have for all purposes the
same citizenship status as immediately preceding her marriage."
(Chap. 411, 42 Stat. 10211022.)
21. When "The Code of the Laws of to United States of America of a

General and Permanent Character in Force on December 7, 1925" was
approved, the provisions, corresponding to the disqualifications for
naturalization and the citizenship and naturalization of women embodied
therein were:
"367. Naturalization of woman; sex or marriage not a bar. —
The right of any woman to become a naturalized citizen of the United
States shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because
she is a married woman. ( Sept. 22, 1922, c.411, 1, 42 Stat. 1021.)
"368. Same; women marrying citizens or persons becoming
naturalized; procedure. — Any woman who marries a citizen of the
United States after September 22, 1922, or any woman whose husband
is naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen of the United
States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to
citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance
with the following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the
United States and the one-year period of residence within the State or
Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided
continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. (Sept.
22, 1922, c. 411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"369. Same; women who have lost citizenship by Marrying

aliens eligible to citizenship; procedure. — A woman, who, before
September 22, 1922, has lost her United States citizenship by reason
for her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized
as provided in the preceding section. No certificate of arrival shall be
required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the
marital status she shall have resided within the United Stators. After
her naturalization she shall have the same citizenship status as if her
marriage had taken place after September 22, 1922. (Swept. 22, 1922,
c. 411, § 4, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"370. Same; Women married to persons ineligible to
citizenship. — No woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship
shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital status.
(Swept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 5, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"371. Same, wife of alien declaring becoming insane before
naturalization; minor children. — When any alien, who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes insane
before he is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a
homestead entry under the land laws of the United States, she and
their minor children may, by complying with the other provisions of the
naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of
intention. (Feb. 24, 1911, c. 151, 36 Stat. 929.)" (Chap. 9, 44 Stat. 156,
158.)
which, of course, must be read together with the provisions on

inadmissibility of Chinese, anarchists, polygamists, non-English speaking
persons, etc. in Sections 363-365 of the same Code.
22. The Act of May 26, 1926 extended naturalization privileges to
alien veterans of World War I, thus:
United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) as used in
this Act, the term "alien veteran" means an individual, a member of the
military or naval forces of the United States at any time after April 5,
1917, and before November 12, 1918, who is now an alien not
ineligible to citizenship; but does not include (1) any individual at
anytime during such period or thereafter separated from such forces
under other than honorable conditions, (2) any conscientious objector
who performed no military duty whatever or refused to wear the
uniform, or (3) any alien at any time during such period or thereafter
discharged from the military or naval forces on account of his alienage.
(b) Terms defined in the Immigration Act of 1924 shall, when
used in this Act, have the meaning assigned to such terms in that Act.
"Sec. 2. An alien veteran shall for the purposes of the
Immigration Act of 1924 be considered as a non-quota immigrant, but
shall be subject to all the other provisions of that Act and of the
immigration laws, except that —
(a) He shall not be subject to the head tax imposed by
section 2 of the Immigration Act of 1917;
(b) He shall not be required to pay any fee under section 2 or

section 7 of the Immigration Act of 1924;
(c) If otherwise admissible, he shall not be excluded under
section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, unless excluded under the
provisions of that section relating to —
(1) Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous
contagious disease, except tuberculosis in any form;
(2) Polygamy;
(3) Prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons;
(4) Contract laborers;
(5) Persons previously deported;
(6) Persons convicted of crime.
"Sec. 3. The unmarried child under eighteen years of age, the

wife, or the husband, of an alien veteran shall, for the purposes of the
Immigration Act of 1924, be considered as a non quota immigrant
when accompanying or following within six months to join him, but
shall be subject to all other provisions of that Act and of the
immigration laws.
'Sec. 4. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to
any alien unless the immigration visa is issued to him before the
expiration of one year after the enactment of this Act." (Chap. 398, 44
Stat. 654-655.)
23. The Act of June 21, 1930 authorized repatriation of certain

veterans of World War I. (Chap. 559, 46 Stat. 791.)
24. On March 3, 1931, the Act of September 22, 1922 as amended
as follows:
"Sec. 4.(a) Section 3 of the Act entitled "An Act relative to the
naturalization and citizenship of married women," approved September
22, 1922, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
'Sec. 3.(a) A woman citizen of the United States shall not
cease to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage
after this section, as amended, takes effect, unless she makes a formal
renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over
naturalization of aliens.
'(b) Any woman who before this section, as amended takes
effect, has lost her United States citizenship by residence abroad after
marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship
may, if she has not acquired any other nationality by affirmative act,
be naturalized in the manner prescribed in section 4 of this Act, as
amended. Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth
shall not be denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her
race.
'(c) No woman shall be entitled to naturalization under
section 4 of this Act, as amended, if her United States citizenship
originated solely by a reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United
States or by reason of the acquisition of United States citizenship by
her husband.'
"(b) Section 5 of such Act of September 22, 1922, is

repealed." (Chap. 442, 46 Stat. 1511-1512.)
25. The Act of May 25, 1932 contained the following somewhat
pertinent provisions:
United States of America in Congress assembled, That
(a) an alien veteran, as defined in section 1 of the Act of May
26, 1926 (ch. 398, 44 Stat. 654; title 8, sec. 241, U.S. C. Supp. 1), if
residing in the United States, be entitled at any time within two years
after the enactment of this Act to naturalization upon the same terms,
conditions, and exemptions which would have been accorded to such
alien if he had petitioned before the armistice of the World War, except
that (1) such alien shall be required to prove that immediately
preceding the date of this petition he has resided continuously within
the United States for at least two years, in pursuance of a legal
admission for permanent residence, and that during all such period he
has behaved as a person of good moral character; (2) if such admission
was subsequent to March 3, 1924, such alien shall file with his petition
a certificate of arrival issued by the Commissioner of Naturalization; (3)
final action shall not be had upon the petition until at least ninety days
have elapsed after filing of such petition; and (4) such alien shall be
required to appear and file his petition in person, and to take the
prescribed oath of allegiance in open court. Such residence and good
moral character shall be proved either by the affidavits of two credible
witnesses who are citizens of the United States, or by depositions by
two such witnesses made before a naturalization examiner, for each
place of residence.
"(b) All petitions for citizenship made outside the United
States in accordance with the seventh subdivision of section 4 of the
Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, upon which
naturalization has not been heretofore granted, are hereby declared to
be invalid for all purposes.
"Sec. 2. (a) The seventh subdivision of section 4 of the
Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by
striking out 'the National Guard or Naval Militia of any State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia, or the State Militia in Federal Service.'
"(b) This section shall not be applied in the case of any
individual whose petition for naturalization has been filed before the
enactment of this Act.
"Sec. 3. The last proviso in the first paragraph of the seventh
subdivision of section 4 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is
amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in
lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that this proviso
shall not apply in the case of service on American-owned vessels by an
alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence.'
"Sec. 4. Section 32 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subdivisions:
'(c) If the name of any naturalized citizen has, subsequent to
naturalization, been changed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, or by marriage, the citizen may, upon the payment to the
commissioner of a fee of $10, make application (accompanied by two
photographs of the applicant) for a new certificate of citizenship in the
new name of such citizen. If the commissioner finds the name of the
applicant to have been changed as claimed he shall issue to the
applicant a new certificate with one of such photographs of the
applicant affixed thereto.
'(d) The Commissioner of Naturalization is authorized to make
and issue, without fee, certifications of any part of the naturalization
records of any court, or of any certificate of citizenship, for use in
complying with any statute, State or Federal, or in any judicial
proceeding. Any such certification shall be admitted in evidence
equally with the original from which such certification was made in any
case in which the original thereof might be admissible as evidence. No
such certification shall be made by any clerk of court except upon order
of the court.'
"Sec. 5. So much of subdivision (a) of section 33 of such Act
of June 29, 1906, as amended, as read 'Upon obtaining a certificate
from the Secretary of Labor showing the date, place, and manner of
arrival in the United States,' is hereby repealed.
"Sec. 6. Section 4 of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement
the naturalization laws, and for other purposes,' approved March 2,
1929, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and
inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that no
such certificate shall be required if the entry was on or before June 29,
1906.'
"Sec. 7. Despite the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 1
of the Act entitled 'An Act making it a felony with penalty for certain
aliens to enter the United States of America under certain conditions in
violation of law,' approved March 4, 1929, as amended, an alien, if
otherwise admissible, shall not be excluded from admission to the
United States under the provisions of such subdivision after the
expiration of one year after the date of deportation if, prior to his
reembarkation at a place outside of the United States, or prior to his
application in foreign contiguous territory for admission to the United
States, the Secretary of Labor, in his discretion, shall have granted
such alien permission to reapply for admission.
"Sec. 8. The compilation of the statistics to show races
nationalities, and other information, authorized and directed to be
prepared by the Commissioner of Naturalization, shall be completed
and published at the same time, as near as practicable, as the
Publication of the statistics of the 1930 census except that reports
covering the census of 1910 shall be completed and submitted not
later than January 31, 1933, and reports covering the census of 1920
not later than December 31, 1938. Such statistics shall show the
records of registry made under the provisions of the Act entitled 'An
Act to supplement the naturalization laws, and for other purposes,'
approved March 2, 1929. Payment for the equipment used in preparing
such compilation shall be made from appropriations for miscellaneous
expenses of the Bureau of Naturalization.
"Sec. 9. The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, is authorized to provide
quarters without payment of rent, in the building occupied by the
Naturalization Service in New York City, for a photographic studio
operated by welfare organizations without profit and solely for the
benefit of aliens seeking naturalization. Such studio shall be under the
supervision of the Commissioner of Naturalization.
"Sec. 10. The tenth subdivision of section 4 of the Act of June

29, 1906 (ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 598), as amended by the Act of May 9,
1918 (ch. 69, 40, 40 Stat. 545; U.S.C., title 8 sec. 377), is hereby
amended to read as follows:
'Tenth. That any person not an alien enemy, who resided
uninterruptedly within the United States during the period of five years
next preceding July 1, 1920, and was on that date otherwise qualified
to become a citizen of the United States, except that he had not made
a declaration of intention required by law and who during or prior to
that time, because of misinformation regarding his citizenship status
erroneously exercised the rights and performed the duties of a citizen
of the United States in good faith, may file the petition for
naturalization prescribed by law without making the preliminary
declaration of intention required of other aliens, and upon satisfactory
proof to the court that he has so acted may be admitted as a citizen of
the United States upon complying in all respects with the other
requirements of the naturalization law.' (Chap. 203, 47 Stat. 165-167.)
26. By June 27, 1952, the right of a person to be naturalized could

no longer be denied by reason of race or sex or because such person was
married, although various disqualifications were still maintained, such as
lack understanding, capacity to read and write English, or of the principles of
the constitution and form of government of the United States, being opposed
to organized government of law, favoring totalitarian forms of government,
deserters from the armed forces, etc. (Secs. 1422 to 1426, USCA 8-9, 1953;
See also Secs. 1421 et seq., USCA 8, 1970.)
B — QUALIFICATIONS
Apart from the above disqualifications, the statutes referred tea
contained express requirements as to qualifications as follows:
(1) The Act of 1790 required residence, good moral character and
adherence to the principles of the United States Constitution.
(2) That of 1795 required a declaration of intention. residence,
adherence to the U.S. Constitution, good moral character and no title of
nobility.
(3) That of 1798 referred only declaration of intention and
residence.
(4) That of 1802 required residence, renunciation of allegiance to
former government, adherence to U.S. Constitution, good moral character
and declaration of intention.
(5) That of 1804 was practically I the same as that of 1802.
(6) So also were those of 1813, 1816 and 1824.
(7) That of 1828 mentioned only residence and declaration of
intention.
(8) Those of 1855, 1870 and 1888 amended the law in other
respects.
(9) That of 1906 contained the following provisions:
"SEC. 4. That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen
of the United States in the following manner and not otherwise:
"First. He A hall declare on oath before the clerk of any court

authorized by this Act to naturalize aliens, or his authorized deputy, in
the district in which such alien resides, two years at least prior to his
admission, and after he has reached the age of eighteen years, that it
is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the united States, and
to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien may be at
the time a citizen or subject. And such declaration shall set forth, the
name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign
residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the, name of the vessel, if
any, in which he came to the United states, and the present place of
residence in the United States of said alien: Provided, however, That no
alien who, in conformity with the law in force at the date of his
declaration, has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States shall be required to renew such declaration.
"Second. Not less than two years nor more than seven years
after he has made such declaration of intention he shall make and file,
in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting and duly verified, in which petition such applicant shall
state his full name, his place of residence (by street and number, if
possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date and place of his
birth; the place from which he emigrated, and the date and place of his
arrival in the United States, and, if he entered through a port, the name
of the vessel on which he arrived; the time when and the place and
name of the court where he declared his intention to become a citizen
of the United States; if he is married he shall state the name of his wife
and, if possible, the country of her nativity and her place of residence
at the time of filing his petition; and if he has children, the name, date,
and place of birth and place of residence of each child living at the time
of his petition: Provided, That if he has filed his declaration before the
passage of this Act he shall not be required to sign the petition in his
own handwriting.
"The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever in or
opposed to organized government, or a member of or affiliated with
any organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in or opposed to
organized government, a polygamist or believer in the practice of
polygamy, and that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United
States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and
particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
which he at the time of filing of his petition may be a citizen or subject,
and that it is his intention to reside permanently within the United
States, and whether or not he has been denied admission a, a citizen of
the United States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of such denial,
the court or courts in which such decision was rendered, and that the
cause for such denial has since been cured or removed, and every fact
material to his naturalization ailed required to be proved upon the final
hearing of his application.
"The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of at least two
credible witnesses, who are citizens of the United States, and who shall
state in their affidavits that they have personally known the applicant
to be a resident of the United States for a period of at least five years
continuously, and of the State, Territory, or district in which the
application is made for a period of at least one year immediately
preceding the date of the filing of his petition, and that they each have
personal knowledge that the petitioner is a person of good moral
character, and that he is in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be
admitted as a citizen of the United States.
"At the time of filing of his petition there shall be filed with the
clerk of the court a certificate from the Department of Commerce and
Labor, if the petitioner arrives in the United States after the passage of
this Act, stating the date, place and manner of his arrival in the
United States, and the declaration of intention of such petitioner, which
certificate and declaration shall be attached to and made a part of said
petition.
"Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on
oath in open court that he will support the Constitution of the United
States, and he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince potentate, state, or
sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state,
or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will
support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and
allegiance to the same.
"Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court
admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding the date
of his application he has resided continuously within the United States
five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is
at the time held one year at least, and that during that time he has
behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the same. In addition to the oath of the
applicant, the testimony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the
United States, as to the facts of residence, moral character, and
attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be required, and
the name, ,place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be
set forth in the record.
"Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has
borne any hereditary title, or has been of any of the orders of nobility in
the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the
above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of
nobility in the court to which his application is made, and his
renunciation shall be recorded in the court.
"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become
a citizen of the United States dies before he is actually naturalized the
widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the
other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any
declaration of intention." (34 stat. 596-98.)
10. Those of 1911 and 1916 contained amendments as to other

matters.
11. That of 1918 provided for different qualifications for Filipinos,
Porto Ricans, etc. for naturalization in addition to service in the U.S. Navy or
Philippine Constabulary.
12. Those of years after 1922 when Section 1994 was repealed
would have no material bearing in this case.
Amen.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B..L., dissenting:
I regret not being able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Barredo.
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and I in order not to delay, the
release of the decision, I am expressing here the basic reasons for my
disconformity.
The pivotal problem is whether the provision of section, 15 of our
Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) requires that an alien
woman, married to a Filipino citizen, must prove that she possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by said law, in
order to be deemed a Filipino citizen. The affirmative has been the constant
doctrine of this Court since 1957, in the first Ly Giok Ha case (101 Phil. 459)
or at the very least since 1959, in Lee Suan Sy vs. Galling, 106 Phil. 713.
This established doctrine would now be set aside primarily on the basis
that section 15 of our Naturalization Law is a verbatim reproduction or exact
copy of section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Act of
Congress of February 10, 1855); that because said section of the Revised
Statutes had been uniformly construed by American courts as requiring
merely that the woman marrying a citizen should not be disqualified herself
from becoming a citizen, that a similar interpretation must be given to the
aforesaid section 15 our own Naturalization Act.
This view might be tenable if the Philippine statute had beenin its
entirety a reproduction of the American model. But where the coincidence is
limited to a section of the Philippine statute, which taken as a whole is
different in requirements and spirit, I submit that the rule advocated by the
main opinion does not apply, and that our section 15 should be construed
conformably to the context and intendment of , the statute of which it is a
part, and in harmony wealth the whole.
It is worth nabbing that the American law of naturalization stresses
primarily the disqualifications for citizenship (see USCA, Title 8, secs. 363 to
366 and 378). The only positive qualifications are "bona fide intention to
become a citizen of the Unlighted States and to renounce forever all
allegiance and fidelity" to a previous sovereign (Do., sec. 372) and residence
for the specified period. This is particularly true of the American law at the
time the first law was enacted concerning acquisition of citizenship by alien
women married to U.S. citizens (the Act of February 10, 1855). Under such
conditions, it is understandable that the interpretation of the words "who
might herself lawfully be naturalized" Should be that the marrying alien
woman should not be disqualified from becoming a citizen.
But our naturalization law separates qualifications from
disqualifications; the positive qualifications under section 3 thereof express a
policy of restriction, as to candidates for naturalization as much as the
disqualifications under section 4. An a !it has been shown in our decision in
the second Lo Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha vs. Galling, L-21332, March 18,
1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under section 4 would not
necessarily qualify under section 3, even if the residence qualification were
disregarded. In other words, by giving to section 15 of our Naturalization Law
the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification
under section 3 could result in admitting to citizenship women that section 2
intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why the American
interpretation of the words "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
should be considered binding in this jurisdiction.
The spirit of the American law, decidedly favorable to the absorption of
immigrants, is not embodied in our Constitution and laws, because of the
nationalistic spirit of the latter.
In effect, the main decision introduces marriage to a citizen as a means
of acquiring citizenship, a way not to contemplated by Article IV of the
Constitution.
I am not unaware of the fact that the decisions of this Court have made
very difficult the acquisition of citizenship by alien woman marrying Filipinos.
But the remedy lies in a change of the statute. And it is not amiss to observe
here that since 1959, when the present doctrine on the matter was adopted,
the Legislature has not expressed any dissent therefrom, when it could have
easily altered or clarified the legal provisions affected if Congress were
convinced that this Court had misinterpreted its intent.
Concepcion, C . J ., Zaldivar and Makasiar, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Followed in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-13790, promulgated Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 300; Lu Choy Fa vs.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-20597, Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 604 the other cases
are discussed in the opinion.
2. Justices Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result.
3. Kua Suy v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 300; Lo
San Tuang v. Galang, G. R. No. L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638; Sun
Peck Yong v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 874;
Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876; Choy
King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402; Austria
v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336; Brito v.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539; Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang (2nd), G. R. No. L-21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 414; Go Im Ty v.
Rep., G.R. No. L-17919, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 797.
4. Supra. (101 Phil. 459).

* See, also Ops., Sec. of Justice, No. 28, s. 1950; No. 96, s. 1949; Nos. 43, 58,
98 and 281, s. 1948; No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940.
5. In the deliberations, Chief Justice Concepcion explained that his opinion was
not meant to give that impression.
6. Justice Barrera penned the decision in Sun Peck Yong, supra, and Tong Siok
Sy v. Vivo, supra.
** Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473; Ly Giok Ha @ Wy Giok Ha v.

Galang, 54 Off. Gaz., 356.
7. To avoid repetition, the pertinent portions of the opinion will be quoted in a
more appropriate place later in this decision.
8. G.R. No. L-21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 414.
9. Pertinent portions of the opinion of Justice Reyes will be quoted later in a
more appropriate place in this decision.
10. 17 SCRA 797.

11. See id., pp. 801-804.
12. One can easily perceive from the language of Justice Makalintal in Choy
King Tee that he was expressing the consensus of the Court's- membership
then rather than his own personal views.
13. The law firms PAREDES, POBLADOR & NAZARENO; LICHAUCO, PICAZO &
AGCAOLI; MEER, MEER & MEER; PONCE ENRILE, SIGUION REYNA,
MONTECILLO & BELO, RAMIREZ & ORTIGAS; SALVA, CHUA & ASSO.; and
SYCIP, SALAZAR, LUNA, MANALO & FELICIANO.
14. See quotation from Lo San Tuang earlier on pp. 27-32 of this opinion.
15. See opinion of the Secretary of Justice, No. 79, s. 1940.
16. For ready reference, attached as an appendix of this decision is a brief
study of all the naturalization laws of the United States from 1790 to 1970
showing how the matter of qualifications and disqualifications, whether racial
or otherwise, have been treated in the said statutes, from which it can be
readily seen that the disqualification of alien wives from becoming citizens
has not been always exclusively on racial grounds during the period that the
Act of Feb. 10, 1855 and, later, section 1994 of the Revised Statutes were in
force.
17. The statement in Sinco's book cited by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang does
not indicate any authoritative source. In any event, for the reasons already
stated the racial motive could at most be only one of the reasons for the
elimination of Section 1.
18. A more extensive discussion of the relevance of this repeal of 1922 is made
further in this opinion.
19. Decided, April 15, 1869, next to Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373.
20. More accurately, the phrase "free white persons," does not only refer to
people of the white race but also to non-slaves.
21. In this connection, it is to be noted that all the naturalization laws of the
United States from 1790 provided for such qualifications of residence, good
moral character, adherence to the Constitution.
22. (f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have
not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States,
whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.
23. After Ly Giok Ha and Cua, the Secretary of Justice found more reason to
sustain the previous view of the Department on the matter. See opinions
already cited.
24. Ong Son Cui v. Republic, G.R. No. L-9858, May 29, 1957, 101 Phil. 649.
25. Somehow, the language of the whole law conveys the idea that only male
aliens are contemplated for judicial naturalization.
26. Three possible situations are contemplated, namely: (a) the woman is
already married to the alien before the latter's naturalization; (b) she marries
him after such naturalization; or (c) she marries a native-born Filipino; in all
these instances, the effect of marriage is the same.
27. Brother Connon of La Salle College and Father Moran of Ateneo University.
28. Former Dean of the College of Law, U.P. and later President of the
University, now delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971.
28a Sec. 1994 Revised Statutes.

*** It should be observed, parenthetically, that by its very nature, citizenship is
one of the most difficult facts to prove.

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Lim Yao v. CID, 41 SCRA 292

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G)

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of

"The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the

"The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by

'On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a

"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered

"'Eﬀect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung

'Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well

We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In eﬀect, the

"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,

'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a

'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of

'(e) Persons suﬀering from mental alienation or

'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

As may be seen, although not speciﬁcally in so many words, no doubt

"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the

'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a

"This view ﬁnds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang

xxx xxx xxx

"Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups ?

"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang

"The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the

'First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous

'Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and

'Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth

'In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall,

"Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to

"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of

Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong V. Commissioner of

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was

"Reﬂection will reveal why this must be so. The qualiﬁcations

'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of

It is diﬃcult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing

"Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act

"And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the

"The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021,

"Section 6 of the act also provides 'that . . . 1994 of the Revised

"This construction limited the eﬀect of the statute to those aliens

"In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed,

"In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed.

"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act

"Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not

"Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the,

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory

"1. One of the qualiﬁcations required of an applicant for

"Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more