Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Valves Used in Liquid Oxygen and Cold Gaseous Oxygen Systems
Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Valves Used in Liquid Oxygen and Cold Gaseous Oxygen Systems
Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Valves Used in Liquid Oxygen and Cold Gaseous Oxygen Systems
INSTALLATION, OPERATION,
AND MAINTENANCE OF VALVES
USED IN LIQUID OXYGEN AND
COLD GASEOUS OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
AIGA 094/17
Revision of AIGA 094/16
As part of a programme of harmonization of industry standards, the Asia Industrial Gases Association
(AIGA) has issued the publication 094 ‘Design, manufacture, installation, operation, and maintenance of
valves used in liquid oxygen and cold gaseous oxygen systems’. This has been jointly produced by
members of the International Harmonization Council and originally published by the European Industrial
Gases Association (EIGA) as IGC Doc 200, The safe design, [manufacture, installation, operation and
maintenance of valves used in liquid oxygen and cold gaseous oxygen systems’.
This publication is intended as an international harmonized publication for the worldwide use and
application by all members of Asia Industrial Gases Association (AIGA), Compressed Gas Association
(CGA), EIGA, and Japan Industrial and Medical Gases Association (JIMGA). Regional editions have the
same technical content as the EIGA edition, however, there are editorial changes primarily in formatting,
units used and spelling. Also, any references to regional regulatory requirements are those that apply to
European requirements.
Disclaimer
All technical publications of AIGA or under AIGA’s name, including Codes of practice, Safety procedures and any other technical
information contained in such publications were obtained from sources believed to be reliable and are based on technical
information and experience currently available from members of AIGA and others at the date of their issuance.
While AIGA recommends reference to or use of its publications by its members, such reference to or use of AIGA’s publications by
its members or third parties are purely voluntary and not binding.
Therefore, AIGA or its members make no guarantee of the results and assume no liability or responsibility in connection with the
reference to or use of information or suggestions contained in AIGA’s publications.
AIGA has no control whatsoever as regards, performance or non performance, misinterpretation, proper or improper use of any
information or suggestions contained in AIGA’s publications by any person or entity (including AIGA members) and AIGA expressly
disclaims any liability in connection thereto.
AIGA’s publications are subject to periodic review and users are cautioned to obtain the latest edition
Reproduced with permission from European Industrial Gases Association. All rights reserved.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Scope.............................................................................................................................................................. 1
3 Definitions ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
3.1 Publication terminology ........................................................................................................................ 1
3.2 Technical definitions ............................................................................................................................ 2
4 Oxygen properties, hazards, and hazard analysis and risk assessment ........................................................ 2
4.1 Oxygen properties................................................................................................................................ 2
4.2 Oxygen hazards ................................................................................................................................... 3
4.3 Oxygen hazard analysis and risk assessment ..................................................................................... 3
9 Site installation.............................................................................................................................................. 19
10 Operations .................................................................................................................................................... 20
10.1 Personnel ........................................................................................................................................... 20
10.2 Isolation, drain, and vent valves......................................................................................................... 20
10.3 Pressure relief valves......................................................................................................................... 20
10.4 Pressurizing piping systems .............................................................................................................. 21
10.5 Valve leaks......................................................................................................................................... 21
10.6 Shutdown and startup of piping systems ........................................................................................... 21
11 Maintenance ................................................................................................................................................. 21
11.1 General considerations ...................................................................................................................... 21
11.2 Maintenance of valves ....................................................................................................................... 23
11.3 Assembly and installation .................................................................................................................. 23
11.4 Spares................................................................................................................................................ 25
11.5 Supervision and inspection ................................................................................................................ 26
11.6 Documentation ................................................................................................................................... 26
11.7 System restart after maintenance ...................................................................................................... 26
12 Training ......................................................................................................................................................... 26
12.1 Training scope and elements of the training programme .................................................................. 26
13 Quality assurance, quality control measures for valves and spare parts ...................................................... 27
13.1 Valve manufacturer control ................................................................................................................ 28
13.2 Construction site management .......................................................................................................... 29
14 References ................................................................................................................................................... 30
AIGA AIGA 094/17
Figures
Figure 1—Flowchart showing an oxygen hazard analysis .................................................................................... 5
Figure 2—Generic kindling chain .......................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3—Example for a bypass system ............................................................................................................. 15
Section Change
Title change and AIGA office address change
2 Scope change to include customer station bulk storage tank systems
4.3 Oxygen hazard analysis and risk assessment reordered and amended
5 Additional requirements added
6.1 Selection of metallic materials rewritten and table removed
6.4 Reference to ASTM G74 added
7.2.3 Clarification of customer station valves in customer station service
7.2.3.1 Bypass systems for pressure equalization added
7.2.4.2 Requirements for ball valves amended
7.2.4.3 Requirements for gate valves amended
7.2.5 Requirements for hard facings and burn resistant coatings added
11.1 Section expanded
1 Introduction
This publication has been prepared by a group of experts in industrial gases technology or oxygen
equipment representing oxygen manufacturers and is based on technical information and experience
currently available.
The use of incompatible materials, unsuitable lubricants, improper cleaning and/or ingress of
impurities, and procedural failures have been identified as root causes of a number of severe
incidents that occurred over the past few years involving liquid oxygen valves with concentrations
greater than
90 mol % of oxygen. This indicates the need for continual improvement in the fundamental knowledge
of design, material selection, manufacturing, cleaning, installation, operation, maintenance processes,
and storage related to valves in liquid oxygen service. This is necessary for liquid oxygen valve
specifiers, suppliers, and manufacturers as well as those who clean, assemble, install, operate, and
maintain these valves.
In order to avoid similar incidents with potentially fatal consequences, requirements for cold oxygen
systems are outlined in this publication.
The information contained in this publication only applies to new installations designed after the
publication of this document and not to existing installations. However, the information contained in
this publication may benefit existing installations or those in the project phase. Furthermore, to the
extent that they exist, national laws may supersede the practices included in this publication. It should
be noted that all local regulations, tests, safety procedures, or methods are not included in this
publication and that abnormal or unusual circumstances could warrant additional requirements.
The industrial gases industry has demonstrated that personnel who are involved in the design,
selection, manufacturing, handling, cleaning, installation, and maintenance of valves in cold oxygen
service require training in these respective areas.
2 Scope
This publication covers isolation valves, control valves, check valves, pressure relief valves, drain, and
vent valves in air separation units (ASUs), their backup and storage piping system, and customer
station bulk storage tank systems. It addresses the design, material selection, manufacturing,
cleaning, installation, operation, and maintenance of oxygen service valves operating at temperatures
less than –30 °C.
Valves in warm service connecting instrumentation devices are excluded from the scope of this
publication. Some of the principles discussed in this publication may be used for other cold oxygen
applications.
3 Definitions
3.1.1 Shall
Indicates that the procedure is mandatory. It is used wherever the criterion for conformance to specific
recommendations allows no deviation.
3.1.2 Should
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3.1.3 May
3.1.4 Will
3.1.5 Can
Metals or metal alloys that, after being subjected to an ignition event, either will not burn or exhibit
burn quenching behaviour, resulting in minimal consumption under specific process conditions that
the metal experiences.
Liquid, supercritical fluid or cold gas with a temperature less than –30 °C and an oxygen concentration
greater than 23.5 mol%.
Any material, other than metal, or any composite material in which the metal constituent is not the
most easily ignited component and for which the individual constituent cannot be evaluated
independently (see ASTM G63 Standard Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen
1
Service [1]).
Organization that manufactures a valve assembly and is responsible for its design.
Individual or organization that has responsibility for defining technical and/or procurement
requirements for oxygen valves and their actuation systems, where applicable.
Organization that supplies a complete oxygen valve. This can be a valve manufacturer or a third-
party.
Oxygen, which is essential to life, is colourless, odourless, and tasteless. The normal concentration in
air is approximately 21% by volume.
The presence of an oxygen-enriched atmosphere cannot be detected by human senses. Oxygen also
does not produce any physiological effects that could alert personnel to the presence of oxygen
enrichment. Increasing the oxygen concentration of the air at atmospheric pressure does not
constitute a significant health hazard.
1
References are shown by bracketed numbers and are listed in order of appearance in the reference section.
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At atmospheric pressure, liquid oxygen boils at –183 °C and has a slight blue colour.
Oxygen is heavier than air. It can accumulate in low lying areas such as pits, trenches, and
underground cavities or rooms. This is particularly relevant when there is a cold oxygen spill. In that
case, the generated cold gaseous oxygen is three times heavier than air.
Oxygen is not flammable but supports and accelerates combustion. Oxygen concentrations greater
than 23.5% create fire hazards but not asphyxiation hazards. Flammable materials, including some
materials that are normally relatively non-flammable in air, burn very rapidly in high oxygen
concentrations. As concentrations increase greater than 23.5% oxygen, ease of ignition of clothing
increases dramatically. Once ignited by even a relatively weak ignition source such as a spark or
cigarette, clothing can burst into flames and burn rapidly. Greater than 40% oxygen, the fibres on
clothing and body hair and oil are subject to flash fire when ignited, which spreads rapidly over the
entire exposed surface.
Personnel should not be exposed to oxygen-enriched atmospheres because of the increased risk of
fire. Areas where it is possible to have high oxygen content shall be well ventilated. Vents shall be
piped outside of buildings or to a safe area. Where an oxygen-enriched atmosphere is possible,
special precautions shall be taken such as installation of oxygen analysers with alarms, ensuring a
minimum number of air changes per hour, implementing special entry procedures, or a combination of
these procedures. Warning signs shall be posted at all entrances to alert personnel to the potential
hazard of an oxygen-enriched atmosphere. For additional information on oxygen hazards, see AIGA
005, Fire Hazards of Oxygen and Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres [2].
The three elements necessary for an oxygen valve fire to occur are an ignition source, oxygen, and a
flammable material (fuel). Since oxygen is assumed to be present in all liquid oxygen or cold gaseous
oxygen systems, it is important to have a clear understanding of any potential ignition sources and
mechanisms present in the system as well as good knowledge of the flammability properties of the
materials present in the valve.
A risk assessment and oxygen hazard analysis shall be carried out by personnel with knowledge and
training in the field of oxygen compatibility and familiarity with relevant CGA, EIGA, AIGA, American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), and other applicable standards. This assessment shall be
done for a defined valve model. If this model is used again for the same process applications, the
assessment does not need to be repeated unless the design has changed.
The risk assessment should consider that active ignition mechanisms can occur due to inadvertent
causes (for example, failure to remove or prevent contamination) and can be different between steady
state operation and transient conditions or process upsets, including those in which gaseous oxygen
can be present.
An oxygen hazard analysis is a method used to evaluate the risk of fire in an oxygen system. It
assesses the probability of ignition or consequence of ignition (ignition versus sustained burning
based on operating conditions). It can be used to select materials for new designs or to evaluate the
compatibility of materials in existing valves. In general, acceptance criteria for materials in a given
application depend on two key factors, ignitability and flammability. Various processes for oxygen
hazard analysis have been published over the years with different steps to assess the probability of
ignition and sustained combustion.
The oxygen hazard analysis process includes the following steps as shown in Figure 1.
a) Assemble required information and resources:
• Application conditions (oxygen concentration, pressure, temperature, etc.) with particular
attention to transient conditions (i.e., cooldown) and worst-case scenarios (for example, valve
failure) of the oxygen system in which the valves are used;
• References of valves used in similar operating conditions (see 13.1.2);
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• Assembly and component drawings, materials of construction, and flammability data for
materials;
• Procedures used during manufacturing, cleaning, installation, operation, and maintenance;
and
• Experienced personnel/team familiar with relevant industrial guidelines (CGA, EIGA, AIGA,
ASTM, and other applicable standards).
b) Evaluate the flammability of materials in application pressure and minimal cross sectional
thickness.
c) Evaluate probability of ignition based upon contributing factors present:
• Review potential for contamination;
• Review type and location of non-metals;
• Review type and location of metal trim and determine location of thin sections on trim and
valve body/bonnet;
• Assess and document location of potential ignition mechanisms (such as friction, mechanical
impact) and possible kindling chain, particularly with respect to location of non-metals and thin
metal sections; and
• Consider operational history of existing valve models under known operating conditions for
example, stainless steel valves in customer station applications.
d) Evaluate potential consequences of a fire on personnel, equipment, and operations.
e) Identify mitigation steps to reduce probability of ignition or eliminate or mitigate risk of
ignition/kindling chain and hazards to personnel, equipment, and operation. These steps include:
• Ensure the design and manufacturing process allows for cleaning of all components to the
required specifications;
• Avoid the use of lubricants where possible. Where lubricants are used, ensure they are
compatible in oxygen service (see 6.4);
• Eliminate or minimize mass of non-metal component(s);
• Use non-metals with a higher auto ignition temperature (AIT), higher mechanical impact
resistance, and lower heat of combustion;
• Use burn-resistant alloys suitable for the operating conditions;
• Design so metal components are at a thickness that is burn resistant and suitable for the
operating conditions;
• Design to protect non-metals by avoiding contact with direct flow;
• Design to protect exposed non-metals by encapsulating in metal as much as possible;
• Change operating parameters for transient/worst-case scenarios; or
• Mitigate consequences by using barriers or isolating the component from personnel.
f) Document results of oxygen hazard analysis, including specific design drawings, bill of materials,
cleaning documents and certifications, recommendations, resulting design and/or process
changes, hazards identified, and mitigation steps.
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The most common ignition mechanisms (thermal energy sources) are the result of improper system or
component cleaning, improper operation, or improper maintenance. System parameters such as
oxygen concentration, pressure, gas velocity, and temperature are factors influencing ignition
mechanisms and propensity for material ignition and combustion.
In a kindling chain, an easily ignitable material ignites (such as contamination in the system or a non-
metallic component) and the energy released from this combustion ignites a more ignition resistant
material, which in turn ignites an even more ignition resistant material (such as a metallic component).
The kindling chain process is a function of each material’s inherent minimum ignition energy
requirement, heat of combustion, and heat transfer (thermal conductivity) characteristics. The
combustion propagation rate of a material, once ignited, becomes a factor of its chemical composition
and physical and mechanical properties including thickness and surface area to mass ratio. The
kindling chain is minimized by ensuring the system is cleaned for oxygen requirements and that the
metals and non-metals present have a low probability for ignition and combustion propagation, if
ignited (see AIGA 021, Oxygen pipeline and piping systems) [3]. Design features such as heat sinks
and fire stops can also help mitigate ignition and combustion propagation via efficient heat transfer
mechanism.
Figure 2 is a representation of a generic kindling chain showing successive ignition and combustion
from what typically are the easiest to most difficult to ignite components in a valve. The energy gap
shown can be defined as the difference in the maximum baseline thermal energy generated during
operation and the thermal energy required to ignite the most flammable component or contaminant, if
present. Also, shown in Figure 2 are example strategies and approaches for two risk mitigation
methods that can be used in conjunction with one another. These are:
• Reduce the probability of ignition by eliminating ignition mechanisms where possible; and
• Increase the burn resistance of valve components in order to disrupt successive
ignition/combustion (i.e., break the kindling chain) to both decrease the probability of metal
combustion and impact severity of an event in a valve.
Contamination is a common link in the kindling chain. Contamination sources include but are not
limited to:
• dirt, debris, particles, hydrocarbons (hydrocarbon lubricants, machining oils, etc.), entering a valve
during assembly or maintenance;
• residues such as cleaning agents, dirt, or debris remaining in a valve due to improper cleaning;
• lubricants or thread sealants that migrate into the oxygen wetted area from threads or from
accessories such as actuators and gearboxes;
• contaminated compatible lubricant (metallic particles and hydrocarbons);
• metallic flakes and particles formed during assembly;
• particulates originating from breakdown of seals, valve friction, shearing metal pieces, cavitation,
degradation of non-metallic components, and migration of impurities from gaskets, packing, and
seat material;
• items accidentally dropped into the system by personnel; and
• environmental contamination from improper, unprotected storage.
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Frictional heating can occur between stationary and moving parts, that is with relative motion, and can
occur with both metallic and/or non-metallic materials. This can be due to poor design or when gaps
or clearances become reduced during operation. This can also produce particles. Frictional heating is
a consequence of surface finish, shape, ability to dissipate heat, size, and valve type. Frictional
heating is one of the most active ignition mechanisms in cold oxygen systems and this grows as pipe
diameters or pressures increase.
Particle impact is considered an unlikely ignition mechanism in liquid oxygen. Although some high
pressure gaseous oxygen incidents have been attributed to particle impact, there are no known liquid
oxygen incidents that have been attributed to particle impact. The main barriers to ignition by particle
impact are low velocities in liquid oxygen and the low operating temperature. In addition, credit may
be taken in systems where any particles in the liquid oxygen are removed. For example, by pump inlet
filters leaving the pressurized cold oxygen systems particle-free. Therefore, particle impact is more of
a hazard for cold gaseous oxygen.
During transient conditions, such as the cooling down or warming up of a cold oxygen system or
during upset conditions, vaporized oxygen is present in the system. In this case, potentially flammable
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particulate contamination can ignite and kindle target metals by impingement at high gaseous oxygen
velocities.
Heat is generated from the transfer of kinetic energy as a result of a single or repeated impact of non-
metal or metal resulting from vibration, a quick closing valve, or a chattering check or relief valve. This
mechanism was identified as the energy source for many liquid oxygen incidents including when two-
phase conditions were present leading to the ignition of non-metallic materials used for valve seats or
seals. Direct mechanical impact on bulk metal alone is not considered to be credible for ignition of
most metals.
By their nature, liquid oxygen systems face the additional risk of hydrocarbon accumulation wherever
boiling of liquid oxygen occurs. However, this ignition mechanism is more related to process and
system design and not directly related to cold oxygen valves.
Heat is generated when a gas is rapidly compressed from low pressure to high pressure. Ignition by
adiabatic compression is usually considered as non-active in liquid oxygen. It can be active in
transient conditions such as the cooldown or warm-up sequence of a cold oxygen system. This can be
sufficient to reach the AIT of non-metallic materials and organic contaminants directly exposed to the
adiabatic compression and to ignite these materials. This ignition mechanism is more relevant with
quick opening valves.
Electrical arcing from a power source with sufficient energy to ignite the material receiving the arc-
lightning strikes and electrical surge of non-grounded system could cause ignition when it arcs to a
metallic flammable material.
Ignition can occur when a static charge discharges with enough energy to ignite the material receiving
the discharge or exposed to the discharge energy. Static discharge is more likely to occur in a dry
environment, which is the case in cold oxygen systems.
The following factors in combination with ignition mechanisms in 5.1 can influence the probability
and/or severity of an incident:
• Personnel exposure in the immediate vicinity of a cold system when started, shut down, or in
operation;
• Oxygen leak leading to upset conditions (for example, oxygen enrichment, dry boiling, and high
velocity);
• Rapid vaporization/flashing, cavitation;
• Mechanical failure/rupture of a component of a valve;
• Excessive vibration resulting from incorrect internal valve clearances, improper assembly, or
excessive piping loads;
• Contamination of any kind (that can be present or introduced into the system) due to inadequate
cleaning, residual contamination from cleaning agents/cleaning process, contaminated soft goods
and/or lubricants, post cleaning testing such as hydro testing, packaging, site assembly, and
maintenance procedures;
• Mechanical stress due to sudden temperature changes;
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6 Material selection
The information from the publications referred to in this section should be used to apply the burn
resistant method as shown in Figure 2.
The metallic material shall be suitable for the mechanical service including resistance to cold
embrittlement.
The ability to ignite and sustain combustion of metallic components in any given oxygen application is
a function of several process and design related factors including, but not limited to:
• concentration, pressure, velocity, and temperature of the oxygen;
• component geometry and dimensions;
• ignitability and combustion characteristics of the metal itself;
• close proximity to non-metals (one possibility for the presence of an ignition mechanism and
kindling chain from non-metal to metal); and
• ignition mechanisms likely to be present.
Metal properties and conditions affecting potential ignitability and flammability include:
• thermal conductivity;
• heat of combustion;
• mass and its geometry (thick versus thin);
• oxygen concentration and pressure;
• presence of gaseous versus liquid oxygen; and
• flow conditions before and after ignition.
Typical metallic materials for cold oxygen valve components, where ignition mechanisms are present,
include:
• brass;
2
• bronze;
• cobalt alloys;
• copper and copper alloys;
• copper nickel alloys;
• nickel and nickel alloys; and
• austenitic stainless steels.
Other base material alloys may be used for valve bodies in low purity or low pressure oxygen
applications; however, specific knowledge and expertise are required for the use of other base
material alloys.
2
Aluminium bronze is not typically used. See AIGA 021 [3].
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ASTM G94, Standard Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service provides guidance for selecting
metallic materials for oxygen service [4]. Some of the data listed in ASTM G94 are based on ASTM
G124, Standard Test Method for Determining the Combustion Behavior of Metallic Materials in
Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres, which provides a test method for comparing the flammability
characteristics of metallic materials in gaseous oxygen [4, 5]. In this test, sample rods of a metal are
intentionally ignited at a specific oxygen concentration, temperature, and pressure and then compared
against burn/no-burn criteria. The test can also be used to show the relative flammability
characteristics of a specific metal at different thicknesses.
However, the ASTM G124 test method does not provide criteria for relating the data to the suitability
of a metal for use in any specific oxygen application (i.e., warm or cold oxygen), or design
configuration [5]. The data does provide a useful basis for selecting metallic materials based on their
relative flammability behaviour in gaseous oxygen, in the event any ignition mechanism becomes
active.
NOTE—Based on the thermal energy required to raise a metal’s temperature to its ignition
temperature, the local environment around the ignition point is likely to become gaseous oxygen. If
combustion occurs and continues, the burning region is also likely to remain in gaseous oxygen due to
the combustion energy release rapidly vaporizing the surrounding liquid oxygen.
ASTM G124 data can provide some guidance in alloy selection from a combustion propagation
standpoint based on test conditions in warm gaseous oxygen [5]. ASTM G124 test data should be
carefully considered if used as a reference for metallic material evaluation for cold oxygen applications
[5]. First and foremost, it is imperative that selection of suitable metallic materials for cold oxygen
applications take into account the function of the valve and the mechanical properties required for
valve components for the specific cryogenic application.
Operating in liquid oxygen service provides an additional safety margin against ignition due to
cryogenic temperatures compared to cold gaseous oxygen service.
Non-metallic materials are widely used for bonnet gaskets, valve seats, seals, valve packing, and
similar components of valves to reduce friction and to minimize gas or liquid leakage. Many non-
metals are flammable in cold gaseous oxygen or in liquid oxygen even at low temperature and low
pressure and concentrations greater than 23.5%. The main factors affecting their ignition and fire
propagation are the pressure, temperature, and oxygen concentration.
In a kindling chain, the non-metallic component is often the link that promotes the ignition of the
metallic material just adjacent and in intimate contact with it. Therefore, the heat of combustion of the
non-metal component and its mass are important parameters to consider.
The suitability of any non-metallic material shall be evaluated for the full design temperature and
pressure ranges.
Precautions shall be taken to avoid contamination during the manufacturing process of non-metallic
materials. Contamination can be introduced from high pressure hydraulic systems or other machining
processes. Changes in materials used during the manufacturing process shall be evaluated before
use to ensure new hazards are not introduced.
The following steps shall be considered and confirmed by the valve manufacturer for valves
containing non-metallic materials:
• Minimize the quantity of non-metals used;
• Evaluate possible ignition with kindling chain and take account of heat dissipation in the design by
embedding the non-metallic part in an adequate mass of burn resistant metal (where necessary)
that will act as a heat sink;
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• Avoid locating non-metals directly in the gaseous or liquid oxygen stream, where possible; and
• Prevent excessive friction or mechanical impact of the non-metallic component.
There is no defined pressure threshold above which non-metallic components are no longer allowed.
However, the greater the pressure is, the more caution is required for the use of non-metallic
materials. Data for mechanical impact tests are only published for liquid oxygen at ambient pressure.
The consistency of composition of non-metallic components can vary especially for plastics,
elastomers, and compound material.
The selection of non-metallic materials for valves requires two steps. First, verify the mechanical and
chemical suitability, flexibility, etc., (other than oxygen compatibility) of selected non-metallic material
based on design and operating conditions (including transient conditions). Second, determine the
ignitability and burn resistance of the material in cold oxygen. This can include AIT, mechanical impact
test in liquid oxygen, and minimum pressure leading to ignition by adiabatic compression if the non-
metallic material can be exposed to adiabatic compression and energy released when burning (heat
of combustion).
In practice, it is usual to consider a minimum AIT of 300 °C (572 °F) at a minimum test pressure of
103 bara (1500 psia) according to ASTM G72, Standard Test Method for Autogenous Ignition
Temperature of Liquids and Solids in a High-Pressure Oxygen-Enriched Environment or at 120 bara
according to EN 1797, Cryogenic vessels. Gas/material compatibility or ISO 21010, Cryogenic
vessels. Gas/material compatibility [6, 7, 8].
For valves operating in liquid oxygen service, the non-metallic material shall pass a mechanical impact
test in liquid oxygen. For more information concerning test methods and list of non-metallic materials,
see ASTM G63, ASTM G72, EN 1797, ISO 21010 , M034-1, List of nonmetallic materials by BAM
Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing, ASTM G86, Standard Test Method for
Determining Ignition Sensitivity of Materials to Mechanical Impact in Ambient Liquid Oxygen and
Pressurized Liquid and Gaseous Oxygen Environments, and ASTM D2512, Standard Test Method for
Compatibility of Materials with Liquid Oxygen (Impact Sensitivity Threshold and Pass-Fail Techniques)
[1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. The test and appropriate test report shall be completed by a referenced
3
laboratory according to International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Federal Institute for
Materials Research and Testing (BAM), or ASTM standards. Existing and valid test reports can be
used if the type and origin of the non-metallic material have been verified. Special consideration shall
be given if only the base material has been tested and not the final product configuration (for example,
braided packing). Although a base material could have been successfully tested, it might not pass the
test when fabricated into the final product configuration.
All valve components which are subjected to cold oxygen (i.e., wetted or in the flow path) shall be
designed to function without lubrication between moving parts. Valve components that are exposed to
oxygen (for example, seat, stem, and plug) should be designed for assembly and workshop testing
without any lubrication being required. In specific cases where lubricants and locking compounds are
required for assembly, their use and type shall be approved by the valve specifier and the amount
shall be minimized. Removal of lubricants after assembling may not be possible. The type and
location of lubricant and locking compounds used shall be indicated on the valve drawing.
Oil lubricants are very difficult to contain because of their low viscosity. They can migrate along the
stem of a valve through valve packing, tight clearances, and through seals including valve stem
extensions for cryogenic service. Lubricants and greases suitable for oxygen service are generally
halogenated chlorotrifluoroethylene (CTFE) and perfluoropolyether (PFPE) fluids, which are thickened
with silicon oxide or polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE). Many oxygen-compatible lubricants are
hydrophilic and provide no corrosion protection as compared to hydrocarbon-based lubricants.
Experience and testing have demonstrated that oxygen compatible greases do not provide the same
level of lubrication as hydrocarbon-based greases. Many failures have occurred due to corrosion
3
Examples include CTE (Air Liquide Blanc-Mesnil, France), BAM (Berlin, Germany) and WHA International, Inc. (Las
Cruces, NM, USA)
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caused by the atmospheric moisture. It should be noted that in cryogenic conditions lubricants are
likely to freeze and cement valve parts together.
A lubricant or locking compound is considered as compatible for use for valves if the following
conditions are met:
• AIT greater than or equal to 400 °C at the maximum operating pressure in gaseous oxygen or at
103 bara in case the maximum operating pressure is lower than 120 bar;
• The lubricants pass the mechanical impact test in liquid oxygen at ambient pressure, as
determined by an acceptable test method (for example, by ASTM G86 or ASTM D2512 [10, 11]);
and
• The lubricant passes a pneumatic impact test in gaseous oxygen at a test pressure of at least
50 bar greater than the maximum operating temperature, as determined by an acceptable test
method (for example ASTM G74, Standard Test Method for Ignition Sensitivity of Nonmetallic
Materials and Components by Gaseous Fluid Impact [12]).
NOTE—Even minor contamination of an oxygen compatible lubricant (for example, hydrocarbons, dust, metal
particles, or chips) can significantly reduce the ignition resistance of the lubricant.
Gearboxes typically have hydrocarbon grease as the lubricant. Design features shall ensure that
oxygen leakage cannot come into contact with hydrocarbon lubricants and that hydrocarbon lubricants
cannot migrate into the oxygen wetted area. When this cannot be ensured, tested oxygen compatible
lubricants shall be used.
Assessment of lubrication migration from the gearbox is especially important for valve design where
part of the stem is exposed to the internal oxygen because of rising stem movement, for example,
globe and gate valves. The motion of the stem during operation increases the risk of external
contamination such as hydrocarbon greases to be transported through the packing of the valve over
multiple operations (see 5.1.1, 7.2.4.3, and 7.2.4.4).
The risk of this type of migration shall be considered based on maximum environmental temperatures
that could decrease the viscosity of the grease and increase the probability of migration along the
valve stem.
7 Design philosophy
The safe design and operation of a cold oxygen system depends on various factors that can influence
each other. This section describes the principal hazards associated with cold oxygen systems and the
manner in which these hazards can be minimized by good design practices.
An oxygen hazard analysis of valves as described in 4.3 shall be followed for the given valve
operating range and model. Results of such an analysis shall be documented and re-assessed if the
operating range or valve model changes. This analysis can be reflected in company standards and
procedures. All the design principles described assume sufficient cleanliness as described in Section
8.
The design of all parts shall allow for an approved cleaning process (see Section 8).
7.2.1 General
Valves shall be manufactured in accordance with this publication and for the specified oxygen valve
applications. Materials of construction and the physical design of the valve shall be selected
considering all the normal, maximum, and upset operating conditions as well as startup and shutdown
conditions to which the valve can be subjected.
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The valve specifier shall provide specifications and perform a design review. The valve manufacturer
shall make available the design documentation (for example, drawings, bill of materials, material test
reports, etc.) to accomplish the review. Components within the flow stream shall meet the following
requirements.
If the valve has an integral metallic seat, any hard-facing coatings shall be in accordance with 7.2.5.
All parts of the valve shall be designed to allow disassembly for oxygen cleaning.
Anti-static features to limit static electricity accumulation as well as electrical continuity through the
valve shall be integrated into the design.
The valve should be designed with stem extension, where necessary, so the gland packing remains at
ambient temperature while in operation to prevent oxygen leakage. To allow for good insulation, the
radial clearance between valve stem and extension tube shall be minimized.
The assembly of the valve stem into the bonnet and bonnet extension can scratch the surface finish of
the valve stem. Scratches on the valve stem can influence sealing ability and can increase the risk of
contaminant migration, especially for rising stems, for example, gate and globe valves. The internal
shoulders of the bonnet, bonnet extension, packing gland, etc., shall avoid sharp edges and be
deburred to reduce the risk of stem scratching.
Testing (for example, long term cycle testing, leak testing, etc.) may be specified for new
valves/designs that have not been previously qualified in liquid cryogenic service. Test procedures
shall be agreed upon between the specifier and the manufacturer.
Where used, stem bearings (radial/axial) that are exposed to the flow stream or wetted shall meet the
mechanical wear resistance requirements of the valve design to reduce ignition potential caused by
mechanical overstressing or friction from parts physically rubbing or galling.
Internal metallic components can contribute to kindling and act as a fuel; so, specific characteristics
such as burn resistance and heat of combustion of the metallic materials are key factors. There are
two basic approaches that can be used in tandem to help reduce the risk of an ignition/combustion
event inside a valve.
• Minimize the energy available to promote and kindle non-metal-to-metal and direct metal ignition
combustion. This includes cleaning, minimal use of non-metals, minimal use of thin components,
parts using best evaluated non-metallic materials in terms of oxygen index, AIT, heat of
combustion, electrical continuity, internal metallic components selection regarding minimum
thickness, and avoiding thin sections on pressure containing parts; or
• Maximize the energy threshold needed for ignition combustion of internal metallic components
and pressure containing parts (valve body). In practice, this involves the use of metallic
components whose chemistry and geometry (surface area to mass) are considered burn resistant
for specific service conditions (oxygen concentration, pressure, and temperature).
Isolation valves are designed to operate in either the fully closed or the fully open position but never in
a throttling mode. Customer station isolation valves are typically used in throttling service (see 7.2.3).
If the operating pressure is greater than 3 bar, they shall only be operated with a differential pressure
of less than or equal to 0.3 bar unless designed for throttling service or an oxygen hazard analysis
and risk assessment is carried out.
In cold oxygen service, particularly during system cooldown and startup, isolation valves opened with
a high differential pressure across the seat can experience:
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• high velocity and turbulence through the valve during its opening, possibly resulting in cavitation
or two phase condition;
• frictional heating and/or mechanical impact of internal components due to severe vibration; or
• rapid downstream pressurization and possible temperature rise due to adiabatic compression.
Valve tightness is applicable in one direction only. The installation direction should be indicated on the
valve body, process and instrument diagrams (P&ID), and/or piping assembly drawings. The leak
tightness of the valve shall be type tested at cryogenic temperatures.
Valves that operate at differential pressures and can be operated in all positions between fully closed
and fully open are regarded as throttling valves. In general, valves used on customer station tanks
and similar liquid storage tanks are called isolation valves but are designed for throttling service.
Throttling valves shall follow the burn resistance method for material selection (Section 6) as these
can be subject to high differential pressures and high velocities resulting in a higher risk potential for
ignition.
Throttling valves can be automated or manually operated and include those used for pressure control,
flow control, and bypass valves. These normally include globe, eccentric plug butterfly, ball valves,
and regulators.
Other examples of throttling valves include vent valves, bleed valves, pressure relief valves, drain
valves, and other valves operated under high differential pressures.
For cold oxygen systems operating at pressures greater than 3 bar, a bypass system shall be installed
for each isolation valve unless the isolation valve is designed for throttling service or operating
procedures can be used to equalize pressure (within 0.3 bar) across the isolation valve before
opening. A bypass system is normally piped from immediately upstream to immediately downstream
of an isolation valve. A bypass system is used to slowly pressurize upstream or downstream piping
system to mitigate risks associated with the excessive mechanical loading on the isolation valve, high
fluid velocity and rapid pressurization.
In addition, the bypass system should be designed so that vibrations are minimised as flow induced
vibration can be a source of ignition.
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Emergency shutoff valves are usually automated, operate in the fully open position, and are normally
closed only in the event of an emergency. The valve can experience momentary high velocities, high
mechanical load, and turbulence during closing. Emergency shutoff valves shall be treated as
throttling valves and are normally of butterfly, globe, or ball type.
Vent and drain valves can experience high velocity and impingement and are usually treated as
throttling valves. Because these valves can operate in warm gaseous oxygen or cold oxygen, an
oxygen hazard analysis and risk assessment shall be performed to determine if the valves should
follow this publication’s material selection method or be designed as part of a warm gaseous oxygen
system (see AIGA 021 [3]).
When fully open, ball valves operate with the ball out of the flow stream. When this valve is partly
open, thin edges of the ball are exposed to the flow stream. See Figures 1 and 2 for material
selection.
Ball valves are inherently quick opening, which leads to concerns about adiabatic compression and
temperature rise, especially for any elastomers downstream in the piping system. Ball valves may be
equipped with gear operators to ensure slow opening. Ball surfaces should not be plated as the
plating can scrape off and create an ignition source. Welded overlays or coatings should be used
instead of plating. Overlay or coating of ball surfaces shall comply with 7.2.5. In addition, ball valves
shall be designed with internal pressure relieving features to avoid pressure build up from liquid or
cold gaseous oxygen trapped in the ball cavity. Bidirectional isolation design shall not be specified
since it compromises the internal pressure relieving feature.
When open, butterfly valves operate with the valve disk in the flow stream.
In case of reverse flow, the seat groove can become a thin part in the flow stream area and needs to
follow the described burn resistance method. See Figure 2 for selection and design of internal metallic
parts.
The shaft to bonnet or shaft to body bearing/bushing should be a metallic design and shall be
designed to meet the mechanical requirements at maximum pressure differential across the valve
disk.
Butterfly valves are inherently quick opening, which leads to concerns about adiabatic compression
and temperature rise, especially for any elastomers downstream in the piping system. Butterfly valves
may be equipped with gear operators to ensure slow opening.
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Gate valves shall not be used as throttling valves for cold oxygen applications. In a limited pressure
and size range typically found on customer station tanks, gate valves have been successfully used in
throttling service and may be used provided they meet the requirements in 7.2.3. An internal pressure
relieving feature shall be provided if necessary to avoid pressure buildup from liquid trapped between
the wedge and the body.
Pressure equalization shall be established between the inlet and outlet of a process gate valve prior to
opening.
The shaft to bonnet bearing/bushing should be a metallic design and shall be designed to meet the
mechanical requirements at maximum pressure differential across the valve wedge.
Gate valves shall be metallic seated with a soft or metallic seal according to application and tightness
requirements. The integral metal seat and seal material (if any) shall meet the specific metallic
material selection criteria.
Gate valves designed with part of the stem wetted by oxygen when closed and exposed to the
external environment when open, should be reviewed for risk of external contaminant migration
through the stem seals (for example, packing).
Globe valves are commonly used in cold oxygen on-off (open-closed) or throttling applications and
can be manual or automated. The trim design varies with specific valve manufacturers but it can have
a relatively thin section fitted with non-metallic inserts to minimize leakage. Sometimes, for high
differential pressures, cage trims are used that are usually of thin section and provide sites for debris
to be trapped and create friction. In this case, the trim of the globe valve shall be designed for a higher
burn resistance.
Globe valves designed with part of the stem wetted by oxygen when closed and exposed to the
external environment when open, should be reviewed for risk of external contaminant migration
through the stem seals (for example, packing).
Pressure relief valves in cold oxygen service will experience warm gaseous relief during initial opening
and high velocities across the trim. There will be impingement on the exhaust part of the housing and
outlet piping although these areas are normally at or close to atmospheric pressure. The sizing of the
trim and the valve inlet determines the gas velocity at the valve inlet. Specific metallic material
selection as described in Section 6 can be used for both nozzle and poppet trim, which are considered
impingement sites unless other mitigating measures are in place. Ignition can also occur due to
mechanical issues such as chattering.
If particles are present, there will be impingement on the exhaust part of the housing and outlet piping.
When performing an oxygen hazard analysis and risk assessment on pressure relief valves, the
potential for contamination, plugging, or backpressure of the exhaust vent shall be considered under
all expected operating conditions.
For pilot operated pressure relief valves, the pilot valve is exposed to oxygen and shall be designed
accordingly.
Check valves contain components that are always in the flow stream and can be subjected to
mechanical impact. The material selection of the disk, plate, piston, hinge, or spring of a check valve
shall be evaluated according to the material selection process in Section 6. The components of check
valves are designed to impact with each other and shall be considered as potential sources of ignition
energy.
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The internals of the valve should avoid using small components. Check valves should be sized,
selected, and installed to minimize chatter.
Facings such as welded overlay with hardening and/or burn resistant metallic material coating are
acceptable.
The material of welded overlay, metallic coating, and the final metallurgical bonding shall meet the
expected operating conditions. The factors to be considered include the thickness and burn resistance
of a coating, plating, or welded overlay, and its adherence to the substrate. In the case of coatings
and platings, the hazard is disintegration and particle generation that can result in contamination of
the oxygen flow stream and/or reduced burn resistance. Overlay welding and/or metallic coating shall
be agreed upon between the valve manufacturer and valve specifier.
The valve manufacturer shall specify the type and location of the lubricant used for external
equipment requiring lubrication such as gear operator or hand lever. The actuators and gearbox shall
be designed to prevent lubricant leakage and subsequent migration to the process. For example, this
can be done by providing a sealed gearbox and a distance piece open to the atmosphere. If the stem
is mounted vertically or at an angle towards the valve, ensure that a device such as a deflector plate is
used to prevent leakage down the stem into the packing area.
In rare cases, oxygen can be used as an instrument gas supply. These systems have specific design
requirements due to the presence of oxygen. The instrumentation materials such as volume booster
or quick exhaust and actuator materials shall follow the oxygen material selection guide lines defined
by AIGA 021 [3].
In addition to good design and material selection for the valves used in cold oxygen service, organic
and inorganic contaminants including oils, greases, thread lubricants, fibres, rust, dirt, filings, and
other foreign material shall be removed from the valves and the associated piping. This is in order to
reduce risks of ignition and combustion propagation. See CGA G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen
Service and AIGA 012, Cleaning of equipment for oxygen service for guidance on oxygen service
cleaning [13, 14].
Valves shall either be specified or purchased cleaned for oxygen service, or cleaned before use
applying a process approved by the valve specifier. When specified and purchased as cleaned for
oxygen service, this requirement shall appear on all purchase orders for the valves. The
manufacturer’s or third-party vendor’s cleaning procedure, cleaning agent specified, and the quality
control procedure shall be reviewed and accepted by the valve specifier. The valve specifier shall
ensure initial and periodic inspections and audits of the manufacturer’s/third-party vendor’s facilities
including the cleaning and quality control procedures. The cleaning process shall be qualified for each
valve type.
The cleaning strategy is an essential part of valve manufacturer qualification (see 13.1.2).
The geometry of the valves to be cleaned shall be considered while selecting a cleaning method so
that cleaning, rinsing, purging, and drying can be planned to ensure that all surfaces are cleaned and
any cleaning agent residue is completely removed. The valve manufacturing and machining
processes shall be so the required cleanliness can be achieved. Machining chips, burrs, etc. shall be
eliminated. In addition to cleaning the normally oxygen wetted surfaces of a valve, other areas of the
valve that could come into contact with oxygen in case of damage to the valve internals shall also be
cleaned for oxygen service. As it is often difficult to ensure adequate cleaning of inaccessible areas of
the valves, individual valve components shall be cleaned before assembly. Care shall be taken to
ensure valve parts are not contaminated during assembly.
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The use of solvents as cleaning agents is an alternative to aqueous cleaning agents. Some solvents
are incompatible with non-metallic parts of the valve such as the valve seat. Some solvents can be
absorbed by the non-metallic materials and render a compatible material non-compatible and create a
flammability hazard. Properties of the non-metallic parts can also change leading to problems such as
valve leaks. These shall be considered when selecting the solvent.
If the valves need to be cleaned in the field, for example after maintenance, the valves shall be
cleaned by trained and qualified personnel. Contractors cleaning valves shall be qualified by the valve
specifier for oxygen cleaning. Care shall be taken on those parts of the valves with hidden cavities or
areas inaccessible for inspection. Precautions described in this section shall be followed during field
cleaning of the valves.
All cleaning inspection and assembly activities until packing, including activities in the field, shall take
place in a designated area for clean work.
Regardless of the cleaning method used, inspection to verify and document cleanliness is required.
Cleaned parts and/or valves shall be inspected by qualified personnel. Failure to pass inspection
requires recleaning and re-inspection. It should be noted that some contaminants do not fluoresce
under ultraviolet light and cannot be detected during inspection using ultraviolet light. See CGA G-4.1
and AIGA 012 for guidance on inspection procedures [13, 14].
Recleaning activities usually require the disassembly of the valve and can require a return to the
manufacturer.
A valve is considered to be clean for oxygen service when organic, inorganic, and particulate
contamination have been removed to the level specified. See CGA G-4.1, AIGA 012, ISO 23208,
Cryogenic vessels—Cleanliness for cryogenic service, and ASTM G93, Standard practice for
cleaning methods and cleanliness levels for material and equipment used in oxygen-enriched
environments, for guidance on threshold detection limits and cleanliness acceptance criteria [13, 14,
15, 16].
Once a valve or part has been cleaned and inspected, it shall either be used immediately or packaged
and labelled to prevent recontamination during storage, transportation, and prior to installation and
commissioning.
Care shall be taken to ensure that cleaned parts are not recontaminated during assembly or
packaging once they have passed inspection. Tools used for assembly or installation shall be cleaned
to prevent them from contaminating the parts. If there is any question regarding cleanliness,
inspection of the valve is required and cleaning carried out, if necessary.
Parts and/or valves that are not immediately used after cleaning and inspection shall be sealed in
new, clean plastic bags or appropriate containers. Individual pieces should be packed in separate
bags. Precautions to be taken include:
• New plastic sheeting may be used on valves in place of separate bags, as necessary;
• Protective covering shall not leave a residue;
• Openings on valves shall be sealed with clean caps, plugs, or blind flanges;
• Small valves, parts, gaskets, fittings, etc., shall be packed or bagged in plastic bags and sealed
for protection from contamination;
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• Do not use any adhesives on oxygen valves. The adhesive in waterproof cloth (duct tape) is not
oxygen compatible and is difficult to remove; and
• All protective caps, plugs, blinds, and other packaging shall be kept in place until final assembly or
installation.
Packaged parts cleaned for oxygen service shall be labelled as “CLEANED FOR OXYGEN SERVICE”
and should indicate the number of desiccant bags, if any, that have been put inside the packaging.
The number of desiccant bags indicated on the label shall be removed before installation of the valve
or part.
Valves or parts in damaged or opened packages or having illegible labels shall be re-inspected and
recleaned if necessary.
Oxygen service cleaned valves and parts shall be stored in an area designated for oxygen service
cleaned parts. These shall be segregated from valves and parts that have not been cleaned for
oxygen service.
8.5 Records
Records of oxygen service cleaning inspections shall be made available to the valve specifier by the
valve manufacturer or the third-party cleaning vendor. When a valve is cleaned in the field, the
contractor responsible for the cleaning shall prepare and submit records to the owner. When cleaned
by qualified owner personnel, they shall follow internal company policy and procedures. See CGA G-
4.1 and AIGA 012 for guidance on record keeping [13, 14].
9 Site installation
Cold oxygen piping and piping components shall be cleaned for oxygen service before installation and
cleanliness shall be maintained thereafter. If any contamination occurs during installation, recleaning
and inspection are required. Care shall be taken that all traces of the cleaning agent have been
removed from the system as the cleaning agent could have accumulated at low points and dead ends.
Piping system installation shall be carried out by contractors approved in their particular discipline (for
example, mechanical, civil, instrumentation) in accordance with the design drawings and
specifications. Procedures in accordance with the work instructions of the manufacturer shall be made
available to technicians and supervisors.
Valves cleaned for oxygen service shall be installed in the clean piping system. Blowing out of the
system can occur after the valves are installed. The geometry of the valves shall be reviewed to
ensure that particles remaining in the piping cannot accumulate in cavities inside the valve during the
blowing operation. For example, valves with cages can trap the particles being blown out. Such valves
should be installed only after completing the blowing operation or recleaned after completing the
blowing operation. Alternatively, valve internal components can be removed during the blowing
operation provided oxygen cleanliness is maintained and verified before their re-installation.
Valves shall be installed in the correct direction. Directional arrow markings are typically present on
the valve body or stem. It is not always obvious to the valve installer(s) whether the arrow indicates
the direction of normal flow or the direction of pressure against which the valve shall seal when in the
closed position. This can be opposite of the normal flow direction. The directional arrows shall be
interpreted by the construction supervisor(s) (for example, from piping isometrics or P&ID). This
information shall be provided to the installer(s).
Liquid oxygen valves shall be installed with the stem having at least a minimum slope of 15º upwards
from the horizontal orientation with the valve body at the lowest point. The valves shall not be installed
with the stem in the horizontal orientation to prevent accumulation of hydrocarbons in the valve due to
dry boiling of liquid oxygen. Trycock valves may be regarded as gas valves.
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10 Operations
10.1 Personnel
In addition to being trained in work safety knowledge, personnel who operate and maintain oxygen
systems shall also have specific training and understanding of oxygen safety requirements (see
Section 12).
All the relevant operating and safety procedures shall be available to operations personnel.
Subcontractor’s personnel shall be informed about, and have access to all the relevant safety
information.
Operations personnel shall work with clean hands and work clothing (uncontaminated by oil, grease,
or dirt). Items contaminated when used for other services such as automotive maintenance or fuelling
shall not be used in oxygen service (for example, clothing and gloves).
Operational personnel shall receive instructions about the use of isolation, drain, and vent valves to prevent
inappropriate use.
Isolation, drain, or vent valves that are not designed to be opened with high differential pressures in
oxygen service that could be opened by mistake shall be labelled with a warning sign prohibiting
opening under high pressure. A lockout/tagout (LOTO) process should be in place for these valves.
An operating procedure shall be in place that gives guidance to the operator should they observe the
following phenomena of pressure relief valves in liquid oxygen systems:
• chattering/vibration;
• icing up; and
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• leakage.
Operating procedures shall define how to pressurize piping systems to avoid excessive mechanical
loading or unacceptable temperature increase due to adiabatic compression (see Section 5).
Provisions shall be made for determining the pressure difference across isolation valves regardless
whether locally or remotely controlled.
An operator site walk should include checks for any leaking valves. See Section 11 for safety
precautions to be taken when dealing with leaks.
External leaks from liquid oxygen valves (seals or outlet piping) should be stopped as soon as
possible to prevent damage to the surrounding equipment and surfaces by cryogenic fluids and
possible oxygen- enrichment hazards in the immediate surroundings.
An internally leaking (passing) valve can also result in hydrocarbon accumulation due to continuous
dry boiling within the valve or piping. This accumulation can lead to violent energy release and
corrective action should be undertaken to resolve this situation (see Section 5). This also applies to a
non-leaking dead end liquid oxygen valve that has lost its gas seal which normally results in icing up
of the dead end valve. Periodic purging is required to prevent hydrocarbon accumulation.
Liquid oxygen leaking at the packing of valves is a common cause of ice buildup that should be
avoided on valves in cryogenic service because it can impede valve operation and can stop the valve
from fully opening or closing. A liquid oxygen leak at the packing of a valve can lead to oxygen
enrichment in the environment.
Written procedures are required for shutdown, startup, and maintenance of piping systems. The
personnel involved in this work, including contractors, shall be informed of the specific risks related to
oxygen and the tasks to be performed.
No repair work shall be carried out on equipment and plant until a permit to work has been authorized.
See AIGA 011, Work permit systems [17].
11 Maintenance
Personnel who operate and maintain oxygen systems shall be trained and understand oxygen safety
requirements (see Section 12). They shall be familiar with the hazards and safeguards of the system
they are maintaining. The valve manufacturer’s and/or owner’s maintenance procedures shall be
available to maintenance personnel. Contractor personnel shall be informed about and have access to
all the relevant safety information.
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Maintenance personnel shall work with clean hands and work clothing (uncontaminated by oil, grease,
or dirt). Items contaminated when used for other services such as automotive maintenance or fuelling
shall not be used in oxygen service (for example, clothing and gloves).
When working on oxygen wetted surfaces, only clean hands or gloves that are free of lint, fibers,
powder, and uncontaminated by oil or grease are allowed.
Before performing work on oxygen systems, a safety work permit should be issued or an equivalent
safety procedure in place. Guidance on work permit systems can be found in publications such as
AIGA 011 [17].
LOTO procedures shall be used with positive isolation as necessary when maintenance is undertaken
on the oxygen system itself.
A management of change (MOC) process shall be followed for any changes made, other than
replacement in kind, to the piping system, gaskets, control system, valve internal parts, etc. See AIGA
010, Management of change for guidance [18].
A MOC process shall also be followed for any changes in inspection, maintenance, or cleaning
procedures.
The decision to repair any leakage while the system is in operation shall be based on a risk
assessment. If the leak is liquid, a cryogenic hazard is present, and this shall be included in the risk
assessment. Leakage most commonly occurs at flanges and valve glands. These may be addressed
as follows:
• Flanges—If flange bolts are not excessively frosted, it is possible to manually retorque bolts (see
11.3.4 on cold torqueing). Only use hand tools; and
• Valve glands—If gland nuts can be safely accessed, tightening of the valve gland is possible.
Exposing personnel to an oxygen-rich atmosphere that will saturate their clothing and hair with oxygen
can present a hazard if there is any source of ignition. Any person that is inadvertently exposed, or
who considers that it is possible that some oxygen could have migrated into clothing or hair, should
leave the area and avoid all sources of ignition until the oxygen dissipates (see AIGA 005) [2].
Open pipes or ports shall be protected with oxygen cleaned plugs, caps, or blinds. These should be
controlled as listed items on a register so that they can all be accounted for when work is complete.
Rags and adhesive tape shall not be used inside pipework or on flange faces. Protected piping should
have a dry oil-free nitrogen or air purge applied to ensure that debris cannot enter the piping and to
prevent condensation. Care shall be taken when using purges in closed areas or in confined spaces
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such as valve boxes and coldboxes. Assume that purge gas will enter that space and label and barrier
it accordingly against inadvertent entry by personnel. Asphyxiation hazards shall be managed by an
appropriate work permit process (see AIGA 008 Hazards of inert gases and oxygen depletion and
CGA SB-2 Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres) [19, 20].
All tools used on oxygen valves shall be clean and free of grease.
A separate clean area shall be allocated for servicing oxygen equipment. Machining, welding, or other
maintenance work not requiring oxygen cleanliness shall not be carried out in this area while
maintenance is being carried out on oxygen equipment. Benches, tools, and vices used in this clean
area shall be cleaned and hydrocarbon-free. Care should be taken when using lifting tools that could
have been contaminated when used for other activities. Work surfaces should be covered with clean,
lint-free cloth. The area is also likely to include a variety of equipment for oxygen cleaning, including
solvent or detergent baths. These shall have appropriate fume extraction equipment.
If a functional or tightness test is needed, it shall be carried out using clean, dry, and oil-free air or
nitrogen.
For further details, see CGA G-4.1 and AIGA 012 [13, 14].
Work shall be performed in accordance with approved work procedures or quality plan. If such
procedures or plans are not available, prior to the start of maintenance the company or contractor
shall submit a quality plan with hold and witness inspection points for approval by a qualified person.
As a minimum, the quality plan shall cover the following points:
• Confirmation that all replacement parts meet the oxygen valve specifications;
• Confirmation that all parts are free of burrs, sharp edges, mechanical damage;
• Inspection for oxygen cleanliness (see 8.2); and
• Inspection and acceptance records shall be kept for the cleaned equipment (including piping) or
assembly.
For further details of cleanliness inspection, see CGA G-4.1 and AIGA 012 [13, 14].
Repair procedures shall be available. Repair workshops shall be assessed and have their facilities
qualified based on their ability to perform oxygen work and technician skills and knowledge.
Depending on size and time constraints, valves may be replaced rather than repaired.
The direction arrow on a valve should always be noted upon removal. It is essential to re-install the
valve in the same orientation.
11.3.2 Alignment
Before bolting up the valve, the alignment deviation of the flange face and flange bolt holes shall not
exceed the values defined in the project specification. All bolts shall pass easily through both flanges.
The tolerance on the termination of all piping other than flanged connections shall be as shown in the
design drawings and specifications.
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Overstress in the valve body shall be avoided as it can cause leaking or friction and can lead to a
potentially hazardous situation.
11.3.3 Gaskets
Gaskets shall be installed in accordance with the design drawings. The use of gasket types or
materials other than those defined in the project specification shall be prohibited unless approved by a
person competent to assess the oxygen compatibility of the proposed material for the service
conditions. Changes to the gasket specification shall undergo a MOC process (see 11.1.2). Gaskets
should only be removed from packaging immediately prior to use. If the package is found open and
contamination is suspected, the gaskets shall either be recleaned for oxygen service or rejected.
Gaskets shall be correctly sized and centred to ensure that no part of the gasket protrudes beyond the
inner wall of the pipe into the flow stream. The use of gasket sealants shall be avoided to prevent
extrusion of the sealant material into the pipeline system. The reuse of any gasket is prohibited.
Gaskets for oxygen systems should not be hand cut from sheet because they are difficult to clean and
can have ragged edges which could protrude into the flow stream.
Care shall be taken when cleaning the flange surface to ensure that any debris created does not enter
the pipework.
Gaskets, nuts, and bolts shall be visually inspected to ensure that they are clean and in good
condition. PTFE-based coated bolts are ideal for obtaining the required torque for tightness. A
lubricant as defined in the project specification may be applied to bolt, threads, and bearing faces of
nuts and washers before bolts are inserted into flanges and tightened.
It is sometimes necessary to retighten flange studs after first cooldown when valves are re-installed
after maintenance. For this reason, valves that are installed in perlited or rock wool boxes or within
external pipe insulation should not be re-insulated until after a cold test of the system. Valves should
be checked for leakage before insulating.
Hydrocarbon contaminated PTFE tape or PTFE sealant is a potential root cause for incidents.
Only pure virgin PTFE tape or PTFE sealant is permitted. PTFE tape ordered to the following
standards (or equivalent) have low residual lubricant content and are acceptable for liquid oxygen or
gaseous oxygen service.
st nd rd
• EN 751, Sealing materials for metallic threaded joints in contact with 1 , 2 and 3 family gases
and hot water. Unsintered PTFE tapes [21];
• BS 7786, Specification for unsintered PTFE tapes for general use; or [22]
• A-A-58092, Commercial Item Description (CID), Tape Antiseize, Polytetrafluoroethylene [23].
Other materials shall be tested in accordance with 6.3 and 6.4.
Thread tape should be used sparingly where required. No excess tape protruding into the process is
allowed.
Thread sealant should be applied uniformly to cover the threads needed. No excessive amount of
sealant is allowed.
11.3.6 Lubricants
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The use of hydrocarbon lubricants in actuator and gearbox mechanisms is only permitted where
originally specified by the actuator or gearbox manufacturer. Dangerous situations can occur if
lubricants migrate into oxygen wetted parts. Ensure that safeguards remain in place to prevent any
lubricant from migrating along the valve stem. See 7.2.4.
All valves shall be uniquely identified by identification tags, plates, or other similar permanent marking.
This identification shall be durable and remain attached to each valve during maintenance. It is not
permitted to interchange valves unless approved through an MOC process.
All valves shall be assembled, disassembled, and installed in accordance with the piping design
drawings. All valves shall be handled in a way that maintains their cleanliness and prevents ingress of
moisture, oil, dust, and other contaminants. It is essential to maintain bagged or blinded conditions
until the moment of re-installation in the field.
Valves in oxygen service removed from piping during maintenance shall be segregated from valves in
other service.
11.4 Spares
Spares produced by the original valve manufacturer are strongly preferred (i.e., original equipment
manufacturer [OEM]). Where OEM parts are not available, all materials and especially soft goods shall
be an exact replacement for the original unless approved through the MOC process. The modified
parts or materials, or any change in source of the parts, shall be reviewed and approved by a person
competent to assess oxygen compatibility.
CAUTION: Some facilities have nearly identical valves that are not used in oxygen service but which
could have different internal components including non-metals.
Incorrect selection of spare parts between non-oxygen valve spare parts and oxygen valve spare
parts is a potential root cause of incidents. Fires have occurred due to confusion in selection and use
of spare parts. Spare parts approved for oxygen service shall be segregated from the non-oxygen
service parts. Do not swap parts between non-oxygen service valves and oxygen service valves.
Orders for materials for oxygen service should not be combined with those for other materials. If there
is concern and/or uncertainty about their cleanliness, the materials shall be inspected and cleaned
according to specified procedures. The materials should be delivered free from rust, scale, oil, and
grease. See 8.4 for more details and information on packaging.
A component that is cleaned for oxygen service shall only be used at the service conditions for which
it was ordered. Using it in different service conditions without a MOC process is not permitted as the
part could be incompatible with the original valve. Approval from a company expert shall be obtained
before using it in a different service condition.
Gaskets shall be stored and bagged with other oxygen components and only opened in the field when
needed at the moment of installation (see 11.3.3).
11.4.4 Labelling
All packaging for spare parts used in oxygen service shall have a label indicating “CLEANED FOR
OXYGEN SERVICE” (see 8.4).
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Periodic warehouse checks of stored valves and or spare parts are recommended. The packaging
shall be intact and the oxygen service labelling shall be present. If packaging is damaged or labelling
is missing, recleaning or replacement is required.
For the supervision and inspection of the maintenance activity the following is required:
• qualified supervision to approve contractor workshops, capabilities, methods, and cleanliness
procedures;
• cleanliness inspection of valves being maintained; and
• supervision of installation of valve to ensure compliance with requirements (see 11.1).
11.6 Documentation
For quality documentation measures for valves and spare parts, see Section 13.
Hydrocarbon cleanliness can only be achieved by rigorous attention to component, valve, and system
build cleanliness as the maintenance is performed as previously described. Similar attention should
be given to particulate cleanliness. However, it is important to be realistic. When working in the field,
cleaning gasket faces or final installation of a valve between flanges, particulate can fall into piping,
particularly when vertically orientated. Particulates are not always visible and not easily removed.
Accordingly, it is recommended that any oxygen system that has been opened for maintenance is
blown out with clean, oil-free and dry air or inert gas (for example, nitrogen) wherever possible. This is
the only real proof test for particulate cleanliness in many real-life situations.
Care shall be taken when using inert gas due to risk of asphyxiation.
Personnel should be excluded from the startup area of equipment as far as practical when re-
commissioning systems that have been opened and/or subjected to maintenance.
12 Training
All personnel working with oxygen systems shall be trained in oxygen system safety hazards. These
personnel can include operations and maintenance personnel, engineering, procurement,
construction, contractors, commissioning and startup, contracting and procurement, warehousing
staff, inspection staff, valve manufacturers/suppliers, and design organisations.
The following training topics shall be applied to personnel involved in oxygen systems according to job
function.
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Potential hazards and safeguards related to cold oxygen should be included in the training. It is
recommended to present examples about incidents.
Site operational procedures relating to oxygen valves and all the relevant operating and safety
procedures shall be available to operations personnel.
Training for cleaning and cleanliness for oxygen service shall be developed according to CGA G-4.1
and AIGA 012, [13, 14 ]. Tools and clothing shall be clean for working on oxygen equipment.
Personnel shall be trained that only approved materials (spare parts, supplies, etc.) shall be used (see
11.4.1).
Maintenance personnel shall be trained on how to handle oxygen valves to ensure cleanliness
between site delivery, storage, and installation. For details, see Sections 9 and 11.
12.1.5 Assembly
The training shall follow the valve manufacturer’s assembly and installation guidelines. For spare part
handling, see 11.4.
13 Quality assurance, quality control measures for valves and spare parts
Quality control needs to be a joint effort between the valve specifier, valve manufacturer, and where
appropriate, the construction company and maintenance company. The required quality can only be
achieved if a common understanding of what needs to be done is established. Third-party inspectors
may be used to verify quality systems.
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AIGA AIGA 094/17
Manufacturing should follow standard acceptable quality control guidelines to ensure repeatable
manufacturing processes that produce a product compliant with the applicable specifications.
The valve manufacturer shall be qualified to manufacture and provide service according to the valve
specifier’s requirements.
A shop tour is recommended to follow the processing of oxygen valves, with the focus in particular of
the entire oxygen cleaning and assembly processes.
Qualification may be repeated in case of changes in organization, quality requirements, and new
products.
When the valve manufacturer decides to make a change in the manufacturing process of a specific
order (for example, a change in material, assembly, cleaning, or packaging) the manufacturing shall
be stopped. This change shall be documented and notification sent to the valve specifier to seek
approval before manufacturing resumes. For valves made for stock (mass produced), changes made
shall be reflected in the part number and/or documentation.
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The valve specifier shall determine the type of design review required. The valve specifier should
check the valve manufacturer’s documentation prior to the commencement of manufacturing.
This includes:
• design drawings;
• material; and
• inspection and test plan.
If a type approval was previously carried out (meaning a specific valve model was tested, see 7.2) and
the valve passed all quality criteria, an individual document review may not be necessary.
13.1.5 Inspection
To check the compliance with the specifications and quality requirements, inspection of purchased or
overhauled valves shall be carried out. The frequency of inspections can vary with experience gained
from earlier inspections. Inspections should be carried out at different stages of the valve manufacture
or overhaul process and not only after the work is finished. The inspection may occur independently or
be part of an audit or the qualification process.
Documentation shall be made available by the valve supplier for verification by the valve specifier
including:
• certificates of compliance;
• cleanliness, assembly, and leak checking records;
• material test report and/or certificate; and
• maintenance, installation, storage, and operating instructions.
Valves shall be packed and tagged after testing and stored in a clean, dry location until shipped.
Construction personnel (company or contractor) are responsible for following all specifications and
shall acknowledge that they understand the specification requirements for cleanliness and oxygen
compatibility.
In installations where the work will be performed by company employees (technicians), company
policies as well as the following requirements shall apply.
The contractor shall be qualified to install valves according to valve specifier’s requirements. This
process mainly consists of:
• material receiving process;
• material storage; and
• installation.
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AIGA AIGA 094/17
In addition to site receiving material procedures, site receiving and quality control assurance
personnel shall also:
• check integrity of valve packaging and labelling; and
• check the packaging for visual indications of gross contamination (for example, liquids, rust)
without opening the package.
If unsure of valve cleanliness, open the package and perform a visual cleanliness check. For this
check, the valve does not need to be disassembled.
If the packaging is found opened or damaged, the valve shall be inspected to determine if recleaning
is necessary before storage. This can either be carried out on-site or the valve will have to be sent
back to the valve manufacturer.
13.2.3 Storage
Oxygen valves shall be stored in a designated area which is marked “cleaned for oxygen service” or
equivalent.
13.2.4 Installation
Immediately before installation of valves a visual cleanliness inspection shall take place and shall be
documented (see 8.2). Only valves without visible contamination shall be installed. For this inspection,
the valve does not need to be disassembled unless contamination is suspected. Care shall be taken
not to contaminate the valve during handling. Oil and grease shall not be used for the installation of
oxygen valves.
14 References
[1] ASTM G63, Standard Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen Service
www.astm.org
[2] AIGA 005, Fire Hazards of Oxygen and Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres www.asiaiga.org
NOTE This publication is part of an international harmonization program for industry standards. The technical
content of each regional document is identical, except for regional regulatory requirements. See the referenced
document preface for a list of harmonized regional references.
[4] ASTM G94, Standard Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service www.astm.org
[5] ASTM G124, Standard Test Method for Determining the Combustion Behavior of Metallic
Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres www.astm.org
[6] ASTM G72, Standard Test Method for Autogenous Ignition Temperature of Liquids and Solids
in a High-Pressure Oxygen-Enriched Environment www.astm.org
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AIGA AIGA 094/17
[9] M034-1, List of nonmetallic materials compatible with oxygen by BAM Federal Institute for
Materials Research and Testing www.bam.de
[10] ASTM G86, Standard Test Method for Determining Ignition Sensitivity of Materials to
Mechanical Impact in Ambient Liquid Oxygen and Pressurized Liquid and Gaseous Oxygen
Environments www.astm.org
[11] ASTM D2512, Standard Test Method for Compatibility of Materials with Liquid Oxygen (Impact
Sensitivity Threshold and Pass-Fail Techniques) www.astm.org
[12] ASTM G74, Standard Test Method for Ignition Sensitivity of Nonmetallic Materials and
Components by Gaseous Fluid Impact www.astm.org
[16] ASTM G93 Standard Practice for Cleaning Methods and Cleanliness Levels for Material and
Equipment Used in Oxygen-Enriched Environments www.astm.org
[17] AIGA 011 EIGA Doc 40, Work permit systems www.asiaiga.org
[19] AIGA 008, Hazards of inert gases and oxygen depletion www.asiaiga.org
[22] BS 7786, Specification for unsintered PTFE tapes for general use www.bsigroup.co.uk
[24] ISO 4287, Geometrical Product Specifications (GPS)--Surface texture: Profile method -- Terms,
definitions and surface texture parameters www.iso.org
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