Investigating Corruption in the Philippines: a former Tanodbayan’s Experience By: Atty. Simeon V.

Marcelo Introduction Corruption in the government has been a perennial problem, as I found out as
one of the four (4) advisers of the World Bank’s President on good governance and anti-corruption, not
only of developing countries but even of developed countries. Of course, corruption is usually more
widespread and deep-rooted in developing countries. In developing countries, aside from its immediate
effect on the limited resources of the government, corruption leaves a piercing adverse impact in the
integrity and competency of the government in alleviating poverty. According to the World Bank and
Transparency International, corruption is the “misuse of public offices for private use.”1( Sapanjeet Kaur,
“E-Governance-Impact on Corruption”, available at
http://www.researchmanuscripts.com/isociety2012/47.pdf.) A similar definition was provided by
Professor Susan Rose-Akerman: “Corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong in the
management of the state. Institutions designed to govern the interrelationships between the citizen and
the state is used instead for personal enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt. The price
mechanism, so often a source of economic efficiency and a contributor to growth, in the form of bribery,
undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of government.” (R.D. Pathak, “The Role of EGovernance in
Tackling Corruption and Achieving Societal Harmony: Indian Experience”, available at . Why Fight
Corruption? Corruption discourages investments, limits economic growth, alters the composition of
government spending, undercuts a nation’s mission to reduce poverty and hinders improvement 
Though the Head of the Office of the Ombudsman of the Philippines is named Tanodbayan under the
Philippine Constitution, he is usually referred to by the public as the Ombudsman.  Former
Tanodbayan of the Office of the Ombudsman; Member, World Bank Independent Advisory Board (on
Good Governance and Anti-Corruption). Delivered during the 12th Regional Seminar of the ADB/OECD
Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific held in Dili, Timor-Leste on 24-25 July 2013.    2 in the
quality of life for the rural and poor segments of the developing countries. (J. Mistry and A. Jalai, “An
Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between E-Government and Corruption”, available at
http://www.uhu.es/ijdar/10.4192/1577-8517-v12_6.pdf, citing Bharga and Bolongiata. “Challenging
corruption in Asia: case studies and a framework for action”, The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/ The World Bank. Working Paper No. 27580. Washington, D.C. http://bit.ly/W5Urku.)
“…corruption cripples development in many ways (Gray and Kaufmann 1988; Hutchcroft 1997). It
worsens income inequality and poverty (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 1998), reduces investment
rates (Mauro 1997), lowers economic growth (Tanzi and Davoodi 1998), diminishes democratization,
and weakens representation (Ocampo 2001). It enervates economy and society in insidious ways. It is, as
World Bank president James Wolfensohn put it, a cancer." -- Challenging Corruption in Asia, pp. 3-4,
Bhargava and Bolongaita [2004 ed.] I. Investigation Department I assumed the position of Tanodbayan
on 17 October 2002. The Tanodbayan is the head of the Office of the Ombudsman, an independent anti-
corruption body created pursuant to the provisions of our Constitution. The Philippine Constitution
(Article XI, Section 13) and Supreme Court describe the Office of the Ombudsman as the “protector of
the People”. Thus, in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591 (November 21, 1990), our Supreme
Court identified the immense responsibilities of the Office: As protector of the people, the office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act or omission of any public
official . . . when such act or 3 omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec.13 [1])
The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," (in this case the Special
Prosecutor), "to take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution"
(Sec. 13 [3]). The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or
omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require
that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official
duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The reason for the creation of the
Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to
insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals'
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of
official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office
to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or
omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770). Based on my
experience as head of the Philippines’ anti-corruption body and also on my own research of the
experience of several successful anti-corruption agencies, the cornerstone of any successful crusade to
fight corruption is a strong field investigation department which is staffed with an adequate number of
competent and honest field investigators and provided with sufficient resources to accomplish their
bounden task. The Field Investigation Office (as we named our investigation unit) should specialize in
investigating corruption cases, with its personnel well-trained in detecting and gathering sufficient vital
evidence to convict in court perpetrators of graft and corruption against the government. 4 When I
became the Tanodbayan, tucked under my belt were two (2) decades of private law practice which
basically involved commercial cases. Hence, what I knew about the Office of the Ombudsman and
fighting corruption was essentially restricted to being a principal prosecutor during the impeachment
proceedings against a former President Joseph Estrada and later, as Solicitor General (for almost two
years) handling, among other cases on behalf of the Government, the long delayed ill-gotten wealth civil
cases against the Marcoses and their cronies. Thus, with very limited knowledge, I took it upon myself to
promptly get acquainted with the internal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman and the way it
operated. Always an adherent of the principle of “never reinvent the wheel”, I started my own research
while also asking friends to help in researching about successful anti-corruption agencies abroad and
their efforts aimed at fighting graft and corruption. I began to look for working models, best practices
and success stories. A friend of mine whose assistance I sought, told me about Hong Kong’s Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Prior to this, I was totally ignorant about Hong Kong’s ICAC. My
friend informed me, based on what he found out in the internet, that ICAC was established as a
response to pervasive corruption in the police organization and other government agencies in Hong
Kong in the 1970s; how it struggled in its early years; and how it became the formidable and effective
anticorruption institution it is today. I then said to myself - maybe we can replicate ICAC’s experience at
the Office of the Ombudsman. After all, the likelihood of similarities between the culture of corruption in
Hong Kong and in our country is probably very high because of our common Asian background. By
coincidence, in January 2003, an anti-corruption convention sponsored by ICAC was scheduled to be
held. Thus, I sent two (2) of my officials to Hong Kong to attend this convention, with the specific mission
to learn about ICAC’s structure and operations. There, they met officials of ICAC who, by a stroke of luck,
introduced them to Mr. Tony Kwok, who had just retired as ICAC’s Head of Operations, the unit in
charge of investigation. This encounter initiated a very fruitful collaboration between the Office of the
Ombudsman and Mr. Kwok. Incidentally, Mr. Tony Kwok rendered his services to us free of charge. For
the information of our participants who do not know Mr. Kwok, he “has 33 years experience in the anti-
corruption field, including 27 years of service with the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC), which he joined shortly after its inception in 1974, and hence had witnessed and
participated in the successful battle in 5 transforming Hong Kong from a very corrupt place to one of the
cleanest city. He retired as Deputy Commissioner and Head of Operations in 2002.” (see
http://www.kwok-manwai.com/html/introduction_e.html) Unfortunately, when I assumed office in
October 2002, apart from my limited knowledge on anti-corruption, I could not immediately take off
with new anti-corruption plans and programs. This was due to the simple fact that the Office of the
Ombudsman, as a whole, severely lacked the necessary personnel, skills, funding and equipment to
wage its war against corruption. [Mutual Evaluation Report on the Republic of the Philippines - Asia
Pacific Group on Money Laundering; Feliciano Commission Report; Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy, Ltd. Survey (issue no. 66)] At that time, the Office, among its problems of severe lack of
resources, had only thirty-two (32) full-time prosecutors handling approximately two thousand (2,000)
cases at the Sandiganbayan (our anti-graft court for high-ranking government officials) and even worse,
only thirty-seven (37) field investigators to cover a bureaucracy of about 1.5 million public officials and
employees. To aggravate the situation, it turned out also that there were never any training program for
its prosecutors and investigators and no investigation or surveillance equipment available for their use.
Further, Ombudsman prosecutors and investigators were not only severely undermanned, but also
grossly underpaid. Benchmarking against Hongkong’s ICAC based on the data provided by Mr. Kwok, it
was revealed that there was a gross discrepancy between the Office of the Ombudsman and ICAC in
terms of personnel, budget and compensation. The most serious discrepancy was with respect to
manpower resources, particularly with respect to the investigating personnel. ICAC then had eight
hundred thirty-seven (837) field investigators, while we had only thirty-seven (37) investigators. This
would show that in Hong Kong, for a bureaucracy of 174,175, ICAC had a ratio of one (1) investigator
which had then every 208 government officials and employees as against the Office of the
Ombudsman’s ratio of one (1) investigator for every 17,241 members of our bureaucracy (which
includes the military and the police). In reaction, our Office, pleaded with, and partially succeeded, after
almost a year, in securing funds from the Department of Budget and Management. Though the funds
granted was enough only for the creation of 56 positions for field investigators, it was very welcome
since our total number of field investigators almost tripled from 37 to 93. With the new field investigator
positions, we deemed it essential to re-organize and rationalize the fact-finding and intelligence
operations of the Office. Thus, with the help of Mr. Tony Kwok, we formed the Field