G.R. No.

L-33211 June 29, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under
review.

This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the

exempting circumstance of insanity.

There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8,

1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house
of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the
area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal

On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying:

"Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he
repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a
hammer until she was dead.

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the
bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the
adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was
baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.

After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken
refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and
threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo
na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda.
Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "

After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon
and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at
Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening.
How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown
in the record.

Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the
Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He
found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody.
Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of
Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp.
15- 17, Record).

A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an

autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right
eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On
opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage.
The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen
brought him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on
September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the
municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation.

On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal
Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating
circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex.

Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months

after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling
Kikay- He believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam,"
"mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by
those persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swan. Puno
believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a
headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack
doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill the
"mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".

Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two
children. He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among
his friends are drivers. (Exh- B).

Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the
murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The
following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble
bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida
did not see any bee.

Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his
mother. He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another
rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog
to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He
repeatedly boxed the dog.

Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that
dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance
had a ferocious expression.

Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto

Puno came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was
soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy
that he called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to
eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.

Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song.

When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused.
Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's
father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at
Teotimo.

While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a
moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next
morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto
thought they were his fellow cursillistas.

The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving

that puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts
testified that Puno acted with discernment.

Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R.
Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten
times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno
was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was
afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing
and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to
Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and
irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor
Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.

Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno
was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents
complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such
as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed
that while Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms
were "not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his
environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's
testimony.

Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital,

testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted
with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could
distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor
Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and
that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached
third year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).

On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the

offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National
Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):

Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-

Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962
from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness
when he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.

His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San
Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did
not come back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according
to information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense
are not given.

MENTAL CONDITION

... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in

person and without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but
becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the
ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.

xxx xxx xxx

REMARKS

In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was

suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from
any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.

The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several
isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic
process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a
markedly, retarded individual of which he is not.

However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like
schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment
but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense
committed.

The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of

Court and the order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the
mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine
whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed
the killing.

The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of
Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by
the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.

The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had
gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he
singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he
thought that she was a witch.

Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed
the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially
when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that
the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his
environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and
ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).

His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the
trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.

When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the

evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27
Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence
(People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col
because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from
schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of
discernment and freedom of will.

Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the
accused must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs-
Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).

Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability."
(People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs.
Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz,
109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting
circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-
504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)

After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule
just stated and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and
helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on
that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom
of will.

In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in
the National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering
from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was
recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where
the accused used to work as a laborer. About one year and two months
later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him for re-
employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of
murder.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as
murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating
Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of
his superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian
female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do
nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".

Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of
abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act
afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself"
(People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13
Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil.
446).

Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated

because the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July
31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).

The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable

juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1)
"por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria,
reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion
de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha
resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident,
meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de
meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp-
582-3).

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her
old age should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or
showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65
Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382,
404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).

However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating

circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended
by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or
schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78
Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87
Phil. 658.)

Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el

matar a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una
circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos
deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado
de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene
verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).

It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be
imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to

reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of

the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the
accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga

filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant
herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed
with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife
hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby
inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said
Belen Macalino Sigua.

All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect
towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty.
(Record, p. 2)

On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to

the crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March

16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a
male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua
was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit,
Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope
he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the
morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with
blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp.
4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).

The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz
Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5)
of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the
latter part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from
him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many
documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the
procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said
"never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that
his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of
P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death
of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the
accused. According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up
to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December
1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her
husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his
arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week at
the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of
his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead,
operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to
March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always;
maltreating their children when he was not used to it before; demanding
another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing
any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were
also times when her husband would inform her that his feet and head were
on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at
around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache;
however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately
relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When
Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried
as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home
only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her
way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak"
(translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her
parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the barangay
officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he
replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart."
Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a
number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail.
The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their
neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-
16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed,
"here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did
not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to
Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for
Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental
hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August
25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino
Dungo was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the
commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under
organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke.
(TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).

Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder.

However, he was not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick.
He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he
claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of
Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death
of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)

Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente

Balatbat testified that the accused was his patient. He treated the accused
for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side
weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was
somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr.
Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low
level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29,
November 7, 1988).

On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as

principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing the accused as follows:

1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the

law;

2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as

actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the
perpetration of the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon
indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he
embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial
court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed
the crime.

It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already

admitted by the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is
whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime
changed.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense
charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be
held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a
mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a
person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there
be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v.
Puno, 105 SCRA 151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined

border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are
three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely:
delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane
delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable
basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the
same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane
person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational
person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by
reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose
between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency
being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is
insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and
moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)

So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a
definite test or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or
criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in
language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding
of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing
light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's
general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with
his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.

Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the

person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is
the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of
the act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of
the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the
thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we
determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)

In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the
National Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was
suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during
and after the commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4).
Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by
perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and
impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of
strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was
organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent.

Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the
accused was permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To
quote

Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the
lucid intervals unfortunately are not present, sir.

(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of

psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988).
Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of
insanity is curable.

Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis
since January of 1987, thus:

Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time
the patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may
be allowed to scan my record, the record reveals that the patient had a
stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract expired and he
was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is
noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-
occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and
loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22,
August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the
National Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's
assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or
three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors
arrived at this conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife
and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations
on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in
quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the
commission of the offense.

The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused,
though he may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact
that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the
accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of
the latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by
the DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote hereunder the
testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:

Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the
accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987,
when you met the accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted,
accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife why she was asking
so many documents: why she was requiring him to be interviewed and file
the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he
wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land
Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that
your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the
transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you
asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent
somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer of the landholding
in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the
comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things
difficult for the transfer of the landholding in the name of my father and my
name."

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was

supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not
usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering
from impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the
accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was not
insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that
the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he
committed it. To quote:

Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the
accused, when asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he
answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his
counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for
the postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to
another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your
conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a
laboratory examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the
behavior of the patient, like for example praying for postponement and
fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient
is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the
accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears
normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties
we have encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we
prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the members of the
medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for example he
shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was
aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he
killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those
words because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-
41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence.

The statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr.
Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it
highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act
charged. As stated by the trial court:

The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the
act was sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he
perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was
hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern
to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as
treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the
scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight
in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that
he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the
victim (Rollo, p. 63)

There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court
had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the
witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the
truth or not.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the

accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact
of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:

In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime,

the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound
mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise
stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil.
288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden
of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita,
145 SCRA 451)

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity

is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and
avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity
must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on
the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the
burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as
charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby

AFFIRMED without costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126116 June 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERLINDO YAM-ID alias "ELY," accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 17, 1997 of

Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court of the 7th Judicial Region stationed in
Toledo City in its Criminal Cases No. TCS-2581 and 2382 finding accused-
appellant ERLINDO YAM-ID guilty of murder and frustrated homicide,
respectively, and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in
the first case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, in Crim. Case No.

TCS-2381 this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Murder and
pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 hereby imposes the Mandatory penalty of
DEATH and to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay actual damages in the amount of P40,000.0.

In Crim. Case No. TCS-2382, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide under Art. 249 RPC in relation to Art. 50 and
after applying the indeterminate sentence law, it is hereby the sentence of
this Court that said accused will suffer the penalty of SIX (6) Years and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor in its minimum period to TEN (10) YEARS
of Prision mayor in its maximum period. The OIC, Branch Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to remand the records of these cases to the Supreme
Court for automatic review.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 45, Rollo.)

The case for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General as follows:

Julius Cantutay was a resident of Saksak, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Appellant

Erlindo was his neighbor. So, too, was Danilo Tejamo, his uncle, and six (6)
year old Jerry Tejamo his cousin (p. 2, tsn, July 31, 1995).

On April 1, 1994, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Julius was sent by
his grandmother, Amanda Ceniza, to Brgy. Tutay, Pinamungajan,Cebu, to
deliver benignit, a local delicacy, to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry
Tejamo was with Julius. On their way to Dequiado's house, they passed by
the house of appellant who greeted them, "Good Evening". After said
salutation, appellant suddenly unsheathed a long bolo. On instinct, Julius
pushed Jerry, who was then walking in front of him, and told the latter to
run. Appellant ran after the two. Jerry was overtaken by Julius. Julius
momentarily stopped to wait for Jerry, but appellant caught up with Jerry.
Appellant stabbed Jerry with the bolo on the left portion of his back. Not
content, appellant held Jerry by the hair and hacked him on the nape. Jerry
fell to the ground. As a coup de grace, appellant stabbed Jerry on the right
side of his back. Jerry died on the spot. Appellant then knelt over the
prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the blood from his neck (pp. 3-9, tsn,
July 31, 1995).

Scared out of his wits, Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to the latter's
father, Danilo Tejamo. Danilo was then sleeping, Julius narrated the
harrowing incident to Aniceta Tejamo, wife of Danilo. Aniceta Tejamo is the
sister of Julius's father, hence, an aunt (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 26,
1995).1âwphi1.nêt

Aniceta roused Danilo from his sleep and both of them ran to the site of the
incident. Before they could reach the place, however, they were met by
appellant, who had a bolo in hand. Danilo asked appellant the whereabouts
of his son. Appellant instead answered, "I will kill all of you", and
immediately hacked Danilo. Danilo was able to dodge the attack, but he
slipped and fell to the ground. Appellant struck at the fallen Danilo, who
tried to parry the attack, but Danilo nevertheless got hit on the bridge of his
nose. Danilo tried to stand, but appellant hacked him anew. This time,
Danilo was hit on the head, and he fell to the ground, bloodied (pp. 7-11,
tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).

Since Danilo was not moving anymore, Aniceta shouted that Danilo was
already dead. Appellant took hold of Danilo's collar to finish him off.
Inexplicably, the tip of the bolo hit appellant's stomach and blood oozed
from the wound. Perturbed, appellant ran towards his house and threw the
bolo to the ground. Danilo regained consciousness and sought treatment
(pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).

Expenses for the wake and burial of Jerry amounted to P40,000.00 (p. 14,
tsn, ibid.)

(pp. 109-112, Rollo.)

During the trial, accused-appellant denied killing the 6-year old Jerry
Tejamo and pleaded self-defense for his assault on Danilo Tejamo, Jerry's
father. He contended that due to a land dispute between his family and the
in-laws of Danilo Tejamo, the latter tried to kill him by firing at his house. In
retaliation, he hacked Danilo Tejamo at the forehead but Danilo shot him,
hitting him below the navel, in the process, causing a prolapse (the
exposure of his intestines). Then, he lost consciousness.

The trial court did not give credence to accused-appellant's tale and after
trial on the merits, it found him guilty as charged.

In this automatic review, accused-appellant now makes a complete turn-

around and admits killing Jerry Tejamo. He, however, would plead insanity,
and, as to his conviction for frustrated homicide regarding his attack on
Danilo Tejamo, accused-appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove his intent to kill.

The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to

change his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An appeal in a criminal
case opens the whole action for review on any question including those not
raised by the parties (People vs. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People
vs. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374
[1993]; see also Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The
reason for this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the accused
should be considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]).
This legal maxim acquires greater significance in this case where accused-
appellant faces the supreme penalty of death. It is our policy that in a death
penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a despicable
homicidal felon is involved for an erroneous conviction will have a lasting
stain in our escutcheon of justice (People vs. Alicundo, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]).

At this instance, the defense, now as represented by the Public Attorney's

Office (PAO), contends that at the time of the incident, appellant was
suffering from a chronic mental disorder, otherwise known as
schizophrenia, which is characterized by a person's inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality and is often hallucinations and delusions
(Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p.
860 cited in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 63, Rollo).

Accused-appellant's defense of insanity is anchored on the testimony of Dr.

Antonio Yapha who treated his wound. Said doctor testified that contrary to
accused-appellant's claim that Danilo shot him, he did not find any entrance
for the alleged gunshot wound. The doctor said that a wound caused by a .
38 caliber slug will not result in a prolapse, that is, the intestines slipping
out of the usual place. In the words of the defense, this "belied the
testimony of accused-appellant that his stomach had a prolapse and
instead bolstered the testimony of the prosecution witness that accused-
appellant tried to kill himself with a long bolo" (Brief for the Accused-
Appellant. p. 63, Rollo). As further proof of insanity, the defense cites
accused-appellant's gruesome act of sucking Jerry Tejamo's blood after he
had mercilessly stabbed the boy to death.

Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as

such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Ambal, 100
SCRA 35 [1980]). In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a
criminal prosecution, the starting premise is that the law presumes all
persons to be of sound mind, or otherwise stated, the law takes for granted
that acts are done consciously. Insanity being the exception rather than the
rule in the human condition, "the moral and legal presumption is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person and
that a felonious or criminal act (delicto deloso) has been done with
deliberate intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence and malice" and that
whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of
proving its existence (People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 [1987] citing
Article 800, Civil Code; US vs. Martinez, 34 Phil 305, 308 [1916]; People
vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292 [1960]; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Fhil. 147, 153
[1939]; US vs. Guevarra, 27 Phil 547 [1914]; People vs. Renegado, 57
SCRA 275, 286 [1974]; US vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218 [1915]; People vs.
Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 [1923]).

In the case at bar, the defense regrettably failed to discharge its burden of
proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of
the crime. The only intimation of insanity that accused-appellant could point
at is the non-medical opinion of the PAO that accused-appellant was
suffering from schizophrenia because he sipped his victim's blood and tried
to kill himself afterwards. No medical certificate was presented to
substantiate the claim of insanity. No testimony was proffered to support
the allegation. We are not aware that the PAO now has the expertise, more
so the authority, to diagnose its clients of their mental condition. While we
agree that sucking Jerry's blood and stabbing one's self in the stomach are
not acts expected of a normal person, we, however, have to be careful in
distinguishing between insanity and passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from some physical ailment. The
State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a
general plea of insanity (People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708 [1995]; People vs.
Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 [1991] citing People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87; see
also People vs. Amba, supra).

We do not discount the possibility that accused-appellant may have "lost

his mind" after killing the 6-year old Jerry as manifested by his slurping of
the boy's blood and his attempt to commit suicide. However, for insanity to
be appreciated as an present immediately before or at the very moment the
crime is committed, and not thereafier. We do not believe that accused-
appellant was insane when he killed Jerry and hacked Danilo before
attempting to take his own life. To reiterate, no iota of evidence was
presented to prove the same. Verily, the defense of insanity was not even
raised during the trial of the case. It is invoked only now on appeal, giving
us the impression that it is but an afterthought.

And now to the propriety of the penalty imposed.

The trial court cited the following as the attendant circumstances that
qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder, or aggravated the same, to
wit:

1. Bad blood existed between the family of the accused and the
complainant's father-in-law due to a land dispute prior to the incident
therefore premeditation exist;

2. Treachery — the sudden and unexpected attack.by the accused against

unarmed minor who is 6 years old without any means to defend himself
and the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack (Pp. vs. Molato,
G.R No. 66634, 29 February 1989; Pp. vs. Canzano, 95 SCRA);

3. The killing of the victim Jerry Tejamo, a minor 6 year old child constitutes
an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery when an adult illegally
attacks a child of tender years and causes his death (U.S. vs. Butag, 38
Phil. 746).

(p. 43, Rollo.)

and having earlier explained that —

. . . The brutal and senseless killing of Jerry Tejamo, a 6 year old child
manifest accused's perversity and callousness as a cold blooded murderer
and brings him to fore as a heinous criminal under Rep. Act 7659 which
defines heinous as a grievous, odious and hateful offense by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickectness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
and repugnant and outrageous to the common standard and norms of
decency and morality in a just civilized and orderly society. This is the kind
of man the accused is.

(p. 42, Rollo.)

meted out on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal

Case No. TCS-2381.

We affirm the finding of the trial court that treachery attended the killing of
the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally attacks a
child of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists (People vs.
Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 [1997]; see also People vs. Caritativo, 256
SCRA 1[1996]).

The trial court, however, erred in finding that evident premeditation

attended the commission of the crime. The following requisites must concur
before evident premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused had clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act (People vs. Magno, 260 SCRA 300 [1996]).
Here, the prosecution omitted or failed to present any evidence to show
any, much less, all of the above elements. The bad blood that allegedly
exists between accused-appellant's family and the in-laws of Danilo
Tejamo, Jerry's father, does not, in any way, prove evident premeditation.

It was thus treachery that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder.
However, there being neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance,
the maximum penalty of death imposed by the trial court must be reduced
to the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with our decisions in
People vs. Magno, supra, and People vs. Lucas, (240 SCRA 66 [1995])
where we explained that if there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, then the crime, although falling under Republic Act No.
7659, will not be punished by death but by the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, the Office of
the Solicitor General correctly observes that the crime committed by
accused-appellant in stabbing Danilo Tejamo constituted only attempted
homicide since the wounds suffered by Danilo were not life threatening.
Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty of reclusion
temporal for the crime of homicide. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for an attempted crime is two degrees lower than that
prescribed by law. Attempted homicide is thus punishable by prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
penalty to be meted out on accused-appellant should be anywhere within
the range of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto
mayor, and the maximum should be taken from the medium period of
prision correccional (Art. 64, par. 1) the range of which is two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the Attempted Homicide, the accused-appellant shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional medium as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, finding

accused-appellant GUILTY of MURDER in Criminal Case No. TCS-
2381and sentencing him to suffer the reduced penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the parents of the victim
the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and to pay actual damages
in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. In Criminal Case No.
TCS-2382, accused-appellant is found guilty of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE
instead and sentenced to two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and correcional as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148695 May 27, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS, appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For automatic review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental (Branch 50 stationed in Bacolod
City) in Criminal Case No. 00-20595, dated February 26, 2001, finding
Randy Belonio y Landas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and sentencing him to death.

The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000, charged appellant with
Murder as follows:

"That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the City of Talisay,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an
improvised knife, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one RAMY TAMAYO, thus causing injuries in the vital
parts of the body of the latter which caused his instantaneous death.

"That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a recidivist for having been

convicted by final judgment of 4 years, two (2) months, one day to six years
in Crim. Case 94-16609 entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Randy
Belonio y Landas for Homicide."2

Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000,3 appellant, assisted by his counsel
de oficio, pleaded not guilty.

In his Brief,4 the Solicitor General narrates the factual antecedents of the
case, as summarized by the trial court, as follows:

"Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6, 2000, her grandmother

was buried and there was a wake in their house at Brgy. Zone 14 in the
evening. Her first cousin, the late Ramy Tamayo, also called Ramon
Tamayo, arrived in their house at about 10:00 P.M. together with his wife.

"Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they could sit
on a nearby bench, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from a store only a few
meters away. The store was furnished with a small opening for the store-
keeper to attend to the customers and Ramy was occupying that space in
front of the opening to pay when the accused Randy Belonio arrived.
Randy tried to force his way in front of the opening and as a consequence,
he bumped on Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard
look.
"Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused
came over and sat on the other end of the bench. Then the accused asked
Ramy for the latter’s cigarette lighter. The accused asked Ramy from what
place did he come from and why was he there. Ramy answered the
accused in a normal manner.

"The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer, who was
facing the direction of the approaching accused, saw him and noticed that
he was wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not see the accused as
he was facing sideways to Jennifer. Without saying a word and without
warning, the accused delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger which was
concealed in his hand. Ramy was hit on the right chest, Jennifer stood up
and ran towards her house shouting for help. There at the gate of the fence
of her house, she heard another thudding sound of a stabbing blow. When
Jennifer entered her house, she announced that Ramy was stabbed.

"Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house. Jennifer saw the
accused running away towards the back of the barangay hall. The Tanods
who came over failed to find the accused. Then when the Barangay
Captain and the policemen arrived, Jennifer informed them of the direction
towards which the accused fled. The accused was arrested from one (1) of
the houses near the barangay hall where he took refuge.

"Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer of Talisay City on
January 6, 2000. He conducted an autopsy on the remains of Ramy
Tamayo and listed his findings in a necropsy report which he prepared.
These findings are as follows:

‘1. Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on one (1) and (inferior
portion) and blunt on the other end (superior portion) located at the 4th
intercostal space;

‘Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the left nipple and it
penetrated downward hitting the left side on the heart;

‘2. Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is situated just above the site
of the first wound.’

‘The first wound was fatal as it damaged the heart.’"5

In his Brief,6 Randy Belonio adopted the above findings of the trial court
and the prosecution. However, he raises the defense of insanity, an
exempting circumstance, and for such purpose, depends on the expert
assessment of his witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified thus:

"This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia), Chronic

Undifferentiated and probably triggered by (s)ubstance abuse of Shabu and
Marijuana.
"Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a mental institution like the
National Center for Mental (H)ealth in Mandaluyong City or treatment in the
psychiatric unit of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Regional Hospital in
Bacolod City and later rehabilitation in the Negros (O)ccidental Mental
Health Center at Paglaum Village, Bacolod City."7

The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty
of Murder and that he had full control of his mental faculties. It held that the
testimony of Dr. Ester Regina Servando was more weighty and credible
than that of Dr. Gauzon.8

The trial court convicted appellant, thus:

"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Randy Belonio
y Landas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in
the Information, as Principal by Direct (Participation) with the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery and the special aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. There are no other aggravating circumstances
nor is there any mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.

"The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of Randy Tamayo the
following amounts:

"1. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;

"2. The sum of ₱3,629.70 as reimbursement for hospital expenses;

"3. The sum of ₱940,716.00 as compensatory damages; and

"4. The sum of ₱100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky Tamayo as moral

damages."9

Hence this automatic review.

In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error of the court a quo for
our consideration:

"The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the exempting

circumstance of insanity pursuant to Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended favoring the accused-appellant."10

In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was not in his right and
normal frame of mind when the killing took place. He avers that no normal
person would ever bump another person, give the latter a hard look and
eventually stab him to death. He adds that he and the victim did not know
each other at that time.11
Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a reliable expert witness and
is more knowledgeable and experienced than Dr. Servando.12 He explains
that Dr. Servando was once under the tutelage of Dr. Gauzon and that at
the time of their respective testimonies, the former was only 37 years old,
while the latter was 57 years old.13 Appellant also cites portions of the trial
court’s Decision where Dr. Gauzon referred him to the Bacolod City Health
Office for psychiatric examination. The trial court also branded the accused
as a homicidal maniac, which appellant says, is judicial notice of his mental
sickness.14 In sum, he concludes that all of these circumstances show that
he was insane at the time of the killing.

We find these arguments without merit.

The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will and
intelligence, and that a felonious or criminal act has been done with
deliberate intent, that is, with freedom and intelligence.15 Whoever,
therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence.

Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as

such must be adequately proved.16 The law presumes that all persons are
of sound mind, and that acts are done consciously.17

In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of
proving that appellant was insane. The testimony or proof of appellant’s
insanity must relate to the time preceding or the very moment of the
commission of the offense charged.18 We find the evidence adduced by
the defense sorely insufficient to establish his claim that he was insane at
the time he killed Tamayo.

The main circumstances presented by the defense that remotely evinces

that appellant was insane at that time was his act of bumping the victim,
without any apparent reason, giving him a long hard look, and then
eventually stabbing him. However, this sequence of events cannot
overcome the legal presumption of sanity, let alone prove appellant’s
insanity.

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act. Proof of the existence of some
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it can be
shown that the offender was not completely deprived of freedom and
intelligence.19 As culled from the trial court’s findings, Belonio, after giving
the victim a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter, lighted his cigarette
and conversed with him.20 Afterwards, he left and came back armed with a
dagger with which he stabbed Tamayo. Immediately thereafter, he escaped
and went into hiding. Contrary to a finding of the existence of insanity,
these acts tend to establish that Belonio was well aware of what he had just
committed, and was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise,
he would not have attempted to escape and go into hiding.
Aside from the "bumping" incident earlier discussed, the only other
evidence of insanity that appellant could relevantly point to is the medical
certificate prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio was
suffering from schizophrenia. This witness was presented to refute the
findings of the prosecution’s expert witness Dr. Ester Regina Servando
which negated the existence of this mental condition.

A run-through of Dr. Gauzon’s testimony strengthens this Court’s resolve to

affirm the lower court’s findings. Part of his testimony is reproduced as
follows:

"ATTY. JACILDO:

Q. Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is specifically

mentioned here that the subject here ‘was found to be incoherent and
irrelevant and disoriented as to time, person and place, and that there was
plight of ideas and adjustment, as well as insights.’ Will you kindly explain
this to this Honorable Court?

A. What meant there is that, when you talk to the individual, sometimes you
get answers right, sometimes it is wrong. That is when you say that he is
incoherent. When you say irrelevant, that pertain to the question. Now, as
far as dates, he could not remember the date. As far (as) the place, he
could not recall the place when he was in my office. And some of the
persons that were with him, he could not identify them. Now, when I say
that there was plight of ideas, that (was) when he was talking. As a matter
of fact, I gave an example, when I asked a question – when I asked him
about the first killing incident and his answer was, ‘face to face kami,
simbahan namon kag inagaw namon ang baril’ because of warship. That is
only one, because there were others that you could not understand what he
was talking about whether you have to rely only on other things. And
sometimes, he would talk on things which are not there. That means he
was hallucinating. Now, judgment is usually poor. Because, when I asked
him of what he will do regarding the case, he would just say that, ‘Ti, amo
na ya.’ And he said, ‘Ano kamo da ya?’ kay ang warship. So, I was asking
him about the values of what he was doing and he could not give me that
answer. And he does not know what he was doing. That means that there
was no reality testing. He does not know what is the real fantasy.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of Psychiatry, about how long

has the subject, Randy Belonio, been suffering from his mental disorder
that you mentioned in your Medical Certificate?

A. Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in the history that his
father was medically disabled when he was ten (10) years old, and the
mother was only a fish vendor and there were, I think, eight (8) to ten (10)
in the family and with a meager income and have to (fend) for themselves.
And in a very young age of ten (10), the parents had the attitude of ‘Bahala
na ang kabata-an’. That means, they have to take care of themselves. At
age 13, he was brought by the relative to Manila, and although he was
incoherent, you can get from his answer by mentioning so many places,
(like) Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT, Cubao. That means, at
age 13, he was already around these areas (f)ending for himself. And the
(s)treet (u)rchins, you know for a fact, that they are influenced by drugs. So,
by that time, with that dysfunctional family, and without any family to take
care of himself, he was not doing what the society expects him to do. So
that they have dysfunctional family and with dysfunctional relatives. So, the
value system was really poor. So that the thinking process of this individual
was not developed to what the society expects him to be. So, it started at
that time. So, when he was taking shabu, it triggered every tissue that the
symptoms came out. That’s why, he became suspicious, (he) became
irritable and anybody who would try to not befriend him and tried to be
angry with him, he would immediately suspect that something would
happen to him in which he would react by defending himself, and probably
by killing. This individual had, actually, committed, say, killing. I would not
say murder because that’s your term, but he had killed already three (3)
persons in different years. So, he does not already know what he was
doing because he was psychotic, which in your parlance is insane.

Q. Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to this date, what you
are trying to say is that, this subject, Randy Belonio, was already suffering
from schizophrenia?

A. Yes."21

Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on October
25, 2000 (around nine months after the stabbing incident) the latter was
suffering from schizophrenia. However, the evidence of insanity after the
fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is
also proof of alleged abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime.22

The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to Belonio’s condition
during the interview, months after the incident. His report was silent as
regards the incidents occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which
Belonio stands trial. The second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonio’s life
history, which was offered to prove that he had been suffering from his
alleged condition since childhood.

However, perusing the story as narrated by the doctor, the same was a
mere statement of Belonio’s life and family history, explaining what brought
about his supposed mental condition. There was no showing that he was
actually suffering from schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To
demonstrate that he had been suffering from this condition, the doctor
pointed to the fact that he has already killed three (3) persons, including the
present incident. However, such conclusion is non sequitur and, at best, a
circuitous argument. Further, the veracity of these findings is belied by the
fact that the accused did not raise this defense during his prosecutions for
the other killings. No other circumstances evincing its existence were
presented during trial.

Furthermore, Dr. Gauzon’s examination cannot surmount Dr. Servando’s

punctilious and overwhelming analysis, which took two days to narrate. She
explained the history of the accused, including his family and medical
background, conducted a mental status examination, which was based on
her direct interviews with him, and gave a series of other written
psychological examinations.23

The portion of Dr. Servando’s testimony pertinent to her findings regarding

Belonio’s mental condition is quoted as follows:

"FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:

Q. Can you please read for the record this (r)esult which consist only of one
(1) sentence?
A. Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history, mental status
examination, and psychological examination, patient was noted to be
evasive, suspicious, and manipulative but no psychotic features were
observed upon evaluation. x x x.
Q. So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a)n by ‘patient was noted to
be evasive, suspicious, and manipulative’?
A. Actually, during the psychological examination, we have to give series of
questions. And then the patient (does) not answer directly to our question.
He would go around the bush. And then, after that, we also found out
during the result of the psychological examination that the same pattern
was noted.
Q. Does this mean that he was totally capable of being manipulative or
evasive?
A. Yes.
Q. He did it intentionally?
A. Yes.
Q. With the knowledge that he knew the answer but does not want to give
the answer?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say, that he has full control of his mental faculties that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Because there was an intention to be manipulative and there was an
intention to be evasive because he was suspicious?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said that there was no psychotic features(,) x x x (w)hat does
this mean?
A. When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of symptoms such as
delusion and hallucination that are being extracted from the patient or being
displayed by the patient. However, during the examination, the symptom or
the patient’s answers are not enough to put him to a criteria of psychosis
because the delusion and the hallucination as well as the thought process,
the thought contents must be concretized enough in order for us to
determine to diagnose that this patient is actually suffering from psychosis.
Q. So, subjected to your examination, this patient did not come up to the
level where he could be diagnosed as having delusion and hallucinations?
A. Leading to psychotic features.
Q. So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic features?
A. Yes."24

The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to the credibility of these
two expert witnesses and their respective testimonies. The time-honored
doctrine is that the question of which witness to believe is one best
addressed by the trial court. The findings of fact of the judges who heard
the evidence are accorded great respect and are seldom disturbed on
appeal for they had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, and
to determine by their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their
testimonies.25 The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
trial court which found Dr. Servando’s testimony more credible for the
following reasons:

"1. It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a disinterested and

unbiased witness. She does not know the accused and she is not known to
the accused. She will not be benefited if the Court upholds her findings and
she had no reason to testify falsely. On the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was
admittedly paid for his services, hence, it could not be truly said that he is
an impartial and disinterested witness. If his findings (are) upheld, the
benefit to the practice of his profession is enormous;

"2. As a government official, Dr. Servando has the presumption of regularity

in the performance of her duty. No such presumption arises in favor of Dr.
Gauzon;

"3. The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is evasive and
manipulative is supported by the Court’s own observation. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"4. The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on his interview with
the accused and the members of the accused’s family. It was the members
of the accused’s family, the sister of the accused who informed Dr. Gauzon
that at the age of 13, the accused began to use drugs. The information that
the family of the accused was impoverished; that the accused spent his
adolescence in Metro-Manila; that the accused was a neglected child were
all supplied by the kins of the accused who were not presented as
witnesses. There was no showing that Dr. Gauzon took precautionary
steps to validate the information. On the other hand, Dr. Servando also
conducted interview of the accused and his accompanying relatives
including the BJMP guard who escorted him. In addition, Dr. Servando
conducted a series of written tests which are tailored to determine the
mental capacity of a person. The result of the written tests confirms the
observation of Dr. Servando in the interview that the accused is evasive
and manipulative."26

Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more

stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is
not enough; there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act.

Every individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of one’s

mental faculties. Appellant’s past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did
not act with complete absence of the power to discern; (2) he was not
deprived of reason; and (3) he was not totally deprived of his will.

As held in People vs. Madarang,27

"An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason
thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty
because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused
is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of
conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had
already admitted committing the crime. x x x."28

Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing evidence to establish his

alleged insanity at the time he stabbed Tamayo, we are constrained to
affirm his conviction.

We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the records of this case,
especially the evidence of the prosecution. We find no reason to modify,
much less reverse, the findings of the trial court that, indeed, appellant’s
guilt for murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We now look into the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, any
person found guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. The same Code further instructs that when in the commission of the
crime there is present an aggravating circumstance which is not offset by
any mitigating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.29

A review of the records supports the conclusion of the trial court on the
presence of treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. For treachery to
be appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the means of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.30

In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on how the killing was
executed, as follows:
"Q. What did you do there?

A. While we were conversing at that bench, after a short while, or five (5)
minutes, Randy Belonio came and he asked to light his cigarette because
Ramy was smoking at that time. He was allowed by Ramy to light his
cigarette.

Q. Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo and Randy Belonio
aside from asking lighting of cigarette?

A. While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired from Ramy why he
was there, Ramy told him that he is attending the wake of his grandmother.
Further, Randy asked him where he came from? And Ramy answered that
he is from Hda. Bubog.

Q. After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did anything?

A. He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he took a look at Ramy.
After some minutes, he went out.

Q. And after few minutes was there any incident happened?

A. After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just walk normally, and
when he was near Ramy he stabbed Ramy hitting on the chest and while
the weapon was still on the breast of Ramy I stood up and ran away.

Q. From what direction did Randy came when he approach you?

A. He came from their house because their house is near our house.

Q. In relation to you, where is this house located?

A. Witness indicating that he came from her side, where the house is
situated.

Q. And which side did you sit, the side near the direction of the house of
Randy Belonio or far from the house of Belonio?

A. The other side.

COURT:

It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of Ramy?

WITNESS:

A. Yes, sir.

APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q. And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when he was suddenly
stab.

A. He was sitting in this manner.

COURT INTERPRETER:

Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the other legs and move
slightly her body was in side way.

APP AGRAVIADOR:

Q. That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy Belonio who was
coming from the house?

A. Yes, Ma’am.

COURT:

Let me interrupt. He was facing you? Ramy was facing you while you were
facing the direction where the house of Randy Belonio, so that Ramy was
facing on the other side?

WITNESS:

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

APP AGRAVIADOR:

Q. When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on the chest of Ramy
Tamayo, did you see the reaction of Ramy Tamayo?

A. He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to the house.

APP AGRAVIADOR:

Q. When for the first time did you see the weapon used by Randy Belonio
in taking the life of Ramy Tamayo?

A. When he thrusted that knife.

COURT:

Before or after he delivered the stabbing blow?

A. At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that was the first time I
saw that knife.
APP AGRAVIADOR:

Q. When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy Tamayo x x x, you did
not see the knife?

A. Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his hand."31

Appellant’s acts of leaving, then returning after a few minutes armed with a
knife -- which he concealed while approaching the victim and which he
used in stabbing him -- while the latter was sitting, unaware and not
forewarned of any danger, manifest a deliberate employment of means to
ensure the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim might make.

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which was alleged in the

Information was also duly proven. "A recidivist is one who at the time of his
trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code."32 The records33
show that appellant was previously convicted by final judgment of
Homicide, which like Murder, falls under the title of "Crimes against
Persons."

The award by the court a quo of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity is in

accordance with jurisprudence.34 The amount of ₱25,000 as exemplary
damages should also be given because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. However, the court erred in awarding the
amount of ₱940,716 as loss of earning capacity. In "accordance with the
formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA
511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality,"35 the
loss of Tamayo’s earning capacity is to be computed as follows:

Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Living

Expenses)

where: Life expectancy= 2/3 (80 – the age of the deceased)

= 2/3 (80-24) x [(₱200x365)- ₱36,500]

= ₱1,362,545

The award for loss of earning capacity should therefore be ₱1,362,545.

There being testimonial evidence in support of moral damages, an award

for it is proper. However, it should be reduced to the more reasonable
amount of ₱50,000 considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured
party.

Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the amount of ₱3,627.70 were
duly supported by receipts. However instead of awarding actual damages,
we grant temperate damages in accordance with People vs. Andres,36
where the Court said:

"[W]e declared in the case of People vs. Villanueva that:

‘… when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less
than ₱25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for
₱25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.
Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds ₱25,000,
then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages
based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.’

"The victim’s heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages in the

amount of ₱25,000."37

Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless
they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-20595

convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
DEATH is AFFIRMED. The award for loss of earning capacity is
INCREASED to ₱1,362,545; moral damages is REDUCED to ₱50,000;
actual damages is DELETED but temperate damages of ₱25,000 and
exemplary damages of ₱25,000 are awarded.

In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending Section 23 of the

Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded,
upon finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of
Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was
being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the
house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that
afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he
suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after
which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months
pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus
which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon
conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the
crime the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique
Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and
when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his
mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then
when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he
dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla
held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his
enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and
left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that
she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in
desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around
him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble
with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute
with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts,
with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing
criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that
the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not
necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to
us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be
found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also
conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man
commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it.
But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was
the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in
whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking
Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be
inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for
the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also
motives for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion.
The doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination
and not in his right mind.

We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of
the deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to
inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly
show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did
not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say
that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased,
who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as
he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting
his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing
that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed

from, the courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the
offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in
the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the
director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace,
with costs de oficio.

So ordered.
G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36,
convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in
relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with
the said crime in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba,

Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40
grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the
following:

… [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth

Regional Narcotics Unit received an information from an unnamed
informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by former
Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time
group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at
Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.

Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as

the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the
other members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked
money consisting of a ₱1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe
"money bills" supposedly amounting to ₱100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R.
Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a
Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-
300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the
morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-
8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).

It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate
No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The
unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the
informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that
Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of "money
bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and
handover (sic) to Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn,
handed the bundle of "money bills."

Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the
transaction was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately
thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose. The buy-bust bundle of "money bills" and the shabu were recovered.
The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon
conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN,
October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo
examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen, indeed,
was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30,
1996, pp. 31-36).4

On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following
facts:

Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they
were at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change
money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to
handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of these people
as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain
Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.

They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was parked. Sonny Zarraga
was forced to board another car while another person drove Sonny
Zarraga’s car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards
Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one
of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarraga’s car. One of
the men saw a substance inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said
person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with ₱1.5 Million peso
(sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarraga’s mother-in-
law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room,
Sonny Zarraga’s cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarraga’s
wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay
₱1.5 Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga
instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of
₱75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would
withdraw the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny
Zarraga’s release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and
Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw
the money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a
commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank manager to call the
police.

Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left
at the room and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were
investigated.1awphi1.nét

The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarraga’s jewelry,
₱85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarraga’s car spare tire, jack and
accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the ₱2,000.00 using
Sonny Zarraga’s ATM card.5

On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both
accused of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to an
indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years.

Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of ₱2 million each and to
pay the cost of suit.

In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by

the accused shall be credited in their favor.

Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to

deliver and surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to
the Dangerous Drugs Board.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court
erred as follows:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL

CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
 II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT
IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY,
THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT
IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III. EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
AGAINST THEM:

(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY
AGAINST THEM.

(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN

THE AMOUNT OF ₱2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE
SUIT.7

The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with

modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant
Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he
committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the
Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when the crime
was committed and that the prosecution failed to prove the same, he
should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.

Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari,
alleging that –

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING

PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO
WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY
ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A
DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED
WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.8

The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised

Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless
he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as
amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the
Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with
discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists
that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment
under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA
made no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the
allegation in the Information that the petitioner and his co-accused
conspired and confederated to sell the shabu subject of the Information
sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there
was no need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the
Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not necessary
for the trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the
petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the
petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed
with judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.

The petition is meritorious.

Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of
age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a
felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined
and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the
minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability.
The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed
lacking the mental element of a crime – the capacity to know what is wrong
as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human
acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong.9
However, such presumption is rebuttable.10 For a minor at such an age to
be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened11 to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with
discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong.12 Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the
minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime
relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the
crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his
hiding the corpus delicti.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable

doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the
crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale
of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against
the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny
Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the
affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring
out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The
petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga,
who handed the same to the poseur-buyer:

Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?

A The two of them, Sir.

Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell
them?

A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.

Q And what was your response?

A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.

Q And what happened next?

A After that I showed my money, Sir.

Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative
specifically…. I withdraw that.

Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams
tell us who asked you that question?

A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?

A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.

Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What happened to the shabu?

A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.

Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?

A He handed it to me, Sir.

Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?

A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him
the money, Sir.

Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A The ₱1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.

Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?

A I made signs to my companions, Sir.

Q What signs did you give?

A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.

Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?

A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested

them.

Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Tell us.

A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.

Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was

arrested by these police officers?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Please tell us.

A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.

Q And after that, what happened?

A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.13

Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?

A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.

Q Who made the request for its examination?

A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.

Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with
the shabu?
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.

Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what
container was it contained?

A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic

and white soft paper, Sir.14

It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-
buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who
received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out
and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely
sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the
transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is
no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft
white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin.
Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for
illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer:

ATTY. VERANO:

Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?

A No, Sir.

Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?

A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.

Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?

A I don’t know, Sir.

Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age
of the boy?

A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.

Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you
not surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?

FISCAL:

It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.

ATTY. VERANO:

May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very
young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.
COURT:

The witness may answer.

WITNESS:

A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by
pushers.15

Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the

petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right
from wrong. We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-
examination and the petitioner’s answers thereto:

FISCAL:

Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.

COURT:

Please proceed.

FISCAL:

Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13,
1995 and did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 o’clock in the
afternoon?

WITNESS:

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City?
You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 o’clock?

A No, Sir.

Q What time did you leave?

A After lunch, Sir.

Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody
of the police, you said that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a
chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that
[L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the
seats of the car, is that correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call
to anybody since the day that you were arrested?
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.1a\^/phi1.net

Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared
inside that [L]ancer car?

A No, Sir.

Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were
accosted by a male person at the workshop and then you went out of
Megamall and when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car
dangling at the waist. At whose waist?

A From my cousin.

Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car
was?

A No, Sir.

Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level
parking area of SM Megamall, is that correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?

A No, Sir.

Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he
had not made any call?

A No, Sir.

Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you
claimed that there was already this group which met you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male
person who arrested you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?

A No, Sir.

Q These people do not know your car?

A No, Sir.
FISCAL:

No further question, Your Honor.

ATTY. VERANO:

No re-direct, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you
seen any shabu. In support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself
to an examination?

WITNESS:

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?

A Yes, Sir.

COURT:

The witness is discharged.16

The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the
petitioner conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer,
and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from
wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two
or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is
right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the
petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he
conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano ,17 we held
that:

Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene’s mental

capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to
show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the
incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated
therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still
be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the
presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion
to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this
regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity to
incriminate him.181awphi1.nét
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence.19

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the

review on certiorari1 of the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals4 (CA) that affirmed with modification his conviction for the crime of
qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159,
Pasig City, in its decision of April 5, 2006.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA5 was playing with her friend BBB in
the second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner
arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with
them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with
her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual
intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner
warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.

AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher)

and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both
accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to
physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent
with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the
physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under the following
Information:

On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his
(accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and
consent.

Contrary to law.6

The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of
denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the
alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA only invented her story because
she bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties’ mother
(CCC) supported the petitioner’s story; she also stated that AAA was a
troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that the petitioner was fifteen
(15) years old when the alleged incident happened.7
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her;
she confirmed the petitioner’s claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.

On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as

follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused

ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and
hereby sentences the said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the
amount of ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and
₱25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.8

The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAA’s

credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)9 to exempt him from criminal
liability considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was
committed.

The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction with modification

as to penalty as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert
Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award of damages are likewise
affirmed.

SO ORDERED.10

In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA
held:

As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that
Robert is not exempt from liability. First, it was not clearly established and
proved by the defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of
the commission of the crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present
Robert’s birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No.
9344. Neither is the suspension of sentence available to Robert as the
Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:

We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006. Section 38 of the law reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is

under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the
juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of
P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have
not been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the
intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as
provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a
crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from
having their sentences suspended.11

The CA denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration;

hence, the present petition.

THE ISSUES

The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution’s evidence on his guilt of

the crime charged; what he now assails is the failure of the CA to apply
paragraph 1, Section 612 of R.A. No. 9344 under the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No.
9344 on the petitioner’s exemption from criminal liability;

(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the
defense to present the petitioner’s birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of
R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution
by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and

(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton13 thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.

The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the
burden of proof for purposes of determining exemption from criminal liability
based on the age of the petitioner at the time the crime was committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution
as the party who stands to lose the case if no evidence is presented to
show that the petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled to the
exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344.14 He
additionally claims that Sections 3,15 7,16 and 6817 of the law also provide
a presumption of minority in favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that
any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.

The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on
record – specifically: the allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the
petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never objected to, and the findings
of the RTC – established that he was not more than 15 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime.

The People’s Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
counters that the burden belongs to the petitioner who should have
presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence proving that
his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner
is presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence
suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton.18

THE COURT’S RULING

We grant the petition.

We examine at the outset the prosecution’s evidence and the findings of

the lower courts on the petitioner’s guilt, since the petition opens the whole
case for review and the issues before us are predicated on the petitioner’s
guilt of the crime charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant
under the terms of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the
criminal, not on the civil, liability.

We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the

records of the case, to deviate from the lower courts’ findings of guilt. The
records show that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime
charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating
evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information
charged.19 As against AAA’s testimony, the petitioner could only raise the
defenses of denial and alibi – defenses that, in a long line of cases, we
have held to be inherently weak unless supported by clear and convincing
evidence; the petitioner failed to present this required evidentiary
support.20 We have held, too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of the
complainant.21 We sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as
we see no compelling reason to doubt the validity of their conclusions in
this regard.

While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground – i.e., exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 – that implies an admission of guilt,
this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the
defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even
inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense’s claim of exemption from
liability was made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this may
initially imply an essential change of theory that is usually disallowed on
appeal for reasons of fairness, 22 no essential change is really involved as
the claim for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence
submitted below and with the lower courts’ conclusion that the petitioner is
guilty of the crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature,
admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from
criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he
cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted
by law. In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful,
too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45)
opens the whole case for review, even on questions that the parties did not
raise.23 By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into
every circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the accused.24 It is
with these considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct and more
specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of children in
conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.

We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law
on exemption from liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA
committed in these regards. Specifically, the CA’s findings of fact on the
issues of age and minority, premised on the supposed absence of
evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.25

In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the
ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are
at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement
to exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of
the latter is material in characterizing the crime committed and in
considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.

Minority as an Exempting Circumstance

R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on
May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in
conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system that would
ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-
being through a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance
and supervision orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and
vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional care.26
More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as well the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed
what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended, previously provided – i.e., from "under nine years of age" and
"above nine years of age and under fifteen" (who acted without
discernment) – to "fifteen years old or under" and "above fifteen but below
18" (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law – as the old
paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did – presumes that the minor
offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong,
so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be
held accountable.27 The current law also drew its changes from the
principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15
years as formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right
their wrong through diversion and intervention measures.28

In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal
liability because he was not more than 15 years old at the time the rape
took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioner’s failure to
present his birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344.29
The CA also found him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence
because the imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua
to death.

Burden of Proof

Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence,

refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in
order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution
which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The
prosecution completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it
believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution
has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances
showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot
otherwise be held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution
completed its evidence and had done everything that the law requires it to
do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which now
claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should
be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the
crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of
showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he
committed the rape charged.30

This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age
are not elements of the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no
duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime
when clearly they are not. 31 If the prosecution has a burden related to
age, this burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance
that qualifies the crime of rape.32

Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence

to Prove the Accused’s Minority and Age

The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that

the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in
conflict with the law may be determined:

SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined

from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
[Emphasis supplied]

Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344
provides the implementing details of this provision by enumerating the
measures that may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain
the child’s age:

(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such as

(a) Child’s birth certificate;

(b) Child’s baptismal certificate ;or

(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the child’s
school records, dental records, or travel papers.

(2) x x x

(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of

such documents, the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures
to determine age by:

(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g.
date of birthday, grade level in school);

(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of
the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);

(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and

(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.

xxx

Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed
only in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence existing at that time
on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accused’s
minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,33 we accepted testimonial
evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the absence of
any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This
was followed by U.S. v. Roxas34 where the defendant’s statement about
his age was considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to
establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the
offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,35 the Court
appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim
that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense in the
absence of any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the
prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia,36 we found the testimony of the
accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his
minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial37 and
David v. Court of Appeals,38 and ruled that the allegations of minority and
age by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecution’s failure
to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.

In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the

accused’s minority and age upon the concurrence of the following
conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the
birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove
the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from
accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the
time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the
prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the
accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are untrue.

All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC
both testified regarding his minority and age when the rape was
committed.39 Second, the records before us show that these pieces of
testimonial evidence were never objected to by the prosecution. And lastly,
the prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the
petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime was committed.

We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in his
favor.40 Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the petitioner’s age at the
time he committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In other words,
the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place
should be read to mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is
the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.

Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and
established jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory developments,
the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving
evidentiary value to the petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies relating to the
former’s age.

Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344

That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and
that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when he took the
stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.41 As we explained in discussing
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 934442 in the recent case of Ortega v.
People:43

Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years

old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate
local social welfare and development officers (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of
the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time of the promulgation of judgment
but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old. [Emphasis supplied]

The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article
22 of the RPC, as amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not found to be a
habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the
petitioner is a habitual criminal.

Civil Liability

The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused
shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal liability;
hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from
criminal liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he
would have been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from
criminal liability.

The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as
amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his
relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of consanguinity and
the latter’s minority.44 Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability
corresponding to qualified rape.

The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not
appear to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in her
testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and
the defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the
relationship exists. We find, however, that AAA’s minority, though alleged in
the Information, had not been sufficiently proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid
down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant:

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing

cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as
an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents

such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been

lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age,
the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. [Emphasis
supplied]

The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not
likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAA’s
age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his failure to
object to AAA’s testimony be taken against him.

Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the

crime to qualified rape – i.e., relationship within the third degree of
consanguinity and minority of the victim – does not exist. The crime for
which the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should
therefore only be simple rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC,
not qualified rape. The civil liability that can be imposed on the petitioner
follows the characterization of the crime and the attendant circumstances.

Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of ₱50,000.00 but

increase the awarded exemplary damages ₱30,000.00, both pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence.47 Moral damages are automatically awarded to
rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim
suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award.48 Article 2230 of the Civil
Code justifies the award of exemplary damages because of the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of relationship between AAA and petitioner
and dwelling.49 As discussed above, the relationship (between the parties)
is not disputed. We appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance
based on AAA’s testimony that the rape was committed in their house.50
While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be
appreciated as basis for the award of exemplary damages.51lavvphi1

We modify the awarded civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, the

latter being the civil indemnity appropriate for simple rape52 on the finding
that rape had been committed.53

In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to

discuss the petition’s third assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for
rape filed against petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioner is REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner’s continued detention, we
hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.

Florentino Saguin for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental

Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal,
with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the
accused is homicide, according to the following information:

That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod,

municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused
Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his
bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious
wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article
404 of the Penal Code.

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel
in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.

The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose
in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of
Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba
drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called
Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to
Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange
of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his
wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This
occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his
house to see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling
for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand
towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the
bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.

There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy
and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of
Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony
of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his
house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling
between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were
nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other.
Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit
Omamdam; he was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas
was trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.

The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the

description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay
dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.

There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced
Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges that it was caused
accidentally and without malicious intent.

Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having
seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not
incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded
Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's
wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the
accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion.
The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was
endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but,
as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately
and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas,
the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing
so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act,
since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal
liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the
case.

The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant
to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the
possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had
pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment
when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest,
without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him.
The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later,
and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this
wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See
that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident.
Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of
this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the
fiscal.

We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had
it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we
deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15
Phil., 47), to wit:

The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals,

directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when
possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
investigation.

In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the
proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of
evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty
person to indulge the criminal act.

In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused
Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio.

So ordered.
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.

O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed,
as alleged in the information, as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused,
with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild
chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the
breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said
Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the
deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in
that the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest,
there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards
secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.

The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The
defendant appealed.

There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at
all as to the important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the
morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa,
Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a
malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a
few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his
laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then
went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration
which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice
filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across
the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with
his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so
during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the
deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens.
The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever.
The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at
something under a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although
the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the
deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a
portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some
contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the Government
witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy
and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that
the accused accepted the invitation. The accused, however, testified that
he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the
deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying
something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What
took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that
subject he testified as follows:

And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where
the wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the
first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to
eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I
shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the
chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw
that I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my
companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my
shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my companions were
working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence,
and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides
that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he
and myself went together to see the dead body.

Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point
where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The
defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to
the malecon where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead
chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the
laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa
says that they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The
accused says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased
lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be
easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the
cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his
fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide
the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken
which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the
accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it
had been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and
Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the
cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or
eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and
buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw
on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he
helped the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him,
although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to
compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge
of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial,
however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and
told the story substantially as above.

So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between
the accused and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a
tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity
and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show
any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission
of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would
be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt.
That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were
shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.

Article 1 of the Penal Code says:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by

law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary

unless the contrary shall appear.

Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:

He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by
mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.

Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:

A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the

contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is
satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if

life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful
act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia.,
154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs.
State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs.
Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)

In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of

the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.

In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not
required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the
State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury
should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner
admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State
must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury
that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance
of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to
be erroneous.

In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution

for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which
constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.

In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.

We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the

judgment of conviction.

The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted,

and his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio.

So ordered.
G.R. No. 150647 September 29, 2004
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of
the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and the innocence of the
accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the
Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a
careful reexamination convinces this Court that an "accident" caused the
victim’s death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses
create a reasonable doubt on appellant’s guilt. Hence, the Court must
uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to set aside the February 28, 2001 Decision2 and the October 30,
2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–GR CR No. 18759.
The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No.
36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed
CA Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the

sense that the [Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight
(8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects."6

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:

"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with his .45 service pistol, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable
cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he
was then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital
parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim
thereafter."7

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent’s version

of the facts as follows:

"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of

Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.

"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at
the Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a
robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. With the
arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by the Concepcion
Elementary School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with
other School Administrators. When his wife asked him, ‘Why will you be
arrested?’ [H]e answered ‘[Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is
why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for my arrest.’

"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st

Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was
detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in
the robbery case.

"Later that day, about a little past 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who
is a police sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was
detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical
interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa: ‘Let’s go to the
investigation room.’ The investigation room is at the main building of the
compound where the jail is located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado
Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.

"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster
which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in
its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.

"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the
shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away.
When the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed
petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma
(first name not provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was
visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma
examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring
Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr.
Ricardo Jabonete, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the remains
of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:

‘Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.

‘Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges,

modified by sutures, surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left
side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed
medially backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th
intercostals space into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe,
left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8th
thoracic vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm.
Edges, modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior
midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented
medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on its widest portion, at infero-
medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From anterior
midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into
penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of
the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented
medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9th intercostal
space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.

‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds

on chest and abdomen.

‘REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.’

"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboa’s
body were gunshot wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left
side of the chest about the left nipple and exited to the right side of the
back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right. As to
the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle
of the gun was probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side,
and the gun must have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound.
Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side.
Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated
that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the gun’s nozzle
to the right side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance
points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters."8

Version of the Defense

The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision,

which in turn culled them from the trial court. The RTC summarized the
testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to the
incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as
follows:
"Erna Basa:

"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up
to the afternoon; at about past 2 o’clock that afternoon while working on the
backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of words which were not
clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to
verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the
possession of the gun; she was inside the room and one meter away from
the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters
away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy
was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she
was not certain who pulled the gun. x x x.

"Eden Legaspi:

"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she
was inside the investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo;
at about 2 o’clock that same afternoon while there inside, she heard a
commotion outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the
commotion started they were seated on the bench and after the commotion
that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door
and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun and
immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place
where she was seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two
men fall down x x x.

"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:

"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company then attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of
the investigators of their outfit; about 2 o’clock or past that time of January
4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation;
as he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and
about to open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach
him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was a
suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by the police of
Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their
stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of the
stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa walking with him,
he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his
waist; then as he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the
door, the victim, who was two meters away from him, suddenly approached
him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his gun
with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and, with
that right hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able
to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him
(Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry
the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand,
in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he
and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from
its holster as both of them held the gun; more grappling followed and five
seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to
his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his
right when the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still
grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber and
cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the
grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun,
while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun
fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than
Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine
who of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying ‘stop
that’ and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando
Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and said that the
case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when his gun
was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.

"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery

case that happened during the first week of December, 1989; he was the
one who filed that case in the town of San Dionisio and that case involves
other persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also
the chance to invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery
case; x x x [I]t was after he took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang
called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the
stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the
investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty
meters, more or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the administrative
office, the office of the commanding officer, officer of the operations division
and that of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim
tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab
his gun, he locked the victim; the hand of the victim was on top of his hand
and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun; that the entire handle
of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell
whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion
of his gun from the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located;
during the incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not
approach, but just viewed them and probably reported the incident to their
commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy)
was not in his right sense; when his commanding officer came some five to
ten minutes later and took away his gun he did not tell him anything.

"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.

"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on
the cadaver of Tomas Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his
autopsy findings respecting which he made an autopsy report he said he
found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with
trajectory medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the
stomach with trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of his
examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-shirt and a
jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any
powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were
believed by him to be powder burns as they look like one; he also found a
deformed slug in the pocket of the jacket of the victim."9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim
was not successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had
been in control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had
been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it
went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he
deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on
the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that
there had been a grappling for the gun.

To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of
petitioner that the death of Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People
v. Reyes,10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is not prone to accidental
firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims
because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked
and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing
it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied
on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased
must have been intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary
to make the gun fire."11

Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of

the OSG:

"[Petitioner’s] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the
victim been shot only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the
victim not only once but twice, thereby establishing [petitioner’s] determined
effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming
without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have
been followed by another shot on another vital part of the body. The fact
that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two different
and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or
angles, means that there was an intent to cause the victim’s death, contrary
to [petitioner’s] pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-
repeated principle that the location, number and gravity of the wounds
inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened
during the incident. x x x.12

Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held

that petitioner had miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful
aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA
disagreed with the conclusion of the trial court that the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the commission of
the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by
the appellate court in this manner:

"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating

circumstance, the public official must use his influence, prestige and
ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position,
then there is no abuse of public position.’ (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA
655, 670). In the instant case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a
premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former fetched the latter from
the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the
[petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial
court’s finding that the said aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took
advantage of his public position to commit the crime cannot be sustained.
Hence, there being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved,
the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x."13

Hence, this Petition.14

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the

Court’s consideration:

"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming
petitioner’s conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to petitioner’s overwhelming
evidence to support his theory/defense of accident.

"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming
the conviction of the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that
when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full control of the handle of the
gun, because what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the
petitioner reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa were
both holding the gun in forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.

"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor general’s
observation that the fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes
petitioner’s determined effort to kill the victim.

"IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the

evidence presented when it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was
front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the victim were
side-by-side each other when the grappling ensued.
"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioner’s
reaction to the incident when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of
petitioner after the incident strongly argues against his claim of accidental
shooting.

"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive
or lack of it in determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the
part of petitioner to shoot at the victim when the same was put in serious
doubt by the evidence presented.

"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of
accident and self-defense are inconsistent.

"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the

penalties and damages."15

In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether
the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident; and second,
whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Accidental Shooting

Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive.16 Both courts possess
time-honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But where some facts are
misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may
overturn the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as
in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or
guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.

Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised

Penal Code:

"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The

following are exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

‘4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intent of causing it.’"

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to
the victim was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to
circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled.17 Thus, in
determining whether an "accident" attended the incident, courts must take
into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault
or negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the main
question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber
pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?

Petitioner Not in Control of the Gun When It Fired

The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who
witnessed the incident firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-
examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon of January 4,
1990 as follows:

"ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a
commotion. That commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting
as part of that commotion which you heard?

A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could
not be understood.

Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?

A. No, sir.

Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any
voice while you were inside the investigation room as part of that
commotion?

A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified.
They were talking somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was
a sort of trouble in their talks.

COURT:

Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the
deceased in this case? Am I correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?

A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her
side) and I saw both of them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?

A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)

Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands
holding the gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right
hand?

A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir
Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy.

COURT:

Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?

A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands
grappling for the possession of the gun.

Q. How many hands did you see?

A. Two.

Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY TEODOSIO:

Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?

A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.

Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the
gun?

A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboa’s
hand was also there. Both of them were holding the gun.

Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?

A. The handle.

Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his
right hand?

A. At first they were not directly facing each other.

Q. So later, they were facing each other?

A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain
steady as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against
force.

COURT:

Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?

A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.

Q. What was the distance?

A. Very close to each other.

Q. How close?

A. Very near each other.

Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?

A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their
bodies would touch each other.

Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?

A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.

Q. And they were directly facing each other?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?

A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the
gun was released from its holster and then there was an explosion.

Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.

Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its
possession?

A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.

Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?

A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was
pointed to because the gun was turning.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?

A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt.
Pomoy. He was the one holding the gun.

Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt.
Pomoy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of
Sgt. Pomoy?

A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with
each other, it was then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one
holding the handle of the gun? Am I correct?

A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.

Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the
gun?

A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.

Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the
gun as you testified?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?

A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand,
was he in front of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoy’s right
and Balboa’s left sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side
at a closer distance towards each other.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun
during that time?

A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of
the gun and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the
gun.

Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun
was being held by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the
gun or the portion near the trigger?

A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle
of the gun with his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of
Pomoy, the same hand holding the gun.

Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?

A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly
anymore whose hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands
were holding the gun.

Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, ‘Daw duha na sila nagakapot’,
what you really mean?

A. Both of them were holding the gun.

Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?

A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.

Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as
what you have previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt.
Pomoy?

A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoy’s right
hand was still on the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over
his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing his
right hand with her left hand over her right hand as if holding something.
The thumb of the left hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right
hand.)

COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already
pulled out form its holster and while the accused was holding the handle of
the gun?

A. Left hand.

Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the
handle of the gun up to the time when the gun was pulled out from its
holster?

A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because
the left hand of Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir
Balboa which is about to grab the handle of the gun.

COURT:

Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the
victim away from him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right
hand?

A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy
was using his left hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his
right hand.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of
the gun of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?

A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right
hand.

COURT:

Q. That was before the gun fired?

A. Yes, sir."18
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of
the gun during the scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest
the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts.
That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon
was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for
the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was
trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off
the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances,
petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of
the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.

It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the
following declaration of the appellate court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his
right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the left hand of the
victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration
would safely lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein
[petitioner] was in full control of the gun."19

Release of the Gun’s Safety Lock and Firing of the Gun Both Accidental

Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a
safety lock that, unless released, would prevent the firing of the gun.
Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence showed that the weapon
fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court,
this fact could only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun
and shot at the victim. This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.

It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession
of the gun. This frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having
been finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The
eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not
be dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have
been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.

That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and
conclusively negate the claim that the shooting was accidental, as the
same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45
caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in
question, explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought
about:

"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-

automatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away
the empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its
chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location
of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe
perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going
downward from left to right thus pushing Balboa’s upper body, tilting it to
the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioner’s hand over the gun; the
second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of
Balboa’s body as he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioner’s
hand x x x."20

Thus, the appellate court’s reliance on People v. Reyes41 was misplaced.

In that case, the Court disbelieved the accused who described how his gun
had exploded while he was simply handing it over to the victim. Here, no
similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the
gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More
significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the
mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used
in Reyes.22 Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently
described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession
thereof becomes the object of a struggle.

Alleged Grappling Not Negated by Frontal Location of Wounds

On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the
deceased were all frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that
a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that "if there was indeed a
grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each
other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back
trajectory which would lead to an inference that the victim was shot
frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta."23

Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of

the parties at the precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions
would in turn be relevant to a determination of the existence of variables
such as treachery, aggression and so on.

In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the
wounds becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim
and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its
nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of
the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this
case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that
the parties’ positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was
neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the
eyewitness testimony as follows:

"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was
pointed to because the gun was turning."24

xxx xxx xxx

"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his
right hand?

A At first, they were not directly facing each other.

Q So later, they were facing each other?

A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain
steady as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against
force."25

In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:

"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot
frontally. First, because the position of the gun does not necessarily
indicate the position of the person or persons holding the gun when it fired.
This is especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession
of the gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.

"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left
side of the victim during the grappling when the gun fired. The second
wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper
body was pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45
pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun,
Balboa pulling the gun down as he was going down. When the gun went off
the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboa’s body
was going upward because his upper body was pushed downward twisting
to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination,
petitioner testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we
separated from each other. This sequence of events is logical because the
protagonists were grappling over the gun and were moving very fast. x x
x."26

Presence of All the Elements of Accident

The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time
performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by
mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no
intent to cause the injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these
elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a
member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company.
Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer
that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the
latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that
petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim
suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law,
petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon
by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon
was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the
vicinity, including petitioner himself.

Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary

precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun
locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times,
especially within the premises of his working area.

At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to
cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato
Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to
any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm
the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.

The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only
to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as
an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release
of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which
led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the
very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s
culpability.

Petitioner’s Subsequent Conduct Not Conclusive of Guilt

To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner
immediately after the incident was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt
was evident from the fact that he was "dumbfounded," according to the CA;
was "mum, pale and trembling," according to the trial court. These
behavioral reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His
behavior was understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been calmly
escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in
the next breath, he was looking at his companion’s bloodied body. His
reaction was to be expected of one in a state of shock at events that had
transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.

Second Issue:

Self-Defense

Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that

he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb
from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in
which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from
imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not
occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill
the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather,
they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’
attempts to possess the firearm.

Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the
service gun of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion of whether the
assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision

REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

MAPA, J.:

The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of

Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after
the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons
of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John
E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said
crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the
corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.

The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards
Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of
the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so
by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant
affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime,
Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This
witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto
Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he
was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that
when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by
Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him
and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the
corpses.

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by
reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under
such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against
him.

As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that

he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has
been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as
well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate,
expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of
the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence
when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and
guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a
witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness
says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a
confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of
another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to
him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily,
without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as
proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration
of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and
which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not
punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the
defendants criminally liable according to law.

By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the

judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the
costs de oficio in both instances.

So ordered.
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Alberto Barretto for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of
that province an information charging Liberato Exaltacion and
Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they,
subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound
themselves to take part in a rebellion against the Government of the United
States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the
purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by force of arms,
this against the statute in the case made and provided.

In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of
Bulacan, testified under oath that the two defendants were arrested in the
month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a
number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called
general of bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town of
Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers now on pages
2 and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who
recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to them; that the
said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said
documents under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society
was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this statement was
made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of
Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as
witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the defendants told
Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents under fear of
death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been captured. The
witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he
held office as such in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who
was kidnapped in the month of October, 1902.

The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second
July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the
name of God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the
superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death
in the defense of the mother country. The two accused, under oath,
testified to having signed the said documents and alleged that they did so
under compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the
thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one day
when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to
him, who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and
upon his replying in the negative they compelled him in view of his denial to
sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.

The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he
was captured at a place called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and
that on the day following his release, having been unable to pay the $300
which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa.
The defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he was
captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as
policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him
and took him into the forest and there compelled him by threats of death to
sign the documents now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they
allowed him to go upon promise to return. This defendant testified that
Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the hands of
the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released
they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the
presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a
lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been
captured.

The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer,

and Hipolito de Leon — of whom the last two were present when
Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan,
and reported to him what had happened to him — all testified to the same
fact and corroborated the statements of the accused with respect to their
capture and their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness
Morales.

The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above
referred to, signed by the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the
latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the
judgment of the court below.

The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were

kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and that they
signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve
them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are
charged. The conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to
the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio
Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were
released by the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best
demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the
trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of
the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the Exaltacion was unable to
determine the date when he was captured or that on which he appeared
before President Testa.

The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No.
292 not having been established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we
are of the opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the
defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be
informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be
furnished him for his information and guidance.

So ordered.
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.

C.W. Ney for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime
of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of
three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be
no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his
functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness
which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the
evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this
case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal
president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police
officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid
down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).

The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed,

unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant
arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining
witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him
brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of
the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the
extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought
before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True,
three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at
the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace
nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the
peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take
a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all
practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the
other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the
first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which was
intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or
stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same
municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must
assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local
conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the
uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and
more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two
adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that
he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and
delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this
record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest
and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due
performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial
nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind
the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where
the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early
return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not
prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a
local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an
arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a
neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the
forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local
municipal judicial officers.

The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant
must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is
charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.

Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to

reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the
costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging
that the trial court erred:

I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr.

Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and

II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in

sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.

The facts of record may be summarized as follows:

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the
appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five
brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it
was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few
minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and,
having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped
her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked
before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the
appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be
alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called
Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him
to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the
body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it
and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being
asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not,
the appellant answered in the affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day,
Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan,
Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed
still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under
the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the
physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house
and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man,
Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the
child was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had
amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the
appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to
her house at the time and on the date above-stated.

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary,
was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the
appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower
court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-
General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains
that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under
subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment
having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the
child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds
found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by
bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was
found.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be

committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under
said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or
must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her
child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it,
to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the
incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband as he
considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he
knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by
the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had
been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had
no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin

Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and
carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left
the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy,
to the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her
house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact
that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and
that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This
illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as
well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the
circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or
difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover
Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from
books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the
reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not
occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which
causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh
exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child
from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going

into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly
lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child
in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or
any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all
happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal
Code).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations,

and granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in
the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been
so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should
be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant
are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has
the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby
acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with
costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this
case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General

Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.

Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge

Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve
thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).

The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto,

a twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del
Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9,
1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his
father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at
Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided
to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be more
security.

Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed

an extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was
already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner,
Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on
the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.

Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He
poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a
match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help.
Nobody came to succor him.

Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the
municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better
keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that
night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the
cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went
home.

Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-
year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on
the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the
back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If
the burns were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and
tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would
cause death", she said. She explained that, because there was water in the
burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be
complications.

Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate
of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).

The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the
prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor,
Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to
present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention
prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint
affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder.1

It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court,
was a vital witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove
the victim's dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res
gestae.2

In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into

the issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he
was in the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from
Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the
assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt.
Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns
were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.

Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court

branded "as a complete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream for
help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it
happened to be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of
Napola and put out the fire.

Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by

Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio
was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.

The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of removing
Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly
alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he
was not the incendiary.

Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the
credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution
witness and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible
witness. It should be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a
crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police
investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the
fiscal's office. That might explain why it was not immediately discovered
that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.

The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and

Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural
burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given
credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand,
chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole
record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.

This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides
that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).

The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no
alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las
condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la
constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como
el tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la
herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).

The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused
was the cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854).
So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted
lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire
to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the
victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there was
a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused
to warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40
C.J.S. 854, note 90).

There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon
another person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime
of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper
medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs.
Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on
the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly treated. The
victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack
of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man. The person
who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire
(incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64
Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).3

The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public
position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have
maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his
position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The
prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of
his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency.
The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate
for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police
officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as
effectively protect the individual from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs.
Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).

But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed"
(Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts
that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to
maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a
nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating,

circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of
the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with
costs against the appellant.

So ordered.
G.R. No. 125053 March 25, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER CAÑA LEONOR, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR.; C.J.:

In the decision 1 of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212, the

Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, found accused-appellant
Christopher Caña Leonor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as death indemnity; P44,318 as
actual damages; P2 million as moral damages; and P50,000 as attorney's
fees.

CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information 2 whose accusatory portion

reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of

Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and
against the will of complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of
force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of said
complainant did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest
her cash money worth P900.00 and Titus wrist watch valued at an
undetermined amount, belonging to said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on
the occasion of the said Robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, without justifiable reason, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds which caused her death.

At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered a plea of not

guilty. 3

It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos Building in General

Santos Avenue, Bicutan Extension, Parañaque City, at around 11:30 a.m.,
CHRISTOPHER stabbed dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, which wound
ultimately led to her death. That much is admitted by CHRISTOPHER. The
prosecution and the defense differ, however, in the circumstances
surrounding the incident.

The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1 Luis F.

Galeno, PO3 Mateo Interia, Dr. Ravell Ronald Baluyot, Dr. Edgardo de
Guzman, Dr. Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr. John Enrique Franco,
Fernando Tarlengco, Geraldine Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst.
Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray. The defense presented
CHRISTOPHER, Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato
Leonor, and Alexander Pagubasan.
The office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the evidence for the
prosecution as follows:

In the morning, of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by
profession, was at her clinic at the third floor of the Hermanos Building,
Bicutan, Parañaque, Metro Manila, when a man entered and inquired about
the cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee,
the man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor, said that he
would come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came
back[,] and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco
was preparing her dental instruments when Leonor barged in and
demanded money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on the
table. On hearing this, Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, grabbed her watch
and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the clinic and saw the man
running out of the building. Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help.

Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting,

"Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng taong iyon." Baquilod noticed that
Dr. Tarlengco was referring to the man "running out of the building, coming
from upstairs." Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he
was joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted by people
running after a person with bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod
caught up with Leonor, Baquilod grabbed Leonor's hand and took
therefrom a Titus wristwatch and P900 cash. When queried, Leonor readily
answered, "Sir, hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko lang ito dahil
kailangan ng pamilya ko." Leonor was brought to the Parañaque Police
Block Station. PO3 Interia who was instructed to investigate proceeded to
Dr. Tarlengco's clinic, where they saw, among other[ ] [things], a bloodied
balisong (fan knife) at the ground floor of the Hermano's building. Baquilod
turned over the watch and money he took from Leonor to Interia.
Thereafter, Galeno and Interia returned to the police station where they
were interrogated.

Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Centel
where she underwent an emergency operation for a stab wound on her
chest. After the operation, Dr. Tarlengco's father, with the doctor's
permission, was allowed to talk to his daughter inside the operating room.
Although Dr. Tarlengco was gasping for breath, she spoke to her father,
viz:

Q: So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the Operating
Room? What did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?

A: She said that this man pretended to be a patient.

Q: And what else did she say?

A: He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and then she said,
"Dad, when I quoted my price, he said that he would come back and left in
a hurry."
Q: What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?

A: "After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit down first at my
Waiting Area because I [had] to still prepare the instrument needed."

Q: Then, what happened after that?

A: She said, "while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad, this man
barged in. He demanded for my money. I told him it [was] on my table. And
after telling that, Dad, he stabbed me and then he grabbed my watch and
he [ran] away" and she said, "I struggled Dad, to come out of the clinic and
when I was on the porch, I saw this man coming [sic] out of the building. I
shouted for help, I said "Saklolo, saklolo, sinaksak ako ng taong iyan.
Hulihin ninyo."

Q: Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that incident, Mr.
Tarlengco?

A: After that, in tears, she said that "Dad, I don't know, why inspite of
getting my money this man stabbed men" and I was numbed at that point of
time, I [could not] talk anymore, I [could not] tell anything to her anymore, I
just combed her hair with my fingers.

Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room where she

subsequently died.

Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who conducted the post-
mortem examination of the deceased, testified that Tarlengco's stab wound
on the chest could have been caused by single bladed "fan" knife.

Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr. Tarlengco while
reviewing for the BAR Examination, owned a Titus watch similar to that of
her sister. Both watches were given to them by another sister Cecille. On
the morning of May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco strap the watch
on her wrist, Geraldine, likewise, saw her sister, Dr. Tarlengco place in her
wallet one 500-peso bill and four 100-Peso bills, after showing the same to
Geraldine, who earlier was teasing her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, that the
reason why she did not buy the dress she wanted to buy at Cinderella's
was because she had no money. If only to prove her sister Geraldine
wrong, Dr. Tarlengco showed her money which she took from her wallet. 4

Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim, testified that he
got to talk with Dr. Tarlengco at the hospital. He asked Dr. Tarlengco what
happened, and she answered that a man posing as a patient held her up
and stabbed her. 5

Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengco's fiancee, testified that when he learned

about his fiancee's killing, he immediately went to the crime scene and,
thereafter, to the Block 7 police station where he confronted the suspected
killer, Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the latter; thus:
Q: And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the cell of this
suspect?

A: I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I found this man
without any shirt on and he was sitting at the corner and he was trying to
avoid me and I asked him, "Bakit mo ginawa iyon?" Sabi niya, "hindi ko po
naman gusto, Kailangan ko lamang ang pera."

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else did he say, if
any?

A: While I was shouting at him, "Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak mo pa. Bakit

mo ginawa iyon?" "Hindi ko po naman gusto iyon, mahuhuli na po ako,"
sabi niya. "Mahuhuli na po ako kaya ginawa ko iyon?

Q: Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if any?

A: And he told me that he needed the money. 6

SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the statement of
Dr. Tarlengco's father and executed a Referral 7 to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal for CHRISTOPHER's inquest. Interia reported in the
referral that CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with homicide but
forgot to state the property stolen from Dr. Tarlengco. After Mr. Tarlengco
reminded Interia of the stolen items, the latter intercalated into the referral a
reference to P900 and a Titus wristwatch forming part of the evidence
against CHRISTOPHER. 8

Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the impact of her

daughter's death, viz.:

Q: In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco, did your
family incur any expenses?

A: Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we are having
up to this time. You know, up to this time, we kept on weeping. My father,
the grandfather of my daughter, was shocked and in anguish, he also
succumbed to death in less than two months, because of what this evil
person [had] done to us. My work was affected. My wife's work is affected.
There are times when we are at home, we don't know what to do anymore.
We are in total misery. I don't know why this was done to us by the devil
deeds of this person has done to us [sic]. 9

In relation to Dr. Tarlengco's death, her family spent P8,718 for hospital
expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500 charged by Funeraria Malaya where
she was brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250 paid to Manila Memorial,
Inc.; P5,000 for the masses held for Dr. Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for
the food served to the guests at Dr. Tarlengco's wake. 10
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995, at about
6:00 a.m., he left (his town Calauag, Quezon, and boarded a Jam Transit
bus bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan knife in his pocket. He was to
fetch his family for the town fiesta to be held on 25 May 1995. His head and
two of his molar teeth were then aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a
bus bound for Bicutan Extension. 11

Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his

aching teeth pulled. He found Dr. Tarlengco's dental clinic at the third floor
a certain building in General Santos Avenue. He asked Dr. Tarlengco how
much an extraction cost, and was told that the fee was P150 per tooth.
CHRISTOPHER negotiated a charge of P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco
rejected the offer, CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for another
dentist, but before he could make his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco
stopped him and agreed to charge P100 per extraction. CHRISTOPHER
was made to sit on the dental chair as Dr. Tarlengco prepared the
instruments for the extraction. Just as she was about to inject anesthesia,
she remarked that she changed her mind and would charge P150 per tooth
pulled. CHRISTOPHER pushed away Dr. Tarlengco's hand, which angered
her. She castigated and cursed CHRISTOPHER for asking for an
extraction without being able to pay for it. 12

As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco
cursed and pushed him, at which moment he blacked out. 13 He then
sensed that the dentist was in pain, and he saw blood spurting. He realized
that he stabbed the dentist. In shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost
the grip his fan knife, and ran out of the clinic and out of the building. When
he looked back at the clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help, A
security guard, with his shotgun aimed at CHRISTOPHER, ran after the
latter. 14

CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he came

across Police Officer Galeno, who grabbed him by the hand and asked
what happened. He replied, "Sir, nakadisgrasya ako." 15 Galeno warded
off the pursuing security guard who insisted on apprehending
CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought CHRISTOPHER to Block 7, Parañaque
Police Station, and later, to the Police Headquarters along the Coastal
Road in Parañaque. Four policemen, including PO3 Interia, took turns in
mauling and kicking him, and one policeman even took money from his
wallet. Also, his clothes were confiscated. 16

During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had stabbed Dr.

Tarlengco, but denied that he had taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from
the victim. He was surprised when later, he was informed by Assistant
Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray that he would be charged with
robbery with homicide, not homicide only. 17

Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHER's uncle, revealed that at about

noon of 15 May 1995, while he was at home, he received a telephone call
from CHRISTOPHER saying that he had stabbed someone. When he
asked CHRISTOPHER why he stabbed someone the latter answered,
"Aburido ako Kuya Ding, aburido ako." ("I am troubled, Kuya Ding, I am
troubled"). 18

Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHER's father, testified that he went to see his

son at his detention cell but could hardly recognize him because he was
bloodied. He remembered that CHRISTOPHER complained of toothache
before he left for Manila. 19

Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three hours before

the former took the stand. Unassisted by any "dental aid" or nurse, he
determined that two of CHRISTOPHER's teeth were due for extraction 20
and, at the condition they were in, were probably aching as early as a year
before. Citing his experience, Dr. Besa claimed that people complaining of
toothache are usually irritable, although he admitted that none of his
patients complaining from a toothache has ever killed a person or even
brought a fan knife to his clinic. In fact, he never heard of any patient with a
toothache who killed a dentist. He recalled one instance when a patient
boxed him after he unintentionally hurt the patient while pulling a tooth.

These were the evidence before the trial court which merited
CHRISTOPHER's conviction. CHRISTOPHER urges us to modify the
judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and not of robbery
with homicide, and (2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary
surrender, and voluntary confession.

CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

are fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions, and are therefore
obvious concoctions and manufactured evidence. He points out hat
Baquilod failed to mention in his sworn statement, given to the police
immediately after the incident, that he retrieved a Titus wristwatch and
P900 worth of peso bills from CHRISTOPHER. Baquilod likewise testified
that Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help because she was stabbed; she made
mention of having been robbed. Then, too, SPO1 Galeno stated in his
sworn statement that Dr. Tarlengco was only stabbed.

CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod, Galeno,

Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu Guray that he admitted to them on separate
occasions his commission of the offense charged are inadmissible because
the admission was not in writing, was not made with the assistance of a
counsel, and was not preceded by a warning as to the consequences of the
admission. In any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence.
Additionally, he stresses the possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she
caused the filing against him of the information for robbery with homicide.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General refutes CHRISTOPHER's
claims, asserting that the robbery was duly and satisfactorily established by
the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father, corroborated by the
testimonies of Baquilod and Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim
that she was robbed when she shouted for help from her clinic's balcony is
of no moment, since she later told Dr. Franco and her father of the
complete events that transpired. Galeno's failure to mention in his Sworn
statement that money and a wristwatch were retrieved from
CHRISTOPHER does not negate his claim to that effect, because he later
stated that fact in his testimony. The settled rule is that testimonies in open
court are superior to affidavits taken ex parte. That Interia inserted the
stolen items in the Police Referral does not diminish the truth of the
allegation of robbery, since it appears that the intercalation was intended to
make the Referral accurate.

The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of the
highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with
the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing
witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances
of weight and influence that have been overlooked which, if considered, will
affect the result of the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical
and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide
questions of credibility, since he has heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying. 21 Nevertheless, in view of the
gravity of the charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to
meticulously review the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER
had indeed committed the offense charged and the prosecution's evidence
it beyond reasonable doubt.

CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of

evidence, therefore, shifted to him; he had to prove a justifying 22 or
exempting 23 circumstance to avoid criminal liability. He miserably failed to
do so.

The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr.

Tarlengco by reason or on the occasion of a robbery 24 with the use of
violence against or intimidation of a person. One could be convicted of
robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively
as any other essential element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain
of personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person or by using force upon things, constitutes
robbery. 25

Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered

from CHRISTOPHER as belonging to Dr. Tarlengco. These testimonies
indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal property belonging to Dr.
Tarlengco, consistent with the disputable presumption that a person found
in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act. 26 While CHRISTOPHER denied that
Dr. Tarlengco's watch and money were recovered from him, the
independent and corroborative testimonies of police officer Galeno and
guard Baquilod prove otherwise. The trial court found the testimonies of
these two witnesses more credible, and we see no reason to depart from
its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also pointed out that the intercalation of
stolen items in Interia's referral report to the Prosecutor indicated the
fabrication of robbery charges against him. But the intercalation was
sufficiently explained as an honest mistake, especially considering that
Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before the
intercalation, that the charge against CHRISTOPHER was robbery with
homicide.

It is indisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengco's

belongings. The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a
presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was
deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the
presumption becomes one of robbery. 27 The prosecution proved in this
case that there was violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr.
Tarlengco's property.

Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando

Tarlengco, the victim's father, because he stated the most incriminating
piece of evidence — the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco. While,
generally, a witness can testify only to those facts which are derived from
his own perception, 28 a recognized exception thereto is the reportage in
open court of the declaration of a dying person made under the
consciousness of an impending death where that person's death is the
subject of inquiry in the case. 29 To be admissible, a dying declaration
must (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant's
death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) be
made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper
influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been
competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify.

Dr. Tarlengco's dying declaration complied with the above requisites. She
talked about the incident which led to her condition. The declaration was a
first-hand account of the incident, bereft of opinion or conjecture. The
account was made in a criminal case where her death was part of the
subject of inquiry. And, most important, she was convinced that she was
about to die; thus:

Atty. Revilla:

Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw her inside
the operating room?

Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, "Dad, I have a feeling I can no
longer endure this."

Atty. Revilla:

Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were talking to
her, Mr. Tarlengco?

A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep herself
awake, and in my desire to help her awake, I asked her what happened.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Revilla:

Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating room, after
that, Mr. Tarlengco?

Witness Tarlengco:

A On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping and
complaining of pain and gasping for breath. . . . 30

Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to be her
patient demanded money from her. After she surrendered her money to
him, the latter stabbed her and took her watch as she lay injured.

The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was
committed, there being violence and intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but
that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of said robbery.

Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case. CHRISTOPHER

claims that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as the act
committed; that there was sufficient provocation by the offended party
immediately preceding the offense; that he acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have produced in him passion and obfuscation; that he
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority; and that he voluntarily
confessed having committed homicide.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide

cases where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds
on vital organs of the victim, 31 as in this case.

The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to

the gravity of the retaliatory act. 32 The events which led to the stabbing
were described by CHRISTOPHER as follows:

Q: Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anesthesia, you said
Dra. Tarlengco changed the price from P100.00 to P150.00. Then, you
parried her hand. Is that correct?
A: Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]

Q: What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?

A: The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.

Q: When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at the dental
chair? Right?

A: Opo.

Q: After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you, right?

A: No, sir. I just said "why did you change the price?" and I stood up. That
was the time she cursed me.

Q: When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an instrument?

A: No, Sir. she just got mad.

Q: Did she slap you on your face?

A: No, Sir. She just pushed me.

Q: And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body?

A: No, Sir.

Q: And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body?

A: She just told me bad words. 33

CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and "bad words" justify

retaliation with a knife. Such claim is undeserving of belief and does not
entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of prior
provocation by the offended party.

CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation

as, according to him, he momentarily blacked out and instantly found his
fan knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengco's chest. To be blinded by passion and
obfuscation is to lose self-control, 34 not consciousness. Moreover, courts
cannot appreciate passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing
that there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful
excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control. 35 As we
discussed earlier, the events leading to the stabbing precluded any natural
tendency to produce a powerful excitement in CHRISTOPHER.

CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in authority

or to any other person. While he was being pursued by Security Guard
Baquilod, he intentionally went to where there were many people,
presumably to confuse Baquilod, Furtunately, Police Officer Galeno was
able to grab him by the hand and prevented him from further eluding
justice. There is nothing in the record which can lead us to conclude that he
surrendered to anyone.

Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating
circumstance contemplated by law is a plea of guilty made spontaneously
and unconditionally in open court before the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution. 36 CHRISTOPHER made no such plea.

What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The penalty for

robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. 37 There being no
evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or in favor of
CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be
imposed, 38 without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 39 We
likewise believe that the awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengco's family of moral
damages of P2 million and attorney's fees of P500,000 are excessive. We
reduce them to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of

Parañaque in Criminal Case No. 95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As monified,
accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAÑA LEONOR is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as indemnity for death;
P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as
attorney's fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.

Filemon A. Cosio for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San

Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served. The
accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten, proceeded to the
kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's
answer was; "There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of
you." The effect of this on the accused as explained by him in his
confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as
the provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting
down, the accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with an
ax, causing death the following day.

As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of

course not interfere with the findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the
penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit
of a mitigating circumstance which on cursory examination would not
appear to be justified. This mitigating circumstance was that the act was
committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony.

The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to

whether this circumstance was rightly applied. That there was immediate
vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo to the
accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a
grave offense" is more uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the
words "gato que arañaba a todo el mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto,
como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating
circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13,
1886.) But the same court has held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu
padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of October 22, 1894.) We consider
that these authorities hardly put the facts of the present case in the proper
light. The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would
to the average person be considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant,
an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke
in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower
court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance,
and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the penalty provided
for the crime of murder.
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to
seventeen years four months and one day of cadena temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to
pay the costs is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

So ordered.
G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Branch VIII, Manila dated October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro Pajares y Florentino"
convicting herein appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.

Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in an

Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely
sought to insure and better accomplish his criminal design, in the City of
Manila. Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with five (5) others whose true names, real Identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
and treachery, attack, assault. and use personal violence upon one
DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by then and there mauling him and
hitting him with a baseball bat at the back of the head, a vital part of the
body, thereby inflicting upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN a
club wound on the head which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death.

Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p. 1)

He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in an

Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely
sought to insure and better accomplish his criminal design, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with five (5) others whose true names, real identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by mauling
and hitting him with a baseball bat at the back, a vital part of the body,
thereby inflicting upon him a club wound at the back which is necessarily
mortal and fatal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, because of the timely and able medical attendance rendered upon
the said RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which prevented his death.

Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 1)

Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 5; Original Records of Criminal Case No.
85-40580, p. 8). Upon the petition of herein appellant that the two (2) cases
be consolidated, a joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong, Salud

Manguba, Pat. Conrado Bustillos, Dr. Norman Torres, Dr. Prospero
Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan and Arlene Viojan as witnesses while only
appellant Leandro Pajares took the witness stand for the defense.

Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the

same Renato Perez who is the victim in Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for
Frustrated Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11,
1985, he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store
located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy something. They were walking
abreast with each other, the deceased was at his right side and was a bit
ahead of him, when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and
hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a short
distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to
help Viojan. he, too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting
him at the back below the left shoulder. He then grappled with the appellant
for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's companions, namely:
Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost
consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by
Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was treated for the injuries he
sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7, 1986, pp. 4-23). He identified in
court the baseball bat used by Pajares (TSN, Hearing of September 16,
1986, p. 36).

On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant Pajares for

less than a year and that although they both live in Zone 89, he and the
deceased belonged to a group which is an adversary of the group of the
accused (Ibid., pp. 39-41).

Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No. 6, WPD,
testified that he was on duty on October 12, 1985 when one Napoleon
Gabawa sought their assistance regarding a killing incident that happened
in Gomez Street, Paco, Manila. They went to the house of appellant
Leandro Pajares at 1453 Gomez St., Paco, Manila and invited the latter
and his brother to the station for questioning regarding the aforementioned
incident. Pajares verbally admitted his participation in the incident (TSN,
Hearing of March 11, 1986, p. 26). The incident was registered in the
Police Blotter Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal
Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33)

On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant Pajares under

arrest after he verbally admitted that he was responsible for the death of
Diosdado Viojan, but the booking sheet and arrest report has not been
accomplished yet (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p 27).
Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of Investigation,
testified that she examined a baseball bat for the presence of blood upon
the written request of Pat. Conrado Bustillos (Exhibit "C-1", Original
Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 69). In connection with the
study she made, she submitted Biology Report No. B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C".
Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 68) that shows the
absence of blood on the baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of June 23, 1986, pp.
30-32).

Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call he

received from the Philippine General Hospital on October 12 1985 he went
to the morgue of the said hospital to investigate a dead on arrival case of
one Diosdado Viojan. A close examination of the body of the latter showed
that he suffered a fracture at the back of the skull. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the scene of the crime to make an ocular inspection where he
was informed that there was another victim by the name Renato Perez.
Pat. Bustillos further testified that Renato Perez was investigated at the
Homicide Section and that the latter executed a sworn statement (Exhibit
"F" Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p 208) in relation to
the incident. In the same manner, Roberto Pajares. brother of herein
appellant was also investigated and who also executed a sworn statement
(Exhibit "G", Ibid., p. 219) The alleged murder weapon, a baseball bat, was
turned over to him by Cpl. Ben Macalindog (TSN, November 18, 1986, p.
46).

Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General Hospital,

testified that on October 12, 1985, a certain Diosdado Viojan was brought
to the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital for head injury,
left occipital region. The victim was in critical condition necessitating
immediate surgery. He did not personally attend the operation but learned
that the victim died while undergoing the surgery. Witness further averred
that the injury could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a baseball
bat (TSN, Hearing of December 2, 1986, p. 46).

Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of

Investigation, testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of
Diosdado Viojan and in connection therewith submitted Autopsy Report No.
N-85-2161 (Exhibit "L", Original Records on Criminal Case No. 85-40579,
p. 224) indicating that the cause of death was "Hemorrhage, meningeal,
severe, traumatic". He further testified that a single forceful blow against
the head using a blunt instrument like a baseball bat could have caused the
injury (TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987, pp. 58-60).

Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan, testified that

when her son died, she hired the services of Tree Amigos Funeral Parlor
for P12,000.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 10511 (Exhibits "P"
and "Q", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229)
(TSN, Hearing of February 23. 1988, p. 66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the incident
her husband was working with PEMCO earning about P500.00 a week. At
the time of the incident, she was three (3) months on the family way. She
gave birth to a baby girl and it was her parents-in-law who paid for the
expenses during her delivery. At the moment, she is living with her parents
(TSN, Hearing of April 4, 1988, p. 67).

Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the

prosecution. He asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the
name Dado, having met him once at the store, and Renato Perez by the
name Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store of Alex Blas
with about eight (8) other People watching television. Hence, he did not see
who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the
advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At about 3:30 in the morning
of October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house. Without asking
any question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN,
Hearing of August 1, 1988, pp. 72-76).

At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the

crime since a gun was poked at him. He identified his signature at the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit "J", Original Records of Criminal
Case No 85-40579, p. 222) but alleged that he signed the same without
being allowed to read the contents thereof without the assistance of
counsel and while being held at the collar at the back of his shirt. He
likewise averred that during investigation the investigating policemen
molested him like "pinipitik-pitik" his ears with rubber band or chopping his
neck with karate chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He, however, admitted that even
after several days he did not complain about what were done to him (Ibid.,
p. 128).

On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5) houses
away from the store of Alex Blas, the scene of the crime (TSN, Hearing of
August 22, 1983, pp. 90-91). He likewise denied any knowledge about any
quarrel between his brother, Roberto Pajares and the deceased Diosdado
Viojan (TSN, Hearing of September 19, 1988, p. 108).

As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October 25,

1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered finding herein accused LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO of
1433-B, Gomez St., Paco, Manila, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges against him, as follows:

CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:

The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and
there being no modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him
to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory
penalties of the law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her child the sum of:
P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral expenses; P15,000.00 as moral
damages; and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and
finally the costs of the suit.

CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:

The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Slight Physical Injuries as defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art.
27, both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing him to an
imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.

Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.

SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)

Hence this appeal.

Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is
tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment which is
prohibited by the Constitution. Appellant points out that hours before the
clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger brother, was
mauled by the group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court
referring to the entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of
Roberto Pajares. The mauling of the latter is a big insult and truly offending
to the appellant and his family. Hence, the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by
herein appellant was a vindication of the grave offense committed against
his family. a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering further that the appellant was just
nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the offense the penalty
imposed by the court a quo should have been seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).

The appeal is devoid of merit.

In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery,

the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness Renato
Perez which it found to be credible. According to the lower court, the latter
"gave his account on what was done to them by the accused and his
companions in a simple, candid, straightforward manner" (RTC Decision.
Rollo, p. 36).

It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses

by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because it
is the trial court that has the opportunity to observe them on the stand and
detect if they are telling the truth or lying in their teeth (People v. Santito,
Jr., G.R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991 [201 SCRA 87]). The appellate court
can only read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses which commonly
is translated from the local dialect into English. In the process of converting
into written form the statement of living human beings, not only fine
nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching
and listening, may escape the reader of the written translated words
(People v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 99258, September 13, 1991 [201 SCRA 616]).

Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store
of Alex Blas, watching television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas
even advised him to go home so as not to be involved in the incident.
However, the latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's testimony.
Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it
must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could
have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the
time of the commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September
4. 1991 (201 SCRA 317]). In the case at bar, appellant was within the
vicinity of the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the

perpetrator of the crime. In the face of the clear and positive testimony of
the prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the
crime, the accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness. The Positive
identification of the accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime
cannot be overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such positive
identification of the accused that he killed the victim establishes the guilt of
the accused beyond moral certainty (People v Arroyo, supra).

The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery.
There is treachery, the law says, when the offender adopts means,
methods or forms in the execution of the felony which ensure its
commission without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make (People v. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30,
1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit
Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind without any warning
thereby precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.

Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is

whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it may be true that
appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the
deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in
the Police Blotter (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case
No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits "G",
"Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a
lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of
Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable
appellant to recover his serenity (People v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042,
December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his
favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with modification that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with the policy of this Court on the matter.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.

TORRES, J.:

For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus
Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman,
illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro
Province, until trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of
1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live
with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new
relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the
Army who then went to live in the said house.

On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks

together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from
the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal
Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes,
asked the corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the
corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation,
Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him
the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to
which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to
live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can
live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my
mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was
drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand,
but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that,"
whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the
partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who
was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side
of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour
later.

Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went
to render assistance and wrested the weapon from the hand of the
accused. The latter immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to
the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail;
and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported
that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused
Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver
cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who
reported the occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908,
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of said province charging
Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings were instituted, the
trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the
10th of September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty
of death, to be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to this court for review.

The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case,
constitute the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the
Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and
roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at
close, if not point blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and
unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a conversation, in
which she was concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and
after usual and customary words had passed between her and her
aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred that means,
manners, and forms were employed in attack that directly and specially
insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to the author
thereof as might have been offered by the victim who, owing to the
suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place
where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.

The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his
exculpatory allegations which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the
evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively
establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully
convicted author of the violent and treacherous death of his former
mistress, Agustina Sola.

It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of
Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but managed to support
himself on his two hands, and when he got up again the said corporal
threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew
his revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his
revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.

This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the

witnesses Wallace Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd
Nickens in their respective declaration, especially with that of the second
and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at
the deceased, as shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached
the accused in order to take his weapon away from him which he
succeeded in doing after a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out
of the house. Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in the breast and
caused her death was not due to an accident but to a willful and
premeditated act on the part of the aggressor with intent to deprive the
victim of her life.

In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to,

the presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation,
and the fact that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased
should be taken into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances
appears proven from the testimony of several witnesses who were
examined at the trial of the case.

Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as
committed with treachery, the circumstance of premeditation should only be
considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is, however, manifest
and evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused.
According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited,
Hicks asked leave from the former to be absent from the canteen where he
was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging
that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also
shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon
the latter's invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the
revolver, the instrument of the crime, was lying on the table on which were
also several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring
to the deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see
her dead than in the arms of another man, and when the accused went to
bed apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when called, the
witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in
the cuprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of
cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,

deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had
left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a
clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges
besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting
everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to
be a proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his
apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully
accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planed
to do beforehand.

As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating

circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article
9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by
jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which
mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is
in accordance with the law, it is our opinion that the same should be
affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however, that the
death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in
the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory
penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly
remitted in the pardon.

So ordered.
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

F.C. Fisher for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which
he was convicted in the court below is conclusively established by the
evidenced of record.

The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to
fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the
medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of
opinion that the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article
9 should have been taken into consideration, and that the prescribed
penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of
article 9 is as follows:

The following are extenuating circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have

produced passion and obfuscation.

The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion,
killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or
lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a
mutual acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict
was entitled to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his
offense under the provisions of the above-cited article.

This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts
as set forth in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada
(p. 69, in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:

Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for

having caught her in her underclothes with another party and afterwards
shoots himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible for that crime with
the extenuating circumstance of having acted with violent passion and
obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba did not so hold and its
judgment was reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of
article 9, number 8, of the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts
held to be true by the trial court, and which were the immediate cause of
the crime by producing in the accused strong emotion which impelled him
to the criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient
impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion
and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation,
and as the judgment did not take into consideration the 8th circumstance of
article 9 of the code, the Audiencia rendering it seems to have violated this
legal provision."

It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that
the "causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-
control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise
from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the
benefit of the provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the
ground that the alleged causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate
from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,

deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had
left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a
clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges
besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting
everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to
be in a proper manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his
apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully
accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had
planned to do beforehand.

In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the
aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations
with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being
merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go
and live with another man. In the present case however, the impulse upon
which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and
obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with
him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his
discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the supreme
court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in
the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and
obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating
circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.

Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the
reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the
judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should
be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated April 15, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,2 in Criminal Case No.
A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P21,730.00 as actual expenses.1âwphi1.nêt

The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant
with the crime of parricide reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the intent to and being
then armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with
the said weapon one FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate
spouse, and as a result of which his said wife suffered fatal injuries which
directly caused her death immediately thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

Contrary to law. 3

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial

ensued.

The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion

Javier Panit and Alma Javier, daughters of the victim and accused-
appellant, and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as follows:

Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier

were legally married on December 18, 1954. 4 In their forty-one years of
marriage, they begot ten children. Accused-appellant and Florentina lived
at Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier.5

On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three o'clock in the morning,
Consolacion Javier Panit, who lives near her parent's house about ten to
fifteen meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac
ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she
heard her mother scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house
and met her sister, Alma who, weeping, told her that their parents were
quarrelling. Alma, at the time of the incident was living in her parents'
house. Consolacion and Alma then proceeded to their brother Manuel's
house, which is located about seventy to eighty meters away from their
parents' house. The three then proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel,
who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother and his father,
accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then ordered
Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their father to the hospital. At this
point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead and that their
father confessed to him that he killed his wife and there after allegedly
stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their bedroom, drenched in
her own blood. 6

Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband,

and her son, Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help. 7

SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas

Police Station in La Union, testified in the investigation he conducted with
SP04 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza regarding the incident of
June 15, 1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the
barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant
allegedly killed his wife. The police authorities then proceeded to accused-
appellant's house in Brgy. Tugod, Sto.Tomas, where they saw Florentina
lying in the bedroom floor covered with blood. Upon interviewing the
victim's children, Pacho testified that Manuel told him that his father
confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to him the bolo
covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo was
allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. 8 The medical
findings indicated that the victim suffered from multiple injuries and her
neck was almost cut off from her body. 9

Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his

wife in their bedroom with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as
the same one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A" and which he
used in wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed
his wife because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that
when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know
what he was doing. 10 He claims that he was insane at the time of the
incident.

The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April

15, 1997 rendered a decision finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused,

Eduardo Javier y Basin is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death;
to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
for the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and to pay
the cost of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.11
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty, considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and obfuscation. 12
While accused-appellant does not question the decision of the trial court in
rejecting his defense of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a
lower penalty because at the time of the incident, he was suffering from
loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time, which would have caused him
to commit the crime.

He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit
relationship with another man, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to
commit the crime.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-
appellant cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of illness in the absence
of a medical finding to support his claim. Accused-appellant cannot likewise
be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the
absence of sufficient evidence.

We find the appeal bereft of merit.

Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as

defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court
rejected this defense of insanity for failure of the defense to prove that
accused-appellant was indeed insane at the time of the incident. The
defense never presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor
was a psychiatrist ever presented to validate the defense of insanity.
Equally important, the defense, during trial, never alleged the above-
claimed mitigating circumstances of illness and passion and obfuscation,
thus weakening the case of accused-appellant.

In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had

been suffering from insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to
commit an act beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The
defense went on to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial
sleep loss to support his contentions. 13

For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated,

the law requires the presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2) such illness
should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. 14

Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent

upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this
case, however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went
blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was
presented regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. This Court
can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere
presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was
shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his
exercise of will-power at the time of the killing.

On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts
he committed. First, he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with
the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying
to commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in
killing his wife; and he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he
remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from
the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows
that he was in full control of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that
he was suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of his will-
power. On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating
circumstance alleged by accused-appellant.

Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to

mitigate his criminal liability.

In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to

obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) there should be an
act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2)
said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 15 The foregoing elements
were not proved to be present in instant case. In fact, during accused-
appellant's testimony, he even stated that he was not jealous of his wife.

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:

In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced
alleged passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not
account how he killed his wife nor did he explain the cause why he was
prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for applying
to him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause
which produced it has not been established. 16

All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his

suspicions regarding his wife, aggravated by his illness made it possible for
him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down his
criminal liability.

Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will
generally not be disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best
position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence considering that it
observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial.
In the case at bar, the trial court was able to observe the behavior of
accused-appellant and it stated that his recollection of the details
surrounding the killing is so impeccable that only a person in his right mind
can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the
crime of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:

Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not

punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the
lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.17

In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not
allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the
prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance. 18 Likewise,
no mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the
accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed.

As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00
imposed by the trial court as one of civil indemnity instead of as moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union,

Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140937 February 28, 2001
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31,
1999, and resolution, dated November 22, 1999, of the Court of Appeals,1
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin,
Southern Leyte,2 finding petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of
P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974,
and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

The information against petitioner alleged:

That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province

of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1) black
female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to
his damage and prejudice in the amount aforestated.1âwphi1.nêt

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The prosecution established the following facts:

Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject
of the case, upon its birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained under the
care of Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave the care
and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24,
1984 to March 17, 1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March
2, 1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March
14, 1986 when it was lost.4 It appears that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan
in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he
came back for it at past 9 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay
found the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of
Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had
taken the animal.5

Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover
the animal from petitioner's wife, but they were informed that petitioner had
delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time
barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the
two went to Florentino's house. On their way, they met petitioner who told
them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his father's house, where
Maria recognized the cow. As petitioner's father was not in the house,
petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that
they could talk the matter over with his father.

However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the
matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte.6 As a result, Narciso and
petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted
taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December
3, 1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17,
1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim (Exh. B).7

Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986,

signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two
years old and female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing
of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on
the right and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs.
C, C-1 to 4).8 All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same
one they had taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex,
and its color. Gardenio described the cow as black in color, with a small
portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the
middle of the forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears,
and four cowlicks located near the base of its forelegs and the hindlegs.9

On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an

agreement which he had with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take
care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which petitioner
would get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that
the cow in question was his share and that it was born on December 5,
1984. This cow, however, was lost on December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he
reported the loss to the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog,
on December 3, 1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1).10

Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had
seen the cow at Pilipogan, under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He,
therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see
whether the cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner
took it with him and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father
Florentino Canta.11 Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino refused
to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso so that they could
determine the ownership of the cow.12 As Narciso did not come the
following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he told his son to take the
cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told.
Three days later, Florentino and Exuperancio were called to the police
station for investigation.13

Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated

February 27, 198514 and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at
the treasurer's office of the municipality of Padre Burgos, to the effect that
he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of
petitioner Exuperancio Canta on February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5).15 The
statement was executed at the preliminary investigation of the complaint
filed by petitioner against Narciso.16

Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal

treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate
of Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E,
E-1 and 2).17 On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986
but, at the instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27,
1985.18

On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner
guilty of the offense charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the
prosecution, the trial court stated:

From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it
is indubitable that it was accused Exuperancio Canta who actually took the
cow away without the knowledge and consent of either the
owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio Agapay.

That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and
stealth considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay
was at his shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but
separated by a hill.

The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by
claiming ownership. He, however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused
alleged that on February 27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On
rebuttal Franklin Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and
even categorically declared that it was only on March 24, 1986 that the
accused brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos, when he
issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on
February 27, 1985. Franklin Telen testified thus:

"Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle

was issued by you on February 27, 1985. Is that correct?

A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.

(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)"

The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less

than the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN,
September 29, 1992, pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why
would he lie on its registration? And why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin
Telen to antedate its registry? It is clear that accused secured a Certificate
of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning and manipulation
(Exhs. A & B) only after the act complained of in the instant case was
committed on March 14, 1986. His claim of ownership upon which he
justifies his taking away of the cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other
hand, the complainant has shown all the regular and necessary proofs of
ownership of the cow in question.19

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended
that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal
intent in taking the disputed cow.

First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He
cites the following circumstances to prove his claim:

1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question

would suckle to the mother cow, thus proving his ownership of it;

2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the

Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985 in his
name, and found that they tally;

3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking
it, and later to the police authorities, after a dispute arose as to its
ownership; and

4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P. D.

No. 533.

These contentions are without merit.

P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as

. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the

consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether
or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things.

The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is
taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent
of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5)
the taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is
accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things.20

These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the
cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking
the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the
cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the
owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay,
despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal
for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking
to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner
adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to deprive Narciso of his
possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence
or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the
commission of the crime.

Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large

Cattle which petitioner presented to prove his ownership was falsified.
Franklin Telen, the janitor in the municipal treasurer's office, admitted that
he issued the certificate to petitioner 10 days after Narciso's cow had been
stolen. Although Telen has previously executed a sworn statement claiming
that he issued the certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted that
he antedated it at the instance of petitioner Exuperancio Canta, his friend,
who assured him that the cow was his.21

Telen's testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal

treasurer of Padre Burgos that no registration in the name of petitioner was
recorded in the municipal records. Thus, petitioner's claim that the cowlicks
found on the cow tally with that indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle has no value, as this same certificate was issued after the cow
had been taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay. Obviously, he had
every opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the certificate would
tally with that existing on the cow in question.

The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to
the police authorities does not prove his good faith. He had already
committed the crime, and the barangay captain to whom he delivered the
cow after taking it from its owner is his own father. While the records show
that he filed on April 30, 1986 a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel,
the complaint was dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as a
countercharge to a complaint earlier filed on April 16, 1986 against him by
Narciso Gabriel.

Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question
would suckle to the mother cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to
alien cows.22 Hence, the fact that the cow suckled to the mother cow
brought by petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the
mother cow.

Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of

Ownership is "not in order," it does not necessarily follow that he did not
believe in good faith that the cow was his. If it turned out later that he was
mistaken, he argues that he committed only a mistake of fact but he is not
criminally liable.

Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership is not only "not in order." It is

fraudulent, having been antedated to make it appear it had been issued to
him before he allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such
fraudulent certificate and made use of it negates his claim of good faith and
honest mistake. That he took the cow despite the fact that he knew it was
in the custody of its caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of
his act.23 As the Solicitor General states in his Comment:

If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified
the identity and/or ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or
Gardenio Agapay, who is petitioner's cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26).
Petitioner, however, did not do so despite the opportunity and instead
rushed to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner had committed a mistake of
fact he is not exempted from criminal liability due to his negligence.24

In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the
knowledge and permission of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had
allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his
claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that "The true owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of the property." What petitioner did in
this case was to take the law in his own hands.25 He surreptitiously took
the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act
belies his claim of good faith.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the
finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-
appellant is guilty as charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb their
findings.

However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two

respects.

First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating

circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of
voluntary surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority
or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.26 In the present
case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact,
no complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow
to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be
voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the
authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that his search and capture would require.27 In petitioner's case,
he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it
unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the
trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be
considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be considered in
favor of petitioner.

Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of §2(c) of
P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D.
No. 533 as a special law and applied §1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by
the same." However, as held in People v. Macatanda,28 P. D. No. 533 is
not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification
and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus
indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal
Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, §10 of the
law provides:

The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance

in the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case
should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision
mayor in its maximum period.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the

modification that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to
suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death
of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he
was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages
and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The information alleges:

That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of

Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident
premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo
Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties,
inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which
directly caused his death.

Contrary to law

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following

facts:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC
Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine
Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of
Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang
market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p.
21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the
glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his
whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt.
Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after
Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his
waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana
appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's
waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to
go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and
the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2)
meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and
Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt.
Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled
out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the
receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign
the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to
return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter
that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang,
Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled
out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several
times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter
(pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).

While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt.
Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and
policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate table about
one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused
and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo
Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the
same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the
combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and
thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately
thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building
of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana
brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired
several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused
(pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the
cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are
embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which
reads as follows:

Postmortem findings.

General:

Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with

postmortem lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are
dilated. Finger and toe tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy
incision at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior
midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at
the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior
midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2)
stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each, respectively.

TRUNK:

(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the
anterior midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior
wards and slightly upwards, passing superficially between muscles and
tissues.

(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the
anterior midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior
wards, downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th
intercostal space.

(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior
midline, 96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards,
upwards and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach
and the gastric vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and
infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the right lung.

(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm.
from the posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.

UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm,
measuring 3 by 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.

(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right
index finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.

Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic
cavity.

There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater
curvature of the stomach.

There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and

intrathoracic hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body,
perforating the stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of
the right lung.

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies
on the following facts:

At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and
his wife were in a restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in
order to take their lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal
where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant,
the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a
person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer
alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be
served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro
Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After
receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him
in his table. The accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to
the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who,
however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their
conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about
smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not
reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked
the accused for his identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling
Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his
picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League
of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).

Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and
after the accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it
away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his
pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter
got mad and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me
or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt.
Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the
accused on the head with its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood
gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the
accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer,
pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times and then
pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79,
Ibid).

The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang,

Cavite, where he intended to surrender to the authorities. But on his way,
he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of
Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that
he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If
here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused
to the municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang,
Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just
across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p.
4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was
brought back by the Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he
was detained for two days before he was picked up by the Philippine
Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in
Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p.
6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused
as heretofore stated.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear,

sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA
410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6
SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80
Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59
Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove justification, the accused must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57;
People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496;
People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264,
270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7
7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the
wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally liable
for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of
legitimate self-defense.

In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt.
Guillermo Masana who committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit
him on his head with the handle of his gun after he refused to surrender his
(accused's) ID to him.

This claim does not merit belief.

The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased
because the same was his and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him
with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this
refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to
the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the
accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after
the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of
authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except
in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance,
and finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be
obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact
to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the incident happened,
he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing
(pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that
it was the accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased
and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun
be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the
aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in
his death.

The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he
parried the third blow. This claim is belied by the record. During the trial,
the court a quo asked the accused to show the scar produced by the
injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus —
Court

Q Where is that scar?

(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"

[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].

Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the
foregoing testimony in his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:

Injuries:

(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.

(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe

(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .

The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-
77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that before the stabbing incident took
place, the deceased and the accused were facing each other. If that was
the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the
accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on
the right side of his head and and on his right ear lobe WE find that this
particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him
twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow and then
stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the scar but
also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the
protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both
right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not
parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right,
side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such
claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course
of human behavior.

The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier

Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried with both hands the thrust of the
appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head on the edge of
the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.

When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on
his way to the municipal building from the scene of the stabbing incident
purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that he told the Chief
of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his
(Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his
injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal building of Indang,
Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC
Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any written statement,
much less inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt.
Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more
than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed self-defense during
the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of
Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really
acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief of Police
at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who
allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana
hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering
for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made
before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid
constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was
committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since
the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and
unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of
any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth,
must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.

The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after
he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses
that the police was present during the incident between the appellant and
the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the
knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.

II. Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or

homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of authority?

According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder

because "it was established by the prosecution that during the stabbing
incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting
upon mortal wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a
sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to flee or
defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery"
(p. 14, Appellee's brief).

In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S.
vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).

WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied

by the following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:

COURT

Q What is the truth?

A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo
Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on the
edge of a table; that is why he sustained an injury and blood oozed from his
head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied).

Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:

ATTY. MUÑOZ

Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a table and
you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?

A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally bumped
his head on the table.

Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the extent that
he bumped his head on the table?

A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana already
stabbed?

A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed.

pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].

After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of

Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that
the assailant and the victim were indeed face to face when the stabbing
took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was
able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he
used in warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his
head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical
treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the
moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support
a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167).
Besides, the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation
to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at
the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate
(People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs.
Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused employed
means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to
himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within
striking distance of his three companions, two of whom were police officers.
Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused and the victim
about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and
at the moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a
knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly,
therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was
the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This
kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the
commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be
proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51
Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised
Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because

the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a
person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple
reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then
knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a
person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did attack
and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance
of his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex
crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred
in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the
required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would
only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this
principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a
peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt
or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal
Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party
on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person
attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties,
because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault
the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority
(People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil.
1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).

In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was
held that failure to expressly alleged in the information that the accused
had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority does not
render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein
from which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person
attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault
upon a person in authority reads as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the

crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba,

Municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a
public school teacher in the school bonding of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on
the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced and
kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss
Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstances of having committed it inside the school building and during
school classes.

Contrary to law.

And the ruling of the Court was:

Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance
of official duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148,
Revised Penal Code).

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978),
"teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public
or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be
deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of article 148." This
special classification is obviously intended to give teachers protection,
dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official duties. The
lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is
no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge
that the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly
erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the

accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in
the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in
authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status
as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance
thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code).
This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De
Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta
vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305,
Nov. 28, 1975), the information for Direct Assault reads:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin,

Municipality of Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto
Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was
armed with a piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with
said pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin
of said municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said
councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties.

The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:

Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the

information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority
and that such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such
allegation is fatal in this case."

The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on

certiorari.

This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for
review on certiorari but the refiling of a valid information against the
accused, for the following considerations:

The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed

that '(I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the
merits. There is want of factual finding upon which their conviction or
acquittal could have been based.'

It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the

information was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the
crime of direct assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the
position of authority held by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio
councilman (and hence the agent of a person in authority under Article 152
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See
U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11,
Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].

What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal
is that it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the
position of authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school
teacher, then engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it
is not necessary to allege further that the accused also knew that such
position was that of a person in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the

accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in
the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in
authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on `his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status
as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance
whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil
Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or
penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for reasons of expediency, policy
and necessity.

Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the

information for failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the
merits with factual findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent
that the fiscal's proper course is not the present petition but the refiling of a
valid information against respondents-accused, as herein indicated.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of

a valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated
(emphasis supplied).

The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc.,
supra, applies to the instant case; because the information in the former is
strikingly similar to the information in the latter and does not allege facts
from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the
person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated

because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a
PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling
Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.

The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such,
refers to a high social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or
station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are
placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law
Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster
Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon
an officer in order to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in
matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which
to determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official
standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of
comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, p. 100).

Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People
vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant
Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk
therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the
murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People
vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor
(People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief
of police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero 88
Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First
Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG
7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere
chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of
an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).

As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals,

those "generally considered of high station in life, on account of their rank
(as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever
there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the
offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present"
(Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).

The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a

mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with
assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder,
then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or
insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because
either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the
appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating
circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or
frustrated murder, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was
appreciated:

(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service
Commission, was charged with and convicted of the murder of the
assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;

(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and
convicted of murder for the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and
attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano
Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted
of robbery with homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and

(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret
Division of the Bacolod City Police Department was convicted of murder for
the killing of the chief of police.

The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority

under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be
appreciated in the case at bar.

The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police

Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in the
same restaurant when the incident occurred.

As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or
grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the dagger from him and
thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant
admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now
claims that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of
police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.

While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150,
157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21
SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority refers to a
person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a
public authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need
of re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of
the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of
the term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and
152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the
doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public
authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker
could have easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said
phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a
different meaning for the term public authority, which may however include,
but not limited to persons in authority.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio

lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority or a public authority.
Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in authority under
CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs.
People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs.
Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No.
8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a
person in authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain
peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to
apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the
aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even
enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons
in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police
heads and supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as
exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality, which is
patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or
barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse,
or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.

With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the

appellant should therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of
reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.

WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT
TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE
THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT
FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12
YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.

THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY

AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.

Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G.

Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J:

This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by
virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado
Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as
follows:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in her
own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it

was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having
givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)

The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial
rendered its decision on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and
sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1

His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused
filed a notice of appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals.

On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado

Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should
accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.

We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment
appealed from is not in accordance with law.

Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.

Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act

No. 296, as amended) —

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,

reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided,
in —

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment; ...

WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for

appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law. 2

By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was
certified to this Court and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was
ordered docketed. 3

Preliminary question —

The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which

strikes at the very root of a long standing practice and procedure evoked
for the last forty years or so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4

Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case

where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to
it by the Court of Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the
accused, but without imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death
on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court?5

Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the
view that for this Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision
before Us must have imposed on the appellant the penalty either of
reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warranted.

The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe
otherwise and hold the view that the dispositive portion of the decision as
written and rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and the law,
and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal.

A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was

certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and
simply on the ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty that should
be imposed ill this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the
Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower
court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be followed by the
appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which
read:

Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division

should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.

In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different,

and We may say, strong reactions from the Justices then composing the
Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was
ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts
to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed upon the appellant
was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of this Court.

From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel
V. Moran, We quoted the following pertinent portions:

The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of
necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in
the law precluding this Court from exercising ing its authority to pass upon
such question which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this
Court may exercise its power of review the Court of appeals is bound to
make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are necessary to
support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to
be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides
th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no appellate
jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must
do so "with a specific and clear statement of grounds therefor." the
requirement of with and specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent
erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.

Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon"

appearing in the provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the
Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had
already examined the evidence and was ready to render judgment on the
merits, but having found from the facts established by proof that the penalty
to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of entering
judgment thereon , it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination. Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of
fact, the latter being more important than the former for they supply the real
basis for determining jurisdiction ...

The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a
Court of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is
imposed, for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the
judgment appears to be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of
First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment
on the merits containing both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
under such circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the
law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by examining
the evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and of law that might
have been committed by the trial court. But here, the Court of Appeals is
refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to
complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it believes that such
jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer
the case to this Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene
in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,

xxx xxx xxx

Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to

make effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and
this Court, as defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section
138, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment, including offenses arising from the same occurrence or
committed on the same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the
Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact
necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either
life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings of
fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived
therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will
assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned to
the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)

In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there
was substantial compliance with the law as the order of certification made
reference to the opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General
whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion
that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution.

Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle

that the Court of Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the
evidence so as to determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but
dissented from that portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as
he was of the opinion that the case should have been remanded to the
Court of Appeals.7

Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the
majority insofar as it held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or
a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or
life imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly dissented from
statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
to be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this
Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the
merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither essential nor
necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar
Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino
Padilla.8

B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled
in Ramos — that is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of
fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion
perpetua or death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our
appellate jurisdiction.

We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit
of the law which confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to
review on appeal and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases
where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.

Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the
Supreme Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the
National Assembly. 10

Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the
foregoing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.

Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction -

the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or death.

The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second
paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the
use of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering
judgment", viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division
should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)

As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with
the duty of imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the
Rule requires is that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that
death or life imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon ...

The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the

Court of Appeals shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of
the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the
crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation considering that
the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the penalties
concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an
"entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to
Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of
judgment" presupposes a final judgment — final in the sense that no
appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court within the
reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal.12 It is only then that there is a
judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of
judgments. 13

It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second

paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the Court of Appeals from entering judgment"
when there is no judgment to be entered .

But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the

Supreme Court when the decision being certified contains no penalty or
sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance
where there is a complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is
simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final determination by the
Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence,
based on the findings of facts of the appellate court which as a rule are
conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of
the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and
impose the correct penalty for the offense committed.

We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from
rendering judgment " there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can
only assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it
drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible
contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under
the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the
spirit and intent it was conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.

On the merits of the appeal —

1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution

consists solely of the testimony of the offended party. Here We have the
declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was a little less
than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial court found the charge
of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the
People's brief as follows:

The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on
November 20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang
Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in
question on September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at
a house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year
high school student at the Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p.
36, Estigoy).

On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had
just arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon).
Because it was then raining and the bus was parked several meters away
from the bus station, she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about
three minutes of waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by
inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she
did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of the
bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it
seemed that the former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).

Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some
100 meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4,
Id.). When the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her
(p. 5, Id.).

When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted
and again he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed
to carry her bag, her was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).

Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close
it when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32,
Id.). When she entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled
a dagger eight inches long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill
you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i
Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her
Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand with a
handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the dagger
and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the
down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of his pants
(p. 8, Id.). He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts
to extricate herself from the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft.
and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the
accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8,
59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.), used his thigh to separate
the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p.
36, Id.). He nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina
of the complainant after prying open the part of her panty covering her
private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost consciousness.
When she recovered, he was already gone (p. 9, Id.).

The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the
terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately
brought to the Baguio General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10,
Id.). Then they proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police
accompanied them to the Health Center where she was again examined by
Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C;
p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave their respective
statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.).
She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio
(Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo

The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness
stand and he testified on the physical examination conducted on the person
of Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained
in the report were as follows:

1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00

and 11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a clock.

2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.

3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.

4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.

5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra
or extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)

Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that
the condition of the hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin
before the incident complained of, and that the number of lacerations and
contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted
to effect the sexual act. 14

For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted
with each other since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode
together in a bus; that the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room
of Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time
he had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having occurred inside a
shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his
surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15

2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for

discarding the findings of facts of the trial court which were sustained by
the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence as a result
of which it certified the case to this Court.

Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what
possible motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in
fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family shame
and humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her
classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be denied that a
public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can
be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her
body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the
hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful
event which she would prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If
Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the
situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the
truth.

The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not
married the girl although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On
September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old
and was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal
impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the complaint was
instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the
trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.

Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the
opportunity to ask for help or attract the attention of other people before
she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so. According to counsel
there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market
place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a jeep to proceed to
the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which
was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant
to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16

Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the
time from the moment she saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter
had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the
bus was to hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the
conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not do anything
about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney
station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect
that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether
she suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No
sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could not call the attention of
the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular
moment the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when
Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around 19
and in fact she went straight to her room and it was at that particular
moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the
door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced
entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and
said "If you will talk I will kill you."

Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may
manifest an aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or
impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a
silent. fearful attitude.

Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance
to the acts of the accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing
himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there were no signs of
extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress
and underwear.

The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the

veracity of Margarita's straightforward and positive declaration as to how
appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126
lbs and five feet 21 and six inches tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded
in accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was less
than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs.21

In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present,
and so long as it brings about the desired result, all consideration of
whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22

All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for
him to consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a
similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a
man of superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of
rape the Court held:

It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the

existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it
is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing
Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine
has been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one
of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70
SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force
or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the
age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23

Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the
latter submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and
personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with
a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for
help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita could
muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his
coitus on the victim. 24

One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D.
Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio
City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the
National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner
is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the
questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced
Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was
"No". 25

On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions

meritorious and We quote from his decision the following:

As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith
and credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy
depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the
nature of the subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this
instant, were not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will
fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He
was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a reason to
fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal and
unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)

To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a
deadly weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been
committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was
merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all
intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3),
Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim
owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a
bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to
protect and uphold.

Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of
the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be
applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado
Daniel for the crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng
by way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00) and pay the costs.

Decision Modified.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable

doubt has been adduced, it is also essential that the accused has been
duly afforded his fundamental nights.

Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court
of Parañaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a
criminal complaint, which read:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino

Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of

Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW

Parañaque, Metro Manila

August 8, 1994

(SGD) MANUEL P.

BERMAS

Complainant

Assisted by

(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS

Mother 1

Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which
the lower court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its
decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court
by way of automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise
known as An Act To Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other
Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took effect on 31
December 1993).

The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an

account, rather briefly, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.

On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped

by her own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a
wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8,
Parañaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a
knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty, placed himself
above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital
movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he
threatened the victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9,
ibid.)

On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which

yielded the following findings:

The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries

noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen,
intact but distensible and its office wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any hymenal laceration. 2

The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the
charge, and that of his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who
attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere resentment
by the latter. The trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the
accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz:

The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of
rape on her daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not
do such a thing because he loves so much his daughter and his other
children. In fact, he said that he even performed the dual role of a father
and a mother to his children since the time of his separation from his wife.
The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime of rape,
the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of
the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her
frequent coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of
no other reason as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever
charge him of the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for being
admonished by him whenever she comes home late in the night.
The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied
that the complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the
complainant did not come home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that,
she is a liar. She told the Court that the concoction by the complainant of
the rape story is probably due to the resentment by the latter of the
frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She
further added that she was told by the previous household employer of the
complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify further that she
does not believe that the accused, who is her father, raped the
complainant, who is her younger sister. 3

The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the
prosecution against the accused as having been duly established and so
ruled out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of
private complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint
against her father. The court adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH
PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00,
Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 4

In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in

collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several
errors allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:

I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.

1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing
the accused's counsel de officio;

2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;

a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal

arrest;

b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid

filing of the information;

c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;

d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case

number;

e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;

f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.

3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio.

a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

b. His work was shoddy;

4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio

5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and

prejudicial to the accused.

B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE

TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.

C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE

HEARD AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.

E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE

LAW.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT "SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME

CAUTION" THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE
FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 5

The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the
appeal enough to warrant a remand of the case for new trial.

It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years

of age, assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement
before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Parañaque Police Station,
stating, in sum, that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas, her own father in 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03 August 1994,
particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly
signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of
Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect
that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.

On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused
was brought before the trial court without counsel. The court thereupon
assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be
the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial
was waived.

The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The

prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She
testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense
counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then
asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de officio.

ATTY. VILLARIN:

And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my pañero

besides me, would accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de
officio because I could not also give justice to the accused because as a
lady lawyer, if my pañero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my
request.

COURT:

It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is
your sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting?

ATTY. VILLARIN.

That is why I am asking this Honorable Court. 6

Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed
the new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to
cross-examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he
barely had time, to prepare therefor. On this score, defense counsel
Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant appeal would later point out:

To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto

Gomez to be appointed as defense counsel de officio. And so the trial court
appointed him.

Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross
examination, presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross
examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on
the accused who stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far
too inadequate. He could not possibly have familiarized himself with the
records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the
statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police,
transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with the accused and
his witnesses, all in ten minutes. 4

The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had
testified.

The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December

1994, it was later reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was called on
09 January 1995, the following transpired:

COURT.

Where is the counsel for the accused?

COURT.

Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the
defense to present its evidence.

PROSECUTOR GARCIA.

Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.

COURT:

Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that
the accused is under detention . . . it seems he cannot comply with his
obligation.

COURT:

(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?

ACCUSED R. BERMAS.

Wala po.

COURT:

It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In
view of the fact that the defense counsel is not interested anymore in
defending the accused because last time he moved for the continuance of
the hearing of this case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly
delaying the proceedings of this case and considering the accused here is
under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints another
lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.

In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear
in this Court to defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained
to appoint another counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused.
For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the
counsel de officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas. 8

The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the
request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to
be relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted, thus:

COURT:

Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?

ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:

As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I
be allowed to give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering
that the lawyer from the PAO.

COURT:

What about?

ATTY. LONZAME.

I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will
allow us to be relieved from our responsibility as appointed counsel de
officio of the accused.

COURT.

You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de

officio? As an officer of the Court you don't want to handle the defense of
the accused in this case?

ATTY. LONZAME.

I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my

responsibility as counsel de officio.

COURT.

So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?

ATTY. LONZAME.

Yes, Your Honor. 9

Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness
stand. He denied the accusation against him. The next witness to be
presented was his married daughter who corroborated her father's claim of
innocence.

The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame
who himself, for one reason or another, had ceased to appear for and in
behalf of accused-appellant.

This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant
has not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So
important is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our
fundamental law and its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of
the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has already been
recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a
defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, 10 and that if he is unable to employ counsel, the court
must assign one to defend him. 11 The 1935 Constitution has no less been
expressive in declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that —

(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the
1973 Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987
Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the
provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right
to counsel as early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be deemed
to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution, states —

Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 14 xxx xxx xxx

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.

The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right
of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment.

The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in

criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. 12 Chief Justice Moran
in People vs. Holgado, 13 explained:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right
and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for
the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own. 14

In William vs. Kaiser; 15 the United States Supreme Court, through the late
Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused "needs the aid of
counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's
complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment." An accused must be
given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented,
there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. 16 The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be
heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with
or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than lust the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds
substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to
his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. 17

It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel;

he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and
should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires
or that one can be provided to him at his request. 18 Section 7, Rule 116,
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the
gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall
appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing
who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available,
the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good
repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.

A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. 19 A mere pro-forma

appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests
of the accused merits disapprobation. 20 The exacting demands expected
of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de
officio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to
assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from
this responsibility except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons.
21

Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on
29 March 1999, this Court has said:

We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our

displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with
their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight
of their client.

xxx xxx xxx

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer

to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He
must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this
regard renders him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case,
the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the
fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed
their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the
accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after
trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and
Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, otherwise, commission of any similar act in
the future will be severely sanctioned.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the
court a quo for new trial.

WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on
the basis of the complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned Atty.
Ricardo A Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby
appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.

Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Parañaque,

Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for
having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court
and as members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall
be dealt with most severely.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Ramon Diokno for defendant.

TORRES, J.:

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909,

while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of
Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound
on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo
Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter,
upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his
assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor,
the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was
passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in
front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the
same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of
which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of
Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana
leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both
wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital,
where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the
wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the
district court charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings
having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced,
rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the
accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to
this court for review.

From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond
doubt that the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the
Penal Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that
the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep
cut on the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load
that he was carrying and was about to start for the door of the store in front
of which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the
tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow,
he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was
unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground, died
in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form
employed in the attack the violent death of the said Chinaman was
consummated with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five
qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article as calling for
the greatest punishment.

When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had
perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died
about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in
Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed
him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the
said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a
sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful
in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in
case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order
of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his
intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself
with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day
and a night from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a
Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him,
immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter
was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to
enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once;
he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.

From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-
confessed and self-convicted author of the crime in question has been
unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of
Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him,
because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went
juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed only two
persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would
have killed many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of
a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can
not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of
civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be
restrained, especially as the very people who up to the present time have
been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in
this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened
a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of
appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so
committed.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating

circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into
consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present,
which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has
already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the
accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto
Mupuck to go juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with
the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a
pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly
acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict
irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life
without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a
most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the
constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who
ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused
knew perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of
committing them.

As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused,

upon accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to comply
therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated
over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders
received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end
provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and
started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the
life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he
had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a
certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the
arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of
unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of
the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances
which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material
and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person
having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent,
the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent
intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he
received the order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident.
Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise,
premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the
former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two,
premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely
because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter
might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the
other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was
agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his
subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to
carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being
immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once
Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.

The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings
instituted by the United States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on
page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be
seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different
from the case where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain
individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal intent. On going
to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two
persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of
the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being
without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less
grave penalty according to the nature of the concurrent circumstances.

For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating
circumstance is present to neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it
is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with
costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be
executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577,
and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be
sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the
Penal Code. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General

Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma. Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-
appellee.

Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution

eyewitnesses disclose that at around six o'clock in the morning of June 9,
1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso,
Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his
wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba,
he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the
coconut tree.

His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She
went outside the hut. From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw
five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was
already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut
tree. His assailants were about five meters away from him.

She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who
were firing at her husband. She and her brother Ricardo had known
Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other
malefactors.

Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted,
"Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her.
She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the
hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five
minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When
Flora returned to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was
already dead.

On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old,

a brother of Flora, was inside his own nipa hut which was about ten meters
away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were
eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw
his brother-in-law being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom,
Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang
using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from
the top of the coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was
trying to approach her husband but she had to flee to her hut when
Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he
was likewise fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in
his own hut.

Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her
after she left the hut and went to see her dead husband, who was lying on
the ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that
his brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children and brought
them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less thirty meters away from his hut
in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police who went to
the scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.

The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained

twenty-three gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body, fourteen of
which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B).
He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).

On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo
were interrogated by the Silang police. They executed sworn statements
before the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the
assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in her statement that she knew
those persons because from time to time they used to pass by her place.
They resided at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio Adlas.
On the basis of those statements, the police filed on June 10 in the
Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed
persons. Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on
June 13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The
other accused have not been apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch,
rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang of murder, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages
in the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang
appealed.

The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and
that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that
in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the
house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at
Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to
defray the matriculation fees of his children.

As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until

morning. He would try to raise the sum of two hundred pesos which
Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They
allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next
morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock on June 9,
Gatdula delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza
then went to the Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They
returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the evening of June 9 in
Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.

In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of
the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law,
Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that
they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who
riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to
overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict
in criminal jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi.

The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his
witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of his arrest, and Mendoza even
visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not
interpose the defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police and
when he was summoned at the preliminary investigation.

Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs.

Cortez and her brother Ricardo Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are
not glaring, strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were
not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to
deficiencies in observation and recollection, or misapprehension of the
misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the
defective translation of the questions and answers but they do not
necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to commit falsehood (People vs.
Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26,
1973, 54 SCRA 350).

The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently
testified that they saw Sangalang, a person already well-known to them,
among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering
identification negates appellant's alibi.

The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand,
Sangalang did not show that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a
malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .

Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and

deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution. He made a spirited
defense of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable
doubt on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.

The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree.
He was unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted.
He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack
shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution
which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense
which the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly
established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can
be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046).
Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs.
Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged in the
information, was not proven.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on

Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125633 December 9, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, date 29 July
1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting 1
accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating
circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that
simply read:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon the person
of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and consent. 2

When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea

of not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereupon ensued.

The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court
in its decision under review, thus:

The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995
at around 5:45 in the afternoon, he performed a physical examination and
medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon
physical examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on the
mandibular area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found
that the labia majora and minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a
woman who had just given birth; or a normal appearance as a result of
several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He submitted a
report on his findings (Exhibit "A").

The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the
information who testified that on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock
midnight, while asleep in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City, a man whom she had not seen before suddenly
entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and
put his hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will
kill her. She resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced
to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she
followed. After climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant
house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told
to undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo.
Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her. Then she was told to lie
down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her
vagina. After inserting the man's penis to her vagina, she was told to lie
face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis into her
anus. After inserting the man's penis into her anus, she was told to turn
around face up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning around
face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part. After
the man had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she
was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was
going to take a rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what
happened to others saying that "lahat ng nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa
ayokong may magsumbong." All the time the man was inserting his penis
and fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting:
"tulungan po ninyo ako," but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was
already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab
the man on his chest. The knife broke. She suddenly grabbed the bolo and
hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of
the bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the
signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met that she killed a man.
The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to
the place where she was raped. They found the man lying down still alive.
The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to be accused
Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C),
narrating what happened to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI
Medico-Legal Officer for examination.

On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City,
where she worked as housemaid, she went to her friend's house named
Patrick because she brought mongo and because she and Patrick's wife
Inday, are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of
August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle
Verde, Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep at
Patrick's house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she saw accused passed by
in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other persons slept in the
house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her
son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In
entering the house were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When
awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard her because they were sleeping
and at the same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was
really afraid because she was boxed on her chest and accused was
holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the garage,
which was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of
fear. Accused also undressed himself. While accused was on top of her,
holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her sweetheart. She even said,
why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart.

The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Women's Desk Unit,
Makati Police Station who testified that she came into the possession of the
bolo, Exh. D, because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The
bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal Village,
was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the Investigator.
After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she
conducted an investigation. Based on her investigation, she learned from
Nita Fernandez that when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on
August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing beside her. Nita was
punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to go outside,
instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After
climbing the fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on her
breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house owned by Captain
Pascua, where suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way to the hospital
on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape Nita
Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth
because they were sweethearts.

Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995,
while at AFOVAI Village, Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the
house of General Renato Icarma together with many other laborers,
somebody told him that his wife was waiting for him in the house of Captain
Pascua. At 10:00 o'clock that evening, he went to the house of Captain
Pascua; and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick
Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin
of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After opening the door, Nita
Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an angry
mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why
he was late. He explained that he did not expect her to come, as his
understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he will call her by phone or write
her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they talk outside
as she was ashamed with the neighbor, and they will disturb the child who
was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and Nita
went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they
arrived in the vacant house, it was closed, so they slept in the terrace. He
denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was
surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita
Fernandez will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez concocted the
story of rape because of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez
for hacking him.

On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the

house of General Romeo Icarma (the house where he and 15 other
workers were constructing a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a
Mason, since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita Fernandez
named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita
became sweethearts in February 1995. They have not live together
because Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only meet during Nita's day
off. He has been at Nita's place of work, but he used to call then at her
telephone numbers which are 6326062 and 6356060. They used to see
each other at Gen. Icarma's place where he lived. On August 26, 1995,
when the incident in questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer
residing at Gen. Icarma's place because they were told to leave in April
1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters
away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because
Nita does not know the workers in Gen. Icarma's house, Nita left and went
to the house of Captain Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen.
Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy Abella told him that Nita
was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain
Pascua's place, he met Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were
Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child who
were all awake, except the child. Although Ablon was very much willing to
accommodate him in Ablon's house, he brought Nita to the house of the Air
Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and
ashamed to stay at Ablon's house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in
Ablon's place, saying that instead of sleeping at Ablon's place, she prefers
to go back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at Valle Verde
because it was already late at night and if anything happens to her, her
daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not
bring Nita to Gen. Icarma's house because it is crowded and the Colonel's
house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascua's house. They went to the
Colonel's house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was
carrying "banig, pillow and blanket," and did not notice that Nita was
carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonel's house and was closed. They
slept in the terrace of the house on a cement flooring. While he was
sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When hacked, he just said
"aray". The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left
and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen knife. When the Military
Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonel's house because he went to
another house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the
assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military Police.
He did not leave the colonel's house. He just stayed in the premises.
Despite his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the
morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because
he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and pushing her on her chest when Nita
insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file
a complaint against Nita for hacking him. 3

In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced
judgment, thus:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, with aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of
P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit. 4

Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the

conviction and the imposition of the death penalty decreed by the trial
court; he contends that —
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION

THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND
IGNOMINY. 5

The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape
cases that have been previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the
instances before it, of two people, each testifying on the same incident but
making a clearly discordant testimony. Since only the participants could
directly testify on the sexual congress, here conceded to have taken place,
extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the
complainant and the accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord
great respect over the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import employed by the Court,
it would be best not to disturb the findings of the court which has heard the
evidence except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been
overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into account can alter
the outcome of the case. 6 Regrettably for accused-appellant, no such
exceptive instances of possible oversight are perceived or evident in this
case.

Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by

the trial court and by this Court as well, of what had transpired during the
late hour of the night in question.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on
August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight?

A At Fort Bonifacio.

Q What city or municipality?

A I do not know but it must be here sir.

Q Meaning Makati City?

A Yes sir.

Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?

A I was sleeping in my friend's residence.

Court:

Q What is the address of that friend's residence at Fort Bonifacio?

A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.

Q Why were you there at that time?

A Because I always go there and my son's residence is beside the house of

my friend sir.

Court: Proceed fiscal:

Pros. Manola:

Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your
friend in AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual
incident that happened?

A There was sir.

Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?

A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend

suddenly there was a man who entered the house where I was sleeping.

Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?

A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my

mouth sir.

Q What else happened after that?

A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo
and he said if I will not obey him he will be going to kill me sir.

Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?

A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.

Q Did you climb over the fence?

A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.

Q Were you able to go over the fence?

A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.

Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb
over the fence?

A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.

Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam
witness?
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to
undress and I took off my clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.

Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey
him?

A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.

Q Did you obey him?

A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.

Court:

Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of
the accused for you to undress?

A Yes sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man
to go to that vacant house and to undress why did you follow this
instruction?

A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.

Q Why do you say that he might kill you?

A He like to rape me sir.

Court:

Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?

A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me
sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q So what happened after according to you were instructed to undress?

A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.

Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?

A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.

Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?

A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he
inserted his penis to my vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what
happened next Mrs. Witness?

A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my

anus sir.

Q After that what happened next Mrs. witness?

A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his
fingers to my private parts going it and out sir.

Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.

Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this
person according to you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private
part?

A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.

Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?

A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.

Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?

A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that
he does not want me to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.

Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court
room would you be able to recognize him?

A Yes sir I could recognize him.

Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this
person if he is inside?

Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped
him and when asked his name answered as Rolando Alfanta.

Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the
name of Rolando Alfanta uttered the words "lahat nang ni rape ko ay
pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong" what happened next
Mrs. Witness?

A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going

to take a rest.

Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?

A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife
and stab him in the chest sir.

Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack
him sir.

Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs.
Witness?

A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the
signal where the soldiers were.

Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to
you?

A Yes sir.

Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?

A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.

Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that
according to you you have killed a person what happened next?

A We went to the person who raped me sir.

Q And did you see him there?

A Yes sir.

Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were
allegedly raped?

A The soldiers sir.

Q Did you find this person who raped you?

A Yes sir.

Q What was he doing?

A He was lying down sir.

Q What happened after that?

A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the
hospital.

Q Who brought him to the hospital?

A The ambulance of the soldier.

Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in

connection with what you have just narrated or told or testified to this
afternoon?

A I could remember.

Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?

A Yes sir.

Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutor's

office consisting of two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize
this statement?

A Yes sir I could recognize this.

Q Is that your statement.

A Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now this bolo which according to you you surrendered to the soldier at
the signal if you see this bolo again would you be able to recognize it
again?

A Yes sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when
this bolo is presented by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.

Court:

Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist
line of the accused did you bring it also?

A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I
brought.

Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?

A Yes sir.

Q How did you ask for help?

A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?

A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.

Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?

A None sir.

Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to
your private part?

A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir.

Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into
your vagina?

A He forced that to insert it.

Q Forced it to where?

A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.

Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your
vagina?

A Yes sir I feel it sir.

Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were
awakened?

A I do not know him.

Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?

A I saw him around 7:00 o'clock in the evening that he was passing thru the
front of the house of my friends where I was sleeping.

Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you
sleeping?

A Only me sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you
stab him with the knife how many times have you stabbed him with the
knife?

A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.

Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got
hold of the bolo you hacked him how many times have you hacked him?

A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of
him he might kill me.

Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.

Court: Cross-examination.

Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.

Court: Proceed.

Atty. Manalo:

Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house
of your friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?

A One of their children so there were three and I was one.

Q Were you sleeping in one room?

A I was sleeping in the sala sir.

Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of
that house?

A It was closed but it was not locked.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your
friend when you could already at the house of your employer?

A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to

them sir.

Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that
mongo to your friend?

A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.

Q By the way what time did you go there?

A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.

Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?

A 6:30 sir.

Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isn't?

A Yes sir.

Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to
reach that place isn't?

A Three rides sir.

Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where
you were sleeping at the time the place where you were sleeping or the
place of the room where the owner of the house were sleeping?

A First it is the sala where he passed.

Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other
improvised locked placed in that door like a wood?

A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.

Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that
time?

A Patrick sir.

Q And how are you related to Patrick?

A His wife is my friend sir.

Q What is the name of his wife?

A Inday sir.

Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the
house of your friend Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling
you holding a bolo?

A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at
the same time he placed his hands on my mouth sir.

Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how
many times were you boxed by the accused on the chest?

A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really
afraid of him.

Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?

A Yes sir.

Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and
also on her mouth.
Q Was it strong?

A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.

Note: Witness holding on his left chin.

Q How about on the chest?

Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.

A It was not too strong sir.

Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?

A Yes sir.

Q Where?

A I fell on the ground down.

Q Where were you boxed by the accused?

A Outside sir of the house.

Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the
ground is that correct?

A Yes sir.

Q And you followed him?

A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and

because I was afraid because he was holding a bolo sir.

Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?

A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was
undressing himself.

Q Was it lighted the place?

A None sir.

Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?

A Near sir.

Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?

A Yes sir.

Q How big?
Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.

Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.

Court: Answer

A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.

Atty. Manalo:

Q And then you lie down?

A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.

Q Was he still holding the bolo?

A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.

Q How did you see him?

A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of
me I cried and he was holding the bolo.

Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.

A When I cried he was on top of me sir.

Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?

A He was molesting me sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend
according to you?

A 9:00 o'clock in the evening sir.

Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of
your friend?

A I saw him that he was passing.

Q Where were you at the time?

A I was seating by the window sir. 7

The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward

categorical, and relatively free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason
is advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial
court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the
complainant. Neither is evidence adduced to show that the complainant
has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant
in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a
woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the test
of credibility, 8 for it is said that no woman in her right mind will cry rape,
allow examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to
the humiliation concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless the story
were true. 9

Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the

complainant had been lived-in partner for almost a year, and that while they
did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at the porch of the house of a certain
Air Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the
victim that evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate
any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in
the house where the victim was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995,
there were at least three persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick
Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couple's son) who could have
responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the house
was purposely left unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come
in to the house, and (c) when the victim was made to climb a fence
followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.

The "sweetheart theory" of accused-appellant would appear to be another

worn out strategy, often resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate
oneself from criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a
letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a
romantic liason between accused-appellant and the complainant. The latter
testified:

Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?

A No sir.

Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?

A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my

sweetheart?

Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is
concerned because your sweetheart was then womanizing?

Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.

Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.

Court: Answer.

A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:

Q Really?

A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir. 10

It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab

her beloved for petty reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it
made this evaluation; viz:

This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant
Nita Fernandez were sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let
alone common sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack
him.. Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first
with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate the
outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the
manner she did in stabbing and hacking him. At least, if they have some
relationship, she would not show anger the way she did. 11

Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26

August 1995 in the house where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove
the sexual assault. It was already close to midnight when the incident
occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by then apparently all
sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that accused-appellant
immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on
her mouth and threatened to kill her if she dared refuse to yield to his
demands. Understandably, the victim was shocked, gripped by fear and
then cowed into submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of
the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of
the offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would be
unreasonable to expect the victim to act with equanimity of disposition and
to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat made by
accused-appellant. 12

The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the
complainant wanted accused-appellant to have a chance to see her during
the late evening indeed should deserve scant consideration. The so-called
love angle was properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of concrete
evidence to establish any such relationship.

Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant

ordered her to climb a fence, it should be enough to state she did not
appear to have had any real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the
intruder who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and while
inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she could not have done any
much better since she was all the time within striking distance of the bolo-
wielding malefactor.

And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating

circumstances of nighttime and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk
and ending at dawn. 13 The law defines nights as being from sunset to
sunrise. 14 By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating
circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is specially
taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by
insuring the offender's immunity from capture. 15 As an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it is
duly proved although not alleged in the information. 16 The Court
entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the
cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being
recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an
abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her,
assured of the stillness of a sleeping world. 17 The Court has long held that
this aggravating circumstance can be considered when an accused takes
advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from
his illegal act. 18

With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had
inserted his penis into her vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down
and while in that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he
ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her.
The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of People vs. Saylan, 19
where this Court said:

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not
only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also
"the same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims
there was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter
have shown that this "position" is not novel and has repeatedly and often
been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation." (Brief, p. 24.) This
may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not
otherwise. 20

Art. 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an

aggravating circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought
about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The
circumstance, it is said, 21 "pertains to the moral order [and] adds disgrace
and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime."

The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman

under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. 22

In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was

armed with a bolo to realize his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of
a deadly weapon could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in
the crime of rape 23 for not having been correspondingly alleged in the
information as to make the offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred
"qualified rape" punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In People vs.
Garcia, 23 the Court declared:

One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced
amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the
death penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape the
victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a homicide is
committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a
special complex crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant
circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying circumstances
since they increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as
aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty but
do not increase it to a higher degree. The original provisions of Article 335
and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.

xxx xxx xxx

Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved,
they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances, (People vs.
Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934]; People vs. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March
27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17,
1994, 229 SCRA 289; People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October
16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since the latter admit of proof even if not
pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People vs. Domondon, 60
Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August 1988,
164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to
be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified
form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned. 25

Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion

perpetua. Thus, even if there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion
perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
in "all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant

Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty therein
imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of
P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused

Filomeno Camano by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the killing of Godofredo Pascual and
Mariano Buenaflor.

The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:

On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay,

Province of Camarines Sur, between the hours of four and five o'clock in
the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice
the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol
"palas" which is a sharp bladed and pointed instrument about two feet long
including the black handle, tapering to the end, about one and one-half
inches in width, (Exhibit "C") while the latter was walking alone along the
barrio street almost infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim,
Godofredo Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds for which he died
instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio A. Tan, Municipal Health
Officer, of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "A", pp. 5,
Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches below
left axilla, a little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin, subcutaneous tissues,
muscles one (1) rib, pleura of left lung, pericardium, penetrating the
ventricles of the heart, Media stinum, the right lung and exit to the right
chest. One inch opening.

2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm

CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe

hemorrhage.

After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused

proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Mariano Buenaflor
leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with
both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the
latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and
rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay
prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave him a final thrust
of the bolo at the left side of the chest above the nipple running and
penetrating to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at
the back, of one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The
victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which were specifically
described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated February 17,
1970, as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above the
nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit
at the back of one (1) inch opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous
tissues, pericardium the auricles of the heart, the left lung towards the right
side of back.

2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep three-
fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the sternum.

3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and one-
half (1-1/2) inches deep.

4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.

5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and bone of
anterior side.

6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.

7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back near
spinal column.

8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin and
bone.

CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to
severe hemorrhage from the heart." Out of the eight (8) wounds, two (2)
are mortal wounds, namely wound Number one (1) and wound Number
Three (3), (Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The
two victims Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together with the
accused are neighbors, residing at the same street of Barrio Nato, Sagñay,
Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident
was not preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the victims
and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).

Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the
two victims had a misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along
Sagnay River. During this occasion it appears that the accused requested
Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by
Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This refusal greatly
offended and embittered the accused against the victims. From this time
on, the accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment
against them. And although on several occasions, the accused was seen at
the game table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the friendly attitude
towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial than real, more so, with
respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom he openly detested. He consistently
refused to associate since then with the two victim especially, Mariano
Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were made by Amado Payago,
a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were
refused. Instead, defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge
Mariano Buenaflor to a fight and announce his evil intention to kill them.
(t.s.n., pp. 50-53, session November 22, 1971.)

Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the
accused. That after killing the two victims, he returned to his house, where
he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez,
Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by laid peace officers for him to surrender.
When brought to the Police headquarters of the town for investigation he
revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by him under the
table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was
dispatched, and recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when
presented to he Chief of Police was still stained with human blood from the
base of the handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as to who
was he owner of said bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He also admitted
the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. however, when he
was asked to sign a statement, he refused. 1

For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno

Camano was charged, under two (2) separate informations, with the crime
of murder attended by evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement
of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly.

The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so
in self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. He also denied
holding a grudge against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and
belittled the fist fight he had with Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they
were drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they were drunk,
it resulted in a fist fight, which they had soon forgotten. 2

His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970,
he was fishing in the open sea. He went ashore at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning and was met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had
a big catch, demanded a percentage. for the fishery commission. When he
refused to give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that he was hard-
headed. He went home, taking his things along with him. After eating
breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. 3 He ate his dinner 4 and prepared to go out to sea again. While
he was standing in the yard of his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo
Pascua, Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable, Abelardo Bolaye,
Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the store of
Socorro Buates, went to him and Godofredo Pascua, without any
provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted what happened next: "I
defend myself but inspite of that I was hit on my upper arm. Then after that
I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I was hit on my lower jaw.
(Witness pointing to the bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that
bolo from him."

"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was
able to take hold of his hands and I was able to grab the bolo. After I have
taken the bolo from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the
ground and the rest of the group except Mariano Buenaflor run away after
seeing that Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano
Buenaflor approached me having also a bolo then immediately when we
meet each other I boloed him and when he has wounded he run away and
when he was running away I run after him. After I have boloed Mariano
Buenaflor he run away so I run after him because I know that he has a gun
and if he reach home he will get that gun and he might shoot me." 5
Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.

The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:

Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret
cannot give credence to the testimony and story of the accused, and his
lone witness, Nemesio Camano, who is his first cousin. The claim of self-
defense does not find support in the evidence presented. The claim, that a
group of eight (8) men headed by Godofredo Pascua and Mariano
Buenaflor ganged up on him by boxing him one after another while others
were throwing stones at him; that he was attacked by Godofredo Pascua
with a bolo which he succeeded in wresting from him; that he did not know
Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he killed said Mariano Buenaflor after a
bolo duel, are mere fictions of a desperate man without evidentiary support.
His testimony on these points, and that of his cousin Nemesio Camano are
simply incredible not only because they are inherently improbable in
themselves, but also because of their clear inconsistencies on
contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia argumenti that
he was really ganged up by eight (8) persons, some boxing him while
others throwing stones at him, and two of whom were armed with a bolo,
and that he was all alone fighting them and yet he did not suffer any
physical injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight (8)
persons to contend with, two armed with bolos, it is simply unbelievable
that he should come out of the melee unscathed.

The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and
every piece of evidence presented by the defense and has relaxed all
technical rules of evidence in favor of the accused in search for evidentiary
support of his claim of self-defense in vain. Conscious of the enormity of
the offense and the bitterness attached to an adverse decision, the Court
has earnestly searched in vain for facts upon which to lay the basis at least
of a finding of reasonable doubt in favor of the accused at least just to
avoid the ugly and unpleasant task of signing an adverse court decision.
But, the falsity of their concocted story is so apparent and self-evident to
need further elucidation. This is demonstrated by the record. They simply
cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the Court feels very much
intrigued by the fact that notwithstanding that many people witnessed the
incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that the accused had
more sufficient time to look for witnesses among his friends, relatives, and
neighbors in the barrio, during the long period that this case has been
pending trial since February 17, 1970, that he could not get any witness to
testify in his favor, other than his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, whose
testimony, coming as it is from a very close relative is naturally very
vulnerable to grave doubt and suspicion for coming from a biased source.
Could this mean lack of public sympathy because the horrible act was in
truth committed by the accused? Is this a sign of public condemnation? Be
it as it may, this unpleasant circumstance has no bearing or influence in the
painful decision of this case. What impelled and compelled this Court in
making this painful decision, much to his dislike, are the bare and
incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence presented
indicating beyond per adventure of doubt the stark reality which shows that
there exist that moral certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-24339,
June 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the bitter conclusions herein reached,
is based on the compelling and irresistible facts born out by the evidence of
record found after sleepless night of study that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and intoxication with no mitigating circumstance. The accused
and his only witness, Nemesio Camano changed their declarations not only
once, twice, or thrice, but many times, placing the Court in quandary and
confused what theory or testimony is to be believed and considered among
the mess of contradictory, inconsistent, and diametrically opposed
statements. Considering the manner and tenor they were given, - the
accused and his only witness changing stand in every turn, leaves no room
for doubt than that said testimonies are merely concocted and fabricated as
a desperate attempt to salvage a hopeless case. 6

In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano

Buenaflor and the cause of their deaths are not disputed. Counsel de oficio
merely claims that the accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and
not murder, as charged; and prays for the modification of the judgment and
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed upon the accused
Filomeno Camano.

(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts
of the accused, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, are all
indicative of E, "spur-of-the-moment" decision and action.

The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the

killing had been carefully Planned by the offender, when he prepared
beforehand the means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into
execution, and when he had sufficient time dispassionately to consider and
accept the consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. 7 It
has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof of the
following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the killing
of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to
how and when the plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what
time had elapsed before the plan was carried out. The trial court merely
concluded that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated
because "the accused has been nursing the evil design to kill both the
victims since three years prior to the occurrence of the incident on February
18, 1970, when both of them refused the request of the accused to have
his boat towed by the motor boat belonging to Mariano Buenaflor while
fishing along Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the fatal killings,
said accused refused consistently to join his neighbors in their drinking
spree where both the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were present;"
"in fact, no less than ten attempts made by witness Amado Payago inviting
the accused to be reconciled with the victims were rejected;" and that "on
the contrary, it has been established that whenever the accused was drunk,
he announces his intention to kill the victims, and as a matter of fact he
challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."

The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the
appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the aforementioned incident
merely established the motive for the killing of the two victims. 9

The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight
whenever he was drunk and announces his intention to kill the latter does
not reveal a persistence of a criminal design since there is no showing that
in between the utterances of the threats and the consummation of the
crime, the appellant made plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the
killing.

As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of

Pascua and Buenaflor and of the marked persistence to accomplish that
plan, the trial court's conclusion cannot be sustained.

(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the
commission of the crime.

The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that

Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method
which has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk
to the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put up. His
testimony reads, as follows:

Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you notice
whether there is anything unusual incident that happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please relate it?

A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run
after Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.

Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by
Filomeno Camano?

A More or less 12 to 15 meters.

Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno

Camano?

A He was walking to his house.

Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the

time that Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?

A From behind sir.

Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what

happened to Godofredo Pascua?

A He fell down and keep on turning.

Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua

fell down?

A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor. 10

His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds

sustained by the deceased Godofredo Pascua. The autopsy report, 11
showed that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was
three (3) inches long and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a little bit
posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the body; and the point of exit was
the right chest, one (1) inch Iateral to the right nipple with a one (1) inch
opening. If the deceased was stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as
claimed by counsel for the accused, the entrance wound would have been
in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the
back. The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding that the
deceased Godofredo Pascua was assaulted from behind.

With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was

attacked while in a kneeling position, with his arms on top of the gate of the
fence surrounding his hut and his head was "stooping down." 12 He was
hacked on the head, causing him to fall to the ground, and then
successively hacked and stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground,
until he died. The attack was also sudden, unexpected, and lethal, such as
to disable and incapacitate the victim from putting up any defense.

(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of

abuse of superior strength, which the lower court appreciated in fixing the
penalty, is absorbed in treachery.

This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of
superiority is absorbed in treachery. 13

(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication

was erroneously appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Counsel
argues thusly:

As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted

that there was no proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the
killing other than the bare testimony of Payago that from his house he
allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house which is about 30 meters
away. The prosecution did not present any police report or doctor's
certification that accused was found to be intoxicated at the time of the
killing. Moreover, it was not shown by competent evidence that accused
purposedly became drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense.

If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating

circumstance because it affected accused's mental facilities such that it
diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to comprehend
fully the consequences of his acts. 14

There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if

accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan
to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. 15 To be
mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. 16 A habitual drunkard is one
given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of
daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and
undermines will-power making its victim a potential evildoer. 17

The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to
excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk every
now and then. The testimony of Amado Payago to this effect, reads as
follows:
Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are
already in good terms because they even go on drinking spree, is it not?

A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against
Godofredo Pascua.

Q And how did you come to know about this plan?

A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk.

Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not
towed, could you remember how many times more or less did you hear him
speak about his plan before the stabbing incident?

A Whenever he is drunk.

Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard
him?

A I cannot remember, sir.

Q About five times?

FISCAL CLEDERA:

Already answered.

A Whenever he is drunk.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?

A I cannot estimate, sir.

Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been
an altercation between him and Filomeno Camano prior to the incident, is it
not?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was this altercation about?

A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was
refused by Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by Godofredo
Pascua is owned by Mariano Buenaflor.

Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this
Buenaflor?

A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor
immediately prior to the incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A In his house.

Q When you saw him where were you?

A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our
window.

Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so that
you can see from your house?

A More or less 30 meters.

Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?

A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are
arriving far from our house.

Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the

accused was drunk when this incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident
immediately prior that has precipitated this stabbing incident between the
accused and the victim

A None, sir.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How about you, did you now drink that time?

No, sir. 18

The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that
the said appellant was in a state of intoxication at the time of the
commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication
should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not
proper in the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the Constitution which
provides that: "Excessive fines shag not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted."

The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or
excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 19 the Court said:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-

Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
"punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the Constitution." It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."

The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno
Camano guilty of Murder in each of the two cases. The offense being
attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any
aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum
of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of
reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each
case.

WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the

appellant, as above indicated, the judgment appealed from should be, as it
is hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs against the said
appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.

Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G.
Briones for appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of
opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of
P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged

errors as committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:

The lower court erred:

1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular

Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the administrative
investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and
Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of
whom have since been dismissed from service.

2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments

have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs
secret service."

3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in

denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to
injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly
instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.

4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs

secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable
with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.

5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the

court room while other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the
previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the
court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular
Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan
Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.

6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.

7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng
to order the opium from Hongkong.

8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the
conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.

9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the

conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.

10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the
crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four
years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the
presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the
unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from
a contaminated, polluted source.

The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt

at the trial:

About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se

Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of
opium.

About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of
Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called
upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad,
at his office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much
his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told him he had
spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table,
the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is
for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to
recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and
put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the
provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called Samson and
told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was
not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see
him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he
had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said
accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins,
and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the
opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a
ship that would go direct to Cebu.

At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai
loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina — a
shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned
to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad
informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the
steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson
would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would
be distributed among certain employees in the customhouse.

Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards

the end of November, Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan
had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and
remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several
times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the
captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail,
and the 30 cases remained on board.

The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929.

While he was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to
watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to
do everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se
Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929,
Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready to
withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then
told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have
a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was
told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the
customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on
leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take the
money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel
Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said
colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to
discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and
Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That
afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the
case to the fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the
conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence of
Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer
available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez &
Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the
evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo,
Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and
concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung
from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor.
As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had
brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the
opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell
Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After
pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked
him where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the
cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng
returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant
Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man
from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson
then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter
answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he
had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it
when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation,
which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu
aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me about this
before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you
were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson
how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a
cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was
good business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed
money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It
was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10
o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay
arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain
papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been
hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the
aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-
1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles
described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the
Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo
and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the
pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him,
they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium
(Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to
the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to
examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18,
they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value
of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.

In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached

Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the
opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any
questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is
that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as
to bring it in here without the knowledge of those — " pointing towards the
customhouse.

The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a
loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from
Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it
cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of money by
bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng,
furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector
of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who
told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then
wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he
had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of
Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then
wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter
answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of the
Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived,
Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did
not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th,
and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to
accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when
the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's
house on the night of December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to
deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu
personally promised to pay him that amount.

The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial

court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit
the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of
Juan Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from the court
room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged
statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the
sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative

proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and
Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who
were dismissed from the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting
it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to
impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means
prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.

With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan
Samson, the principal witness of the Government, from the court room
during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it
does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).

Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of
stenographic notes of the defendants statements, since they contain
admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in
shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides
the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard the
statements.

As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts

alleged in the information, we find that the testimony given by the witnesses
for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the
Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only
did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their
participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua
Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the
gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had
asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This
assertion, however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan
Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the
owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.

But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan
Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his
conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the
port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a person to
commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to
seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having
obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed
the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving
only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be
managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful
issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest
of the smugglers.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to

commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are
summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the

practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed,
and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.
The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief
is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original
design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in
carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally
held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that
the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but
there are cases holding the contrary.
As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein
defendants-appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter
contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of
customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them that he would
remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the
customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out
of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is
certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should
prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for
this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime
merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief
of the customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling
illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to
assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to
the prosecution and conviction of the latter.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the

same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986
AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, finding the accused appellant guilty of the
crime of bribery. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby find the

defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code; and there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, We hereby impose upon
her the penalty of imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-
one (21) days and a fine of P 100.00. The defendant shall also suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification from holding office. With costs.

Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection

B of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" in an information which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then employed as Hearing Officer in the
Department of Labor, with station at Cabanatuan City, and therefore, a
public officer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
demand and receive for herself the amount of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency, from one Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as
a condition and/or consideration for her to act on the claim for
compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco
pertaining to the death of her husband, which claim was then pending in
the office wherein the abovenamed accused was employed and in which,
under the law, she has the official capacity to intervene.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the respondent

appellate court in its decision as follows:

Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an

employee of the National Irrigation Administration assigned as instrument
man at the Upper Pampanga River Project. Upon the death of her husband
on April 27, 1971, she approached the appellant, a hearing officer of the
Workmen's Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the
procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the
requirements, she prepared the application forms and attachments and
filed them with the Workmen's Compensation Unit at San Fernando,
Pampanga. (pp. 213, TSN, October 3, 1973).
After a few days, the complainant went back to San Fernando to verify the
status of her claim. She was informed that the death certificate of her
husband, their marriage contract and the birth certificates of their children
were needed. She secured these documents and brought them to San
Fernando. She was told that her claim papers had been forwarded to
Cabanatuan City, particularly to the appellant, for consolidation of the
requirements. So she went to see the appellant. (pp. 13-18, TSN, October
3, 1973).

When she saw the appellant, the complainant was told that she had to pay
P 100.00 so that her claim would be acted upon. The complainant told the
appellant that she had no money then, but if the appellant would process
her claim she would give her the P100.00 upon its approval. The appellant
was adamant. She would not agree to the complainant's proposal.
According to her, on previous occasions certain claimants made similar
promises but they failed to live up to them. (pp. 18-24, TSN, October
3,1973).

The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, erstwhile chief

of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, to inform him
of the demand of the appellant. Col. Yoyongco gave the complainant two
50-peso bills (Exhibits B and B-1 ) and instructed her to go to Col. David
Laureaga, Provincial Commander of Nueva Ecija, for help. (pp. 24-25,
TSN, October 3, 1973).

After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito

Carlos to entrap the appellant. The two 50-peso bills were marked with the
notations 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-
violet powder. With this preparation, Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno, CIC Balcos
and the complainant proceeded to the office of the appellant. When they
arrived thereat, the appellant was talking with three persons who had a
hearing before her. They allowed the three persons to finish their business
with the appellant. After the group had left, the complainant and CIC Balcos
who pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the appellant.
Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno stationed themselves outside the room and
observed events through a glass window. Aside from the appellant, the
complainant and CIC Balcos, there were three other persons inside the
office. These were Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato de Lara and Gregorio
Ocampo. The complainant again requested the appellant to process her
claim. The appellant countered by asking her if she already had the
P100.00. In answer, the complainant brought out the two 50-peso bills from
her bag and handed them to the appellant. As the appellant took hold of the
money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand and told her she was under arrest.
Whereupon, Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno immediately entered the room and
helped in the arrest of the appellant. (pp. 3-12, TSN, November 6, 1973).

The appellant was brought to the PC headquarters where her hands were
examined with a special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The
examination was witnessed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Talavera. The
result was positive. (pp. 12-13, TSN, November 6, 1973).

On the other hand, the petitioner presented her own version of the facts:

On her part, the appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of P
100.00 by the complainant. She declined the offer and never touched the
bills when they were laid on her table. If she was found positive for ultra-
violet powder, it was because CIC Balcos rubbed the bills on her hand and
dress. He did it four times once at her office, once at the Milky way
Restaurant and twice at the PC Headquarters. (Decision, Court of Appeals,
Annex "A", p. 5)

When the complainant went to the office of the appellant in Cabanatuan

City, she demanded the release of the decision of her case, but appellant
told her that she cannot do so for the reason that she is only a hearing
officer to receive evidence about the claim for compensation due to the
death of her husband, and the real office to decide the case is that
Workmen's Compensation Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga. The
complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, Chief of the
Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, Cabanatuan City to
inform him of the demand of the appellant for P100.00. Col. Yoyongco gave
complainant two fifty (P50.00) peso bills. After listening to the complainant,
Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap appellant by the use of
fifty (P50.00) peso bills which were marked with the notation 'CC-NE-l' and
'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder, the two fifty-
peso bills. After this preparation Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the
complainant proceeded to the office of the complainant. When they arrived
in the place the complainant was talking to the 3 persons who had then a
hearing before her. After the appellant finished the hearing the complainant
and the CIC Balgos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew
approached the appellant. Then the complainant again requested the
appellant to process her claim by this time the complainant took the 2 fifty-
peso bills from her bag and gave to the appellant but the appellant pushed
the money, and CIC Balgos grabbed her hand and told her appellant was
under arrest. The appellant was brought to the headquarters where her
hands were examined with special light for the presence of ultra-violet
powder. The examination was witnessed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Cabanatuan City and the result was positive. (TSN, pp. 12- 13,
November 6, 1973)

On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a witness for the appellant testified that
he was in the office of the appellant at the time the incident took place and
he saw the amount of P100.00 being offered by the complainant to the
appellant but the latter refused to accept the money. When appellant
refused, CIC Balgos took it, rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and
announced that he was arresting her.
Appellant further testify (sic) that complainant offered P100.00 to her to
expedite the preparation of the decision of her claim and said complainant
put two fifty peso bills in her table after which she was arrested and
investigated and a complaint was filed against her for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquiline R.

Araneta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment for ONE (1)
YEAR, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay the
costs. The P100.00 consisting of two fifty-peso bills which were marked as
Exhibits 'B' and 'B-l' are hereby ordered returned to Mrs. Gertrudes
Yoyongco who owns them.

As indicated earlier, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of

the lower court and convicted the petitioner instead of the crime of bribery
under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner now assigns the following errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE

PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE DEVISED
BY MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY IN CABANATUAN
CITY.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

PETITIONER OF BRIBERY WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE FISCAL AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE

PETITIONER FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the criminal intent
originated in the mind of the entrapping person and for which reason, no
conviction can be had against her.

This argument has no merit.

The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation, We agree with the

submission of the Solicitor General that:

xxx xxx xxx

... There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to
ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of
the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit
the crime (People vs. Galicia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the
mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The Idea and the resolve
to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the Idea and carries it into execution.

The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As

already stated, entrapment does not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does.

Even more emphatic on this point is People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng
(56 Phil. 44) where this Court ruled that the mere fact that the Chief of
Customs Secret Service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally
imported opium through the customs house, in order to assure the seizure
of the said opium and the arrest of its importers is no bar to the prosecution
and conviction of the latter. In that case, this Court quoted with approval 16
Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec. 57, which states that:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that the

practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed,
and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence of the instigation of the
detective. ...

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was
denied due process of law because she was not charged with bribery in the
information but for a crime falling under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Again, this argument is erroneous. The contention of the petitioner was

squarely answered in United States vs. Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this
Court held that the fact that the information in its preamble charged a
violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused
guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. To the same effect is
our ruling in United States vs. Guzman (25 Phil. 22) where the appellant
was convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on appeal, he
was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement of public funds as
defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.

As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of
bribery and the facts proved during the trial show its having been
committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in the designation of the
crime's name is not a denial of due process.

In United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that:

The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of

credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show
beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as
defined in article 387, in connection with Article 383 of the Penal Code, has
been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint
that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated
by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to
constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid
articles of the Penal Code.

Our review of this decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner
was convicted has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED without costs.

Considering however, that this case has been pending since 1971, that the
amount involved is only P100.00 and that the defendant-appellant is a
mother of four, it is recommended that the petitioner either be granted
executive clemency or be given the privilege of probation if she is qualified.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for

appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146309 July 18, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by the police for the

purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plans. Bare denials by the accused cannot overcome the
presumption of regularity in the arresting officers' performance of official
functions.

The Case

Roberto Mendoza Pacis appeals the August 18, 2000 Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 265) in Criminal Case No.
6292-D, in which he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua after being found
guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425 (RA 6425), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659).

The Information dated June 3, 1998, and signed by State Prosecutor

Marilyn RO. Campomanes, charged appellant as follows:

"That on the afternoon of April 07, 1998, inside Unit #375 Caimito Ville,
Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and dispatch 497.2940 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as "SHABU", a
regulated drug to undercover NBI agents who acted as poseur-buyer[s],
without the corresponding license, and/or prescription to sell, distribute and
dispatch the aforementioned regulated drug, to the damage and prejudice
of the Republic of the Philippines."2

During his arraignment on July 30, 1998, appellant refused to plead despite
the assistance of counsel.3 Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for
him.4 After due trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the [a]ccused,

ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Section 15, Article III [of] Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No, 7650, and hereby SENTENCES him to
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), plus the cost of suit.

"The 'Shabu', subject matter of the Information in this case, is hereby

ordered FORFEITED in favor of the [g]overnment and ordered TURNED
OVER to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal as provided by
law."5
The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution's version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) as follows:6

"On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the
Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received
information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-
half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" for the
amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or a total of four
hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the
Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and
Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case.

"In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and
the informant went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito
Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to
appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2)
kilogram of shabu. The total price was reduced to four hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P450,000.00). It was agreed that payment and delivery of
shabu would be made on the following day, at the same place.

"On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the
informant went to appellant's house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper
bag with markings "yellow cab". When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found
a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While
examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior
Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent
Congzon returned, he gave the "boodle money" to Atty. Yap who then
handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellant's receipt of the
payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested
him.

"Per instruction of Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon transmitted the shabu
to the Forensic Chemistry Laboratory for examination.

"NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales testified that on April 8, 1998, she
received the specimen from Senior Agent Congzon together with the letter
request. The specimen weighed 497.292940 grams. After examination, the
specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride."
(Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant, on the other hand, presents the following version of the facts:7

"Accused-appellant, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS is a legitimate

businessman having been engaged in the sale of imported automotive for
quite a long time. On April 6, 1998, he was in his house at 375 Caimito
Street, Caimito Ville, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. In the afternoon of April 6,
1998, he was in Caloocan City in Dome Street, in the house of defense
witness Ramon Ty. He was there to pick-up witness Ty because they had
an agreement that he was to bring him to far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
They left right after lunch at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Witness Ty
mentioned to him that they were to meet Mr. Andrada and Dr. Lachica.
They reached Pangasinan at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. They saw
the persons they were supposed to meet in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and
after seeing those persons, they stayed overnight. In his address at Valle
Verde II, accused-appellant had a live-in partner named ANNIE
GONZALES. He was a car owner and had a former driver named Rey, who
drove for him for less than a year. He had to dismiss his driver Rey
because he was always late or would be absent for work without informing
him ahead of time. After staying overnight in far away Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, they left for Manila on April 7, 1998 at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning. When they reached Manila proper, he dropped off witness Ramon
Ty in his house at Caloocan. Then, he went straight home to Valle Verde to
take a nap. At more or less 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 7, 1998, he
was at home at Valle Verde, together with his live-in partner, ANNIE
GONZALES. Later that afternoon, three (3)-armed persons entered his
condominium unit. There was a commotion downstairs and his live-in
partner Annie Gonzales opened the door and he was awakened. Annie told
him that there were three (3) people with guns looking for him and they
went up to the room right away. The three-armed men told him that they
were NBI agents but did not show any identification. Agent Justo Yap, Jr.
was one of them. Agent Congzon Jr. was also one of them, but NBI Special
Investigator Larosa was not one of them. When they entered the room, the
gun of NBI Agent Yap was already pointed at him while the two (2) other
agents were holding the butts of their guns. They were in civilian clothes.
They told him to step-out and that they were looking for [s]habu. They were
not able to find any in his room or downstairs. When they were looking for
the [s]habu, the accused appellant responded "WHAT SHABU?" "What
[s]habu are you looking for?" When he stepped out of the room to go down
to the living room, he saw his former driver Rey together with his father.
Rey[,] as stated before was his former driver and he had seen the father of
Rey once or twice before. Rey and his father were also in the living room. A
paper bag with the lettering "CAB" was presented to the accused appellant
in his house. He noticed that the bag came from Rey and was hiding it
behind him when he gave it to agent Yap. Agent Yap got it from the cabinet
near the kitchen. Agent Yap wanted him to admit that it belongs to him and
that it came from his condominium. Agent Yap also showed him the bag
with white powder and what was shown to him was a white substance in
powdery form. After it was shown to him and he was asked to admit that it
was taken from his place, he and his live-in partner ANNIE GONZALES
were brought to the NBI at Taft Avenue. He did not see Rey and his father
anymore at the NBI Office. When they were at the NBI, the Agents asked
the accused-appellant to admit that the shabu was taken from his
apartment. He told them that it was not from his apartment. Agent Yap told
him that if he will not admit he will stay in jail longer or will be put behind
bars. The accused appellant was brought to the NBI Headquarters on April
7, 1998. When he was taken from his house by the three NBI Agents, he
was not informed or appraised of his constitutional rights such as the right
to counsel and to remain silent. The same thing is true when he was
brought to the NBI Headquarters, where he was not appraised of these
basic rights. When he was asked to admit that the shabu was taken from
his place, he told them that it was not from him and asked why [they were]
doing [this] to him. The NBI Agents insisted that he is hard-headed and if
he would just follow them he will be free if he will tell the source of the
shabu. There were no statements taken from the accused-appellant in the
afternoon of April 7, 1998; no statements were also taken from him in the
morning of April 8, 1998. The agents were trying to negotiate with him. The
negotiation was such that if he cannot produce the source of the
contraband, then he had to produce P200,000.00 in order to get himself
free. The NBI Agents agreed to let Annie Gonzales go and look for money.
Annie Gonzales was able to produce only P40,000.00. It was brought back
by Annie Gonzales to the NBI on April 8, 1998 and gave the sum to Agent
Yap. Agent Yap looked very disappointed when he received the money. He
said that it was not the agreement that was made. That, the agreed price of
P200,000.00 was short of P160,000.00. The accused-appellant requested
again if he could use the phone to call up his cousin J-C Mendoza. He got
in touch with his cousin, who said that he will try to get the amount. He
again requested Agent Yap if he could allow Annie Gonzales [to] go to his
cousin and see if there was cash that she can get. Annie Gonzales was
allowed to leave again but the P160,000.00 was not produced. Annie
Gonzales did not come back anymore because she was not able to
produce the money. She did not show up anymore at the NBI Headquarters
because she will be detained together with him (accused-appellant).

"Defense witness Ramon V. Ty corroborated, on all material points, the

testimony of the accused-appellant. He was the driver of Joey Albert, the
singer, for three (3) years more or less. He knows accused-appellant
because he is the brother-in-law of Joey Albert. He first met Roberto
Mendoza Pacis at his house, when he together with Vicente Pacis,
husband of Joey Albert, went there. In the morning of April 6, 1998, he was
at home. In the afternoon, they left his house at around 2:00 o'clock. They
were bound [for] far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, because his physical
therapist, Dr. Lachica who resided in Pangasinan, was supposed to buy
some instruments from him. He needed the instruments to help him
exercise his body even without therapy because he had a stroke in 1993.
When they reached Urdaneta, Pangasinan, he did not see his therapist
because the latter was at his cousin's house. After being told where Dr.
Lachica was, they went to see him. They were able to get the gadget from
him. They went to Manila the following morning. They left at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning of April 7, 1998 and reached his house in Caloocan
City at around 10:30 o'clock in the morning. Whe[n] they reached
Caloocan, he went home and Roberto Mendoza Pacis said that he will also
go home."
Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, noting that they testified in a clear and
straightforward manner. It debunked appellant's defense of "frame-up" as it
was neither substantiated nor proven. It held that affirmative testimony,
especially when it came from the mouth of a credible witness, was far
stronger than a negative one.

Hence, this appeal.8

The Issues

Appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:

"1. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA
6425 as amended, despite the inherent incredibility of the NBI (National
Bureau of Investigation) version of the manner the alleged buy-bust
operation was conducted.

"2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving too much weight to the testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution when their testimonies were shot with
material discrepancies and inconsistencies.

"3. The lower court erred when it failed to accord full significance [of] the
fact that the informant was not presented in court when circumstances
demand for his presentation.

"4. The lower court erred when it failed to give weight and credence to the
alibi offered by the accused as a defense."9

These issues may be summed as follows: (1) whether the "buy-bust"

operation that led to appellant's arrest was valid, (2) whether the
presentation of the informant was necessary to prove appellant's guilt, and
(3) whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to
appellant's alibi.

This Court's Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

First Issue:

Validity of the Buy-Bust Operation

Claiming that he was framed by the agents of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), appellant assails the validity of the buy-bust operation
that led to his arrest.

Entrapment Distinguished from Instigation

In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping
and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be
defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals
themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that
entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending
criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.10

A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to
the arrest of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the
highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor
and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or
not.11 In the present case, the RTC noted that the prosecution witnesses
testified in a clear and straightforward manner in narrating the events that
had transpired before and during the buy-bust operation.

Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law,
for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner.12 Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the
narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the
law and presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.13

No Proof of Ill Motive on the Part of NBI Agents

It is not unusual in criminal cases of this kind to have a version of the

prosecution so diametrically opposed to that of the defense. However, upon
a careful perusal of the records, we find the evidence presented by the
defense to be unsound and self-serving.

Appellant did not submit any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers to falsely impute to him a serious and unfounded charge.
Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution
were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so
moved, and that their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.14 The
records show that appellant had a ready supply of shabu for sale and
disposition to anyone willing to pay the right price.

Elements of Crime Duly Proven

Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime

of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug.15 These elements were duly proven in
the case herein. The records show that appellant sold and delivered the
shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers. It was seized and identified as a
prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence. Appellant was
likewise shown to be aware that what he was selling and delivering was a
prohibited substance.
Second Issue:

Identity of Informant Not Necessary

With respect to the informant's identity, we hold that it may remain

confidential. There are strong practical reasons for keeping its secrecy,
including the continued health and safety of the informant and the
encouragement of others to report any wrongdoing to police authorities.16
This is settled jurisprudence and we will not belabor it here.

Third Issue:

Alibi as a Defense

On April 6, 1998, NBI agents, acting as poseur-buyers of illegal drugs,

allegedly went to the house of appellant to discuss with him preliminary
arrangements for the sale. However, Pacis disputed this allegation. To
bolster his claim, he presented his sister-in-law's driver, Ramon V. Ty, who
testified that he was with the former in Urdaneta, Pangasinan on that same
day; hence, appellant could not have been with the poseur-buyers in
Manila to discuss the quantity and the price of the shabu to be delivered
the next day.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. The excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no
exception.17

In the present case, however, we agree with the RTC that the claim of Ty
was not substantiated by the testimonies of the persons he and appellant
were supposed to have met in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

Hence, appellant was unable to disprove the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses that on April 6, 1998, he was discussing the terms of the sale
with the poseur-buyers.

Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the

accused -- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial which
are negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law.18

Compared with the detailed, convincing and well-documented Decision of

the trial court, appellant's denial and alibi pale into insignificance.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8578 November 17, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANSELMO DIRIS, EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, and TOMAS OLEA, defendants.
ANSELMO DIRIS and EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, appellants.

Godofredo Reyes, for appellants.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Tayabas convicting the defendants of the crime of robbery.

During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the defendant Tomas
Olea withdrew his appeal and the judgment of the lower court is therefore
final as to him. The only question now presented for our consideration is
the appeal of the defendants Anselmo Diris and Eustaquio Siaga.

We are of opinion that the evidence of record fully sustains the contentions
of the prosecution and the findings of the lower court as to the facts. It will
not therefore be necessary to review the evidence in detail.

It appears that Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag,

Province of Tayabas, received from the railroad company on July 7, 1912,
more than P400 in payment of certain land expropriated by that company,
and that the defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was
present when the money was counted and paid over to his uncle. The
record shows that the money was deposited in a trunk and that this fact
was also known to Olea, who had free access to his uncle's house and was
accustomed to come and go at will.

On the morning of July 12, following the date of the receipt of the money
from the railroad company, Fulgencio Seal left the house between 8 and 9
o'clock in the morning, leaving his wife in charge of their tienda. A short
time thereafter the three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio
Siaga engaged the woman in conversation while the other two defendants
went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and took the money, amounting to
P353, and a receipt for P100. The record shows that at the time of the
robbery part of the money received from the railroad company had been
paid out and that the balance in the trunk was only P353.

The woman was somewhat deaf and had no knowledge of what was taking
place upstairs. She stated that she saw the two defendants go up into the
house, but as Tomas Olea was her husband's nephew and accustomed to
come to the house she thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio
Seal later in the morning the robbery was discovered, and when his wife
reported who had been there he immediately went in search of his nephew.
The nephew when found admitted the theft of the money and promised that
if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he would try and recover it
from the other defendants. Together with Olea the uncle then went in
search of Diris. The uncle was told to wait at a certain place until the
nephew should return, and when he failed to come back the uncle went in
search of him and after found him and Diris in a barber shop in the
municipality of Lopez. The matter was reported to the justice of the peace
of that municipality and the two defendants were arrested. On the person of
Tomas Olea were found two bank notes of the denomination of P10 each,
P3 in half-peso denominations, and P4 in 10-centavo pieces.

Fulgencio Seal testified that the money in the trunk consisted of one bank
notes of the value of P200, P100 in the bank note of the value of 10 pesos
each, and the remainder in currency in P1, 50-centavo, and 10-centavo
denominations, there being P23 in 10-centavo pieces. It appears that by
some error on the part of the justice of the peace the money was returned
to Olea; however, there can hardly be any doubt that it was a part of the
money which his uncle had in the trunk. At the trial the defendants denied
that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied that they
were present at the house on the morning in question; and Eustaquio
Siaga, while admitting that he was at the tienda stated that he went there
alone. The presence of the defendants at the house on the morning in
question is not only established by the wife of Fulgencio Seal, but her
testimony on this point is corroborated by that of Conrado Fernandez, a
neighbor. In view of all the facts of record the statements of the defendants
cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively established.

Olea having withdrawn his appeal and the other evidence of record being
sufficient in itself to sustain the conviction of all the appellants, it is not
necessary for us to discuss the objections set forth in their brief as to the
admission of the alleged confession of guilt of Olea.lawph!1.net

It has been suggested by counsel, that the defendant Eustaquio Siaga,

who remained below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation
while the other defendants went up into the house, should only be held as a
complice (accessary before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not
as a principal. In support of this view we are cited to Viada (Vol. I, p. 370),
as follows: "The persons who entertains the owner of a house while
robbers are assaulting it, so that he will not return thereto until after the
robbery has been consummated, is also an accomplice in the crime,
inasmuch as he cooperated therein by a simultaneous act, although not an
indispensable one for its accomplishment."

It will be seen however that the case supposed by the noted commentator
clearly implies that the owner of the house was entertained at some
distance from the place where the robbery was committed; it does not
appear how far away, but apparently not anywhere in the immediate
neighborhood. The present case offers a different situation. The defendant
Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and must be held to
have been present with them aiding and abetting them in the commission
of the crime by remaining below and talking with the woman in order to
distract her attention from what was going on upstairs. In doing so he was
evidently serving as a guard to warn his companions in case there should
arise any necessity for giving an alarm. When the other defendants came
down out of the house he went away with them.

This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and
aids and abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its
perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in its
material execution, is guilty as a principal. We have also held that one who
stands as guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep others
away or to warn his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of
discovery, takes a direct part in the commission of the crime and is
therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of the Penal Code (U. S. vs.
Reogilon and Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep.,
545; U. S. vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep., 555.)

Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that Siaga was
properly convicted as a principal.

It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for P100 as being
of that value. The actual money stolen amounted to only P353.

While we have held that checks, warrants and similar instrument, payable
to order an evidencing an obligation to pay money, may under certain
circumstances be treated as worth their face value in fixing the value of the
stolen property for the purpose of grading the crime and the penalty to be
imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the penalty prescribed in the Code
is made to depend on the value of the property taken (U. S. vs. Raboy, 25
Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs. Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are of opinion
that a mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in the
absence of any proof as to its value, cannot be held to have anything more
than a mere nominal value in fixing the penalty and assessing the civil
indemnity to be imposed on one convicted of its theft.

The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist, having been
previously convicted of the crime of robbery by the Court of First Instance
of Tayabas in the case of the United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12,
1904, which judgment of conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 9,
1905 (4 Phil. Rep., 498).

The judgment of the trial court should be modified, in so far as it affects

these appellants, by reducing the amount of the civil indemnification from
P453 to P353 and by substituting the words presidio mayor for the words
prision mayor in the dispositive part thereof, and thus modified the
judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants Diris and Siaga should
be and is hereby affirmed, with a proportionate share of the costs of this
instance against each of the appellants.
G.R. No. L-39086 October 26, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ONG CHIAT LAY, ET AL., defendants.
ONG CHIAT LAY, appellant.

Juan S. Alano, T. de los Santos, Eduardo D. Enriquez and Gibbs ad

McDough for appellant.

Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly
informed against by the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with
having feloniously burned a building in which was located a store belonging
to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his codefendants
were tried jointly upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua
and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of
arson and sentenced to suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000,
respectively, and to pay one-third of the costs.

In support of this appeal, appellant has signed the following errors:

First. The lower court erred in holding that evidence presented against the
accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely,
that the crime of arson had been committed.

Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented
against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish his guilt of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it

must be shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the
criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced another or others to
commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an
act without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal
Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act
who, participating in the criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and
personally take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same
end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal
Code Ann., 144.)

In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in
the burning of the building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on
appellant's absence from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious
circumstances indicating his guilt. Appellant was prosecuted on the theory
that he induced his said codefendants to set fire to the building. Hence the
three were charged jointly on an information alleging conspiracy among
them. This allegation of conspiracy, however, has been negatived by the
acquittal of appellant's codefendants. The same may be said with regard to
the theory that appellant had induced his codefendants to perpetrate the
unlawful deed; for it seems clear that one can not be held guilty of having
instigated the commission of a crime without its first being shown that the
crime has been actually committed by another.

In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said: "Pero las
prueblas de la acusacion, a juicio del Juzgado, no establecen que los
acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing hayan cooperado directa o
indirectamente a su coacusado Ong Chiat Lay en la comision del delito.
Las pruebas indiciarias presentadas contra los referidos acusados Ong
Ban Hua y Kua Sing no pueden producir mas que mera sospecha de que
dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento de lo que habia realizado Ong
Chiat Lay, pero esta sospecha no puede servirse de base para una
sentencia condenatoria, y por ende se debe absolver a los mismos
acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing de la querella."

While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs. Tom (13 N.
C. [2 Dev. L., 569), is pertinent to the question now under consideration. In
that case, the court held that although more than two persons are charged
with conspiracy, the acquittal of all but one of those charged amounts to the
acquittal of that one, since there can be no conspiracy unless at least two
unite. Ruffin, J., therein said: "Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilty
cooperation of two, at least, to constitute it, in which there is a mutual
dependence of the guilt of each person upon that of the other, principle
would seem to demand that all the accused should be jointly tried and
convicted, or acquitted. In other cases of dependent crimes, that upon
which the rest depends must be first established. Such is the law between
principal and accessory. The reason is that there may be as full defense as
possible upon the very point of the principal's guilt, by that principal himself
who is best able to make it. To make that rule effectual, it became
necessary to establish another that, but by the accessory's own consent,
no proof of the principal's guilt should be heard against him until it was first
established against the principal himself. The rule arises out of the nature
of dependent criminality. Now conspirators may be said to be co-principals.
The guilt of both must concur to constitute that of either; and it must
consists of a joint act, and it makes one crime in both. As the trial of one
need not precede ha of the other, the trial of both ought to be concurrent. I
think it more than probable that anciently such was the course. But, clearly,
now it is otherwise. There are many precedents of the separate trial of
person indicted for offences that could not be committed by less than two.
(. . . Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1 Strange, 193; Rex vs. Niccolls [1745], 2
Strange, 1227.) It is too late now to question it. But it can never follow from
those cases that where one of the persons, the establishment of whose
guilt is essential to the conviction of the other, has been legally acquitted,
the other does no hereby become discharged. It cannot be that a man can
be held guilty to any purpose who has, in due course of law, been found
not guilty. The analogy between this case and that of the accessory is
strict. The acquittal of the principal is an immediate and absolute discharge
of the accessory. For there can be no aid given to a deed when the deed
itself was never perpetrated. So, where guilt consists in the joint act or
intent of two, and it is found that one of them did not join in the act or intent,
it is conclusive as to both. For A could not conspire with B if the latter did
not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a verdict affirming the guilt of
fewer persons than could commit the crime, and affirming the innocence of
all others charged, has been held to be an acquittal of all." (4 B. R. C.,
930.)

While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct
offense, it is clear from the nature of the evidence presented that appellant
alone could not have committed the unlawful act. As already stated, the
theory of the prosecution was that he conspired with or induced his
codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of the charge was
conspiracy, and the acquittal of his codefendants is clearly inconsistent with
appellant's guilt.

This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this case. Appellant

was convicted wholly on circumstancial evidence. As stated in the decision
of the trial court: "Las pruebas de la acusacion son todas indiciarias, que
son las que siempre se presentan para probar esta clase de delito, porque
su autor o autores ordinariamente no lo practican en presencia de un
trercero." Continuing, the court further said: "El traslado de los muebles del
acusado Ong Chiat Lay a varios sitios antes de occurrir este incendio, su
indiferencia a todo lo que ocurria en la madrugada de autos, su ausencia
del lugar donde estaba instalado su bazar mientras ardia el edificio
ocupado por este, y el hecho de no haberse negado que fuera el el autor
del incendio ante el teniente Piccio, son pruebas indiciaras muy fuertes
contra este acusado. El hecho de que se olia a gasolina dentro de la casa
ocupada por el establecimiento "China Bazaar" en la ocasion en que el
repetido Ong Chiat Lay transladaba sus muebles y su residencia a otro
sitio, y el haber sido encontradas varias latas de petroleo o gasolina vacias
en el mismo terreno donde estuvo levantada dicha casa inmediatamente
despues de occurrir el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas indiciarias
muy fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong Chiat Lay. Todas estas
pruebas apreciadas en su conjunto constituyen una evidencia clara de la
culpabilidad del acusado Ong Chiat Lay."

It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can

not be had unless the corpus delicti is first established. (State vs. Sullivan,
17 L. R. A., 902.) To establish the corpus delicti in arson the proof of two
elements is required, namely, (1) the burning of the house or other thing,
and (2) the criminal agency in causing it. (Spears vs. State, 16 L.R.A. [N.
S.}, 285.) The corpus delicti may be proved by circumstancial evidence.
(State vs. Sullivan, supra.) However: "Before a conviction can be had upon
circumstancial evidence, the circumstances proven should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which
points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
It is indispensable that the evidence be derived from interrelated facts and
duly proven in a manner that will lead to a logical and rational conclusion,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused is the author of the crime. In
other words, there must be from all the circumstances, a combination of
evidence which, in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no
room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused." (Moran, The Law
of Evidence, 453; numerous cases cited in support of the text.)

While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave
suspicions against the appellant, they fall far short of establishing his guilt
clearly and satisfactorily, as required by the well-settled rules of evidence.
This court held in United States vs. Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant
a conviction upon circumstancial evidence, all the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. The chain of circumstances which would have pointed to the appellant
as the guilty person was broken by the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua
Sing. As already explained, the acquittal of his said codefendants is not
only consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is innocent, but is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is guilty.

It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.

Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder,

and sentencing him to be hanged.

The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman
of Parang. He is alleged to have committed the murder by inducement. The
proofs tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the
accused sent Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The
following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the
house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri,
to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the presence of the accused, who
was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the
afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until
night, when the accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered
Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there killed, the accused
asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect from the governor.
He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that
Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the
work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the
accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the
cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and
about 200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck
the first blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter.
The deceased at the time he was killed had his hands tied behind his back.
On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding
told the accused that Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said
that it was all right and appeared to be very much pleased.

The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the
recognized headman of Parang, and it appears from the testimony of the
witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very powerful
influence over them, hence this power over them was such that any order
issued by him had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the
witnesses testified: "He (the accused) knows what is good and what is bad,
and he is the headman of the governor. He is headman of Parang." And in
answer to the question, "He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?"
replied: "There is none, only himself." He further said: "The people do not
hesitate to take his orders because he is the headman of the governor."
Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get angry with the people, what
would he do to them?" this witnesses answered: "I do not know; might kill
them." Another witness, answering the question as to why he did not run
away instead of going to the Chinese cemetery as the accused ordered
him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well, take the same
thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do
it." Prior to this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to
a man like me and tells me it is by order of the governor and that he has a
warrant there, well, a man like me does what he tells me." Another witness
declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not believe that he would make me do
anything unjust." The same witness afterwards testified in answer to the
question: "Would you have killed this man if any other person besides
Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not." Another
witness declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the headman's
orders, and if we did not do it, he would get angry with us." This witness,
answering the question, "Did Panglima make you think that he was acting
under the orders of the Government in causing this man to be killed?"
testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question, "And you
thought that it was a legal execution, did you?" answered, "Yes, because
he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."

We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons
who, at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him
responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders.

Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals

in a crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it."

Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:

They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or

grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening
means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on
paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we have already said that he who
suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an
instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such
case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who
force the other to commit the crime.

One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a

consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and
moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing
such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. We have already
seen in our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one who
physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by
showing that he acted with due obedience to an order; in such case the
criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the one who orders, that is, upon
him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act.
But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior and
therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt him from criminal
responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his
command, directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law
also as principal in the crime.

The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand
which commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the
consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because
without such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been
committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits the
crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from
criminal responsibility; on the contrary, we have already seen in our
comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such circumstance constitutes
an aggravation of his crime.

We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto
there are similar means by which another may be induced to commit a
crime which also make the one who offers the inducement the principal in
the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it must
be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple
advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words
uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice and such words
constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral
law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such
words have a great dominance and great influence over the person who
acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as
physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.

The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the

principles involved and their application to particular cases:

It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who,
during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants,
"Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything more than say
these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of
homicide by inducement, the court saying that, "considering that, although
the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not
so to the extent that they may be considered the principal and moving
cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from
such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be
so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not
have been performed."

In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid
down that "a person who advised a married woman whose husband was
very stingy and treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob
him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason
that imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who
simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another,
"Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such
advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held
in mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of
which a person may be considered a principal in the same manner as he
who executes the act itself can only be founded in commands, sometimes
in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone
produces the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the
words of Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded
the event at the time do not appear in sufficient detail to show with
clearness the effects which the words produced, or the relative situation of
the deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to which the fight
had progressed at the time the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision
of the court below does not show sufficient facts upon which to affirm that
Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke
the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to
use said weapon."

In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of
having proposed to other persons the abstraction of the tickets which were
the subject matter of the robbery, at the same time telling them the place
where they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the
robbery because the proposal to commit the robbery was not sufficiently
efficacious to be the cause of the crime, as the crime, under the facts,
could have been committed without it; nor was the indication of the place
where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to induce the
robbery."

The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing
concrete cases in which the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a
matter of law, to constitute inducement. They not only lay down the legal
principles which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also
illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those principles to
actual cases.

The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the
acts of the accused constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the
application of the principles to concrete cases.

In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court
were: "It appeared that Lulu, who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married
couple) in the town of X, gave birth to a child on the morning of the 28th of
March, the offspring of her illicit relations with William. It had been
previously agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to
William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it in some
frequented place so that it might be found and taken up; but Joe changed
his mind and handed the child over to the father, telling him, 'Here is your
child, do with it whatever you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to,'
which the latter actually did." Under the facts the accused was held guilty
by inducement.

In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a
woman who, living with a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence
of a daughter who continually manifested her disgust and repugnance for
such conduct, conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred
and conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious methods,
obtaining for that purpose poison and various deadly weapons, and
contriving that she and her family and all of the tenants in the house should
go to the theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick and
obliged to remain at home, in order that her lover might be entirely
undisturbed in killing the daughter and that he might not be surprised in the
act, such woman is the author and principal of the crime the same as her
lover who actually committed the deed."

In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes
advantage of his position as an inspector for the maintenance of public
peace and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with
the threat that unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as
an escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers from
the vicinity of the place to be robbed, and who after the robbery received a
part of the booty, was guilty of the crime as principal, although he did not
take personal part therein."

In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a
barrio who, accompanied by a number of peace officers, ordered them to
stop certain music that was being played in the public street, and after the
order had been obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons
expressed his resentment against the act whereupon the alcalde ordered
the peace officers to attack the man, which they did, inflicting upon him
various wounds, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by inducement."

In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from
the balcony of his house cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were
fighting with others to kill those with whom they were fighting before they
were killed themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing
as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by inducement by
reason of the injuries inflicted under such orders."

In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the
inducement and the commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes
a principal to the same extent and effect as if he had physically committed
the crime exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or
agreement for a consideration, or through influence so effective that it
alone determines the commission of the crime."

In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the
proposition that the secretary of the ayuntamiento who induced a certain
persons to form new lists of compromisarios five days prior to the election
of senators was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists,
saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that the secretary of the
ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura, induced the members of the
council to commit the act stated, his participation as principal in the
commission of the act is well established according to the provisions of
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code, because such inducement
coming from a person of such influence as the secretary of the
ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently dominant to
turn the mind of those induced."

In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a

woman who was at enmity with an uncle for having refused to renounce in
her favor a donation which a relative had given to him, who made frequent
threats to kill the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum
of money together with the land involved in the donation if he would kill the
uncle, and who told her son that, if they were unable to get anybody else to
kill the uncle, he must do it himself as he would thus inherit 15,000 pesetas
with which they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he must
leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the
crime of murder committed by the son under such inducement. The court
said: "It being borne in mind that the suggestions with which the mother
moved the mind of her son to kill the uncle had the force of a real
inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by means of the
relations which she bore to him as well as the reward which she held up
before him."

In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as

principal in a crime, him who, "by direct and influential means and taking
advantage of the inexperience of a boy of tender age," induces him to
commit a crime, was warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the
fact that the inducement exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the boy,
Ramon Carballo, to steal the jewels in question from his grandmother's
house shows such a direct and inducing cause of the criminal act that
without such inducement the crime would not have been committed."

In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement
referred to in paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever
the act performed by the physical author of the crime is determined by the
influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act,
whatever be the source of such influence."

In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the
"principal by inducement in five different larcenies, it having been proved
that the inducer, knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was
stolen by the persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them
thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to
carry it and contributed on five different occasions to the realization of the
larcenies, it appearing that the physical authors of the crime were boys
under 15 years of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the
inducer without discernment or judgment of their own," the court saying that
in view of the fact that she knew that the oil which she first purchased from
the boys was stolen oil, that the boys were less than 15 years of age, and
therefore easily led, that she furnished the vessels in which to carry the
stolen property — all indicate conclusively that the five crimes were
committed by the influence exercised by the woman, which inducement
was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was that
which determined its commission."

In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command
of a master to his servant, by reason of the special relations which exist
between them, contains the elements of inducement which makes the
master who orders such servant to cut wood belonging to a third person, in
order that he might benefit thereby, the principal of the crime committed by
such servant," the court saying that "in view of the fact that the command of
the master to the servant, made within the sphere and under the ordinary
conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple and apparently
legitimate, contains the necessary elements, directly and sufficiently
efficacious, of inducement according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of
article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing that the master, taking advantage
of the ascendency and authority which he naturally must exercise over his
servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry away wood from land which
he knew did not belong to him, without disclosing to the servant that
circumstance, which concealment gave rise to the influence which the
master exercised over the servant in that particular act."

The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands

apply the foregoing principles to particular cases.

In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it
appeared that one of the defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a
warehouse and assisted in procuring false keys with which to open it. He
took no immediate part in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion
said:

These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of
the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted.
From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to conceive the
idea of its commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out himself,
he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution of the crime
by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to
steal. The better to induce him to commit the offense, he clearly
demonstrated how easily it could be accomplished, instructed him as to the
best means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for the false
key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the way of determination to
execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in question. These acts
constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said
robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it
appeared that the accused induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by
holding up before them the fact that by such act they would be able to
obtain P40 which was then in the house of the victim, as well as the
carabao which he owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you only make
a little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the P40 which
was received from the sale of the house in town." They having made an
unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having
returned and explained why they had not been able to kill them, the
accused said to them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to
do what I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio
because I thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes then spent
three days clearing some land for another person from whom they received
P2.25. About noon of the third day of their work, the defendant went to
them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply
with our agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill
Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same
place you were concealed before." The murder was committed as
proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of the crime, and that he was
liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of
January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)

In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it
appeared that the accused had a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a
laborer, in which the accused asked him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his
associates, to which he replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I
wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as follows: Order must be
disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any
person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to obey this order, but defendant
gave him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then
he gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I have ordered
and in case you incur any responsibility I will be responsible to the court,
and as soon as you wound any person or persons, return to me and I will
defend you." The court held that these facts constituted sufficient
inducement to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court
said:

Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman,

and more or less dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other
hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this crime was committed, a man of
great influence in Escalante. He had a great number of people working for
him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political
leader of his party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had
two brothers-in-law in the municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief
of police and two others were members of the police force. He had
acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the Roman Catholic
Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own
house on the afternoon of May 15, where the question of murdering the
priest was discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He
dominated all who were present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to
commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately after
murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported the
fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great
and powerful that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio
was directly induced to murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can
be no question.

In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it
was held that the "one who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is
liable as a principal, although he does nothing himself in the actual
commission of the crime."

In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it
appeared that "a married woman suggested to her paramour, with whom
she had been maintaining illicit relations that he kill her husband in order
that thereafter they might live together freely. The paramour acting upon
these suggestions and actuated by a desire to possess the woman for
himself without the interference of the husband, killed him. The guilty pair
immediately thereafter made their escape and lived together as man and
wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:

We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully
established por pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the
understanding that the woman would live in illicit relations with the
murderer after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by precept)
which constituted "a real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting
inducement (excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and
suggestions of the woman constituted something more than mere counsel
or advice which her co-defendant was entirely free to accept or not, in that
they were coupled with a consideration which, in view of the relations
existing between them, furnished a motive strong enough to induce the
man to take the life of her husband; and for the further reason that due to
these illicit relations she had required such an influence over her co-
defendant that her insistent suggestions that he commit the crime had a
marked and controlling influence upon his mind.

In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it
appeared that the accused proposed to his companions an assault upon
the house of Francisco Tolosa; that armed with a talibon he accompanied
them during the assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood
watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that his companions would
not be caught, and that, finally, he accompanied them to the place where
the deceased was killed. These facts were held by the court to be sufficient
to make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct
participation.

In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a
command. There does not seem to have existed, however, any official
relation between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill
Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those
whom he induced held no official position under him and owed him, legally
speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom, however, the
headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and whose
commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to
those who physically committed the crime that he had a warrant from the
governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed, and urged upon
them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the Government. This
representation was false, but it produced the same effect as if it had been
true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representation was
false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional factor going
to insure obedience to his orders.

Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring

the acts of the accused within the definition of inducement by command,
and we do not believe there is, there would still remain all of the elements
necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement. From the
authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid down therein as those
which must govern in the determination of whether or not the acts of an
accused constitute inducement under the law, it may be stated as a general
proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a
nature and made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of
the crime, and such inducement was offered with the intention of producing
that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed
by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional
on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in
view.

The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases

where there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution
and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime,
together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the result of
indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them, inherently,
almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word spoken without
reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to,
crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto
without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any
expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that
it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and
the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime
committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete
cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that
such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.

In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to
the persons who actually committed the crime that he had an order from
the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under
obligation to carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this
inducement was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested
with the intention of moving them to do his bidding, and that such
representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it may be said,
and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely
sufficient to produce the effects which actually resulted and that such
commands may be considered the moving cause of the crime, still there is
no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused had
in his possession an order from the Government commanding the death of
Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the death; and where two
fundamental causes work together for the production of a single result and
one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory and the
other upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.

There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There

were present, also, the aggravating circumstances of desplobado and
nocturnity.

We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well
founded, and we accordingly affirm the same, with costs.
G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO
CORTESANO, defendants-appellants.

Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao

finding them guilty of frustrated homicide, with the aggravating
circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior strength, and
sentencing each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years
of prision correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel
Pulido jointly and severally in the sum of P540, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the corresponding costs.

The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is
that the lower court erred in convicting the appellants, and in not acquitting
them with the costs de oficio.

The first question to be considered is the participation of the several

defendants in the commission of the crime.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis
Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano were working on the hemp plantation of
Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who
was the overseer or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the
gross receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house on the
plantation.

Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road
through the plantation. According to the offended party he refused to grant
this request because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine
on the other hand contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission
requested and he began work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido
and his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name
of Barabadan, were returning home from the cockpit that evening they
noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had been destroyed for
the purpose of opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the
hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party went to the house of the
defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a sharp conflict in
the evidence as to what followed. The witnesses for the prosecution
contend that while the offended party was talking with Omine, Eduardo
Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that
Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him
except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano then held
Angel Pulido by the arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine
shouted to him "pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the
breast with his bolo.

Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand
maintain that the offended party and his son were the aggressors; that the
first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an
offensive epithet and asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants,
struck him in the breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor
attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido and his son attacked him their fists,
Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion
and Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was wounded by
Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine never uttered the words attributed to him
or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.

The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his
son, and a Bagobo, named Saito, who was their relative and lived with
them. Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The witnesses for the
defense were the four appellants.

The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it
was struck by Eduardo Autor. The anger of Angel Pulido and his son was,
however, directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the
destruction of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy among
the defendants, but the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito,
narrated the facts of the incident in such away that all the four defendants
would appear to be equally responsible for the injury sustained by the
offended party. The evidence does not convince us that Ladion and
Cortesano took any part in the fight; on the contrary it inclines us to believe
that they ran away and were not present when Angel Pulido was wounded.
This impression is strengthened by the fact that they were not included in
the original complaint subscribed and sworn not by the offended party on
December 29th. They were not included as defendants until the amended
complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were present and
held the offended party by the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence does
not show that they held him for the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to
strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for
the purpose of preventing the offended party and his son from continuing
their attack on Omine. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to
hold Angel Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his
bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y
matale". According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and
Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in the face with their fists, and
Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario
Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight
between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had
already drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need of any
inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this
case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the
words in question, we are of the opinion that they would not be sufficient to
make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the
words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel
Pulido. In the first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already
other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have
uttered the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in
question were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor
to strike the offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was
working under the direction of Omine, apparently according to the
testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear
that Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases
cited by the Solicitor-General of a father giving orders to his son are
obviously different from the case at bar.

In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was
held that in order that a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement
it is necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. In that case various
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved
and their application to particular cases were cited with approval. One of
the decisions cited was that of April 24, 1871, where it was held that one
who, during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the
combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing the he did anything
more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty
of the crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of Spain said:
"Considering that, although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and
even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered
the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement
cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act
induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without
it the act would not have been performed." Another decision cited was that
of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a father who simply said to
his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another. "Hit him! Hit
him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given.

Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code without change as No. 2 of article
17, Viada says that in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act
can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or
such words have great dominance and great influence over the person who
acts, that it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful
as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th
Edition.)

We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor

are not responsible for the injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the
wound of the offended party, found that it was the intention of the
defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the offended party, and accordingly found
said defendant guilty of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence
does not justify this finding. It is true that the wound was serious and in a
vital part of the body, but judging from the nature of the wound, which was
about eleven inches in length, extending from the breast to the lower ribs
on the right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the point of
the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably
given during a commotion and without being aimed at any particular part of
the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the offended
party only once. This fact tends to show that it was not his intention to take
the offended party's life. If he had so intended, he could easily have
accomplished his purpose, so far as the record shows. It might be
contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended party a second
time, because he thought that he had already killed him. This was
apparently the theory of the prosecution, because the offended party and
his witnesses testified that the offended party dropped down unconscious
when he was wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to sustain
that contention. In the first place a cutting wound like that in question would
not ordinarily render the injured man immediately unconscious.

In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, that Angel Pulido did not fall down
unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while the blood was flowing
from his breast and stomach; that Saito approached the wounded man to
support him and take him home.

It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the
result unless the intent to kill is manifest.

When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act

which was not realized, the facts from which it is claimed that intention
sprang must be such as to exclude all contrary supposition. When this
intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by the
defendant, greater importance should not be given to such acts than that
which they in themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be
extended beyond that which is actually involved in the material results of
his act. Intention may only be deduced from the external acts performed by
the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a definite result, the
courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other
result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)

There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was
accidentally wounded in a struggle for the possession of the offended
party's bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E,
executed on December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his
bolo and struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very
aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones
graves, since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of
his usual work for a period of more than ninety days, and not of frustrated
homicide.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to

Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted
with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant
Eduardo Autor, the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is
convicted of lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight
months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P540, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to
pay the corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is fixed at one
year of prision correccional.
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who
is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the
prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the
accused in this case, his prosecution for murder with assault upon a person
in authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even stronger by the
defense itself.

As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to
Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:

At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia
was eating at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell
of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a
policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his
car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his vehicle,
Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and soon thereafter the two
smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente Capalad and
the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared
both of them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he
asked the waitress ff she knew them but the waitress said she did not. 1
Then the mayhem began.

While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand
and Capalad with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled
out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist and started
stabbed Camantigue in the back. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to
draw the gun from his holster but Montealegre, thus released, restrained
Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from defending himself
Montealegre used both his hands for his purpose 3 as Capalad continued
stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fen to the
floor and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered
toward the door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired
again. 5 Capalad fled into a dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase
and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in
the alley with a bullet wound in Ms chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad
survived, both expiring the following day. 6
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7
Having been informed of the incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite
police immediately organized a team that went to look for him that very
night. 8 They did not find him in his house then but he was apprehended in
the morning of March 12,1983, on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He
gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was the fugitive being
sought. 9

Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body,

testified that death was caused by shock due to massive internal
hemorrhage caused by seven stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver,
stomach, pancreas, and diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length
and about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood found on it was analyzed as
human.11 The stabbing incident was narrated in detail at the trial by
Abadilla, 12 who was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 13

On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented

Camantigue from drawing his pistol while he was being stabbed by
Capalad, demonstrating with the aid of court personnel the relative
positions of the three during the incident. 14

On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more

emphatically, thus:

Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue upon

drawing his gun, what happened to Camantigue?

A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because he was
being held by Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the back. 15

He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of

the accused-appellant —

Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the back,

accused Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue at that
time?

A. Yes sir.

Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc.

Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir, he knew. 16

In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:

Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw gun,
Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. With what hand?

A. Both hands, sir.

Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?

A. No. sir.

Q. Why?

A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.

Q. With both hands?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands rights hand of Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both hands the
hand of Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?

A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor. 17

San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct

examination.

Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?

A. He was on the right side.

Q. What was he doing at that time?

A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but
Montealegre held his hand.

Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?

A. No. sir.

Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun? They

slammed down on the floor and when they were already on the floor, I ran
away because I was already figures lightened. 18

The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he

insisted:
A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre suddenly
held the hand of Camantigue.

Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue, what

happened to Camantigue?

A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding his
hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back. 19

And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:

Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre was

holding the right hand of the policeman to prevent him from drawing his
gun?

A. Yes, sir. 20

The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in

confinning his own guilt. He claimed he ran away before the stabbing but
his testimony, consisting of denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of
ignorance and forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have
the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the kind of defense
he offered to exculpate himself from the charge established against him by
the prosecution.

Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what

happened if any?

A. Camantigue pulled his gun.

Q. What happened after that?

A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened. 21

xxx xxx xxx

A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really happened.

Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?

A. I did not see. 22

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfb. Camantigue shot and killed
Vicente Capalad?

A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue killed
Capalad. 23

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc.Camantigue was holding both
of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?

A. I did not see anything. 24

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while
Capalad was on the left side?

A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.

Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of Camantigue?

A. I am not sure if that is the right side.

Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were
placed?

A. I cannot remember. 25

It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was
happening on that evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal
figures of the stabbing incident, he could not have not known, nor could he
later not remember, that startling event that even more onlookers could not
forget. The evidence has established that the accused-appellant was
directly and personally involved and was in fact one of the two persons held
by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet Montealegre would now insist,
quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that night.

If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would
have been less likelihood of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention
would have been fully concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover, there
would have been nothing to restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol
and defending himself against Capalad if the accused-appellant had, by his
own account, already escaped before the stabbing.

It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the
accused-appellant did was attempt to hide, only to be found the following
morning on board a bus bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended,
he first gave a false name before he finally admitted his Identity, thus
beginning the mesh of contradictions, admissions and denials, in which he
would enshare himself.

The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the
time of the stabbing, the victim was in uniform and, therefore, could easily
be recognized as a person in authority. Several witnesses testified as to his
attire when he was killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim was in
civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record shows that no less than the
accused-appellant himself, replying to questions put to him by the
prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be a policeman. 27

The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having

collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted
in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the
accused-appellant holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from
drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that the accused-
appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless
equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the
attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable
cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1)

participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before
the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would
not have been accomplished.

The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence

correspondence of a prior agreement between Capalad and Montealegre,
their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The
Court sustains this view, which conforms to our consistent holding on this
matter:

Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred

from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense
was committed, participants had the same purpose and were united in its
execution; as may be inferred from the attendant circiumstances. 29

xxx xxx xxx

We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino

Bautista. The whole incident happened because the accused came upon
Bautista and Mallabo fishing within or near the fishpond enclosure of Carlo
Aquino which was under the care of Vicente Cercano.

But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be

established, it is not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or
agreement to commit the assault; it is sufficient that at the time of the
aggression all the accused by their acts manifested a common intent or
desire to attack Bautista and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused
became the act of all. 30

xxx xxx xxx

If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards

accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert is proven. A conspiracy only be entered
into after the commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of
the crime. 31

As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:

There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from
behind when the latter was stabbed by his collaborated Victor Buduan, was
a positive act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although
the intent can be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that
had not appellant held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could
have partied the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By
immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although there
was no anterior conspiracy , the two cousins showed unity of criminal
purpose and intent immediateIy before the actual stabbing. 32

xxx xxx xxx

It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the

running decedent in such a manner that the latter could not even move or
tum around. This enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn
bolo and was barely five meters away from the decedent, to finally overtake
him and stab him at the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore
performed another act-holding the decedent—without which the crime
would not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by
indispensable cooperation. 33

The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was

correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, as qualified by
treachery, with assault upon a person in authority. Accordingly, he must
suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being
no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil indemnity,
which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical and
fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.

Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty
while enforcing the law against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was
struck down with no less than seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his
own admission, was at the time of the incident "burned" on marijuana. The
kiner also eventually succumbed, and that made the second life needlessly
lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There was another Iife also ruined,
this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself, although, fortunately
for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever foreclosed. In
the somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he has
done, he may yet find his ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and remorse.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified,

without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-39401 September 30, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERTO SIMBRA and SERGIO TOLIBAS, accused. SERGIO TOLIBAS,
accused-appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Actg. Solicitor General Reynato S.

Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for plaintiff-appellee.

Manuel V. Montilla for accused-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:

Charged with rape committed according to the information, as follows:

That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan, Butuan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually,
helping one another by, means of force, threats and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, and forcibly feloniously and successively have carnal.
knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a girl of 16 years
old.

Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify the
offended party, Gresilda Gonzales, in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P12,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs. In the service of his sentence, the
accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention
conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep.
Act 6127, it appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a voluntary
agreement to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners."

Quoting from appellee's brief, the crime was committed as follows:

At about 7:30 p.m. on May 24, 1972, complainant Gresilda Gonzales left
her house in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water from the artesian well
located in the public market. She carried a pail and a hose. About 36
meters away from her house, along an unlighted portion of the road leading
to the public market, appellant and Berto (Roberto) Simbra, strongly
smelling of 'tuba', accused her. Berto Simbra grabbed her by the arms. She
struck him with the hose she was holding and shouted for help. Appellant
quickly covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each other,
appellant and Berto Simbra dragged her to the 'serin' (as spelled in
appellant's Brief; also spelled "siren" and "seren" in the transcript of
stenographic notes). The 'serin' is a pile of sawdust surrounded by breast-
high grasses and big trees, near the public market. (pp. 48-53, 68-69, 71-
75, November 22, 1972; pp. 6, 9-10, TSN, February 6, 1973).
At the "serin", Berto Simbra threw complainant to the ground and, with
appellant holding her arms and covering her mouth, forcibly removed the
men's pants and panties that she was wearing. Then he brought out his
penis and went on top of her. She kicked and stuggled vigorously but he
nevertheless succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and having
carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and wanted to shout but she could
not do so because appellant covered her mouth. After a while, Berto
Simbra stood up and went to urinate. When he came back, he had another
sexual intercourse with her. (pp. 53-56, 75-81, TSN, November 22, 1972.)

With Berto Simbra also holding complainant, appellant also had carnal
knowledge of her although she resisted vigorously and kicked him. He was
able to do so three times. (pp. 56-57, 80-82, TSN, November 22, 1972).

When Berto Simbra and appellant were finished, complainant noticed a wet
substance and plenty of blood in her genitals. (pp. 4-5, TSN, December 11,
1972)

Before leaving the "serin", appellant and Berto Simbra instructed

complainant not to reveal what happened on pain of being killed. Appellant
emphasized the threat by pretending to choke her. (p. 57, TSN, November
22,1972; p. 12, TSN, December 11, 1972)

Berto Simbra and appellant brought complainant to the house of Ernanita

Jusay, sister of appellant, which was about 250 meters distant from the
'serin'. Although her house was in the same community, complainant told
Ernanita Jusay that she came from Buenavista because that was the
instruction of appellant and Berto Simbra. Complainant stayed in the house
of Ernanita Jusay until 9:00 p.m. of May 25, 1972 when her aunt, Alicia
Pepito, who lived nearby, and Langihan policeman Domingo Macuno, Jr.
fetched her. She could not leave until she was fetched because appellant
and Berto Simbra were guarding her. (pp. 58- 60, 81-86, TSN, November
22, 1972).

Complainant was brought to Alicia Pepito's house, then to her house and
finally to the police station where she was interrogated. She and her mother
gave sworn statements (Exhibits C and 2) to the police. (pp. 19-22, 60-62,
86, TSN, November 22, 1972; pp. 6-7, TSN, December 11, 1972).

Dr. Angelus R. Tupaz, Medico-Legal Officer of the Butuan City Police

Department, examined complainant at 2:30 p.m. on May 27, 1972. He
found still fresh lacerations of her hymen at 3:00 and 6:00 o'clock positions
which he said were probably caused by sexual intercourse. He also found a
slimy white substance at the cul-de-sac of Douglas of complainant's
genitals. The substance turned out to be spermatozoa upon examination.
The spermatozoa was about one (1) cc., indicating that it may have come
from more than one man. (pp. 67, 11, TSN, November 22, 1972). He
prepared a medical report containing his findings. (Exhibit A/Exhibit 1)
After the incident, Berto Simbra absconded. He left his house at Langihan;
Butuan City, and was nowhere to be found at the time of the trial. (p. 14,
TSN, February 6, 1973) Thus, the trial was only against appellant.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that about 8:30 in the evening of May
24, 1972, he and Berto Simbra went to the dance hall at the Emilio
Compound in Butuan City to dance. They met Gresilda Gonzales, the
sweetheart of Simbra, and upon invitation of Simbra the three of them went
to the "serin" (pile of sawdust) at about nine o'clock. In going to the "serin"
they passed through a street where there were many people. Simbra and
complainant were conversing with each other as they walked side by side,
while he (appellant) was about twelve (12) feet behind them. Upon
reaching the "serin," he (appellant) remained at a place about thirty-five
meters away to watch for people who night come around. After a while he
saw complainant taking off her pants and panties, spread them on the
"serin" and then lay down on them. Berto Simbra went on top of her and
they had sexual intercourse, twice within one hour. After Simbra was
through, he approached appellant and told him to go to her as she was still
lying down on the "serin." He did go to where complainant was and asked
her if he could also lie down with her. She consented and three times he
had sexual intercourse with her.

About 12:00 midnight, the three of them (Simbra, complainant and

appellant) went to the house of Ernanita Tolibas Jusay (appellant's elder
sister). He introduced complainant to Ernanita as his sweetheart from
Buenavista. However, Simbra told Ernanita that he and appellant had just
had sexual intercourse with complainant. Appellant and complainant spent
the night in that house while Simbra went home to his own house which
was about 150 meters away. The following morning, complainant spent the
whole day in Ernanita's house doing nothing except sat in the sala, ate and
slept. At about 8:30 in the evening, complainant was fetched by her aunt
and a policeman.

Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with complainant but
claims that he did so with her consent.

The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by his sister

Emanita Tolibas Jusay.

The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual intercourse with
complainant against the will of the latter and through the use of force and
intimidation. Appellant claims that the court erred "in giving too much
credence to the testimony of the offended party Gresilda Gonzales."

The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant did not for a
moment tolerate the indecent acts of appellant and Simbra. She was going
to the artesian well at the public market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch
water, when she was seized by Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held
her arms and dragged her towards the "serin." Her mouth was covered with
a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and even kicked Berto Simbra
and appellant. Upon reaching the "serin," Simbra threw complainant on the
ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off her pants
and panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice. Thereafter, Simbra
also held complainant when appellant had sexual intercourse with her,
thrice.

After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra and appellant
with death if she would reveal what happened to her. Appellant
emphasized the threat by pretending to choke her.

Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon complainant, there

would be abrasions and contusions on her body. While it is true that Dr.
Tupaz found no injuries on her body, except the lacerations on her hymen,
the fact is, the rapists did not really employ violence upon her but only used
force by holding her arms, covering her mouth, dragging and throwing her
to the ground and pinning her down. She was not boxed, beaten or injured
in any way. The force coming as it did from two big men and applied on a
15-year old girl was enough to overcome whatever resistance there was,
without necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions,
hematoma, and other injuries on complainant's body, except the lacerations
oil her hymen.

Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of appellant that she
was the girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen her rapists passing her house
before the date of the incident but the fact is, she came to know their
names at the Police Station only when she was investigated.

The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant was not a

woman of loose morals that after her alleged sweetheart had satisfied
himself she consented to have sexual intercourse with appellant and with
the blessings of Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree to
allow two men to successively take advantage of her in the presence of the
other. In the case of People vs. Soriano, 35 SCRA 633, this Court said:

To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed, no woman

would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men-or-three,
according to Antonio Gallardo-in the presence of each other, unless she
were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record
before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year
high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her
testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth.
In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would
falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged.

Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against

her will by employing force and intimidation, the crime committed is rape
through direct participation. And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it
possible for the latter to have carnal knowledge of complainant also against
her will and through force and intimidation, appellant committed another
crime of rape through indispensable cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty
of two crimes of consummated rape.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but modified in

the sense that appellant Sergio Tolibas is hereby sentenced twice to the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. With costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA, FELICISIMO
DOBLEN alias Simoy and VICENTE ROJAS, accused-appellants;
GASPAR MISA, accused whose death sentence is under automatic review.

Jose W. Diokno for appellant Nierra.

Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for accused Misa.

Alberto Cacnio for appellants Doblen and Rojas.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Octavio R

Ramirez and Trial Attorney Lolita C. Dumlao for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano Nierra and
Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision dated March 4, 1970 of
Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas of the Court of First Instance of South
Cotabato, General Santos City Branch II, convicting them of murder,
sentencing each of them to death and ordering them to pay solidarity an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim Juliana Nierra
(Criminal Case No. 2081).

Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was also sentenced
to death and ordered to pay a similar indemnity (Decision of August 25,
1969, pp. 36-8, Record). His death sentence is under automatic review.

According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52,

and Pagano Nierra, 39, her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the
businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio
Tinago, General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano sold
pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II,
while Paciano was the owner of two launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana
was the wife of Aniceto Nierra, Paciano's elder brother. To mollify Pagano,
by diminishing the competition between their launches, Aniceto sold Elsa II.
Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano were not on speaking terms.

In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra

conceived the Idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose,
Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's
house in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted
murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-
4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in
June, 1969. He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja vs.
Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of
Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in
consideration of three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the
morning after the killing he would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the
municipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away
from General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the same place on
August 12, 1969.

That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa scheduled the

assassination on July 8, 1969, Pagano said that it was up to Misa since he
was the one who would kill Juliana.

In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra,

delivered to Misa at the beach a package containing a caliber .38 pistol
with five bullets. Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him
that he (Misa) had been hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as
lookout on the night of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.

On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near the creek
or canal about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia
was stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps
from the scene of the crime. Pagano was near the house of Juanito
Desinorio about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The
houses of the two Desinorios were separated from the house of Juliana
Nierra by an alley.

Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of
the crime in close proximity to the back of Juliana's house where. as he had
previously observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of
nature. The house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the beach
of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.

Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the
beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa
unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and
while in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol
and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed
the actual killing.

The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained a gunshot

wound in the tongue. The bullet passed through the buccal cavity down to
the spinal column where the slug was extracted.

Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing commotion, went
down from the house and saw his prostrate wife with blood oozing from her
mouth and nose. Her panty was pulled down, her dress was raised up to
her waist, and her genital organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor
pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of Paciano
and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the houses of Tony Desinorio
and Francisco Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso Gas Station
crossed the creek or canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the
gun into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded to the
Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind and returned to the
beach near the victim's house.

The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing through the alley
between the house of the victim and the Desinorio houses, which alley
separated the building of the Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from
the Esso Gas Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia resided. Their
residence was about two hundred meters away from the scene of the
crime.

A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be at the Villa

Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening of July 8, 1969, when the
killing was perpetrated, testified that she saw Pagano Nierra wearing an
underwear and striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio
Tinago. About five minutes later, she saw Pagano the boulevard and
running towards Saguing Street. He was wearing long pants. The witness
made a statement to the police about what she had seen.

Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for Tupi and
alighted near the municipal building. Paciano Nierra arrived in that place
and gave him four hundred pesos. Misa returned to General Santos City,
gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and proceeded to the victim's house where he
mingled with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil there,
staying there for four nights.

He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the , buses and the
pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission of one peso per passenger.
Policemen arrested him and Rojas as for questioning but they were later
released. He left the city and brought his family to Barrio Luan, Maitum
South Cotabato. There, he was arrested again, this time by Constabulary
soldiers.

On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of

the city police department. He signed a confession admitting the killing of
Juliana Nierra and implicating the other accused therein. The statement
was sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the killing.
Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch of the scene of the
crime was prepared.

On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his

testimony, he admitted again the killing and confirmed his confession
implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He
executed another confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn to
before the city judge.

Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa, Doblen,
Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with
murder aggravated by reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity,
ignominy and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had
been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder of Antonio Abad
Tormis in Cebu City.

As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co accused, his
confessions and testimony were offered by the prosecution and were the
main bases of the judgment of conviction and the imposition of the death
penalty.

As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual cases will
be separately reviewed.

Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an

improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed to explain
thoroughly to him the gravity of the offense and the consequences of his
plea of guilty.

That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had

acquired some experience in criminal procedure. Not only that. He
executed two extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime as the
triggerman He testified at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was
sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star witness during the trial of
his co-accused. His testimony against his co-accused, delineating their
roles in the commission of the killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his
plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as
to his understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs.
Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).

Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that

the judgment of conviction be set aside and that the case be remanded to
the lower court for new trial To hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would
again be the star prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and
preposterous ceremony.

The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any complicity in the killing
of Juliana Nierra. Their version is that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at
about eight o'clock in the evening, Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his
house. Gaudencia Nierras was in her room, writing something. Eduardo
Nierra, the couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion Sabihon
a housemaid, was somewhere in the house premises.

Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he came out of the
room, he met Nolasco Docallos who said that Juliana Nierra was shot.
Paciano Nierra asked who shot her. Docallos answered that he did not
know.

Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's motorcycle in

going to the hospital. Paciano instructed his son Eduardo to render
assistance. Paciano could not go out because two years before he had
undergone a surgical operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave
the children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor
that Juliana was already dead.

At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day, Gaudencia went to

the funeral parlor. She talked with Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto
Nierra, her brother-in-law and husband of the victim, did not answer when
she tried to talk with him.

Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife and their
Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano,
boarded a bus and went to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the
outrigger of a vinta, a trip which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed
upon with Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not
able to buy bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez Restaurant.

The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at two o'clock in
the afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor. They were not able to talk
with Aniceto Nierra. In the evening of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers
for the repose of the soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the
second, third and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the
succeeding nights because she was advised that it was bad for her to do
so. Their child attended the novena Paciano could not attend the novena
because he had kidney trouble. They gave one hundred pesos to Juliana's
family as contribution to the funeral expenses.

The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial, Aniceto lost
consciousness and collapsed Paciano revived him by pressing his
abdomen. After the coffin was placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the
niche. The Nierra spouses gave to Aniceto an additional two hundred
pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness because he
was a recidivist and his testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. That
contention is devoid of merit.

Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in his
confessions and testimony was that he was hired by the Nierra spouses,
through Doblen to kill Juliana for the price of three thousand pesos. That is
sufficient for the conviction of the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the
assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony refer to minor
details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual
commitment to pay Misa the balance of two thousand six hundred pesos
must have impelled him to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if
such a revelation speeled his own destruction.

The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is
belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for
killing Juliana Nierra. He was induced to do so because of the monetary
consideration promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to
Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Before Juliana's
assassination, Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill Nene Amador, her
former housemaid, who was allegedly Paciano's mistress. That projected
killing did not materialize.

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the alleged

conspiracy is inadmissible in view of the rule that "the act or declaration of
a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules
of Court).

It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as evidence

against appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by
evidence other than such testimony and that there is no such independent
evidence. This argument is wrong. It is not supported by action 27 of Rule
130

Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to

testimony given on the stand at the trial where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant" (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil.
531, 541).

Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding that the motive
for the killing was to stifle business competition. This argument is refuted by
the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that
Paciano Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager
or "brains" of Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola distribution
businesses.

In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa II, while it was
under construction. Aniceto had to sell that launch because of Paciano's
threat that somebody would be hurt if its operation was continued. Pagano
told Rodelio that the latter's mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked was bad
and dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions, Paciano even
challenged his brother to a fight.

Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court convicted them on
the basis of the hearsay testimonies of Guillermo Sanchez and Jose
Samoya. This argument is misleading. The judgment of conviction was
anchored principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool
used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death. Misa's
evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.

The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that Misa, Rojas
and Doblen were implicated in the killing of Juliana Nierra. It was the
affidavit of Sanchez, linking Misa to the killing, that gave the police a
breakthrough in the solution of the case. After the connection of Misa with
the crime was established, the police arrested him and obtained his
confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the investigators.

The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the trial court
erred in admitting as evidence the affidavit of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh.
J) which was obtained through an alleged promise of immunity. The record
is not clear as to that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on
August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified at the pre investigation. The
record of his testimony before the fiscal was signed by him. He was
assisted by counsel at that pre investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise of
immunity was shown to have been made by the fiscal to Rojas.

In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is cumulative in

character. As already stated, the crucial and decisive evidence consists of
Misa's testimony and confessions.

Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted acted the
preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant Doblen, having been
allegedly hired by the offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial,
he acted as counsel de oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared
for Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).

The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly

prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already noted, were convicted on the
basis of Misa's confessions and testimony. The appellants have not
successfully overthrown or rebutted Misa's evidence.

It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of Paciano

Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend on Aniceto Nierra by
pretending that he had no hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.

We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the night of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and
Gaudencia Nierra did not go to the funeral parlor to view the remains of
Juliana.

After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there was a
confrontation between the said spouses and Aniceto Nierra in the house of
their brother, Alonso, in the presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The
following dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:

Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of your wife?
Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to you that you were
standing by the post and Paciano (Gaudencia) was also standing in a
another post when he (Misa) killed my wife. From now on I have no brother
by the name of Pacing.

Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.

Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they were
confined in the city jail (translation):

My companion Pacing (Paciano):

I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do my best that
you will be fre qe. Before the trial of (in) court, I would like that you give
me the sum of P600 even if you give the cash advance of P 500 before
Sunday. OK and you give the same thru the hole.

Your companion,

(Sgd.) Gaspar Misa

Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately. (Exit 1)

The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co-
conspirators. The Nierras were co-principals by inducement. By acting as
lookouts during the perpetration of the killing, they became co-principals by
cooperation as well.

Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. — Doblen's alibi was that on the night of the
killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan, South Cotabato. He returned to
General Santos City at ten o'clock in the morning of the following day. He
denied that he accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4,
1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing the murder
weapon.

Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his pumpboat at
Lion's Beach, General Santos City. However, that could not have precluded
him from having acted as lookout on that same beach.

These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's confessions
and testimony have no probative value because there was no other
evidence proving the alleged conspiracy. As already stated, that rule does
not apply to testimony given on the witness stand where the defendants
have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People vs. Dacanay,
92 Phil. 872).

It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because he was not

present when Misa and the Nierra spouses discussed the liquidation of
Juliana Nierra and that when Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he
(Doblen) did not know that it contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it
is contended that he was not present at the said conference between Misa
and the Nierra spouses.

These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen and Rojas
indubitably show that they had community of design with the Nierra
spouses and Misa in the assassination of Juliana Nierra.

Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that the trial court
erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained
under an alleged promise of immunity.

It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain anything

connecting him to the murder. In that affidavit, he denied that he had any
participation in the commission of the crime and that he conspired with
Misa. So, the admission in evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at
all.

The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified
by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As to
the Nierras, relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.

Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in

which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added shame, disgrace or obloquy to
the material injury caused by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating
(U.S. vs. Abaigar 2 Phil. 417).

In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of

guilty. That did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon him.

Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on

the Nierra spouses is in accordance- with law. However, for lack of the
requisite ten votes, the death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should
be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and
delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of
the crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty
pesos for his work.

After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we

have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as
accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should
be punished as co-principals. However, since their participation was not
absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that
the court should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to them
(People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases).

In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the

principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an
accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was,
relatively speaking, of a minor character (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil.
515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598;
People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with respect to

Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.

(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is communited to

reclusion perpetua. The civil liability imposed upon her by the trial court is
affirmed.

(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are convicted as

accomplices. They are each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten
years of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen years of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and to pay solidarily with the
principals an indemnity of six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the heirs
of Juliana Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the extent of six
thousand pesos for the principals' civil liability. Costs against the accused.
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON
DOBLE and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple

homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons
in authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused
were brought to trial, the other five named only as "John Does" in the
information having remained at large. Two of the five accused who stood
trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the trial court, the
Court of first Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on the appellants
herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The
decision of the trial court is now before Us for review for having imposed
the death penalty.

Both the de ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General,
Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so
narrated in the appealed decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the
relevant and material facts accurately reflect the evidence presented,
except only as to the fact that there were eight malefactors, with respect to
which appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief).

As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:

Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily
armed with pistols, carbines and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a
motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the
Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in
Navotas and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men
disembarked from the banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction of
the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the
people around in panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in different
directions scampering for safety. As time went on, the shots grew in
intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their
banca, still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like
"bayongs". "They boarded the waiting motor banca and sped away. As a
result of the shooting, many people got killed and some injured. Among
those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of
the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teofilo
Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a
market collector, was also killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat.
Armando Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and
Pedro de la Cruz.
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North
hay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an
unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight and closes at 8:00 in the
morning. The bank has ten employees, more or less, including a security
guard. It has two cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under
the care of Melvin Domingo and the other one under the care of Alejandro
San Juan. At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant
cashier of the bank, was near the cage of Domingo when two men entered
the bank asking that their money be changed. Domingo refused, saying
that they had no small denominations. Suddenly, three men armed with
long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They
ordered the employees to lie down, face downward and then demanded the
key to the vault. When Reyes answered that they do not have the key, the
armed men aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon it until its doors
were opened. They entered the vault and found that they could not get
anything as the compartments inside the said vault were locked. Not being
able to get anything from the vault, the armed men went to the two teller
cages and took whatever they could lay their hands on. Not long
afterwards, the men left, carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.

Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat.
Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats.
Pangan, Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelists. were on duty
watching the fish landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he
heard a burst which he believed came from a Thompson. He said he saw a
man pointing a Thompson upwards while he was in front of the banca
Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst coming from the same
direction. Antonio and his companions then went to the middle of the road
and again they heard shots, and this time they were successive, coming
from their left. Antonio could not see who was firing the shots. Suddenly, he
said, he saw one of this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw
also Dominador Estrella sitting down folding his stomach. They were both
felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank. Antonio told
Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm. Sgt.
Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio
said, he went to the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that
from the outpost he heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in
the thigh. After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded companions
placed in a vehicle, together with Evangelista and Aguilos who were
already dead. Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of the PC,
lying prostrate in the ground already dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).

It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the
killing that followed in its wake were actually committed, the three
appellants had no participation. It is not surprising that the Solicitor General
has recommended the acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble.
With this recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of this
appellant ahead of the other two, appellants Antonio Romaquin and
Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the
following observation:

As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met
in his house to discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank This
circumstance, standing alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he performed any act tending
to the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or
induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act without which it would not have been
committed. It could be that Simeon was present at the meeting held in his
house and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme but, aside from
this, he did not cooperate in the commission of the robbery perpetrated by
the others. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not
punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose (15 CJS 1062).

We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that
Simeon was a principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite his
non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved
that Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him an
accessory. Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he gave
P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967)
could hardly be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is significant
that in his statement he claimed he had not yet received his share. (pp. 10-
11, Appellee's Brief; p. 146, Rollo).

A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the

Solicitor General to be with convincing rationality it is only that portion in
which is cited Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police
Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet
received his share" that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor General's
recommendation, for it gives the impression that Simeon had given material
or moral support or encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those
still at large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot.
However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that
impression, and reveals the true import of that statement as intended only
to show that Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and
therefore did not receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote
pertinent portions Of his statement. on custodial investigation:

3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?

S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang Bangko

sa Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.
4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?

S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa

pero nito pong buwan na ito.

5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng isang

bangko dito sa Navotas?

S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga

taong nangholdap dito sa Navotas.

6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?

S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa pa at

ang mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng bangka, si Joe
Rondina Cresencio Doble at narinig kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon
pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan pero makikilala ko Pag aking
nakitang muli.

7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?

S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng
gabi (June 13, 1966).

8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?

S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa Navotas,

9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?

S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after being

shown five (5) other pictures).

10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?

S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa

Navotas, Rizal.

11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat ako ay
nakikinig lamang.

12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano

pa ang iba mong mga narinig?

S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose

Rondina na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG
MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."

13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?

S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing paglaban.

14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?

S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.

15. T — Pagkatapos?

S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.

16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?

S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay

nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila. At
noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio
Romaquin at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong aking parte ay
hindi pa naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa amin.

17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba

ay mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa salaysay mong ito?

S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.

18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?

S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang

lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at nakapagbigay pa ako ng
mungkahi na ako na lamang ang maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay
may pinsala sa paa at maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh
lamang.

19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?

S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.

20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?

S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.

21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?

S — Wala na po.

The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used
as the meeting place of the malefactors for their final conference before
proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did
not join them because of a qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him
only a liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the
malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it
was only because it was near the landing place of the banca, and so he
invited them to his house while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere
presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling
them that he could not join them because of his foot injury, and will just wait
for them; evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in not being able to join
them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in the
attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against
their vicious plan for which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a
co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks among the
malefactors in his house.

Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of

Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical
condition alone, he could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the
pursuit of their criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the latter
to be one of them.

Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio

Doble, their main contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon
which their conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for
having been allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation of
basic constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. In
support of this contention, appellants have only their own self-serving
testimony to rely upon.

Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department
someone he could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt.
Lacson hit him on the left side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose
consciousness; that he was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery
liquid was poured over his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it was
then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he could not read
because of his blurred eyesight.

Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force

him to admit culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must,
accordingly, be whether the claim of violence and involuntariness of their
statements is true as to render said statements inadmissible in evidence.

Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial

statements (Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that
the same is negated by how the details as given by both appellants in their
respective statements fit into each other, at least as to the part played by
each from the time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure the
latter's banca up to their get-away from the scene of the crime. Thus, while
Romaquin claimed in his statement that although he wanted to escape from
the scene after his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission, he
could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his
escape, as was the order given Cresencio by the rest of the gang. The
latter denied this allegation when he testified that he returned the gun given
him because he did not know how to use or manipulate it, although in his
extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated
that he accepted the gun.

The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself

which is generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted
on one while giving his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs.
Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).

The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent

maltreatment to which appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the
appellants presented medical certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly
inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs.
Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to
the fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of
Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused, made no admission of his
participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he
admitted that no violence was applied to him when he gave his statement
(p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough
that the appellants could not have been dealt with differently as their co-
accused Aquino who was allowed to give his statement freely without the
employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence also disclosed
a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin asking the latter
not to reveal the names of their companions. This means that the names of
the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both
appellants. That the Identity of five of those charged in this case has
remained only as "John Does" indicate the non-employment of any
coercive means with which to force them into revealing the names of their
companions in the robbery, again negating the claim of torture and
violence.

It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually

confirmed their extra-judicial statements when they testified in court. By all
the proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their
custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one
named among the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by the
investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio.
(pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the
extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.

It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly

attempting to escape could have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants
which affected their freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12,
Appellant's Brief). This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in
the giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after their
interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-
2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of Rodolfo
Dizon. His death therefore, took place long after appellants have given their
main statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only
bothered to check the dates of the main statements of both appellants
which were given not later than just past the middle of June, 1966, and that
of the supplementary statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he
would not have probably come forth with this argument.

Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs.

Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants'
custodial statements, for their having been unaided by counsel, nor
informed of their right thereto during the interrogation. 'There might be merit
in this contention were the right to counsel during custodial interrogation
one of constitutional grant as is provided in our 1973 Constitution, before
which the right was given only to an accused, not to a mere suspect during
in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4; People
vs. Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of their
custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite of assistance of
counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been
granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.

The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither

be appreciated to impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements.
It is the voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its
admissibility, for no principle of law or constitutional precept should stand
on the way of allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite
justly demanded being that ample safeguard be taken against involuntary
confessions. Once the element of voluntariness is convincingly established,
which, incidentally, is even presumed, the admissibility of an extra-judicial
confession, admission or statement becomes unquestionable. 1

The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with

the testimony they gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is
less than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as
as was the holding of the trial court. The most damaging admission made
in the extra-judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe
Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1966, if
he could procure a banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked
by Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be used for robbery.
Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind
Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied Joe Intsik to
Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also
Exh. 1, Romaquin, p. 15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked
him to bring his friends in his banca, to board a launch for a trip to Palawan.
The discrepancy between the statements of Cresencio and Romaquin as to
the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for while according to
the former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the latter, it
was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan.
What is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with which both
appellants were allowed to give their respective statements while in
custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily
make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted
to draft Cresencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the
robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had
enough men all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the
commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full
mutual confidence of each other, which is not shown with respect to
appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just
a few hours before the actual robbery.

Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal

malefactors still at large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The
amount received by Romaquin who alone was given money by the
malefactors in the sum of P441.00, indicate that the latter did not consider
appellant as their confederate in the same character as those constituting
the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very well represent
only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he extended to the
malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one. Cresencio, on
the other hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only Romaquin
who gave him P4 1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he
were a full-fledged ally or confederate.

The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of
their vicious misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear
of being implicated, as shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his
escape, is further proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-
conspirator, who is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For
his part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun with which to
cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned the gun because he did
not know how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left near the
beach to prevent appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime with banca.
In his statement, however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he refused
to accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he received it.

The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-
principals in the crime charged. At the most their liability would be that of
mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio
consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the
gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of
the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca was
to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to be
robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent
their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable
manner. Even without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could
have been committed, specially with the boldness and determination shown
by the robbers in committing the crime.

The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit

"H", p. 26, Record of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to
reveal to the police the names of their companions. He went to Romaquin
and asked for money which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to
show that he had helped in some material way to deserve a share in the
loot.

As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to

Cresencio with which the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away
from the scene, evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal
purpose, and that all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not
voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to prevent his escape,
could have been just an extra precaution, lest he would be stricken with
fear in the course of the commission of the crime specially if attended by
shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made the
trip with knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that
he returned the gun given him with which to prevent Romaquin from
speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as should have
been his natural impulse had he not joined in the criminal design. His act of
hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat,
all attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of cooperation he
knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their criminal
purpose.

An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the

Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must
be a Community of unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice
and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil.
526), to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense
and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case,
appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction
which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs. Batalan
45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.

It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in

the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary
to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to
have joined is the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices.
Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the
killing. Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent
the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults
committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal Code). 2

The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too
lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which
they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish their
complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually
robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons, including peace
officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so
heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the
outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not
been shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The
desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us
in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve,
and as the evidence warrants.

Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin

guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of
robbery in band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled
to acquittal as so recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no
sufficient evidence, to which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio

Romaquin, as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor
minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill
Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph
5 of the same code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by
nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no mitigating
circumstance, both appellants should each be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months, twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of
1112,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from

is affirmed in all other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble
who is hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he should be continued in
confinement for some other legal cause. Proportionate costs against
Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO
alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL,"
accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and

Virgilio Doctolero, charged with and convicted in the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple murder and
unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the court a quo
the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused

Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the
crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on
the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other
circumstances to mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS
(CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4
Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical
injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty
of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of
reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty
of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of
reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional
penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight
physical injury suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of
P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the
sum of P12,000.00; and the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in
the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The
accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4) cost de
oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was
committed as follows:

That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday,

municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed
with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength
and with extreme cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo,
Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the
same accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby
inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds which caused his death.2

Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged. In its decision, the trial court made the following findings and a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution thus:

It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio

and Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio
Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they
were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was
on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his
mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun,
Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he died on the way. . . .

The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible
for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting
physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with
their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo
Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.

The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife
Maria Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun,
at about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria
Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria
Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came from
the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of
the road in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who,
without warning and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of
Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The
latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for
possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became
frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for
the possession of the bolo of the former, so she ran away in the direction of
the house in Sitio Binday.

Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she

was cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo
Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all
surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While
throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to
come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial
Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming
down from the house going towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be
patient and forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time,
Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three
accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the
three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told
them why they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied
"Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they struck Marcelo
Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio
Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the
head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.

The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by

the testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared
that while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she
reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she
saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at
their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was
about to go to their house to get her children but she saw the three
accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the
palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there, she heard
Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng,
your children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from the
house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom
they also boloed several times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero
arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left.3

On the other hand, appellants present the following version:

On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico

Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio
Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the
brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn,
p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company
were on their way home. (p. 8, Ibid).

Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8,
ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist.
So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that.
The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward
swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in
the process (p. 10, ibid).

At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico

Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10,
ibid) with the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the
back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes
were towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11,
ibid).

Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio
Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at
the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and
Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).

Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was
eating his meal, together with his small children upstairs, while accused-
appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his
meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-
Salazar).

He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his
children as he might meet something bad that night. He did not enter the
house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father
asked him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p.
4, Salazar).

He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house
of his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his
house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate
neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get
down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial
Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told
him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave
when the old woman hit him at the back of his neck, causing him to see
darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing,
February 17, 1971).

Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at

the trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did
not notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move,
but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the
yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and
thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that
the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in
its scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but
Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your foolishness" and hit
him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico
Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a
second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it
away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get
the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the latter
insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many
times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4

The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury
caused to the child. A doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the
crime and pictures were then taken.5

Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the
court below established that ––

. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero,

namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side
of the forehead. There is fracture of the underlying skull.

(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with
fracture of the underlying skull.

(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with
fracture of the underlying skull.

(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left
eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.

(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the
month towards the lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is
detached.

(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.

(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a
severance from the level of the middle finger.

(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd
of the forearm, left.

(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.

xxx xxx xxx

One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab
wound around 3 cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal
space just at the left border of the sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9)
wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx xxx xxx

(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep
penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.

(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right
clavicular region.

(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the
second wound.

(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the

underlying skull at the right frontal portion of the head.

(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the
head.

(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint,
exposing the bony portion, left.

(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.

(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.

(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion
of the hand right. There was fracture of some of the underlying bones.6

Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident

physician at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez,
explained the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2
inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there
was another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There
was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch, temporal right." He further
testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on November 8, 1970
and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later.7

During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant

Ludovico Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the
withdrawal of his appeal8

and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same
day.9

In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of
counsel for accused-appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio
Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death certificate attached
thereto as Annex "A".10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the
liability of appellant Conrado Doctolero.

The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated
as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense,
appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises
the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place where
the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not
corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other
erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or an
accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source
and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel
suspicion.11

This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the

positive and categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the
prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution
Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves
more credence.12

There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely
against appellants. The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy
may have had against appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the
time she testified, on good terms with appellants as shown by the following
testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:

Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the

prosecution witness (sic) your relationship with her was harmonious and
rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?

A Yes, sir.

Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her

relatives she did not fail to see you in your house?

A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13

As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria
Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the persons who went up
her house that night of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a
grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous
incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun
should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of
the crime."14

When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason
on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification
should be given full credit.15

And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to
certain inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not
so substantial as to destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the
People, the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the appellants in their
brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each observer in
relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and
inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from
demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all persons
who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is
but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details.17

In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the

prosecution witnesses which refer to minor details cannot destroy the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.18 And where the prosecution
witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of
the crime and the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material
points, the contradictions become insignificant.19

Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo
who conducted the investigation himself and personally examined the
scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to
the contrary. Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was
motivated by an improper motive other than that of accomplishing his
mission.20

Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the
police department of San Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were
committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros were involved. He further
testified that when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and
investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused
Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun.21

In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his

investigation and the weight to be accorded to his findings was properly
addressed to the trial court.

The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio,
participated as accomplices in the slaying of the women and the infliction of
injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the ratiocination of the
Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:

Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning
and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have
already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and
shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146,
tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up the house.
Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero
and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother
Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room
of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the
many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and
D-1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio
and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear
either the screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact between
the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was
ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these circumstances, it is
obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew
what was going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just
stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from
brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to
believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as
their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women,
ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of
these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their
brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as
he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless
women and a child.22

We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying
outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim,
the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid,
making him guilty as an accomplice.23

Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a

sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in
their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an
accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the
principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.24

This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that
where the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of
forcible abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if
the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
accomplices.

Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of

appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not
they were liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation.
There being ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt
exists on the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form
of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices,26

no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.

The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical
injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention
for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less
serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be imposed for said
offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice.

The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal
terminated only his criminal liability but not his civil liability.27

Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under
current case law, the same should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he
having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the
trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to
him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is

hereby rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3)
indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the death of
Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical
injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the
estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania
Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-
half (1/2) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS,
PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life
imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the
deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta
Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the last being the supposed
wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate nor any other proof of
their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged
with parricide.

Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24,
1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived
together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters
distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however,
their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had
deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took
time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis
Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at
work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year
old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them.
Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on
between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and
Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the
child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of
more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and
Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time;
then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down,
Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the
police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of
Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him,
for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the
latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he
would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday
morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash
clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-
appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small
hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's
house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he
elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence
of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we
will kill him".

Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24,
1967, while the same 12-year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food
for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the
house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the
other appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the
child was in the "batalan", she heard them conversing in subdued tones,
although she could not discern what they were saying. She was able to
recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen
through the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all
residents of Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime. She
noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not
last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an avocado
tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat,
Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his
daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa
also excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep.
So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as she was through she again
called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the
presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she
said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the
door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that moment, he was
suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four
accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns
and seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him
again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for
help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the
scene, going towards the east.

The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who
lived nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside
and questioned her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized
the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not
to reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still
later on, other persons arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of
the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his own house by
the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours
after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who
came from Manila arrived one day after the burial followed by their mother
who came from La Paz, Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had not
earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she was
afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the circumstances
surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn
statement she thereafter executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to
the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior
to her marriage with Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra.
She has a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her
dearly, that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and
regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she
was still single up to the time of her husband's violent death on June 24,
1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they moved to and resided in her
husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos
and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land
in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by
Bernardo's parents and their other children. She and Bernardo lived in their
own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her
parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her
husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to
Bernardo when he quarrels with his own mother who wanted that
Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never
did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me
alone". Her in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get
the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his
schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not give
him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending
over to her. She never left their conjugal home for any long period of time
as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the house to go
to other places they were only during those times when she had to go to
Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even on
said trips, she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to
go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons
carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and always
rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day
because the weapons carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who
waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter
became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and
horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo
would go and report the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the
matter to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they may help
locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are
neighbors, the latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away from
theirs. But illicit relationship had never existed between them.

Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their
house cooking their food for supper. Two of the children, Corazon and
Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining
room making a plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the night
because at daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as
the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the adjoining room
where Bernardo was to call him for supper, and he then proceeded to the
kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the
kitchen when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive
gun shots coming from near their "batalan". They were all so terrified that
they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet at that precise
time that her husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the
other room on their way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from
Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as soon
as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did not see the
killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining.
Bernardo was in her arms when the first group of people who responded to
their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of police, some
members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised
Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she
was then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an
investigation of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot
prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He also found
some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the
nothern wallings of the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to
relay the information about the death of her husband to her relatives in
Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother
and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they
have left their house in Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after
they lost the land they used to till there in a case with the natives called
Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967,
and after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their
house, they conducted an investigation, but she did not give them any
information relative to the Identity of the persons who shot her husband
because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-
law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz,
Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9) days mourning
was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children under their
custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-
law have axes to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon,
under their custody, they had forced the said child to testify against her.
She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during
his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work
on.

Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan

was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24,
1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2)
policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the
latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on
June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he
could not have anything to do with the said killing. On the other hand,
Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on
the date of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon
by the chief of police of the place to accompany him in answer to the call
for help of the wife of the victim. The other two appellants Bides and Berras
also alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on that
date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had been
staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the chief of
police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was then municipal
secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join
them, but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs.
Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters away from the place of the
killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.

After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the

prosecution and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal
evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting
inconspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was
sitting by the supper table in their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra.
They were actually seen committing the offense by the witness Corazon.
She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father
nearby. They were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob
and she used to see them often before that night. Although only Talingdan
and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of
the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she
called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before the four
appellants went up the "batalan", they already fired shots from downstairs.

We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on

Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa
had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several times. She went
to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman
of their town, who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her
father to come down, but the latter refused because the former was a
policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting to her
father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."

We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the

amorous relationship between her mother and appellant Talingdan, as
already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in the morning
following the quarrel between her father and her mother and the threat
made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she
saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting with her mother in
a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away from their house, near where
she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard
one of them ask "Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts,
however, as to whether or not her mother did say to her in shoving her
away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If it
were true that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered why
she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she again saw the
said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting
talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in
such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and
which We have carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder
qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said
offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the
dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the offense, namely, evident
premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No
mitigating circumstance has been proven.

Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered
from vital contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood
because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not
agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the
witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of the
occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or after
Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was before or
after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of
Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or
not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs when they first
fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen appellants in
the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.

Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently

unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We agree with the following
rebuttal of the Solicitor General:

Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of

Corazon Bagabag by pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in
her testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when
she informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly
observed by the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the
mentality of her father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second,
Corazon also declared that the accused conversed that Saturday night
preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place
although there was a place which was unlighted in the same premises. But
this only proves that the accused were too engrossed in their conversation,
unmindful of whether the place where they were talking was lighted or not,
and unmindful even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that
Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not fire their guns. Even if these
accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were privies to the
same criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the witness
Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on her
part which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that
only three bullets from the guns of the four male accused found their mark
on the body of her father. But would this not merely prove that not all the
accused were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father
was still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his
death was instantaneous It is respectfully submitted, however, that the
doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag
in this regard without in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as
regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed, there are
no evident badges of falsehood in the whole breadth and length of Corazon
Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)

Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of
her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering
she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she testified, an age when
according to Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestion of others" because "he has already got some principles, lying is
distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the
sentiment of self- respect, and he never loses an opportunity of being right
in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent
explanation has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her
father to three other men, aside from Talingdan whom she knew had
relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her account of how
he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.

Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to
her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct
and cross, would show that she was constant, firm and steady in her
answers to questions directed to her." We have Ourselves read said
testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the
witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants' apprehension in their
Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave imputation of a mother's
infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband,
would if consistently impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a
vicious poison enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing
instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel
Corazon was too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the
manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her
whole testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is
too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially
maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in
the face of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually
witnessed the event she had described. We reject the possibility of her
having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did.

The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not
merit serious consideration. Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that
the following refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:

Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the
testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the
deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But
the appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the
first shot was fired, the gunman was about 3-½ meters from her father (p.
60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves the theory of the
defense that the killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree some
4 to 5 meters away from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that
the Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio
Hall and Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks
on the southern walling of the house of the deceased, as well as empty cal.
30 carbine shells under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court,
however, made the following apt observations on the testimony of defense
witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:

This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to

investigate the crime after the deceased had already been buried; that he
investigated the widow as well as the surroundings of the house where the
deceased was shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado
tree. He stated that the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding
of about 1-½ meters high and that he saw bullet holes on the top portion of
the wall directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of the house of
the deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the
position of the assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that the
assailant might have been standing. The assailant could not have made a
bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because the
'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high, and further, when asked as to the level of
the ground in relation to the top sidings of the 'batalan,' he answered that it
is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it is impossible for the
assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the 'batalan,'
hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no
consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC corporal
testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another PC
sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same province of
Abra (pp. 324- 325, rec.).

As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting,
suffice it to state that no testimony has been presented, expert or
otherwise, linking said shells to the bullets that were fired during the
shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the
positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot her father as
they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)

At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the
scene of the crime when it happened. This defense of alibi was duly
considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed aside as
untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which goes to show
that in the mind of the defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained
and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it would do well for this
Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in
reference thereto thus:

This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not
stand firmly in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the
prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused as the authors of the
crime. This is so because, first, according to the three accused — Bides,
Tobias and Berras — they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the
house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250 meters away from the scene of
the crime. Granting, for the sake of argument, but without admitting, that
they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan,
Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned down at sunset
which is approximately between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the
accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have committed the crime and
went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of
the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs. Bayongan is only
250 meters away from the house of the victim. Second, the three accused
have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan, the owner
of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster their
defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his
defense of alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor
Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman
Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They
started in Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in
Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to accompany the
mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued Cathedral and after
conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house
of the cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra.
From that time, he never saw the mayor until after they went home to
Sallapadan on June 26th.

This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have
returned anytime on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the
commission of the offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th
at sunset, then returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him
back to Sallapadan on the 26th.

The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have
been accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive.
As a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of
Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another
policeman who accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and
still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and the policeman
presented to corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?

Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of

the Cursillo Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the
prosecution. On the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No.
3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20
to 23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not
on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan
also attended the cursillo held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen
in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears
because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.

(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the
testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of
Appellants' Brief.)

Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to

whom the Solicitor General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal,
We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the
Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving
that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there
is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in
their culpable acts that led to his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is
claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her
part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a
conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly
that way.

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not
beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot have the same
liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual
shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the
planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it
was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408,
411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it either by
herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such
conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really
includible. After all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with him
for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete
elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already
enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark
Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become
pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for
all her faults was just to slap her.

But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is
in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an
accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the
room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she
inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her
father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal
what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell
it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the
peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened,
instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she
claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the
actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away
with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation
with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting
in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an
accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code.

As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was

murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious that appellants deliberately
chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking
advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed
treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In
addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with evident premeditation.
Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with
his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday
evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive
Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresa and enough
time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with their
objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the
offended party.

In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being

murder, qualified by treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and that the offense was committed
in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the
law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant
Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same
murder.

WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of

the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances,
without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa
Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five
(5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other
respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the
resolution of this Court dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition
is whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in
the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left
their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the
house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while
Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had
been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the
lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn
and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who
was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor
responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down
from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino
and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the
one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon
reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed
his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col.

Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement
which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified
as his assailant.

The autopsy report of his body shows the following-

Gunshot wound

POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal

1 & 2 cm. diameter left

Slug found sub cutaneously,

2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Tension Hemathorax 1

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint
filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court
indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office
(JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case
against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed
an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.

Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then
commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead
of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an
answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court
finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on
him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of
prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision
was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3

Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are
invoked:

1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY

OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF
THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN
THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT
THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.

2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE

CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED
UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE
"ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;

3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF

THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case
against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he was
discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in
the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case
No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial
court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.

The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment

was submitted by the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On
January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of
petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for
reconsideration to which the respondents were again required to comment.
The required comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for
resolution.

The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in
the information as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be
convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of

murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other
categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same
offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the
crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show
that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present
during its commission or must have known its commission is the only
logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen
driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together
when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius
Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively
assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the
offense proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the
defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. 5

In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it
appears that there was a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the
defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other
offense necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not
be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody,
so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information.
The commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There
is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the
participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being
held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced,
however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be
validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.

At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an

accessory right then and there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner
was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the
substantial rights of petitioner.

The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an
accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge
against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory
are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can
be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case
was acquitted can the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be
maintained?

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of
theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due
to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised
Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime
was in fact established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in
an arson case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the
acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed
inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no
basis for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the
responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the
same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had
been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as
principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by
the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held
that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed
that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two
other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the
information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not
presented by the prosecution.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the
victim pinpointing Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was not
shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother
who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also
deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to
subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of
the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the
crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of
Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following observation:

There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the

ineptitude of the law enforcement agencies to gather material and
important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the public
prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the successful
prosecution of the case. 9

Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on

the failure of the prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required
to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the person
who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.

A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle
with an unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the
scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime of
murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the principal
or assailant, although not identified, was established. In such case, the
Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable
independently of the assailant.

We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped

before he could be tried and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted
thereby even if the commission of the offense and the responsibility of the
accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should
be held criminally liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the
assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the
bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above
discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he
was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle
driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even
adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was
established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of
the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of
no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the
accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of
Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is

FINAL.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115431 April 18, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE TORREFIEL, accused-appellant.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias "Mark"; Casiano

Masgong alias "Manny"; Saturnino Suyod alias "Ka Eddie"; "Jerry Delicano
alias "Ka Cocoy"; Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias ''Ka Balot"; Noel Semira alias
"Ka Nido"; Ricky David alias "Ka Macky"; and Alex Francisco alias "Ka
Jing," were charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for Murder and
in Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan. These cases were, upon agreement of the parties,
jointly tried, since they arose from the same incident and involved the same
parties. The trial proceeded as against the accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel
only, the rest of the accused having remained at large.

After trial, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant1 in each of the

cases, the dispositive portions of which are quoted hereinbelow:

In Criminal Case No. 2909 for Murder:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences the
accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.

The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of damages . .
..2

In Criminal Case No. 2910 for Murder:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences the
accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months and One(l) day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.

The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of
damages. . . .3

In Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Jose Torrefiel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery and sentences the accused to
suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Fourteen (14)
years and Eight (8) months. . . .4
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel, appealed to the Court of Appeals. After
considering the evidence and the law involved, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of conviction in all the cases but refrained from
entering judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for murder,
having ascertained that the proper imposable penalty for each of said
crimes is reclusion perpetua, and instead, certified these two (2) cases to
us for final determination pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The facts as correctly summarized by the prosecution in its Brief are as

follows:5

On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay

Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, Realidad Mangilog woke up early to prepare their
breakfast. Her husband Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo were
about to join her downstairs, when someone knocked at the kitchen
backdoor (TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 3-4).

It was Leonardo who opened the door. When the door was opened
appellant Jose Torrefiel armed with a bolo and a hand gun entered the
house first followed by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex
Francisco, Saturnino Suyod and Noel alias "Nido" in that order, who were
all armed with long firearms. (TSN, Ibid, p. 5).

The group greeted Leopoldo as "How are you Tay?" to which the latter
answered "as usual." Leopoldo even served the newcomers with coffee,
but because the coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad asked
Hermogenes Calizo, who was then the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to
buy coffee from the store. (TSN, Id. pp. 5-6).

The group of appellant Torrefiel did not even touch or taste the coffee
served them by Leopoldo. Instead, appellant, Casiano Masgong and Satur
Suyod aimed their guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him to death
(TSN, Id. p. 6).6 Simultaneous to the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house
by the group of appellant was the shooting and stabbing of Reynaldo who
was then taking a bath inside the bathroom located outside of the house by
the other members of the group who did not enter the house..(TSN. Id. p.
7)

After the killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo, the accused ransacked the
house and took P500.00 cash, wrist watch, kitchen wares, grocery items,
chickens and guitar. (TSN, Id. p. 10)

Before the accused left the house of the victims, they even fired their guns
at random. They were blaming the victims to be responsible to the incident
why the military was running after them. They were also telling the people
along the road that the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered (Id.,
p. 11).
Accused-appellant invoked the defense of alibi, claiming that at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989, he was at the house of Barangay
Captain Benedicto Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, which can
be reached in an hour and a half (1 1/2) from Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Akalan, the scene of the incident. He had gone on vacation to Barangay
Agbalogo on May 22, 1989 and attended the fiesta on May 25, 1989. He
had remained in the said barangay since then upon the advice of his wife
not to return to Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, appellant's place of
residence, as the situation there was somewhat hot.7 Benedicto Puod
confirmed appellant's claim as to his whereabouts in the morning of May
26, 1989, recounting that he and appellant were, indeed, together drinking
alcoholic drinks from 7:00 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning on the occasion
of the birthday of his child.8 In addition, Pedro Tosio as a witness testified
as to the presence of appellant at his house in Barangay Agbalogo in the
morning until about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, the day
of the fiesta, declaring further that he also saw appellant pass by his house
on May 26, 1989.9

In his appeal, accused-appellant interposed the following assignment of

errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 2909.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 2910.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 2911. 10

On the first and third assignment of errors, accused-appellant maintains his

defense of alibi, stressing that, not being around at the time and place of
the incident as he was at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, he could not
have murdered Leopoldo Mangilog and robbed the Mangillogs of their
personal belongings.

We are not persuaded.

It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused. 11 Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, the
accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 12
That accused-appellant had been positively identified as one of the culprits
by prosecution witness Realidad Mangilog cannot be doubted. The
Mangilogs and the accused-appellant had known each other for years as
neighbors. Accused-appellant whose parents reside in Barangay Agbalogo,
Makato, Aklan, established residence in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan
when he got married to a resident there. Since his house is only about one
hundred and fifty (150) meters away from that of the Mangilogs, there were
occasions when accused-appellant would visit the Mangilogs, usually for
coffee, and that Leopoldo Mangilog would also go to the accused-
appellant's house. Indeed, eyewitness Realidad Mangilog knows the
accused-appellant so well that she could not have been mistaken in
identifying appellant as one of those armed men responsible for the death
of her husband and son on that fateful morning of May 26, 1989. She
testified thus:

Q. When your husband open (sic) the door, was there somebody who got
inside?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you at that time?

A. I am (sic) at that time at the door dividing the sala and the dining room.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Were you able to recognized (sic) those persons who entered your
house?

A. I can recognized (sic) Jose Torrefiel leading the group and Masiano
Masgong alias Manny, Alex Francisco followed by Satur or Saturnino
Suyod and the other one was Noel Semira alias Nido. 13

Moreover, the two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto Maguirang and

Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed the presence of accused-appellant in
Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident in question.
Maguirang testified that while he watched over his carabao which was
grazing on May 26, 1989 at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the
appellant and his group as they passed by him from a distance of about ten
(10) meters heading towards the direction of the house of Leopoldo
Mangilog in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan. 14 He could not be
mistaken as to appellant's identity since he had on several occasions seen
appellant together with the same group of armed men 15 Calizo, on the
other hand, claimed that he had seen appellant face to face in the men
house of the Mangilogs that same morning of May 26, 1989 shortly before
the subject incident occurred since at that time he was living in said house.
He only happened to be sent out by Realidad Mangilog to buy coffee so he
did not get to see the actual killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo Mangilog. 16
It is significant to note that no improper motive can be imputed to Realidad
Mangilog as would make her testify falsely against accused-appellant;
hence her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 17

Evidently complementing the positive identification of accused-appellant as

one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged is his failure to prove that it
was physically impossible for him to be at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Aklan at the time of the incident, assuming that his claim that he went to the
house of Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26,
1989 was true. As testified to by appellant himself, it would take just one
and a half (1 1/2) hours to reach Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan from
Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. Needless to state, it would not at all be
impossible for appellant to be at Barangay Agbalogo at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning or some two hours after the crimes were committed at Barangay
Naligusan.

In his second assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that he had

nothing to do with the killing of the victim Reynaldo Mangilog, obviously
relying on the testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect that Reynaldo
Mangilog was shot and stabbed to death by the members of appellant's
group who stationed themselves outside the house.

This contention we also find untenable, conspiracy being clearly manifest in

this case as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals. For collective
responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be
proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime 18 as
only rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable since in the nature
of things criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in
writing. 19 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused
immediately prior to, during and right after the shooting of the victim which
indicate their common intention to commit the crime. 20

The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant
arrived together at the scene of the killings, (2) they were all fully armed; (3)
three of them simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo Mangilog, while an
undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4)
the attack on the two victims was executed simultaneously; and (5) the
accused's statement to the effect that the victims were responsible for the
fact that the military men were running after them. This tends to establish a
motive on their pant to kill the victims. All these indubitably indicate a
concerted effort on the part of the accused on a common design to kill the
victims.

Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable
as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation. 21 In fact, it
is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final
liquidation of the victims 22 or to ascertain the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator as the applicable rule is that the
act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. 23 It hardly matters,
therefore, that accused-appellant did not actually participate in the killing of
Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo Mangilog.

As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed by the Solicitor

General, the killing of the victims was qualified by treachery. Leopoldo
Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly
thereafter. Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to
death while he was taking a bath. It may be added that the victims were
naturally unarmed at that time and their execution was done so early in the
morning, that is, when they had practically just awakened. Under the
circumstances, the victims were clearly not in any position to defend
themselves from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused. 24
These circumstances are manifestly indicative of the presence of the
conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, i.e., the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted. 25

The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed

men and evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances. These
findings are factual and the rule is that findings of the Court of Appeals
upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless
shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, 26 and, in this case, there
is no such showing. However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery
absorbs the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed
men, as it appears that the accused saw to it that they were armed and far
outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their
criminal objective. 27

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since we find
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the
generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was also
attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in each
case, applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the
proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the time the
crimes were committed.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each case of murder (Criminal Cases Nos.
2909 and 2910)

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006
NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.

On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12

years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory
portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a
minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting with
discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant,
DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age,
against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.3

The Case for the Prosecution

The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.4
One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.5 In 2002,
she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in
Pasay City6 and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.7

Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail
eggs at a nearby church.8 Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto
Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.9
Next to Teofisto’s residence was a vacant house.10

Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past
6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mother’s store.
Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container with the unsold
quail eggs.11 Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared
the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a
pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a
little light from the lamp post.12 She resisted to no avail.13 Petitioner
ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He
removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of
her.14 She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.15
She felt pain and cried.16 She was sure there were passersby on the street
near the vacant house at the time.

It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl’s cries.
He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from
the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the
scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what
happened.17 She told her father about the incident.18 Her parents later
reported what happened to the police authorities.19 Debbielyn told the
police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.20

Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went
out of their house to get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning
from within the adjacent vacant house.21 He rushed to the place and saw
petitioner, naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping
motions on her anus.22 The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, "Hoy,
bakit ginawa mo ’yan?"23 Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled.24
Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived.25 Later, Teofisto gave
a written statement to the police investigator regarding the incident.26

Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside
their house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn
had been raped near the vacant house by petitioner.27 He rushed to the
place and found her daughter crying. When he asked her what happened,
she replied that she had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house
and then left.28 He then looked for petitioner and found him at his
grandmother’s house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay
hall.29 On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the Philippine
General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she
was examined by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo.

Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the
Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25,
2002, she interviewed the victim who told her "Masakit ang pepe ko," "Ni-
rape ako."30 Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the child,
and found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty
yellowish discharge between the labia minora.31 There was also a fresh
abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 o’clock position near the anal opening.32
She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt force or
penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign
body33) was applied to the perineal area34 not more than six or seven
days before.35 The abrasion could have been caused on September 24,
2002. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the
external genitalia;36 neither did she find any other injury or abrasion on the
other parts of the victim’s body.37 She concluded that her findings were
consistent with the victim’s claim that she was sexually abused by
petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September
24, 2002, Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her
daughter had been raped by petitioner who was then in his aunt’s house at
Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and
Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and
take the boy into custody, and they did as they were told.38

The Case for the Accused

Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She

declared that the abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused
while the offender was on top of the victim.39 She explained that the
distance between the anus and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3
centimeters.40 The abrasion was located at ¼ of an inch from the anal
orifice.

Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City
South High School.41 He had been one of the three outstanding students
in grade school and received awards such as Best in Mathematics.42 He
also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of Completion
from the Philippine Air Force Management Information Center.43 He
denied having raped the private complainant. He declared that at 6:30 p.m.
on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice in the
carinderia44 and he saw her on his way back.45 He also met his father,
who asked him what he had done to their neighbor. He was also told that
the victim’s father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him.46 He did
not ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told to
pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunt’s house. Petitioner
also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunt’s house.47
Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his
aunt’s house and brought him to the barangay hall. He did not know of any
reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.48

Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.49 While

confined at the Pasay City Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on
"Issa," a young female inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about
half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left
arm.50

Nida Llave testified and identified her son’s Certificate of Live Birth, in
which it appears that he was born on March 6, 1990.51 She declared that
at about 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn
Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her
son had raped the private complainant. She went to their house to look for
her son and came across Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son.
She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at
Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.52
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of
the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt
when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top
of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and
consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor,
he cannot be meted with the Death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel
Llave y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the
special mitigating circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences
him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8)
years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).53

The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that
petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused
her, petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered petitioner’s
declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.54

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following
in his Brief as appellant therein:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE

MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON
THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD
WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA
AGAINST THE LATTER’S FAMILY/RELATIVES.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE

PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING
CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.55

The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to

the penalty meted on him.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby

MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium
as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium
as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
complaining witness the amount of ₱50,000 by way of moral damages and
₱20,000 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.56

Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,57contending that the

prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence,
he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion in a
Resolution58 dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:

As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with

discernment, his conduct during and after the "crime" betrays the theory
that as a minor, the accused-appellant does not have the mental faculty to
grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the
accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his grandmother’s house
intimates that he knew that he did something that merits punishment.

Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant
is a recipient of several academic awards and is an honor student further
reinforces the finding that he [is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his
years and is thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors his
age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.59

Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant
petition before this Court:

ISSUES

I. WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9

YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME,
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.

III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF

LAW.

ARGUMENTS

I. THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF

COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE
FINDING OF RAPE.

II. PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.

III. PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.

IV. THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS

HEARSAY.

V. THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.

VI. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.60

The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as

follows: (1) whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary
investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the private
complainant, and if in the affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in
perpetrating the crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by the appellate
court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to the
private complainant.

On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a
preliminary investigation before the Information against him was filed.

On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He
insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material points. He points out
that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his
penis to the point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillo’s
report stating that there was no evidence of injury on the victim’s external
genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the victim’s testimony and
that of Dr. Castillo’s report, the latter should prevail.

According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice
as factual basis of conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victim’s
testimony lacks credibility in view of her admission that, while she was
being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the street.
Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the
body through the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the
prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.

Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents
on her testimony before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she
interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not
understand the meaning of the word "rape" and its Filipino translation,
"hinalay," and that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence
of the latter’s parents.

Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud’s testimony has no probative weight

because and had an ill-motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on
cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto
demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victim’s
parents to complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police
Investigator Milagros Carroso.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner
was subjected to an inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of
the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the
absence of external injuries does not negate rape; neither is it necessary
that lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated if
there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface.
Corroborative evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the
testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction
of consummated rape. When the victim testified that she was raped, she
was, in effect, saying all that is necessary to prove that rape was
consummated. Petitioner’s evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of
Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is
incredible that the victim and her parents would charge petitioner with rape
solely on Teofisto’s proddings.

The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during,
and after the rape based on the undisputed facts. The submission of the
OSG follows:

Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the
alleged rape incident, he is presumed to have acted without discernment
under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. Under said
provision, the prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with
discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there was no
evidence presented by the prosecution to show that he acted with
discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit.

Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined

as follows: "the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption
from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over
nine (9), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong" (People v. Doquena,
68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age,
he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act
(Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).

Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998
Ed.), writes that "discernment is more than the mere understanding
between right and wrong. Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor
between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging
whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, which may be known
and should be determined by considering all the circumstances disclosed
by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and
conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v.
Doquena, supra).

In the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape
incident, as well as his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with
discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the
prosecution’s witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and
ran away. Shortly thereafter, when his parents became aware of the
charges against him and that private complainant’s father was looking for
him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came
to arrest him in his grandmother’s house that petitioner came out in the
open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of going
into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral
depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong.
Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if he was not least aware of the
moral consequences of his acts, he would have immediately confronted
private complainant and her parents and denied having sexually abused
their daughter.

During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he

was a consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several
academic awards. This allegation further bolstered that he acted with
discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner
was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor student
further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well
beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors
of his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.
Hence, although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he
possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be denied that he
had the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong. This is important in cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy
to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the
accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, the
Supreme Court has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence;
without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because … the
infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability"
(Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).

The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the
petitioner was being held for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that
petitioner acted with discernment before, during and after the rape incident.
For a boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep
mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of
his wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be exempted from criminal
liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with
discernment.61

In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was
on the peri-anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists
that there can be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the
female organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the
accused acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an
honor student is not enough evidence to prove that he acted with
discernment.

The petition is not meritorious.

On the first issue, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his right to
a regular preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The
record shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person

is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the
offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for
a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he
may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen
(15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary

investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns
of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule.

As gleaned from the Certification62 of the City Prosecutor which was

incorporated in the Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the Information
was filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10,
2002, and thereafter filed a petition for bail.63 Petitioner’s failure to file a
motion for a preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that
an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a waiver
of his right to such preliminary investigation.64

On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the
prosecution adduced evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private complainant as charged in
the Information. In People v. Morata65 the Court ruled that penetration, no
matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the
penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains,
points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated.66

From the victim’s testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioner’s

penis touched the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the
pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of the extent of the
penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape
passed the stage of consummation.67 She testified that petitioner dragged
her behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to
lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He
then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: From what time up to what time?

A: From 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.

Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did
you go to school from 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?

A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.

Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?

A: I went home.

Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R.
Higgins, Maricaban, Pasay City?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And what did you do after you went home?

A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.

Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?

A: It is near our house, walking distance.

Q: What is your mother selling in that store?

A: She sells quail eggs.

Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where
she was selling quail eggs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is
selling quail eggs past 6:00 p.m.?

A: My mother asked me to bring home something.

Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home?

A: The things she used in selling.

Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?

A: Totoy pulled me.

Q: Pulled you where?

A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.

Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house?

A: He told me to lie down on the cement.

Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?

A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.

Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his
shorts, what happened next?

A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina?

A: It was painful.

Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did you do
to you?

A: He kissed me on my lips.

Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your
lips, what did you do?

A: I cried.

Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside
your vagina and kissed you on your lips. What happened next?
A: Somebody heard me crying.

Q: Who heard you crying?

A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.

Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?

A: Totoy ran away.

Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?

A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the
matter to my parents.

Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?

A: Yes, Sir.68

On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:

ATTY. BALIAD:

Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he

inserted his penis inside your vagina?

A: I was lying down.

Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time?

A: He placed on top of me.

Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?

A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.69

When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a

vagina from an anus, the victim declared that she could and proceeded to
demonstrate. She reiterated that the penis of petitioner penetrated her
vagina, thus, consummating the crime charged:

Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused,
Neil Llave or "Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered
your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where is your "pepe"?

A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)

Q: Where is your anus?

A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)

Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case
penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his
penis touched any part of your anus?

A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.70

While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the
private complainant’s genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s
testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of
abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially
when the victim is a young girl as in this case.71 According to Dr. Castillo,
the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and reverting to its original
form.72 The doctor testified that her report is compatible with the victim’s
testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:

Atty. Baliad:

Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused,
Neil Llave or "Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil
entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where is your "pepe"?

A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)

Q: Where is your anus?

A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)

Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case
penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his
penis touched any part of your anus?

A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.

xxxx

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination

propounded on the report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is
complaining that around 6:00 in the evening of September 24, 2002, she
was sexually abused and that on the following day, September 25, you
interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and in
binocular (sic) "masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako," would your findings as
contained in this Exh. B and C be compatible with the allegation if the minor
victim that she was sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00
p.m.?

Atty. Baliad:

Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.

Court:

What is your objection?

Atty. Baliad:

The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the
minor who made the complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:

The answer were provided…..

Court:

The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the
complaint of the minor. Overruled. Answer.

Witness:

A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.

Fiscal Barrera:

Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the
Provincial and Final Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the
lower portion of these two exhibits there appears to be a signature above
the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D., whose signature is that
doctor?

A Both are my signatures, Sir.73

Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainant’s
anal orifice could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the
crime charged:

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the
male person inserting his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process,
would it be possible that this abrasion could have been caused while in the
process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the anus
where you find the abrasion?

A: It is possible, Sir.

Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged
perpetrator is a 12-year-old minor?

A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.

Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an
erection of his penis?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a

male person can have erection?

A: Even infants have an erection.74

Petitioner’s contention that the private complainant was coached by her
parents into testifying is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private
complainant testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner and
remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by
the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to
and identified the petitioner as the perpetrator.

It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old
Grade II pupil, could have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her
plaint was true.75 The Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and
monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and found
her testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of
the evidence on record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and
circumstances of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted, which, if considered would merit a nullification or reversal of
the decision. We have held that when the offended party is young and
immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give
credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.76

Neither do we lend credence to petitioner’s claim that the charge against

him is but a fabrication and concoction of the private complainant’s parents.
Indeed, petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had no
ill-motive against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn
Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with
Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against
you for sexual abuse?

A: I don’t know of any reason, Sir.

Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding
with Lyn-lyn’s parents, spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos,
do you think of any reason as to why they would file a complaint against
you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?

A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.

Fiscal Barrera:

That would be all, Your Honor.77

There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their
daughter before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to
subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public
trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.78

On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been
assaulted by petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he
failed, he and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This
manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for
his delictual acts.

That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents
passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is
not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be committed by the
roadside and even in occupied premises.79 The presence of people nearby
does not deter rapists from committing the odious act.80 In this case,
petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private complainant near the
house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by, impervious to the fact
that a crime was being committed in their midst.

Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence
that can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the
offended party. Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing
alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible.
Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the
perpetrator.81 Thus, even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the
testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence
beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.

Teofisto’s testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his

uncle caused the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family
were residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to
the police investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn
and narrated how he witnessed the crime being committed by the
petitioner.82 In the absence of proof of improper motive, the presumption is
that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled
to full faith and credit.83

The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment
when he had carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot
be faulted for affirming the trial court’s ruling.1âwphi1

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person
over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability,
unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting
circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the
offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by
culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.84 On the other hand,
discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused
acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or
deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and during the trial.85 The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.
Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the
resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to
insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts.
When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the
petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of
his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid being
arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived
and took him into custody.

The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school
student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his
class in his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee
contest.86 At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.

In People v. Doqueña,87 the Court held that the accused-appellant therein

acted with discernment in raping the victim under the following facts:

Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña
committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such
pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying
therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the
accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this
court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during
the trial of this case.88

The CA ordered petitioner to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and

₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages. There is no factual basis for the award
of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no aggravating
circumstance was alleged in the Information and proved by the People;
hence, the award must be deleted.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.