The Multiple Self-Aspects Framework: Self-Concept Representation and Its Implications

Pers Soc Psychol Rev OnlineFirst, published on June 10, 2010 as doi:10.
1177/1088868310371101
Personality and Social Psychology Review
The Multiple Self-Aspects XX(X) 1–25

© 2010 by the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, Inc.
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Representation and Its Implications DOI: 10.1177/1088868310371101

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Allen R. McConnell1
Abstract
The multiple self-aspects framework (MSF) conceives of the self-concept as a collection of multiple, context-dependent selves.
From this perspective, five principles are derived, addressing issues such as how context activates particular regions of self-
knowledge and how self-relevant feedback affects self-evaluations and affect. Support for these principles is discussed. Further-
more, the MSF advances several novel predictions, including how active self-aspects filter one’s experiences and perceptions,
how the impact of chronic accessibility is more circumscribed than previously realized, and how self-concept representation
modulates the experience of affect. In addition, the MSF helps integrate isolated lines of research within several diverse litera-
tures, including self-regulation, stability and variability for the self, the integration of others into the self-concept, and several
individual difference factors as well. Overall, the current work speaks to issues of relevance to several subdisciplines in psychol-
ogy (e.g., cultural, developmental, personality, social) interested in the self, providing conceptual and methodological insights.
Keywords
self, identity, social cognition, self-regulation
Indisputably, “the self” is one of the most central topics in selves, how are they represented? How does the organization
psychology, with far-ranging implications for social inter- of self-knowledge influence affect, self-evaluation, and behav-
actions (e.g., Baumeister, 1998), personality (e.g., Robins, ior? How do we integrate and reconcile different perspectives
Norem, & Cheek, 1999), developmental processes (e.g., Howe, and findings about the self? What are the ramifications for
Courage, & Edison, 2003), culture (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, how we conduct research on the self? In the current work,
1991), and memory (e.g., Kihlstrom, Beer, & Klein, 2003), I tackle these questions by proposing that the self is represented
to name just a few. Yet how self-concepts are represented is in an associative network. From this approach, five principles
not well understood. In fact, in a seminal article on self and about self-concept representation are forwarded. I then review
memory, Greenwald and Banaji (1989) concluded that “the the evidence supporting these principles, discuss new hypoth-
self’s structure has not yet been well described” and that “much eses and psychological insights derived from this view of the
of the work on delineating the self as a knowledge structure self, and finally integrate a number of disparate findings and
remains to be done” (p. 52). In the more than two decades theories in the literature.
since the publication of their conclusion, there is still no con-
sensus on the self’s structure. In this article, a framework for
how the self is represented in memory is outlined and its Prelude
implications for understanding behavior are explored. A great deal of research examining the self in the psychologi-
It is notable that although psychologists have identified cal literature views it as a relatively unitary entity (for critiques,
process-based accounts for how people understand and represent see Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, &
information about individuals and groups (e.g., N. H. Anderson, Peng, in press). Although many researchers offer prefaces
1971; Asch, 1946; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994; to the contrary and then focus on a limited domain of the self,
Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989), our perspective of how self-
relevant knowledge is organized in memory is far less devel- 1
Miami University, Oxford, OH, USA
oped. Most view self-concept as the content of what people
Corresponding Author:
believe to be true about themselves (Baumeister, 1998; Forgas Allen R. McConnell, Miami University, Department of Psychology,
& Williams, 2002), but many important questions remain. For Oxford, OH 45056
example, is this content about one self or many? If it is for many Email: [email protected]
Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 6, 2016

2 Personality and Social Psychology Review XX(X)
Figure 1. Hypothetical self-concept for a person named Rachel with five self-aspects (the ovals) and associated attributes (the rectangles)
Note: Shaded attributes are those associated with more than one self-aspect.
the impression derived from the literature suggests that there self has personal, relational, and collective levels. More
is a single self. For example, research on topics such as self- broadly, some researchers have focused on the interplay of
esteem, self-theories, self-clarity, and cognitive dissonance social identities and the self, with perspectives ranging from
typically focuses on overarching evaluations of one’s sense of viewing social identities as relatively independent of the self
self-worth, lay beliefs regarding the stability of one’s personal- (e.g., Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) to seeing
ity, certainty in one’s beliefs about the self, and consistency them as infused into the self-concept (e.g., Deaux, 1993) to
of one’s beliefs and actions, respectively (e.g., Campbell et al., viewing them as evolving across a number of stages (e.g.,
1996; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Dweck, 1999; Swann, Chang- Amiot, de la Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007). Even though
Schneider, & McClarty, 2007; Tice, 1993). In other words, a number of important theoretical distinctions have been for-
most work at least implicitly assumes there is a broad, over- warded regarding these levels of the self, with a few exceptions
arching self to be evaluated, understood, and reconciled. In (e.g., Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Trafimow, Triandis, &
contrast, the current perspective explores the value of explicitly Goto, 1991) little work has considered their organization in
considering how the self-concept is composed of multiple, memory. Furthermore, no perspective has been advanced that
contextually activated selves. can assemble the diversity of perspectives on the self (e.g.,
Of course, some researchers have proposed that people social roles, private selves, relational selves) into a compre-
possess multiple selves (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, hensive framework.
1986; Roberts & Donahue, 1994). Although these important Finally, a number of scholars have considered the role of
lines of work acknowledge a multifaceted self, they do not culture in understanding the self, with much of this work advo-
articulate how these selves are organized in memory. Further- cating for a relatively unitary sense of self for members of
more, each of these literatures typically considers a particular individual-centered cultures (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus,
type of multiple self (e.g., an ought self, a feared self) without & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).
any attempt to integrate the diversity of multiple selves out- Specifically, it has been argued that in independent cultures
lined across different literatures. For example, those interested (e.g., North America, Western Europe), the self is defined as
in understanding personality and symbolic interaction have relatively separate from social context, unitary, and consistent
considered variability for the self across a fixed set of social in nature (compared to a more interdependent, connected self
roles (e.g., Block, 1961; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, in more collectivists cultures). But is this really the case?
1993; Serpe, 1989). Although social roles are undoubtedly an Although the current perspective certainly agrees that impor-
important component of the self, there are certainly other tant cultural differences in self-construal exist, it contends that
aspects of the self that transcend roles. the self even in independent cultures is far from being unitary,
Indeed, many psychologists have posited that a number of consistent, and separate from social context.
facets compose the self beyond just social roles. For example,
some have focused on specific facets of the self, such as one’s
academic, social, and emotional self-concepts (e.g., Marsh & The Multiple Self-Aspects Framework
Craven, 2006; Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). Others, In the current work, a formulation of self-concept structure is
however, have emphasized the private, public, and collective advanced, the multiple self-aspect framework (MSF). Figure 1
aspects of the self (e.g., Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Triandis, illustrates the self-concept of a person named Rachel, who
1989). Similarly, Brewer and colleagues (e.g., Brewer & will serve as an example throughout the article to illustrate key
Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001) proposed that the points. In this framework, self-knowledge is represented as a

McConnell 3
Table 1. Five Principles of the Self Derived From the Multiple person derived from reflexive consciousness and self-awareness
Self-Aspects Framework across time (Baumeister, 1998; James, 1890), the MSF contends
that her behaviors and experiences are primarily directed by
1. The self is a collection of multiple, context-dependent
self-aspects. more distinct self-representations. Specifically, her self-concept
2. Self-aspects are associated with personal attributes, which is viewed as a collection of multiple, context-dependent self-
become more accessible when the self-aspect is activated and aspects stored in memory that serve to guide her behavior.
vice versa. These self-aspects (the ovals in Figure 1) reflect meaningful
3. Overall affect reflects the evaluation of one’s self-aspects contextual aspects of her life and are idiosyncratic in nature.
weighted by their accessibility, and thus feedback about a In her case, they include roles (e.g., daughter, student), social
self-aspect will affect general affective states to the extent that
identities (e.g., being Jewish, sorority sister), and social rela-
the information has implications for one’s evaluation of that
self-aspect. tionships (e.g., Mike’s girlfriend). For other people, self-aspects
4. Feedback about a self-aspect influences evaluations of other might also consist of goals (e.g., who I want to be), affective
self-aspects that share greater attribute associations. states (e.g., being moody), and behavioral situations (e.g.,
5. The impact of information pertaining to a specific attribute on meeting new people). Thus, self-aspects are broad organizing
overall affect increases as the number of self-aspects concepts, capturing roles (e.g., Roberts & Donahue, 1994),
associated with the attribute increases. goals (e.g., Higgins, 1997), private and public selves (e.g.,
Triandis, 1989), and relational and collective identities (e.g.,
Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Their idiosyncratic nature reflects
network of distributed nodes. Each node is associated with one’s experiences (e.g., influence of meaningful others,
other nodes, which vary in their accessibility (Bruner, 1957; immersion in cultural contexts, experiences in the environment),
Collins & Loftus, 1975; Hayes-Roth, 1977; Higgins, 1996; and these self-aspects function to guide one’s understanding
Smith & Queller, 2004). At any given moment, the activation and behavior.
of different associative regions within this network gives rise Returning to our example, at any given moment, a variety
to context-modulated contributions to perception and behavior. of contextual inputs (e.g., environmental settings, social inter-
The MSF is certainly not the first description of self-concept actions, mental simulation) serve to activate relevant self-
representation (e.g., DeSteno & Salovey, 1997; Kihlstrom & aspects, which in turn organize Rachel’s ongoing experiences
Klein, 1994; Marsh & Craven, 2006; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), and direct her actions. That is, self-aspect activation results
and in fact it arose from our earlier work on self-complexity from the dynamic inputs and constraints of one’s goals, actions,
(e.g., McConnell et al., 2005; Renaud & McConnell, 2002; and cognitions as the self moves through the environment (e.g.,
Schleicher & McConnell, 2005), which historically was inter- Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric,
ested in explaining who experiences greater emotional vari- 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004). Furthermore, self-aspects vary
ability in the face of feedback and stress (e.g., Linville, 1985, in their accessibility, with some self-aspects being more acces-
1987; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). The MSF evolved from sible (and thus, more likely to guide behavior) because of recent
our previous work when it became clear that the depiction of or frequent use (Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Higgins, Rholes, &
the self-concept in the self-complexity literature was under- Jones, 1977). For example, when waking up on a particular
specified and incomplete. This led to developing a more com- morning, Rachel’s “student” self-aspect is more likely to guide
prehensive account of self-concept representation grounded in her initial behavior if she spent the previous evening in the
self-complexity but extending into new areas to explain a library studying, whereas her “Mike’s girlfriend” self-aspect
broader array of phenomena. In this article, I identify five is more likely to direct her actions if she had been on a date
principles derived from the MSF (see Table 1) and review their with Mike instead. In most circumstances, one self-aspect will
support. Although the MSF is not the first attempt to describe be relatively more activated, directing context-appropriate
how the self-concept is organized in memory, there is consider- perception and action effectively (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Hasher
able evidence in support of this particular depiction of the self. & Zacks, 1988; Shallice, 1972). For instance, even if Rachel
And more important, the current work demonstrates that the had just been on a date, entering a classroom would likely
specific arrangement of self-knowledge described by the MSF increase the accessibility of her “student” self-aspect to such
generates novel predictions and serves heuristically as a valu- a level that it would be the primary determinant of her behavior.
able scaffolding to integrate a number of diverse literatures on Yet if the class was a course on Jewish studies, it is likely that
the self that typically reside in isolation from each other. both her “student” and her “being Jewish” self-aspects would
have increased accessibility, leading to their joint influence on
Principle 1: The self is a collection of multiple, context- her behavior.
dependent self-aspects.
Principle 2: Self-aspects are associated with personal
Although Rachel has general affective experiences (e.g., attributes, which become more accessible when the
mood states) and an overarching awareness of herself as a self-aspect is activated and vice versa.

The MSF proposes that each self-aspect is associated with different as a function of which self-aspects are more acces-
a number of attributes in the network of self-knowledge. These sible. For example, Rachel’s behavior on a given evening might
descriptive attributes (the rectangles in Figure 1) can include be quite different based on whether she is in the library (where
traits (e.g., shy), behaviors (e.g., philanthropic), physical her student self-aspect would be activated) or at a Panhellenic
characteristics (e.g., attractive), affect (e.g., proud), and social function (where her sorority sister self-aspect would be acti-
categories (e.g., female), among others. Attributes can be quite vated). These distinct contexts would trigger different self-
idiosyncratic and derived from numerous sources, including aspects, which through spread of activation would actuate
culturally transmitted knowledge (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Shweder associated attributes that in turn can evoke different traits,
et al., 1998), feedback provided by others (e.g., Cook & Douglas, emotions, goals, perceptions, and actions. Thus, one’s behavior
1998; Mead, 1934), inferences drawn from one’s own behavior will be quite different across contexts to the extent that one’s
(e.g., Bem, 1967; Fazio, 1987), experiences moving through self-aspects are associated with relatively unique attributes,
one’s environment (e.g., Neisser, 1991, 1993), and physically yet one will reveal considerable stability within contexts.
experienced or simulated bodily states (e.g., Niedenthal et al., Activation between self-aspects and attributes is assumed
2005; Wilson, 2002). Attributes are the products of a number to be bidirectional. As noted above, context can activate a
of exemplars (e.g., personally experienced events, behavioral self-aspect, which in turn increases the accessibility of related
episodes), which are depicted by the vertical lines underneath attributes. As a result, Rachel might be shy and giving when
each attribute. Although it is assumed that exemplars give rise with her parents but a proud partier with her sorority sisters.
to attributes, any given exemplar can influence multiple attri- On the other hand, the activation of particular attributes should
butes, and it may take many exemplars to produce an attribute. increase the accessibility of associated self-aspects as well.
For example, Rachel’s sense of being philanthropic may have Thus, drinking beer at a work-related picnic might increase
been developed after several specific exemplars (e.g., her rabbi the accessibility of her “sorority sister” self-aspect (even
extolling the virtues of charity at her synagogue, her donating though the event does not involve her sorority), which in turn
blood to the Red Cross, her chairing a fund-raiser for her sorority). could lead her to act in ways consistent with her Panhellenic
Following a number of such events, these exemplars can lead identity at the picnic. This notion that context and behavior
to more global and abstracted self-representations (Kihlstrom can mutually prime each other and affect a broad range of
& Klein, 1994; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992). activities (e.g., one’s goals, one’s judgment) is consistent with
Although self-aspects reflect organizing contexts that are many contemporary perspectives on social cognition (e.g.,
extrapersonal (e.g., when I am, where I am), attributes are the Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006;
descriptive features exhibited by the individual in those contexts Ferguson, 2007; Smith & Semin, 2004).
that are intrapersonal (e.g., what I am, how I am). In some
cases, attributes may be uniquely associated with one self-aspect Principle 3: Overall affect reflects the evaluation of one’s
(e.g., attractive), whereas other attributes may be associated self-aspects weighted by their accessibility, and thus
with multiple self-aspects (e.g., philosophical). Thus, attributes feedback about a self-aspect will affect general affec-
exist in an associative system, forming a broad, intricate network tive states to the extent that the information has impli-
of self-knowledge. Although any concept in theory could serve cations for one’s evaluation of that self-aspect.
as a self-aspect or as an attribute depending on how it is con-
strued by the individual, the MSF views attributes as represent- The MSF proposes that self-concept structure plays an
ing descriptive information about the individual (e.g., Rachel’s important role in shaping general affective states (e.g., mood,
qualities as a sorority sister might be quite unique from any state self-esteem). These affective experiences are of interest
other member of her sorority) and self-aspects as representing not only as phenomenological events but also because they are
the context binding that individuating information together (for important in directing behavior. For example, diffuse affect
a similar discussion regarding the distinction between social influences the extent to which people process information
categories and traits, see Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, effortfully (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007), reveal creativity in
1999). That is, the adjectives people use to describe their quali- problem solving (Gasper, 2003), render causal judgments (e.g.,
ties (e.g., shy, philanthropic) will generally be their attributes, Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), vary in reports of their
whereas the nouns that establish contexts binding those attri- physical health (e.g., Salovey, Detweiler, Steward, & Bedell,
butes (e.g., Mike’s girlfriend, student) typically reflect their 2001), use stereotypes (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Suesser,
self-aspects. Although this distinction may seem somewhat 1994), and recall events (e.g., Bower & Forgas, 2001). Thus,
vague, people can easily and reliably report their self-aspects understanding the relation between self-concept structure and
and attributes, and their idiosyncratic self-perceptions have affective experiences is quite important.
predictive utility for understanding their affect, behaviors, and Within the MSF, it is assumed that Rachel’s current affective
self-regulatory activities (to be discussed). state is derived from evaluations of her five self-aspects. If her
Because the attributes associated with one’s self-aspects self-aspects are activated at roughly equivalent levels, her mood
can be quite differentiated, one’s behavior may be markedly should reflect the average appraisal of her five self-aspects.

McConnell 5
On the other hand, to the extent that a self-aspect is more may not only shape general affective states (Principle 3) but
dominant in its activation, its influence on her general affect also influence appraisals of other self-aspects with shared
should grow in proportion to its relative accessibility. This attributes. For instance, if Rachel’s boyfriend remarks that she
assumption has important implications. Consider, for example, is a wonderful girlfriend, it may not only enhance her evaluation
that Rachel’s boyfriend telephones and tells her that she is a of her “Mike’s girlfriend” self-aspect but also increase the
wonderful girlfriend. Although such positive feedback is likely positivity of her sense of her attractiveness, her caring, and her
to enhance her general affective state (e.g., increase positive femininity because all three attributes are associated with her
mood), the MSF articulates a process through which this occurs. dating self-aspect. And via spreading activation, the positivity
First, his phone call should provide a context that increases the transduced from his comment to these attributes may also
accessibility of her “Mike’s girlfriend” self-aspect, augmenting enhance appraisals of other self-aspects associated with these
its contribution to her overall affect. Second, to the extent that attributes. As an example, her “daughter” self-aspect is composed
his comment enhances her evaluation of that now highly acces- of five attributes, two of which are also associated with her
sible self-aspect (i.e., she views her “Mike’s girlfriend” self- “Mike’s girlfriend” self-aspect. Thus, her evaluation of herself
aspect more positively following his call), it should have an as a daughter may grow more positive in proportion to the ratio
especially strong influence on improving her general affect. of attributes it shares with the self-aspect associated with the
Similar outcomes would be expected for negative events too. self-relevant feedback. However, her boyfriend’s comment may
In statistical terms, changes in appraisals of relatively acces- not affect appraisals of her student self-aspect because there is
sible self-aspects should mediate how self-relevant feedback no associative overlap of attributes. Hence, the MSF anticipates
affects one’s overall affect. that feedback may not only change general affect and evalua-
It is important to note that Principle 3 anticipates that feed- tions of the related self-aspect but also influence appraisals of
back about particular self-aspects should have a greater impact other self-aspects based on the particular associative structure
on general affective experiences. For instance, some self- of one’s self-concept.
aspects should be relatively more chronic or more central to
the self, and thus their influence should be greater than less Principle 5: The impact of information pertaining to a
chronic or less central self-aspects. Frequently encountered specific attribute on overall affect increases as the
contexts should result in highly accessible self-aspects, which number of self-aspects associated with the attribute
should reveal greater activation even in the absence of recent increases.
use (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Because the MSF assumes
that more accessible self-aspects make greater contributions In the previous example, we considered the impact of
to general affect, feedback about chronic self-aspects (which Rachel’s boyfriend providing feedback about a self-aspect (i.e.,
by definition are highly accessible) should be quite consequen- she is a wonderful girlfriend). Yet sometimes feedback pertains
tial. It is also likely that some self-aspects are more central to to people’s attributes. For instance, imagine that Rachel’s boy-
the self (Rosenberg, 1979; Sedikides, 1995). Although central- friend told her that she’s very attractive. Although his comment
ity has been operationalized in a number of ways, including would probably increase her evaluation of her “Mike’s girl-
reports of importance to the self (e.g., Boldero & Francis, 2000) friend” self-aspect, it has no implications for other self-aspects.
and ratings of self-descriptiveness (e.g., Verplanken & Holland, On the other hand, consider that he complimented Rachel’s
2002), how centrality for the self is represented in memory femininity. Positive feedback about this particular attribute is
has received little attention. The MSF sheds light on this issue. pertinent to three self-aspects, and thus its potential to affect
To the extent that more central self-aspects are more accessible her overall affect should be relatively greater, all things being
in general or share attributes with other self-aspects, the propa- equal, than a comment praising her attractiveness. Thus, as
gation of self-relevant feedback through the associative network attributes are associated with more self-aspects (whose evalu-
as outlined in the MSF should result in information related to ations, in turn, contribute to general affective states), feedback
central self-aspects having a greater impact on the self. Thus, about them should be especially influential for general affect.
the MSF anticipates a number of ways in which self-aspects In statistical terms, the proportion of self-aspects in one’s self-
can differ (e.g., chronicity, centrality), but its focus on repre- concept associated with a particular attribute should mediate
sentation accounts for how feedback about these self-aspects how feedback about it changes overall affect.
is especially weighty.
Principle 4: Feedback about a self-aspect influences Support for the MSF Principles
evaluations of other self-aspects that share greater Principle 1. The foundational principle of the MSF is that the
attribute associations. self-concept is a collection of multiple, context-dependent
self-aspects. Although some programs of research acknowl-
Based on the spread of activation within the MSF, one can edge the existence of multiple selves (e.g., Higgins, 1987;
consider a relatively intriguing possibility: Self-aspect feedback Markus & Nurius, 1986; Marsh & Craven, 2006; Roberts &

Table 2. Types of Self-Aspects Generated by Participants With Examples and Their Prevalence
Percentage of
Type Examples self-aspects
Situations When in a crowded situation, meeting new people 18

Relationships With my boyfriend, with my family 17
Roles Daughter, as a student 16
Affective When I’m freaking out, my positive qualities 13
True selves The real me, who I really am 13
Goal Who I ought to be, who I’m afraid I’ll become 10
Temporal The old me, my future me 5
Public How others see me, the public me 2
Alone When I am alone, by myself 1
Others 5
Note: N = 140.
Donahue, 1994), these lines of research have, typically, only prevalence of a unitary self-concept was extremely low, and
considered particular types of multiple selves (e.g., one’s ideal those who reported having a “true self” viewed it as only one
selves, five common social roles, one’s academic self-concept) self-aspect among many others.
in a restricted manner. Other work in the self-complexity Although people may report having several self-aspects,
literature (e.g., Linville, 1985; Renaud & McConnell, 2002) it is possible that there is tremendous overlap in the attributes
and in the self-concept compartmentalization literature (e.g., associated with each self-aspect, making distinctions among
Showers, 1992; Showers & Kling, 1996) has allowed people them less important. For example, one could view oneself
to generate their own self-aspects but only by putting self- as being “shy” as a daughter, “shy” as a sorority sister, and “shy”
descriptive traits into groups as a means to produce self- as a student and thus reveal great consistency across many
aspects. Thus, to evaluate Principle 1 more fully without identifiable contexts. To consider this possibility, another study
imposing any constraints (e.g., asking participants to consider asked 339 Miami University undergraduates to identify their
specific roles, having them build self-aspects from collections self-aspects (as in the previous study) and then to ascribe
of traits), it would be useful to observe the self-aspects that attributes that describe themselves in each self-aspect from a
people spontaneously generate in an open-ended fashion. list of 40 traits (half positive, half negative) commonly used
To this end, 140 undergraduate participants at Miami Uni- by college students to describe themselves (Showers, 1992).
versity were asked to identify the “meaningful aspects of their In this self-concept description task, they were told to use as
lives” to assess their self-aspects. This participant population is many or as few of the attributes as they wanted, that they could
interesting to consider because members of an individual- reuse attributes in multiple self-aspects, and that they did not
centered culture should, based on prevailing thinking, be rela- have to use all of attributes provided. On average, they listed
tively more inclined to report having unitary selves. Asking 4.43 self-aspects and used 22.59 of the 40 attributes provided
participants to generate self-aspects in an open-ended manner, in describing themselves across their self-aspects. Although
without specific instructions or examples, can provide some 42% of the attributes used appeared in more than one self-
insights into perceptions of their own, idiosyncratic self-aspects. aspect (suggesting some continuity across self-aspects), 58%
Although such reports have limits (e.g., introspective access, of the attributes used were only associated with one self-aspect.
self-presentation), they have been used effectively in a number Thus, most people reported having multiple self-aspects that
of studies to capture accessible self-knowledge that is predictive were largely described by unique (instead of recurring) attri-
of behavior (e.g., Linville, 1985; Showers, 1992). butes. Yet there was also some redundancy in the attributes
On average, these participants listed 4.23 self-aspects. As associated with some self-aspects, and in accordance with the
shown in Table 2, in order of prevalence, people reported social MSF, this is important for the operation of MSF principles
situation self-aspects, relationship self-aspects, social role self- that rely on spread of activation across the self network to
aspects, affectively laden self-aspects, true selves, goal-related produce several outcomes of interest. Overall, these data
self-aspects, temporally oriented self-aspects, public selves, demonstrate that people report a number of relatively diverse
and alone self-aspects (with others being too unique to char- self-aspects.
acterize). It is interesting to note that although these students Principle 2. A key assumption of the MSF is that social context
lived in an independent culture and were free to report having activates a relevant self-aspect, which increases the accessibil-
just one self-aspect, very few did (less than 3%). Moreover, ity of the attributes associated with it. In other words, only
of the remaining participants, only 43% reported having a the attributes associated with the relevant region of the self-
“true self” among a collection of other self-aspects. Thus, the knowledge network should become activated. Although this

McConnell 7
principle seems intuitive, empirical support for it has only that behaviors (e.g., walking slowly) activate associated con-
recently been provided. cepts in memory (e.g., stereotypes of the elderly) directly
In one study, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2004) had though the principle of ideomotor action (James, 1890; also
undergraduates who were members of the Greek system (i.e., see Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Similarly, work
campus sororities) participate in a study where some had their on embodied cognition has shown that actions can directly
sorority self-aspect activated by a questionnaire asking them to activate concepts in memory as well (Niedenthal et al., 2005).
reflect on their sorority identity (a control condition had no Thus, although the bottom-up route to self-aspect activation
such priming). Next, all participants completed a lexical deci- awaits demonstration, such outcomes seem likely.
sion task in which some words referred to Greek life (e.g., keg, Principle 3. The MSF proposes that general affective states
party). Lexical decision tasks ask participants to judge as quickly (e.g., mood, state self-esteem) are related to the appraisals of
as possible whether strings of letters presented are words or one’s self-aspects and are especially reflective of evaluations
nonwords, with faster judgments of target words indicating their of relatively more accessible self-aspects. This principle sug-
greater accessibility in memory. Those students whose sorority gests two different, testable assertions. First, all things being
self-aspects were activated through priming were faster at judg- equal, the average evaluation of one’s self-aspects should pre-
ing Greek-related words in comparison to control participants. dict general affective states. Second, feedback about a specific
This work suggests that self-aspect-pertinent information enjoys self-aspect will increase its accessibility (Principle 2), resulting
an activation advantage; however, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen in especially strong changes in general affective experiences
did not assess students’ own idiosyncratic attributes in these when the feedback influences appraisals of that self-aspect.
self-aspects—only general knowledge broadly associated with To assess the first assertion, 87 Miami University under-
Greek life. To provide further evidence that context activates graduates completed a modified version of the self-concept
specific self-knowledge, it would be beneficial to prime a self- description task and two different general affect measures.
aspect and observe that its specific attributes are rendered more The self-concept description task was the same as previously
accessible in memory. described (i.e., list self-aspects and select their attributes from
Accordingly, McConnell, Rydell, and Brown (2009) con- a list of 40 items), but after participants completed the task,
ducted an experiment where, during an initial prescreening they evaluated the positivity of each self-aspect listed on
session, participants completed the self-concept description a scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).
task described previously (i.e., reporting their self-aspects and General affect was assessed with two commonly used mea-
which of 20 positive and 20 negative attributes were associated sures: Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and the Positive
with them). Several weeks later, they returned for what seemed and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
to be an unrelated, three-part study. In the first and third “stud- Tellegen, 1988). The Self-Esteem Scale assesses general evalu-
ies,” participants completed identical lexical decision tasks ative beliefs about the self (e.g., “I take a positive attitude
where the target words were the same 40 attributes provided toward myself”), and the PANAS evaluates participants’ mood
to them during the self-concept description task completed by asking them to indicate the extent to which they are cur-
weeks earlier. In between these lexical decision tasks, partici- rently experiencing 10 positive (e.g., proud) and 10 negative
pants wrote for 5 min about one of their self-aspects (hereafter, (e.g., distressed) affective states, which are combined to pro-
the targeted self-aspect) that they listed in the self-concept duce an index of relative positive mood (analyses conducted
description task. The writing exercise was designed to activate on the positive and negative scales separately produced simi-
the targeted self-aspect, which according to Principle 2 should lar results). To assess overall self-aspect appraisal, the mean
increase the accessibility of only those attributes idiosyncrati- evaluation across each participant’s self-aspects was com-
cally associated with it. Indeed, that is exactly what was obtained: puted, which was then correlated to participants’ general affec-
Participants were relatively faster (following the priming) tive measures. As expected, those who reported more positive
with lexical judgments about attributes they associated with self-aspects also had greater self-esteem (r = .48, p < .01) and
the targeted self-aspect and not for self-descriptive attributes more positive moods (r = .33, p < .01). Thus, general affective
associated with their other self-aspects. This supports the pre- state (assessed by two different measures) was reliably related
diction that context (in this case, instantiated by the writing to self-aspect evaluation.
exercise) activates the relevant self-aspect, which in turn Although supportive of the first premise of Principle 3, the
increases the accessibility of attributes associated with it. data are clearly limited by their correlational nature. But more
Principle 2 also anticipates that the activation of self-relevant intriguing is the MSF-derived prediction that feedback about
attributes (e.g., one’s traits, one’s behaviors) should increase a self-aspect affects general affect more strongly when it
the accessibility of associated self-aspects, which in turn should changes one’s evaluation of the now-activated self-aspect. To
direct one’s perceptions and actions. At present, there is no explore this possibility experimentally, we (McConnell et al.,
work directly testing this bottom-up route for self-aspect acti- 2009) conducted a study where participants completed the
vation. However, other lines of work suggest that this assump- self-concept description task (including evaluations of each
tion is reasonable. For instance, Mussweiler (2006) demonstrated self-aspect generated) in an initial laboratory session. Several

weeks later, 60 of those who reported having student and dat- Principle 5. In addition to predictions about the impact of
ing self-aspects returned for a second session where they self-aspect feedback, the MSF anticipates that feedback about
completed a bogus personality test (see McConnell, Rydell, a self-relevant attribute will affect overall affect, especially as
& Leibold, 2002). Specifically, participants’ descriptions of the number of self-aspects associated with it increases because
a series of inkblots were “scored” by a computer, resulting general affect is determined by the evaluative inputs of self-
in either positive (e.g., “you are in the top 10% of college aspects. In support of this hypothesis, we conducted yet another
students in terms of having fulfilling romantic relationships”) experiment where participants completed the self-concept
or negative (e.g., “you are in the bottom 10% of college stu- description task before responding to a bogus inkblot-based
dents in terms of having fulfilling romantic relationships”) personality test (McConnell et al., 2009). However, instead of
feedback about either their dating or student self-aspect (i.e., receiving feedback about a self-aspect (e.g., one’s dating self-
their targeted self-aspect). After receiving this feedback, par- aspect), they received feedback about an attribute that was
ticipants’ mood was assessed (using the PANAS), and they used in their self-concept description task (e.g., outgoingness,
once again evaluated the positivity of each of their self-aspects intelligence). The feedback about this attribute was either posi-
on the same scale used in the first experimental session. Not tive (i.e., top 10% with respect to the attribute) or negative
surprisingly, the feedback (positive or negative) affected mood (i.e., bottom 10% with respect to the attribute) in valence.
and evaluations of the targeted self-aspect, indicating that it Following the experimental feedback, participants’ mood was
was viewed as credible information. But more important with assessed using the PANAS. Not surprisingly, participants had
respect to Principle 3, changes in evaluations of the targeted more positive moods following positive feedback than fol-
self-aspect mediated the impact of feedback valence on mood. lowing negative feedback. But more important for the MSF,
For example, negative feedback about one’s student self-aspect this effect was mediated by the proportion of self-aspects
lowered one’s mood, and this drop in mood could be accounted associated with the feedback-relevant attribute. In other
for by how much the feedback reduced positive appraisals of words, feedback about an attribute had more of an impact on
the student self-aspect. Thus, changes in general affect (in this general affect when its spread of activation implicated more
case, mood) were driven by how self-relevant feedback modi- self-aspects.
fied views of the activated self-aspect, underscoring how
overarching affective experiences are shaped by how feedback
affects the self at the level of self-aspects. New Insights Derived From the MSF
Principle 4. The aforementioned study (McConnell et al., 2009) The Impact of Self-Aspects Is Pervasive: Invisible Context.
reported additional analyses that evaluated Principle 4, which The MSF suggests that one’s perceptions and actions, at any
proposes that feedback about a self-aspect not only affects gen- given moment, are directed by only a subset of self-knowledge.
eral affective experiences (Principle 3) but also can influence For instance, changes in mood were determined by the extent
evaluations of other self-aspects that share common attribute to which self-relevant feedback altered appraisals of currently
associations. Recall that participants received feedback about a activated self-aspects (McConnell et al., 2009). This perspec-
targeted self-aspect, but they provided evaluations (both prior tive raises intriguing questions about how life events, in general,
to the experimental feedback and afterward) for all of their self- affect the self. As previously noted (also see Swann et al.,
aspects, including nontargeted self-aspects (i.e., those not directly 2007), most research on the self assumes that feedback affects
related to the feedback). Thus, one can examine, in the wake of some global sense of self. However, the MSF suggests that it
feedback about the targeted self-aspect, how appraisals of non- is more likely that feedback has its primary impact on activated
targeted self-aspects changed as well. And more specifically, the self-aspects and that broader consequences (e.g., affective
detailed structure of the self outlined by the MSF anticipates experiences, changed appraisals of other self-aspects) are
that the impact of feedback about a targeted self-aspect on propagated by spread of activation through an individual’s
evaluations of nontargeted self-aspects should be stronger when self-concept structure. In other words, self-relevant feedback
more attributes associated with the nontargeted self-aspects are is typically situated in a particular context, and its wider rami-
also associated with the targeted self-aspects. Thus, for each fications are determined by self-aspects and their organization
nontargeted self-aspect, an overlap index capturing the propor- in the self-knowledge network.
tion of its attributes that were also associated with the targeted More generally, this suggests that the accessibility of self-
self-aspect was computed. Indeed, consistent with Principle 4, aspects can affect behavior in a number of ways, and this has
those nontargeted self-aspects that showed the strongest changes important implications for how we measure self-related con-
in evaluation following feedback were those that had greater structs. For example, when assessing undergraduate partici-
attribute overlap with the targeted self-aspect. In other words, pants’ lay theories about the nature of their personality as being
self-aspect feedback not only changed perceptions of that self- relatively malleable and changeable (e.g., Dweck, 1999), it is
aspect and affected overall affect (as discussed for Principle 3) possible that such measurements may be biased by participants’
but also influenced evaluations of other self-aspects that shared beliefs about their student self-aspects (even in the absence of
greater associations with the same attributes. specific instructions to consider this aspect of their life) because

McConnell 9
they typically enter the laboratory on an academic campus to attributes listed by participants were associated with only one
take part in a class-related experiment, and thus it is likely that self-aspect, some were not. In examining the data from the
their student self-aspect is highly accessible during the experi- 339 participants presented earlier, average individuals had at
ment. Although self-theory (e.g., Dweck, 1999; Dweck & least one attribute appear in 69% of their self-aspects. Attributes
Leggett, 1988) proposes that lay beliefs can exist for specific that appear in such a large proportion of one’s self-aspects are
qualities (e.g., Is one born intelligent or is it developed?), probably relatively chronic in nature (Higgins et al., 1982;
attempts to measure general lay beliefs may be strongly influ- Markus, 1977). Interestingly, the prevalent view of chronicity
enced by beliefs about activated self-aspects. is that some attributes (typically assumed to be traits, though
It is important to note that the current analysis is not a this premise is probably more appropriate for independent
criticism of self-theories research per se (indeed, these issues cultures than for interdependent cultures; Cousins, 1989;
apply to work from our lab; e.g., McConnell, 2001; Renaud J. G. Miller, 1984, 1986; Shweder & Bourne, 1984) are always
& McConnell, 2007), but rather this reflects a broader point accessible and thus always influence perceptions of the self
about how the relative activation of a subset of self-knowledge (e.g., Markus, 1977) and of others (e.g., Bargh, Bond, Lombardi,
may produce an invisible context (i.e., the inadvertent influence & Tota, 1986). For instance, someone who is chronic for “hon-
of accessible self-aspects) in many situations and may affect esty” should evaluate himself or herself and others based on
experiments designed to capture general knowledge about the the implications of “honesty” because of its heightened acces-
self. But more generally, invisible context may filter any per- sibility in memory. In sum, past work on chronicity (and on
ception or action, not just self related. For example, Rachel schematicity) has assumed that these concepts guide interpre-
getting off the phone with her parents (which increases the tation and behavior in all contexts.
accessibility of her daughter self-aspect) might affect her per- When considering the example of Rachel, some attributes
ceptions of an acquaintance (e.g., viewing him as being rela- (those in gray in Figure 1) are associated with multiple self-
tively shy) or her own behavior (e.g., giving a dollar to a aspects. For example, attributes such as traits (e.g., caring),
charitable cause when asked). Although work has shown that group attributes (e.g., female), and behaviors (e.g., philan-
priming traits can influence social perceptions (e.g., Higgins thropic) that are represented in multiple self-aspects will be
et al., 1977), the current analysis suggests that self-aspect acti- relatively more influential than attributes associated with only
vation may produce similar outcomes as well. And relatedly, one self-aspect. These qualities should be more chronic because,
the activation of close others (who may themselves be repre- all things being equal, attributes associated with a greater num-
sented in one’s self-aspects, such as “Mike’s girlfriend”) may ber of self-aspects have more opportunities for activation,
influence self-perceptions through similar contextual effects increasing the likelihood that the attribute will be relatively
(Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). more accessible because of repeated use (Higgins et al., 1982).
Also, many studies in the literature (e.g., Berglas & Jones, An interesting corollary of the MSF is that although some
1978; Linville, 1985; Renaud & McConnell, 2002) involve attributes will be relatively chronic, they may not be germane
undergraduate participants completing a task in an academic to all self-aspects. Thus, when context activates a self-aspect
laboratory (i.e., their student self-aspect is activated) and receiv- that is not associated with a chronic attribute, it is less likely
ing feedback suggesting poor academic or intellectual perfor- that the attribute itself will be especially influential, despite its
mance (i.e., feedback that is student self-aspect relevant), and general prevalence in the self-concept. As a result, the impact
its subsequent impact on affect and behavior is assessed. It is of chronic attributes may be more limited than previously
quite possible that they would be less affected if the feedback thought. When considering the example of Rachel, although
did not implicate qualities important to their student self-aspect her femininity may be a relatively chronic attribute, it has no
in a context where their student self-aspect is highly accessible implications for her “student” self-aspect. Thus, it should not
and influential in directing behavior. Although these and other affect her behavior when she is in the role of being a student.
similar studies assume that feedback about one’s student self- Yet because past work on chronicity has assumed a relatively
aspect is powerful because of its centrality (undoubtedly true unitary self-concept (i.e., a trait is chronic for the self), existent
in many cases), it may also be the case that part of its potency research would anticipate that chronic attributes should influ-
is derived from the fit between the feedback and one’s most ence perception and behavior in all domains. The MSF, in
accessible self-aspect. Similar concerns, both theoretical and contrast, predicts domain specificity even for attributes tradi-
methodological, have been expressed by those who study tionally considered to be chronic.
socially situated cognition (e.g., Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007) Recent work in our lab has supported this MSF-derived
and the influence of context on self-reports (e.g., Norenzayan prediction (Brown & McConnell, 2009b). In two different stud-
& Schwarz, 1999). Future research should explore how invis- ies, participants’ chronic attributes were assessed using tradi-
ible contexts operate and evaluate their theoretical and meth- tional measures. For example, one of the most frequently used
odological implications. methods asks individuals to list traits they frequently see in
Chronicity May Not Be So Chronic. When considering the others (e.g., people they like, people they dislike, people they
data presented earlier, it is interesting that although many encounter), and those that are listed initially and repeatedly are

deemed chronic (e.g., Higgins et al., 1982). In addition to report- self-aspect related to one’s gender or being a college student).
ing their chronic traits (as solicited by traditional measures), That is, stereotype threat can be either experienced or fore-
they also completed a self-concept description task to determine stalled based on which self-aspect is activated (also see Shih,
which self-aspects were, or were not, associated with their Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). Again, the MSF illustrates that
chronic trait. During a subsequent experimental session, par- many phenomena such as stereotype threat may be more
ticipants activated (through a 5-min writing exercise) a self- nuanced than currently viewed because of how an activated
aspect that either was or was not associated with their chronic self-aspect guides behavior.
trait. Afterward, they made judgments about either them- The Self Is Composed of More Than Traits. Another impor-
selves (e.g., speeded judgments about whether traits were self- tant implication of the MSF is that it views self-relevant attri-
descriptive) or others (e.g., assessing ambiguous behaviors butes as being composed of more than just traits. The position
that could potentially be interpreted as in line with their chronic that trait knowledge is “the base element” of the self-concept
traits). In both studies, participants showed the chronicity effects is prevalent (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Markus, 1977;
previously reported in the literature (e.g., faster “me” judgments Roberts & Donahue, 1994), yet at the same time this approach
for a chronic trait, assimilating others’ behaviors in line with a is limiting. For example, this perspective reflects an independent
chronic trait) when the writing exercise primed a self-aspect cultural bias to view the self as being primarily composed of
associated with their chronic trait but not when the writing task personality traits (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; J. G. Miller,
primed a self-aspect not associated with their chronic trait. Thus, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). More broadly, the trait
it appears that the outcomes associated with chronicity were approach to personality has received a great deal of criticism
observed only when a self-aspect associated with the chronic (e.g., Mischel, 1973; Pervin, 1994; cf. McCrae, 1994; Robins,
attribute was activated, indicating that chronic traits are not John, & Caspi, 1998). Operationally, many studies from differ-
“always turned on.” ent perspectives examine self-concept by asking participants
If this position is correct, then why has past work shown to describe themselves based on traits provided to them (e.g.,
broad consequences of chronic attributes? First, the MSF would Linville, 1985; Roberts & Donahue, 1994; Showers, 1992).
anticipate that, stochastically, any given self-aspect is relatively For example, research on self-concept differentiation asks par-
more likely to have chronic attributes associated with it than ticipants to endorse the extent to which they exhibit a variety
not. Second, most studies exploring chronicity have been con- of fixed traits derived from the five-factor model of personality
ducted with undergraduate students in university-based labo- across a fixed collection of roles (McCrae & Costa, 1999).
ratories. As a result, both the assessment of chronic traits and Greater variability in trait endorsement between roles (e.g.,
the demonstrations of their impact probably involve the activa- being outgoing with friends but not as a worker) reflects greater
tion of the same self-aspect (e.g., one’s student self-aspect), self-concept differentiation, which has been shown to be related
and thus a similar context exists for both the measurement of to more maladaptive outcomes such as being more anxious,
chronic attributes and the situations where their consequences more depressed, and lower in self-esteem (Donahue et al., 1993).
are revealed, further underscoring the impact of invisible Some of the most advanced theoretical work on self-
contexts. knowledge representation has concluded that the self
The distribution of attributes among self-aspects may play becomes increasingly represented by traits, instead of episodic
a pivotal role in a variety of important outcomes. If we once events, as more information about the self is encountered (e.g.,
again return to the example of Rachel, although “female” is Klein et al., 1992; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996). Specifi-
an attribute that is associated with several of her self-aspects cally, these researchers have found support for the idea that
(and hence would be considered relatively chronic by con- although self-knowledge is initially exemplar based (i.e.,
ventional standards), it is not associated with her student self- composed of specific behavioral episodes), it becomes
aspect. Thus, despite the prevalence of this attribute across increasingly abstracted into trait summaries as people develop
many of her self-aspects, her gender may be relatively unim- greater experience with a behavioral domain (e.g., Klein, Chan,
portant for her student self-aspect. As a result, the MSF would & Loftus, 1999; Klein et al., 1992; Klein et al., 1996).
anticipate that Rachel might be far less susceptible to stereo- Although we believe that self-relevant attributes are often
type threat in the classroom (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007; Steele, composed of traits especially after the accumulation of a con-
1997) than another woman whose gender is associated with siderable number of behavioral exemplars and especially in
her student self-aspect even if this other person’s self-concept cultures that promote independent self-construals (Markus &
has “female” associated with fewer self-aspects and thus (by Kitayama, 1991) or entity theories of personality (Dweck,
prevailing standards) is less likely to be gender chronic. Indeed, 1999), other forms of self-relevant knowledge seem likely as
recent work in our lab (Rydell, McConnell, & Beilock, 2009) well. For example, Carlston’s (1992, 1994) associated systems
demonstrated that whether stereotype threat effects are revealed theory assumes that different systems underlie visual, verbal,
by women performing math problems who are aware of the affect-related, and action-related information. These systems
cultural stereotype that “men are better than women at math” are hypothesized to produce specific forms of social representa-
depends, in part, on which self-aspect is activated (e.g., a tion: physical appearance (visual system), personality traits

McConnell 11
(verbal system), affective responses (affect system), and behav- provides a signaling cue to people with respect to their behav-
ioral responses (action system). Additional types of representa- ior. For example, a number of self-regulation theories view
tions result from blends of these systems (e.g., combining the stronger negative affect as resulting from greater discrepancies
visual and verbal systems gives rise to “social categories”). with desired outcomes (e.g., Carver, 2001, 2003; Carver &
Work in our lab (e.g., Schleicher & McConnell, 2005) import- Scheier, 1998; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1987,
ing associated systems theory into self-concept representation 1997). More generally, mood influences the extent to which
has been promising. For instance, we found that people spon- people seek information to understand their environment (e.g.,
taneously use a wide variety of attributes (e.g., physical appear- Schwarz & Clore, 1996), continue performing a task (e.g.,
ance, emotions, behaviors) in describing their self-aspects in Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993), exhibit creativity
addition to personality traits, and this broader array of attributes (e.g., Gasper, 2003), form attributions (e.g., Sinclair, Mark,
provides additional utility predicting people’s responses to & Clore, 1994), and scrutinize persuasive appeals (e.g.,
stressful life events. In short, people view the self as composed Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995). Because the MSF addresses
of more than just trait attributes, and assessing self-concept with how affect is experienced, it offers insights for how a variety
a broader constellation of attributes captures meaningful vari- of important outcomes are influenced by self-concept
ability in predicting human behavior. representation.
Yet another area that reveals the importance of viewing the For example, a common feature of self-regulation theories
self as composed of more than traits is work on embodiment is that discrepancies with one’s goal selves result in stronger
(Niedenthal et al., 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004). For example, negative affect, which in turn compel one to work harder to
there is growing evidence that sensorimotor information and reduce the discrepancy. The magnitude of this affect is assumed
proceduralized knowledge often play critical roles in develop- to be proportionate to the absolute discrepancy (e.g., Higgins,
ing expertise and in helping individuals to juggle cognitive 1987) or the degree to which one is making progress toward
demands in the environment (e.g., Beilock & Holt, 2007; the goal (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998). Although these factors
Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; Wilson, 2002). are undoubtedly important, the MSF would also add that self-
As people develop extensive domain-specific information, we concept representation plays a role in how discrepancy-related
would anticipate that they would have self-aspects to represent affect is experienced. For example, as one’s discrepancy-
this knowledge with attributes that include motoric and kin- related self-aspect is more accessible in memory (Principle 3)
esthetic representations. For example, people with expertise or as related attributes are associated with more self-aspects
in playing sports such as hockey or football, in comparison (Principle 5), any affect experienced should be even stronger,
to people who do not have experience playing the sport, are increasing goal pursuit activities. Thus, the MSF proposes
faster at correctly identifying that a visually presented target that self-concept organization contributes to self-regulation
item was incorporated into written descriptions of sport- because the structure of one’s self-concept shapes the propaga-
specific actions when the presentation of the target item’s tion of affective experiences.
action matched the behavior implied in the sentence than when Another MSF-derived insight is that one’s affect (e.g., mood,
it mismatched the behavior implied in the sentence (Holt & self-esteem) is shaped by how self-relevant feedback changes
Beilock, 2006). Thus, it seems that for people with consider- evaluations of the now-activated self-aspect (McConnell et al.,
able firsthand experience in activities, information associated 2009). In some ways, this finding seems reminiscent of work
with the motor actions performed in those domains is repre- by Pelham and Swann (1989), who found that one’s self-esteem
sented in memory. Although this is a relatively new area of was more related to self-conceptions held with greater certainty.
interest, the implications of embodiment for issues ranging From the perspective of the MSF, to the extent that greater
from social cognition (Smith & Semin, 2004) to attitudes (e.g., certainty results from self-aspects that are more frequently
Beilock & Holt, 2007) are considerable, and their application used, those self-aspects should (all things being equal) be more
to self-concept representation merits additional attention, espe- activated. And based on Principle 3, evaluations of such highly
cially when considering issues such as the development of exper- accessible self-aspects should be more influential in shaping
tise. Similarly, we would expect other consequences of expertise overall affect, including self-esteem. Although this explanation
(e.g., better domain-relevant memory) to become imbued in is admittedly tentative, the MSF suggests a mechanism to
one’s self-aspects as well (e.g., Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & account for why some self-conceptualizations influence affect
Starkes, 2002; Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, & Carr, more strongly than others (e.g., Pelham & Swann, 1989).
2006; Chase & Simon, 1973; Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989; More broadly, the MSF provides an approach for the inte-
Norman, Brooks, & Allen, 1989). This emerging area of work gration of affect with the self. The “self is more than traits”
reaffirms the importance of ensuring that any model of self- perspective of the MSF allows one to consider how attributes
concept representation considers both declarative and proce- related to affect and emotion may be triggered by self-aspect
duralized knowledge about the self. activation. Research shows that activating emotions affects
Self-Concept Structure Plays an Important Role in Affect- perception at a very basic level, leading to greater perceptions
Based Phenomena. Several lines of work propose that affect of similarity between stimuli related to emotions that one is

currently experiencing (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, A second issue of interest is understanding how self-concept
1999). When context activates a self-aspect associated with structure evolves over time. For example, do self-concepts
specific forms of affect, the MSF would anticipate that sub- “come and go” (e.g., Rachel breaks up with her boyfriend but
sequent information processing would be filtered by the affect replaces this self-aspect with a clique of new friends that also
associated with that self-aspect. And when self-aspects reflect features attributes overlapping with her daughter self-aspect),
one’s social group memberships (e.g., sorority sister), group- or does self-concept representation suddenly shift in its struc-
specific emotions (e.g., proud) that have become associated ture? At present, we really do not have many answers to these
with these group identities may be triggered (see Smith, Seger, questions, but we believe that collecting developmental data
& Mackie, 2007). Furthermore, the bidirectional nature of the will be important for improving our understanding of how the
MSF predicts that activating specific emotions such as pride self changes.
might lead to activating group identity self-aspects associated
with these emotions.
The Development of Self-Aspects. One area that awaits Integrating the MSF With Other
additional work is expanding our understanding of how self- Perspectives on the Self
aspects develop. Overall, we view some self-aspects as being Self-Regulation. As previously noted, a great deal of work has
the product of top-down processes, whereas others are assem- focused on how the self plays a role in goal attainment (e.g.,
bled in a bottom-up fashion. For example, top-down self-aspects Carver, 2001, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1997;
are those transmitted from cultural knowledge (e.g., “being a Markus & Nurius, 1986; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Although these
married son”; Shweder & Miller, 1985), feedback from other programs of research differ in important ways, they each propose
people (e.g., “you are a tidy person”; R. L. Miller, Brickman, that temporal selves (e.g., future selves, past selves) and goal
& Bolen, 1975), and pervasive stereotypes (e.g., “being African selves (e.g., ought selves, feared selves) serve to guide behaviors
American”; Crocker & Major, 1989). In general, these are self- and that discrepancies with them provide self-regulatory feed-
aspects that “are supplied” to people from extraperson sources. back that directs subsequent action. It is interesting that although
On the other hand, many self-aspects are assembled in an intra- each of these theoretical perspectives suggests having “other
personal, bottom-up manner based on self-perception (e.g., selves,” none of them speaks to the representation of
Fazio, 1987), experiences navigating through the environment these selves. One possibility derived from the MSF is that goal-
(e.g., Neisser, 1991), and on-line integration of one’s experi- related selves are represented as self-aspects. Indeed, the data
ences (e.g., McConnell et al., 2002). Although bottom-up self- presented in Table 2 suggest that people do spontaneously list
aspects may take more time to construct than top-down self-aspects that are temporal and goal related in nature.
self-aspects (which can be conferred, in toto, to the person based If goal-relevant selves are represented in memory as self-
on his or her place in the social order), once formed, self-aspects aspects, a number of possibilities are suggested. For example,
should serve to maintain a sense of stability within that par- consider Higgins’s (1997) regulatory focus model, which posits
ticular context regardless of their formation. that discrepancies with one’s self-guides (e.g., ideal selves rep-
From our perspective, there are two different but important resenting one’s aspirations, ought selves reflecting one’s obliga-
sets of questions for which we know too little. First, what are tions) serve to direct goal-relevant behaviors. The regulatory
the developmental processes involved in the production of self- focus model posits not only that different self-guides exist and
concept organization? Although there has been considerable serve to produce particular types of emotions but also that par-
work exploring the development of self-esteem and domain- ticular types of goal-directed behaviors are initiated to reduce
specific competencies (e.g., Harter, 1992; Marsh & Ayotte, 2003), self-discrepancies. Specifically, reducing discrepancies with an
there has been less work in understanding the development of ideal self engages a promotion focus involving the eager pursuit
self-concept representation (but see Amiot et al., 2007; Marsh of successes, whereas reducing discrepancies with an ought self
& Shavelson, 1985; Shavelson et al., 1976). For instance, initiates a prevention focus that emphasizes the vigilant mini-
Shavelson et al. (1976) posited that self-concepts are multifaceted, mization of losses (e.g., Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, &
hierarchically organized structures that become behaviorally Molden, 2003). Based on the MSF, we would anticipate that
more variable at more specific levels. Although similar to the ideal self-aspects should be composed of a greater number of
MSF in a number of ways, those authors forwarded a measure- engagement-related attributes (e.g., “confident,” “energetic”),
ment instrument that assesses students’ competencies in several whereas ought self-aspects should reveal relatively more
fixed domains (e.g., peer relations, reading, math) that are of protection-related attributes (e.g., “careful,” “weary”).
interest to educational settings. In the past 30 years, this is still It is important to note that goal-relevant self-aspects are
how self-concept has been assessed in this literature (e.g., Marsh important to many literatures, including self-awareness theory
& Ayotte, 2003; Marsh & Craven, 2006). In our view, it would (e.g., Carver, 2003), future selves (e.g., Markus & Nurius,
be beneficial to employ new techniques (e.g., the self-concept 1986), cybernetic theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998), and self-
description task) to explore the development of self-concept determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Interestingly,
structures in ways that are not tethered to specific domains. despite the considerable predictive utility of these theories, the

McConnell 13
proportion of self-aspects reported that are specifically devoted that people should show sizable consistency within situations
to goal selves and temporal selves is relatively small (i.e., 15% but can exhibit considerable variability across situations. Yet
of self-aspects). Although they are undoubtedly important the MSF allows for many other forms of self-knowledge beyond
(e.g., one’s “future doctor” self-aspect may guide one’s behav- situationally triggered self-aspects.
ior through college, medical school, and residency for many Another mechanism by which self-regulation may be
years and later become the foundation of one’s professional achieved is through prescriptions provided by role-based self-
identity), the fact that 85% of spontaneously generated self- aspects, which are often culturally constructed and transmitted.
aspects are not directly tied to goal selves and temporal selves For example, Shweder and Miller (1985) provided an analysis
suggests that self-regulatory activities may involve other com- of Hindu customs and social order (particularly among Oriyas
ponents of the self. Perhaps there are particular, and heretofore in eastern India), observing that many roles in Hindu culture
unstudied, forms of self-regulatory behavior that might be (e.g., being a woman, being a married son) stipulate rigid
demonstrated by those who have self-aspects that reflect affec- obligations and duties. In such cases, one’s behaviors may be
tive states or abstract situations. strongly regulated by culturally mandated self-aspects. Similar
For instance, it is possible that many people may engage in outcomes (i.e., role-based self-aspects serving to regulate
self-regulation based on the prescriptions provided by a par- action) should be revealed in cultures and organizations where
ticular self-aspect (e.g., when in a large group situation) that members strongly subscribe to a common tradition and history.
guide behavior. People whose self-concepts include such self- Thus, even in a relatively independent society such as the
aspects undoubtedly do so because their past experiences differ United States, “culture” exists at many levels and can supply
from those of people who do not (e.g., someone who feels role-based self-aspects that guide behavior, whether it is
social anxiety around others is more likely to have an “in a Southern views on honor-related violence (e.g., Cohen, 1998;
large group situation” self-aspect than someone who is at ease Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) or how Greek letter organization norms
in such situations). Such a suggestion is consistent with classic influence eating disorders and substance abuse (e.g., Landa
research emphasizing the important role that scripts and stories & Bybee, 2007; McCabe et al., 2005). Accordingly, one’s
play in behavior (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977, 1995). How- “Southerner” or “sorority sister” self-aspects in the United States
ever, the current analysis would suggest that such scripts may will encompass expectations that serve to regulate behavior.
be represented in one’s self-concept and that the incorporation Thus, the content and sources of self-aspects may vary con-
of such situation-specific self-aspects into self-knowledge siderably across cultures and organizations, but their represen-
reflects relatively more persistent goals and needs of the indi- tation and functions should not.
vidual (Bargh, 1982). Although most people can describe “how Interplay of Consistency and Variability for the Self.
to act in a large group situation,” the fact that such knowledge A long-standing question about the self is whether it is con-
is deemed to be a meaningful aspect of the self reflects its sistent or variable (e.g., Cervone & Shoda, 1999; DeSteno &
import to such people. Salovey, 1997; Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kunda, 1986). In
This perspective is compatible with reasoning by Mischel many ways, this classic issue ties the study of the self in social
and Shoda (1995; also see Cervone & Shoda, 1999), who pro- psychology to many disciplines less focused on situational
posed that people exhibit “if . . . then . . .” situation–behavior variability, including personality, cultural, and developmental
relations that account for how individuals show marked vari- psychology. Moreover, one can consider variability for the self
ability in their behaviors across time. Specifically, they propose at a number of levels, including whether the self is variable
that although some people exhibit variability in their actions within contexts, across contexts, and across the life span.
across time, they often show consistent behaviors in particular From the perspective of the MSF, we would expect relative
situations. They proposed a personality system that is composed consistency for the self within contexts. Presumably, context
of if–then situation–behavior profiles (or person × situation activates self-aspects, which in turn increases the accessibility
interaction terms; e.g., Mendoza-Denton, Ayduk, Mischel, of associated attributes. Although it is possible that attributes
Shoda, & Testa, 2001) that account for how people perceive associated with a self-aspect can change, it seems that signifi-
coherence for the self while revealing variability in their actions. cant revision of attributes within a self-aspect is relatively
The MSF would incorporate such “if . . . then . . .” relations unlikely. Like any cognitive structure, self-aspects, once
into one’s situational self-aspects. Indeed, the prevalence of formed, should be relatively robust, which will ultimately serve
situational self-aspects indicates that the activation of a specific self-consistency motives (Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003).
self-aspect by a particular context would result in situation- That is, self-aspects should serve to guide information seeking,
specific cognitions, personality characteristics, emotions, and fill in informational gaps, assimilate ambiguous feedback to
behaviors being activated as well. Thus, the notion of “person confirm preexisting self-knowledge, encourage others to view
by situation self-encoding” (e.g., Mendoza-Denton et al., 2001) the self as consistent with one’s own beliefs, and be resistant
is quite consistent with the MSF, and both would anticipate that to change (e.g., Bargh, 1982; Greenwald, 1980; Markus, 1977;
such situation-specific knowledge should serve to direct one’s McConnell et al., 2002; Steele, 1997; Swann et al., 2003; Swann
behavior appropriately. Moreover, both perspectives anticipate & Read, 1981). Although self-perception can affect views of

the self (Salancik & Conway, 1975), such changes are rare adopt new social roles (e.g., child, student, spouse, parent)
when one has well-developed self-knowledge (Chaiken & and find themselves in new contexts, thus shifts in self-concept
Baldwin, 1981). Of course, change is possible. For example, representation should result. Moreover, in many contexts, the
based on Dweck’s (1999) work on implicit theories, people content of the self-concept will be influenced by establishing
holding more incremental views of a self-aspect might reveal attributes that help to distinguish the self (especially in inde-
greater self-aspect change than those who adopt a more entity pendent cultures) from others (e.g., optimal distinctiveness;
theory perspective of that self-aspect. In general, though, we Brewer, 1991). Thus, the content of one’s self-concept will
would expect relative consistency for an individual across time often reflect attributes that distinguish one from others in a
within the same context. given contexts. For example, children are more likely to use
Between contexts, however, the MSF would anticipate the their gender when describing themselves if they live in house-
possibility of considerable variability for the self. From the holds where their gender is in the minority (McGuire &
data presented above, it is clear that people typically possess McGuire, 1988). Thus, Rachel is more likely to have the attri-
several self-aspects and that many of them are composed of bute “female” in her family-related identity (e.g., daughter
relatively unique attributes. As a result, it is not surprising that self-aspect) if her siblings are mostly brothers instead of mostly
one can behave quite differently in different situations. How- sisters. Thus, the functions self-aspects serve (e.g., optimal
ever, we anticipate that there are factors that influence the distinctiveness) will influence the attributes associated with
extent to which one’s self-aspects will reveal variability. First, self-aspects, which in turn will result in context-specific expres-
being a member of a culture that stresses people are variable sions of one’s self-definitions. And do self-aspects change in
(instead of consistent) should increase the likelihood of more systematic ways across time? Although there is considerable
differentiated self-aspects. Also, because self-aspects by nature work on developmental milestones and abilities (e.g., Kohlberg
reflect discrete, meaningful facets of the self, we would antici- & Kramer, 1969; Piaget, 1932), our knowledge about how
pate that, in general, those possessing more self-aspects would self-concepts change throughout the life span is nascent (but
have more differentiated self-aspects. On the other hand, as see Amiot et al., 2007).
discussed earlier, those who have attributes that are highly In addition to questions about changing content, another
accessible or associated with many self-aspects should reveal issue that is very germane to the MSF is whether self-concept
greater consistency across contexts. structure reveals a developmental signature. That is, indepen-
The issue about whether the self varies across situations dent of the content, do people maintain the same number of
reflects different perspectives on the nature of the individual. self-aspects throughout their lives, or are there factors that lead
For example, personality psychologists have focused on deter- to the representation of self-concept changing with the passage
mining an individual’s stable characteristics (e.g., Pervin, of time? For instance, are some people more prone to experi-
1994), whereas social psychologists have argued that people ence “emotional rollercoaster lives” because their self-concepts
vary considerably as a function of the situation (e.g., Ross & inherently feature attribute overlap, making feedback about
Nisbett, 1991). One attempt to bridge these perspectives is any self-aspect more consequential in general? Intriguing ques-
the position that people reveal consistency within situations tions such as these await future research.
but show variability across situations (e.g., Cervone & Shoda, Integrating Others Into the Self: Relationships and Social
1999). Indeed, the MSF endorses this perspective, arguing Identities. It is fascinating that although the self seems to, at
that the activation of self-aspects increases the accessibility first blush, suggest all that is isolated and unique about a person,
of relevant personal attributes, resulting in within-context important others are an integral part of self-knowledge. This
stability. On the other hand, different contexts should evoke fact is affirmed by Table 2, which notes that the second most
different self-aspects, which can lead to markedly different widely reported type of self-aspect is directed toward relation-
behavior. However, the MSF also anticipates meaningful indi- ships with others. In one sense, it is not surprising that “spouse”
vidual differences in the extent to which people exhibit dif- or “with friends” self-aspects would be important to so many
ferences across contexts. Primarily, people who possess fewer because the need to belong is considerable (e.g., Baumeister
self-aspects or who possess self-aspects that share considerable & Leary, 1995; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Correll & Park, 2005;
attribute overlap with other self-aspects should reveal rela- Twenge, 2007). However, it is noteworthy that such relation-
tively more similarity across contexts. Thus, the nature of ships are freely associated with the self, even in a culture where
self-concept representation will predict whether an individual the presumed bias would be on how the self is solitary and
exhibits cross-situational similarity or variability. This ability unique. Clearly, this indicates that even those who live in an
to capture “for whom” variability is likely a unique strength independent culture value connectedness with others to such
of the MSF approach, and its emphasis on the representational a point that other people become part of one’s self-concept.
structure of self-aspects allows for the prediction of which A number of lines of work have considered the interrelations
situations will, and will not, reveal similarity for a person. between others and the self. Indeed, concepts such as “attach-
One can also think about the functions of self-concept rep- ment,” “interdependent self-construal,” and “inclusion of other
resentation and its changes across the life span. Clearly, people in the self” suggest (at least, metaphorically) that important

McConnell 15
others are connected to, rather than separate from, the self effects, previously noted). This alternative interpretation under-
(e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; scores the differences between a unitary view of the self and
Cross & Madson, 1997; Lewin, 1948; Markus & Kitayama, viewing the self as being composed of multiple self-aspects.
1991; McCall, 1974). As an example, one of the most widely By proposing that “the self is assimilated” by considering
used measures of interpersonal interconnectedness is Aron a close other, one tacitly assumes a single self-concept “that
et al.’s (1992) Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale, which asks moves” as a result of priming. The MSF view, in contrast,
participants to report their closeness with another using one of argues that one has multiple self-aspects and that context (e.g.,
seven Venn-like diagrams of overlapping circles ranging from priming) activates a particular self-aspect that is qualitatively
no overlap to almost complete overlap, with greater overlap distinct from other self-aspects. Of course, we do not suggest
reflecting more inclusion. Yet how are such relations repre- that priming (producing assimilation or contrast effects; see
sented in memory? We propose that important others are often Mussweiler, 2003; Stapel & Koomen, 2000) cannot alter self-
accorded their own self-aspects, and thus they are directly perceptions. Instead, we propose that, at times, apparent
integrated into one’s self-concept. assimilation effects may simply reflect the discrete activation
As illustrated in Figure 1, the fact that Rachel possesses a of a relational self-aspect.
“Mike’s girlfriend” self-aspect reflects a considerable degree There may be other means by which close others influence
of inclusion, which was unlikely in the early days of their perceptions of the self as well. For example, Cohen and Gunz
dating. Moreover, as Mike becomes “more included in the self,” (2002) demonstrated that members of interdependent cultures
the overall accessibility of her “Mike’s girlfriend” self-concept (i.e., participants whose parents were born in Asia), in com-
should increase, augmenting its influence on her perceptions parison to those from independent cultures (i.e., those whose
and behavior. Furthermore, Mike’s qualities, attitudes, and parents grew up in North America), recalled more personal
mannerisms may become associated with this self-aspect, memories from a third-person perspective than from a first-
setting the stage for mimicry effects that help coordinate their person perspective. Similarly, Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, and
interactions together (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bavelas, Suzuki (2004) found that cognitive dissonance effects were
Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986; Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; observed for European Americans quite broadly but only for
LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976). Indeed, recent work has shown Japanese participants following priming that induced a sense
that mimicry effects can be quite context dependent (e.g., van of being evaluated by others. Studies such as these demonstrate
Baaren, Horgan, Chartrand, & Dijkmans, 2004), which is con- how others influence the self in cultures that encourage inter-
sistent with their integration in one’s self-aspects. Thus, the dependent self-construals. However, the MSF anticipates these
MSF proposes that an included other would have a devoted outcomes would be observed for those with more relational
self-aspect in memory and that its relative degree of accessibil- self-aspects (even for members of independent cultures) and
ity would correspond to reports of greater inclusion with the that influence-of-other effects should be especially likely for
self. Furthermore, we would expect that any significant “other the specific others represented in these relational self-aspects.
entity” could reveal such outcomes, producing self-aspects These specific others who become represented in the self-
devoted to other individuals (e.g., brother), nonpersons (e.g., concept can be important standards for the self, setting the
dog owner), groups (e.g., family), social collectives (e.g., Cubs stage for especially strong social comparisons (see Tesser, 1988;
fan), and less tangible social relationships (e.g., child of God). Zell & Alicke, in press).
By adopting the idea that close others will be represented As noted above, the inclusion of others in the self should
in self-aspects, some intriguing findings in the literature might not only involve individuals but also apply to larger collections
be reconsidered. For example, it has been forwarded that the of people. It is interesting that although many theoretical per-
activation of close others affects one’s perceptions of the self, spectives consider the extent to which people identify with
with much of this work reporting assimilation toward others’ their social groups (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner,
traits in one’s own self-reports (e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002; 1996; Crocker & Major, 1989; Deaux, 1993; Major, Quinton,
Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; & Schmader, 2003; Steele, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner
Gabriel, Carvallo, Dean, Tippin, & Renaud, 2005). Although et al., 1994), far less work has considered how these social
this work has been considered evidence of assimilation of the identities are represented in memory. One notable exception
self toward the representation of another, it is also possible that is research by Smith and colleagues, who demonstrated evi-
the consideration of a close other for whom one has a self-aspect dence of associations in memory between the self and one’s
means that the activation of that relational self-aspect (e.g., social in-groups (for romantic partners, see Aron et al., 1992).
one’s spouse self-aspect) activates the attributes associated Smith et al. (1999) found participants were faster in judging
with that relationship-specific self-aspect, which then deter- whether traits were characteristic of in-group members when
mines reports of self-relevant attributes. In other words, rather they were self-descriptive than when they were not self-
than producing assimilation in one’s self-concept, close others descriptive (also see Smith & Henry, 1996). We would contend
may activate relational self-aspects, which in turn directly guide that as one identifies or disidentifies with social groups, these
one’s self-assessments and behaviors (through invisible context affiliations are often reflected in one’s self-aspects. For instance,

highly accessible identities (e.g., one’s religious or cultural eliminating stereotype threat effects (Rydell et al., 2009). Thus,
heritage) are likely to be reflected in one’s self-aspects (e.g., self-aspects provide a means by which one can manage mul-
being Jewish). And like any other type of self-aspect, we pre- tiple social identities, allowing context to activate one but not
dict that more central (and more important) social identities another and producing markedly different behavior from the
would be activated more frequently, resulting in increased same individual.
accessibility for these self-aspects. Thus, similar to our predic- This perspective that social context can differentially acti-
tions regarding inclusion of others in self, we anticipate that vate self-knowledge related to one’s social groups is also an
more accessible social identity self-aspects will correspond important component of the multidimensional model of racial
to greater perceptions of identification with those social identi- identity (MMRI; for a review, see Sellers, Smith, Shelton,
ties. As a result, the MSF provides a means by which one can Rowley, & Chavous, 1998). Specifically, this work proposes
assess greater social identification in terms of its representa- that the manner in which racial identity triggers racial salience
tion in memory (i.e., its accessibility), and this single mecha- is through situational cues, which is compatible with how the
nism can account for the inclusion of social entities discussed MSF proposes that context triggers a self-aspect related to
in a number of disparate literatures (e.g., close relationships, one’s social group (also see Mischel & Shoda, 1995). One
intergroup memberships). important recent contribution of the MMRI is exploring the
On the other hand, disidentification may be achieved by development of racial identity trajectories (e.g., Seaton,
eliminating a self-aspect from one’s self-concept. For example, Scottham, & Sellers, 2006; Yip, Seaton, & Sellers, 2006),
in the face of the pejorative cultural stereotype that African which further underscores the importance of considering the
Americans do not excel academically, it has been suggested development of self-aspects across one’s entire lifetime.
that many African Americans disidentify with academia in Personality and Individual Differences. The MSF not only
response to racial stigmatization (Crocker & Major, 1989; speaks to underlying processes involving the self but also pro-
Steele, 1997). The MSF would propose that such disidentifica- vides a bridge for thinking about relations between self-concept
tion would be revealed by African Americans eliminating stu- representation and individual differences. Typically, personality
dent self-aspects from their self-concepts. On the other hand, psychologists have been more concerned with documenting
those who continue to identify strongly with a stigmatizing meaningful individual differences than with considering how
self-aspect and retain it in their self-concept are more likely they are represented in memory, whereas other researchers
to suffer the consequences that accompany it, such as expe- studying the self have often exhibited little interest in individual
riencing greater stereotype threat (Schmader, 2002). Thus, differences. But despite the emphasis of the MSF on self-
the MSF provides an approach by which long-standing ideas concept organization, it anticipates that personality will be
such as identification and disidentification are captured in revealed in self-concept representation at two levels of the self.
terms of representation. Self-aspects. We would expect that meaningful individual
Indeed, the relation between self and group identification differences would be reflected in the self-aspects that people
may be quite fluid, and the MSF provides useful ways to possess. For example, people greater in self-monitoring
explain such variability. For example, Shih et al. (1999) con- (Snyder, 1974) are more likely to attend to situations that
ducted a study where Asian American women, who presum- determine which role self is required, and thus we would antici-
ably had self-aspects corresponding to their ethnicity and to pate that those greater in self-monitoring would report a greater
their gender, served as participants. In the study, either their number of role self-aspects. On the other hand, people with a
ethnic or gender self-aspect was primed through a writing task more independent self-construal (Singelis, 1994) should be
before completing a series of difficult mathematical problems. more likely to report having a “true self.” Relatedly, individuals
When their ethnicity was primed, the women did well on the who are greater in interdependence are more likely to empha-
problems (presumably, the activation of their ethnicity led to size interconnections with others, which may be reflected by
better performance because the stereotype that “Asians are having self-aspects that stress orientations toward others. For
good at math” became self-relevant and guided their behavior). instance, it has been shown that women are more likely than
On the other hand, when their gender was primed, the women men to have such an orientation (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997),
performed more poorly on the same problems, reflecting the especially for close dyadic relationships (Gabriel & Gardner,
effect of stereotype threat (i.e., activating a negative self- 1999). Thus, we would expect cultural and gender differences
relevant stereotype can impair performance on problems asso- in the proportion of relationship self-aspects.
ciated with a stereotype, such as “women are bad at math”; In line with this reasoning, preliminary work in our lab
Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Schmader & Johns, suggests that gender and culture may show such a correspon-
2003; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). As previously noted, dence. For example, we have found that women (relative to
work in our lab has shown that women facing stereotype threat men) and those who endorse relatively greater interdependent
in math are motivated to adopt positive identities (i.e., activate self-construals (Singelis, 1994) have a greater proportion of
their student self-aspect instead of their gender self-aspect) when relationship self-aspects. These findings suggest that meaning-
concurrently provided with multiple self-aspect categories, ful individual differences relate to the types of self-aspects

McConnell 17
one possesses. As such, the MSF establishes links between negative life events, an integrated self-concept will mitigate
social cognition and personality, affirming the importance of the consequences of unfortunate occurrences. These two out-
each and the mutual relation between self-concept structure comes (i.e., better experiences following positive events for a
and its content. compartmentalized self-concept and following negative events
Attributes. When considering one’s self-relevant attributes, for an integrative self-concept) have received considerable
the MSF provides additional insights for our understanding empirical support (e.g., Showers, 1992; Showers & Kling,
of personality. In the current framework, personality can be 1996; Showers, Zeigler-Hill, & Limke, 2006).
viewed as the attributes associated with one’s self-aspects. When considering the compartmentalization approach from
When activated, the set of attributes associated with a particular the perspective of the MSF, the MSF offers some distinct advan-
self-aspect should promote behavioral consistency within that tages while also capturing its attractive features. For example,
context (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Yet some attributes will its consideration of variability in self-aspect accessibility may
likely be influential across contexts because they are repre- very well provide the underlying mechanism involved in par-
sented in multiple self-aspects. Thus, the MSF anticipates that ticipants’ self-reports of the differential importance of self-
consistency will be exhibited by individuals within particular aspects reported by Showers and colleagues. Moreover, even
contexts both by the attributes associated with specific self- though taking into account the distribution of positive and
aspects and more globally by attributes associated with many negative attributes among self-aspects may add predictive util-
self-aspects. ity to understanding valence-related outcomes, we contend
Moreover, the MSF proposes that stable individual differ- that considering the distribution of specific attributes among
ences should be exhibited in a number of ways that transcend self-aspects brings greater precision. Consider the following
personality traits, such as in one’s physical appearance, social situation involving Rachel: She has an unpleasant breakup with
identities, affective responses, and behaviors. Without a doubt, her boyfriend, which would be a negative event for a self-aspect
traits play an important role in cross-situational stability (Costa exclusively composed of positive attributes. The MSF would
& McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1993), especially in independent anticipate the dissolution of her relationship would affect the
cultures (Cousins, 1989; J. G. Miller, 1984, 1986); however, attributes associated with this self-aspect, which could also
the MSF anticipates that many different types of self-relevant have implications for her views of herself as a daughter (40%
knowledge will promote consistency as well. For example, of its attributes are associated with her relationship-specific
one’s physical appearance, group memberships, and behaviors self-aspect). Thus, the focus on specific attributes and the self-
will encourage stability through processes such as symbolic aspects with which they are associated provides greater predic-
self-completion (e.g., Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), behav- tive precision than focusing only on the distribution of general
ioral confirmation (e.g., Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), valence in one’s self-aspects. In fact, we believe that findings
and stereotype threat (e.g., Steele, 1997). As a result, one’s own observed by Showers and colleagues might be even stronger
actions as well as others’ responses contribute to coherence for to the extent that one incorporates the greater specificity offered
the self in particular, and at times multiple, contexts. Further- by the MSF.
more, the MSF anticipates that such consistency will be realized Self-complexity. Because the genesis of the MSF began with
through a variety of means (e.g., trait expectations, behaviors, our previous work on self-complexity, it is appropriate to
physical appearance). consider what the MSF offers that is new to this literature.
Research on self-complexity (for reviews, McConnell &
Comparing the MSF to Other Strain, 2007; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002) focuses on the
Self-Concept Conceptualizations overall complexity of one’s self-concept to produce an indi-
Compartmentalization of the self. Work on compartmentaliza- vidual difference variable to predict outcomes ranging from
tion of the self (e.g., Showers, 1992; Showers & Zeigler-Hill, dealing with stress (e.g., Linville, 1987) to effective mental
2003) has examined whether one’s self-aspects are compart- regulation (e.g., Renaud & McConnell, 2002). In this work,
mentalized (i.e., predominantly associated with attributes of a lower self-complexity represents the degree to which one’s
uniform valence—i.e., mostly positive or mostly negative attri- self-concept is composed of few and relatively similar self-
butes) or integrated (i.e., a mixture of positive and negative aspects. For example, those lower in self-complexity report
attributes). In addition to considering the valence of the attri- stronger affective responses to life events, presumably because
butes within one’s self-aspects, this line of research also takes the feedback involves a larger proportion of their overall self-
into consideration the importance of one’s self-aspects. Overall, concept and because overlap among attributes allows the
it is argued that an interaction of compartmentalization and feedback to “spill over” to other self-aspects (Linville, 1985).
importance of one’s self-aspects predicts affective experiences. Although this spillover effect is predicted by the MSF (most
For example, in the face of positive life events, a compartmen- directly with Principle 3), the MSF offers additional insights.
talized self-concept will enhance positive experiences because First, self-complexity research focuses on identifying a single
presumably activated self-aspects will be primarily associated individual difference measure to capture the overall represen-
with positive qualities. On the other hand, when experiencing tational nature of the entire self-concept, whereas the MSF

makes “local” as well as global predictions. For example, the The MSF incorporates these features into its account of
MSF accounts not only for general affective experiences but self-concept representation. For example, exemplars (e.g.,
also for changes in evaluations of specific self-aspects (e.g., events, behaviors) are at the base of self-knowledge, and it is
Principle 4). In addition, its account for how self-relevant feed- proposed that over time the accumulation of exemplars results
back affects overall affect recognizes that accessibility varies in more abstract forms of self-knowledge. However, unlike the
across self-aspects and attributes based on recent and frequent mixed-model perspective, the MSF anticipates that abstracted
use, which adds a dynamic component to self-knowledge that information about the self extends beyond just traits. As previ-
affects behavior and affective experiences. In general, the pro- ously noted, we contend that attributes are composed of many
cesses assumed to underlie self-complexity are captured by types of self-knowledge, including behaviors, emotions, affec-
MSF principles, yet the MSF offers additional predictions not tive responses, social categories, and physical features as well
anticipated by self-complexity research while forwarding a (Carlston, 1994; Schleicher & McConnell, 2005). Furthermore,
more comprehensive account of self-concept representation traits should play a less central role for the self in interdepen-
(e.g., differential accessibility of self-aspects and attributes). dent cultures (J. G. Miller, 1984). Thus, the MSF is completely
More generally, the broader applicability of the MSF sug- compatible with the key features of mixed models of the self,
gests interesting new directions for self-complexity research. but it proposes that abstract self-knowledge comes in many
For instance, consider the aforementioned connections between forms other than personality traits.
the MSF and self-regulation. In situations where negative affect Cognitive-affective processing system theory. Finally, there has
serves a signaling function in goal attainment (e.g., regulatory been recent attention given to how the self might be represented
focus, cognitive dissonance), new connections between self- in a connectionist framework, especially by Mischel and col-
complexity and goal-directed behavior can be identified. leagues (e.g., Mischel & Morf, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 1995,
Indeed, recent work in our lab has shown that when one is 1998), who have proposed that the self is composed of a number
induced to experience hypocrisy (by acknowledging the impor- of cognition-affect units in a connectionist framework. Although
tance of good study habits right before recalling specific epi- connectionist models provide some distinct advantages such
sodes of poor study preparation), those lower in self-complexity as neural plausibility (e.g., McClelland, McNaughton, &
experience strong cognitive dissonance and are especially O’Reilly, 1995), it is unclear at this point how compelling the
motivated to change their attitudes about studying because the existent evidence is in support of this perspective on the self.
structure of their self-concept intensifies the experience of For example, the primary piece of supportive evidence provided
hypocrisy (McConnell & Brown, 2010). Yet this form of atti- is that people seem to exhibit “if . . . then . . .” situation–behavior
tude change was completely eliminated by providing people relations (e.g., Mendoza-Denton et al., 2001). Although such
with an opportunity to affirm an important personal quality. findings are compatible with a connectionist approach, they
Thus, this work shows that a classic phenomenon such as cog- do not mandate one and can be explained by many accounts
nitive dissonance is influenced by how the self-concept is (e.g., Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), including the
represented in memory. Other work in our lab inspired by the MSF (as previously explained). Furthermore, the choice to
MSF has identified additional ways to advance and broaden establish the basic unit of this model as mental-emotional
self-complexity research, such as identifying the conditions representations raises questions. What constitutes cognitive-
under which better social support and more desirable personal- affective representations? Are experiences without strong affect
ity characteristics promote better well-being (McConnell, disqualified from self-knowledge? Also, because knowledge
Strain, Brown, & Rydell, 2009) and determining when people in a connectionist model is derived from the pattern of activa-
are more likely to work harder following failure instead of tion across processing units, what is the value of proposing
sidestepping opportunities to practice and prepare for the future that processing units are cognitive-affective representations
(Brown & McConnell, 2009a). specifically? Admittedly, all new frameworks require time to
Mixed-model approaches to the self. One productive line of establish findings that demonstrate their advantages, but at
research has advocated a mixed-model account of self-concept present the MSF can account for situation–behavior relations
representation (e.g., Klein et al., 1992; Klein et al., 1996; by considering how the activation of self-aspects (i.e., situa-
Klein et al., 1999). This perspective proposes that initial self- tion) can produce a variety of outcomes that are even broader
knowledge is represented as behavioral episodes, but as one’s than those anticipated by this connectionist approach.
experiences in a behavioral domain increase, the primary unit
of self-knowledge becomes trait summaries (Kihlstrom &
Klein, 1994). This body of work has employed very clever Conclusion
priming methodologies to provide support for this position, The MSF provides an account of self-concept representation
and the findings parallel work in the person memory literature that emphasizes the importance of one’s multiple, context-
showing that it takes a number of behavioral episodes before dependent self-aspects in determining one’s experiences and
trait-based expectancies emerge in impression formation behavior. This framework generates five principles, supported
(Srull & Wyer, 1989). by recent data, which explain a number of phenomena such

McConnell 19
as how self-relevant feedback is experienced and how it influ- Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close rela-
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phenomena. In addition to these new insights, the MSF helps The additive nature of chronic and temporary sources of construct
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Acknowledgments Bavelas, J. B., Black, A., Lemery, C. R., & Mullett, J. (1986).
The author thanks Christina Brown, John Cacioppo, Shinobu Kitayama, “I show how you feel”: Motor mimicry as a communicative act.
Robert Rydell, Tonya Shoda, Rick Shweder, Eliot Smith, and Penny Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 322-329.
Visser for their comments on this article. Beilock, S. L., Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C., & Starkes, J. L. (2002).
When paying attention becomes counterproductive: Impact of
Declaration of Conflicting Interests divided versus skill-focused attention on novice and experienced
The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the performance of sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental
authorship and/or publication of this article. Psychology: Applied, 8, 6-16.
Beilock, S. L., & Holt, L. E. (2007). Embodied preference judg-
Financial Disclosure/Funding ments: Can likeability be driven by the motor system? Psycho-
The author(s) received the following financial support for the research logical Science, 18, 51-57.
and/or authorship of this article: This work supported by National Beilock, S. L., Jellison, W. A., Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R.,
Institute of Mental Health Grant MH068279, National Science Foun- & Carr, T. H. (2006). On the causal mechanisms of stereotype
dation Grant BCS 0601148, and the Lewis Endowed Professorship. threat: Can skills that don’t rely heavily on working memory still
be threatened? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32,
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Pers Soc Psychol Rev OnlineFirst, published on June 10, 2010 as doi:10.

Personality and Social Psychology Review

The Multiple Self-Aspects XX(X) 1­–25

Representation and Its Implications DOI: 10.1177/1088868310371101

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Situations When in a crowded situation, meeting new people 18

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