Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (Ahjag)

A policy tool of proven value is at hand.
Called the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG),

it was designed to facilitate coordination between the Philippines government and the MILF to
share intelligence on terrorists and avoid accidental clashes while government forces pursued
them. Allowed to lapse in June 2007, it was formally renewed in November but not fully
revived. It should be, as a counter-terror and conflict management mechanism that worked,
and a similar arrangement should be developed with the MNLF. The problem is that it will only
work if there is progress on the political front – that is, in peace negotiations – so that
insurgents see concrete benefits from their cooperation with the government.
As part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, U.S. forces are strengthening the

Philippines military and using civic action to drive a wedge between rebels and the Muslim
populace. But if their goal is to defeat the ASG and its foreign, mainly Indonesian, jihadi allies,
they are casting the net too widely and creating unnecessary enemies.
Mass-based insurgencies like the MILF and MNLF rely on supportive populations. By
extension, small numbers of terrorists rely on sympathetic insurgents. Counter-terrorism’s
central task in a setting like that in the Philippines is to isolate jihadis from their insurgent hosts
– not divide insurgents from the population. Recent gains against the ASG came only after the
MILF expelled key jihadis from mainland Mindanao in 2005. Yet AHJAG, the mechanism that
made this possible, is not getting the attention it deserves.
AHJAG was crafted as part of an ongoing government-MILF peace process. For more
than two years, it prevented conflict escalation as the search for terrorists intensified in MILF
strongholds in western Mindanao and led to a few cases of the MILF’s disciplining extremists in
its own ranks. It helped force the ASG’s core group, including Kadaffy Janjalani and Abu
Solaiman, to Sulu, where they were killed.
This has come at a heavy price in Sulu, where no equivalent ceasefire machinery exists
to separate jihadis from the dominant local guerrilla force, the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF). Instead, heavy-handed offensives against ASG and its foreign jihadi allies have
repeatedly spilled over into MNLF communities, driving some insurgents into closer
cooperation with the terrorists, instead of with government.
Ceasefire mechanisms like AHJAG depend on substantive progress toward a

comprehensive peace pact, but negotiations with the MILF remain deadlocked. While the
Arroyo administration is distracted by turmoil in Manila, and Washington focuses on economic
and military approaches to an essentially political problem in the Philippines south, AHJAG has
been allowed to wither. As an innovative means of depriving transnational extremists of refuge
and regeneration while building confidence with insurgents and strengthening moderates
among them, this mechanism needs to be strengthened and expanded.
RECOMMENDATIONS To the Philippines Government:
1. Facilitate insurgent cooperation against terrorists by addressing substantive political

grievances, including by committing immediately to:
a) resume exploratory talks with the MILF on the basis of the right to self-determination
of the Bangsamoro people, with the goal of a formal agreement on ancestral domain by
June 2008 and formal talks on a final agreement to start by July; and
b) resume Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) tripartite talks to review

implementation of the 1996 Jakarta peace agreement with the MNLF, without further
delay, and with Nur Misuari’s participation, as sought by the MNLF.
2. Initiate discussion with both MILF and MNLF on reestablishing counter-terrorist cooperation
along the following lines:
a) appoint senior, full-time AHJAG chairs and staff, ensure full and prompt funding and
create teams for Basilan and Sulu;
b) encourage the MILF, as a step toward the demobilisation and reintegration of its
members in the event a peace agreement is signed, to clarify its membership, in the first
instance by providing a list of expelled members to prevent post-facto alibis;
c) formalise government-MNLF ceasefire mechanisms, map MNLF camps and

communities in Sulu and upgrade the gentlemen’s agreement that facilitated Oplan
Ultimatum’s early success to formal ceasefire and intelligence-sharing mechanisms; and
d) guarantee in return through a restored international Joint Monitoring Committee that

clearly demarcated MNLF camps and communities will not be attacked.
To the U.S. Government:
3. Review official military doctrine with emphasis on clarifying the distinction between
insurgents and terrorists, and in the specific Philippines case encourage insurgent cooperation
against terrorists by supporting AHJAG and similar mechanisms.
4. Use all the resources at its disposal to encourage the Philippines government and the MILF
to finalise a formal peace agreement.

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A policy tool of proven value is at hand.

Called the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG),

As part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, U.S. forces are strengthening the

Ceasefire mechanisms like AHJAG depend on substantive progress toward a

1. Facilitate insurgent cooperation against terrorists by addressing substantive political

b) resume Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) tripartite talks to review

c) formalise government-MNLF ceasefire mechanisms, map MNLF camps and

d) guarantee in return through a restored international Joint Monitoring Committee that

To the U.S. Government:

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