E O C A O S T R 5. in The Considered Opinion of This Court, Petition Deserves To

1.
EXECUTIVE ORDER CANNOT AMEND OR SUPPLANT THE RULE
 PIYUSH 5. In the considered opinion of this court, petition deserves to

VERMA succeed on point No.3 putforth by Shri M.S.Bhatti. This is trite law
V. STATE that by issuing executive instructions, statutory rules cannot be
OF supplanted although same can be supplemented. Putting it
MADHYA differently, if the statutory rules recognize and approve that the
PRADESH, Executive Engineer is the competent authority for grant of earned
2018 SCC leave, the said power cannot be taken away by issuing the executive
ONLINE instructions. Since, earned leave in the present case is granted by the
MP 116, competent authority as per the schedule of the said rules, on
executive fiat, the said power or benefit cannot be taken away.
Resultantly, the impugned order dated 03.08.2016 cannot sustain
judicial scrutiny. The said order is set aside. Petition is allowed.
 PRIYANKA 13. It is settled proposition of law that executive instructions cannot

GAUTAM overrule or override the statutory Rules. Therefore, in case there is a
V. STATE conflict between the executive instructions and the rules made
OF HP under Article 309, the rules made under Article 309 will prevail and
CWP NO. in case there is conflict between the rules framed under Article 309
354 OF and the law made by the legislature will prevail. It is further trite that
2014 administrative instructions or orders can only be issued in matters of
which the Rules made under Article 309 are silent, therefore,
administrative instructions can only supplant the Rules but cannot
supplement the same. Even a policy decision taken by the
Government cannot have the force of rule made under Article 309 of
the Constitution of India. Needless to state that Article 162 whereby
the Government is competent to issue administrative
instructions/orders and Article 309 operate in different area. In
exercising the powers under Article 162, the Government cannot
ignore the Rules framed under Article 309. Thus, any appointment or
regularisation of an appointment made in contravention of the rules
made under Article 309 shall be void. It is equally settled law that the
rules framed under Article 309 cannot be amended or modified by
an administrative order or instruction even by way of adding to the
provisions of the statutory rule, unless there is a gap in the rule
which required to be fill up. Therefore, what essentially follows is
that the Government cannot amend or supersede the statutory
Rules by administrative instructions and it is only when the Rules are
silent on any particular point can the Government fill up the gaps
and supplant the Rules or the law by issuing instructions that too not
inconsistent with the Rules. Thus, an administrative instruction
cannot abridge or run counter to statutory provision or Rule.
 GULBIR
SHASTRI V.
STATE OF
PUNJAB
CWP NO.
12788 OF
1994
ISSUE 2 & 3
Union Of India & Anr. vs D.P. Singh & Ors.
13. We would first take up the legal issue pertaining to the amendment of the Bye-Laws.
It is always open to an employer to adopt a new policy to fix, change or alter the
conditions of service of the employees. An employer would be acting within his right in
doing so. Conditions of service, for this purpose, would include promotion and seniority.
An employee cannot claim a vested right or static applicability of the conditions of
service which were in existence when he had joined the service. The power to amend or
change the conditions of service is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the
amendment or change cannot offend Articles 14 and 16 and the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, or be arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise objectionable
on account of being contrary to any applicable statute. In the present case, the
respondents have not questioned the amendment of the bye-laws or contended that the
same are arbitrary or invalid. The impugned judgment also does not record any finding to
this effect. The contention of the respondents, which has been accepted by the impugned
judgment, is that the appellant No.2 Council could not have changed the rules or
conditions of service to the perceived detriment of the respondents after they had joined
and were appointed in the service of the appellant No.2 Council. This precept which is a
foundation of the impugned judgment is unacceptable and contrary to law. The new bye-
laws have to be assessed and analysed on merits, and not on the basis of the old rule
position.
14. We now turn to the first issue. An amendment to the service conditions normally
operates prospectively, unless it is made retrospective by express provision or necessary
intendment. Retrospectivity is not to be inferred by way of surmises and conjectures.
Retrospective amendment taking away the benefits already acquired under the old service
conditions can be challenged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as being
arbitrary and unconstitutional. Lastly, an employee cannot claim a vested right to
promotion. He has a right to be considered for promotion. When a chance of promotion is
affected, it does not mean denial of consideration, for the employee is considered for
promotion under the new rules. Mere chance of promotion is not a condition of service.
23. In High Court of Delhi and Anr. Vs. A.K. Mahajan and Ors. (2009) 12 SCC 62, the
Supreme Court had decided the contention whether the right to promotion which had
already been crystallized could be taken away by retrospective amendment by way of a
notification. Reference was made to the following paragraph of the decision in Railway
Board Vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 to elucidate:-
"19. The High Court has mainly relied on Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah[(1997)
6 SCC 623 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1527] and more particularly, para 24 thereof. Shri Misra,
learned counsel for the respondents also very heavily relied onRangadhamaiah case
[(1997) 6 SCC 623 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1527] . The said para 24 is as follows:
(Rangadhamaiah case [(1997) 6 SCC 623 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1527] , SCC p. 638) "24. In
many of these decisions the expressions „vested rights‟ or „accrued rights‟ have been
used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective
operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive
appointment, etc. of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of
a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an
anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that
time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has
the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing
rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in
consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of
India, AIR 1967 SC 1889] , B.S. Vadera[B.S. Vadera v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC
118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni,
(1983) 2 SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 231] ."
The learned counsel pointed out as held by the High Court that any provision with
retrospective operation, having an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority,
substantive appointment, etc. of the employees would be bad in law and would be in
breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The High Court also proceeded
to hold that since one of the writ petitioners, who were invited for the interview in the
year 1994 was not invited in the year 1995, the vested right of the writ petitioner had been
adversely affected by the retrospective operation of the Rules."
Interpreting the said paragraph, it was held that when there is an amendment having
retrospective effect, it has to be given effect to. However, such amendment can be struck
down if discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution, when they have the effect of taking away the benefit already
available. It was clarified that the right of an employee to be merely considered is not a
benefit as it may or may not result in selection or promotion. If a mere chance of
promotion is affected by the amendment, it is inconsequential. It was observed:-
"22. This Court has time and again held that since promotion is not a right of the
employee, a mere chance of promotion if affected cannot and does not invalidate the
action on the part of the employer. That right of consideration may accrue at a particular
point of time or subsequently thereto. Merely because at a particular point of time the
employee is not considered, does not mean the total denial of the consideration of the
employee."
On the question of arbitrariness, noticing the fact that the employees were promoted, it
was held:-
"23. In the present case, it is not as if Writ Petitioner 8 concerned was altogether denied
the benefit of consideration for ever. He was undoubtedly considered later on and was
promoted also. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the amendment had the effect of
denying him the benefit of consideration, which was available to him. He did continue
with that benefit and was actually benefited under the same. This is apart from the fact
that the concept of consideration is an uncertain concept. One can understand a pension
amount which is already decided or the promotion which is already granted or the
seniority which is already conferred upon or the substantive appointment which is already
made. If the amendment has the effect of denying this crystallised promotion, seniority or
substantive appointment, then certainly the amendment could be held as arbitrary. But
that has not happened in the present case. Here, no promotion was already granted or
seniority already fixed, or any substantive appointment already made which were affected
by the retrospective amendment. The observations in abovequoted para 24 of
Rangadhamaiah case [(1997) 6 SCC 623 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1527] have to be understood
in that sense."

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1.

EXECUTIVE ORDER CANNOT AMEND OR SUPPLANT THE RULE

 PIYUSH 5. In the considered opinion of this court, petition deserves to

 PRIYANKA 13. It is settled proposition of law that executive instructions cannot

Union Of India & Anr. vs D.P. Singh & Ors.

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