Nations in Transit: The Antidemocratic Turn

NATIONS IN
TRANSIT 2021
The Antidemocratic Turn
NATIONS IN
TRANSIT 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Nations in Transit 2021: The Antidemocratic Turn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Instability and Repression in Russia.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Managing Expectations about Breakthrough Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Standing In and Standing Up. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Nations in Transit 2021 Map.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Media Matters.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Hope and Pushback: How Citizens and Political Leaders
Can Band Together to Counter Repression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Recommendations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Nations in Transit 2021: Scores.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Nations in Transit 2021: Overview of Score Changes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Nations in Transit 2021: Category and Democracy Score Summary. . . . . . . . . . 26
Nations in Transit 2021: Democracy Score History by Region.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
This booklet was made possible through the generous support of the
US Agency for International Development and the Lilly Endowment.
Freedom House is solely responsible for the report’s content.
RESEARCH AND EDITORIAL TEAM

Elisha Aaron, David Meijer, Shannon O'Toole, and Tyler Roylance ON THE COVER
provided editorial assistance for the report. People in Budapest protest for the
independence of Hungary's University
This booklet is a summary of findings for the 2021 edition of Nations of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE)
following changes that threaten the
in Transit. The complete analysis, including detailed reports on all university's autonomy. Image credit:
countries, can be found on our website at www.freedomhouse.org. Marton Monus/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
NATIONS IN
TRANSIT 2021
The Antidemocratic Turn

By Zselyke Csaky
Attacks on democratic institutions are spreading faster than ever

in Europe and Eurasia, and coalescing into a challenge to democracy itself.
Incumbent leaders and ruling parties are corrupting and continued with Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” a
governance and spreading antidemocratic practices across decade later, has expanded, and forms of governance that
the region that stretches from Central Europe to Central are decidedly not democratic are taking root. Antidemocratic
Asia. These actions are opportunistic, but are often cloaked politicians are also sharing practices and learning from one
in an ideological agenda. And as they become increasingly another, accelerating the turn toward alternatives.
common, they are fueling a deterioration in conditions that
will have global implications for the cause of human freedom. Countries all over the region are turning away from democracy
or find themselves trapped in cycle of setbacks and partial
Democracy has never been the only game in town, but for recoveries. In the 2021 edition of Nations in Transit, covering
more than two decades after the transitions that ended the the events of 2020, a total of 18 countries suffered declines
Cold War, leaders and politicians continued to pay lip service in their democracy scores; only 6 countries’ scores improved,
to the democratic model. Over the past decade, however, amid while 5 countries experienced no net change. This marked
the erosion of the liberal democratic order and the rise of the 17th consecutive year of overall decline in Nations in
authoritarian powers, the idea of democracy as an aspirational Transit, leaving the number of countries that are designated as
end point has started to lose currency in many capitals. Existing democracies at its lowest point in the history of the report.
institutions’ failure to address pressing societal concerns,
increasing polarization, and growing inequality have fueled
uncertainty and anger, and major democracies’ mismanagement Nations in Transit Methodology
of the COVID-19 pandemic has provided additional fodder to
those interested in exploiting disillusionment with the traditional Nations in Transit evaluates elected state institutions
champions of democratic governance. (local and national governments), unelected state
institutions (the judiciary and anticorruption
In this period of change and discontent, antidemocratic leaders authorities), and unelected nonstate institutions
in the region have started to redefine norms and renegotiate the (civil society and the media), all of which are
boundaries of acceptable behavior. A contestation that began necessary for a healthy, well-functioning democracy.
with Vladimir Putin’s “sovereign democracy” in the mid-2000s,
FreedomHouse.org 1
NATIONS IN
TRANSIT 2021 The Antidemocratic Turn
Antidemocratic norm-setting in contributed to the SNS’s sweeping election victory and the
Central Europe formation of a nonrepresentative parliament in 2020. In
Slovenia, Prime Minister Janez Janša—who had benefitted
Two countries, Poland and Hungary, stand out for their
from Hungarian investment in the Slovenian media industry—
unparalleled democratic deterioration over the past decade.
has elevated verbal attacks on journalists to a new level. But
Hungary has undergone the biggest decline ever measured
this antidemocratic learning process is most visible in Poland,
in Nations in Transit, plummeting through two categorical
where last year the government used a state-owned energy
boundaries to become a Transitional/Hybrid Regime last year.
giant to acquire four-fifths of the country’s regional media
Poland is still categorized as a Semiconsolidated Democracy,
outlets and announced plans to impose an advertising tax,
but its decline over the past five years has been steeper than
which would strip an already ailing private media sector of
that of Hungary.
vital resources. Both of these steps were essentially torn from
The ruling parties in Budapest and Warsaw have long been the playbook of Fidesz, Hungary’s ruling party.
emulating each other in cracking down on judicial autonomy,
independent media, the civic sector, and vulnerable minority Transfers of antidemocratic norms have also taken place on
populations. Recently, however, they have moved from issues such as the rights of LGBT+ people and abortion. In
attacking the liberal principles that underpin democracy these cases, Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has
to setting new norms themselves and openly spreading led the way, deploying hateful rhetoric and mobilizing its
antidemocratic practices. base around the fight against what it calls “LGBT and gender
ideology.” In the wake of PiS’s successes, including the 2020
Hungary’s model of media capture, for example, has been reelection of President Andrzej Duda after a homophobic
openly embraced by likeminded governments in the region. campaign, Hungary’s government similarly elevated attacks on
In Serbia, President Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian the LGBT+ community to the top of its political agenda, ending
Progressive Party (SNS) have overseen the mainstreaming the legal recognition of transgender people and amending the
of smear campaigns and progovernment propaganda, which constitution to ban adoption by same-sex couples.
THE DOWNTURN DEEPENS

The Downturn Deepens
The majority of countries in the Nations in Transit region—including all but one democracy—are worse off than they were
Theas
four years ago, majority of countries
measured in the
by the net Nations
change in Transit
in their region—including
Democracy Scores. all but one democracy—are worse off
than they were four years ago, as measured by the net change in their Democracy Scores.
.5
.36
.25 Change in Democracy Score (2017-2021) .25

.21
.11
0 .04
-.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 0 0
-.07
-.11 -.11 -.11 -.11
-.14 -.14 -.14
-.18
-.21 -.21
-.25 Average
-.25 -.29 -.29 Change in
Democracy
Score
(-.11)
-.5
Hungary and Poland

have experienced the
-.75 steepest declines ever
-.75 recorded in Nations in
-.86 Transit.
-1
This infographic is from the Nations in Transit 2021 report by freedomhouse.org
2 @ FreedomHouse #NationsInTransit
Freedom House
The goal of the ruling parties in Hungary and Poland is to after months of mass arrests, beatings, torture, and the
legitimize their antidemocratic practices. This is why, after incarceration of scores of political prisoners, the vision of a
politically subjugating their respective court systems, Fidesz more democratic Belarus now seems increasingly distant.
and PiS have started to promote their judicial “innovations”
in newly founded law journals. And while their planned “rule Kyrgyzstan, the only country in Central Asia that was
of law institute” has yet to get off the ground, they have reasonably close to emerging from the category of
clearly staked out a position beyond the pale of Europe’s Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes, experienced a violent
legal norms, challenging the European Union’s rule-of-law and extralegal power grab in 2020 by a political outcast and
enforcement mechanism as “political” and arguing that there former prison inmate with links to organized crime. The
is no commonly agreed definition of the rule of law. confirmation of Sadyr Japarov’s rise to the presidency in
January 2021, even if he is supported by a significant portion
of the population, signals a return to strongman rule, and
Deepening autocracy in Eurasia upcoming changes to the constitution are likely to further
The entrenchment and expansion of antidemocratic norms fortify his dominant position.
and ideas is not a new phenomenon for the broader region.
Such practices and innovations have long been shared between Perhaps the only bright spot in Eurasia was civil society’s
Russia and its neighborhood. Over the past decade, there incredible resilience in the face of democratic deterioration
has been a proliferation of “foreign agents” laws to crack and the coronavirus pandemic. Organized civic groups, ad
down on civil society, the use of legislation on extremism hoc grassroots initiatives, and conscientious citizens joined
and counterterrorism to silence political opponents, and the forces to fill the void left by the state in 2020. This exposed
creation of puppet organizations that legitimize authoritarian the massive governance failures of autocratic regimes while
governments and affirm their sovereignty. providing the population with much-needed help and hope in
a time of crisis.
But in Russia and the rest of the Nations in Transit region’s
eastern half, this pattern has taken a noticeable turn toward
deepening autocratization. Reform movements losing steam
Nations in Transit is a catalogue of reform efforts; its
For the first time in the report’s history, Russia’s score on methodology is rooted in the assumption that transition
the National Democratic Governance indicator bottomed away from a nondemocratic system and toward something
out, reflecting President Putin’s absolute control after the more democratic is both possible and desirable. Yet 2020
fraudulent 2020 constitutional referendum and his vicious was not a good year for reform, and in many countries
efforts to silence dissenting voices. The attempted murder where there had been hope for change, much of the
of Aleksey Navalny in 2020 and his imprisonment in a momentum seems to have drained away.
notorious penal colony this year was just the most prominent
demonstration of the regime’s cruelty. The suppression In Armenia, the war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
of protests with unprecedented severity, the extension of has triggered a domestic crisis that risks undoing the
the foreign agents law to practically any citizen involved in success of the 2018 Velvet Revolution. The country’s
political activities, and plans to tighten state control over the democracy score declined for the first time since the
internet all suggest that the Kremlin is fearful of its critics and revolution, and developments to date this year, including
determined to secure a choreographed victory in the fall 2021 tensions between the military and Prime Minister Nikol
elections by any means necessary. Pashinyan, demonstrate that the situation could grow
worse. In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s reform
Similarly, in Belarus, the brutal crackdown on protests efforts met with strong resistance from the judiciary as
that followed the fraudulent 2020 presidential election entrenched interests fought to preserve the status quo. The
represented a significant escalation for Alyaksandr opportunity to uproot Ukraine’s corrupt, oligarchic system
Lukashenka’s regime. After years of repression punctuated by is closing, and steps in early 2021, such as the controversial
periods of diplomatic thaw, Lukashenka faced a groundswell shutdown of oligarch-owned television networks,
of opposition as protesters from all walks of life united behind underscore the difficulty of upholding democratic principles
the prodemocracy candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Yet while confronting a stubbornly undemocratic establishment.
FreedomHouse.org 3
NATIONS IN
THE EXPANSION OF THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE

The Expansion of the Antidemocratic Alternative
Incumbents and ruling parties in Central and Southeastern Europe are corrupting governance and spreading
antidemocratic practices. Incumbents and ruling parties in Central and Southeastern Europe are
corrupting governance and spreading antidemocratic practices.
POLAND HUNGARY
Poland’s ruling party has deployed Hungary’s model of media capture has
hateful rhetoric, mobilizing its base been openly embraced by likeminded
around the fight against what it calls governments in the region.
“LGBT and gender ideology.”
SERBIA
SLOVENIA President Aleksandar Vučić has
Prime Minister Janez Janša has overseen the mainstreaming of smear
raised verbal attacks on journalists campaigns and progovernment
to a new level. propaganda.
Physical, verbal, and/or legal Efforts to erode judicial and Attacks on the rights
harassment of independent media. prosecutorial independence. of LGBT+ people.
In Moldova, the election of Maia Sandu as president in late countries. While important transfers of power took place
2020 raised hopes for change, but her attempts to overcome in Montenegro in 2020 and Kosovo in 2021, it is still unclear
hostility in the parliament in 2021 have led to protracted whether they will lead to an improvement in democratic
political and interinstitutional struggle, which could further institutions. And without such institutional transformation,
weaken democratic safeguards. In Georgia, the opposition’s any political opening is extremely difficult to sustain.
boycott of 2020 parliamentary elections and the February 2021
arrest of opposition leader Nika Melia clearly demonstrated
the end of the country’s recent reform attempts. Georgia’s Democracies must take the field
democracy score is now close to where it was a decade ago, The turn away from democracy and toward antidemocratic
before the current ruling party rode to power on a wave of
alternatives in the region will have global implications. The
public frustration with the increasingly autocratic incumbents.
leaders and parties in question are openly demonstrating
their rejection of democratic norms, which often comes hand
By contrast, in North Macedonia and Uzbekistan, piecemeal
in hand with the adoption and promotion of “authoritarian
efforts have yielded some positive change on the ground,
counter-norms.”
resulting in improvements in the countries’ scores. The reforms
in Uzbekistan—including in the agricultural and judicial sectors—
That such steps are taken by elected leaders claiming to act in
are improving citizens’ lives, though they are clearly not aimed
the national interest—or according to an ideological agenda—
at cultivating democracy or allowing genuine political pluralism.
In North Macedonia, meanwhile, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s can sometimes obscure the underlying reality: the ultimate
center-left government has repaired some of the institutional goal of these practices, from institutional capture to the
damage wrought by his right-wing populist predecessor, and still scapegoating of vulnerable groups, is to keep ruling parties and
has a chance to deliver the benefits of democracy. elites in power indefinitely. If antidemocratic norms are allowed
to spread, they will legitimize a broad range of abuses and make
A success story is especially needed in the Balkans, life more difficult for millions of people, not just in autocracies
where democratic gains have been rolled back in most but also in the gray zone between democracy and dictatorship.
Freedom House
The challenge faced by democracy’s defenders is significant, keeping the door open to progress and buttressing the
but not insurmountable. As antidemocratic leaders grow institutions that facilitate change, primarily the electoral
more ambitious and strategic, it is time for democrats to go framework and the media. And in authoritarian regimes that
beyond simply recognizing the threat. Rather than watching are ramping up oppression, democracy advocates will need to
with concern on the sidelines, they need to take the field. enhance monitoring and assist victims of persecution, while
preparing to respond to any future opportunity for change.
Best practices and lessons learned should be shared among
democracies, just as autocrats have been exchanging their Ultimately, however, democracies must deliver the benefits
ideas. Democratic states also need to coordinate their foreign of free self-government to their people. Citizens will have
policies with a focus on core principles, not just security to be presented with tangible results to restore trust in the
concerns or geopolitical competition. In ailing democracies system and build support for the shared mission of defending
and hybrid regimes, attention should be concentrated on democratic ideals in an increasingly hostile world.
INSTABILITY AND REPRESSION IN RUSSIA

By Mike Smeltzer
For the first time in the history of Nations of Transit, Russia’s However, the tolerance ordinary Russians have shown
National Democratic Governance score has dropped to its towards their government’s antidemocratic drift has lately
lowest possible position. The events of 2020, including a eroded. Recent standard-of-living improvements have
fraudulent constitutional referendum enabling President not kept pace with the dramatic rise of the early 2000s.
Vladimir Putin’s continued rule past 2024 and the attempted GDP-per-capita growth has stalled, real disposable incomes
assassination of opposition leader Aleksey Navalny, depict have fallen, and everyday necessities like food have become
a political environment that lacks any trace of democratic more expensive. The reasons for this vary from the impact of
character. A recent deluge of repressive acts by the Kremlin, COVID-19 to the West’s sanctions, instituted after the illegal
such as Navalny’s unjust imprisonment, the brutal crackdown annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Donbas in
on subsequent nationwide protests, and the March 2021 arrests Ukraine. As Russians face deteriorating economic conditions,
of opposition figures in Moscow, demonstrate how deeply elite corruption—highlighted by crusaders like Navalny—has
threatened Putin feels by domestic developments. Recognizing increasingly become a point of social irritation.
that its relationship with the public has weakened, the Kremlin
has chosen to drop its facade of “managed democracy” and is Through his investigations into high-level corruption and his
rapidly moving to a strategy of wholesale repression. campaign’s crafty use of social media, Navalny has turned
away from the traditional opposition narrative about the
Kremlin’s antidemocratic stance and human rights abuses.
Society’s changing calculus Rather, Navalny, ever the opportunistic politician, has sought
Russia’s deepening autocratization has been incremental but to lay bare the vast extent of Putin-era corruption, and make
steady. Putin came to power in a period characterized by explicit the connection between individuals’ deteriorating
the preceding Yeltsin administration’s dramatic failures: war, quality of life and the state’s support of the wealthy elite.
instability, and oligarchy had marred its reputation. While the
repressive nature of the Putin regime was evident in its early
years—the Yukos trial, the elimination of direct gubernatorial The Kremlin’s shifting response
elections, the closure of independent media outlets, and the As more and more Russians connect the dots between their
harassment of journalists, along with the notable murder of Anna daily grievances and the Kremlin’s corruption, Putin will
Politkovskaya—social, political, and economic matters stabilized likely consider any dissent to be an existential threat to his
under his leadership. Even as Putin established a kleptocratic continued rule. And so, the Kremlin has shown a marked
system of patronage that captured and perverted Russia’s change in its response to expressions of dissatisfaction as it
democratic institutions, society’s willingness to protest declined. grapples with the shift in the public mood.
FreedomHouse.org 5
NATIONS IN
HITTING ROCK BOTTOM

Six of the eight Consolidated Authoritarian RegimesHitting
in theRock Bottom
Nations in Transit regionnow have the lowest possible
National Democratic Governance (NDG)
Six of the eight ratings. Authoritarian Regimes in the Nations in Transit region
Consolidated
now have the lowest possible National Democratic Governance (NDG) ratings.
Change in NDG Score (2012-2021)
AZERBAIJAN BELARUS KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN RUSSIA TAJIKISTAN TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN

7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00 3.03
Average NDG
3.00 score in Nations
in Transit 2021
2.00
1.75
1.75
1.50 1.50
1.50
1.25 1.25
1.25
1.25
No change
No change No change
1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
There has, until recently, remained a sliver of space for However, in an environment marked by increasing popular
alternative voices in Russia, where protests are more discontent—often directed at Putin himself—the regime has
common than is widely recognized. The Kremlin previously more recently favored a strategy of wholesale repression to
eschewed a pervasive campaign of repression, instead maintain its grip. Civil society, independent media, and the
choosing when and where to apply the full force of the state political opposition have all felt the shift in the repressive
in response to protests. For example, mass protests against nature of the state in 2021.
pension reform in 2018 were not met with brutal repression
by the police or security services, but with a partial policy The authorities’ response to the early 2021 protests
rollback. In 2020, protesters in the northwestern region of was uniquely repressive in the contemporary Russian
Arkhangelsk who opposed an unwanted landfill project— context. More than 12,000 Russians were detained, in what
and initially faced a forceful police response—won a rare independent media outlet Proekt described as a staggering
victory against the elite, and even saw their prolandfill intensification in judicial punishment against protesters.
governor resign. Of course, ample evidence abounds of That figure represents a six-fold increase in the number of
violent repression against concurrently held protests. administrative arrests over protests held in 2017 and 2019.
Using this tactic of selective repression, the Kremlin has used At the same time, the state continues to shrink the space
the law as a cudgel to wield against those who criticize Putin for dissenting voices, constraining the ability of dissatisfied
and his continued rule. Rather than simply outlawing dissent Russians to learn or speak about events via independent
or opposition, the Kremlin perverted freedom of the press, media outlets, the online environment, or civil society.
electoral processes, and the rule of law to serve its own Russia’s foreign agent law, which was adopted in 2014 and has
authoritarian ends. Through this incremental strategy, the impacted the ability of civil society groups to operate, has
Kremlin rhetorically remains a “managed democracy” as far as been expanded to apply to independent media outlets and
domestic audiences are concerned. even individuals.
Freedom House
Police forcefully detain

a protester in Moscow,
Russia in January
2021. Image credit:
Ruslan Kroshkin/
Shutterstock.com
The Kremlin and its allies have also worked to keep the While his dominant United Russia party is guaranteed to
political opposition at bay. Aleksey Navalny’s poisoning win a majority in the lower house, what with the regime’s
and subsequent arrest are, of course, the most extreme top-down control of elections, the Kremlin may nevertheless
examples of the complete silencing of Putin’s most serious see some cracks in Putin’s support among the population.
political opponents. But the Kremlin has also attempted to Rather than a conciliatory state response to their legitimate
exert more explicit control on the electoral environment grievances, Russians have witnessed a transition to fully
by circumventing judicial oversight of campaigning consolidated authoritarian rule, defined by the attempted
complaints, mobilizing supporters against Navalny’s “smart murder of political opponents and the silencing of any
voting strategy,” and, as mentioned above, arresting dissent. So long as Putin prioritizes the stability of his corrupt
opposition figures. system of patronage over the public’s concerns, he will face
an increasingly disaffected population that bristles at the
quotidian inequalities of life in a kleptocratic state. And yet,
Stability through repression as Russia’s civil society score has demonstrated in recent
Unlike in 2016, President Putin finds himself in a precarious years, those who oppose this state of affairs will continue to
position ahead of this September’s parliamentary elections. mobilize and fight back, no matter the repression they face.
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS ABOUT BREAKTHROUGH ELECTIONS

By Noah Buyon
During the present “recession” in democracy around the countries—such as Kosovo, Moldova, or Ukraine—have
world, most democratic systems have not transformed been mired in the gray zone for years, but others—notably
neatly into authoritarian regimes. Rather, as recent editions Hungary, Montenegro, and Serbia—have only recently been
of Nations in Transit demonstrate, declining democracies reclassified as hybrid regimes, and still more are hurtling
are entering what Thomas Carothers called the “gray toward reclassification.
zone” of hybridity. In the Nations in Transit region, some
FreedomHouse.org 7
NATIONS IN
How can these countries exit the gray zone, or avoid it outraged voters and driven them to support anticorruption
entirely? A defining feature of hybrid regimes is that their crusaders, including Slovakia’s victorious OĽaNO party,
leaders continue to allow somewhat competitive elections. which ran on the slogan “Together against the mafia,” or
The contests are not necessarily free or fair, but neither are Moldova’s newly elected president, Maia Sandu, whose
they complete shams, as is the case in authoritarian regimes. slogan declared, “It’s time for good people.”
Consequently, hybrid regimes can be drawn back toward
democracy through the ballot box if enough voters are willing Second, citizens are casting ballots in large enough
to support new leadership. However, “while an opposition numbers to thwart incumbents’ efforts at intimidation and
victory is not impossible” in the gray zone, as Larry Diamond manipulation. In Kosovo, turnout was up 3.4 percentage
has cautioned, “it requires a level of opposition mobilization, points in 2019 and 7.7 in 2021, relative to the parliamentary
unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be elections in 2017. Turnout soared past 60 percent in Slovakia
required for victory in a democracy.” for the first time since 2002. Records were shattered in
Montenegro, where nearly 77 percent of registered voters
To varying degrees, these traits could be seen in recent participated in last year’s elections, and among the diaspora
elections in Kosovo (2019 and 2021), Montenegro (2020), and in Moldova, which accounted for 15 percent of the votes cast
Moldova (2020), along with the municipalities of Banja Luka in the first round of the 2020 presidential poll. These figures
and Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020). In all of these are especially striking in light of COVID-19, which contributed
hybrid regimes, the political opposition overcame the odds to to historically low voter participation in nearby Croatia,
unseat entrenched incumbents. Similarly, the 2020 national North Macedonia, and Romania. The pandemic also trimmed
elections in Slovakia—a consolidated democracy that has been turnout in Bosnia’s municipal elections, but only by a modest
in decline—resulted in the ouster of the long-ruling Smer party. 1 to 2 percent.
The outcomes were not preordained. The governing Of course, these factors do not always translate into
parties enjoyed undue advantages at the polls, whether electoral breakthroughs. Public outrage at Montenegro’s
though clientelism, control over the media landscape, or self-serving elites goes a long way toward explaining
other means. Prior to the opposition victories, none of how the political opposition was able to end the 30-year
the countries mentioned above had taken any steps to rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists, despite the
make their elections more open, as evidenced by their latter’s misuse of state resources and domination of
stagnant performance on Nations in Transit’s Electoral the media sector. However, in Poland, a similar set of
Process indicator. advantages—the ruling Law and Justice party’s exploitation
of state resources and political control over the public
Although each electoral breakthrough is unique, two broadcaster—was sufficient to stymie the opposition’s
interrelated factors may best explain how voters in hybrid or energetic bid for the presidency.
backsliding regimes have been able to “break the collective
action problem and deliver change through elections,” as There is no magic formula, then, for voting out the parties
Tena Prelec and Jovana Marović put it. responsible for a country’s hybrid status. Moreover, there
is no guarantee that an opposition win will bring an end to
First, these voters are angry. The recent electoral upsets backsliding or an exit from the gray zone. As Licia Cianetti and
occurred against a backdrop of corruption scandals and Sean Hanley observe, it is fashionable to describe movements
other abuses of power that revealed the ugly venality of that ride to power on a wave of anticorruption sentiment as
the existing leadership. Kosovo, Montenegro, Moldova, “prodemocracy,” but anticorruption politics can easily contain
and Slovakia perform far worse on Nations in Transit’s illiberal or other antidemocratic features.
Corruption ratings than they do on any other indicator.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the sole exception, although that Such negative qualities make it hard to celebrate the
is partly because some of its other ratings are also quite low. opposition’s triumph in Banja Luka or Montenegro
A 2020 incident in which authorities awarded a contract unreservedly, as the new mayor of the former and the new
for the importation of medical ventilators to a fruit-farming government of the latter have espoused ethnonationalist,
company underscores that corruption is by no means exclusionary views. Similarly, in its erratic and occasionally
checked in the country. Stories of official wrongdoing have unconstitutional response to the pandemic, Slovakia’s
Freedom House
Supporters of opposition groups celebrate after polls close in Montenegro's August 2020 parliamentary elections.
Image credit: Risto Bozovic/AP/Shutterstock
OĽaNO-led government did not distinguish itself vis-à-vis its Fidesz party, for example, is constantly tinkering with the
predecessor. In Moldova, President Sandu’s push to engineer electoral framework to fortify its parliamentary supermajority.
a friendlier parliament through early elections has entailed Yet the united opposition still has a chance to win its uphill
numerous procedural violations, mirroring the risky “move battle in next year’s elections, because voters still have a real
fast and break things” approach adopted by the reformist choice at the ballot box. By contrast, voters in Russia, which
governments of Armenia and Ukraine. While the victorious has long since exited the gray zone and joined the ranks of
Vetëvendosje party in Kosovo represents a genuine break consolidated authoritarian regimes, have no such luxury in
from the status quo, its qualified support for unification with their upcoming parliamentary elections.
Albania could unsettle the wider region.
This makes it all the more tragic when opposition groups
Nevertheless, it is always the case that when corrupt or in hybrid regimes feel compelled to boycott elections due
repressive incumbents lose power through elections, to dramatically tilted playing fields, as recently occurred in
there is at least an opportunity for change in a more Georgia and Serbia. While depriving the winners of legitimacy
democratic direction. and drawing attention to serious abuses, boycotts also
deprive voters of what little opportunity for change may
It is unrealistic to expect that the leaders of hybrid or remain. Elections will not always result in an upset or propel a
backsliding regimes will do anything to make it easier for country out of its hybrid status, but the chances drop to zero
voters to deliver electoral breakthroughs. Hungary’s ruling when no one makes the attempt.
FreedomHouse.org 9
NATIONS IN
STANDING IN AND STANDING UP

By Noah Buyon & Mike Smeltzer
Denizens living in the countries covered by Nations in vacuum. It is largely thanks to civic mobilization and resilience in
Transit will remember 2020 as an annus horribilis due in extremis that 2020 was not the worst year for democracy and
no small part to the COVID-19 pandemic, with regional good governance in the survey’s history. Below, we highlight how
governments proving unable to meet the moment. At civil society held firm while other pillars of society buckled.
year’s end, countries in the Nations in Transit region
featured heavily among the 10 that reported the world’s Civic actors in the region often supplemented, or substituted
worst COVID-19 death tolls per 100,000 people (four), for, the state. As the Belarusian government adopted a policy
and even more so among the 10 with the worst suspected of ignorance in response to COVID-19—which strongman
fatality undercounts (a staggering seven). Meanwhile, the Alyaksandr Lukashenka called a “psychosis”—the private and
Turkmenistani government has gone so far as to insist their third sectors effectively spearheaded the country’s response,
country is virus-free. coordinating care, procuring personal protective equipment
and medical supplies, and setting social-distancing standards.
A tragic combination of incompetence and negligence has In Tajikistan, where the autocratic government of Emomali
allowed for these results. The year has been marred by dilatory Rahmon suppressed independent media outlets while
crisis legislation, lackluster electoral management (making voting promoting doctored pandemic-related data, activists shared
simultaneously less convenient and more dangerous), unchecked information on how to take necessary health precautions and
disinformation, budgetary starvation of local authorities, how to donate to the most vulnerable, all while disseminating
discriminatory policing, and rampant corruption, which triggered accurate fatality figures.
many of the score declines in this year’s survey. Ultimately,
governments flailed while responding to COVID-19 and to the Similar mutual-aid networks developed in many other
bouts of dislocation and violence that made 2020 so bleak. countries. Armenian civil society actors absorbed tens
of thousands of displaced people fleeing the Azerbaijani
While institutional actors have aggravated these challenges or military’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, providing housing,
otherwise abdicated responsibility, civic actors, ranging from clothing, and medicine, and assisting with family reunification
everyday people to formal organizations, filled the leadership while Yerevan struggled to prosecute the war. After
Protesters ride bicycles

through the streets
of Ljubljana during
an antigovernment
protest in May 2020
amid the COVID-19
pandemic. Image credit:
Luka Dakskobler/SOPA
Images/Shutterstock
Freedom House
WHERE CIVIL SOCIETY SHINES BRIGHTEST

Where Civil Society Shines Brightest
Across the Nations in Transit region, civil society groups are democracy’sbiggest boosters and the most steadfast advocates
Across the Nations in Transit region, civil society groups are democracy’s
of citizens’ rights. biggest boosters and the most steadfast advocates of citizens’ rights.
ESTONIA
RESILIENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
LATVIA
LESS MORE RUSSIA
RESILIENT RESILIENT LITHUANIA
Resilience is determined by subtracting a country’s BELARUS

National Democratic Governance rating from its Civil Society rating. POLAND
CZECH REP. UKRAINE

SLOVAKIA
KAZAKHSTAN
SERBIA SLOVENIA HUNGARY
ROMANIA
CROATIA
Through persistent protests, activists in
BOSNIA SERBIA MOLDOVA
Serbia have elevated environmental & HERZ.
BULGARIA UZBEKISTAN
issues to the national agenda, leading MONTENEGRO GEORGIA KYRGYZSTAN
the state to scrap plans for destructive KOSOVO
ALBANIA NORTH AZERBAIJAN
hydroelectric power plants. MACEDONIA ARMENIA
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UKRAINE ARMENIA
While state and local-level officials As the government dealt with a myriad Formal and informal civil society
argued over who was responsible for of problems, from procurement of PPE to groups provided shelter and
migrants and refugees trapped in the testing policies, concerned citizens and primary care to tens of thousands
country due to COVID-19, everyday local entrepreneurs in Ukraine mobilized of people displaced by the
citizens organized the provision of basic to provide free transport for medical Azerbaijani military during the war
necessities to this vulnerable population. workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Kyrgyzstani police absented themselves amid postelection Perhaps for this reason, in-person action continued in many
rioting, self-defense groups worked to keep the peace. countries, despite concerns about COVID-19.
Ultimately, however, civil society cannot do all the work that It is notable that many street demonstrations were met
belongs to other institutions, least of all the state. Practically, with intense repression. Indeed, the year’s events have
they lack the capacity to. The impressive sums raised by the again demonstrated that civil society’s effectiveness is
#BYCOVID19 crowdfunding campaign in Belarus and the impeded when political elites view it as a threat. Recent
Armenian diaspora’s Hayastan All Armenian Fund pale in events in Poland and Russia provide illustrative examples of
comparison to state budgets. Moreover, civil society’s normative this tendency. Having draped itself in a cloak of anti-“LGBT
role is not to replace the state, media, or other institutions, but and gender ideology,” Warsaw cracked down on a mass
to complement and, when necessary, resist them. movement contesting a Constitutional Tribunal ruling which
effectively outlawed abortion. In Russia, demonstrators
Examples of pushback abounded in 2020, as civic actors who rallied against the unjust arrest of opposition leader
pioneered innovative forms of pandemic-appropriate protest Aleksey Navalny took direct aim at Putin’s kleptocratic
to hold leaders to account. As political infighting hobbled system of patronage and were subjected to unprecedented
the Kosovar state’s COVID-19 response, frustrated citizens state violence.
took to their balconies en masse, banging pots and pans
to sound a call for unity. In Slovenia, thousands attended Despite these reprisals and impediments, civic mobilization
weekly demonstrations on bicycles to circumvent bans on is the single most important factor keeping many regimes in
gatherings, after allegations of political interference in the the Nations in Transit region from backsliding or bottoming
public procurement of medical supplies surfaced. Elsewhere, out entirely. Even if civil society is not a leading indicator
protesters maintained social distancing on picket lines by of democratization, as Nations in Transit data suggest, it is
organizing convoys of cars and online flash mobs. However, certainly a bulwark against the spread of authoritarianism
these protests, lacking the full force of conventional street and antidemocratic alternatives in the region and the
demonstrations, often failed to achieve their stated aims. world at large.
FreedomHouse.org 11
NATIONS IN
TRANSIT 2021 The Antidemocratic Turn Freedom House
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021
ESTONIA
LATVIA RUSSIA
RUSSIA LITHUANIA
BELARUS
POLAND
CZECH REP. UKRAINE

SLOVAKIA KAZAKHSTAN
HUNGARY MOLDOVA
SLOVENIA ROMANIA
CROATIA
BOSNIA
& HERZ. SERBIA
MONTENEGRO BULGARIA
GEORGIA UZBEKISTAN
KOSOVO NORTH KYRGYZSTAN
MACEDONIA
ALBANIA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN
SURVEY FINDINGS
Regime Type Number of Countries
The map reflects the findings of Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2021 survey, which assessed the status of democratic development
Consolidated Democracy (CD) 6
in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia during 2020. Freedom House introduced a Democracy Score—an average of each
Semi-Consolidated Democracy (SCD) 4 country’s ratings on all of the indicators covered by Nations in Transit—beginning with the 2004 edition. The Democracy Score is
Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime (T/H) 10 designed to simplify analysis of the countries’ overall progress or deterioration from year to year. Based on the Democracy Score and
Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (SCA) 1 its scale of 1 to 7, Freedom House has defined the following regime types: Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (1.00–2.00),
Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (2.01–3.00), Transitional/Hybrid Regime (3.01–4.00), Semi-Consolidated
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (CA) 8
Democracy (4.01–5.00), Consolidated Democracy (5.01–7.00).
Total 29
12 @ FreedomHouse #NationsInTransit FreedomHouse.org 13

NATIONS IN
MEDIA MATTERS
By Zselyke Csaky
In functioning democracies, the media provides information establishing direct footholds in the Balkans, the model itself
to the public, mediates between citizens and politicians, has been exported to much of the coverage region.
and serves as a watchdog, uncovering abuses of power and
forcing institutions to correct their course. This model is adhered to in Slovenia, for example, with its
government interrupting the public news agency’s funding
In practice, the delineation between politics and the press stream. The Polish government, meanwhile, has used state-
is unclear even in responsive democratic states, never owned companies to take control of regional outlets while
mind the countries covered by Nations in Transit, which harassing critical media through administrative and legal
we often classify as Hybrid/Transitional or Consolidated measures. In 2020, Gazeta Wyborcza, the country’s second-
Authoritarian Regimes. In much of the region, journalists and largest daily newspaper, was fighting over 50 lawsuits, many of
outlets are increasingly coopted, harassed, and silenced by them filed by the ruling Law and Justice party and its allies.
those in power.
The Albanian media environment, which has long been
Independent and critical outlets faced increasing pressure plagued by oligarchic control like much of the coverage
from the media-capture model pioneered in Hungary—and region, has also been affected by the increased use of
to a lesser extent, Serbia—in 2020. Under this model, legal strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). In
and economic tools are used to squelch critical outlets addition, controversial antidefamation legislation threatened
and bolster friendly reporting. While connected Hungarian to restrict online speech there. The Georgian media
businesspeople have not been entirely successful in environment was also affected by political interference and
A protester near the Embassy of Belarus in Moscow holds a sign reading, “Journalism is not terrorism” in support of independent journalists
working in Belarus. Image credit: NickolayV/Shutterstock.com
Freedom House
polarization in 2020, with the dismissal of staff members also tightened their grip by expanding the “foreign agents
from publicly funded Adjara TV and Radio serving as a potent law” to include journalists (such as those working for Radio
example of the pressure placed on journalists there. Free Europe/Radio Liberty), testing the implementation of
a sovereign internet law, and escalating pressure on social
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic also narrowed the media companies.
space for independent reporting, with media outlets finding
themselves cash-strapped and consequently more vulnerable Notwithstanding the onslaught of negative news throughout
to political control. The Romanian government used the the region, there were also remarkable examples of resilience.
pandemic as cover to distribute €40 million ($44.9 million) Exiled journalists, bloggers, and individuals active in diaspora
to media outlets in a manner that strengthened clientelistic communities—including those from Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,
networks instead of outlets in need. and Azerbaijan—continued to report on developments in
their home countries. Journalists also employed innovative
In repressive environments, the pandemic augmented means to continue their work in difficult conditions.
persecution. The authoritarian regimes of Tajikistan and Independent Belarusian outlets, for example, moved en masse
Turkmenistan denied the existence of COVID-19 months to Telegram to circumvent government blocking.
after the pandemic began and punished any reporting on
the dire heath and economic consequences. Tajikistani Outlets facing precarious financial situations also turned to
authorities also introduced heavy fines for “false or crowdfunding and membership-based solutions. A group of
inaccurate information,” threatened those “sowing panic,” journalists who resigned from Index.hu—the most popular
and blocked websites keeping an independent tally of news site in Hungary—over a loss of editorial control
pandemic-related deaths. launched Telex, an outlet that raised €1 million ($1.1 million) in
its first month.
The media crackdown was not limited to COVID-19
reporting. Belarusian authorities engaged in brutal These examples of resilience, while sporadic, nevertheless
repression after last summer’s elections, with hundreds hold the key to improving not just the media environment,
of journalists facing arbitrary arrest, physical assault, and but the region’s overall democratic health. Those looking to
detention. Foreign correspondents saw their accreditation arrest the expansion of antidemocratic practices would do
revoked or denied, while internet users encountered well to turn their attention to the media and work to buttress
extensive shutdowns and website blocks. Russian authorities the independence of this institution.
HOPE AND PUSHBACK: HOW CITIZENS AND POLITICAL LEADERS

CAN BAND TOGETHER TO COUNTER REPRESSION
By Zselyke Csaky & Mike Smeltzer
Politicians are norm entrepreneurs. When they berate populist narratives to galvanize support in Kyrgyzstan. It also
journalists, or whip up fear by alleging that upholding rights found instances where illiberal, top-down messaging took
for LGBT+ people and ethnic or religious minorities harms hold in public opinion and societal norms, such as growing
the majority, they reap political benefits in the short term, hostility toward media in Slovenia, and frequent rhetorical
but help entrench antidemocratic values in the long term. attacks on LGBT+ people in Poland and Hungary.
Nations in Transit 2021 found frequent instances of However, by confronting autocratic behavior and standing
politicians instrumentalizing dangerous rhetoric for up for democratic values, civil society, political leaders,
political gain—such as Bulgaria’s nationalist reasoning for and governments can shape the conversation as well.
blocking North Macedonia’s European Union (EU) accession Over the past year, there were also a number of positive
negotiations, and Sadyr Japarov’s embrace of exclusionary developments in the Nations in Transit region where
FreedomHouse.org 15
NATIONS IN
Protesters gather in Riga, Latvia to show solidarity with the people of Belarus in August 2020. Image credit: Girts Ragelis/Shutterstock.com
ordinary citizens and politicians alike took action against to the proindependence Baltic Way demonstrations 30
attacks on democracy, and upended seemingly fixed years earlier, political leaders grew vociferous in their
narratives in the process. denunciation of rights abuses under Lukashenka. Lithuania’s
foreign minister vehemently rejected Belarus’s extradition
request of opposition leader and likely presidential election
Belarusian protesters propel winner Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, for instance.
political shifts
Events in Belarus offered a wake-up call to citizens and More directly impactful were the actions taken by political
autocrats alike. For Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the political and leaders, often in concert, to counter the repressive
civil unrest was a signal to orchestrate shows of support for turn in Belarus. The EU issued three separate rounds of
fellow autocrats, in the hopes of preventing similar unrest sanctions against the Belarusian regime, including penalties
at home. But for hundreds of thousands of Belarusians, that targeted Lukashenka himself. Lithuania blocked EU
another round of bogus elections was intolerable. And payments to Belarus for a cross-border assistance program
for supporters of democracy at all levels of society in over concern about misuse. Additionally, both Estonia and
Central and Eastern Europe, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Poland committed financial resources to “raise awareness
violent crackdown on the ensuing peaceful demonstrations of democracy and rule of law” in Belarus, and to provide
was a step too far: after years of political tolerance of funding for the country’s beleaguered independent media.
authoritarianism in Belarus, repression of the country’s
massive prodemocracy movement galvanized international
support for the demonstrators, and prompted real Standing up to threats at home
consequences for the longtime autocratic regime. In addition to standing up for democracy in authoritarian
states, some politicians and governments have spoken out
As citizens in the Baltics formed human chains in on threats to democracy within the EU. While the Matovič
solidarity with their Belarusian neighbors, harkening back government in Slovakia had a mixed record on issues of
Freedom House
democracy and human rights, the country’s president, public tenders due to concerns about transparency and
Zuzana Čaputová, made an unambiguous commitment to national security. And in 2021, amid a culmination of
them on several occasions in 2020, calling for rebuilding concerns over “dividing Europe,” the three Baltic countries,
trust in institutions domestically, and issuing strong criticism Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia conspicuously scaled back
of neighboring Poland and Hungary for vetoing the EU’s their presence at the latest summit of the 17+1 platform
rule-of-law mechanism. Čaputová’s rhetorical turn-in was a on cooperation between China and Central and Eastern
strong break with the past embrace of illiberal ideas in the European governments, rejecting the CCP’s ongoing attempts
Visegrad Four. to expand its global presence through multilateral institutions.
There were also instances of pushback against the Amid a deluge of grim news from the region, these instances
authoritarian reach and influence of the Chinese Communist of pushback and cooperation might seem like isolated
Party (CCP) in the EU. In the Czech Republic, President Miloš examples. But focusing only on the negative can warp our
Zeman has long advocated for closer ties, but a weariness senses and prevent us from seeing that politicians can also
of the CCP was growing more evident in public discourse in change norms in a positive direction, one step at a time.
2020. Meanwhile, governments in Romania, Lithuania, Croatia, Words matter, and not just when they are used to set a
and Slovenia have banned Chinese companies or suspended negative example.
FreedomHouse.org 17
NATIONS IN
Recommendations
To counter the spread of antidemocratic practices in Europe and Eurasia, democracies, especially the United States and
European Union (EU) member states, should do the following:
NURTURING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

Reinvigorate alliances with other democracies, and support multilateral institutions. The expansion of antidemocratic
governance in Europe and Eurasia can be countered by cooperation and information sharing among democracies, and their full
engagement in multilateral institutions. The United States, EU, and democratic alliances should work to address the threat posed
by antidemocratic norm setting and prevent authoritarian-minded governments from ignoring international commitments
and taking advantage of international systems, including the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE). Democracies should adopt policies that efficiently and effectively counter the spread of antidemocratic practices, and
should hold each other accountable for living up to democratic ideals.
Invest in independent elections. Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of any democracy, and independent and
transparent electoral processes are necessary to foster a competitive electoral environment and citizens’ trust in election
integrity. Yet, politicians across the region have bent the rules to further entrench their control over elections, making peaceful
transfers of power increasingly difficult. Work by the United States, EU, and other democracies to support free and fair
elections across Europe and Eurasia should emphasize the importance of impartial election observation and efforts to combat
disinformation.
• Impartial election observers are key to ensuring trust in electoral processes. Governments across the region should
support and welcome robust observation, including by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR). The ODIHR’s well-established methodology, which includes both long-term assessments of the campaign
environment and election-day observations, can inform the operations of smaller and domestic observer missions.
National authorities should regularly reexamine past observations’ findings and act upon recommendations to improve or
reform their electoral processes.
• In addition, given the extent and impact of digital disinformation and election interference across the region, the OSCE
should further incorporate digital election interference into its election-monitoring methodology, especially the sections
on long-term observation practices.
Support civil society and grassroots movements calling for democracy. Peaceful protest movements appealing for
reform can drive long-term democratic change, but face greater odds without international support—as the brutal crackdowns
on protesters in Belarus and Russia have demonstrated. The United States, EU, and other democratic governments should
provide vocal, public support for grassroots prodemocracy movements, and respond to any violent crackdown by authorities
with targeted sanctions, reduced or conditioned foreign assistance, and public condemnation. Democracies should also
be ready to welcome human rights defenders who face attacks, grave threats, unlawful detention, or other dangers due to
their work. Civil society groups, citizen-led social movements, and other nonstate actors with democratic agendas should be
provided with technical assistance and training on issues such as coalition and constituency building, advocacy, and physical and
digital security.
Freedom House
• The EU should ensure that its annual rule-of-law reports for member states—which are intended to “facilitate cooperation
and dialogue in order to prevent problems from reaching the point where a formal response is required”—describe how
well civil society is protected in practice, and whether groups are able to operate openly and freely.
• The United States and other democratic governments should ensure that financial assistance is focused on fostering
systemic resilience. This should include providing assistance on sustainable business models; incentivizing the
philanthropic community to support civil society organizations, including with core funding; increasing transparency
around the activities of government-supported NGOs (GONGOs); and engaging with grassroots actors.
• The United States, EU, and other democratic governments should maintain a principled stance on bilateral engagement
with governments that implement so-called foreign agent laws, laws on “undesirable organizations,” and other cynical
measures that purport to promote transparency but in practice target legitimate civil society groups. National authorities
should directly challenge these policies and raise human rights concerns in every bilateral engagement. More broadly,
democracies should condemn the current global trend of criminalizing civil society engagement with out-of-country
partners, donors, and other stakeholders.
Support free and independent media. Providing the public with access to fact-based information about current events is one
of the best ways to combat authoritarian power. It is especially important during times of emergency, and will remain essential
as the world begins to recover from the coronavirus pandemic. Governments should provide support for independent media,
including exile media, such as financial assistance, technical support, skills training, and mentoring. Laws should protect the free
flow of information, allow journalists access to elected officials, allow the public to place freedom of information requests, and
guard against state monopolization of media outlets.
• In the United States, the Biden administration should restore the regulatory “firewall” protecting editorial independence
at the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM). The firewall’s elimination in 2020 harms the credibility of US public
broadcasters operating in foreign countries and limits their effectiveness in countering propaganda. Full, bipartisan
support is necessary to ensure the integrity and robust operations of USAGM-sponsored media outlets. Notably, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has come under assault in Europe and Eurasia, with a spurious case pending against
it in Russia and harassment and threats, including death threats, levied against its investigative journalists in Kyrgyzstan.
The United States, EU, and other democracies should insist that the government of Russia immediately drop its politically
motivated investigation of RFE/RL, and call on officials in Kyrgyzstan to fully investigate threats against RFE/RL journalists
and hold perpetrators accountable.
• In the EU, governments should work to ensure that the system of media capture pioneered and exported by Hungary does
not take root in Poland and other countries. This strategy can be countered through a vocal defense of media pluralism
by senior officials and the adoption of EU-wide rules on transparency of media ownership. The European Commission’s
rule-of-law reports should include an assessment of independence at state-owned media in each member state to
enable early detection of signs of media capture; these outlets are often the first to be co-opted if a hostile government
comes to power.
• In the EU, governments should address the use of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) to stifle
investigative journalism. The EU should promote an anti-SLAPP directive that would give journalists and media groups
the ability to request rapid dismissal of these types of lawsuits in member states, and provide financial support to media
groups facing them.
FreedomHouse.org 19
NATIONS IN
• Democracies should also scale up efforts to support independent media. In the United States, the executive branch
should work with Congress to create a large-scale Enterprise Fund for Independent Media. This fund would invest in
promoting free expression and quality journalism internationally, and would seek financing partnerships with democratic
allies; its efforts should focus on supporting the emergence and sustainability of independent media, promoting effective
investigative journalism, and protecting journalists at risk. To elevate diplomatic work centered on media freedom,
the United States should appoint a Special Envoy for Press Freedom. As part of a comprehensive strategy to protect
journalists, this envoy, working with the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, should track
and recommend action against governments and officials who persecute and intimidate journalists.
Promote international peer-to-peer exchanges. In light of growing authoritarianism and escalating tensions between
democracies and authoritarian regimes, peer-to-peer exchanges are critical in fostering relationships among future leaders.
Cultural, educational, and professional exchanges help build understanding and strengthen partnerships between nations and
offer future leaders a platform to develop collaborative, innovative strategies to fight back against attacks on democracy and
reverse democratic erosion. The United States, EU, and other democracies should increase investments in such programs to
empower young leaders to strengthen democratic governance around the world. In the United States, programs such as the
Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program for high school students from Europe and Eurasia, and the Young Transatlantic
Innovation Leaders Initiative (YTILI) Fellowship Program for emerging entrepreneurs from Europe, have provided young people
important opportunities for professional development, and fostered lasting, positive relationships among potential future
leaders. Democratic governments should also help fund events that connect activists and civil society groups across borders, so
they can share strategies, tools, and approaches.
COUNTERING THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

The European Union should take urgent action to end ongoing attacks on democracy inside the union. The EU’s rule-
of-law mechanisms should be used in a strategic, comprehensive, and systematic manner, deploying all tools available including
infringement and monitoring measures, as well as financial penalties. The European Commission last year added a mechanism
to the EU’s budget that allows the EU to withhold funding for member states that fail to uphold the rule of law. Poland and
Hungary have filed a complaint with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over this new mechanism. The ECJ should address this
complaint in an expedited manner, and the European Commission should trigger this mechanism against noncompliant member
states as soon as possible. The commission should also enforce Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), which allows for financial penalties in cases where a member state fails to implement ECJ rulings. For Article
7 proceedings, which aim to punish member states that violate the common values of the EU by suspending certain rights
guaranteed by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the European Council should keep Poland and Hungary on the agenda
and organize at least one hearing per EU presidency.
Utilize targeted sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy of accountability for human rights abusers and
corrupt officials. Targeted sanctions against individuals who engage in egregious human rights abuses or large-scale corruption
are not a standalone solution, but are a powerful tool for deterring harmful behavior. Democracies should devise comprehensive
strategies for deploying targeted sanctions in concert with their full suite of foreign policy tools to bring accountability for
international human rights abuses and acts of corruption. When possible, democracies should coordinate their efforts to jointly
impose sanctions on perpetrators for maximum impact. Recent targeted sanctions imposed jointly by the United States, EU,
United Kingdom, and Canada on four Chinese officials and a security organization over the mass detention of Uyghurs and other
members of religious and ethnic minority groups should serve as a model for multilateral coordination on sanctions to maximize
impact. Democratic nations that do not yet have laws allowing for targeted sanctions for human rights abuses and acts of
corruption should enact them, and those with laws on the books should ensure that they are fully resourced and enforced.
Freedom House
• The US Congress should reauthorize the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 USC 2656 note),
which allows for visa bans and asset freezes on individuals and entities engaged in human rights abuses and corruption.
Reauthorization should eliminate the December 23, 2022, sunset and codify Executive Order 13818, which enables the
United States to impose sanctions for serious human rights abuses. The executive branch and Congress should work
together to ensure adequate funding for sanctions implementation and enforcement.
• In the EU, officials should continue to utilize the global human rights sanctions regime adopted in December 2020,
including by imposing sanctions against those involved in gross human rights violations in Russia and Belarus. The EU
should expand the regime, or adopt new regulations, to make acts of corruption a sanctionable offense.
Take steps to more effectively address kleptocracy and transnational corruption. Governments broadly agree that
addressing the corrosive effects of global corruption is critical. However, the nearly universal political statements of intent to
combat corruption have not been translated into effective action to root it out. Any serious effort to promote democracy and
counter authoritarianism must include measures to combat corruption and kleptocracy, which have become business models
for modern-day authoritarians.
• Given the transnational nature of corruption, the United States, the EU and its member states, and democratic
governments worldwide should develop and implement comprehensive strategies that prioritize anticorruption efforts
at home and abroad. This should include pursuing an anticorruption agenda across international bodies including the
United Nations, OSCE, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and others, and promoting
coordination among them. There is also a need to focus on implementation and enforcement, ensuring that states
actually adhere to the anticorruption commitments they voluntarily made. Democracies should include civil society in
discussions of anticorruption programs, as they often play key implementation and monitoring roles.
• In the European Union, the centralized disbursement of EU funding by national governments can be a significant source
of corruption. Most EU countries covered in Nations in Transit lack domestic mechanisms that guarantee the transparent
use of these funds. The EU should ensure that there is effective follow-up on European Anti-Fraud Office reports, which
document fraud against the EU budget and corruption within the EU’s institutions, and outline consequences for misuse.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office should consider the merits and feasibility of proposals to establish a list of the
worst corruption offenders.
• In the United States, the proposed CROOK Act (S.158/H.R.402) would establish an action fund offering financial
assistance to foreign countries during historic windows of opportunity for anticorruption reforms. Another draft law, the
Combating Global Corruption Act (S.14), would require the US government to assess corruption around the world and
produce a tiered list of countries. US foreign assistance directed at the lowest-tiered countries would require specific risk
assessments and anticorruption mechanisms, such as provisions to recover funds that are misused. Both measures would
contribute significantly to the global fight against corruption, and both should be passed into law.
FreedomHouse.org 21
NATIONS IN
TRANSIT 2021 The Antidemocratic Turn Freedom House
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021
ESTONIA
LATVIA RUSSIA
RUSSIA LITHUANIA
BELARUS
POLAND
CZECH REP. UKRAINE

SLOVAKIA KAZAKHSTAN
HUNGARY MOLDOVA
SLOVENIA ROMANIA
CROATIA
BOSNIA
& HERZ. SERBIA
MONTENEGRO BULGARIA
GEORGIA UZBEKISTAN
KOSOVO NORTH KYRGYZSTAN
MACEDONIA
ALBANIA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN
SURVEY FINDINGS
Regime Type Number of Countries
The map reflects the findings of Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2021 survey, which assessed the status of democratic development
Consolidated Democracy (CD) 6
in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia during 2020. Freedom House introduced a Democracy Score—an average of each
Semi-Consolidated Democracy (SCD) 4 country’s ratings on all of the indicators covered by Nations in Transit—beginning with the 2004 edition. The Democracy Score is
Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime (T/H) 10 designed to simplify analysis of the countries’ overall progress or deterioration from year to year. Based on the Democracy Score and
Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (SCA) 1 its scale of 1 to 7, Freedom House has defined the following regime types: Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (1.00–2.00),
Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (2.01–3.00), Transitional/Hybrid Regime (3.01–4.00), Semi-Consolidated
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (CA) 8
Democracy (4.01–5.00), Consolidated Democracy (5.01–7.00).
Total 29
12 @ FreedomHouse #NationsInTransit FreedomHouse.org 13

NATIONS IN
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: OVERVIEW OF SCORE CHANGES

Decline Improvement Unchanged
Country Democracy Score Democracy % NDG EP CS IM LDG JFI CO

Albania 3.82 TO 3.75 46% t t
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.32 TO 3.36 39% s
Croatia 4.25 54%
BALKANS
Kosovo 3.18 TO 3.14 36% t

Montenegro 3.86 TO 3.82 47% t
North Macedonia 3.75 TO 3.82 47% s s
Serbia 3.96 TO 3.89 48% t t
Bulgaria 4.54 TO 4.50 58% t

Czech Republic 5.64 TO 5.57 76% t t
Estonia 6.07 TO 6.04 84% t
CENTRAL EUROPE
Hungary 3.96 TO 3.71 45% t t t t t

Latvia 5.79 TO 5.82 80% s
Lithuania 5.64 TO 5.68 78% s
Poland 4.93 TO 4.57 60% t t t t t t
Romania 4.43 TO 4.39 57% s t t
Slovakia 5.29 TO 5.32 72% s
Slovenia 5.93 TO 5.86 81% t t
Armenia 3.00 TO 2.96 33% t

Azerbaijan 1.14 TO 1.07 1% t t
Belarus 1.39 TO 1.29 5% t t t
Georgia 3.25 TO 3.18 36% t t
Kazakhstan 1.32 5%
EURASIA
Kyrgyzstan 1.96 TO 1.86 14% t t t

Moldova 3.11 35%
Russia 1.39 7% t s
Tajikistan 1.18 TO 1.11 2% t t
Turkmenistan 1.00 0%
Ukraine 3.39 TO 3.36 39% t
Uzbekistan 1.14 TO 1.25 4% s s s
CATEGORIES:
NDG – National Democratic Governance LDG – Local Democratic Governance The NIT ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with
EP – Electoral Process JFI – Judicial Framework and 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress
CS – Civil Society Independence and 1 the lowest. The NIT 2021 ratings reflect the period
IM – Independent Media CO – Corruption from 1 January through 31 December 2020.
Freedom House
Methodology
Nations in Transit 2021 evaluates the state of democracy The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing
in the region stretching from Central Europe to Central the lowest and 7 the highest level of democracy. The
Asia. The 23rd edition of this annual study covers events Democracy Score is a straight average of the seven
from January 1 through December 31, 2020. In consultation indicators and is also expressed as a percentage, where 0
with country report authors, a panel of expert advisers, represents the lowest and 100 the highest level of democracy.
and a group of regional expert reviewers, Freedom House Based on the Democracy Score, Freedom House assigns each
provides numerical ratings for each country on seven country to one of the following regime types:
indicators:
Consolidated Democracies (5.01-7.00): Countries
• National Democratic Governance. Considers the receiving this score embody the best policies and practices of
democratic character of the governmental system; and liberal democracy, but may face challenges—often associated
the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the with corruption—that contribute to a slightly lower score.
legislative and executive branches.
Semi-Consolidated Democracies (4.01-5.00): Countries
• Electoral Process. Examines national executive and
receiving this score are electoral democracies that meet
legislative elections, the electoral framework, the
relatively high standards for the selection of national leaders
functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation
in the political process. but exhibit weaknesses in their defense of political rights and
civil liberties.
• Civil Society. Assesses the organizational capacity and
financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and Transitional or Hybrid Regimes (3.01-4.00): Countries
political environment in which it operates; the functioning receiving this score are typically electoral democracies where
of trade unions; interest group participation in the democratic institutions are fragile, and substantial challenges
policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist.
extremist groups.
• Independent Media. Examines the current state of press Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes (2.01-3.00):
freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and Countries receiving this score attempt to mask authoritarianism
editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable or rely on informal power structures with limited respect for
and independent private press; and the functioning of the the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail to
public media. meet even the minimum standards of electoral democracy.
• Local Democratic Governance. Considers the Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes (1.00-2.00):

decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and
Countries receiving this score are closed societies in which
capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency
dictators prevent political competition and pluralism and are
and accountability of local authorities.
responsible for widespread violations of basic political, civil,
• Judicial Framework and Independence. Assesses and human rights.
constitutional and human rights protections, judicial
independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, Nations in Transit does not rate governments per se, nor does it
guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects rate countries based on governmental intentions or legislation
and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. alone. Rather, a country’s ratings are determined by considering
the practical effect of the state and nongovernmental actors on
• Corruption. Looks at public perceptions of corruption,
the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial an individual’s rights and freedoms. A more detailed description
disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of of the methodology, including complete checklist questions for
anticorruption initiatives. each democracy indicator, can be found at https://freedomhouse.
org/reports/nations-transit/nations-transit-methodology.
FreedomHouse.org 25
NATIONS IN
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: CATEGORY AND DEMOCRACY SCORE SUMMARY
Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, CATEGORIES:

with 1 representing the lowest and 7 the NDG – National Democratic Governance JFI – Judicial Framework and Independence
highest level of democratic progress. EP – Electoral Process CO – Corruption
The average of these ratings is each CS – Civil Society DS – Democracy Score
country’s Democracy Score (DS). The IM – Independent Media D% – Democracy Percentage
Democracy Percentage (D%) is the LDG – Local Democratic Governance
translation of the Democracy Score to
the 0–100 scale.
Country NDG EP CS IM LDG JFI CO DS D%

Estonia 5.75 6.50 6.25 6.25 5.75 6.50 5.25 6.04 84%
Slovenia 5.75 6.50 5.75 5.25 6.50 6.00 5.25 5.86 81%
Latvia 6.00 6.25 6.00 6.00 5.75 6.25 4.50 5.82 80%
Lithuania 5.50 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 4.50 5.68 78%
Czech Republic 4.75 6.75 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 4.50 5.57 76%
Slovakia 4.75 6.25 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.25 4.25 5.32 72%
Poland 3.75 5.75 5.50 4.25 5.50 3.25 4.00 4.57 60%
Bulgaria 4.25 5.50 5.50 3.50 4.75 4.25 3.75 4.50 58%
Romania 4.25 4.75 5.50 3.50 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.39 57%
Croatia 4.25 5.00 5.25 3.75 4.25 3.50 3.75 4.25 54%
Serbia 3.25 4.25 5.50 3.25 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.89 48%
Montenegro 3.25 4.25 5.25 3.25 4.25 3.50 3.00 3.82 47%
North Macedonia 3.50 4.50 4.75 3.50 4.00 3.25 3.25 3.82 47%
Albania 3.25 4.25 4.75 3.50 4.50 3.25 2.75 3.75 46%
Hungary 3.00 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 2.75 3.71 45%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.00 4.50 4.50 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.36 39%
Ukraine 2.50 4.50 5.00 3.75 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.36 39%
Georgia 2.50 3.00 4.25 3.50 2.75 2.75 3.50 3.18 36%
Kosovo 2.50 3.50 4.50 3.25 3.50 2.50 2.25 3.14 36%
Moldova 2.50 4.00 4.75 3.00 2.50 2.75 2.25 3.11 35%
Armenia 2.25 3.25 4.50 3.00 2.25 2.50 3.00 2.96 33%
Kyrgyzstan 1.25 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.86 14%
Russia 1.00 1.25 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.39 7%
Belarus 1.00 1.00 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.75 1.29 5%
Kazakhstan 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.25 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.32 5%
Uzbekistan 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 4%
Tajikistan 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.11 2%
Azerbaijan 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.07 1%
Turkmenistan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0%
Average 3.03 3.91 4.25 3.28 3.58 3.24 2.94 3.46 41%
Median 3.00 4.25 4.75 3.25 4.00 3.25 3.00 3.71 45%
Freedom House
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: DEMOCRACY SCORE HISTORY BY REGION
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Central Europe
Bulgaria 4.93 4.86 4.82 4.75 4.71 4.75 4.64 4.61 4.61 4.54 4.50
Czech Republic 5.82 5.82 5.86 5.75 5.79 5.79 5.75 5.71 5.71 5.64 5.57
Estonia 6.07 6.07 6.04 6.04 6.04 6.07 6.07 6.18 6.11 6.07 6.04
Hungary 5.39 5.14 5.11 5.04 4.82 4.71 4.46 4.29 4.07 3.96 3.71
Latvia 5.86 5.89 5.93 5.93 5.93 5.93 5.96 5.93 5.86 5.79 5.82
Lithuania 5.75 5.71 5.68 5.64 5.64 5.68 5.68 5.64 5.61 5.64 5.68
Poland 5.79 5.86 5.82 5.82 5.79 5.68 5.43 5.11 5.04 4.93 4.57
Romania 4.57 4.57 4.50 4.54 4.54 4.54 4.61 4.54 4.43 4.43 4.39
Slovakia 5.46 5.50 5.43 5.39 5.36 5.39 5.39 5.39 5.36 5.29 5.32
Slovenia 6.07 6.11 6.11 6.07 6.07 6.00 5.96 5.93 5.93 5.93 5.86
Average 5.57 5.55 5.53 5.50 5.47 5.45 5.40 5.33 5.27 5.22 5.15
Median 5.77 5.77 5.75 5.70 5.71 5.68 5.55 5.52 5.48 5.46 5.45
Balkans
Albania 3.96 3.86 3.75 3.82 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.89 3.89 3.82 3.75
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.68 3.64 3.61 3.57 3.54 3.50 3.46 3.36 3.32 3.32 3.36
Croatia 4.36 4.39 4.39 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.29 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25
Kosovo 2.82 2.82 2.75 2.86 2.86 2.93 3.04 3.07 3.11 3.18 3.14
Montenegro 4.18 4.18 4.18 4.14 4.11 4.07 4.11 4.07 3.93 3.86 3.82
North Macedonia 4.18 4.11 4.07 4.00 3.93 3.71 3.57 3.64 3.68 3.75 3.82
Serbia 4.36 4.36 4.36 4.36 4.32 4.25 4.18 4.04 4.00 3.96 3.89
Average 3.93 3.91 3.87 3.87 3.85 3.81 3.79 3.76 3.74 3.73 3.72
Median 4.18 4.11 4.07 4.00 3.93 3.86 3.86 3.89 3.89 3.82 3.82
Eurasia
Armenia 2.57 2.61 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.61 2.57 2.93 3.00 2.96
Azerbaijan 1.54 1.43 1.36 1.32 1.25 1.14 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.14 1.07
Belarus 1.43 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.36 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.29
Georgia 3.14 3.18 3.25 3.32 3.36 3.39 3.39 3.32 3.29 3.25 3.18
Kazakhstan 1.57 1.46 1.43 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.36 1.29 1.29 1.32 1.32
Kyrgyzstan 1.89 2.00 2.04 2.11 2.07 2.11 2.00 1.93 2.00 1.96 1.86
Moldova 3.04 3.11 3.18 3.14 3.14 3.11 3.07 3.07 3.04 3.11 3.11
Russia 1.82 1.82 1.79 1.71 1.54 1.50 1.43 1.39 1.43 1.39 1.39
Tajikistan 1.86 1.82 1.75 1.68 1.61 1.46 1.36 1.21 1.21 1.18 1.11
Turkmenistan 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00
Ukraine 3.39 3.18 3.14 3.07 3.25 3.32 3.39 3.36 3.36 3.39 3.36
Uzbekistan 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.11 1.11 1.14 1.25
Average 2.03 2.01 2.00 1.99 1.97 1.96 1.93 1.90 1.93 1.94 1.91
Median 1.84 1.82 1.77 1.70 1.57 1.48 1.41 1.39 1.41 1.39 1.36
FreedomHouse.org 27
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President Trustees Sushma Palmer

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Goli Ameri*
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Nations in Transit: The Antidemocratic Turn

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NATIONS IN

Nations in Transit 2021: The Antidemocratic Turn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Nations in Transit 2021: Scores.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Nations in Transit 2021: Overview of Score Changes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Nations in Transit 2021: Category and Democracy Score Summary. . . . . . . . . . 26

Nations in Transit 2021: Democracy Score History by Region.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

RESEARCH AND EDITORIAL TEAM

The Antidemocratic Turn

Attacks on democratic institutions are spreading faster than ever

THE DOWNTURN DEEPENS

.25 Change in Democracy Score (2017-2021) .25

Hungary and Poland

This infographic is from the Nations in Transit 2021 report by freedomhouse.org

THE EXPANSION OF THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE

This infographic is from the Nations in Transit 2021 report by freedomhouse.org

INSTABILITY AND REPRESSION IN RUSSIA

HITTING ROCK BOTTOM

Change in NDG Score (2012-2021)

AZERBAIJAN BELARUS KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN RUSSIA TAJIKISTAN TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN

This infographic is from the Nations in Transit 2021 report by freedomhouse.org

Police forcefully detain

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS ABOUT BREAKTHROUGH ELECTIONS

STANDING IN AND STANDING UP

Protesters ride bicycles

WHERE CIVIL SOCIETY SHINES BRIGHTEST

Resilience is determined by subtracting a country’s BELARUS

CZECH REP. UKRAINE

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UKRAINE ARMENIA

This infographic is from the Nations in Transit 2021 report by freedomhouse.org

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021

CZECH REP. UKRAINE

12 @ FreedomHouse #NationsInTransit FreedomHouse.org 13

HOPE AND PUSHBACK: HOW CITIZENS AND POLITICAL LEADERS

NURTURING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

COUNTERING THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021

CZECH REP. UKRAINE

12 @ FreedomHouse #NationsInTransit FreedomHouse.org 13

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: OVERVIEW OF SCORE CHANGES

Country Democracy Score Democracy % NDG EP CS IM LDG JFI CO

Kosovo 3.18 TO 3.14 36% t

Bulgaria 4.54 TO 4.50 58% t

Hungary 3.96 TO 3.71 45% t t t t t

Armenia 3.00 TO 2.96 33% t

Kyrgyzstan 1.96 TO 1.86 14% t t t

• Local Democratic Governance. Considers the Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes (1.00-2.00):

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: CATEGORY AND DEMOCRACY SCORE SUMMARY

Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, CATEGORIES:

Country NDG EP CS IM LDG JFI CO DS D%

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: DEMOCRACY SCORE HISTORY BY REGION

President Trustees Sushma Palmer

We are proud to partner with individual philanthropists, foundations, corporations, NGOs,

Freedom House identifies and analyzes

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