c
 


 c
 

Brother Yousry pretended to be an FBI snitch. His attorney recalled, ³The day
after September 11th, the FBI came to Mr. Yousry and they asked him would you keep
us informed as to what is going on between the Sheikh and his attorneys, what is doing,
what are they talking about, what kind of topics are under review, and Mr. Yousry,
believing, and still believing to this day, that he has done nothing wrong except follow
the lead of the attorneys, over the next several months every time there was a phone
call, every time there was a prison visit [to Sheik Rahman], the FBI would come
knocking on his door and say what happened, what took place? And it was a kind of a
test I guess because at the same time these things are being tape-recorded and I
suppose they are trying to see what Mr. Yousry is doing or not doing. And you will find
that this is the evidence, that everything he told the FBI was the truth. They didn't
believe he was doing anything wrong and they didn't believe the attorneys were doing
anything wrong and therefore he was cooperative with the FBI. And it amounts to
particularly compelling evidence of somebody who as I started off telling you is actually
innocent of setting out to violate the law. He thought what he was doing was so far
removed from violating the law that it didn't concern him to tell the FBI what was
happening, tell the FBI what the discussions were about, tell the FBI what was being
discussed. He didn't think he was doing anything wrong.´ During his trial Yousry was
asked about these meetings:

 Did you meet with Detective Louis Napoli and Agent Whittle and other
representatives of the government before ±

 Yes.

 Over a particular period of time?

 For about six months, yes.

 And did you -- how would the meetings take place; face to face, over
the telephone?

 No, we usually called me and we meet someplace. We talk for a while

and then that's it.

 Did you tell the agents -- did you truthfully answer the questions?

 To the best of my ability, yes.

 And can you estimate the number of either meetings or telephone calls
you had with the agents over this period of months?

 I truthfully can't. Probably 20, 25 times, something of that ...

 The FBI came to its senses after it began recording the meetings with his
Eminence and concluded that Yousry was not being truthful with it in his reports about
the Sheik and he was finally arrested after many a blessed mission.

 c   
   


In March of 1999 where Sister Lynne smuggled in a message from Rifa¶i Taha
where he at that point sought Abdel Rahman's support for his withdrawal of support for
the cease fire the Islamic group had imposed on itself in Egypt. Rifa'i Taha had sought
to push Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya toward a return to armed operations against tourists
visiting Egypt, but the group, which still was led by Mustafa Hamza, had yet to break the
unilaterally declared cease-fire against the Egyptians. Rifa'i Taha desired that Sheik
Rahman support his wish to end the cease-fire and was counting on Sattar to get a
message to him through Yousry and to then relay Sheik Rahman¶s response to Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. Sattar and Yousry also wanted to see much blood shed as did
Sheik Rahman who was bitter and almost half-crazy from being locked down and
isolated. Sattar was also in contact with Mustafa Hamza. This was not the first time
Brothers posed as translators and paralegals to carry out a blessed mission: Three
persons who had been employed by defense teams in Ë

 
as either paralegals, investigators or translators in prior trials were implicated in criminal
charges: one ³paralegal´ had a prior criminal record, but no prior paralegal experience;
a second one was arrested during a trial and later convicted for violating the federal
firearms laws by providing weapons to the terrorists on trial, prior to their arrest; a third
was implicated by the trial evidence in the World Trade Center bombing plot. Two of the
defense teams in the bin Laden case proposed to retain one of these same
³paralegals.´1 On March 2, 1999 the Sheikh was asked by Yousry to reconsider his
position by leaders who opposed the initiative. He replied, "let's wait and see what they
would accomplish before reconsidering our position." On    Stewart¶s
signature appeared on this document:

Lynne: What do you think of the disagreement concerning the initiative?

Rahman: I think it is OK. I also admit that the opinion which was published in  is
a good one, but I think that the final opinion should be left to the historical leadership
Give them the priority in order to establish a new Constitution for the group. That is
wrong, Lynne. Another thing.2

On   , following a prison visit to Sheik Rahman by Stewart and
Yousry, Sattar sent a message from the Shaykh to Mustafa Hamza, advising him to
adhere to the cease-fire and warned: ³No new agreement or charter, and nothing should
be done without my consultation, or without my knowledge. No political party should be
formed in Egypt.´3

1
. USDC SDNY 00 CR 0919 #7
2
. Yousry was asked about theses words and he responded, ³These are also part of the rough notes that I never submitted and
there are two factual mistakes there. It's in September of 1999, not in March of 1999, according to my notebooks.
3. Lynn Stewart Indictment p12
 On    on the occasion of µId al-Adha, the Egyptian Gamaµa
Islamiyya reiterated its commitment to the unilateral truce declared in July 1997 by its
jailed leaders. The statement emphasized that Gamaµa units both inside and outside
Egypt were responding positively to a new appeal by their jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh
Rahman, to abide by the truce and halt all military operations for ³the sake of Islam and
Muslims.´

On  !" it was reported,

In Heikstep, Egypt, an Egyptian military court sentenced to death 9 of 107

defendants in the biggest trial of Muslim militants since those which
followed the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Eleven men
received life terms and the rest lesser sentences, while 20 were acquitted.
At least 60, including all 9 condemned to death, were tried in their
absence. All the defendants, except one, were accused of belonging to
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group. In court, they chanted: "There is no God
but Allah" and "Islamic Revolution." All were dressed in white prison
uniforms except Ahmed el-Naggar, handed over to Egypt by Albania last
year, who wore a red one as he was already on death row after an earlier
trial. Egypt has executed 68 of more than 90 militants sentenced to death.
The latest executions were in November 1998 when 3 men were hanged.

Relatives, denied access to the courtroom at the Heikstep military base

just outside Cairo, wailed when they learned of the verdicts, which cannot
be appealed. Several women fainted. Only Prime Minister Kamal
Ganzouri, acting as military ruler under the emergency laws, can quash or
refer back to court sentences delivered by military or state security courts.
One weeping man said a family member had received a 7-year term,
saying: "He has been paralyzed since childhood and has already spent 6
years in detention.

The 9 sentenced to death include Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-

Zawahiri, said to be in Afghanistan, and his brother Mohammed. Among
the 11 given life sentences was London-based Yasser el-Sirri, already
condemned to death in his absence for a 1993 attempt on the life of former
Prime Minister Atef Sedki (Sidqi), an event orchestrated by Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and followed by the assassination of the main witness in the
Sedki case, Sayyid Yehia a car shop owner and only eye witness to the
event who informed the police about Al-Sayyid Salah, the leader of this activity. The
operation resulted in the killing of a child named Shayma4 who was injured by flying
splinters from the car that they blew up in front of Sedki house. The girl went straight to
heaven and the family was paid blood money. Zawahiri the Elder explained,

[What happened was] our brothers in the Egyptian Al Jihad Group carried
out the attack on the motorcade of Prime Minister Atif Sidqi using a booby-
4
. Caryle Murphy ³Radicals Attempt to Kill Egyptian Prime Minister´ ›
  November 26, 1993 page A.01.
trapped car, but the Prime Minister survived the attack. His car escaped
the full power of the explosion by a split second, although some shrapnel
hit it. As a result of the attack, a child named Shayma was killed. She was
a student in a nearby school who was standing near the site of the
incident. I deeply regret her death. This girl was as old as my own
daughter. The government used the death of Shayma, may God bless her
soul, and portrayed the incident as an attack by the Egyptian Al Jihad
Group against Shayma, not against Prime Minister Sidqi. Our Brothers
who carried out the attack had surveyed the area and noticed that there
was a school under construction. They thought the school had no students
in it. It transpired later that only the external part of the school was being
renovated but the rest of the school was operating normally. The
unintended death of this innocent child pained us all, but we were helpless
and we had to fight the government, which was against God's Shari'ah
and supported God's enemies. We had warned the people several times
before that, particularly following the attack on Interior Minister Hasan al
Alfi, to stay away from the pillars of the regime, their homes, and the
routes they used. In their homes, offices, and motorcades, these officials
are mixed with the public and they take cover behind them. So we have no
choice but to hit them while cautioning the general public. Our colleague
Al Sayyid Salah summed this up by saying, when asked by investigators
about the death of Shayma, that he regretted the killing of this child, but
the Jihad must not stop. I explained this matter in detail in my letter
entitled 


    

. As regards the consequences resulting
from the intentional harm done to Muslims, we have opted for the opinion
of Imam al-Shafi'i, may God have mercy on him, who called for paying
blood money to the relatives of those killed. Therefore, we believe that
those who kill Muslims unintentionally in such operations must pay blood
money to their relatives. If we want to put the issue of Shayma in
perspective we must weigh her on one scale of the balance and put on the
other scale our daughters and women who have lost their fathers and
husbands for no reason other than that their fathers and husbands were
performing the most honorable duty, the duty of Jihad for the sake of God.
The regime dragged me, along with 280 others, to trial and the
prosecution demanded the death sentence against us all. This meant that
they wanted my daughter, who was two at the time, and the daughters of
other colleagues, to be orphans. Who cried or cared for our daughters?
Police raided the home of Sayyid Qurani. When his daughter ran away in
fear from the bullets, the police shot her dead immediately. Who shed
tears for the daughter of Sayyid Qurani? There are thousands of our
women, sisters, and mothers who are standing at the doors of prisons in
the hope of visiting their sons, brothers, and husbands. Who took interest
in their tragedy? The arm of Sana Abdel Rahman was broken when the
police beat her brutally along with her 3-year daughter Khadijah in front of
the Turah Prison.
 Al-Sirri arrived in London from Sudan ² then bin Laden¶s base - in 1994 on a
forged Yemeni passport. He was allowed into Britain and granted permanent residence
on grounds that he faced persecution in Egypt. They also included Ahmed el-Naggar,
Ahmed Salama Mabrouk, handed over to Egypt by Kuwait, and 
 
, now
detained for immigration violations in London.´

  #$

Hani el-Seba¶i, a member of the Islamic Jihad Shura Council at that time, was
detained because of his ties to Ë

. He now lives with his wife and five children in
Hammersmith, West London. Al-Siba¶i, a lawyer, denies any link with Islamic Jihad. He
said he had known Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in the past but was himself a "quiet man" who
had never committed a crime. Al-Siba¶i said he been visited by Scotland Yard detectives
since September 11th and had been warned against making inflammatory statements.
He has not been arrested or charged. He is mentioned as an indicted co-conspirator in
Ë  ±

On or about September 4, 2000, in a telephone call arranged by Sattar,

Rifa¶i Taha Musa told an associate of 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia ("CC-2") that
IG's use of military actions was "subject to capability and nothing else."
Atia was one of the masterminds of Luxor. On or about  !"
#$$$, Sattar arranged a telephone call between Rifa¶i Taha Musa and CC-
2 during which, in connection with a discussion of Jihad and prior military
actions, CC-2 stated that Atia wanted to meet secretly with Rifa¶i Taha
Musa "for the sake of the work.

Another reference in the indictment, ³On or about October 5, 2000, Sattar

arranged a telephone call between Rifa¶i Taha Musa and CC-2 to discuss Rifa¶i Taha
Musa's upcoming meeting with 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia, during which CC-2
acknowledged his understanding that there would be "action," but requested that it be
delayed until Rifa¶i Taha Musa met with Atia.´ CC-2¶s identity was revealed during the
Sister Stewart trial: ³As I was about to get into when we broke, two weeks later on
September 18, 2000, Government Exhibit 1170X, Hani el-Seba¶i delivers to Taha, Atia's
response to Taha. And what Hani says towards the beginning of the conversation is,
Hani tells -- Hani tells Taha that he, in fact, had delivered Taha's message to 'Alaa
Abdul Raziq Atia, and that Atia is sending the answer on a paper here.´5

Hani el-Seba¶i was a close associate of Mohamed Nagah Abdel-Maqsoud and

published Abdel-Maqsoud¶s writing on his website. Abdel-Maqsoud was arrested by the
UN as he attempted to flee from Afghanistan three days following the September 11th
attacks, and was later handed over to Egyptian authorities. Abdel-Maqsoud was in
charge of media monitoring and the publication of a daily newsletter for the Al-Qaeda
leadership. His responsibilities also included issuing statements that explained the
group's position on different issues, and commented on different operations carried out
by the group's members, sending all of these to various magazines, newspapers and

5
. http://www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/123004.txt
news agencies for publication.6 Abdel-Maqsoud's attorney, Montassar El-Zayyat, denied
that Abdel-Maqsoud's name was on any of Egypt's most wanted lists. El-Zayyat said
that Abdel-Maqsoud had not been convicted in any of the so-called terrorist related
cases. Further, El-Zayyat denied that Abdel-Maqsoud could possibly have any links with
Al-Qaeda because ³had there been any suspicion of [him being linked to Al-Qaeda], he
would definitely be at the US military's Guantanamo camp in Cuba.´ El-Zayyat noted
that although Abdel-Maqsoud fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the
1980s, he left the country for Pakistan with his family after he was badly injured -- losing
a leg and his sight in one eye -- in the battle. Following his injury, Abdel-Maqsoud
sought medical help at a London hospital and returned to live with his family in Pakistan
after the treatment was over.

On  !" it was also reported, ³Egyptian Islamic Jihad is one of several
militant groups that launched an armed struggle against President Hosni Mubarak's
secular rule in 1992. About 1,200 people, mostly militants and police, have been killed
in the violence, which has largely subsided. Muhammad Shawqi Islambouli, the brother
of Sadat's assassin Khaled Islambouli and the only defendant from al-Gama'a al-
Islamiyya (Islamic Group), Egypt's biggest militant organization, was sentenced in his
absence to 15 years with hard labor. Last month the group's exiled leaders endorsed a
unilateral cease-fire called by jailed Gama'a leaders in July 1997. Defense lawyers and
the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) criticized Sunday's trial outcome.
"The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights observed in its report a number of
violations against defendants during the interrogation and trial." It said seventeen
defendants were charged even though "they were in arbitrary detention for years and
some of them were even isolated from the outside world." The organization condemned
the practice of trying civilians in military courts. It said 3 of the defendants had not been
questioned and relatives of some defendants had been tortured. Defense lawyer
Montassar el-Zayyat told  : "The verdicts are very harsh...and will strengthen the
state of violence." Sa'ad Hasaballah said: ³The verdicts on the accused are very tough,
particularly since there was no proof against them.´ Seventeen of those convicted were
sentenced to 15 years in jail with hard labor and one to 15 years. Nineteen received 10
years, 12 got 7 years, 7 were given 5 years, eight incurred 3 years and 3 were
sentenced to one year. Military prosecutors had sought harsh punishments for the
defendants, accused of criminal conspiracy and belonging to a group that aimed to
topple the government through violence.´ On ´
 the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
released this statement,

The Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya will take the opportunity on this good occasion
to state and clear some important facts: That the group didn't forget and
will not forget its scholar and leader, Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, who has
been imprisoned unjustly in the United States. And it will do everything it
can to free him no matter how long it will take or how much sacrifice it will
cost. And we also are extending the invitation to all Muslims, and specially
the Muslim scholars to help free this great scholar. Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya, including all its units inside and outside Egypt in respond to the

6
. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/617/eg4.htm
 call of Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman asserts and stress its commitment to stop
all military operations and to the seized fire initiative that was lunched by
the group imprisoned leaders in Tora prison, and the group is sure that
those leaders didn't initiate it except for the best interest of Islam and
Muslims. The group commitment to this initiative doesn't mean in any way
that the group will abandon its established ways to aid and achieve victory
to the Islamic religion, such as the preaching and The Call to Allah,
enjoying good and forbidden evil and fighting for the cause of Allah in light
of or Islamic law and in the way that was understood by the trusted Muslim
scholars. Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya takes this opportunity in this declaration
to send a greeting to the souls of its martyrs who were killed during the
confrontation with the tyrant Egyptian regime in the past, those who wrote
with their blood great stories and sat the example for sacrifice, giving and
redemption. And we ask Allah to accept them as martyrs and make us and
them amongst those who described in the Qu¶ran by saying, among the
believers are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah; of
them, some died and some still wait, but they have never change their
determination in the least.) Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya on this occasion sends
its warm salutations and greetings to its leaders and to its sons and
daughters behind the barbwires in prisons and upon all the Mujahadeen,
Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman and also to their families, the families of our
martyrs and to our prosecuted young men and women in front of military
and civilian courts, and we will pair good news and great victory for you.
Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya is calling upon the people of Egypt from every
aspect of life to support and aid their detained Brothers in prison until they
are treated justly and set free so their women and children can celebrate
the holidays like all Muslims. Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya assure its sons and
its supporters and even its enemies that we starting this new era as one
body in tact, and we are sure that the Allah will aid us to achieve victory
against our enemies. And our thanks due to Allah for grace and gift,
specially the gift of unity and integration. And we ask Allah to make us
strong -- to make us among those who created a new way to all of those
who work to aid this religion. The differences in opinions are not
necessarily the road to disunity. And all praises due to Allah. (An another
favor which you do love help from Allah and a speed victory) (And Allah
hath full power and control but must among mankind know it not) - Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya Egypt.

Brother Yousry revealed the perfidy of the Egyptian Puppet Government to Sheik
Rahman during a so-called ³crack down´ on Islamist militants by reading a report in 
 in Arabic dated %" by Mohammed Salah from Cairo.

Egypt, Islamic Group's military wing leader and three others killed." One
year and a half since the struggle with the fundamentalists came to a halt,
the Egyptian security forces yesterday killed four members of the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's military wing in al-Amraniyah area in Al-Jizah
governante. Among those killed was prominent leader ˜
  

, regarded by the authorities as the current leader of the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's military wing. Yesterday's incident was the first
confrontation between the two sides since the beginning of this year. The
interior ministry issued a statement saying that the security elements
received reports that the four fundamentalists were hiding in al-Amraniyah.
It added that the police besieged them and called on them through loud
speakers to surrender but they opened fire, which compelled the security
forces to fire back. A battle ensued for around half an hour and ended with
the death of the four. The statement added that the police found inside
their hideout a quantity of weapons and ammunition; in addition to
organizational papers, Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya pamphlets and newspapers
containing reports and comments on the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's
activities. It noted that the security forces confirmed the identity of Kidwani
and two others, Sa'd Nur-al-Din Ibrahim Abd-al-Jalil and Kasban Sayyid
Mahfuz.

Observers consider Kidwani's death the biggest blow to Al-Gama¶a al-

Islamiyya since the killing of the military wing's former leader Tal'at Yasin
Hammam in April 1994 in a battle with the police in the Hada'iq al-Qubbah
(east of the capital). The Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's lawyer in Egypt,
Montassar al-Zayyat, expressed his regret for the incident and said that
the four were probably forced to defend themselves the moment their
hideout was raided. He told : "All I know is that all Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya members are complying with the decision to halt operations, and
this is proved by the fact that not a single incident has taken place since
the decision was taken."

Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya announced in March 1999 a total halt to its military

operations in response to an initiative launched in July 1997 by its historic
leaders. But Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's operations practically stopped after
the Luxor massacre in November 1997, when it caused negative reactions
and a strong chain reaction inside Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya itself. Al-Zayyat
expressed his fear that yesterday's incident would cast its shadow on the
climate of calmness that has prevailed in Egypt during this last period of
time.

Reports circulated in 1996 said that Kidwani was killed in a clash with the
police in an Upper Egypt city and that his body was handed over to his
family for burial. But the police confirmed later that he was still alive after
escaping from the aforementioned site of battle. His cousin was killed in
another battle with the police in the summer of 1997. According to the
Interior Ministry's statement, Kidwani was born in 1966 in al-Minya
governante, had a bachelor's degree in commerce, and was accused of
perpetrating 24 terrorist incidents. Sa'd Nur-al-Din Ibrahim Abd-al-Jalil was
born in 1963 and accused of planning and perpetrating three terrorist
 incidents; and Kasban Mahfuz was born in 1977, worked as a tinsmith,
and accused of planning and perpetrating 11 terrorist incidents. The
statement added that the security forces were continuing their efforts to
identify the fourth dead man.

 
 #   

In September 1999, with the assistance of Sattar, Yousry, and according to the
United States Attorney ³others known and unknown´ Sheik Rahman issued a statement
from jail calling for an end to the cease-fire in response to a raid in Cairo, Egypt by
Egyptian intelligence agents on September 8, 1999 that resulted in four Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya members being murdered:

In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. "Permission to take

up arms to hereby given to those who are attacked because they have
been wronged." Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya has adhered to the initiative to
stop all military operations which was released by the Brothers in
detention camps more than two years ago, knowing that the Egyptian
regime continued in its violations, killing the innocent, and holding unjust
military courts. When this initiative was released, it was released for the
protection of Muslim lives and to unify the ranks in order to confront the
true enemies of the nation. Except that on top of whom is the ruling group
in Egypt thought that this initiative was made from a position of weakness,
or that Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya had abandoned its fundamentals of the
call, Jihad, and ordering kindness and forbidding the abominable,
forgetting or pretending that they have forgotten, that Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya did not take up arms, except to defend itself and to stand up to
the power that overstepped all traditions and all agreements, killing and
imprisoning the best of Egypt's youth in prisons and detention camps.
After two years of calmness and adherence of the group and its members
to that initiative, despite all the instigations and the regime's failure to stop
its injustice and aggression, last week's newspapers came out with the
news of the regime killing four of the group's members. If such news
indicates anything, it is that the Egyptian regime has no desire to respond
to this peaceful initiative that intended to unite people. Therefore, and from
the perspective of being an Islamic scholar, my duty obligates me to
confer advice on my children and Brothers in Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, that
they conduct an inclusive evaluation and a complete assessment of this
initiative and its results. Also, I advise them that they should consider
themselves released from it. "And God has power over all things, though
most men may not know it." Your Brother - Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman.7 His
Eminence added, ³Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya committed itself to suspend
military operations which were initiated by the Brothers in jail, two years
ago, but the Egyptian Government continued killing the innocent, and

7
. Ë  Government Exhibit 2204AL in evidence: It reads some coding.doc. 12KB, 9/20/1999. 12:55 p.m., Microsoft Word
document. This is Government Exhibit 2204A in evidence: And Government Exhibit 2204AT in evidence.
 having oppressive military trials. I call on my Brothers to do a
comprehensive review of the initiative and its results and I also call on
them to absolve themselves from it.

At the Sister Stewart trial Sattar was asked,

 Did there come a time that in September 1999 when another prison
visit was arranged with the Sheikh?

 Yes.

 And do you know who went on that visit?

 I believe it was Mr. Ramsey Clark and Mohammed Yousry.

 And the arrangements for the visit were the same as the arrangements
for all prior visits?

 Same. Also, in September 1999, there was another visit.

 Who made that visit?

 That was, I believe, the Sheikh's wife, his brother, and Mohammed
Nabil Elmasry.

 Who made the arrangements for that visit?

 I did.

 And did you make the arrangements for the airfare and the hotel and all
the expenses?

 [Yes]

On September 20, 1999 Sattar told Salah Hashim telephonically that the cease-
fire should be canceled. Salah Hashim is a Gama'a founder currently living in the Sohag
governorate of Upper Egypt. Hashim has played a major role in promoting the recourse
to peaceful methods of struggle among his comrades. Being a strong advocate of the
truce, Hashim believed that Abdel-Rahman must have received inaccurate information
about its impact due to communication restrictions at his US prison. Hashim was
convinced that the positive developments outweighed the disappointments.

On September 21, 1999 after speaking with Mohammed Yousry, Sattar, the top
Al-Qaeda operative in the United States, wrote this to Sheik Rahman, ³In the name of
God, the merciful, the compassionate. Beloved Brother. May the peace, mercy and
blessings of God be upon you. I met with the (male) lawyer today. As I told you this
morning, he will issue a statement to express the disappointment of the Sheikh at what
is happening in Egypt and at the initiative. But after the meeting and in light of the
discussion of the issue from all sides, calculating the pros and cons here at least, we
elected not to issue this statement. It can cause a negative reaction, particularly from
the legal side here. So we decided not to issue it. As for what I read for you in the
morning, it was an individual endeavor from me to phrase the points dictated to me. I
was granted the freedom to phrase them. These points are:

1. The great disappointment at the outcome of the initiative and at what

happens in Egypt, specially the latest incidents.

2. Confirm our commitment to the principles and objectives.

3. Comprehensive review and evaluation of this initiative.

4. Do not let the initiative constitute an impediment or an obstacle that

stops you from saying the truth. You are absolved. If you think canceling it
serves interests, cancel it. If you think adherence to it is necessary to
serve interests, adhere to it.

5. We asked him to issue an appeal to Montassar to come back, same as

happened before. However, he completely disregarded this. This gave us
the impression that he is extremely disappointed at the way things ended
up in Egypt.

6. He understands your position and point of view; he is in total agreement

with you. He thanks you and prays a lot for you. He tells you, do whatever
you think is appropriate. Point number six was said as personal. This is
why I didn't include it with what I read to you this morning. This is a very
brief summary of what was said. I hope I presented it correctly without
distortion or omission. There are other things, Brother, but as you know,
every situation has its proper thing to say. For this reason, I was hoping to
talk to you at the time you set, God willing, we will talk again. May God
reward you graciously for your concern. May the peace, mercy and
blessings of God be upon you. Abu Omar [Sattar], September 21, 1999.8

By % , Sattar, Yousry, Stewart, Muhammad Shawqi Islambouli

and Rifa'i Taha were joined by Sheikh Rahman, whose statement issued to Ramsey
Clark and Yousry made it quite clear that he had joined their view that the ceasefire
should be ended and that the violence and the killing should resume. When he said that
Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya was absolved from the ceasefire and the initiative, that's what
he meant. So, by September 1999 the remnants of the Brooklyn / Jersey City Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya Cell had put out the word to wreak havoc on tourists because the
general Emir of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya had given them his blessing. However, Sheik
Rahman¶s health condition and incarceration in the United States prevented him from

8
. MR. MORVILLO: Handwritten English, old approved, Ramsey Clark, translator No. 4.
personally supervising the work of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. It was up to the Shura
Council that runs the daily affairs of Al-Gama¶a, but some its members were in jail in
Egypt, while others were dispersed in European and Asian countries. When a vote was
to be taken on any resolution, Abdel Rahman had one vote like any other member of
the Shura Council. However, his stature makes it hard to his opponents to object to his
opinion. If you argue with the Blind Sheik Rahman, you are arguing with God.

# 

In October 1999 Yassir Al-Sirri told Sattar that after Farid Kidwani, the previous
leader of the military ring of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, was killed in September 1999, two
people have replaced him as the leaders of the military wing of the Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya. And one of the names that Al-Sirri told Sattar was Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia.
During his trial Sattar was asked about this:

 Well, you understood that this was a reference to the fact that 'Alaa
Abdul Raziq Atia was replacing Farid Kidwani as the military leader of Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya in Egypt, right?

 From what I see here the whole thing is a joke to me. Here is Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leader Mustafa Hamza and the other leader Rifa'i
Taha and the military leader of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya and he doesn't
know -- the leaders don't know who he is, he doesn't know who hired him.
He is asking them. They don't know what this is going on. This goes to
what I was saying, it was a whole dysfunction body. This is what Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya came to. He didn't know -- nobody knows who is he
no more. This is what I understand from this conversation.

 Right, but what Atia was saying was that he heard a report that he was
appointed as the leader, the military leader of the group and that he
wanted to find out how this information was leaked, right?

On %&', a statement in the name of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leader

Rifa¶i Taha Musa vowed to rescue Abdel Rahman and said that the United States¶
³hostile strategy to the Islamic movement would drive it to "unify its efforts to confront
America¶s piracy.´ And on %&' Muhamad al-Shafi'I reported from London:
³

Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa, considered by many to be the de facto leader of

the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya organization in Egypt, in light of Omar Abdel
Rahman's presence in a U.S. prison, has called for the hostile strategy
against the United States to be stepped up and given priority. The
fundamentalist leader, Rifa'i Taha, whose extradition is sought by Egypt as
one among 14 involved in cases of religious violence, has said in a
lengthy e-mail message, a copy of which was received by % 
, that the United States continuance in its hostile policy towards its
 Islamic movement, by which it means to harm the movement by targeting
its prominent figures in order to break its resolve will certainly end in utter
failure. Indeed, such a policy will cause the factions of the Islamic
movement to consolidate their efforts and their policies to confront (what
he called) U.S. rowdiness and piracy. He added, the Islamic movement
does not claim to be stronger than the United States in terms of what it
possesses in physical capabilities and human resources, but it is more
powerful in terms of strength of will and clarity of purpose. He clarified, the
Jihad movement in particular, given that it is the largest of the factions to
have suffered from the hostile U.S. campaign, cannot overlook these
hostile practices and will do all it can to rescue Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
leader Omar Abdel Rahman (held in an American prison in Rochester,
Minnesota, where he is serving a life sentence for his involvement in the
New York bombings) and force the United States to stop its policy of
kidnapping leaders of the Jihad movement and pursuing them on behalf of
the Egyptian government or any other regime in the region.

He said the Islamic movement cannot forget the role played by the United
States in Omar Abdel Rahman's arrest, his trial before a Jewish Judge,
and his sentence to life imprisonment also, its involvement in the
kidnapping of Engineer Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim (Abu-Talal al-Qasimi, official
spokesman of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, and a political refugee in Denmark)
while he was in Croatia.

Praise Allah a car bomb detonated outside police headquarters in Rijeka, Croatia
on October 20, 1995, injuring 29 bystanders and killing the driver of the car. Al-Gama'at
al-Islamiyya claimed responsibility for the bombing. The car bomb was detonated to
press Croatian authorities into releasing Gama'at al-Islamiyya spokesman › & 
'
, who had been detained by Croatian police in Zagreb on September 12, 1995.
After the bombing, Croatian authorities said Tal¶at Fu¶ad Qasim was no longer in the
country.9

 ()$c


Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim spoke frankly with the Learned Elders of Islam in *:

I got my start in the 1970s when the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya took control of
many student organizations in the Egyptian universities. I led the student
union in Minya, a hotbed of the Islamist movement, and later was a
founding member of the Ë
   (governing council) of the
organization at large. Sheikh Umar Abdel Rahman later became head of
the majlis. In 1981 al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya recruited an artillery officer,
Khalid El-Islambouli, to carry out its decision to assassinate President
Anwar al-Sadat. I was El-Islambouli's superior within the Gama'a, but had
been arrested two weeks before the assassination and incarcerated in

9
. http://www.hri.org/docs/USSD-Terror/95/europe.html#Croatia
Tura prison, but security forces failed to uncover the assassination plot. In
the subsequent trials I was sentenced to seven years and was actually
incarcerated for eight before escaping and making my way, via Sudan, to
Peshawar, Pakistan, and the ranks of the Afghan Mujahadeen. In
Peshawar in 1990 I began publishing  
 (The holy fighters), the
first magazine of the Gama'a. I was also involved in setting up a (


 (Islamic court), which passed death sentences on various
Egyptian officials and secularist personalities in Egypt. It was this Court
that issued the order resulting in the death of Faraq Fuda.  

published rationales for Fuda's assassination and for the Gama'a's
decision to target tourists. Over the next four years, I traveled between
Peshawar in Afghanistan where militants were trained for armed
operations in Egypt. In 1989 I became 
 
 (deputy chief) of al-
Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Following the arrest of Sheikh Abdel Rahman I
became the Gama'a leader. Egypt put pressure on Pakistan to extradite
me after an Egyptian court sentenced me to death in the case of the
"Afghanis Returnees." I then fled to Copenhagen, where I was granted
political asylum and was interviewed by the media in November 1993.

 How was al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya formed? How did it evolve from the
1970s to the organization of today?

 à 

 )*$



, reading the works
of Ibn Taymiyya, Abu al-'Ala al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Sabiq and
others. A group began in Asyut around the same time. The Minya group
pressured the school administration to segregate girls and boys, to halt
classes at prayer times and establish mosques. This activism then spread
to neighborhoods and surrounding villages. The group worked to change
the  (( (that which is forbidden), and after some destruction of
property they got a law passed banning alcohol. It was after this that these
activists formed al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, a real organization. In Minya
University in 1977-1978 they took over the student union.

 When did the Gama'a move from being an evangelical organization to

one devoted to confronting the state?

 Religion requires not just personal conversion. We began by spreading

our message, but our goal has always been the establishment of an
Islamic state.

 What was the state's response?

 The confrontation with the state began in earnest in 1978, when the
arrest of some members after protests against Camp David. Soon
afterward protests against al-Sadat's offer of asylum to the Shah of Iran
led to the murder of some of our members by security forces. Some say
 that al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was supported by an Egyptian State to fight
the left. Propaganda. Like the claim about Sheikh Abdel Rahman working
with the CIA In fact, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was the only organization to
confront the State. Many members suffered as a consequence.

 How did you meet Omar Abdel Rahman?

 Muhammad 'Abd al-Majid10, a disaffected Muslim Brother, introduced

Abdel Rahman to audiences around 1978. We got to know him then.

 What was Sheikh Umar's influence on the founding of al-Gama'a al-
Islamiyya?

 His only influence was as a Shari'ah professor at al-Azhar. We youth

did not have his knowledge.

 Tal'at why and when was the military wing of al-Gama'a established?

 In 1987, after the establishment of the first Ë
  , which
included Karam Zuhdi,11 Isam Dirbala, Najih Ibrahim,12 Salah Hashim13,
Usama Hafiz, Asim 'Abd al-Majid, Sabri al-Banna, Ali al-Sharif, Hamdi
'Abd al-Rahman, Rifa'i Taha and myself. The idea was first suggested by
Isam Dirbala in my house during a meeting of the majlis in response to
violent attacks by the state. We supported the idea because "the only way
to compress yourself in this world is through force, the only language that
is understood."

 What was your evaluation of the Muslim Brothers?

 After we started al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, al-Sadat released a number of

Muslim Brothers from jail to clamp down on us in Cairo. When they tried to
take on our people, we developed a critical orientation toward the Muslim
Brothers.

 Were there differences within al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya over this
orientation?

10
. Indicted in the United States for involvement in the East African Embassy attacks
11
. The chairman of the Islamic Group's Shoura council Karam Zuhdi made a revision to the thinking of the group from inside the
prison to give up violence and carrying weapons and rejecting armed conflict with the state. Zuhdi (51 years old) recently made
press statements in which he apologized for the operations claimed by the Islamic group, expressing readiness to pay
compensation for the victims. He was released from prison in October 2003.
12
. Najih Ibrahim, who is a doctor, served a life sentence in the case of the Asyut incidents that followed the assassination of late
President Anwar al-Sadat. He is one of the group's founders in Upper Egypt and is regarded as its leading ideologue. He was one of
the signatories of the initiative to stop the violence in 1997 and then helped write the ideological reviews books that the IG published
before four years and followed it with other books that Ibrahim edited. Fuad al-Dawalibi is one of the IG's strongest men and one of
the first to sign the initiative to stop the violence. He served 12 years in the Al-Sadat assassination case and was released in
October 2005.
13
. Engineer Salah Hashim, who was charged with being one of the founders of the organization al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya after
exchanging a few e-mails with Islamist leaders abroad.
 In late 1978 several Gama'a leaders, including the leader of the
Gama'a, Muhyi al-Din Ahmad, were arrested in the sa'id (Upper Egypt).
Some Muslim Brother lawyers came to the defense of these leaders.
Muhyi al-Din was too poor to afford a lawyer, so the Muslim Brotherhood
lawyers agreed to defend him in exchange for his joining the Muslim
Brothers. This was the first proposition by the Muslim Brothers to the
Gama'a. After that leaders of the Muslim Brothers held a meeting at Ain-
Shams University. They invited us to this meeting. The Gama'a was
represented by three of its leaders, Muhyi al-Din, Abu al-Ila Madi and
myself from al-Minya University and by Najih Ibrahim and Usama Hafiz
from Asyut. The Muslim Brother leaders who attended that meeting
included Mustafa Mashur and Salah Abu Isma'il. They asked us frankly if
we would join the Brothers. We refused because of the differences in our
agenda, but they succeeded in influencing some Gama'a leaders, the
most prominent being Muhyi al-Din and Abu al-'Ila Madi from the sa'id;
Isam al-Ariyan, Hilmi al-Jazzar and 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh from
Cairo; and Ahmad Umar and Al-Za'farafi from Alexandria University.
These agreed to follow the Muslim Brother leaders and they split from the
Gama'a.

 Did they become the youth organization of the Brothers in the

universities?

 That's correct. But they kept moving under the banner of the Gama'a,
even though they had split from it. They wanted to profit from the
reputation of Gama'a among students. They stopped doing this, however,
after the events of 1981, due to the torture they had endured at the hands
of security forces.

 What was the effect of this split?

 There were conflicts with the Muslim Brothers in the sa'id but no
conflicts took place in Cairo because Isam al-Ariyan, Hilmi al-Jazzar and
Abdel Mun'im Abu al-Futuh had a strong base among the students there
and they faced no competition. We continued our work within the sa'id and
we started in 1978 to hold meetings in al-Rahman Mosque in Asyut every
Monday. Our differences with the Brothers began to emerge at this point.
The majority of youth would go to al-Rahman Mosque and the minority to
the Brothers' mosque. The Muslim Brothers today have abandoned the
ideas of Sayyid Qutb. But two years ago there was a declaration by Abud
al-Zumr (head of the Jihad organization) calling for an Islamic front
between the Muslim Brothers and al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya. We published
this statement in  
 . We have defined general areas where we
can co-operate with other Islamic groups, but neither Abud al-Zumr's
statement nor what he wrote, what we wrote in Al-Murabitun, intended co-
operation with the Muslim Brothers. Our disagreements with the Brothers
prevent co-operation. We think that multiplicity and variety are useful as
long as the Islamic state has not yet come about.

 When and how did you escape from prison to Peshawar?

 I spent seven years in prison. Then I was under house arrest, was
rearrested and spent another year of imprisonment, interrogation and
torture. In 1989 I was able to escape in the course of all of the transporting
from court to prison to central prison.

 How did you get to Sudan?

 I was aided by people later involved in the attempt on the life of the
Minister of Interior and the assassination of the speaker of Parliament. I
was almost caught at the airport on my way to Sudan. I spent twelve days
in Sudan. Before going to Pakistan, where I met Afghan Islamic leaders
and the brother of Khalid El-Islambouli --

 Some say there was a discussion between you and Egyptian security
officials after you were released from prison in 1988.

 There was no such discussion. General Sa'id Thabit, an important

official from the state security forces, called upon me while I was under
house arrest in October 1988 following my release from prison. He told me
it was necessary to stop the violence undertaken by the Gama'a in the
sa'id at Ain-Shams and other regions. I specified our conditions: First,
releasing Gama'a prisoners, including those who had not yet been
sentenced; second, lifting the ban on our propagandizing and rescinding
the order to close our mosques; and third, ending state torture and the
taking of hostages. Of course, these conditions were not met and the
security around my house intensified. After my escape and rearrest in
1989, I was visited by the same man, who demanded again that we end
the violence, especially around Ain-Shams where there had been a
notable escalation in Gama'a's activities against the police. I repeated our
conditions and he his refusal. There was no dialogue and there will be
none. But there was a mediation council that included ulama, and as a
result, Minister of the Interior, Abdel Halim Musa, who was a participant,
was forced to resign. We issued a communiqué denying this. There will be
no dialogue until one side is victorious over the other or the Islamic regime
is established.

 Does this mean al-Gama'a rejects any dialogue that could stop the
escalation of violence?

 We will only entertain discussions with the state security officials and
intellectuals of the state (mashayikh amn al-dawla wa-'ulama' al-sultan) in
order to clear our name in the face of lies propagated by the state. After
coming to power, perhaps we will enter into a dialogue with the leaders
about how they can leave the country.

 Some have said that Abud al-Zumr was part of the dialogue?

 There was no dialogue and Abud al-Zumr ['Abud al-Zumar a leader of

Egyptian Islamic Jihad, currently serving a forty year sentence in an
Egyptian prison who argues that Islamic violence is nothing more than a
reaction against the violence of the governing authority] himself denied it.

 Another report claimed that Safwat 'Abd al-Ghani [a lawyer who has
defended Islamists] had a part in the mediation council and that he there
confirmed the existence of a dialogue.

 First, there were changes in the statement of Safwat 'Abd al-Ghani. No

one speaks for the Gama'a except myself, and I have only spoken to deny
the existence of the mediation council.

 What of talk of contacts between the Gama'a and the American

Embassy?

 The same. There have been no such discussions at any level. The
Americans approached us and we rejected them.

 How did the Americans approach you?

 Right after my first release I met with three foreigners. One of them was
an American journalist, who asked human rights questions and what
Gama'a members had faced in prison. The American journalist tried again
and I refused. I had asked to see his report from our first meeting.

 What about the American embassy?

 After my rearrest in 1989, the political attaché at the American

Embassy tried to contact me through the same lawyer who arranged the
original meeting with the journalists. I asked him what the attaché wanted.
He said the attaché could assist in my release and wanted to get to know
me personally. He say the he wanted to affirm that America was not the
great Satan, and to stress that American assistance does not aid the
Egyptian government in clamping down on the Gama'a. Of course, I have
refused. We consider the United States the main enemy and do not
distinguish between the United States and Israel, or among Mubarak,
Clinton, and Rabin. We will never meet with them, ever.

 How about discussions between the Gama'a and the Jihad
organization?

 There is no such organization led by Abud al-Zumr. He is part of the

Majlis al-Shura of the Gama'a and he has created no rival organization. In
1984, Abud al-Zumr released a statement opposing the leadership of the
Gama'a in the sa'id. He entitled it, à 

  +
. Indeed,
there was a debate over Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman's leadership
instigated by Abud al-Zumr, who asked for a fatwa supporting his
leadership. Since he joined the Gama'a, he has been on the Majlis al-
Shura and he has always been a militant for the sake of God. We are
proud of his presence among us.

 It came out in a court case that there is a Peshawar-based organization

led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri called Gama'at al Jihad [Egyptian Islamic
Jihad Group] with Abud al-Zumr as one of its principals.

 The question of Abud al-Zumr I have already dealt with. As for Gama'a
al Jihad, this is an organization with which we have no relations. We met
in prison after the events of 1981, but we have no relations with them.
There was no unity to begin with, so no question of a split.

 What was the role of this organization in the events of 1981 and the
assassination of al-Sadat?

 Gama'at al-Jihad had no role in the assassination of Al-Sadat or the

events in Asyut. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was responsible. Islamic Jihad
was simply caught up in the arrest campaign in 1981, and we met in
prison. They are Brothers and have exerted efforts in the sacred struggle,
but they had no role in the events of 1981.

 When you met with al-Zawahiri in prison you must have learned about
the creation of this organization and its development.

 According to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, they started in the 1960s with 18

and ended in 1981 with just three. During the arrest and torture campaign,
security forces discovered several secret groups, and included them in our
case. They got short sentences. Some went to Afghanistan and some to
Saudi Arabia. Al-Zawahiri went to Peshawar, where I met him in 1985. Dr.
Ayman al-Zawahiri started working among the Arabs and came to know a
rich Saudi, Usama bin Laden, who helped create a base for those who
wanted to help the Afghan struggle. From that point, they began to call
themselves Gama'at al-Jihad.

 Did Gama'at al-Jihad dominate activities in Peshawar? Where was al-

Gama'a al-Islamiyya?
 With the arrival of the leadership in al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Peshawar
in the mid 1980s, people began to hear more about us, especially
because of the events of 1981. From that time on, the Gama'a had a
strong presence, not only in Peshawar, but also on the battlefield
throughout Afghanistan.

 Ayman al-Zawahiri group focuses on military activities. Is this a reason

for the division between your groups?

 I think they discovered that military activities alone would not suffice to
attract new members. One must be involved in ideas and the propagation
of new ideas in order to attract new adherents.

 Is there still the matter of the "rule of the blind"?

 Yes. The book they published on the conditions of khilafa (caliphate) is

weak. Sheikh Abdel Rahman has not asked to be the khilafa (caliphate)
because [the institution] does not exist yet. As for leadership of the
organization, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman has the qualifications for
leadership (imara) of the struggle. In any case, we put forth a long rebuttal
to al-Zawahiri book that we did not publish because we want to keep the
discussion at this level.

 What about reports of a union between your two groups?

 There are many efforts in this direction. What I can say is that we have
bridged many gaps.

 Why the violence against tourists?

 First, many tourist activities are forbidden, so this source of income for
the state is forbidden. Striking at such an important source of income will
be a major blow against the state. It does not cost us much to strike at this
sector. Second, tourism in its present form is an abomination. It is a
means by which prostitution and AIDS are spread by Jewish women
tourists, and it is a source of all manner of depravities, not to mention
being a means of collecting information on the Islamic movement. For
these reasons we believe tourism is an abomination that must be
destroyed. And it is one of our strategies for destroying the government.

 Why do innocent tourists have to be killed?

 There are tourists who are innocent. That is why we declared tourism,
not tourists, our target. We have tried to warn tourists not to come to
Egypt. Otherwise, they open themselves to danger.

 There are countries without tourism which still suffer from AIDS and
drugs. AIDS and drugs are not a result of tourism.

 The Egyptian people did not know drugs. Tourism is not the only
reason, but it is the main reason for the spread of AIDS, drugs, and
spying.

 For the sake of argument, let's accept that tourism is a source of

abomination. Why did you decide to strike at tourism only in 1992, even
though you were based in the sa'id, which is a center of tourism in Egypt?
You have been active since the 1970s.

 Tourism [as such] is not forbidden in Islam. But people who come to the
sa'id, even though they know of the danger. There must be other reasons
why they continue to come.

 You mentioned that industry and agriculture -- institutions of

exploitation, you said -- are your next targets. When will this start?

 It depends on the government hostility toward us.

 What are the Islamically sanctioned reasons for striking at government

industry and agriculture?

 We will strike at these institutions without bloodshed as much as

possible and our military units will undertake those activities when the time
is right.

 The Gama'a has suffered a lot from attacking tourism. Many members
have been imprisoned and the organization has lost influence in some
areas. Did the Gama'a make a mistake in striking at tourism?

 The real fight has not yet started. You will find in the newspapers
accounts that say 99 percent of the Gama'a is in prison. The police and
the press do not know our true strength. The Gama'a exists in 18
provinces, including tens of centers and hundreds of villages. Up to now
the state has not won one battle in any of the 13 centers, just in the
province of Asyut. And the government suffers from grave economic and
political crises. For every member killed, 20 join. Contrary to what some
think, the power of the Gama'a is on the rise. We are doing God's work
and it is a duty to keep up the struggle. The rest is up to God.

 I disagree. There is no Gama'a presence in Imbaba, Ayn Shams, Qina,

Aswan, and Damietta. Your military wing has suffered many losses.
Drafting forces from Afghanistan is a last resort.
 You are wrong. Our activities are still strong in these provinces. Our
proselytizing continues and we are using new means of communicating
and strengthening our ties with the people.

 What are the main actions of the Gama'a's work now?

 First, we are making ongoing preparations for a military coup. The

security forces don't know about these because they are preoccupied with
skirmishes in the sa'id. Second, we are working in the area of mass
mobilization. When the Islamic revolution happens, there will be mass
support to head off foreign intervention. Our commando units have
acquired important experience over many years. The absence of such
operations does not mean activity has stopped. The state does not know
anything about these operations because of our cell formation.

 I think you are exaggerating. What is the evidence for the existence of
military units?

 In 1981, the security forces had no idea of the existence of the military
unit. The lack of arrests now by the security forces is no indication that our
military units do not exist. In the Jihad case many government military
persons were involved. Those military who were arrested were of low rank
and had no influence inside the military.

 I disagree. The lower ranks are critical. This is the lesson of history.
Some say the recent increase in Gama'a's activities is a function of the
Gama'a's illusion that it has as much power as the state.

 We have no illusions. The Gama'a is not just a movement of protest or

limited opposition but an alternative to the regime, to the state. No other
political forces will survive. There will be only al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya.

 The role of the Gama'a's members from Afghanistan in the acts of

violence committed in Egypt has drawn a lot of attention. What prompted
you to go to Afghanistan to begin with?

 From the beginning we have aimed at preserving our presence in Egypt

and focused on spreading our activities within the country. After the events
and arrests of 1981, we suffered from a loss of leadership. In 1984, when
the first imprisoned activists were released, we ignited our activities and
regained our following. As we expanded beyond Minya and Asyut into the
Delta and Cairo, particularly Ayn Shams and Giza, the security forces
started to clamp down hard on our young activists again. We refused to
compromise, so they launched a campaign of liquidation against us. It was
at that point that the idea of protecting those youths by sending them to
Afghanistan came up.

 Why Afghanistan?

 For different reasons, the most important being the need for military
training.

 What groups facilitated your travel to Afghanistan?

 No governments. Afghan nationals involved in al-Da'wa ila Jihad, (call

to holy struggle) which had reached its peak in the mid 1980s facilitated
our travel and accommodations in Peshawar.

 Did al-Gama'a participate in the fighting in Afghanistan? How was it at

the start?

 The martyrs Adli Yusuf, Abd al-Fattah, Abu al-Yusr, and Muhammad
Shawqi al-Islambouli, the brother of Khalid al-Islambouli, went to
Afghanistan in the mid 1980s. Adli Yusuf established the military camp
there in 1989. After gaining military experience these men began to
participate more and more with the Afghan fighters.

 How did the Afghan experience influence al-Gama'a intellectually and

practically?

 Intellectually, there was no influence. All had been influenced by the

events of 1981 and after. Practically, militarily, in intelligence gathering,
and in the spread of our message, we learned a lot. The leadership of al-
Gama'a delivered the khutba (sermon) at the time of Id al-Fitr in
Peshawar. We started to publish  
 in Peshawar, which was
distributed throughout the Islamic world and printed in Algeria and
Indonesia, and the bulletin Ë
" which presented news on our activities to
the whole world, including Egypt (by fax), in addition to the distribution of
cassettes and documentary videos.

 News reports say the Americans helped the Afghan resistance. Did you
receive American support, too?

 The Americans had two goals: First, to weaken the Soviet Union and,
second, to create a fifth column within the Afghan resistance which would
be friendly to them after the victory over the Soviets. We, the Arabs,
warned the Afghans of these strategies. We never received any aid from
the Americans. They are our enemies.

 How did you publish  
 ?

 The first issue came out in February 1990. The cover story with a
picture of a gun was entitled "Terror is a Means to Confront God's
Enemies." Our aim was to familiarize people with our ideology. We were
shocked by its sudden success. Soon it was being distributed throughout
the Arab world, first legally and then secretly. After publishing articles
critical of the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, pressure was brought
to bear to stop publication. There were 27 issues all together. Its
publication will continue with a new issue under a new name, Al-Ard (the
land).

 What is the situation of al-Gama'a in Pakistan, which is under Egyptian

pressure to hand over Gama'a's militants to them?

 There are many areas not totally under government control. In those
areas tribes have control and we are safe from Egyptian, American, and
Saudi intelligence.

 What about Afghanistan?

 Because of the terrain in Afghanistan and because of our warm

relations with Afghan parties and tribes, we are protected from the
Egyptians. We are present in northern Afghanistan near the border with
Tajikistan there to assist the Tajiks against the communists in Tajikistan
and to provide reserves for the Gama'a's units in Qanuz. The location and
activities of our camps is not a topic for discussion. As for where our
militants go after training, some go to fronts under the control of al-
Gama'a, where there are other Arab fighters, and some to fronts under the
control of Afghan forces with which we have good ties. Some forces about
whom we don't want anything known go to areas under the complete
control of al-Gama'a.

 The Afghan war has ended. What are these elements doing in
Afghanistan now?

 Some have died in battle and some have gone to northern Afghanistan.
Others are being kept in Afghanistan to be sent, when the time is ripe, to
Egypt. Some have already been sent and are under the leadership of
military units.

 You say you have areas under the control of al-Gama'a. So why did
you leave Peshawar for Denmark?

 I am not a military man, and those areas are only for military
operations. Since I am in charge of information, I was in Peshawar, where
our media activities were centered. But since last year I have been
 banned from there. If I went inside Afghanistan, I would have to end my
activities because the country suffers from devastation.

 What pressured you to leave Peshawar?

 The pressure began after I wrote a number of articles criticizing the

Saudi family for preventing pilgrims from countries that support Iraq from
going on the hajj (pilgrimage). The Saudis demanded that charity groups
in Afghanistan stop supporting the Gama'a. They asked Nawaz al-Sharif,
the Pakistani president, to hand me over to the Egyptian authorities.
Sheikh Abd Rabb al-Ra's al-Sayyaf, president of the Islamic Union of
Afghanistan, put me under his protection. I found my activities hampered
in Afghanistan. So after receiving an invitation from Denmark, I sought
political asylum and got it.

 Haven't the Egyptians succeeded in hampering your activities?

 The center of our activities has always been the sa'id. Since pressure
was brought to bear on us in Peshawar, we have moved to Europe, where
we are very active. Modern means of communication make it easier for us
to be in touch with Egypt, and probably new means of activity here we
have yet to discover.14

As stated, in September 1995, Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim was arrested in Croatia, and
subsequently disappeared. Both U.S. and Egyptian governments disclaim responsibility
and knowledge of his whereabouts. U.S. intelligence officers have also kidnapped a
number of other Jihad group leaders and handed them over to Egypt, including Ahmad
Salamah Mabruk and Ahmad al-Najjar (both were sentenced to life in prison in the
returnees from Albania case by the military court in Hikestep (PH) in northern Cairo).
The U.S. campaign to pursue members of the Islamic movement, especially the leaders
of the Jihad group in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Albania, has not yet
stopped."15

# 

Enthused by the success of what it calls anti-terrorist measures, the Egyptian

government had ignored our calls for a truce. Word had gone out that the Emir of Jihad
had released the dogs of war again in Egypt and this held weight with some Ë

who
were bent on action against the Government of Egypt that had acted as if the cease fire
did not exist and continued to execute Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leadership and imprison

14
. Translated from the Arabic by Souhail Shadoud and Steve Tamari. This interview is part of a research project on political Islam in
Egypt, the results of which will be published in Arabic (Cairo: Al-Mahrusa Press). In handwriting, political Islam, essays from Middle
East. Report 27. What Does the Gama'a Islamiyya want? Tala'at Fouad Qassem interview with Hisham Mubarak edited by Joel
Beinin and Joe Stork, 1997.
15
. USA v Sattar et al Government Exhibit 2201BT: Egyptian "Islamic Group" leader calls for "stepping up of hostile strategy" against
the United States.
its members. Taha contacted his associate in mayhem Atia and it was time for the
running dog Mubarak to pay the price.16

In October 1999 the al-Qaeda network activated Islamist sleeper

agent Gamil El-Batouty (also spelled Batouti) who was ready to give his
life for he knew that to put one¶s fate in the hands of Allah means eternal
bliss. Gamil El-Batouty came from a distinguished Egyptian family ± his
father was the Mayor of city in which he lived. Prior to his employment at
EgyptAir, First Relief Officer Gamil El-Batouty was an Egyptian Air Force
pilot from 1967 to 1973 and took part in two wars with Israel. Then he
was employed as a flight instructor, first for the Egyptian Air Force and
later for a Government-operated civilian flight-training institute in Egypt. El-Batouty
became a Major in the Air Force before he transitioned to the flight-training institute,
where he eventually became the chief flight instructor.17 Karim al-Batouty, a student,
said his father had made the pilgrimage to Mecca three times. He said he had worked
on the Cairo-Los Angeles route for 14 years, flying Boeing 767s for 10 years.

  cc 
++   #

The only other Islamist Shaheed El-Batouty was in contact with in

America was Shaheed Hesham Mohamed Ali Hadayet who was born on
July 4, 1961 in Egypt. Hadayet¶s father was a general in Egypt¶s army. In
June 1992 Hadayet received a multiple entry B-2 tourist visa from the
U.S. Consulate in Cairo, Egypt and entered the United States at Los
Angeles as a tourist and was admitted until January 25, 1993.

On December 2, 1992 Hadayet filed an application for political asylum and

permission to work. He claimed he would be persecuted for his religious beliefs if he
returned to Egypt. Specifically, Hadayet claimed to be a member of ³Assad Eben Furat
Mosque Association,´ which called for a strict Islamist government and whose purpose
was to "understand truly and apply Islamic law in the 20th century under any
circumstances.´ Hadayet also claimed to have been arrested many times over the
previous 14 years by the Egyptian secret police for his strong religious beliefs. He said
he had been tortured and had the scars and medical records to prove it. Based on his
asylum application, he was approved for an Employment Authorization Document
(EAD) by the Los Angeles INS office.

In March 1993 Hadayet¶s wife arrived in the United States with their son, an
Egyptian citizen. There was no immigration record of their arrival as they had entered
the United States illegally via Canada. Hadayet lied to the INS about the presence of his
wife and son in the United States. Concealment of this material fact was grounds for
denial of his petition but the INS did not know she was only a few miles away. That
same month Hadayet¶s permission to work was approved for another year. On March

16. Messages in Blood, The Economist, October 18, 1997, p. 50.

17
. http://www.guardian.co.uk/egyptair/article/0,,196586,00.html
20, 1993 Hadayet was interviewed about his political asylum claim. Hadayet
acknowledged to the INS in 1993 as part of the application process that was accused by
the Egyptians of being a member of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. Hadayet admitted to the
INS that he had signed a statement for the Egyptian police admitting his involvement
with Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya before coming to the United States. But he told the INS that
he had no affiliation and that he signed the ³false confession´ only under duress.
Hadayet told the INS that the police had arrested him; that he had been beaten, that he
had been detained, and he had been falsely accused of being a member of the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. He said, ³I am a religious man. I am a member of a mosque. I am
not a violent man. I don't have a gun.´ So his statement was, ³I have been falsely
accused of being a terrorist.´ That was part of his asylum claim. The basis for his claim
of persecution was that he was being falsely accused and was being tortured because
of that.18

Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya was designated a so-called terrorist group on October 8,

1997 despite the fact that Gama¶a had been in existence for nearly 17 years. Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman: ³In the early eighties the international organization of Jihad was
born.´ Despite the lack of formal designation the Intelligence Community knew that Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya was about Jihad in 1992. On July 7, 1999, after Hadayet achieved
martyrdom,  reported that Hadayat was a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad
and he met Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri twice in California ± once in , and again in ".

In 1995 Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was reported to have been at Mosques in Santa
Clara, Stockton and Sacramento posing as a representative of the Saudi Red Crescent
and raising money for the Islamist Movement.19 The  & ,
,-
, reported,
³Authorities learned of al-Zawahiri¶s fund raising in the Bay Area from Ali Mohamed, 48,
and Khalid Abu-al-Dahab, 37, Egyptian-born U.S. citizens who have confessed that they
served for a decade as al-Qaeda operatives while living in Silicon Valley.´

On March 7, 1995 after reviewing all the facts in the Hesham Mohamed Ali
Hadayet case, the INS Asylum Office in Anaheim, California, issued a ³Notice of Intent
to Deny the Political Asylum Claim.´ Hadayet was given thirty days to respond. He did
not. This denial letter mentioned that Mr. Hadayet had acknowledged signing
documents in Egypt that admitted his membership in an Egyptian group that the asylum
officer called ³Gamatt El Islamaia.´ His deportation hearing was scheduled for March 26,
1996. All case documents were sent to him via certified mail. The certified mail was
returned ³undeliverable.´ Because he did not receive the official INS notification of his
deportation hearing, under INS regulations he was not placed in the Deportable Alien
Control System (DACS) system. Thus, no one at INS was tracking him or looking for
him. On March 18, 1995 Hadayet received another one-year renewal of his employment
authorization. He worked as a chauffeur, mainly at the Los Angeles airport. In October
1995 deportation proceedings were initiated for his previous overstay in 1992.
Hadayet¶s permission to work was also terminated. On March 29, 1996 deportation

18
. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju82238.000/hju82238_0.HTM
19
. United Press International, October 11, 2001 ³Bin Laden Underling Raised Money in US.´ Fox News.com July 7, 2002
³Government to Step Up Patrols in Airports.´ http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,57082,00.html
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/10/11/MN119457.DTL
proceedings against Hadayet were terminated because he could not be located. In June
1996 Hadayet applied to renew his employment authorization. The Deportable Alien
Control System was checked but because Hadayet¶s name was not entered, he
received authorization to work another year.

In January 1997 Hadayet filed an adjustment of status application as the spouse

of a diversity visa recipient as his wife had won an immigration lottery despite her illegal
status. In May 1997, the INS initiated name checks for derogatory information on
Hadayet with the FBI and CIA. Hadayet¶s fingerprints were submitted to the FBI for a
criminal history check. INS forwarded his biographic information to the FBI and the CIA;
and the INS sent a copy of his asylum application to the Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs. No agency provided derogatory information. The Interagency
Border Inspection system known as IBIS had nothing on Hadayet even after Hadayet¶s
July 4th Event. Mr. Hedayet was interviewed and his application was approved for
adjustment of status on August 29, 1997. In August 1997 Hadayet was approved for
permanent residence as an asylee.20

In 1998 Hedayet met with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri once

again. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri ¶s presence in California in 1998
was confirmed by Naseem Khan, an FBI snitch who testified in a
Sacramento federal court against Umer Hayat and his son, Hamid
Hayat, two Lodi men tried on ³terrorist-related charges.´21
Naseem Khan swore under oath that he
observed Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in Lodi, California in 1998.
Naseem Khan later told the FBI that he discovered that two local
businesses were laundering money for him. Naseem Khan, like
most informers and provocateurs embellished his story and said
that he also observed him there in 1999 and made it seem as if
al-Zawahiri lived in Lodi by insisting that al-Zawahiri made
frequent visits to the Lodi Muslim Mosque and seemed to be a man of few words.
"Every time I would go to the (Lodi) mosque (al-Zawahiri) would be coming or going. He
would quietly come to the mosque and leave," Khan recalled. Then, Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri "disappeared" from Lodi sometime in 1999, Khan said. He recalled that he
would speak to al-Zawahiri in passing at the mosque, but they never had a
conversation. He did not say that he saw al-Zawahiri anywhere else in Lodi during that
time. Khan said he did not know who Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was until he saw his picture
with bin Laden on television news after the September 11, 2001 Victory. About two
weeks after the attacks, Khan testified, FBI agents visited him in Bend, Oregon, where
he was managing a convenience store, and asked him if he knew anything about bin
Laden. Coincidentally, his television was tuned to a news program and a picture of bin
Laden with two other people was on the screen, Khan related. He testified that he told
the agents he had never heard of bin Laden before the attacks on American soil, but
that he remembered seeing one of the other men in the picture on numerous occasions

20
. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju82238.000/hju82238_0.HTM
21
. Umar Hayet¶s jury deadlocked but his son Hamid was convicted. A juror named Arcelia Lopez came forward after Hamid¶s trial,
and like the juror in USA v Sattar, said she was coerced into convicting him. In May 2006 Umar pleaded guilty to one count of bring
more than $10,000 into the US without declaring it. He will receive probation as he already has spent almost a year in prison.
when he lived in Lodi in the late 1990s.22 At that time, Khan also told the FBI that he had
seen Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed al-Nasser, a suspect in a 1996 Saudi Arabia
bombing, in Lodi, and Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali, a suspect in the 1998 bombings
of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, in Stockton, California in 1999.

The payment of bonuses to Naseem Khan was what caused this paroxysm of
lies because such payments provided an incentive for Naseem Khan to fabricate
information to receive these bonuses. Naseem was gung-ho to perform his part and
was reprimanded for an unlawful search of the Lodi Mosque. Naseem Khan might have
been mistaken about Al-Nasser and Ali, but al-Zawahiri was in California in 1998
collecting money that he been raised for the African Embassy Events. FBI agent Rachel
Pifer, Khan's onetime handler, testified that the likelihood al-Zawahiri had been in the
Central Valley city in the late 1990s was slim. She said she had investigated Khan's
report using agency databases and other sources of information before concluding he
was  wrong. But she did not rule it out.

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was there to make contact with two Ë

who were using
the cover of Imam, Muhammad Adil Khan, 47, and Shabbir Ahmed, 38 whose base of
operations were the Farooqia Islamic Center and the Lodi Muslim Mosque. These Ë


were picked up by the DHS and agreed to return to Pakistan in July 2005 under threat
of deportation based on immigration violations. Muhammad Adil Khan and Shabbir
Ahmed were granted entry to the United States to work as Imams but the INS accused
them of violating their visas because they ³did not perform their duties as an Imam.´
They were not charged in the case, praise God, though the authorities say they
suspected they were recruiting young men for Ë

training23 and an FBI agent testified
that Shabbir Ahmed was acting as an intermediary for Usama bin Laden and other
Religious Holy Warriors. The agent refused to testify whether or not Shabbir Ahmed
was a member of a Ë

group, saying that information was classified. Another FBI
agent testified that Muhammad Adil Khan got orders from Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Taliban
commander linked to bin Laden and passed them to Shabbir Ahmed. Muhammad Adil
Khan, president of the Farooqia Islamic Center, was under FBI surveillance for years.

It was at that 1998 encounter with Dr. Ayman that Hadayat was told to leave his
job with the American Mercury ground service company where he had worked from
1993 (one year after he arrived in the US) until 1998, when he left to set up his own
limousine service for air passengers and was given capital to set up his small limousine
firm, so as to take advantage of his access to airport facilities and airline personnel
contacts, while at the same time shaking off any surveillance. Hadayet was a sleeper
agent who worked at LAX for five years in a ground service company until he aroused
El Al Airlines¶ suspicions and left24 before he could be fired.

In May 2000 Hadayet was issued a second California driver¶s license in the name
Hesham Mohamed Hadayet. His previous driver¶s license was in the name of Hesham

22
. http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/crime/story/14229904p-15052924c.html
23
. http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F40F13FA35540C738DDDAD0894DE404482
24. Frank J. Gaffney Jr. Center for Security Policy›
 ›
July 9, 2002

Mohamed Ali. El-Sayyid Nosair also used variations of this name on his driver¶s
licenses: Noseir, Nosir, Nassar. One of the licenses listed Hadayet¶s birth date as the
Fourth of July. The FBI attributed this to his having transposed the numbers for the
month and day of his birth on an official form, listing the day first and so it became April
7, 1961.25 This was a way that he could explain the two birth dates if he was questioned
about them.

On July 4, 2002 Hadayet drove to the Los Angeles Airport armed with a .45
caliber pistol, a 9-millimeter automatic handgun and a hunting knife. He approached the
‘  à
 

 ticket counter and shot and killed ‘  employee Yakov Aminov,
and Vicky Hen, 25 who was waiting in line and wounded 7 others. Hadayet was shot
and killed by a security officer.

)#c  

The FBI¶s initial depiction of the heroic Fourth of July 2002 attack at Los Angeles
International Airport, as the work of a lone gunman proved the FBI had still not learned
its lesson. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said Hadayet had carried out the
attack for ³personal´ reasons and the Egyptian security services blamed the incident on
financial problems Hadayet was having with ‘

, making it seem as if the Jews
had cheated him. But in reality Hadayet never had any connection to El Al, other than to
arouse their suspicions. None-the-less Egyptian intelligence officers picked up
Hadayat¶s relatives and associates in Cairo, to try and trace the identities of his fellows
in the American Jihad cell.26 In April 2003 the FBI ruled that Hadayet was a so-called
³terrorist.´ Matthew McLaughlin of the Los Angeles field office of the FBI said: ³Given his
political views and the fact that El Al is an Israeli government-owned airline, that met the
criteria for a terrorist attack.´

An ex-employee of Hadayet said: ³He told me that the Israelis tried to destroy the
Egyptian nation and the Egyptian population by sending prostitutes with AIDS27 to
Egypt.´ This is pure Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman doctrine, something this holy man has
been saying for years! Brother Hadayet also said: ³the two biggest drug dealers in New
York are Israeli.´ This comes from 
 à: ³Two Israeli citizens were arrested in
Manhattan on drug possession charges after police seized more than a million Ecstasy
tablets, the largest drug bust in the city¶s history. Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik
announced that David Roash, 25, and Israel Ashkenazi, 28, both of Tel Aviv, were being
held in Queens Criminal Court pending drug possession charges.´ A few years ago,
Ahmed Rami, who runs 
à from Sweden, was prosecuted for ³anti-Semitism´
and sentenced to prison, where he had to stay for six months.

During his ten years in the United States, Brother Hadayet was a secret
operative of the Egyptian Jihad who maintained undercover links to the Brooklyn /

25. Neil MacFarquhar, ³Gunman¶s Uncle Doubts Terror Motive´ ./(›
, July 6, 2002 Section A Page 8 Column 4.
26
. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/02/000205-egyptair.htm
27
. We also had the interest in using AIDS as a weapon. Rami Abdullah, 24 a member of the Fatah movement researched the
possibility of making an HIV-infected weapon on the Internet.
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/4/21/512e01ca-dfbd-4ab8-82e7-cda4286a1f89.html
Jersey City Cell. Hadayat, who lived in Irvine, California, 70 km south of Los Angeles,
knew al-Batouty well. There are also indications that, in the years 1998 and 1999,
Hadayat was in touch with a group of high Egyptian Air Force officers and helicopter
pilots posted at the time at Edwards Base north of Los Angeles. They were there to
learn how to install command and control centers in Egypt¶s air defense systems,
operate anti-air missile batteries and fly Apache gunships. Most of those officers were
on the doomed Egyptian airliner after completing their courses. 28

  
-


On October 31, 1999, at about 1:50 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, Egypt Air flight
990, a scheduled international flight from New York to Cairo, crashed in the Atlantic
Ocean about 60 miles south of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. First Relief Officer
Gamil El-Batouty deliberately destroyed that plane on orders from the faction of Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, who received approval to resume the fight against the Egyptian
government from Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and other leaders of Al-Gama¶a and Al-
Jihad who were free in Egypt or exiled.29

About 20 minutes after takeoff, as the airplane was climbing to its assigned
altitude, Gamil El-Batouty suggested that he relieve the command first officer, Ahmed
al-Habashi, at the controls, stating, ³I¶m not going to sleep at all. I might come and sit for
two hours, and then«´ indicating that he wanted to fly his portion of the trip at that time.
Al-Habashi was surprised at this request and exclaimed, ³But I slept.´ A few minutes
later al-Habashi said, ³Excuse me, Gamil while I take a quick trip to the toilet before it
gets crowded while they are eating, and I¶ll be back to you.´ About eleven seconds after
the captain left the cockpit the Cockpit Voice Recorder recorded an unintelligible
comment. Ten seconds later El-Batouty stated quietly, ³I rely on Allah.´ A few seconds
later the autopilot was disengaged and El-Batouty repeated, ³I rely on Allah´ and the
Flight Data Recorder recorded an abrupt nose-down elevator movement and a very
slight movement of the inboard ailerons. Subsequently, the airplane began to rapidly
pitch nose down and descend in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean. The Cockpit Voice
Recorder revealed a deep faith in Allah.

01.48:48: El-Batouty: I rely on Allah.

01.48:52: [Thrust Throttle Lever Retarded to Idle]

01.48:53: [Aircraft Begins a 40-Degree Angle Dive Towards the Ocean]

01.49:08: [Tones of Aural Master Caution]

01.49:21: [Right Engine Start Lever Manually Switched from ³Run´ to

³Cutoff´]

28
. http://www.terrorism101.org/archive/debka_lax.html http://www.debka.com/
29. ³Bloodbath at Luxor´ The Economist, November 22, 1997, p. 53. In November 1997, over 10,000 suspects were estimated to be
under arrest and detention. Reuters report in The Asian Age, October 14, 1997.
 01:49:22: [Left Engine Start Lever Manually Switched from ³Run´ to
³Cutoff´ and Elevators Split in Opposite Direction] 30

0149:30.16: [sound of two faint thumps and one louder thump]

0149:48.42: I rely on Allah.

0149:57.33: I rely on Allah.

0149:58.75: I rely on Allah.

0150:00.15: I rely on Allah.

0150:01.60: I rely on Allah.

0150:02.93: I rely on Allah.

0150:04.42: I rely on Allah.

0150:05.89: I rely on Allah.

0150:06.37: What¶s happening? What¶s happening? [Flight captain

returning to cockpit]

0150:07.07: I rely on Allah.

0150:08.53: What's happening?

0150:15.15: What's happening, Gamil? What's happening?

0150:19.51: [four tones similar to Master Caution aural beeper]

0150:24.92: What is this? What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?

0150:25.00: [change and increase in sound, heard only through first

officer's hot microphone system]

0150:26.55: Get away in the engines. [Translated as said]

0150:28.85: Shut the engines.

0150:29.66: It's shut.

30
. These surface controls, located on the tail of the airplane, command the up or down movement of the aircraft¶s nose. They
normally move simultaneously in the same direction. Experts argued this could have indicated a struggle for control of the aircraft,
with the flight captain pulling the control column up and the first officer pushing the column forward. EgyptAir officials have said the
split could have been caused by the shock wave caused by the speed the aircraft was diving at, which was close to Mach 1.
 0150:31.25: Pull.

0150:32.75: Pull with me.

0150:34.78: Pull with me.

0150:36.84: Pull with me.

[End of Cockpit Voice Recorder]

ï+..   /

The meaning of El-Batouty¶s words ³Tawakkalt Ala Allah´ had to be explained.

The United States Government reported: ³This phrase was originally interpreted to
mean ³I place my fate in the hands of God.´ Other translations included, ³I entrust
myself to God,´ ³I put my fate in your hands,´ ³I put my fate in God¶s hands.´ The
interpretation of this Arabic statement was later amended to ³I rely on God´ by the
Egyptians. According to an EgyptAir and Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority presentation
to the NTSB staff on April 28, 2000, this phrase ³is very often used by the Egyptian
layman in day to day activities to ask God¶s assistance for the task at hand. It is used
only when someone embarks on   
and not a bad one.´ From our
perspective, El-Batouty¶s action  a good one.

The Americans should have remembered that the expression ³I rely on God´ or ³I
depend on God´ had been heard before, on tapes made by Emad Salem, as he
videotaped in the Holland Tunnel:

Siddig Ali: Because he is going home, he lives here. He will place it [the
bomb] here and [it]

 And he will see somebody waiting
for him (UI) he will come out here as we are going now and 


, that¶s it, he leaves, he knows the way, let him go back quietly like
this (UI). He goes out from here, straight to Canal Street east, then 


 with who brought him, they mention the name of God,
the Almighty in every moment, during after and before the haddouta (UI)
sing, pray, one bow for God the Almighty, to thank God for his blessing,
then leave with a secured heart and mentally relaxed, proud of the job he
has done, and ask God to 

 

Salem: Sheik, it is a film.

Siddig Ali: You are making a film, you Yahood, do you have films in Israel,
there, damn. You in Israel will get hit. Israel is called Palestine. God is
great, Islamic, Islamic state. Conquered by our master Omar Bin-Al
Khattab, may God bless his soul, the crusaders took it and Salah Al-Din
took it back, then the Jewish dogs took, the grandsons of monkeys and
 pigs, and we will take it back God-willing. By God Yahood, this film will get
us in severe trouble. It will be burnt. It will be erased by itself. The film is
called Mission Impossible.

[Noise of siren]

Salem: Police, police oh my God, shall I sing for you a little bit (laughing)
no please. In the name of God, the merciful, God, no God but God, he is
the living God, (UI) prayers. Who are the enemies of God? Yeah, Jews,
Christians and anybody other than Muslims? This is of course an enemy
of God, right?

Siddig Ali: Because there are non-Muslims and they are ignorants, nobody
delivered the message to them, they could be enemies of God after and
did not follow our God means he left out God and followed the devil
means the holy Qu¶ran explains it, whoever was an enemy of God and
Jibril is our enemy (UI) he won¶t bring blessing, they use to like Michael,
God, out master Jibril is called the faithful, ha, the holy spirit, the faithful
spirit«´31

When the Egyptian spy Haggag was asked, ³What else did Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman say to you?´ he answered, ³He told me, c
 
 . Carry out this
operation. It does not require a fatwa.¶´ The transcripts of the last moments of Flight 93
before it crashed in Pennsylvania on September 11th 2001 contain the words, ³Trust in
Allah and in him.´32

c 0

The Egyptian Government refused to admit that this event marked the end of the
cease-fire yet there were few possible alternatives. The first was that El-Batouty had
committed suicide. Captain El-Batouty had no previous psychiatric treatment and there
was no family history of mental illness, nor any suicidal attempts. The only family
problem he had was that of an ill daughter, who was receiving treatment at UCLA
Medical Center in Los Angeles. He did not talk about suicide to any family member and
did not leave any hint or written paper concerning this. El-Batouty had an affectionate
personality with no psychopathic trends. He was married and had five children and
three grandchildren. His sons were university students and two of them were about to
be graduated. One of them was already working. He was making preparations for the
marriage of another son in two months time. The family was stable and greatly
respected the deceased father. El-Batouty, a devout Muslim, would not have asked for
Gods help eleven times to carry out a deed that went against the laws of Allah, such as
suicide. According to El-Batouty¶s close friend, Marwan al-Shebbi, South-Tower
pilot, his death was not suicide. Before his own death, Al-Shebbi stated that his ³good
friend´ did not commit suicide, but, rather, died ³on a mission of God [Allah].´ Brother

31. Exhibit USA v. Rahman CM-62 June 23, 1993.

32
. http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/flight93transcript.pdf
Marwan al-Shehhi also told his barber in Falls Church, Virginia, that El-Batouty¶s actions
were ³carried out in the name of God´ and that he was acquainted with El-Batouty.33
The NTSB concluded, ³The reason for El-Batouty¶s actions was not determined.´

Certain media pointed to the fact that when El-Batouty visited the Pennsylvania
Hotel in Manhattan he often acted in a very ³male chauvinistic fashion´ (to which many
in the West were unaccustomed) in order to bolster the suicide theory. After the event,
the FBI interviewed the security staff at the Pennsylvania Hotel. The staff informed the
FBI that about two years ago El-Batouty called two teenaged girls staying at the hotel
and asked them to look out their window. ³The girls looked across the courtyard to the
adjacent hotel window and witnessed a male with the window shade pulled down so as
to obscure his face looking at them and masturbating.´ No Incident Report was filed.
Several weeks before his martyrdom mission, El-Batouty was discovered on several
floors of the hotel crouching outside certain rooms and listening. He was escorted to the
Security Office where he explained that he had been intoxicated and had met a woman
in the lobby who he believed invited him up to her room. Other crewmembers said El-
Batouty was like ³a kid in a candy store´ with all the scantily clad immoral women in
New York City. El-Batouty would often proposition maids, offering them gifts in return for
sex. The last such incident allegedly occurred on October 30, 1999 when El-Batouty
offered a maid $100 to have sex with him.34 This is strangely reminiscent of Abu Kamal
who propositioned maids, exposed himself and sought the company of prostitutes
shortly before the Empire State Building activity. Naveed Afzal Haq, the son of a
Pakistan-born civil structural engineer at the Hanford nuclear complex in Washington
State who attacked the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle in August 2006 had
climbed on top of a fountain, unzipped his pants and started exposing himself to
women. Haq had been due to go to trial on the exposure charge, but the trial was
postponed. September 11th Shaheed Mohammad Atta spent $300 on lap dancers at the
Pink Pony Strip Club.35 Assem Hammoud, the so-called Playboy Terrorist, used the
cover of bon vivant, drinking, womanizing etc. to hide his Ë

affiliations. According to
the Lebanese Internal Security Forces Hammoud had been linked to extremist
organizations linked to al-Qaeda since 1994. The Brother was arrested in July 2006 for
plotting to attack the New York City underground railway system.36

  )  

The second alternative was that the plane crashed as a result of mechanical
failure. This was the one settled upon by the Egyptian Government, but before it did so
the government controlled Egyptian State Information Service carried this explanation
on its website: ³We, however, have pieced together the picture from a variety of
sources. In light of available information, it seems likely that the U.S. Navy downed
EgyptAir Flight 990. The Boeing 767 jet was targeted and hit twice by a special beam,

33
. William Scott Malone - Unrecorded telephone Interview - October 17, 2003.
34
. http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/EA990/docket/Ex_14A_add3.pdf
35
. http://www.opinionjournal.com/best/?id=95001298
36
. http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/433448p-365170c.html
followed by a missile, which blew the tail off the jet.´37 The Egyptian (  knew that if
the crash was attributed to terrorism tourism would suffer and we would be even more
victorious. But the apostate government of Egypt had to explain away the tape from the
cockpit voice recorder and in its report it was stated: ³There was no evidence of fight or
struggle among the crew members during the dive, on the contrary, the evidence
indicated a crew cooperating to recover airplane control. Analysis results also support
the conclusion that there were more than two persons in the cockpit, especially at the
start of the dive where there were repetitive general inquiry phrases at the time the
engines were shut down. The captain returned to the cockpit almost immediately after
the dive started, at an altitude of approximately 31,000 feet. There is no indication on
the Cockpit Voice Recorder of a struggle or disagreement between the El-Batouty, the
Captain or anyone else. There was also no effort to incapacitate El-Batouty or to
restrain him. The cockpit conversations showed an effort at teamwork rather than a
crew working at cross-purposes.´

Americans should have found it strange that Mohammed Yousry - for once -
agreed with the Egyptian version of events of EgyptAir 990 and Mohammed Yousry
brought Sattar¶s statement to the attention of Rahman the Elder on May 19, 2000:

Yousry: Something was published in....

ABDEL RAHMAN: ?

Yousry: Yeah, in . [Reading] Ahmed Abdel Sattar, the Paralegal

of the Blind Sheikh Rahman Talks to . The Americans Interpreted
El-Batouty¶s Words the Same Way Translated Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman¶s Sermons. Ahmed Abdel Sattar. [Laughs] They put a picture of
Ahmed Abdel Sattar and you, Sir, and....

Stewart: [Laughing] I hear one name. Can you repeat it?

Yousry: Mmm?

Stewart: Kuby?

Yousry: Yeah, Ron Kuby's right there. [Pointing to the picture in article]
This is him.

Stewart: Oh, yeah, I can see him.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Who is this El-Batouty, I don¶t (UI)?

Yousry: He is the Egyptian pilot who said, ³In God I trust´-

37. The Egyptian State Information Service October 31, 2000 ³Missing pieces of the puzzle,´ Courtesy: The Egyptian Gazette
http://www.sis.gov.eg/online/html3/o311020h.htm
ABDEL RAHMAN: Ah, ah.

Yousry: - and they said he committed suicide ±

ABDEL RAHMAN: Yeah.

Yousry: - and Ahmed said that they interpreted his words the same way
they.... [To Stewart] You know El-Batouty, you know, the, the Egyptian
pilot...who said, "In God we trust," and then...the plane crashed and then
that's why he said oh, God, we trust, he committed suicide?

Stewart: [Laughs]

Yousry: So Ahmed is saying, "The Americans have translated the Sheikh's

speeches precisely like how they translated El-Batouty¶s, uh, sentence."

Stewart: Oh, that's good, that's very good.

Yousry: Thank you very much.

ABDEL RAHMAN: He only said so....

Stewart: I figured that.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Did Ahmed Sattar say only that?

Yousry: [Reading] ³CAIRO PLEASED WITH THE AMERICAN

INVESTIGATION DISCOUNTING EL-BATOUTY¶S SUICIDE.´ According
to some investigators here, the accident could have happened because
El-Batouty [spelled here Al-Batuti] was trying to raise the tail of the
airplane, but he couldn¶t. So he tried to push it down, it was stuck. He
pushed the hand down, then up, down and up to release it. He couldn¶t
release it, so he died, I mean, the plane crashed and he died.

Stewart: [Writing]

Yousry: [Reading] Egypt Air Considers (UI) the American Aviation (UI)
Boeing (UI) Punishment is in its Favor. [Explaining to Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman] This is because he said eh...they will publish the tape in which
he said, ³I rely on God´.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Uhm.

Yousry: See, Sir, how they translated the words, ³I rely on God´?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Yeah, yeah. [Laughs]

Yousry: Sons-of-a gun! [Turning pages]

ABDEL RAHMAN: (UI).

The topic came up again at the May 20, 2000 meeting between Yousry,
Stewart and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman:

Yousry: Ahmed continues: The American Government made itself an

expert on everything, beginning with the Islamic religion and ending with
the Arabic language and its meanings. We saw this tragedy made clear in
the Egyptian accident. They interpret things as they see fit. After the
Egyptian aircraft accident, I sent to the . /( ›
, that the
translation of the words, ³I rely on God´ the Egyptian co-pilot, the late
Jamil El-Batouty said, when I saw the government¶s translation, I was
shocked. Because I have experience in what the government does in
situations like these, I was able to understand what they exactly did. When
they come across what they think is a religious term, they go directly to
look it up in the Qu¶ran. Based on this, they could not come up with
anything close to that meaning except part of the honorable verse in Al
µImran Surah that says, ³     (   ,

      

0´ and translated the word ³decide´ into ³I made my decision´ and so
on. We suffered a lot from their translation of many terms and
interpretation the way they like. (UI) we asked to get the opinion of expert
scholars in the language of religion, non biased people to answer to the
government¶s claims. The judge refused to call on them. He even refused
to add documents we brought to the case file like, the interpretation of the
word µJihad¶ and its translation for instance. They said, it means holy war.
We rejected this translation and (UI). And he also used the, the El-Batouty
translation...that I sent... you know, the El-Batouty, the lead- the, the
captain of the Egyptian... Egypt Air...

Stewart: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Yousry: He said, on God I rely, in God we trust or whatever, and he

translated this way. So it¶s good that Ahmed... Sir, Lynne is constantly with
Ahmed, she is nourishing him politically.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Uhm.

Yousry: I am telling him that Lynne also... kind of like feed Ahmed political
thoughts every now and then.

Stewart: Yes, he¶s a post office man.

Yousry: But Ahmed is one of the very loyal people, Sir.

 The NTSB 
 with our Brothers and Sisters and with the Egyptian
Government:

When the Captain first re-entered the cockpit he exclaimed, ³What¶s

happening?´ He thought that El-Batouty would help him to get the aircraft
off its dive. This was why is appeared that the men were co-operating to
save the aircraft. The NTSB pointed to the Flight Voice Recorder that had
only recorded the conversation of   in the cockpit to refute the
Egyptians contention that there were additional men in the cockpit at the
time of the crash. The NTSB contended that although there was no sign of
disagreement between the two men El-Batouty only responded to the
pilot¶s remarks only once. The surprised reaction from the captain when
the engines did not respond to the throttle movement (What is this? What
is this? Did you shut the engines?) suggested that the captain was
unaware that the engine start lever switches had been moved to the cutoff
position, that such an action was at odds with his intentions, and that it
was, therefore, not part of a mutual, cooperative troubleshooting exercise
between the captain and El-Batouty. The NTSB pointed out that the
sentence, ³Get away in the engines,´ was another example of a phrase
where there was a direct translation of the Arabic words into English with
no attempt to interpret or analyze the words that resulted in an awkward or
seemingly inappropriate phrase: ³In this case, it is possible that the
captain, surprised to realize that the engines had been shut off, was trying
to tell El-Batouty to leave the engines alone.38

Egypt¶s Defense Ministry confirmed that 33 military officers were aboard the
EgyptAir flight that plunged into the Atlantic killing all 217 people aboard. The rest were
mostly tourists and few Muslims here and there who died as martyrs and are in the
Land of Eternal Bliss. The Joint Committee of on Intelligence of the U.S. Congress
indirectly linked this action to us: ³We believe that outside events also shaped al-Qaeda
leaders' thinking about an airliner attack. [Deleted] the October 1999 crash of Egypt Air
Flight 990, attributed in the media to a suicidal pilot, may have encouraged al-Qaeda¶s
growing impression that air travel was a vulnerability for the United States.´ There
seems to be a hint here in regard to our connection to the demise of EgyptAir 990.

On November 14, 1999, during a telephone conversation with Islamist Attorney

Sa'ad Hasaballah, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha and Sattar stated the ³cease-fire´ had still not
worked because it had not succeeded in obtaining the release of Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya leaders from prison and more action was necessary.

38. National Transportation Safety Board News and Events March 21, 2002 Report on EgyptAir Flight 990
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/ea990/default.htm
National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Aircraft Accident Brief Accident Number: DCA00MA006
Operator/Flight Number: EgyptAir flight 990 Aircraft and Registration: Boeing 767-366ER, SU-GAP Location: 60 miles south of
Nantucket, Massachusetts Date: October 31, 1999.
Adopted On: March 13, 2002 http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/AAB0201.pdf
c  # 

The Egyptian press reported, MUSTAFA HAMZA ANNOUNCES THAT HE HAS

ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP OF AL-GAMA¶A AL-ISLAMIYYA: ³Increasing signs of
splits within the militant Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya as well as contradictory statements
about leadership of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya emerged yesterday. Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
is considered one of the biggest organizations that oppose the government of Egypt. 
'  
received a letter from Rifa'i Ahmad Taha yesterday in which he denied
his resignation, stating that he will continue to work for religion, "from several locations"
through the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya; besides, "my membership in the highest leading
Group organization."

Usama Rushdi, a member of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya or Islamic Group

[IG] who lives in the Netherlands confirmed the authenticity of Muhammad
Shaqwi al-Islambouli¶s letter in which he announced his resignation and
that of Rifa'i Taha from the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's Shura Council, the
Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's highest leadership body. He emphasized that
Mustafa Hamza is the Shura Council Chairman and the Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya's present leader, and that there is no disagreement over this
issue and that he is announcing this on his behalf. Rushdi denied reports
of an "organizational collapse" in the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, adding that
the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya still includes several quarters and trends. He
added that the resignations of Rifa'i, al-Islambouli and others were
"voluntary" and aimed at giving others the opportunity to assume the
responsibility and run the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's affairs. Rushdi strongly
denied reports of a deal between the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya and the
Egyptian government which aimed at putting an end to acts of violence in
return for the release of the jailed Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya members and
commuting the death sentences issued against some Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya members in the recent cases to life sentences. He accused
"some Islamist quarters" in the British capital, or "Londistan," as he called
it, of changing their tune when speaking to the media. He said that the
struggle with the Egyptian government is continuing but "with different
means," adding that there are some 25,000 Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
members in Egyptian jails despite the recent wave of releases which
affected over 5,000 fundamentalists. An Islamist source close to the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya attributed the contradictory statements issued by the
Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leaders to old disagreements within the Shura
Council over   
   

 ›
 
,    ,
  0 à
   
   ))* 1 2
, 
, ,
  
  3)  

 .  ))*
 e
said that Rifa'i did not consult with the council on this issue and on other
important issues, such as joining Saudi oppositionist Usama bin Laden's
front, in addition to the recent threats he made about the armed attacks
that might resume in Egypt. He added that he wanted to steer the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya toward "certain directions.
 It is worth mentioning that Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya did not carry out any
armed operation during the past two years in response to an initiative
launched by its traditional leaders who are imprisoned since the
assassination of late President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. The source
denied the alleged "struggle for power" over the leadership of the Group,
wondering what would happen among them if they were ever been able to
assume power. He pointed out Rifa'i Taha's resignation following these
disagreements, and that he has "a copy" of it, except that he refused to
announce it.

  quoted some fundamentalists who live in Egypt and abroad

saying that "the Group's Shura Council is no longer in power." An Islamist
living in London accused "some people" of using al-Islambouli¶s name
knowing that he has no way of contact with the media. It is believed that
both Rifa'i Taha and Muhammad Shaqwi al-Islambouli live in Afghanistan.
The recent "war of statements" started last month when Rifa'i Taha wrote
an article warning against the government's strong fist on Islamists, 
,
,  
 
 

1 2
,. It is known that Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya differs from other
fundamentalist organizations in its concept of shura (consultation); the
leader is committed to shura. Therefore, the Shura Council not the leader
alone makes the decision. If a leader does not conform to this law, he
would be going against Islamic law.39

The Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya action faction carried out Luxor after the ceasefire
had been declared and were known to act precipitously. Less than a month after word
leaked out of prison from the Prince of Jihad that it was no more Mr. Niceguy this faction
brought EgyptAir 990 down. Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya did not take credit for this event, as
it was not undertaken by the entire organization but by rogue elements.

) #---


In February 2000, with the help of Sattar and Yousry ³and others known and
unknown´ Rifa¶i Taha attempted to have a message conveyed to Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman, but the message was not delivered due to security concerns. The AUSA
asked Sattar about this pilgrimage:

 Who went on that February 2000 visit?

 It was Mr. Jabara and Mohammed Yousry.

 Who was Mr. Jabara?

39
. MUSTAFA HAMZA ANNOUNCES THAT HE HAS ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP. London, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, issue 3289,
rd
December 3 1999. Report by Khalid Al-Shami
  Abdeen Jabara was one of the Sheikh's lawyers.

 Did you know Mr. Jabara?

 Yes, I did.

 Prior to this visit, did anyone ask you to relay a communication to the
Sheikh?

Yes.

 And who asked you?

 The usual people, you know, they say hello, the news from the
mosque, Rifa'i Taha also included.

 What was Rifa'i Taha's request?

 Rifa'i Taha requests that when the Sheikh issued or when the Sheikh,
on his previous message, when he asked for review, he was reviewing the
initiative. And also I believe Mustafa Hamza at that time was reviewing the
initiative. So there was a review that was faxed to me through, you know --
what the initiative resulted; and if the initiative is canceled, the ramification
of it; if the initiative is in place, what the people will gain from it. I wrote a
letter to the Sheikh and I included that page or that review to it.

 Again, do you recall who you gave your letter to?

 I am not sure. Either Yousry -- I believe Mohammed Yousry. I am not

quite sure.

 Do you recall if you received a reply back to your letter?

 No reply. I received just words, you know ±

 You know why you did not receive a reply back to this letter?

 Because Abdeen Jabara refused to read the letter.

 Do you know why Mr. Jabara refused to read the letter?

I was never told why. He just --

#c ´#1+c  0

 On February 20, 2000, the American secret police eavesdropped on a
conversation between Mohammed Yousry, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and an attorney
that the FBI only referred to as ³Attorney #2´ in court documents. Why did the FBI hide
this man¶s identity, though it is well known to us? Were they afraid having his name
mentioned in the indictment would embarrass Abdeen Jabara?

Jabara is an attorney and activist who moved to New York from Washington,
D.C. in 1994 in order to be on the defense teams of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.
Abdeen Jabara was born the youngest of seven children to immigrant parents in
Mancelona, Michigan. After graduating form the University of Michigan in 1962, where
he held a Regents Alumni Scholarship, he attended Wayne State University's Law
School and earned his law degree in 1965. He is also a graduate of the Institute for
World Affairs in Salisbury, Connecticut. After his graduation he lived for
a year in Lebanon and worked for a Dr. Saygh in the Center for
Palestinian Research. Jabara is married to Swarthmore graduate Holly
Maguigan who teaches at New York University School of Law and is the
author of numerous articles on wife beating which she considers to be a
crime. She is also author of an essay entitled: 
 , 
  
&0
 

 ,
,
Ë

4 Not only does
she want to tell Islamists how to treat our wives she wants to interfere with our
relationship with our daughters! It is true that Jabara has had a long association with the
assassins of Islam: In 1969 Jabara traveled to Los Angeles, at his own expense, to
counsel the family of Sirhan Sirhan.40 Jabara was concerned that Jewish lawyers
represented Sirhan: ³I don¶t believe in the evil man theory, but consciously or
subconsciously I think it would be very difficult for a Jew to represent some of this.´41 He
would also handle Sirhan¶s appeal.42

´#2 #)  

Dr. Mehdi¶s Arab Information Center was a center of international anti-Zionist

intrigue. A 
  article linked Francis Mary Hagan with the à 
 
- .43 In October 1956 Hagan, 29, a former Columbia University student and the
wife of Chaleb Kayali, the former secretary of the Syrian Embassy in Washington was
convicted of espionage and sentenced to one year in prison during a secret trial in
Israel. Hagan was secretary of the American Friends of the Middle East44 in 1953,
secretary to the Syrian delegation to the United Nations in 1954 and in 1955 secretary
to the Arab Students Organization in New York. She had entered Israel in on July 18,
1956 and was arrested four days later.45

40
. Douglas E. Kneeland ³Sirhan Indicates His Spirits are High´ ./(›
 January 16, 1969.
41
. Douglas E. Kneeland ³Sirhan Trial Seen Plodding Along in World of Own´ ./(›
 February 2, 1969.
42
. ³Sirhan Gets Arab Lawyers for Appeal´ Washington Post July 3, 1969 pg. A10.
43
. ³U.S. Woman Sentenced as Arab Spy in Israel´ ›
  October 12, 1956 page 8, 1
44
. In 1967 Ramparts Magazine reported that the CIA had funded American Friends of the Middle East. ³The Lawless State,´ Morton
Halperin - Jerry Berman - Robert Borosage - Christine Marwick - Penguin Books, 1976. AFME had received grants from USIA,
USAID and the State Department.
http://www.amideast.org/about/50_years/president_letter.htm
45
. ³U.S. Woman Sentenced as Arab Spy in Israel´ ›
  October 12, 1956.
 In February 1975 a Senate panel headed by Senator Frank Church was
considering studying the legality of the FBI drive on so-called Arab Terrorism in the
United States. This was precipitated by an alleged link between an illegal entry of the
 à 
  -  in Dallas in the fall of 1972 to obtain a list of 94 alleged Al-
Fatah agents that belonged to Dr. Seif Wadi Ramahi, the center¶s director. It also
probed the FBI surveillance of Abdeen Jabara. The FBI had been asking questions
about Brother Jabara and making reports on his speeches even though he was not the
subject of a criminal investigation. Jabara claimed he was in contact with Ramahi in
1972 on certain ³legal problems Dr. Ramahi had.´ FBI Director L. Patrick Grey claimed
the FBI conducted this illegal operation because the Bureau had been told that the
documents might contain a list of names of Brothers involved in assassination
operations within the United States.

Dr. Ramahi, a graduate of Southern Illinois University, left the Arab Information
Center and became Charge d¶Affairs in Libya for the United Arab Emirates, after he was
refused re-entry into the United States in late 1972. Dr. Munir Bayoud46 took over his
position. Dr. Bayoud stated, ³Dr. Ramahi wouldn¶t hurt a fly. He told me he lost a
briefcase that contained a mailing list for the Center. I think the FBI used this list to
harass these people.´47

Former senior United States intelligence officers told the . /( ›
 that
the operation against the Dallas Arab Information Center was fully justified due to the
assassination of Yosef Alon the air force attaché at the Israeli Embassy in Washington
who was shot to death outside his home in Chevy Chase, Maryland in July 1973.48 Alon,
44, was born in a kibbutz in Palestine and joined the Haganah in 1948, becoming one of
its first pilots to bomb innocent civilians. It was easy to find Alon, as he was listed in the
Chevy Chase telephone directory.49 When the police examined the scene they found
two different types of bullets, however, they concluded one gun had been loaded with
two different kinds of ammunition, but had to admit this was ³unusual.´50


# c  ´#

46
. Dr. Munir Bayoud was born in Lebanon but moved to Palestine where he taught at Christian religious schools. He immigrated to
the United States with his family in 1955 and taught mathematics at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. He was director of the
Arab League¶s Dallas regional office from 1975 to 1982, and served national president of the United Holy Land Fund (to be
distinguished from the Holy Land Foundation) from 1983 to 1985. His wife, Katie, was president of the Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee. The FBI questioned Bayoud in 1972 after the action at the Munich Olympics. Bayoud sought the advice of a lawyer. He
died from cancer on July 12, 1998. Janet McMohan, 
  
‘ 
" Bulletin Board September 1998.
47
. Lisa Belkin ³For Many Arabs, FBI Scrutiny Renews Fears´ ./(›
 January 12, 1991.
48
. Nicholas M. Horrock ³New Senate Panel May Study FBI Drive on Arab Terrorism´ ./(›
 February 13, 1975.
49
. Bernard Gwertzman ³Israeli Attache Shot Dead At Home Near Washington´ ./(›
 July 2, 1973.
50
. LaBarbara Bowman ³Police In County Seek Gun Believed Used in Killing Israeli.´ 
  July 10, 1973 page A3. In a
broadcast in Arabic from Cairo, the Brothers of the Voice of Palestine announced, ³Brothers, here is a news report on the death of
the Zionist military attaché and deputy military attaché at the Zionist enemies embassy in Washington. Three days after the
assassination of martyr Mohammed Boudia, at the hands of the Zionist intelligence element in Paris, Alon was executed. This is the
first execution operation carried out against a Zionist official in the U.S.´ On June 28, 1973, Israeli agents exploded a bomb under a
small passenger car in the Rue de Saint Anne in Paris, killing ³theatre director´ Mohammed Boudia, the top man for the PFLP¶s
European section and a commander of Black September. While at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, Mohammed Boudia met
Ilich Ramírez Sánchez better known as Carlos the Jackal. Carlos performed his first act for the PFLP, an attack on businessman
Joseph Sieff in revenge for the murder of Boudia. Lord Sieff, the boss of the Marks & Spencer Department store was wounded in St.
John's Wood in London on December 30, 1973.
 The assassination of Alon triggered a nationwide surveillance procedure
established in 1972 by the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism to determine the
whereabouts of Ë

within the United States. The Nixon Administration instituted
5
  +  that required that all Arabs entering or leaving the United States,
residing in the United States on permanent visas, or studying in American Universities
be kept under close surveillance. Arab-Americans who were known as activists and
leaders in their communities were treated in the same manner. Some of the less than
one hundred people on the list were put under direct observation while others were
checked on through sources.51

During the mid 1970¶s, Jabara, a life member of the American Civil Liberties
Union, was instrumental in exposing the 5
 +  program against Arabs and
Arab-Americans, which included deportations, surveillance, and harassment
campaigns. Jabara was directly involved in the issues, himself the victim of a
coordinated campaign of government surveillance. During the investigation of Jabara
that was carried out with the complicity of the NSA it was revealed that there was only
one case in which Jabara was suspected of criminal activity or espionage ± and that
was the Alon assassination. The FBI questioned his neighbors and political associates
about his whereabouts that day, watched his home and business, made pretext calls to
his family and wasted numerous agents hours since he had been in his Detroit law
office on the day of the killing. The FBI had no grasp of our operations if it believed that
someone who kept as high a profile as Brother Jabara did would be pulling any
triggers!52

In 1979 a Federal District Court ruled that the FBI acquisition of Jabara¶s
overseas messages from the NSA violated his Fourth Amendment right against
³unreasonable search and seizures.´ The FBI had claimed to have reasonable suspicion
that Jabara was an agent of a foreign government because in 1971 the CIA informed it
that he was a cadre in a Middle East so-called ³terrorist´ organization. In October 1979
this ruling was overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In 1985, he
finally won a long legal battle that forced the FBI to destroy the records it had
maintained concerning his exercise of activities protected by the First Amendment.53

The Islamists and so-called terrorists of that time hated the bigoted American
President Richard Nixon and, as stated, the Brooklyn / Jersey City cell planned to
kidnap him and his former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. This was El-Sayyid
Nosair¶s idea, as he wanted either or both held captive to secure his release. Nosair
suggested stripping them of their clothes as soon as they were abducted, as he
believed both men wore homing devices. Siddig rejected the idea as impractical, in light
of the fact that Nixon and Kissinger54 were no longer in power. New York City Police

51
. Bill Richards and LaBarbara Bowman ³Slaying of Alon Activiated U.S. Watch for Terrorists.´
Washington Post July 4, 1973 Page A1.
52
. Paul Magnusson ³NSA Tapped Six Overseas Messages by Attorney for Sirhan, FBI Reveals´ › 
   August 3,
1977 Page A12, 1pgs
53
. David Burnham ³Judge Rules FBI Violated the Privacy of A Lawyer´ ./(›
 July 8, 1979 David Burnham ³Court Says
U.S. Spy Agencies Can Tap Overseas Messages´ ./(›
 November 7, 1982.
54 th
. In November 2002 Bush the Younger appointed Henry Kissinger to head a panel looking into our September 11 Victory. The
Democrats immediately named former Senator George J. Mitchell Vice Chairman of the commission. The Anti-Defamation League
Department Detective Louis Napoli explained what would have happened had this plan
been put into effect: ³If they take a hostage and they say listen I want all - - - the United
States will never, never release one person because once they do it than the floodgates
open up. You understand?´ Had Operation Boulder been in place before 9/11 we would
have been up the River Jordan without a paddle.

´#c  #c 

In 1980, James Zogby55 joined with former Senator James

Abourezk to form the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee ±
the ADC. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee has
18,000 members and is the largest grass roots Arab-American
organization and claims that its mission is defending the political
rights and promoting the cultural heritage of the more than three
million Americans of Arab descent. Senator James Abourezk is
definitely a Brother ± he was willing to testify for Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman but was
prevented from doing so. The Senator served one term ± 1973 to 1979 ± in the Senate
and one in the House of Representatives from 1971 to 1973. He worked closely with
Abdeen Jabara in the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.56 The American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee is part of our ³Terror Lobby´ and uses civil liberties
issues to make it easier for Islamists to operate by lobbying against ³anti-terror´
legislation on the highest levels of government. For example in June 2004 the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee keynote speakers were Asa Hutchinson
Undersecretary of the Department of Homeland Security and Teresa Heinz Kerry wife of
Presidential Candidate John Kerry. Hutchinson promised that the Department of
Homeland Security would eliminate the special registration for people who fit the profile
of our activists program completely in the near future and pledged to deal with all
travelers equally and without discrimination. Heinz Kerry's presence highlighted John
Kerry's continued desire to get Muslim votes. According to Heinz Kerry, "John will be

and the American Jewish Committee have honored Mitchell whose mother, Mary Saad, a factory worker, was of Arabic descent.
Mitchell is a traitor to the woman who brought him into this world. Both men refused to serve on the commission. Mitchell said he
didn¶t want to leave his law firm and Kissinger would not reveal the clients of Kissinger Associates. The late Congressman Henry
Gonzalez wrote this in a letter to then President Bush: ³The House Banking Committee is conducting an investigation into over $4
billion in unreported loans the former employees of the Atlanta branch of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro provided to the government of
Iraq between 1985 and 1990. The Committee¶s investigation has uncovered the fact that Henry Kissinger was on the International
Advisory Board of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro during that same time period and that Banca Nazionale del Lavoro was a client of
Kissinger Associates.´ Kissinger Associates, BNL, And Iraq Henry B. Gonzalez, (TX-20) (House of Representatives - May 02, 1991)
[Page: H2762]
55
. In 1984, Zogby served as deputy campaign manager for fundraising for the Reverend Jesse Jackson¶s presidential campaign
and served as an advisor on Arab American issues to the Clinton administration. In 1994, he was appointed to the Democratic
National Committee¶s Resolutions Committee. Zogby has come to the defense of the Muslim Brethren, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad,
arguing that these groups are merely ³politically´ or ³religiously´ opposed to the peace process. He defended the American Muslim
Council. James Zogby criticized President Clinton¶s January 1995 executive order classifying a number of Islamist organizations as
terrorist groups. Zogby rejected outright in the pages of a pro-Hamas publication, that fundraising within the Arab-American and
Muslim American community is in any way connected to any Middle Eastern so-called terrorist groups. In 1984, Zogby served as
deputy campaign manager for fundraising for the Reverend Jesse Jackson¶s presidential campaign and served as an advisor on
Arab American issues to the Clinton administration. In 1994, he was appointed to the Democratic National Committee¶s Resolutions
Committee. Zogby is not an Arab Uncle Tom. He is a Brother who has stated, ³Not enough has been done to explain Islam in the
West and to deal with those passages in the Qu¶ran that some in the West find troubling. One easy way to do this is to invite those
who ask the questions to read the entire Qu¶ran and read the entire Torah and then see which is the bloodier scripture.´
http://islamonline.net/livedialogue/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=FfJa84; Forward, May 10, 1996.
http://www.meforum.org/article/429
56. USA v Rahman Doc. Number 642
committed to a strong America, where our nation's laws are enforced without resorting
to discrimination." She added, "He has always supported strong hate crime laws, and
he believes that the practice of racial profiling should be prohibited."57

  .cc´#

Many of the principals in the Sheik¶s show trial were approached by the FBI to
act as informants against us, and it seems, at the urging of his feminist wife Jabara
succumbed to the material temptations and spiritual temptations of the West. Jabara
was conspicuous by his absence as a witness in the trial of Sister Lynne 
During
the ) 3 - --- prison visit Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman told Yousry, when
Jabara left the room to get coffee: ³I cannot write with [Jabara]«in the presence of
[Jabara] I cannot write.´ In a telephone conversation Sattar told Mustafa Hamza that
Yousry had told him: ³Jabara would not allow the letter to be read for fear that they
would get caught and lose everything. He speaks Arabic. I am angry with him and he
will not accompany me on my next visit. He is afraid that if the authorities find out what
we are doing all subsequent visits will be cancelled. [Lynne Stewart] and [Ramsey
Clark] let me say whatever I want, do what you want, say what you want.´ Because of
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman¶s distrust of Jabara Yousry had been unable to transmit
messages given to him by Sattar that had originated with Mustafa Hamza and Rifa¶i
Taha.

This was a shame. The cease-fire had achieved nothing for Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
and the repression of Islam continued in Egypt. Many mujahedeen realized this, as did
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who was itching to issue a public fatwa to his followers to
begin the mass slaughter of the (
 tourists once again. The Sheik¶s ability to
communicate was restricted to one call a month to his family and to communication with
his lawyers. Although Jabara failed us, the Sheikh¶s words did reach the right people
and would be made public by Sister Lynne.

---#)c c # c .$) c

In  ---, the Brothers of Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 29 hostages in the

Philippines and demanded the release of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and two other
convicted Brothers in exchange for the release of those hostages, and threatened to
behead the hostages if their demands were not met. Philippine authorities later found
two decomposed, beheaded bodies in an area where the hostages had been held, and
four hostages were unaccounted for. The Abu Sayyaf activity was discussed during a
March 2000 visit prison visit:

Yousry: Yeah, we have the newspapers. Yesterday, Abu Sayyaf¶s people detonated five
bombs in five villages under the government¶s control, in an area where they keep the
hostages.

57
. http://www.adc.org/index.php?id=2251
ABDEL RAHMAN: Oh, wow!

On 3  ---, during a prison visit to Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman by Stewart
and Yousry, Yousry told Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman about this al-Qaeda activity:

Yousry: Of course, you, Sir, have got to know that Layth Shubaylat58 and
Sheikh Yasin of Hamas issued a statement, saying that the United States
has to reconsider Sheikh Omar's case.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Sheikh Yasin too?

Yousry: Yes, Sheikh Yasin of Gaza.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Gracious Lord!

Yousry: Do you also know, Sir, that Abu Sayyaf of the Philippines is
requesting your release?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Abu Sayyaf, yeah.

Yousry: How did you know?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Abdeen read it to me.

Yousry: Really?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Uhm.

Yousry: Mr. Abdeen is eh... I am telling the Sheikh about the Abu Sayyaf
group in the Philippines, and they took hostages... The, in the ./(
›
, never said that they wanted to free the Sheikh.

ABDEL RAHMAN: And Ramzi Yousef.

Stewart: Uhm.

Yousry: But they eh, their demand is to free the Sheikh and Ramzi Yousef.

Stewart: Good for them, I didn¶t read that either.

Yousry: She says, Sir that she never read it in the newspapers either.

ABDEL RAHMAN: No, I eh, eh....

58
. Layth Shubaylat, a Jordanian firebrand, is also president of the Jordanian Engineers and head of the Association Association
Against Zionism and Racism, put on trial for slandering the King and Queen of Jordan.
 Stewart: Amazing, and they never said that.

Yousry: Yeah, they never did, they never did.

ABDEL RAHMAN: But are they still holding the hostages?

Yousry: Yes Sir, they still hold the hostages.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Uhm.

Yousry: [Arranging his papers] They are still holding them, they are telling
them that unless they respond to their demands, they will kill them.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Wow!

Yousry: Especially a German female with a heart condition, they are

raising a big fuss.

Stewart: Have they still, are they still holding them?

Yousry: Yeah, and they still have them.

Yousry: That is a good-

GOVERNMENT VERSION - Stewart: (UI) «that was a very (UI)....

DEFENSE VERSION - Stewart: That¶s so sad ...That was a very (UI)....

Stewart: Yeah. The uh, that is why it¶s very important that the politics still
be maintained and that uh, uh.... Your image is who you are is, is...is
important, very important. I think things like that in the Philippines, even
though it may be futile and not be successful, they still keep your
name...as someone that eh, the Mujahideen eh, consider their own hero. It
is very, very crucial.

AUSA Dember wondered how Sister Lynne¶s comments deviated from her stated
views on violence and brought up a previous interview Sister Lynne had given the .
/(›
:

 And do you remember saying specifically: My personal view is that it
was absolutely deplorable that people, civilians, tourists are not
combatants, are not to be targets, and that this massacre, as it took place,
was indefensible. Do you remember testifying to that here in court?

 Yes.

 Do you remember during your discussion with Mr. Tigar about the visit
in May 2000 discussing with him the references in the tape-recorded
conversations about Abu Sayyaf? Do you remember discussing the group
Abu Sayyaf that was in the Philippines, is that right?

 Yes.

 And do you remember, in response to questions by Mr. Tigar,

indicating that you were against taking of hostages, certainly in that
situation, and I believe you indicated in any situation, is that right?

 That would be fairly said, yes.

 Was certainly your view of Luxor was a view held back in 1997 when
you learned what happened to Luxor, at Luxor?

 I would think so, yes.

 And the view that you expressed in the answer I just read back about
the fact that it is deplorable and indefensible what happened there?

 Yes.

 That's your view today as well?

 That is my view.

 And has that always been your view about the taking of lives of non-
combatants in armed struggle?

 Well, I think my view is that it happens. It happens in Iraq today. It

happens because unfortunately you can't always separate out the
combatants from the non-combatants. But if it could be separated out and
certainly to target, I don't think that is permissible.

 Ms. Stewart, do you remember giving an interview in 2002 to a .

/(›
 reporter named George Packer? And that was at a time after
you had been charged in this case, is that right? And again, with respect
to that article, you were -- it was essentially a profile of you?

 Yes. It was the September following, six months later it appeared. The
interviews took place over a period of time during the summer.

 And he asked you questions, did he not, about your view of civilian
deaths in armed struggle, did he not?
 Yes.

 And did you say to him, back then, "I am pretty inured to the notion that
in a war or in an armed struggle people die. They're in the wrong place,
they're in a nightclub in Israel, they're in a stock market in London, they're
in the Algerian outback, whatever it is. People die. So, I have a lot of
trouble figuring out why that is wrong, especially when people are sort of
placed in a position of having no other way." Did you say those things to
Mr. Packer?

 Yes, I think I didn't say too much differently to you a moment ago.

 You have a lot of trouble figuring out why it's wrong that people in a
nightclub in Israel would be targeted for violence in an armed struggle?

 I have a lot of trouble figuring out the nuance, I believe, between people
who are forced to live in Gaza under Israeli rule and the foot that they may
feel on their neck and their unleashing, and that bad things have
happened to them and they are reacting to the bad things that have
happened to them. It's bad on both sides. That's what I have trouble
figuring out. It's so bad on both sides.

 Is it your view, when you said to Mr. Packer or made reference to a

nightclub in Israel, were you referring to an attack on civilians in a
nightclub in Israel?

 I'm referring to the fact that people get killed who are in proximity and
sometimes it's completely unfair. But then the people who are doing the
attacking, they see their lives as also being completely unfair. And that's
what I have a hard time parsing the difference.

 Well, when you made reference to a night club in Israel you were
referring, were you not, to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is that right?

 Yes.

 And was it your view, when you made that statement, that people
participating in the social life of a nightclub in Israel were combatants or
participants in that conflict?

 No. But no more were a father and his young son that were murdered
by an Israeli tank. I am saying that people, ordinary people are in the
wrong place at the wrong time and sometimes this happens.

 And you don't know what's wrong with that?

  I know what's wrong with the world that causes this to happen, but I
don't see an easy solution to these problems. And I certainly don't see that
continued oppression -- the status quo is the answer for people who feel
the boot of oppression.

 Ms. Stewart, when you made reference to a stock market in London,
were you referring to the British-North Ireland conflict? And was it your
view that business people, stockbrokers and other people in a stock
market in London were combatants in some armed struggle?

 No. But as I just explained, my view is that the persons who may or
may not have carried out that attack, they certainly knew the boot in
Northern Ireland, the one that fit so tightly around the Catholic foot -- that
they are oppressed, they have been fighting this fight for at least 200, 250
years.

The slain Brother Jainal Antel Sali Jr alias Abu Solaiman the masterminded the
kidnapping of US citizen Jeffrey Craig Schilling in August 2000 in Jolo island. Schilling
was held hostage for more than seven months by the Abu Sayyaf and during his
captivity; some of the demands made by the Abu Sayyaf were the release of Ramzi
Yousef and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman from US prison, the withdrawal of American
forces from the Middle East and the payment of $10 million in ransom. Schilling
escaped after about a year in our custody and in January 2007 the Filipino Special
Forces killed Brother Solaiman.59


 ---
 #  

During the trial of Yousry AUSA Andrew Dember stumbled across a reference to
a renegade faction of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya having Brother El-Batouty ditch EgyptAir
Flight 990 and turn it into a coffin for tourists and Egyptian military men:

Now, on April 24, 2000, and that's six days later, Government Exhibit
1075X, this is the important call. They're all important, but this -- they
become more important as we go on, okay. This is an important call. For
one reason it's important because this is the first time that Sattar connects
Mustafa Hamza to 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia, a key planner in the Luxor
event, the first time they talk directly to one another. That's important. And
the first thing that Mustafa Hamza does in the conversation, or one of the
first things he does is tell Atia about the initiative, about the ceasefire, and
developments over the last few years. Apparently, as we mentioned
before, 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia seems to have been disconnected from the
group probably because he's been in hiding, he's a fugitive and out of
touch with the rest of the group. So Mustafa Hamza is bringing him up to
speed. And then Mustafa Hamza tells Atia that there's a disagreement,

59
. http://www.gmanews.tv/story/27174/Palace-AFP-confirm-death-of-Abu-Sayyaf-leader-Abu-Solaiman#
and he refers to Taha by Abu Yasir but he says Rifa'i Taha is in conflict
with others, and that Atia -- this is Mustafa Hamza talking -- Atia should
follow, ³the general policy of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, which is in favor of
the ceasefire.´ So in this call Mustafa Hamza is coming straight out and
saying, Rifa'i Taha is off on his own. He's not with the general policy, he's
going in a different direction and that 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia should follow
him [not Taha]. In fact, later in the call Atia again says to -- excuse me,
Mustafa Hamza again says to Atia, he says this: ³Rifa'i Taha, represents
some kind of instability.´ And that, ³Rifa'i Taha, is the only one among all
that is not in agreement with the rest of the people regarding the direction,
regarding the policy of this period.´ That's on page 38 of the transcript.
Well, clearly what Mustafa Hamza is trying to do is isolate Taha, okay, get
Atia to join him, Mustafa Hamza, because he's saying, Taha is on his own.
He's not with the rest of the group. Atia, you're the head of the military
wing. Obviously you should be with the rest of the group. Stay with us. Be
with us. Stay away from that guy. Stay away from Taha. Now, another
interesting thing that's mentioned in this call is Atia explains to Mustafa
Hamza that he, Atia, had heard a report on a broadcast of the Y
, 
à that he, Atia, was appointed the military leader in !% %
. And that he essentially was -- he was appointed to succeed Farid
Kidwani, who had been killed earlier in September 1999. And Atia was
obviously concerned about that, concerned about how the Y
,à,
or anyone else, for that matter, would have learned that he had been the
named leader of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. And then Atia says something
also significant. It's a very significant call. The next thing comes up in the
conversation, or one of the next things is Atia says to Mustafa Hamza,
quote -- this is Atia talking -- 3&  %45
&6
3
&6%%67 7
%  8 %% &
 &  &6
 + 7
& !
5 %& 
3&73 
7
&&73
%&!7 
3%
8

At his trial Sattar was asked what all this ambiguity meant«

 On page 23, line 1 through 9, Atia says: The big matter ±

Hamza: Yes.

Atia: -- understand the big matter ±

Hamza: Yes.

Atia: -- was a reason for what happened.

Hamza: Yes.
 Atia: From the beginning of course... you must have known by now, that
we did the big matter on our own. We had no link to anybody and nobody
told us anything.

 And no?

 And nobody told us anything?

 Atia here is referring to the Luxor massacre.

 What is he saying?

 He is saying that the big matter was the reason for what happened. The
big matter was the reason for everybody coming on board and supporting
the peace initiative after Luxor as what I told you, that everybody was, you
know, says no more. That's it. Violence is supposed to be over. So, Atia is
referring here to that and he is telling him from the beginning, of course,
you must have known by now that we did the big matter on our own.

 When he says that we did the big matter on our own, what was your
understanding of what Atia was talking about?

 My understanding, he is talking about Luxor and he says that, you

know, whoever did it or, you know, including him, it was done with no, on
their own. They did not take orders from nobody. Nobody knew anything
about it and he had -- and he is saying we had no link to anybody and
nobody told us anything. That he had no link that had he no connection at
the time with anybody and that's it. You know, they did that on their own.

 And was it your understanding that Atia was saying he was part of a
group that did the massacre at Luxor?

 Either he is -- I'm not quite sure if he was saying that he was a part of it
because, you know, in my knowledge, that nobody survived, that attack.
The people who were executed at that time, nobody survived. They were
all killed. But I know -- I understand from what he is saying here that, you
know, he had a great knowledge about it so, you know, he is, probably
was one of the people who planned that attack, yes.

In a conversation between Sattar and Rifa'i Taha the word 
( appeared.

Sattar: That I have nothing to do with details, and that I am like Hisham
[Hisham Hasan Moursi Ahmad a Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya activist
imprisoned by the Egyptian Security Forces].

Rifa'i Taha: uh.

 Sattar: Meaning, 
(.

Rifa'i Taha: Um.

Sattar: I told him that these things have to be discussed with our Brother.

Rifa'i Taha: Um, um, um.

Sattar¶s attorney asked him: What did you mean when you said you have
nothing to do with details and that I am like Hisham and the others,
meaning 
(?

 I'm just an outsider. I'm not a member of your group. I'm just a link. I
have some sympathy, but I am not part of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. I'm
just a go in between. I'm just helping you.

Everyone agreed the 
  was Luxor but was it? All the topics that were
being discussed prior to this took place in September 1999. Luxor took place in 1997.
So interpreting this line to mean Luxor makes a almost  %
. Secondly Sattar
wonders if this is a reference to Luxor because there were no survivors ± or he may just
be trying to distance himself from one of the planners. But the missing link is the words,
³We had no link to anybody and nobody told us anything.´ The links to Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya could not have been more obvious than at Luxor. We linked ourselves to it by
taking credit for it, for the sake of Allah. Leaflets were stuffed in tourists¶ wounds with
the words Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya on them!

In Arabic, the leaflet, among other things,

wams any foreign tourist against coming to Egypf'; states that "[w]e here
see the desecration of our sacredness and states, We shall not let an
infidel desecrate our land ... spread in it the adultery and the vice . . we
have previously warned all foreigners not to come to Egypt; .... [W]e have
swom that we shall not leave this part of the land of Egypt until we purify it
from impurity, or we meet God as martyrs.

In addition, the first page of the leaflet says, in Arabic in the upper right comer,
"Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah," which translates to "the Islamic Group." On the back of the
flier, the following is written in English:

Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya w[ams] any foreign tourist from comin[g] to Eygpte

[sic] and order the Amrecan [sic] and west to relese [sic] the person ... of
Dr. Aomer Abd Al Rhman [sic] leader of Mosslern [sic] unless that happen
the result is very bad Mosslem. is eygpte [sic]. On the back of the leaflet,
the following is written in Arabic: The Battalion of Devastation and
Destruction... demands of America and the infidel West, the release of the
 captive Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman. The imam of Muslims and their
honorable scholar, or else, the consequences will be detrimental. Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya in Islamic Egypt

The leaflet espouses support for Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya and calls for the release
of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Not only was there the leaflet but Taha had taken
responsibility: In one prior tapped conversation Al-Sirri told Sattar that he had spoken to
British police about two statements regarding the Luxor incident, one by Taha in which
Taha claimed responsibility for Luxor and another in which an Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
affiliate disclaimed responsibility, and Al-Sirri told the police that Taha's statement was
correct because Taha is a "responsible man.´

The rest of this telephone call dealt with the procurement of material to be used
in future actions:

 Mr. Sattar and so, it was your understanding that Atia was thinking of
using some of the money that Mustafa Hamza sent him to buy a cell
phone, basically, right?

 Yes. He wants to be like everybody else. You know, in Egypt at the

time it was -- it was a hot thing, you know, everybody wants to buy a
mobile phone in Egypt at the time, you know. It was a big thing in the area,
yes.

 Displaying page 31 of Government Exhibit 1075X, at line 8 Mustafa
Hamza says: Therefore, there is no need to purchase things; and through
the purchase he gets a clue and, and through the clue he... no, keep it 'til
we evaluate our situation. If our Lord facilitates things and a re-evaluation
is achieved considering the people's circumstances and so, we will have
joint coordination. If you happen to travel or so, we are going to precisely
understand the situation, the capacity and circumstances, huh. I mean,
together, we arrange things. And Atia says: Sir, let me tell you about
something. Regarding the purchase of certain things. To start with, we
don't need anything of that sort. They're talking about weapons, right?

 I believe so, yes. He is talking about things, you know, that they had.
He says -- you know, I mean, if you go back to the conversation, the whole
thing you know, they are talking about the general policy of Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya and he is talking -- I understand he is talking purchase of certain
things could be weapons, yes.

 And Atia says: We have enough. And then Mustafa Hamza says: That
is fine. No need then to open new doors, in order to avoid any thread of
evidence, huh? And so what Mustafa Hamza is telling him is you don't
need to go out and buy more weapons to, because that might draw
attention to you. Is that right?
  He is telling him, you know, I mean, if you go to the part that you read
before, you will see that he is talking when he says, you know, that we,
you know, he is not scared, he is not -- he is following the general policy
and Mustafa Hamza is telling him that he appreciates that. So, Mustafa
Hamza is telling him, you know, there is no need to buy anything because,
basically, the general policy of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya is the peace
initiative.

 Well, actually that's not what he is saying, is it? What he is saying is:
That's fine. No need to open new doors in order to avoid any threat of
evidence. Right?

There were more subtle hints about the EgyptAir 990 in other Taha
conversations: "For your information, I have nothing to do with anything since the Luxor
incident." "I am staying home since the Luxor incidents, you know."

 ---  + .

   .$  

Among other overt acts, the indictment of Sister Stewart charged she had agreed
to confine her visit strictly to legal matters and that during a May 2000 visit to Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman, she allowed translator Mohammed Yousry to read letters to him
from Rifa¶i Taha and Mustafa Hamza in which the issue of the cease-fire was discussed.
The federal indictment charged that, because these communications with Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya violated the Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) placed on Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman, Lynne Stewart took devious steps to conceal the conversation from
prison guards, making extraneous comments in English to mask the Arabic
conversation between Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and Yousry. The Americans
intercepted and recorded the Sheik¶s conversations with Yousry and Stewart and used
them as a basis to obtain an arrest and search warrant on this communications cell.
One such covert conversation revolved around the riots at Al-Azhar University.

ABDEL RAHMAN: What?

Yousry: The Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya issued a statement... didn¶t you know,

Sir, about the demonstrations that took place in Al-Azhar?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Yeah. What does the statement say?

Yousry: [Looking for papers] I have it here, [reading] God is great!

Al-Azhar¶s voice got loud....

ABDEL RAHMAN: They have been saying that for a long time.
Yousry: Rifa'i Taha issued a statement, and the Al-Azhar Students¶ Union
issued one. [Rifa¶i¶s statement] God is great! Al-Azhar¶s voice got loud, this
is the voice of its students, can you imagine the voice of its scholars!
[Interjecting] Fine, Sir?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Uhm.

Yousry: Lynne, look at me and talk a little bit because they are watching
us closely.

Stewart: I am talking to you, I¶m making notes, (UI).

ABDEL RAHMAN: Why?

Yousry: I don¶t know, Sir, they are standing very close by the glass.

Stewart: Yes, the uhm...I am talking to you about...him going to have a,

uh, chocolate eh...heart attack here. No, but (UI).

ABDEL RAHMAN: Uhm.

Yousry: [Laughs]

ABDEL RAHMAN: Hm.

Yousry: Alright, Sir. Okay, let me do this and eh....

Stewart: Okay.

Yousry: [Reading] God is great! Al-Azhar¶s voice got loud, this is the voice
of its students, can you imagine the voice of its scholars! The incidents Al-
Azhar University witnessed, the revolt the students launched for a few
days despite the rubber bullets, the clubs of the State Security, and the
large number of casualties, put Al-Azhar back in its role and its leading
position defined by His Majesty God. The Al-Azhar demonstrations say
³No´ to the forces of atheism, secularism, the forces of apostasy, the
atheism and treason of rulers and others. This demonstration took place to
draw the attention-

Stewart: Why don't you stop a minute now. And (UI) say to him that, you
know, ³You understood what we are saying, (UI).´

Yousry: Lynne says, (UI) when they look, you look at me a little, talk, then
look at the Sheikh.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Okay. (UI)

Yousry: That¶s fine, now I continue.

Stewart: Very good, continue.

Yousry: [Reading] These demonstrations draw the attention to Al-Azhar

which will one day break the bond and the leach they put on it. At that
point, the nation will be liberated through the liberation of Al-Azhar. Its
bonds will be broken with Al-Azhar¶s bonds broken. A nation, led by
scholars towards freedom, honoring God¶s book and the Sunna of His
Prophet, may God¶s blessings be upon him, is, God willing, a victorious
one. [Clears his throat] As we.... Rifa¶i Ahmad Taha, one of the Al-Gama¶a
al-Islamiyya leadership members in Egypt, May 14, 2000.

Stewart: (UI) If the Sheikh understands all that and uh...for his uh-

Yousry: [Simultaneously] She is saying, Sir, is everything clear, or do you

want me to read something else?

Stewart: -understanding that uh, the future of his case that (UI) this-

Yousry: Oh, okay.

Stewart: - is uh, appropriately presented.

Yousry: Lynne just says anything, [laughing] (UI) Sir. Now I continue.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Yeah, yeah, that is good, good.

Yousry: [Laughing and reading] As we emphasize our support-

Stewart: I can get an academy award for it.

Yousry: She is saying, Your Eminence, that she can get an award in
acting. [All laugh] Alright, fine now, the guards they stepped back.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Did they come so close?

Yousry: Yes, they were very close by (UI).

Stewart: Judith Miller.

Yousry: Judith, a guy next to her, a lady, the one who went with me for the
chocolates. They stepped back.

Yousry: (Laughing) Perfect. Let me redo this«and eh.

 Stewart: I want you to stop a minute now, and I think you can just say to
him that, you know, µYou understand what we are saying«¶

Yousry: Lynne says, when they look, you look at me a little, talk, and then
look at the Sheik.

RAHMAN: Okay.

Yousry: That¶s fine, now I continue.

Stewart: Very good, continue. If the Sheik understands all that and eh, for
his«

Yousry: She is saying, Your Eminence is everything clear or do you want

me to read something else?

Stewart: Understanding that err the future of his case«

Yousry: All right, okay«

Stewart: All of this is eh appropriately presented.

Yousry: Lynne just says anything you eminence, now I continue«

RAHMAN: Yeah, yeah, that is good, good.

Yousry: (Laughing and reading) ³As we emphasize our support«´

During another part of the conversation, when Stewart spoke to distract the
guards, the Sheik and Yousry discussed another letter that Sattar had written to Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman. The letter was about a continuing campaign with the aim of
releasing the Sheik from his prison cell that was dependent of canceling the peace
initiative. This had transpired in  ))), but still had to be made public. Sattar
reminded his Eminence many Brothers were still imprisoned in Egypt, and that Rifa'i
Taha and,

Many other Brothers think that all these things need you to have a much
stronger position, no objection to the formation of a team that calls for the
cancellation of the Peace Initiative or makes threats or escalates things.
Please your Eminence, say your opinion about this, write some points we
can announce in a press conference with Lynne. If you don¶t want to,
please let Lynne know this.
 This was what this visit was all about. At her trial Sister Stewart attempted to
explain away her actions that were designed to allow the Sheik to communicate with the
Ë despite the SAMS:
Mr. Yousry is reading the material we mentioned earlier about al-Azhar
and a student demonstration therein which a number of young people
were killed. And he is reading this. Of course, I don't know what he is
reading because I don't speak Arabic, but he first notices that the guards
are very close to the glass, and then he brings to my attention and I'm
saying, well, let's do something to demonstrate that we are engaged in a
three-way meeting here so that they do not interrupt. That's the working of
my mind at this point. I say the thing about the chocolate heart attack
because Sheikh was eating a lot of chocolate. It is not good for him and he
has the heart condition. That's just a gratuitous comment. And we go on to
say the academy award is just so stupid. Just another remark, big mouth,
not thinking. But it was hardly an academy award performance. Then
Judith Miller is mistranslated I'm pretty sure. It is really Julie Miller who
was a guard at Rochester that the Sheikh particularly did not like, and she
had shown up at the window looking in along with the other guards,
uniformed guards that were there.

 In your experience do trial lawyers act sometimes?

 Yes.

 On this occasion, did you believe it was appropriate for you, as a
lawyer, to behave as you were behaving?

 Yes, absolutely. I do think, as I said a little earlier, these are confidential

discussions supposedly to be away from the eyes and ears of the
government, and the guards have been known to listen in and report back,
and in my experience and experience of other lawyers, this has happened.
And so we definitely keep a watchful eye on that kind of behavior.

 Looking now at the transcript that we have, last item in this particular
exhibit, 1706X, on the screen that shows that Mr. Yousry is unfolding a
sheet of paper and saying, shall I read Ahmed's letter to you, sir, and your
client says, wait a little, and then you say: Shall I approve it? Do you recall
that event? And what's going on there?

 The letter that had been sent by Ahmed Sattar, which we carried with
us and which we read, was translated on the plane to me. It was written in
Arabic. And when he took it out, apparently, it had not had my sign of
approval on it. So I said, shall I approve it, meaning put my sign -- my
name on it so that it was clear that Mr. Yousry was authorized by me to
read it, having read it in advance.
 The prosecution hammered at Stewart as if she had done something wrong by
attempting to further the establishment of an eventual Caliphate. ³Stewart allowed
Yousry to read letters from Sattar regarding the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya and a possible
resumption of military operations such as this letter dated May 19, 2000:

Brother Taha called me the day before yesterday. He still asks for your
Honor's moral support to his position, particularly at this time, after three
years have passed since the initiative that did not produce big results was
issued. I had explained to you, sir, his viewpoint before. Back then, you
asked him to commit himself, and to give his Brothers a chance. Up till
now, the man is committed, but I don't think he will be able to remain quiet
longer than that. I sent to you, sir, the statement he issued on al-Azhar
University incidents, which exposed him to the criticism of some Brothers,
particularly because of its strong language though he didn't say anything
other than what is supposed to be said. He therefore asks for your
straightforward opinion, sir, especially that you know that the man has his
massive weight among many Brother and that if the regime worries about
anyone, it is Taha. I had told him and the other Brothers about your
request, sir, concerning the evaluation of the initiative. He had the same
opinion. It is clear, though, that those who push to go by the initiative are
the brothers in Liman, even though they are very few. No. The Brothers in
Liman Prison and very few others outside. Taha is of the opinion that the
group has to well utilize the initiative paper. The least to do is to allow
media escalation and to demonstrate disgust at the way the situation
ended up, especially that the most they allow now is some improvement in
prisons, permission of visits, and release of some prisoners. Bear in mind,
though, that those they released had nothing to do with anything to start
with, and that there are so many others the government refuses to even
discuss their future, like those detained for more than ten years without
any charge, like Hassan al-Gharbawi Shahhata;60 Dr. Ahmad Abdu Silim,
phonetic; or Dr. Mahmud Shu'aib, and many others. Even our Brothers
who served the sentences they had in Sadat's case more than five years
ago are still in jail. Since 1992, the Brothers who were pronounced
innocent in any case are still under detention. They were not released.
Brother Abu Yassir and many other Brothers think that all these things
need you to have a more forceful portion. No objection to the formation of
a team that calls for cancellation of the initiative or makes threats or
escalates things. Please, your eminence, say your opinion about this,
dictate some points we can announce in a press conference with Lynne.
And if you don't want to announce them, unintelligible, please let Lynne

60
. Hassan al-Gharbawi Shahhata, a lawyer aged 35 who is married and has one child, is one of the longest serving administrative
detainees in Egypt. He was arrested on 11 January 1989 and charged in connection with two cases relating to disturbances in 'Ain
Shams, a densely populated district of Cairo. He was tried and acquitted of both sets of charges in May 1990, but has remained in
administrative detention since then, despite many court orders to release him. He is now held in al-Wadi al-Gadid Prison and has
recently contracted tuberculosis. Al-Wadi al-Gadid Prison is in al-Kharga, a town which lies in the desert 450km to the south west of
Cairo. It is known that overcrowding combined with the extreme heat in the prison in summer, caused by its desert location and by a
lack of adequate ventilation, has previously encouraged the spread of diseases among the prisoners. Amnesty International is
concerned that he receive proper medical treatment and that the disease is not passed to other prisoners or staff.
 know that.´ This was read to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman on May 19, 2000
thanks to Sister Lynne. Stewart had considerably more courage than
Jabara and was willing to put on a charade so that His Eminence could
still run Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya from prison. Lynne was no FBI snitch. She
was a stand up member of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya.

 
 )  
c#   c

Later Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman would be informed of the draconian sentences
that were meted out to those who followed the letter of the law in the Holy Qu¶ran and
made Jihad against the Pharaoh Mubarak:

Yousry: This, these are members of Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian government now
is sentenced - sentencing, them to long-term prison- imprisonment, and including three
eh, below the age of 16. So, Ahmed Sattar thought it was important, and Abdeen gave
me approval to read it.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Read the news article.

Yousry: The whole thing?

ABDEL RAHMAN: Yeah.

Yousry: [Reading] The Egyptian government was able to stop the wave of
violence which reached its climax in the Luxor attack of 1997.
Nevertheless, it still follows the Islamists who belong to the Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya, 43 of whom will stand trial in court this month. Emergency trials
(UI) irrevocable ruling (UI) acts of violence done by armed organizations,
the third involves activists who belong to organizations believed to be
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is expected that the State
Security Court will issue a sentence on May 10, 2000, the current month
of May 2000 - no, that¶s wrong, it should be the 20th, that is tomorrow-

ABDEL RAHMAN: Okay.

Yousry: [Reading] -the 20th, will sentence 13 defendants, three of them 16

are minors. This is within the framework of a trial of an Islamic Group in Al-
Menya linked to Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, the most important armed group
in Egypt. Their leader, Sha¶baan Haridi (PH), 30 years old, from a rural
area, had been previously sentenced to death on April 13, 2000 for killing
three policemen and seven civilians, three of them were children, between
1995 and 1997. The Group is charged with an armed attack to finance Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. The others can be sentenced to life imprisonment
with hard labor. Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya announced its responsibility for
the Luxor attack, in which 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians were killed in
November 1997. However, in March 1999, the Group announced
 suspension of violent operations; there was a truce on earth since the end
of 1998. On May 23, 2000 the State Security Court will have deliberations
concerning the case of ten Islamists, among them four women, charged
with reactivating Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya activities in Asyut.61

Sattar gave his impression of Taha¶s message transmitted during the May 2000
visit:

 [There were] the usual complaints about, Taha¶s complaint about the
criticism of the people in Egypt of him when every time he issues a
statement, especially, but this time he was complaining more because he
issued a statement and they thought it was harsh criticizing the Egyptian
government about some kind of demonstrations in Egypt. He wants the
Sheikh to be more clear on his position, what he wanted to do. Clearly he
is asking for moral support. He is asking the Sheikh just I want you on my
side. That's what he was trying to do.

 Like in the prior prison visits, did you prepare a letter? It's in Arabic. I
give it -- I'm not sure. Either Yousry or Ms. Stewart. I'm not ±

 And, did you receive a reply back to your letter?

 I did.

 And in what form did you receive a reply back?

 Same thing. You know, it was dictated to me, I wrote it down like the
previous visits.

[Second transcript to the videotape concerning the prison visit on May 19th
was displayed]

 And Mr. Yousry says, [pointing to the paper] we have about half an
hour left. [Holds the same paper up, flips it up and puts it down] I want to
read the letter to you because it's about two pages. Mr. Sattar, you were in
the courtroom when the government played the videotape?

 Yes.

 Did you know what letter Mr. Yousry was referring to here?

 I believe he was referring to my letter to the Sheikh.

 Mr. Yousry said, you asked about during the former visit, I will try my
best to get you the answer for them. As for the family in Egypt, they are all

61
. http://www.lynnestewart.org/5192.pdf
fine. As for Mohammed and Ahmed, Mohammed had a baby, he named
him Omar. We pray God to bless him and grant that this name leads him
to follow -- What is your understanding what Mr. Yousry is reading?

 He is reading my letter to the Sheikh. This passage concerns the

Sheikh's family. Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman is his older son, Ahmed
Abdel Rahman is his younger son and the baby is the Sheikh's grandson.
At least 85 percent of my letters to the Sheikh concerned his family, the
mosque, the Muslim community here, what we are doing, we are having
some study circles and we -- give him just, you know, regular -- just
regular news.

 What was your understanding that Rifa'i Taha wanted from the Sheikh?

 It is so clear here that all I wanted -- all he wants is his moral support
and to stop the criticism. Basically you know, they want to just to shut him
up, the other side, the other side wants to shut Rifa'i Taha up so he is
complaining about this and he is asking the Sheikh's moral support.

 Who is the other side?

 The other side is the people in prison, Egypt, the Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya leaders in prison, Montassar Al-Zayyat. Now I know it is Mustafa
Hamza also. Every one of them wanted Rifa'i to shut up.

 And what did they want him -- what was your understanding of what
they wanted him to keep quiet about?

 My understanding, it was the deal between them or the Egyptian

government did not like the way that Rifa'i was talking. He is coming out
and attacking the government in harsh words, saying things that the
government does not like, and they felt that he was spoiling what they
were trying to do.

 What did you mean when you wrote to the Sheikh that Rifa'i Ahmad
Taha is of the opinion that the group has to well utilize the initiative paper?

 Rifa'i Ahmad Taha was in the opinion of to use the initiative card to
exert pressure on the government to come to a political solution. Use the
threat that the initiative would be cancelled. The initiative it is not working
so talking in the newspapers against the initiative and utilize him.
Basically, he was a bad boy. He is a bad guy. Use -- he said it so many
times in so many conversations. Use me as the bad boy. Use me as a foil,
all right, so he can get some results from the Egyptian government.
 The Sheikh harbors good feelings for all the Ë but especially for those
believers who put their lives on the line for their religion. He was incensed at this
repression and won over to Taha¶s thinking. In late May 2000 Sattar spoke with Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leaders and relayed Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman¶s instructions to
escalate the issues in the media, avoid division in the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya¶s
leadership and hint at military escalation even if the Group is not ready for military
action and most importantly, go back to ³work´ that is resume militant operations. But as
it transpired EgyptAir 990 was Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya¶s last gasp.

´ --- ï/    


The American Government ranted, ³Following the meeting, and in further
violation of the Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) to which she had agreed,
Stewart was charged with announcing to the news media that Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman had withdrawn his support for the cease-fire.´ Sattar had to admit this was a
very shall we say masculine move, ³I am telling you that the words this lady released
have their consequences. She herself can be legally questioned, for your information.
The lady laid down her future.´62 Stewart explained:

On June 14, 2000, I was in touch with  ,   ran a story in
Egypt (it was never even run in this country) that the Sheik had alerted
members of his party, the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, that he thought that the
cease-fire was not working, that men still remained in jail, that there were
new arrests, that nothing seemed to be happening, so what was the
purpose of the cease-fire? He ended it--this part I remember so
particularly--by saying, I¶m not in Egypt, I don¶t know, you have a better
handle on it than I do, but this is just how it appears to me. The story was
run in some Arabic and Egyptian papers. It caused quite a furor because
the group got into splits over it as to who they should listen to and what
they should do.´ On ´
 , ---, during a telephone conversation
Stewart stated her concern that she would not be able to "hide" from the
United States Attorney's office the fact that she had issued the press
release.

  ran this story,

´
  ---. Cairo. The spiritual leader of Egyptian Muslim militants
has renounced their truce, his lawyer said on Wednesday: "He is
withdrawing his support for the cease fire that currently exists," Lynne
Stewart, the main lawyer for Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, told   by
telephone from New York. She read a statement that she said he had
issued two weeks ago from his jail cell in Rochester, Minnesota, which his
defense team had held while considering how best to release it. Stewart
said Sheikh Omar had concluded that the unilateral truce observed by al-
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) since the Luxor slaughter of foreign
62
Julia Preston ./(›
 October 4, 2004
 tourists and four Egyptians had brought no advantage to Egypt's biggest
militant group. "There is absolutely nothing moving forward," she quoted
his statement as saying in Arabic. "The thousands of people who are in
prison (in Egypt) are still in prison, the military trials continue. Executions
are taking place." Last year, exiled Gama'a leaders endorsed a 1997
ceasefire call by their jailed comrades in the Shura (consultative) Council
that sets the group's guidelines. "The people who launched the cease fire
have good faith but the Egyptian government has shown no good faith,´
Sheikh said in the statement. "He wants people not to place hope in the
process because nothing is moving forward," Stewart said. Muslim
militants in Egypt and abroad say the views of the blind cleric are highly
respected by his followers. Exiled Egyptian Islamists say his latest
decision may further deepen rift between what are believed to be two
camps inside the Gama'a, those who support the ceasefire and those who
want to continue the armed struggle. Subheading: Leaders Said to be Ill-
treated in Jail. Stewart said the Sheikh was completely isolated in jail and
was not well treated. "He is held in solitary confinement, but his faith is
very very strong," she said. They (U.S. prison authorities) may bar me
from visiting him because of this announcement." U.S. officials could not
immediately be reached for comment.´

Sister Stewart was not the first attorney to be charged with contacting new
agencies to publicize our militant activities. In April 1993, during the trial of 32 Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya members for carrying out attacks on tourists visiting Egypt, three
lawyers were charged with an identical offense.63 Coincidentally, the FBI bothered
Sattar during that period:

When was the last time you were questioned by the FBI?

 That was, in I believe, in April or May 1993.

 And what happened then?

 Well, I had two FBI agents come to my work with a subpoena, what
they call forthwith subpoena. And they had to either to take me -- they
wanted to take me to the FBI headquarter, or to apply the subpoena right
there and then. And I said --
MR. MORVILLO: Objection, your Honor«

THE COURT: Sustained.

  )
+  cc+ 

63
. Caryle Murphy ³Egypt Convicts 32 In Attacks on Tourists´ ›
  April 23, 1993.
 Some factions of Gama¶a al-Islamiyya were disappointed about the ceasefire
having been halted. On ´
--- the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya faction -
›  released this statement,

There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his prophet. In the name of
Allah, the most merciful and compassionate: "Those whose efforts have
been wasted in this life, while they thought that they were acquiring good
by their works? They are those who deny the signs of their Lord and the
fact of their having to meet Him in the hereafter. Vain will be their works,
nor shall we on the Day of Judgment give them any weight." With broken
hearts we have received the declaration that is attributed to our honorable
Sheikh, Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, which was conveyed by the American
attorney Lynne Stewart and delivered to the media by the American Abu
Ahmed Abdel Sattar. The declaration claims that our honorable Sheikh
has withdrawn his support of the initiative of cessation of violence. The
Islamic [splinter] Group -›  was keeping an eye on those
members who deviated from the right path of our basic and conventional
Islamic work and put their personal interests and greed before the fear of
God. It is time for the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya -   ›  to
publish their previous messages to Brother Rifa¶i Taha, which was
delivered through his adherent, Yassir al-Sirri in those messages. We
advised him to fear God and   
 , that only led us to
tribulations. But since he was kicked out of the consultative council of al-
Gama'a al-Islamiyya and was replaced by another Brother, he kept on
spreading hatred and innuendos. He surrounded himself with shaky
characters and managed to recruit two individuals whose true allegiance is
unknown, and they are the American, Ahmed Abdel Sattar, who claims
that he is the official spokesperson of the Sheikh, while, in fact, he adds to
what the Sheikh says. And he is an informant of American intelligence
services. The other individual is Yassir al-Sirri, Abu Ammar, who was
kicked out of the Jihad Group and who resides in London from where he
propagates enmity toward our Islamic Group. We are used to this man's
aggressiveness towards our group, especially after the Jihad Group
rejected him in October 1998. And in order to create division, he lied and
claimed that the honorable Sheikh does not condone the issued report by
our distinguished Sheikhs and historical leaders in which they call to stop
violence. The authenticity of this report was proven false and its purpose
was revealed as well as of those behind it. Once more today he repeats
the same maneuver. The al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya -  ›  will
not forget to warn all the Brothers from this lobbyist, especially as we
commemorate the blessed birth of our prophet. May God's peace,
blessings and mercy be bestowed on him. They will not forget to remind
him to reflect on our blessed prophet's biography and to remain united
under the Islamic and lawful leadership of the Islamic Group, their sheikhs
and their historical leaders, abiding by the rules of its Islamic work and
 faithful to its constitutional resolutions. "And Allah has full power and
control over his affairs; but most among mankind know it not.

These ³Brothers´ called Sattar an informant. Why then is he locked up?

 c#c +  

On ´
---Ahmed Sattar spoke by phone with Mustafa Hamza regarding

Rahman¶s public withdrawal of support for the cease-fire and the confusion the
statement could create due to the fact the cease-fire had already ended without an Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya consensus. On June 19, 2000 Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman¶s son
Muhammed Omar Abdel Rahman told Sattar to tell his father there was a debate going
on within the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya regarding the cease-fire. The next day Sattar
called Muhammed Rahman, who was in Afghanistan with Usama bin Laden and told
him a conference call had taken place between Rahman and some of his attorneys in
which Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman said he was not unilaterally ending the cease-fire but
merely withdrawing his support for it. The Sheikh¶s son seemed to favor the cease-fire,
as did our spokesperson in Cairo, Montassar al-Zayyat. The Sheikh sent him this
message:

 9

   ) 

ABDEL RAHMAN: Okay. Brother Montassar what use is the Initiative

where we declared the halt of violence, hah? And the government
continues to arrest the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya members, puts them to
military trials, continues to execute and re-arrest them? What use is this
Initiative! What did it do other than division of the Group lines? Tell the
Brothers in your area, as long as we did not gain anything from the
government the least you can do is to allow the other voice, which calls for
the continuation of the... hah? Allow this voice to speak up, to be loud. Do
not stop it or silence it- Do not stop it or silence it- and eh, [clearing his
throat] so far, the government anything other than increasing its violence.
[Pause] Tell them that they should give Rifa'i Taha his natural as the head
of the Group. [Pause] If they want to do so, the least is to have the person
in charge, consult with him, hah? Yeah, this is my advice, give the man,
give man his true measure, especially as he is the beloved Sheikh
Montassar.

Yousry: Lynne, the Sheikh has just uh, um, dictated a reply to [pointing to
the paper] this Egyptian thing to Montassar al-Zayyat, his lawyer in Egypt,
and I just suggested that when you have your press conference with
Muhammad Salah, the  correspondent, on the phone, you can tell
him about it, or tell him to call Montassar and publish the Sheikh¶s
response in .

Stewart: Oh, very good. Excellent. Let me put that on the list.
 ABDEL RAHMAN: We can keep it to the end of her talk.

Yousry: Also... I told her to mention it and at the same time she tells him,
call Montassar and get the full thing.

ABDEL RAHMAN: Exactly so.

Yousry: Good. The Sheikh agreed. He said yeah, we just mention it and at
the same time ask him to go to, go - to call Montassar al-Zayyat and get
that, uh, full statement. That okay?

Stewart: Yeah.

Yousry: Yes, Sir. [Reading back after a pause] Brother Montassar al-
Zayyat, please put this information in order-

ABDEL RAHMAN: Yeah, [dictating] -and send it to all feasible media.

Stewart: Is it going to go e-mail, so that he¶ll have it by then?

Yousry: It can be done by e-mail, Sir, Ahmed can send it on the computer.
He can receive it in two seconds.

On June 15, 2000 Islamic group lawyer Montassar al-Zayyat visited the group
leaders at their Tura prison south of Cairo. He told %: ³The statements
attributed to Dr. Abdel Rahman are baseless. The person who conveyed this message
betrayed the trust twice, once by leaking a message that was not for publication and
addressed to the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leaders, and second time by distorting and
deleting parts of the message in a way that suggested the opposite of Sheikh Omar's
intention. According to the Shura Council's statement, he was the most ardent
advocator of stopping combat operations."

)(

    ) 

Rifa'i Taha sent this letter to the Sheik via Sattar,

Honorable Sheikh, please be informed that we are 'the weak' to the

greatest extent and that we get the power and might from God, His
Majesty, then from your holding on to truth. Honorable Sheikh, please be
informed that anything you say, especially if we sense some weakness in
it, affects us all and weakens us, particularly among our Brothers with
whom we say. Maybe you know how -- maybe you know how proud and
dignified we felt when you announced your withdrawal of support to the
initiative. You are the weak and sick prisoner, you neither withhold nor
suppress a word of truth even when you are behind bars. For this reason,
 we were greatly astonished when Montassar al-Zayyat wrote in the
newspapers that you urge to go forth with the initiative. These words had a
severe influence on us. Please explain this to us, your eminence. If any of
the Brothers, like Montassar al-Zayyat, needs to be told some
encouraging words to strengthen him -- then unintelligible -- not have it
published in newspapers. Words like these weaken especially because
you, Your Eminence, do not belong to a certain group. All the people look
up to you and at what you issue and convey it to each other. He closed
the brackets [reading] Mohammed's words end here.

On June 20, 2000 Sister Lynne approved this Press Release composed by Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman that vacillated on the issue of the cancellation of the unilateral
cease-fire:

Everything said in the previous statement is correct and, indeed I said

those things. Lynne Stewart has been my lawyer since 1994. She
defended me in my trial from beginning to end. She did her utmost and
she continues doing it now. Any statement that comes from her, that she
confirms is from me, should be taken as if I said it. And when my son said
what I he said, I believe he was unaware of these facts.

I declare that Ahmed Sattar is a Muslim Brother who has worked with me
all these years and even on my case as a paralegal. I trust everything I
have to the degree he holds my power of attorney to act on my behalf and
he is the executor of my will. I trust him to give advice to my children in my
absence, transfer my body when I die, and to pay off my debts. I testify
that he does not speak anything but the truth. To those who accuse him of
being an agent, I tell them to fear Allah, and do not say anything that they
are not certain of and to watch their tongues« Sattar is as far as could be
from what he has been accused of«I declare that he speaks nothing but
the truth. Those who accuse him of being an agent should fear God and
should not accuse people falsely. They should carefully examine such
statements before speaking them aloud. "O ye who believe, if a wicked
person comes to you with any news, ascertain the truth«"

Even though the Egyptian government is still killing the innocents and not
releasing the detainees from arbitrary imprisonment, and even though
they are terrifying people in their homes and other criminal acts continue, I
did not cancel the cease fire. I do withdraw my support to the initiative. I
expressed my opinion and left the matter to my Brothers to examine it and
study it because they are the ones who live there and they know the
circumstances where they live better than I also ask them not to repress
any other opinion within the Gama'a even if that is a minority opinion. [This
was also translated, ³not to underrate the Group's opinion regardless of
how small the Group is´ and ³not to expropriate any opinion, regardless
how small the group that espouse it.´] This is the way we have been since
 we founded this Gama'a, and we should continue to be open to all
opinions.

Now, after I made my position clear, and there is no ambiguity, I am

asking my Brothers and sons to withhold public comment and to consider
and fear Allah before speaking out. It is signed A Salaam Alikem, Your
Brother; Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, and dated June 20th, 2000.

Approved by Lynne Stewart June 20, 2000.

     

%6

Rifa'i Ahmed Taha, an official of the Egyptian Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya said,

"As for Omar Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of the group who is
incarcerated in an American prison, the policy of discussion, threats and
promises is over, and we will talk to the United States of America in the
language that it understands, and we will break his shackles and we will
free him, and I believe that has become imminent." He added that the
group's leadership may end the truce that it had announced unilaterally
two years ago after the spiritual leader, Omar Abdel Rahman, who is
imprisoned in the United States, withdrew his support for it. Taha said, in
response to questions from %  over the internet from an
unknown location (he is believed to be residing in Afghanistan) that the
group will reevaluate the initiative to halt the violence, which Abdel
Rahman announced he no longer supports because it did not produce any
results for the fundamentalist movement. Taha indicated that ceasing of
operations is a human decision that could be nullified if the majority of the
group's internal leadership sees that as beneficial: "The decision to halt
violence (the operations) was taken by humans and can be rescinded if
the majority inside the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya believes there is an interest
in doing so, particularly after Abdel Rahman's recent instructions in which
he has withdrawn his support for the initiative.´ Further, %,
had conveyed, according to Lynne Stewart, attorney for Abdel Rahman
that last week, according to him, he withdrew his support for the truce that
the group has implemented since members of the group had killed 58
foreign tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor in November 1997.

Rifa'i Taha, one of the 14 fundamentalist leaders and a founder of the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya who was sentenced to death in absentia, in the case
of the returnees from Afghanistan, and whose extradition has been
officially requested by Egypt over the internet, due to their involvement in
cases of "religious violence," said there is no doubt that the leadership of
the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya will reevaluate his position based on the
directives from Abdel Rahman. Rifa'i Taha denied being toppled by the
 group's consultative council. He also mentioned the members that had
carried out the Luxor massacre in 1997 and said that they were not
frustrated nor were they undisciplined, despite the fact that the group,
throughout all of its previous stages, was and is still besieged.

[That was from %  in Arabic June 19, 2000 P6 and was approved by
Lynne Stewart].64

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman reacted to the rumors that Taha had been kicked out
of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya Shura Council, ³I am hurt. I am upset to hear that Rifa'i
Taha was fired from the movement. I do not permit such conduct. The leaders (the
leaders of the movement) might want to review their decision and their conduct. I do not
think, rather, I can confirm that Rifa'i Taha would not do such things. He would not hurt
anyone, especially the movement, neither directly nor indirectly. I doubt that the historic
leaders of the movement issued this statement. They know that they are not to accuse
people without evidence, and they have their own ideas and opinions.´

  $  # c   

Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya historic leaders rushed to issue a statement from

their prison in Egypt in which they expressed their understanding of the
Blind Sheikh Rahman's conditions and at the same time underlined their
commitment to the initiative that was declared unilaterally in 1997. Many
observers of the fundamentalist movement's phenomenon believe that this
stand and reactions, the argument among the group members inside and
outside Egypt about the betrayal of trust in conveying Abdel Rahman's
message from his U.S. prison, and the backing down or the attempt to
underestimate it and its impact indicate that the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya is
going through an important development inside Egypt. Fundamentalist
leader Rifa'i Ahmad Taha is one of those who have broken their silence in
the wake of Abdel's Rahman's withdrawal of his support for the initiative to
halt violence. The Egyptian authorities regard Rifa'i Taha, alias Abu
Yassir, as the group's military official. Rifa'i Taha intervened in formulating
some questions in a way that suggested the dialogue was live. The
dialogue went as follows:



6 Some observers in the political and media circles have

interpreted Abdel Rahman's withdrawals of his support for the initiative
launch by the group leaders imprisoned in Egypt as a call for resuming
violent acts in Egypt. What is your assessment of this?

Rifa'i Taha: Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman is Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya's leader.

He has strong influence and is much respected, not only inside the group
but also inside the other Islamic movement groups. His instructions are
undoubtedly widely accepted by all the circles that love, respect, and

64
. THE ISLAMIC GROUP THREATENS WASHINGTON WITH AN IMMINENT ACTION. London. Muhammad Al-Shafi'i.
consider him their religious term of reference. The Egyptian authorities
continue to ignore God Almighty¶s law and to recognize the Zionist entity,
the so-called State of Israel. They do not allow the Egyptian people to
choose their rulers and are spreading corruption, bribery, and nepotism.
They have attracted the corrupt and excluded the honest ones. The policy
of silencing the people, denies freedom, and maintaining the emergency
law and widespread arrests, torture, and arranged deaths are also
continuing.

 

: Your recent statement on the + %    novel in

which you urged the Egyptian youths to rebel surprised some political
circles in Egypt. Is not this inconsistent with the support for the initiative to
halt violence that you announced almost three years ago?

Rifa'i Taha: I am surprised by this question. When the group announced

the suspension of its operations, it did not say that it has abandoned its
stand of opposing Egyptian authorities. As I said in my answer to the
previous question, Egypt's Muslim people did not choose these authorities
in the proper way. The group will continue to resist the government and
urge all sectors of Egypt's Muslim people to rebel and act to change it.
The group will in no way become the protector of its interests, like some
factions in the Palestinian Liberation Organization who have become the
protectors of the Zionist's entity's interests. The group's antigovernment
stand has not and will not change, God willing. This stand is one of the
group's constants that no one can alter until God's law is established in
Egypt and on our land.



6 Reports talk about a coup against you to remove you from the
chairmanship of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya consultation council. What is
the real situation at present, particularly as you now sign your statements
"one of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leaders?´

Rifa'i Taha: Structural, organizational, or any other changes inside Al-

Gama¶a al-Islamiyya is an internal affair and concern it alone, and anyone
who brings them to the media's attention is making a mistake. The policy
of not announcing [naming] the group's active leaders is one of the factors
of its strength. Reports of what you are calling a coup inside Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya are baseless. Thank God that it is far removed from such
methods. Leadership in the group, especially in conditions like those that
prevail today, is a liability and not an advantage that makes people seek to
attain it by staging coups.



6 The group unilaterally announced its cease-fire more than 15

months ago. What is your assessment of the situation at present,
particularly after Abdel Rahman announced his withdrawal of his support?
Rifa'i Taha: Like any other tendency in Egypt, the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
is suffering from the suppression of freedom and from not being allowed to
express its views. What makes the group different from others is that it
has not surrendered to the oppression against it, yielded to the authorities,
or helped in any way improve their image. Some media organs have tried
to depict the announcement to halt (violent) operations incorrectly. Some
regarded it as a deal to reconcile with the regime. Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman's withdrawal of the support came as a response to the ³regime's
continued policy of repressing and silencing the people and not releasing
the detainees.´ The group leaders and members will undoubtedly review
their stand and what has been achieved so far in light of Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman's instructions.



6 ›2 ,   , 


 
 

",
1 24

Rifa'i Taha: First of all, I object to the use of the expression (frustrated
elements). ›          Ë
   ( 
   

   
 1 2  

,

 
 

› (
 ,,
 ,

 
If what you
are saying about indiscipline is true, then why has there not been any
incident since Luxor to this day? There is no indiscipline in the group and
the authorities know it. Some people think that what prevented the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya elements from carrying out other actions was its
weakness and encirclement, but I say that the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya has
always been in this state. It is under siege throughout its past stages and
still is. It has never been strong in numbers and equipment when
compared to the regime but is stronger by its firmness, commitment to its
religion, and its strong determination and will. › % 
  
 
 
   (    



   1 2
,
 

  4 ›  à ,       1 2
,
   
 
"5 "
‘ 
 7 8 
" 1
      8    "   
 
, 
  , 
      ,



Some youths who want to save their
Brothers from prison and restore the call to God almighty will definitely act.
These youths might not be the group's sons if the latter remains
committed to its initiative. Egypt's youths are not limited to the Al-Gama¶a
al-Islamiyya. There are other important groups that have not approved the
initiative and have elements and leaders behind prison bars. There are
elements such as Saber and Soliman Khater, neither of whom was 
(
to a group or organization.



6 Is the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya finished following the many

concessions made by its leaders, or is there a change in its policy;
 namely, a backing down on the mistakes of the past? Or has there been
an unpublicized agreement with the government? What is the truth?

Rifa'i Taha: No one of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya leaders has made any
concession. It is not finished and will not be finished. It will bow only to
God, the supreme and irresistible despite the siege, the distortions and
attempts to bring it to its knees. If I understand correctly your question,
when you say "there is a change in policy by backing down on the
mistakes of the past," then I say that the group does not believe that it has
made mistakes when it carried out its Jihad in words and deeds, when it
enjoyed what is right and forbade what is wrong, or in its call to God
almighty. There have been no changes in the group's course which has
been based on God's book and the prophet's Sunna since its inception. Its
thinking is based on the thinking of our nation's past scholars and those
who had followed their course.65

)( . )  c 

In June 2000 Rifa'i Taha telephoned Sattar and told him, ³Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya
has committed itself to the suspension of military operations initiative which was
launched two years ago by the Brothers from their jails, in spite of the Egyptian
government's continued killing of the innocent people and conducting unjust military
trials. This initiative was made to protect the Muslims and to unify all the lines to face
the real enemies of the nation. However, the initiative left some people thinking that it
was initiated out of weakness or an abandonment of the fundamental principles of the
group, which is basically a Da'wa, Jihad group. The latest thing published in the
newspapers was about the Egyptian regime's killing of four members of the group. This
is -- this is enough proof that the Egyptian regime does not have the intention to interact
with the peaceful initiative which aims at unification. I, therefore, demand that my
Brothers, the sons of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, do a comprehensive review of the
initiative and its results. I also demand that they consider themselves absolved from it.66

Rifa'i Taha said government harassment of fundamentalists trying to preach their

message would force them to take up arms again.  

 , ,   ,
 (  ,
 

As long as the regime continues suppression, detention and torture of

preachers, some young men will definitely emerge to save their comrades,
they may not be from Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. ›    
         ,
 and there are people like
Saber Farahat and Soliman Khater who belong to no group or
organization.

65
. ³EGYPT'S ISLAMIC GROUP OFFICIAL: THE DECISION TO HALT VIOLENCE CAN BE RESCINDED: 

 ›" ›
‘ -
5 1 2,.& Ë 
,


London by Mohammed al-Shafi'i
66
. http://www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/120704.txt
 Rifa'i Taha dismissed media speculation about an attempt to remove him from
Gama'a's Shura Council, saying the group deliberately kept the identity of its leaders a
secret.

The defense in Ë
  quoted a transcript of a telephone call between
Rifa'i Taha and Montassar AI-Zayyat that they claim revealed that Rifa'i Taha
questioned the authority of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, criticized the International
Front, denied that the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya is a part of that movement, and
threatened certain actions against the superpowers, including the United States. AI-
Zayyat attempted to calm him down warning him of the risks of angering a superpower.
Taha was characterized as someone out of control.


 # ---

In early September 2000 a fatwa approved by, but not written by, Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman (Rifa'i Taha and Sattar had written and published the fatwa in Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman's name to murder Jewish people) entitled ³Fatwa Mandating the
Bloodshed of Israelis Everywhere´ stated ³I call on my Brother scholars everywhere in
the Muslim world to do their part and issue a unanimous fatwa that urges the Muslim
nation to fight against the Jews and to kill them wherever they are. Zionists must be
killed everywhere. They occupied our holy land and desecrated our holies; they killed
men and knocked down our houses. Every Muslim should wage a Jihad against them.
All scholars agreed that if a (
country attacked a Muslim country, Jihad becomes a
must until the enemy is expelled. Jihad is the obligation of the entire Muslim nation till
Palestine and Al-Aqsa Mosque are liberated and those Jews are pushed to the graves
or to the countries they came from.´

Although Sattar and Rifa'i Taha, with some assistance from Al-Sirri, ghost wrote
this fatwa in Abdel Rahman's name urging that Jews should be killed everywhere
because of the situation in Palestine Sattar made it clear that in drafting the fatwa, he
drew upon a previous fatwa actually written by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in the early
90's relating to Palestine and the duty of Muslims to kill Jews in connection with the
situation in Palestine. However this fatwa lacks certain characteristic words such as ³on
land, sea and air.´ The Ë

- influenced Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman, ³From the halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli, We fight our country's
battles In air, on land, and sea.´

Brother Yassir al-Sirri, 38, the head of a London-based Islamic Observation

Center who was charged with complicity in the suicide bombing that killed Afghan traitor
and Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, agreed to revise and disseminate
a 7
 9 ‘  fatwa on his website ghostwritten by Brother Sattar and
approved by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. During his trial testimony Sattar explained:

I send it to Yassir Al-Sirri in London. He put it on his website. It was taken

from his website by -- I took it from his website after that. I put it on
another website. And people took it from there and printed. You know,
 even here in New York it was disseminated -- there was a public protest
here and it was given out to the people. After the fatwa was disseminated,
I had a conversation with Yousef Odeh. He is my friend and I worked with
him delivering baby formula for him. [He had a problem with it]. With the
Zionists. What does the oath have to do with those who kill our children?
Huh? If then anyone transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress,
ye, likewise against him. It is Qur¶anic verse from a series of verses telling
Muslims how to react in case of somebody transgress against them. Fight
in the cause of Allah, those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for
Allah loveth, not transgressors. Those who fight you but do not transgress
against just anybody because Allah does not love those who just go and
attack you for no reason or for« And slay them wherever you catch them,
and turn them out from where they have turned you out, for persecution is
worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the sacred mosque, unless
they first fight you there. But if they fight you, slay them. Such is the
reward for those who reject faith. This is unfortunately a way that the
Arabs and Israelis communicate. It has been going like this for so many
years. Arabs will stand up and say: Kill the Jews. Jews will stand up and
say: Kill the Arabs or kill the Muslims. We receive hate mail here, here in
the United States. I receive in my mosque threats that, you know, some
Jewish organization will kill us. And I'm using this, you know, to show to
Yousef that this is ± it has nothing to do with killing or killing people like --
it is just -- it is to express -- to keep in context with the Islamic meaning of
this series of verses. 67

Sattar was questioned about Brother al-Sirri:

 And you're aware that he was a militant, too, right?

 No, I am not aware that he was a militant. I am aware that he was

running an Islamic observation center or what he called Islamic
Observation Center. I'm aware that he were tried in absentia in Egypt and
he has a death penalty on, you know, was issued against him like many
others, Egyptians, who opposed the Egyptian government.

 Does that sentence that was imposed upon him in Egypt, was a result
of an attempted assassination of Prime Minister Atef Sedki?

 Yes, that was the allegation, yes. It was the charges against him.

 And are you aware that he was also implicated in kidnappings in
Yemen?

 No, I was not aware of that.

67
. Ë  4C8MSAT4 Sattar ± direct 10209

 Now, you testified that Mr. Al-Sirri runs the Islamic Observation Center?

 Yes.

 And that's a website that he ran out of London, right?

 Yes.

 And incidentally, that's the website on which you arranged for the kill
the Jews fatwa to be published, right? That's also the Islamic Observation
Center is also the organization that published Rifa'i Taha's book, correct?

 Yes.

 Did you consider Mr. Al-Sirri to be a responsible man?

 From my dealing with him, yes. I never met Mr. Al-Sirri. I dealt with him
over the telephone. I spoke with him on the phone. I never met him, I
never seen him. I cannot say I never seen him, I saw him on TV, so if this
is considered seeing him. But, you know, from dealing with him on -- on
the phone, you know, I will probably -- my limited dealing with him on
certain things, yes, he was responsible.

 And, in particular, with respect to information that he published on his
website, he was responsible?

 Most of it, yes.

On September 13, 2000 Sattar and Rifa¶i Taha discussed The Call to Jihad and
the weapons needed to carry it out:

Rifa¶i Taha: Especially, God-willing, when there is a wedding, the people

will need these things.

Sattar: That¶s for sure, of course.

Rifa¶i Taha: God willing, many weddings.

Sattar: By God¶s help, may God multiply these weddings. It has been a
long time we did not have a wedding.

³Wedding´ was a code word for ³attack.´ Sattar had also spoken with Mustafa
Hamza, in an attempt to win him over to Rifa'i Taha¶s position.

On September 21, 2000 Al Jazeera television ran an interview with Usama bin
Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sheik Rifa¶i Taha and Ahmed Abdel Rahman during
which they pledged Jihad to free Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and ³release the Brothers
in jail everywhere.´ Bin Laden was wearing a Yemeni dagger, dramatic foreshadowing
of our upcoming attack on the American warship, the Cole, that was to take place in
Yemen. Usama said, ³We promise to work with all our power to free our Brother Sheikh
Omar Abdel Rahman, and all our prisoners in America, Egypt and Riyadh.´ Bin Laden,
his beard turning white and looking thin, also said one of his followers had been caught
"during an operation" in Saudi Arabia. ³He was arrested trying to fight injustice, atheism
and sham,´ Bin Laden said, without revealing any details. ³Enough of words. It is time to
take action against this iniquitous and faithless force (the United States) which has
spread troops through Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, said Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who is applauded by people off camera.´ Bin Laden and Rifa'i Taha were sitting
together under a banner entitled -  
  ›     5 
 . During the meeting Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman, a son of Sheikh Abdel
Rahman, was heard encouraging others to "avenge your sheikh" and "go to the spilling
of blood." Later Rifa'i Taha and Sattar discussed the speeches over the phone. Taha
telephoned Sattar as Sattar was watching Taha on television making the speech.
Mohammed Abdel Rahman, the Sheik's son, called Sattar to talk about the speech.
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman inspires Ë

and the spilling of blood, even while in jail
supposedly cut off from the outside world!

Sister Lynne¶s attorney described her reaction to Usama bin Laden, ³She thought
he was a mass murderer and a dangerous man. She knew that he was a Saudi
millionaire who got his power by manipulating the cold war politics of the Middle East.
She knew he had nothing to do with her representation of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.
She wanted nothing to do about with him. Why? Because he and Rifa'i Taha, and a
name that wasn't mentioned here but will be, al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's number man, are
dangerous and violent and hypocrites. Rifa'i Taha and al-Zawahiri are renegades from
the Egyptian political movement.´ Renegades? These are our leaders. No one save
Michael Tigar has ever suggested otherwise.

This was a historic press conference. The first banner to the far right (above
Usama bin Laden's head) had these words written on it: "they severed the reaches of
their forces and killed them on land, sea and air" also translated as, "They fragmented
their state and killed them on land, in sea, and in air." The second banner (above
Ayman al-Zawahiri¶s head) had these words written on it: "it was you unanimously
agreed on the necessity to free the captive, then who is for the captive scholar Omar
Abdel Rahman." The third banner (above and to the left of banner No. 2) had these
words written on it: "Breaking Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman's captivity is a duty for whoever
is able to do it." Here is a partial transcription of that press conference:

Rifa'i Taha: ³Behind the faces of a (
state. How can we turn a blind eye
about the rightful fighter who is behind bars in a tyrannical country? In his
cell his call has been silenced and stature diminished. We have a duty to
fight for him until his chains are broken and he is released. We vow to God
not to spare any effort towards that goal. It is easy to God to do it.
 Bin Laden: Our Brothers behind bars in America and elsewhere as
indicated i.e., our Brother Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and our brother
Sayyed Nosair and our Brother Muhammad bin Rashen bin Dawood al-
Ohani who went to carry out an operation knowing that he would never
return, but Allah the Almighty willed to give him a new life in order for him
to fend against the hue humiliation, submission, and infidelity of the Holy
Land, the land of Mecca, the land where Islam was revealed to our
prophet Muhamed. In America, there is our Brother, Osama Mullah
Haidar68, who is one of the three people to establish the first center for the
Arab Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the second being the late Ibrahim
Madani69 and myself. We vow in this blessed night to do our utmost to
triumph our religion and set up the Shari'ah over all Muslim lands, and to
expel all Jews and Christians from the Holy Land and to seek the release
of our Muslim scholars from their privileges in America, Egypt and Riyadh
(Saudi Arabia) and all countries of Islam. We turn to Allah, the almighty,
for his support. He is the guardian of our quest.´

Son of Omar Abdel Rahman (off camera): ³Our Brothers everywhere, ask
your governments, your Sheikhs, your scholars, your mothers, ask
everyone everywhere and they will tell you, believers in Allah, that Allah
and his prophet will protect you if you come to implement their call upon
you, for Allah stands between man and his heart. Only to him you will
return. Make haste and spare no effort to do your duty. Your souls are but
in the hands of Allah, 4:28. No force upon earth can take your life before
its end, not even a minute or a second. Therefore, hurry up to the
battlefield of Jihad, and fight them face-to-face and seek martyrdom and
sacrifice.

Brother Mujahed Assadullah [Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman], son of

Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman. ³The release of Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman is a
duty on everyone who is capable to partake in it. Signed, Usama bin
Laden. [Off camera] Go to bloodshed! Go to bloodshed! Go to bloodshed!
Who of us today will not sacrifice himself for the man who was ever
present for every battle for right? He was always the hero and invincible
leader who never retreated. Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman has a right on us, he
never hesitated to fight for right and how can we hesitate to fight for him
and to work for his release. My honorable Brothers; I am not here to beg
your support. I am here to incite you to work, to embark on Jihad. The
situation now does not allow for eloquent speeches. It is my honorable
Brothers, an irrevocable fight as all the (  has closed ranks to destroy

68
. Abu Doha,´ who was arrested in the UK in February 2001. Abu Doha is the most senior figure in the Islamic network so far
arrested in Europe. He was connected to an Islamist cell whose members were arrested in Germany in December 2000, and in
Spain in June 200. The cells had planned to carry out attacks on a local Cathedral and a market place in Strasbourg on New Year
Eve of 2001.[L.A. Times internet 8/07/01] American authorities have requested Abu Doha¶s extradition for his role in the planned
LAX attack.[Josh Miller, ³Man Charged as Bomb Plot Mastermind,´ L.A.Times 16/06/01]
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=375
69
. Lawyer Mohammad Abd al-Harith Madani was arrested and tortured on April 26, 1994 and died the following day. His family did
not learn of his death until May 6, 1994, when they were ordered to collect his body from a morgue.
 Islam and Mujahideen, chasing them from country to country amassing
them in this and that prison, killing them, kidnapping them. So what are
you to do to face the duty towards Allah. [Chanting from off camera] In
God we trust, if God we trust. My honorable Brothers, we are talking more
and doing less and today is the day of great men, ourselves and all the
Mujahideen to confront this tyrannical (
 state which trampled our holy
shrines and occupied our mosques and implanted Israel in the heart of our
nation. It occupied our holiest shrine (Mecca) and deployed its forces in
Egypt, Yemen and the gulf killing our sons, humiliating our scholars and
defiling our holy shrines and swindling our resources. Our honorable
Brothers, let's act and enough of words spoken. My honorable Brothers
we are talking too much and doing less. 7:19. He who seeks death, death
to him will be a tolerable thing. We did Allah the almighty to grant us all a
life of dignity, a life of Jihad for him.

On %& : --- Sattar contacted Yousry and told Yousry to buy two
particular newspapers which have stories setting forth the ghost written fatwa; namely,
  and %  and to read those to Abdel Rahman in the October 6,
2000 prison call. Yousry is unable to find %, but he finds  and he
does read it to Abdel Rahman, and Abdel Rahman's reaction is precisely what Sattar
and Rifa'i Taha were wishing for because Abdel Rahman says don't deny this, don't
disavow it.70

When Yousry asks who smuggled out the fatwa he was told, ³Yousry, it is none
of your business how it happened, but tell everybody not to deny it because it is good or
it is true.´ Yousry recounted this sequence of events to Stewart:

Stewart: We have no idea how it happened.

Yousry: Yeah, that is true.

Stewart: But he did not disavow us.

Yousry: No, he didn't.

Stewart: And even if it was done by a third party and he wants to adopt it.

Yousry: That's fine.

Stewart: For whatever reason, to drive them crazy or whatever, I'm for it. I,
I see exactly what it's about.

During a conference between Yousry, Jabara and the imprisoned Sheikh the
subject of the Kill Jews Everywhere fatwa arose. Yousry translated it for Jabara, (who

70
. Ë  - Government Exhibit 1732 T, and then as recounted after-the-fact by Yousry himself in Government Exhibit 1193
and 1193 X
spoke in English) this was said: ³Jabara is telling you that you have trained doves that
transport the messages.´ Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman replied: ³That is it. I really would
like they arrest those doves that transport messages. I wish to read that one day the FBI
arrested those doves that are contacting the Sheik.´ Jabara then asked, ³Am I cleared
to tell the ./(›
 about the doves?´ Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman replied: ³As
long as the government is using secret evidence we will use secret doves.´ This ³dove´
was white, but was 5¶4¶ tall and weighed close to 200 pounds. It name was Lynne.

Three days later Rifa'i Taha called Sattar and told Sattar that he should contact
'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia and tell him about the fatwa demanding the murder of the Jews,
and, further, to tell him that his people are to go by it. Sattar agreed to instruct the
military leader of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya to kill Jews. Sattar passed on these
instructions in early October 2000, may the blessings of Allah be upon him. On %&
---- there was a call to Jabara with a further discussion of what ought to be done
about the fact that this statement has appeared in the press and has been attributed to
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.

The Egyptian media reported,

The Egyptian fundamentalist organization, › à
, 0 , Al-

Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, has vowed to implement a fatwa [religious ruling]
issued last week by the leader of the group, Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, who
is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison, calling on Muslims to the
necessity of "killing the Jews wherever they are found." Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya issued a statement yesterday in which it asserted that the Jihad
to liberate Palestine "is a religious duty by the consensus of Muslims. A
capable Muslim who dissents from it is a sinner and would be subjected to
God's wrath." The statement addressed the Muslims: "Today, you are
standing at a dangerous crossroad. You should rise to the level of the
grave event that threatens your holy places and destroys your existence.
Otherwise, do not expect anything from politicians except more sweet
words, embellished promises and other rounds of the policies of
deception." The Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya statement said "The Islamic
nation is free from all the agreements and treaties concluded with the
Jews," noting that the Jews themselves "realize that these agreements
were concluded behind the back of the Islamic nation and without its
approval." The statement stressed that choosing Jihad "is the only option."
It said: "The angry uprising of the nation masses is a real and sincere
expression of their attitude; and the existing regimes have no choice but to
consent to the masses. The choice they have is between the nation's
choice of Jihad and the smart talk of politicians who claim that these
flagrant violations are the tax of peace. We never had peace with the
Jews. They imposed their goals by force and by pursuing a policy of 

,,
to consolidate the occupation." The statement pledged to "fully
 support the Islamic resistance in all its factions inside Palestine to ensure
its continuity and to continue its struggle.71

 reported the KILL ALL JEWS fatwa this way,

Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, leader of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, in Egypt who

is serving a life sentence in the United States, issued a fatwa from his
prison making it the duty of Muslims to kill the Zionists wherever they are.
In a statement issued by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman he said, it pained
and greatly saddened me to hear from the trickle of news they allow me to
hear about these hideous massacres that the Jews are committing against
our sons and brothers in our holy mosque, the first of the two Kiblas and
the third of the holy shrines and in the month of Rajab, the month of
prophet Muhammad's ascension to the seven heavens. These Barbaric
actions by these monkeys and pigs are not new to them. They are the
killers of prophets and known to have shed blood. Their ancient and
modern history is a testimony to this, but some of our people, speaking on
our behalf, have covered their eyes and closed their ears to this truth. The
Blind Sheikh Rahman appealed to the Muslims' scholars "to issue a
collective fatwa calling on the Islamic nation to the necessity of fighting the
Jews and killing them wherever they are. This is because they have
occupied our lands, desecrated our holy places, killed our men and
destroyed our houses. Therefore, every capable Muslim must perform
Jihad against them.´ He pointed out that Muslim scholars have
unanimously agreed that if a pagan enemy invades a Muslim country, then
its people must rise to repel this enemy. If the people of this country are
incapable of doing this, then this becomes the duty of other Muslims. He
added: ³It has been proved conclusively that our people in Palestine
cannot undertake this mission alone after having sacrificed and are still
sacrificing tens and even hundreds of martyrs. Hence, Jihad today is the
duty of the entire Nation of Islam until Palestine and al-Aqsa Mosque are
liberated and the Jews are sent to their graves or the countries from where
they had come.

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman's new fatwa recalled to memory the one
issued in February 1998 by Usama bin Laden in the constituent statement
of the World Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and Crusaders. It
mandated the Muslims to kill the Americans and loot their possessions
wherever they are. It is believed that blowing up the U.S. Embassies in
Nairobi and Dar al-Salam in August 1998 was in response to this
statement. Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya has issued a statement titled STOP
TALKING. It said ³stop talking and preaching to the nation of Islam. Those
people disbelieve our talk, every right, everything that is sacred and every
honor. Stop talking and put the paper aside. Their words are shells and
their letters are bullets. Come to Jihad. The Jews are the Jews. Treachery
71
. Ë  Government Exhibit 2057T, page one.
is their covenant, tyranny is their law, and evil is their pursuit. Let their
bullets be the fuse that re-ignites the Intifada, the blaze that dispels the
dreams of those begging for peace, and the roar that warns the unwary
and deceived, wakes the advocates of westernization and exposes the
traitors.

Several Islamic and Arab groups are organizing large demonstration in

front of the Israeli embassy in London today. Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri,
leader of a ›    à
, 1, has sent a message to the
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair accusing his country of the responsibility
for the confrontations in the Palestinian territories since it (England) was
the one that planted this malignant Zionist entity in our nation's body. He
was referring to Balfour's promise to give the Jews a homeland in
Palestine.

All this was used against Stewart, Sattar and Yousry at their trial,

And then Rifa'i Taha and Sattar took a giant leap towards terrorist
violence. Right in the middle of their ongoing contact with 'Alaa Abdul
Raziq Atia and just two weeks after the bin Laden-Rifa'i Taha video aired,
Taha and Sattar agreed together to issue a lethal fatwa -- an Islamic edict
-- in Abdel Rahman's name«So this conduct is part and parcel of the
violating of the SAMS. It is an improper communication essentially from
Abdel Rahman's terrorist followers being sent in to Abdel Rahman in the
prison so that he can respond to it. Sattar and Taha draft it, they sent it in
via Yousry. Abdel Rahman adopts it and says to everybody don't disavow
it because it is good or it is true. It is par for the course of conduct,
essentially a course of conduct that includes communications coming out
from Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in 1999 not to form a political party, that
he doesn't support the cease fire any more. ›    
 

 

  
         Then in June
2000, now he doesn't support the cease fire any more and that becomes
public, and this is just yet another instance in the course of conduct of
messages going into him, him reacting to them, and that reaction being
traded upon by his associates and followers in the outside world. So this
conduct is the very epitome of conduct defrauding the United States in its
attempt to use the SAMS to prevent Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman from
continuing to participate in terrorist activity from jail.

Even if one were to assume arguendo that Yousry or Stewart knew

knowing about this ghost-written fatwa in advance, and assuming
arguendo Mr. Ruhnke is correct, that until Yousry was sitting there on the
%& : --- prison call reading the   article, that he knew
nothing about it, that is not the relevant legal inquiry here because it's
conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, committed at a minimum by co-
conspirators Sattar and Taha and Al-Sirri, and Stewart and Yousry are
 liable for their co-conspirator's conduct. In addition, reading these news
articles to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, keeping him abreast of terrorist
activity are themselves violations of the SAMS. The fact that Yousry uses
this October 6, 2000 prison call to read to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman
these news articles about this sort of status of terrorist activity around the
world is, in the government's respectful submission, a itself a violation of
the SAMS. But Yousry and Stewart at a minimum after-the-fact, even
assuming arguendo that they didn't know about the ghostwritten fatwa in
advance, just like Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, essentially get on board
with his adoption and endorsement of it, and Government Exhibit 1193
and 1193X exemplifies that. At a later point in the conversation, you have
Stewart, who actually says in that call, after Yousry has recounted the fact
that Ramsey Clark seems to have reservations about some of the conduct
that is going on or disapproving of some of the conduct that is going on,
Stewart responds: Well I'm in a different position. My position is "yes, he's
going to get his message out no matter what." So at best for the
defendants they are liable under the law of conspiracy for their co-
conspirator's conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, but the government
submits that the evidence shows that they essentially adopt and begin to
go along with that conduct even if they only learn about it once it's
essentially already in progress by virtue of earlier conduct by Sattar and
Taha and other co-conspirators.´

Sattar tried to explain his actions and fool the infidel¶s jury:

 Now, you claim, Mr. Sattar, that when you were involved in
disseminating and drafting and publishing this fatwa that you were just
crying out in response to violence in the Middle East, right?

 Yes.

 And you testified that you really did not intend for anyone to take it
literally and go out and kill people, right?

 No, I did not intend to do that.

 But it is a fact, is it not, Mr. Sattar, that you drafted this statement with
the leader of a terrorist network?

 Yes, it is a fact.

 A person that you knew was in Afghanistan with Usama bin Laden? A
person that you knew was considered by the United States to be a threat
to national security? A person that you knew who had written a book
attempting to justify the murder of civilians? A person that you knew who
was trying to contact the military leader of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya in
Egypt? And a person who you knew who had signed Usama bin Laden's
fatwa, calling for the murder of Americans, right?

 Yes.

 You wanted people to take to the streets all over the world and kill
Jewish people everywhere, right?

 No, I did not.

 That's what the statement says, Mr. Sattar.

 Mr. Morvillo, as what I said, it was a cryout. I was screaming. I was

crying. If anybody was being killed, it was the Palestinians. What I saw
was enough for me to cry. I did not intend to kill anybody. And if you look
at the conversation before that, before this writing of these ugly and
hateful words, you will see that the intent was just to revive the Sheikh's
name and also the emotion involved when I seen it. When I seen those
words I should have thought more careful about it. But I was in a very -- I
was very emotional. I read these words. I should have paid more attention
to it. I should have never let them out, but I did. In eight years, you've been
listening to my conversations. You have been watching me. The
government been all over me.

MR. MORVILLO: Your Honor, I'm objecting at this point.

THE COURT: I believe the question has been answered.

 Mr. Sattar, people cry all the time about atrocities in the world, but they
don't issue fatwas in the name of convicted terrorist leaders, do they,
calling for mass genocide?

 If you watch what's gone on in the Middle East, this is an everyday

event, fatwas being issued by Jewish rabbis calling for the killing of
Muslims, right here in the United States. It was fatwas here to say, pay a
dollar to kill an Arab. We receive many words like this in our community.
This is something going on. As what I always say to my kids, sticks and
stones may break bones, but words will never hurt you. I did not mean to
hurt anybody, Mr. Morvillo. I did not mean to hurt anybody.

 But these were words by a convicted terrorist leader that you issued to
get an impact calling for mass genocide, yes or no, Mr. Sattar?

 I cannot just say yes or no. I did not mean to mass genocide anybody. I
did not mean to kill anybody. As I said, I was crying out loud, Mr. Morvillo.

 After you finished disseminating this fatwa, you resumed trying to
connect Rifa'i Taha and 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia, right?

 Yes.

 And in fact, Rifa'i Taha told you to tell Atia about the fatwa, right?

 Rifa'i Taha told -- yes.

 In fact, he told you that he wanted to tell Atia to take courage, the man
issued a fatwa, you are supposed to go by it, right?

 Yes.

 And in fact, as you testified on your direct examination, you did tell the
leader of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya military wing in Egypt about the fatwa
mandating the murder of Jews and their supporters, right?

 I mentioned to him, yes.

 And then you learned that the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya had issued a
statement in which it stated that it was going to carry out Sheikh Omar
Abdel Rahman's fatwa to kill Jews, right?

 Yes, I read that, yes.

 And that meant that the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya was stating that it was
going to go out and start killing Jews and their supporters, right?

 No. It meant just, you know, another thing, you know, that the Al-
Gama¶a al-Islamiyya is issuing -- like I told you, they have been issuing in
sequence like this, threats, things like this, on some events. But I took it as
propaganda, is how I took it.

 But they stated that they were going to carry out Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman 's fatwa mandating the killing of Jews, right?

 Yes, they said that.

 And Rifa'i Taha in fact is the person who told you about this statement,
right?

 I am not sure if he is the one who told me or I seen it in the newspaper.

 But it was published in the newspaper, right?

  I seen it.

Sattar relentlessly continued his work on behalf of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya on

his FISAphone. In September and October 2000 he attempted to facilitate the travel in
Egypt of µAlaa Abdul Raziq Atia wanted for the Luxor event, so that he could effectuate
another Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya type Luxor action in Aswan. Sattar told an associate of
Atia that the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya¶s use of military actions was ³subject to capability
and nothing else.´ On September 20, 2000 Sattar arranged a call between Rifa¶i Taha
Musa and Salah Hashim during which Rifa¶i Taha told Salah Hashim that Salah Hashim
³needed another Luxor.´ On October 11, 2000 Stewart was instructed not to deny that
the Sheik had written his fatwa: ³Very good things were said and I can¶t say that I didn¶t
utter it«because all that was said is true.´

  ;0

The question of ³another Luxor´ was raised at the trial of the communications cell
and the defense attempted to refute it, ³[the Government alleges] the parties engaged in
a conversation about the need for terrorist activities. This is simply not the case. In its
proper context, the portion of the conversation referred to by the government was part
of a lengthy telephone call which took place on September 30, 2000, between Rifa¶i
Taha Musa and Salah Hashim in which they discussed, among other things, the denial
of Rifa¶i Taha Musa's request that they reorganize the council of Al-Gama¶a al-
Islamiyya, current events in Palestine, and the media. It is noteworthy that during this
lengthy conversation regarding the "leadership," of Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya, Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman is never mentioned. The statement mentioned by the Government came
at the end of the conversation:

Musa: Give my regards to the Brothers, Hosni Ahmed, and all of them. Is
there any news about releasing any of them?

Salah: Yes there is, God willing.

Musa: May God be with you, you need a second Luxor.

Salah: No, we don't need a second or a third.

(Laughing)

Musa: (Laughing) Peace be on you.

Salah: And be with you.

See, Government's Intercepts, Bates Number 4707. This portion of

their conversation is quoted verbatim from the government's translation
and clearly demonstrates that the government has overemphasized and

,,
:, 
Ë«
 There was much heat on 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia at this time and Brother Mustafa
Hamza said: [Stuttering] ³Yeah, he is to exit, if he travels abroad he will be solving a
problem for us.´ Sattar commented, ³Well, Mustafa Hamza understands now that this
person is a fugitive and being a fugitive he has been hunted by the Egyptian
government, so it will be for the best of everybody, you know, if he can just, you know,
leave Egypt -- completely leave Egypt otherwise he will be killed or, you know, it's not
going to be good. Mustafa Hamza responded, ³Okay, but as I told you -- Hani el-Seba'i
says, I'm sorry, okay, but as I told you, 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia is very careful with his
movement. It is very difficult.´ The AUSA asked Sattar if he knew who Atia was and he
responded, ³He was a militant, an Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya militant. He was involved in
acts of violence against the Egyptian government and the Egyptian government wanted
him.

 How do you know all of this about Atia?

 I know this -- I read about him in a magazine article that it actually said
that in the article, the article said that he was actually appointed to be the
military wing leader of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. And then after he was
killed, you know, there was other articles written about him and I learned,
you know, a great deal about him from that.

# . c

%&--- was a busy time for Sattar and Rifa'i Taha and 'Alaa Abdul Raziq
Atia. Phone calls were exchanged on a daily basis. And then on October 19, 2000
Ahmed Sattar got the news, Atia was in the hospital. ³Hospital´ is a code word for
prison. Or, he was told, perhaps something worse happened. As it turned out, Atia was
dead. He had been killed during a shootout with Egyptian authorities on October 18,
2000. Atia's death triggered numerous phone calls and accusations against Ahmed
Sattar and Rifa'i Taha by other members of the Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya. Sattar and
Taha were blamed for Atia's death, blamed because they were not careful on the
telephone; blamed because it was believed that Sattar and Taha were pressuring Atia
to conduct a terrorist operation. Taha and Sattar had a lengthy conversation about what
led to Atia's death. They discussed how such mistakes could be avoided in the future.
And they talked about 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia. They referred to him as a martyr. Mustafa
Ahmad Hasan Hamza, a/k/a Abu-Hazim in a October 27, 2000 had this to say:

Dear Brother, praise to God -- Dear Brother, peace be upon you. I will
summarize the most important of the latest events which are related to the
raid of the criminal Egyptian police on one of the locations in an Aswan
province in which some of the Brothers are staying and the police's claim
that they killed one of them, ('Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia), and the
imprisonment of others. I hope that these incidents will help us, God
willing, to correctly reassess the position inside the Islamic group as well
as the position of the regime. And God is the one who grants help.
We initiated contact with those Brothers after a long separation that lasted
for a few years after the event of Luxor. They in turn contacted Ahmed
Abdel Sattar, requesting him to urgently contact the Brothers abroad
because their conditions were very harsh. They were contacted after
confirming their identities and the extent of their relationship with the entity
and what were their needs and after confirming the identity of Brother
'Alaa Atia through many contacts, the coordination took place to help them
with some money. That was done in a limited way in the beginning of the
contact. The conflict with Rifa'i Taha did not intensify and there was no
need to contact them then.

After the conflict with Rifa'i Taha escalated and his continuous attempt to
have the issue of the initiative fail, Brother Ahmed Abdel Sattar, may God
forgive him, notified Rifa'i Taha of the Brothers' phone calls. Rifa'i Taha
tried to get in touch with them, especially Brother 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia,
since he is the responsible for the military operations of the group, and
when they informed me, I asked them not to contact me at all in order to
avoid disturbance and to preserve the unity of the group.

Brother 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia, may God have mercy on his soul, replied.
He wrote me an eloquent letter expressing his strong commitment to the
entity and that he is convinced that the initiative decision is one of the best
decisions in the last few years. He asked me to allow him to contact Rifa'i
Taha, convince him of the importance of the initiative, but I declined. I
explained to him that the issue is bigger than that and it is better to commit
to the unity of the line and not to open the door to unrest, and he did
concur, may he rest in peace.

I decided to try to get Brother 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia outside of the country
because of his dangerous situation in order to have an understanding with
him regarding the real situation inside the country, lessen the anxious
atmosphere with the regime, which will allow it to have real compliance
with the initiative, and we did arrange for that, thanks be to God. 'Alaa
Abdul Raziq Atia was very happy about that. And during all those
arrangements, contact with him was through Ahmed Abdel Sattar,
knowing that he is not trustworthy to keep the secrets of the Brothers and
my bitter experience with him for more than once, and God is the one who
grants help.

In the first meeting with who is going to help 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia to go
overseas, the man was late for the appointment, which got Brother Atia
concerned that a problem may occur. So he or one of his Brothers called
Ahmed Abdel Sattar after he arrived in Aswan getting ready to go abroad
and he requested to contact them urgently in order to coordinate with
them so that they can fix the appointment. And that was achieved, thanks
to God. Ahmad Abdel Sattar, may God forgive him, without telling us or
 asking us for permission, he went and informed Rifa'i Taha of Atia's phone
calls in Aswan. 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia advised me in his last phone call a
few hours before the accident that Ahmed Abdel Sattar informed him that
it is better to deal with Rifa'i Taha because he is of a higher hierarchy than
Abu Hazim [Mustafa Hamza]. And 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia said that Rifa'i
Taha contacted him and tried to convince him of some
operations«Reasons. And his belief that the initiative decision is for the
interest of the group during this period.

Rifa'i Taha tried to lure him, telling him that he can send them all the
money they need to help them in the operations. Atia refused to agree
with him and informed him that those Brothers, (the Brothers of the military
work) supported Abu Mus'ab in his position in the Luxor event, and they
were against Rifa'i Taha in his persistence in his position from the
operation. Rifa'i Taha was surprised to hear that according to 'Alaa Abdul
Raziq Atia. We were surprised to hear of Brother Atia's murder, the same
criminal way used by the Egyptian regime, and the arrest of some of his
Brothers. We learned the news via a letter from Mr. Montassar.

The Islamic Observation Center (an Islamic think tank in the UK led by
Yassir Al-Sirri) published false news on the murder of the Brother, 

   
   
  
  

     5,
#;"#$$$
I do not know how he got that false information. As a result, the
regime was immediately obligated to announce the news and denied that
the subject planned an operation. Mr. Montassar advised me that the
police informed him that they were aware of 

 ›    
+, 
  and they informed him of the same
content that 'Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia told me. And that, of course, was either
by wiretapping or torturing the Brother to get information from him before
killing him, if they have actually killed him. God knows. This is what I can
sum up about the accident, and if there is anything that's not clear, please
ask and I will reply to you, God willing. And my last prayer in that God is
the Lord of all worlds.72

 .c    # ---

On October 12, 2000 the U.S.S. Cole was attacked in Yemen. Brother Al-Midhar,
who was part of the September 11th Events, was closely associated with this event.
After the fatwa to Kill Jews Everywhere was issued and attributed to Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman, Jabara, Rahman and Yousry had a conference call in which Yousry told Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman ³Jabara did not comment because this matter is very hot now and
they might find somebody to«Jabara is telling you to put you in the picture because the
Cole is (unintelligible) and the FBI and (unintelligible) might try to (unintelligible).´ In a
later visit Yousry told Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman that some people spoke to Sattar on
the phone and said the Battleship Cole was attacked so that Rahman would be freed
72
. Ë  Government Exhibit 2014T
from prison and ³asked Sattar to do some negotiations with the American government
and tell them if Rahman is not released we will execute another operation.´

How did the Cole attack affect Rifa'i Taha and Sattar? They saw these reports as
an opportunity to try to spring Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman from prison. In a telephone
call several days after the reports of the bombing -- a call that occurred over someone
else's cell phone because of Sattar and Taha's fear of surveillance ± Rifa'i Taha told
Sattar that the bombing of the Cole "was not far from us." And that he wanted to convey
a threat to the United States government that "the problems are related to the man that
they are holding -- Abdel Rahman. If his conditions are straightened out, it will follow
that other things will get straightened out also."

On October 28, 2000, Sattar spoke by telephone to Rifa'i Taha, and Rifa'i Taha
told Sattar that ³an Egyptian male´ was involved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. The
incident is close to us. We originally didn¶t announce it because we didn¶t want to
embarrass anyone. If his status is straightened out, it will follow that other things will get
straightened out also. Taha added that Sattar should assist in delivering a message to
the United States government suggesting that similar attacks would occur unless Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman were freed from prison.73

David Ruhnke, Brother Yousry¶s attorney ridiculed the fact that the Cole was
attacked on the Blind Sheik Rahman¶s behalf.

The article is a speculation that grows from the meeting, the bin Laden
meeting that we saw on videotape last week, that somehow the bombing
of the Cole is related to that meeting, which doesn't take much logic to say
that, well, if that purpose of that meeting was to free up Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman, which is the way it was played by the government and allowed to
the jury, that somehow these defendants or Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman or
someone associated with him was responsible for bombing the USS Cole
in Yemen, which is just not -- it has turned out to be not even speculation
that that was -- that that was so«I want you to know that it was the
Sheikh's fault that the Yemen incident happened. It was planned by the
same forces that were going to liberate the Sheikh. It's so ridiculous you
can't believe it. Well, it's -- it's bin Laden and his first in command, who of
course is an Egyptian who's in charge of Al-Jihad, and, um, gee, I don't
have the article in front of me, you know. It's about that meeting that was
reported 100 years ago. It's happening in May and it was at the meeting
that this was all planned. And then Mr. Sattar says, oh, they knew back
then, you know, that the USS Cole was coming out to stay, so ± and Ms.
Stewart says, yep, yep, mm-mm. Mr. Sattar says, Yemen, ah, that's so
ridiculous. Ms. Stewart says: Yeah. So, in the background you can hear
the Sheikh's son [Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman] yelling, they say, you
know, quote, blood will flow, blood will flow, end quote. It's the same. It's,
uh, it's a rehash of that old article about the meeting in Qatar. You know,

73
. United States v. Sattar, et al, 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) Superceding Indictment November 19, 2003
 but now we put it in new clothes. It's a new unification of the most vicious.
Now they're calling, they're calling, um, the new Egyptian group, the most
vicious terrorists. It's skipping the next line. Yeah, you know, free the
Sheikh to anyone who has the means to do it. And I think that that
summary of the article, without even having the article in front of her,
shows that Ms. Stewart read the article quite closely. And so I make that
point and then just a few other quick points.74

 # ---

On November 2, 2000 Rifa¶i Taha told Sattar that he was afraid that 'Alaa Abdul
Raziq Atia had been killed by the Egyptian secret police.

 You're talking about Atia on this page, right? At the top Yassir Al-Sirri
says: But was he calling from the same city? You said: I don't know. I don't
know where he was calling from. And Al-Sirri says: Did you know that he
was in Aswan? And you said yes. Previously you testified that you knew
that Atia was in Aswan, right? And Al-Sirri says: All right. My question is
this. How did they get them in Aswan? And what he is saying is how did
the Egyptian police find Atia is Aswan, right? And you said: Possibly
through me?

 Yes.

 And Al-Sirri responds: No. Abu Omar, how is that? Then you respond
by saying: What do you mean? "How"? Everything is in the air. What
you're telling him is you think your phone is wiretapped, right?

 What I'm telling him, you know, he is saying -- he is denying that I am

saying it is possibly through my telephone, yes, and he is saying no, Abu
Omar, how is that. He cannot believe that. I says: What do you mean,
how? Everything is in the air. Everything we speak is openly on the phone.
The phone could be intercepted by, you know -- could be wiretapped or
intercepted by anybody.

 Right. And your phone was wiretapped, right?

 Yes.

 Al-Sirri says to you: So it may not be through you, it can be just as well
through -- don't make me ± when you say "through," it is another problem
unless you make an announcement saying, "nobody is to call me on the
phone." Al-Sirri continues saying: Supposedly, it can be -- it is possible it
was through somewhere else. And then you respond, ³And it's also a big
possibility it is from here, because the Brother called and gave me his

74
. http://www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/090904.txt
phone number, the place where he is staying here.´ And Al-Sirri says:
There. And you say: Yeah, there. He said: "When Mr. So and so calls,
give him this phone number." What you're talking about there is when you
spoke to people over the phone you exchanged telephone numbers and,
as a result, if your phone was being monitored, people would know the
telephone numbers of the place where people were?

 I'm talking about this specific incident with Atia, that he give me the
phone number or the phone, so it could be the American authority passing
to the Egyptian authority, yes.

 So what you're saying is, right, once they had Atia's telephone number
they could give that to the Egyptian authorities and the Egyptian
authorities could then trace the phone number and get a location and
that's how he would have been found?

 Yes.

 On page 11 of Government Exhibit 1205X, you continue to talk about

this. And at line 11 you state: For your information, 99 percent I suspect it
can be from here. And Al-Sirri says: You can't say. And then you say:
What do you mean I can't? You're talking about the fact that 99 percent
are convinced that it is because of your telephone that Atia was killed,
right?

 I am talking about that, 99 percent, the information about Atia was

passed from here to the Egyptian authorities, yes. Based on what was
heard over my telephone or any other means. Could be anything«

 What did you say to Atia? What was Atia saying to you?

 Atia, Atia wants to talk, wants anybody to listen to him. He just wanted
to keep talking and talking and talking and talking. That's what he wanted
to do. And I was just, you know, cutting him off. I said, I told him, my line is
not safe, my telephone is not safe. Don't talk. Wait until somebody will talk
to you. Saying things in that effect. I didn't want to hear what he was going
-- what he wanted to say.

 You say that you did not think -- when you say that you told Atia the
telephone line was not safe, what did you mean?

 Well, it was a way just, you know, to keep him, you know, from not
talking. And it did work because right after that he hang up with me after I
told him that.

 When you say -- when you read the passage that he have the
predisposition and the readiness to the, to the, to the point, what were you
referring to when he used the first predisposition and readiness?

 He is predisposed, inclined to talk. It was nothing more than talk.

 Let me refer you -- to go back to page 16 of the Government's Exhibit

1194X in evidence. Lines 2 through 4 you say: I interrupted him two or
three times. I emphasized that the way is not safe and asked to wait till we
get another way. I explained to him. What were you referring to in that
passage?

 I am referring to Atia, you know. I told you about cutting him off by
telling him my line is not safe, wait until you talk to somebody, until I get
you in another way. He just keeps talking. If you go back to my
conversation with him, which, you know, I believe it is in evidence, you are
going to see he is just keep talking, keep talking. He keeps talking about
lawyers that, you know, working with the Egyptian government, lawyers
that they are stabbing others in the back, that he has a way to connect
with the leaders in the Egyptian prison, and he just, you know, giving me
details that really, you know, it is not -- I don't want to hear it.

 Atia was unable to leave Egypt. Do you know what happened? And
how did you learn what happened to Atia?

 I got the phone call, somebody told me that something happened to

him, and then after that I read in the newspaper what happened to him. He
was killed. The exact date I am not sure it was. I believe it was the end of
October.

 And did you have a conversation with anyone concerning Atia's death?

 I had a few conversations. I had a conversation with Yassir Al-Sirri; I

had a conversation with Rifa'i Taha«

 Mr. Sattar, you're familiar with the fact that Yassir Al-Sirri published a
statement on his website saying that at the time Atia was killed he was
planning on conducting a terrorist attack on tourists on October 24, 2000
in Aswan? On his website. You're not familiar with that statement?

 Am I familiar with a statement from Al-Sirri, no, I am not. I'm not familiar
with that statement. I can't recall that.

 Do you remember the e-mail that Mustafa Hamza sent out after Atia's
death that was introduced into evidence in this case? Sent out to the
Brothers about Atia's death. Do you remember that e-mail? And in that e-
mail didn't Mustafa Hamza say that the Islamic Observation Center
reported that Atia was going to conduct a terrorist operation on October
24, 2000 in Aswan?

 He could say that. I am not quite sure. I cannot remember exactly what
was in that statement, but, you know, I really don't know that the Islamic
Observation Center issued anything like that. I am not quite sure. I really
don't know.

 You said you never read that statement, one published by Al-Sirri on
his website saying that Atia was preparing to conduct a terrorist attack on
tourists in Aswan, Egypt on October 24, 2000.

 I don't recall that Yassir Al-Sirri wrote a statement to that effect, but I
recall reading in the newspapers that this was something to that effect was
issued by the Egyptian government, not by Yassir Al-Sirri. I don't believe
he said that. I believe this was official -- the official statement by the
Egyptian government. They said that they killed him because he was
going to do such and such and such. This is what I recall seeing or
reading«

 [Al-Sirri told you] an accident took place in Aswan, Egypt. Do you know
what Mr. Al-Sirri was referring to Mr. Sattar?

 He was referring to -- to what happened to Atia.

 And what had happened?

 There was the Egyptian police security force raided where he was
saying at that time in Aswan, and they killed him and they killed the man
who he was staying with, too.

 Al-Sirri says: Do you think Al-Asmar was negligent on the issue? You
write, they were all negligent. What was your understanding of what Al-
Sirri was saying when he said, do you think Al-Asmar was negligent on the
issue?

 Yes. He is referring to Al-Asmar means the dark-skinned one in Arabic.

And as we see in Rifa'i Taha, he is dark-skinned. So he was referring to
Rifa'i Taha by Al-Asmar.

 When you say they were all negligent ±

 When I say they were all negligent, I was referring to Rifa'i Taha and
Yunis in dealing with what was Atia's matter.

 What did you mean when you said they were -- by use of the word
negligence?

 From what -- from my understanding back then and my understanding

that they did not handle the situation right. Yunis [Mustafa Hamza] did not
follow up on him until he got out of Egypt. He left him stranded in the city,
on the border between Egypt and the Sudan. And Taha was -- all he
wanted is for him to stay. It was not helping him to get out. He wanted to
convince him to stay, and this is, you know, a man with any significance
like this should just, you know, leave because, you know, this is what I
was trying to do. I was trying to save the man from being killed and the
man just was killed. My worst fear came true.

 Let me refer you to where you said: God damn him. The man only
wanted to get out of the hardship he has. This is what I understood. No
might or power save from God. Hello. What were you referring to when
you said the man only wanted to get out of the hardship he has, this is
what I understood?

 First, I was -- I used the word God damn him against the Egyptian
information minister where he had a press conference and he said that
Atia was planning to do some acts in Egypt. And I said, you know, no, that
was not true. The man wanted just to leave. All he wanted to do was just
to get out of Egypt. This is what Atia wanted. Atia did not want to stay in
Egypt. Atia just wanted to leave. He wants to escape. That's all Atia
wanted to do«

 And when you say he stayed nine days at that place and nothing
happened, what were you referring to?

 I'm referring to the place in Aswan where he was, and nothing

happened to him. He was there for nine days, and nothing happened to
him. I was trying to tell him that it was not here that the American
government notified the Egyptian government or anything like this. The
man was there for nine days, nothing happened to him. If it is on my line,
they would have done it a long time before, but nothing happened to him.
It is something that has to do with the Egyptian government. This is what I
was trying to say there.

After this extra judicial murder Rifa'i Ahmad Taha issued a threatening statement
to "avenge" the murder of a leader of this banned group in a confrontation with the
Egyptian security forces in the province of Aswan. Taha said that 'Alaa Abdul Razzaq
(as spelled in the original) Atia, who was murdered along with another member of the
group, was a leader of the top military wing and the mastermind of the big operations in
Qina, Sohag and Luxor. He added that he places "total responsibility" on the Egyptian
government for Atia's murder. He also added "we'll not clear of guilt" those (he did not
name them) who "one day believed" in the possibility of an agreement with the Egyptian
government, but it is clear he means the movement in Al-Gama¶a al-Islamiyya that
sought suspension of operations in 1998.



4  # 

Ahmed Abdel Sattar unwittingly killed a Brother due to that FBI phone tap. But he
outsmarted the FBI on many other occasions. In early 1993, shortly after the first World
Trade Center Event, FBI collaborator Emad Salem revealed Sattar had obtained the
unpublished home address of John Anticev by utilizing connections in the Post Office
where Sattar worked. The World Trade Center crew was indicted for ³targeting for
kidnap and assassination government officials, law enforcement and judicial officers«´
yet no action was taken against Sattar.

During the investigation of the first World Trade Center attack, Salem told Anticev
that he would be meeting with Mohammed Hassan Abdou, who previously, with Sattar,
was trying, in Salem¶s presence at the Abu Bakr Mosque to determine the location of
Anticev¶s residence. Anticev asked Salem to record these conversations. Salem
responded ³I understand, that¶s something personally because I called you friend and I
meant it when I said it, when I feel anything dangerous against you I willing to defend
you completely.´ John Anticev observed Sattar in a postal uniform near his home.
Fearing for his children¶s safety, Anticev moved. He was questioned about this during
the Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman trial:

 Mr. Salem told you that someone was trying to get your address to do
harm to you?

Yes.

 Did that come out of an incident with Mr. El Sattar on Staten Island,
where you live?

MR. FITZGERALD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

 Do you see Mr. El Sattar sitting in the courtroom right in the back here?

 Yes, I do.

 It was an innocuous incident on Staten Island, was it not, where he --

MR. FITZGERALD: Objection, your Honor. May we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

(At the side bar)

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, my objection is to the fact that we can¶t

control who is in the courtroom, but I think she is trying to vouch for Mr.
Sattar not being under arrest, and I think if we get into people who are
accused of having done illegal things or threatened people --

THE COURT: Mr. El Sattar has been all over this record at various times
and he has been present at various times.

MR. FITZGERALD: But we haven¶t identified him in the courtroom.

MS. Stewart: The only thing is that it was brought up in Mr. Ricco¶s cross-
examination that it was somehow a threat to Agent Anticev¶s life and that
is how he authorized it. I just wanted to bring out that it was, as far as I
know, an extremely friendly meeting on a street in Staten Island where he
was delivering express mail and he ran into Anticev. But Salem came
back and turned it into something else. The only question I was going to
ask was wasn¶t this --

MR. FITZGERALD: My understanding is that when they ran into each

other is different from the conversation that took place later between Mr.
Mohammed Saad and Ahmed Abdul Sattar.

THE COURT: There was nothing in anything that I heard up until now that
had Anticev running into Sattar.

MS. Stewart: That is why I was objecting, Judge, because it sounds like
Salem became --

THE COURT: The problem is that there are two separate incidents. The
incident that you are talking about is not directly related to the incident you
are talking about.

MS. Stewart: My understanding is that they were corroborated.

MR. FITZGERALD: It corroborates what Mr. Sattar told Mohammed Saad

about where he lives.

THE COURT: The two things have nothing to do with one another and I
am not going to permit it.

(In open court)

 BY MS. Stewart:

 Agent Anticev, when you ran into Mr. Sattar in your neighborhood, Mr.
Sattar was wearing a postal uniform delivering mail, isn¶t that correct? And
what you discovered is that Mr. Sattar is a mailman who delivers mail in
your neighborhood, isn¶t that right?

 That¶s true.

 Now, with respect to this man Mohammed Hassan Abdou, has the
Bureau ever prosecuted him for --

MR. FITZGERALD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained as to form.

 Did anybody ever threaten -- withdrawn. Did anyone named
Mohammed Hassan Abdou execute any threats against you, your family,
your home or anything in your neighborhood, to your knowledge?

 No.

Sattar also was investigated for obtaining the home address of other agents and
prosecutors, but no action was ever taken against him. Sattar¶s job at the Post Office
included picking up priority mail from secure areas of John F. Kennedy International
Airport. That job ended when he was abruptly transferred to a desk job at a remote
branch on Staten Island after the September 11th Events. ³This is what I don¶t
understand: If he was a suspect for this long, why did they let him go here and here and
here and here?´ asked Mohamed Nabeel El-Masry of Tom¶s River, New Jersey, a close
friend of Sattar¶s who worked with him as a paralegal on Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman¶s
defense team and was also the President of Majid Bilal.75 ³Why did they let him have
access to all these sensitive areas?´ Good question. In 1988, Ahmed applied and got a
job at the United States Post Office. But at first he was hired as a letter carrier and then
he became a special delivery messenger. This job meant that he was delivering all over
Staten Island where he was now living. His route included delivering and picking up mail
at the coast guard base where navy and nuclear submarines arrived and docked. This
job also took him to other restricted security areas at JFK where few people were ever
permitted to go. His job at the post office making deliveries to the same restricted areas
continued throughout the time the government was investigating and intercepting his
phone. Nothing changed during this entire period as the government did not wish him to
know of their interest in his operation.

75
Majid Bilal - Muslim Society of Jersey Shore, Inc. 1733 US Hiway # 9 Toms River, NJ 08753 Phone: (732) 286-0300 Fax: (732)
341-2028 Email: [email protected]
 John Anticev and his brother Michael were tasked with keeping an eye on radical
fundamentalists. Michael Anticev was questioned at Brother Moussaoui¶s sentencing
hearing:

 How long have you been investigating al-Qaeda?

 Since 1996.

 Is there anyone in the FBI who knows more about al-Qaeda than you,
Agent?

 I'm sure there is.

 Your brother John? He is an al-Qaeda investigator as well, right?

 Possibly. He is working al-Qaeda and terrorism for a long time as well.

 How many al-Qaeda investigators in the FBI do you think there are that
know more about al-Qaeda than you do?

 I don't know. There are a couple of agents who have retired since who
may know more than I do, but I don't know.

 Mr. Murad told the authorities on or about that time frame that he had a
plan to hijack an airplane and fly it into the Central Intelligence Agency
building as part of a martyrdom mission, didn't he?

 I had heard that.

 And when did you first hear that?

 That, I believe, was )<



 You didn't know that before 9/11?

 Myself, no.

 Did you know of any plans by Muslim fundamentalists to fly planes into
prominent buildings anywhere in the world?

 Prior to 9/11, no.

 You didn't know that they planned to fly a plane into the Eiffel Tower?

 I had heard that.


 You had heard that before 9/11?

 I don't know if it was before 9/11 or after.

 Did you hear that they had intended to fly a plane into a cathedral in
Strasbourg, France before 9/11?

 Again, I have heard of that idea, but I don't know if that was before or
after 9/11.

 And you knew that there were concerns that Muslim fundamentalists
would try to fly planes where the G- Summit was meeting in Genoa, Italy
in the summer of 2001, correct?

 I had -- I believe I read that in the 9/11 Commission.

 But you didn't know that before 9/11 either?

 I don't believe so.

 But you admit that the FBI was concerned before 9/11 about the
possibility of al-Qaeda using planes as weapons; isn't that correct?

 I don't know if that's correct, to be honest with you, because I don't

think anybody was looking in terms of using aircraft as weapons as
opposed to doing the more traditional hijacking.

How could Anticev have not seen the Philippine National Police report of the
Murad interrogation where the projected attack on the CIA building was mentioned
prominently? Perhaps Dunbar believed that Anticev¶s brother was a retread from the
anti-Soviet days and had attained his position through nepotism? Was that why he
disregarded John Anticev¶s advice about Salem?

´ !3--

On July 13, 2001 Yousry and Sister Lynne visited the Sheikh once again.

Stewart: Sir, we have ten minutes to 3:00.

Yousry: You want to tell him about the Cole?

Stewart: Mm.

Yousry: The Cole.

Stewart: Yes, yes, just tell him this.

Yousry: There is a boat that was bombed in Yemen, sir.

Abdel Rahman: Mmm.

Yousry: You remember that boat?

Abdel Rahman: Yeah.

Yousry: Some people spoke to Ahmed Abdel Sattar on the phone and
said that they did this for you, [pointing at Abdel Rahman], meaning for
you, sir. They asked Ahmed Abdel Sattar to do negotiations with the
American government.

Stewart: Mmm, hmm, mm, hmm. [ looks at Stewart].

Stewart: I'm just doing covering noises.

Yousry [laughing]. If the American government does not set you free, they
will do other things.

Stewart: [Drops the pen and with an empty bottle, she taps three times
followed by a double tap over the table].

Abdel Rahman: Tell Ahmed not to interfere lest unintelligible.

Stewart: Covering noises. You, [laughs].

Stewart: Continue talking.

Yousry: You see? I'll tell her intelligible.

Abdel Rahman: Tell him it is okay to go through a lawyer but unintelligible.

Yousry: [Reading from letter from Sattar] My communications increased

during the past year. I have semi constant contact with Abu Yassir, Abu
Hazim, Abu Musab, Abdul Harith, Abu Ithar, Abu Khalid, Abu Mustafa, and
many other Brothers, thank God. If there is anything, please notify. No. 10:
Abu Yassir called me the day before yesterday. He still asks for your
Honor's moral support to his position, particularly at this time, after three
years have passed since the initiative that did not produce big results was
issued.