LNG Fire Protection and Emergency Response
LNG Fire Protection and Emergency Response
LNG Fire Protection and Emergency Response
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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN REFINERIES
While the information in this booklet is intended to increase the store-house of knowledge
in safe operations, it is important for the reader to recognize that this material is generic
in nature, that it is not unit specific, and accordingly, that its contents may not be subject
to literal application. Instead, as noted above, it is supplemental information for use in
already established training programmes; and it should not be treated as a substitute for
otherwise applicable operator training courses, operating manuals or operating
procedures. The advice in this booklet is a matter of opinion only and should not be
construed as a representation or statement of any kind as to the effect of following such
advice and no responsibility for the use of it can be assumed by BP.
This disclaimer shall have effect only to the extent permitted by ant applicable law.
Queries and suggestions regarding the technical content of this booklet should
be addressed to Frédéric Gil, BP, Chertsey Road, Sunbury on Thames, TW16 7LN, UK.
E-mail: [email protected]
All rights reserved. Not part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.
Note: Measurement units used in this booklet are in Metric and US systems.
Published by
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)
Davis Building
165–189 Railway Terrace
Rugby, CV21 3HQ, UK
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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN REFINERIES
Contents
1. Introduction to LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Brief history of LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Basic LNG production and customer flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 LNG import terminal facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. LNG properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 LNG composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Cryogenics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3 Embrittlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4 Heat of vaporization and ‘cold burns’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5 Density and specific gravity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6 Boiling point and vapour pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.7 Changing composition/weathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.8 LNG flammability limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.9 Auto ignition temperature and ignition energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. LNG hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Vapour clouds and vapour dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Vapour cloud visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 Effects of heavy rainfall on LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4 Flash fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5 Radiant heat hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6 Explosion hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.7 Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.8 Rapid phase transformation (RPT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.9 Tests and experiments RPT’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.10 Rollover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.11 Geysering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.12 Personnel LNG and cryogenic hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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4.9 Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.10 LNG vaporizer units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.11 Open Rack Vaporizer (ORV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.12 Submerged Combustion Vaporizer (SCV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.13 Spill control—impoundment/containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.14 Spill control objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.15 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.16 LNG plant basic safety measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.17 Potential leaks and spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.18 Potential releases—cryogenic issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.19 Tankage and thermal radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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1
Introduction to LNG
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2
LNG properties
2.2 Cryogenics
LNG is a cryogenic liquid with temperatures in the order of ⫺162°C (⫺260°F),
at atmospheric pressure. LNG boils at ⫺162°C (⫺260°F) and therefore will
vaporize rapidly if released accidentally.
Other common cryogenic liquids include liquid oxygen, nitrogen, helium, argon
and hydrogen. The table below shows the boiling points of some common
liquids in both Celsius (°C) and Fahrenheit (°F).
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Celsius Farenheit
100 212 Water boils
21 70 Room temp
0 32 Water freezes
⫺0.5 31 Butane boils
⫺33 ⫺27 Ammonia boils
⫺42 ⫺44 Propane boils
⫺162 ⫺260 LNG boils
⫺183 ⫺298 Oxygen boils
⫺195 ⫺319 Nitrogen boils
⫺252 ⫺422 Hydrogen boils
⫺270 ⫺454 Helium boils
⫺273 ⫺460 Absolute zero
2.3 Embrittlement
Safe use of LNG or any cryogenic substance requires an understanding of how
materials may change their behaviour at cryogenic temperatures. For instance,
at cryogenic temperatures, carbon steel loses its ductility and becomes brittle.
As a result, aluminium and stainless steel are typically used in the liquefaction
and regasification sections of LNG terminals.
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3
LNG hazards
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In the USA, CFR Title 49, Part 193-Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal
Standards, Section 193.2059 specifies each LNG container and LNG transfer
system must have a dispersion exclusion zone around it that is owned by the
facility operator. A minimum dispersion distance must be computed for the
impounding system in accordance with the applicable dispersion parametres. It
must also use the DEGADIS (Dense Gas Dispersion) Model developed by the
University of Arkansas and funded by GRI, EPA, USCG and several others.
Alternatively, a model meeting the requirements of paragraphs (ii) through (iv)
in the CFR Section 193.2057(c) may be used.
The exclusion zone must be large enough to encompass the part of the vapour
cloud that could be flammable. In order to account for irregular mixing of the
vapour cloud, the regulations designate the vapour cloud hazard area as the
area where the average gas concentration in air is equal to or greater than
2.5% (one half of the lower flammability limit of methane). This provides a
significant margin of error to account for irregular mixing.
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ACCIDENT This was not an LNG related incident, but it involved two operators
driving to investigate a vapour cloud in a tank farm. Both were killed
when the vehicle ignited the vapour and
destroyed the vehicle, as this picture
clearly shows. Care is always needed
when investigating gas or vapour release
incidents or gas alarms. Picture courtesy
Resource Protection International.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
For emergency response, the radiant heat levels produced from an LNG fire greatly exceed
that of a typical flammable liquid fire such as gasoline or diesel or crude oil. The portable high
expansion foam unit shown in this photo should therefore not be considered for terminals, due
to the risks to responders in deployment. Photo courtesy Resource Protection International.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The BLEVE shown can occur with LPG vessels and containers, sometimes spectacularly
as is the case in this sequence of photographs taken a few seconds apart, but LNG storage
tanks do not have the pressurized storage aspect of LPG and therefore do not have the
BLEVE risk. Photograph courtesy Resource Protection.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
does not actually touch the hot surface. The common experience of this
phenomenon is a water droplet on a hot, greased pan, which seems to dance on
the surface without touching it. The technical term for this occurrence is called
the Liedenfrost effect. In this case, the water droplet can become superheated
because there are no nucleation sites provided by the supporting gas film.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
This vapour film will persist until the spill surface cools enough or until the LNG
temperature gets warm enough. So long as the vapour film exists, heat transfer is
greatly reduced since the vapour layer acts as an insulator. When the difference in
temperature between the LNG and the spill surface gets smaller, the vapour film is
destroyed and a different and more rapid heat transfer mode commences.
The rate of heat exchange between the cold LNG and the warmer spill surface
is now tremendously larger than it was with the vapour film in place—and as a
result the LNG is heated almost instantaneously whereupon a Rapid Phase
Transition occurs. Once this Rapid Phase Transformation (RPT) is initiated, it
proceeds through the superheated LNG almost instantly thus involving
potentially large amounts of LNG.
If the LNG is nearly pure methane, this turbulent but not violent mode of
evaporation will continue to completion. In instances where the LNG contains
ethane and propane, the methane will evaporate first and enrich the composition
of the remaining LNG liquid.
The overpressures are not comparable to chemical explosions, but the size
and energy can cause damage due to the momentum of displaced water.
RPT’s range in size from small ‘pops’ to events large enough to damage
lightweight structures and be a potential hazard to personnel.
• RPTs are more likely to occur in LNG mixtures containing high proportions
of ethane and propane;
• High methane content LNG is unlikely to undergo an RPT;
• Higher cold liquid spill rates and prolonged high rate spill durations are more
likely to produce RPTs;
• Only a small fraction of spilled LNG was observed to undergo RPT.
It is also of note that in one large scale RPT field trial, an RPT occurred
followed by ignition of the vapours. The cause of the ignition is not known nor
have attempts been made to try to recreate this incident. The ignition by RPT is
therefore not a proven fact.
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During the BP LNG Workshop at the Texas A&M fire school, repeated attempts
were made to create a RPT using water hose streams. The LNG used for
these attempts was initially 98% methane and then for latter tests was in the
order of 96%.
Despite repeated attempts at no time did a RPT occur, thus indicating that high
methane content LNG is not likely to create a RPT. The evidence is that lower
methane content LNG is liable to undergo a RPT, although the methane
content ‘limit’ is not quantified.
Water stream forcibly introduced into LNG in a
retention pit. No RPT occurred despite this
operation being repeated many times. The
high methane content (99%) LNG used in this
particular instance, is not likely to create a
RPT. 96% methane content LNG was also
used in RPT attempts but also failed to develop
a RPT. However, it must be noted that RPT
attempts with lower methane content LNG
should not have personnel and handlines in
close proximity, due to potential overpressures.
Photo courtesy Resource Protection
International
It is important for those dealing with LNG, especially at facilities over water, to
recognize the RPT hazards from overpressure.
Several examples of accidental RPT events are listed below for information.
Canvey, UK, 1973
During normal LNG carrier off-loading operations a 100 mm (4 inches) bursting
disc on a 350 mm (14 inches) discharge line failed. LNG was released into one
of the LNG tank bunds where water had collected from recent rainfall.
Three explosions were heard, but the only damage was a broken window in an
adjacent building.
Arzew, Algeria, 1977
Due to the rupture of an aluminium valve, several thousand m3 of LNG were
released over a ten hour period.
The leakage took place on the ground, near a frozen soil tank, but spread onto
the sea and several RPTs were observed. Overpressures and/or projectiles
from the overpressures damaged a number of windows in the general area.
Badak, Indonesia, 1992
An LNG leak occurred when starting a liquefaction train. A decision was made
to continue train operations despite the leak and water curtains were actuated
to reduce vapour cloud size and migration.
Approximately eleven hours after the plant had been started up, RPTs occurred
in a concreted slab covered drainage channel. Resultant overpressures broke
the channel and concrete slabs as well as damaging adjacent pipework. Some
concrete blocks were thrown up to 100 m (330 ft).
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
3.10 Rollover
Rollover can occur in an import facility LNG storage tank if the cargo received
is of a different composition from the LNG inventory in the receiving tank and if
appropriate tank filling procedures are not used.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
When this is the case, temporary density induced stratification may occur, as
illustrated below. This in turn will lead to a temperature rise in the lower layer of
the LNG, which will cause the stratification to become unstable and result in
de-stratification (mixing), commonly known as a ‘rollover’.
When this occurs, there will be an increase in the LNG vaporization rate
(boiloff) that may cause venting to the atmosphere through the LNG storage
tank relief valves.
Operational instrumentation, personnel training and controls are the most
effective methods of preventing rollover in a tank. (See also LNG tanks in this
booklet for instrumentation.)
3.11 Geysering
The term ‘geysering’ is used to identify the phenomenon of the expulsion of
LNG from a quiescent liquid in piping. The cause is the heating of a saturated
(near boiling point) liquid in a lower portion of the piping that quickly boils when
the hydrostatic pressure of the liquid farther up in the piping is reduced.
When the liquid at the lower level becomes warm enough to start boiling, bubbles
are generated. This reduces the hydrostatic head, which in turn increases the
boiling rate. Thus, the geysering becomes self-perpetuating once initiated.
Three familiar and comparative examples are:
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
tank. In this case, the static LNG in the horizontal portion of the unloading line
increases in temperature until boiling is finally initiated.
The resulting bubbles in the vertical pipe to the top of the tank reduce the liquid
density and hence the hydrostatic pressure on the horizontal portion of the line.
Once initiated, this reaction goes to completion very quickly. It will very often
completely clear the pipe of LNG and increase the tank pressure, causing the
relief valves to open.
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Cryogenic injuries
The term ‘ice burn’ or ‘cryogenic burn’, although a misnomer, comes from the
sensation experienced when liquids or materials at cryogenic temperatures
come into contact with the skin. This happens because the nerve endings in the
skin cannot easily differentiate between temperature extremes and therefore
heat and freezing sensations create similar sensations.
For such cryogenic burns, unlike the effects of heat burns, the freezing and
sub-cooling of flesh produces embrittlement of the affected area because of its
water content.
• Remove any clothing that may constrict the circulation to the frozen area.
• Immediately place the part of the body exposed to the burn/frostbite in a
water bath that has a temperature of not less than 41°C (105°F) but not
more than 46°C (115°F). Never use dry heat which will superimpose a burn
upon the frozen tissue, as will heat above 46°C (115°F).
• Simultaneously arrange for transportation to a hospital for further therapy
and observation. If there has been massive exposure to cryogenic material
so that the body temperature is depressed, the patient must be re-warmed by
total immersion into a bath. Under these circumstances, it is best to wait until
the patient is hospitalized because shock may occur during re-warming.
• Frozen tissues are painless and appear waxy with a pallid yellowish colour.
The tissue becomes painful, swollen and very prone to infection when
thawed. Therefore, do not re-warm rapidly if the accident occurs in the field
and the patient cannot be transported to hospital immediately. Thawing can
take from 15 minutes to 60 minutes and should be continued until the blue
pale colour of the skin turns to red or pink.
• If the frozen part of the body has thawed by the time medical attention has
been obtained, do not re-warm. Under these circumstances, cover the area
with dry sterile dressings with a large bulky protective covering.
• Administer a tetanus booster.
• Alcohol and smoking decreases the blood flow to the frozen tissue and
therefore must not be used.
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4
Tanks, containment and
spill control
4.1 Tanks
For export and import facilities, tankage is necessary for LNG storage. The
tank type to be used will depend on a number of factors including land space,
quantified risk assessment and national regulations.
However, where LNG import terminals are generally close to population centres,
industry, power stations, etc., LNG tanks for these facilities will virtually all be
designed as the full containment type as land space is usually at a premium.
Basic description
The single containment tank inner tank consists of a flat metallic bottom, a
cylindrical metal wall built of materials (usually 9% nickel steel) suitable for
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
cryogenic temperatures and with the strength to withstand the hydrostatic load
of the LNG at its minimum temperature and maximum storage pressure. They
also have an insulation layer with a domed roof supported by an outside vapour
barrier or outer tank (usually carbon steel). The insulation below the bottom is
usually cellular glass foam. Tank piping penetrations can be through the sides
but are usually through the roof of the tank.
A low earthen dike or bund wall surrounds the tank to confine any LNG spill.
Basic description
The double containment tank consists of the basic single containment tank but
with the addition of an outer tank designed to contain the LNG, but not the vapour.
The outer tank can be 9% nickel or pre-stressed concrete. In both the single and
double containment cases, the roof is not designed to fully contain the liquid. Tank
piping penetrations are generally through the tank roof. A full height pre-stressed
concrete bund wall or dike surrounds the tank to confine any LNG spill.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Basic description
For a full containment tank, the double containment tank is used but with a
strengthened roof that will contain the LNG and vapours completely during any
spill. All tank penetrations are through the roof. The outer tank is designed to
contain any LNG spill.
A typical full containment tank consists of the following components:
• A concrete tank slab. This may be on the ground with an electric heating coil
to protect the ground from frost heave or an elevated slab.
• A 9% nickel open top inner tank.
• A concrete outer tank consisting of a post-tensioned wall connected rigidly
to the outer concrete bottom slab, with a roof constructed of reinforced
concrete. The inside of the concrete tank is lined with a carbon steel vapour
barrier.
• A 9% nickel steel secondary bottom and 9% nickel steel insulated ‘Thermal
Corner Protection’ (TCP). These are linked together. The top of the TCP is
anchored into the pre-stressed concrete wall, approximately 5 metres (15 ft)
above the base slab. The secondary bottom is placed above a lower system
of cellular glass bottom insulation.
• A carbon steel roof liner forming an integral structure with the reinforced
concrete roof.
• A suspended inner deck supported by hangers from the concrete roof and
roof liner. The suspended deck is made of aluminium, supported by
stainless steel hangers.
• A tank insulation system including insulation under the inner tank bottom
(cellular glass, below the secondary bottom and, if required, between the
secondary bottom and inner tank bottom), insulation between the steel inner
tank shell and the concrete outer tank (expanded perlite) and insulation on
top of the suspended inner deck (also expanded perlite). The bottom
insulation system consists of a dry sand-levelling layer above and below
the cellular glass blocks arranged to accommodate a secondary bottom
steel liner.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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• Pressure controllers, one adjusting the boil off gas compressor capacity
control and the other letting down to the flare header.
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An example of an underground (in-pit) LNG storage tank in Korea. The tank has a
double metal shell with an inner and outer tank. The inner tank is made of metal with
high resistance to low temperature. Additional insulation of thermal insulating materials
and dry nitrogen gas is sometimes used as an inert gas to fill the space between the
inner and outer tanks. In-ground tanks are not the same as in-pit tank. The in-pit tank is
a proper tank as described above, but the in-ground tank consists of a concrete base
and concrete slurry wall sides with insulation and then a stainless membrane covered
over with a dome roof. In effect, it is an in-ground container, rather than a tank.
4.9 Insulation
Expanded perlite is used as insulation in the spaces between the inner and
outer tanks and in the roof space of tanks.
Perlite is not a trade name but a generic term for naturally occurring siliceous
rock. The distinguishing feature which sets perlite apart from other volcanic
glasses is that when heated to a suitable point in its softening range, it expands
from four to twenty times its original volume.
This expansion is due to the presence of two to six percent combined water in
the crude perlite rock. When quickly heated to above 871°C (1600°F), the
crude rock pops in a manner similar to popcorn as the combined water
vaporizes and creates countless tiny bubbles which account for the light weight
and other exceptional physical properties of expanded perlite.
This expansion process also creates the white colouring of perlite. Expanded
perlite can be manufactured to weigh as little as 32 kg/m3 (2 lb/ft3) making it
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Baseload operations use ORVs. Peak shaving operators use the same open
rack ORV which has the following features:
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The impoundment around LNG storage tanks and the spill control and
impounding around equipment containing LNG serves the obvious purpose of
preventing uncontrolled flow of LNG and, in particular, preventing it from
entering sewers and storm drains. The shape of the impoundment area and its
floor construction material have a tremendous impact on the rate of vapour
generation in the event of a spill.
Retention basins/pits
The design and capacity of containment/impoundment for LNG primarily
covers tank or large volume contents of LNG and is covered in national standards
including NFPA and EN. For spills from pipework etc on site, spill retention basins
(pits) are necessary. These retention pits should be located in as safe an area
as possible with minimum adjacent or nearby plant and equipment that could be
affected by flame impingement or radiant heat. Similarly, for vapour migration, the
pits should be located in as safe an area as possible to minimize the potential for
vapour to enter confined spaces or possibly reach potential ignition sources.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Typically, the retention pit design parametres should include the following criteria:
• The capacity shall be equal to or greater than the amount of liquid which
would be spilled by breakage of the pipeline with the highest leakage rate
for the time necessary for detection and for interruption of flow.
• An impounding basin shall be open to the atmosphere.
• A means for limiting evaporation and reducing the rate of burning of ignited
spills and consequences shall be provided.
Impounding areas for LNG in which rain or firewater can collect shall include a
means for removing it to ensure that the required volume is maintained and to
prevent flotation of storage tank or tanks. The water shall drain to an extraction
sump within the impounding area and be removed by pumping or by gravity
flow. Retention pits shall also be kept drained. A reliable method shall be
provided for preventing spilled LNG from being discharged from the contained
area or pit through the water drainage system.
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For retention pits, there are two aspects which have come to light during the
BP LNG Fire School, and which need to be considered for their design where
high-expansion foam system are to be provided, as follows:
Top sides of containment pits, above the maximum liquid level, should be
sloped at an outward angle such that high expansion foam will spread over
this area and offer a more effective blanket for the LNG vapours underneath.
This concept is shown by the sketch below.
Unless the slope from the edge of a
containment pit is away from the pit, moderate
to heavy rainfall, or cooling spray/water curtain
water run-off can enter a containment pit easily
and increase either the vaporization rate or the
fire size due to increased vaporization.
One method of avoiding this problem is to use a
simple low-level kerbing arrangement around the sides of the top of the pit, as
shown below.
This kerbing only needs to be high enough to
prevent run-off into the pit and therefore only of the
order of 25–37 mm (1–1.5 inch) high. It is simply a
barrier to water inflow but should obviously have
the same fire resistance as the pit itself.
The same kerbing considerations should be
applied for drainage channels.
Pit depth
It is obvious from a number of tests and exercises conducted at the BP LNG
Fire School that a deeper containment pit, rather than a shallow pit, increases
the amount of direct radiant heat, such that the concrete walls begin to spall
within a few seconds after ignition of the LNG.
It is concluded that this is most likely due to the significantly greater depth/height of
the pit concrete walls, which amplifies the intensity of heat build up and which in
turn reflects back on to the LNG within the pit and further increases vaporization.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
4.15 Materials
This section considers some of the issues regarding materials of construction,
especially of LNG tanks. A release from an inner tank shell could occur from
one of the following situations:
• protect equipment and main structural supports from localized fire inci-
dent minimizing escalation and endangerment of emergency response
personnel;
• protect the main structural members from cold-splash brittle failure and
resulting overall collapse.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Material defects
Steel plate may have laminations that could leak, but would be unlikely to grow
larger.
Poor welds
All welds must be inspected and critical welds must be 100% radiographed.
Use of the wrong weld material may result in weld failure. Post weld material
verification must be appropriate and is required by codes.
Seismic loading
Tanks are conservatively designed for earthquakes. Metal tanks may be
vulnerable at the welded joint of the shell-to-footer plate. Metal tanks may
sustain ‘elephant foot’ yielding. Special tank designs are required and tank
construction is not permitted in some seismic locations. (Refer to USA 49 CFR
193.2061)
Current tank designs have proved safe for 30 years. Therefore, the variables
impacting safety are proper construction, materials and techniques.
The potential weak link in construction is the third party verification of
radiography, which must be part of a comprehensive quality assurance (QA)
audit program. The most critical weld in an LNG tank is the double fillet weld
joining the bottom course of the inner tank shell to the footer plate. Fillet welds
are difficult to radiograph and in this case, only an in-process inspection, such
as dye penetrate testing, is feasible. This requires special attention in the QA
program.
The inner tank floor is typically fabricated (in place) with large sheets of 3/16”
(5 mm) 9% nickel alloy. The floor is joined by lap welds and supported from
underneath by the load-bearing insulation. Although lap welds are more
vulnerable to defects and defect development, the inner tank floor is essentially
a membrane and not a structural element.
As the understanding of metallurgy and fracture mechanisms have increased,
it is recognized that the catastrophic inner tank failure, although theoretically
possible, was not a credible accident theory for a tank designed and built to
current standards.
The focus has now therefore shifted to a ‘design accident’ which specifies a
release rate and duration dependent on the tank configuration.
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The table below highlights typical materials used for cryogenic liquids.
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• Where flanges are used qualified gaskets, suitable for the joint and services,
should be selected or flanges should be oriented so that if a leak occurs the
jet stream shall not impinge on nearby equipment.
• The location of relief valve tail pipes shall be such as to minimize hazard.
• Design pressures shall leave a sufficiently wide margin above operating
pressures so as to minimize the frequency of the lifting of relief valves.
• Pumps with high integrity seals or submerged pumps and motors shall be
used for LNG.
• It is recommended that galvanized surfaces are located so as to avoid the
possibility of molten zinc contaminating austenitic stainless steel piping and
equipment in the event of a fire possibly leading to brittle fracture or rapid failure.
• Attention should be paid to the installation of zinc and aluminium above
unprotected steel and copper systems. If aluminium or zinc is heated for a
long time with a steel or copper object, that object could develop pits or
holes from alloying during future operation. This phenomenon will not be
instantaneous, but would affect the integrity of the plant in future operation.
• Isolation valves shall be fitted as close as possible to the nozzle, outside the
skirt, of process liquid outlets of pressure vessels containing flammable
liquids such as hydrocarbon refrigerants and LNG. These isolation valves
shall be capable of remote operation by push button in safe location or
automatically by the Emergency ShutDown System.
• Irrespective of the means for recovery of boil-off gas which might exist
elsewhere (for example, re-liquefaction, compression), the vapour space of
the tank shall be connected to a flare/vent or safety valve which is capable
of discharging flow rates from any likely combination of the following:
Piping
Leaks are likely to occur at piping flanges, fittings, welds and pipe penetrations
in vessel walls. Typically, the piping from the jetty to the tanks should have
minimum flanges to reduce spill potential.
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Valve packings
Although valves in LNG service are or should be specifically designed for cryogenic
temperatures, when plant and equipment are cooling down, metal parts obviously
contract significantly. It is then that LNG leaks may occur in valve packings. Where
extended bonnet valves are used for LNG service, packings leaks can be predicted
by an abnormal accumulation of frost on the extended bonnet.
The height of the frost will indicate the scale of the leak problem and will give a
good indication of leak potential. Tightening of the packing may serve to
prevent liquid leaks.
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Vaporizers
For import facilities and peakshaving facilities, the area where the LNG is
vaporized requires extra consideration since this area involves not only high
flow rates and pressures but also often the transition from cryogenic pipe
materials to ambient service materials.
If a vaporizer and its controls were to malfunction and the operator fails to
respond to alarms correctly or in time, cold gas or liquid could reach the
ambient service piping, despite automatic trip devices and interlocks, causing
embrittlement and failure.
Internal blockage
Ice, hydrates and solid carbon dioxide can form in gas streams as they are
being cooled unless the gas has been properly treated for removal of water and
CO2. Excessive build up of these solids in valves and heat exchangers can
lead to partial blockage or in extreme cases, complete blockage.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Blocking in LNG
As LNG heats up it expands and if confined to a fixed volume it can generate
extreme pressures. Therefore, blocking LNG into a fixed volume of piping or
equipment, such as between two valves, must be avoided.
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The four thermal flux levels determining the exclusion zones are listed below:
For design purposes and code compliance, validation of the calculation methods
from the code must be used. The code calculations are complex but can be
easily performed by using the GRI sponsored ‘LNG FIRE’ or equivalent validated
computer model and program. The original approach for these siting provisions
was to consider existing ‘off site’ targets, implying they were not owned or under
the control of the facility owner. A further implication was that the facility siting
would not be invalidated by subsequent encroachment of new occupancies.
Currently (2006), the interpretation is that the facility must either own or control
the properties within the exclusion zones to preclude new occupancies that
would be prohibited by the thermal exclusion zones.
For smaller LNG facilities, other LNG codes, such as NFPA 59A, also deal with
the siting and impoundment of LNG storage containers in a similar manner.
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5
Jetties and marine
facilities
5.1 Jetties
LNG jetties should have the same fire protection as LPG jetties insofar as
elevated firewater cooling monitors are concerned. The elevation of the
monitors will depend on the size of ship and height of loading manifold.
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) document Guide
on Marine Terminal Fire Protection and Emergency Evacuation gives guidance
on the capacity of monitors for gas terminals and the Society of International
Gas Carriers and Terminal Operators (SIGGTO) Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard
Management manual also gives design considerations for jetty fixed monitors.
Typically, the firewater supply for the jetty monitors should be capable of
between 150 m3/h (320,000 ft3/h) and 350 m3/h (740,000 ft3/h), depending on
ship size. Such monitors should be remote controlled, given the potential for
high radiant heat levels.
Elevated cooling water monitors may require
the towers to have cooling spray protection
to ensure they will continue to function under
fire conditions. Photo courtesy Resource
Protection International
Dry powder systems may also be provided at jetties. This is covered more
under Chapter 9—Spill and fire control measures. Dry chemical systems
should follow NFPA 17.
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Firewater systems for jetties should consider access for emergency vehicles
and fire hydrant outlets to enable fire vehicle connection. This would not be a
normal response to manifold LNG fires or gas clouds, but is necessary in case
of a ship internal compartment fire. Emergency vehicles lay by, passing area or
turning point should also be considered.
To allow firewater to be supplied to a ship fire mains for internal firefighting,
a ship-to-shore international firewater connection should be provided at a
suitable location at the jetty. This should follow the OCIMF guidance.
Fire tugs
Fire tugs should have a United States Coast Guards (USCG) or Lloyds
Classification for firefighting (Fi-Fi). The table below highlights the Lloyds
Classifications and capabilities.
Monitors 2 3 4 4
Minimum stream 45 70 70
height (m) (145) (230) (230)
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Typically but not always owned by port authorities, fire tugs should have a recognized
classification. Demonstrations of their capability should be arranged if there is any doubt
over their capability. Picture courtesy Resource Protection International.
The length of a fire tug water stream throw is measured horizontally from the
mean impact area to the nearest part of the vessel when all monitors are
performing in a satisfactory manner simultaneously.
Height of stream throw is measured vertically from sea level to mean
impact area at a horizontal distance at least 70 m (230 ft) from the nearest part
of the vessel.
The fire pump’s fuel oil capacity is for continuous operation of all monitors and
must be included in the total capacity of the vessel’s fuel oil tanks.
The actuation and movement control of the monitors must be remote with the
control station in a protected area or control room with a good general view as
well as locally operable in manual mode at each monitor. At least two of the
monitors must have a fixed arrangement to enable dispersion of the water
stream/jet possible. This simply means that some form of jet conversion to
spray must be provided. Valve controls must be designed to avoid water
hammer.
Evacuation
Emergency evacuation and escape routes should follow the OCIMF guidelines.
In some cases, it may be necessary to consider water spray curtains to protect
against radiant heat during evacuation. In extreme cases, consideration may
need to be given to fixed barriers to protect against radiant heat during
evacuation.
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valves operation. In addition to relief valves for the cargo tanks any piping that
could be blocked in with LNG must have a relief valve that allows for
the expansion of the LNG. The relief valves would normally be relieved back to
a cargo tank.
• enclosed spaces adjacent to the cargo tank such as inter-barrier and hold
spaces;
• cargo compressor room and its electric motor room if applicable;
• cargo control room unless it is classed gas safe;
• airlocks;
• engine room gas supply pipelines and burner platform vent hoods.
The fixed gas detection system must be equipped with audible and visual
alarms which display in the cargo control room, wheelhouse and where the gas
detection system is located. Intervals between sampling of individual spaces
should not exceed 30 minutes and the system should alarm when the gas
concentration reaches 30 per cent of the lower flammable limit.
• 3.0 metres (9 ft) from any cargo tank outlet, cargo vent, valve, flange, com-
pressor room access or vent and forward or aft of the cargo deck;
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• 2.4 metres (8 ft) above the cargo deck or from the cargo containment sys-
tems which are exposed to the weather.
Within these zones all equipment needs to be safe for purpose, including that
electrical equipment is intrinsically safe, flameproof type equipment and
pressurized enclosures type equipment.
The following diagrams are examples of the gas dangerous zones on a ship.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Ship Terminal
Manual trip. Manual trip.
Automatic trips Automatic trips
• Shutdown signal from the shore; • Shutdown signal from the ship;
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• pneumatic;
• electrical;
• fibre optics.
A pneumatic system will only activate the ESD. Electrical and fibre optic
systems in addition to carrying an ESD signal are commonly used for
ship/shore telephones, external telephone and transmission of mooring tension
monitoring system data.
In order to protect both the ship’s manifold connection and the terminal’s hard
arms a Power Emergency Release Coupler (PERC) is fitted in most hard arm
installations. The PERC is comprised of two ball valves and an emergency
release coupler. If the vessel moves outside the normal operating envelope for
the hard arms an ESD will be initiated and cargo transfer will be stopped.
Further movement of the vessel outside of the operating envelope will activate
the emergency release system; the ball valves will close and the emergency
release coupler will operate. One ball valve remains attached to the ship and
the other stays attached with the hard arm. The PERC system may also be
activated by a manual push button. The system is designed so minimum liquid
is trapped between the valves and consequently would be spilled upon release.
A picture of a PERC is shown on page 53.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• The fire main system operates at a higher pressure in order to give a better
water spray pattern. The fire main system will have additional isolation valves.
The fire pumps are capable of remote starting and any part of the cargo con-
tainment system must be able to be reached by at least two jets of water.
• Compressor rooms are fitted with fixed carbon dioxide systems.
• Fixed dry chemical powder is fitted for firefighting in the exposed cargo area
with at least two hoses or monitors capable of reaching the manifold area.
Dry chemical monitors have a discharge rate of not less than 10 Kg/sec
(22 lb/sec) and a range of 10 to 40 metres (30 to 120 ft) depending on
capacity. Dry chemical hoses must have a discharge rate of at least 3 Kg/sec
(6.6 lb/sec) with the rate designed so that one man can operate the hose.
These systems shall be independent with the monitor capable of remote
control operation with minimum powder storage of 45 seconds of operation.
• Water spray systems are used for fire protection, cooling and personnel pro-
tection. The system must be able to cover the following areas: exposed cargo
domes; cargo piping and control valves; deck storage tanks for flammable
and toxic products and the boundaries of the accommodations; compressor
room; cargo control room and any store rooms that contain flammable
materials that face the cargo area. The water spray system must be
capable of covering the above areas simultaneously and at a rate
of 10 litres/m2/min (0.25 US gal/ft2/min) for horizontal surfaces and
4 litres/m2/min (0.1 US gal/ft2/min) for vertical surfaces.
The picture on page 54 shows the areas the water spray system should cover.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
In addition to the above fire protection systems the hull is protected by a water
curtain that sprays water on the hull in the vicinity of the cargo manifold to
protect the hull from cryogenic embrittlement.
The photographs above show the manifold area of the ship. The open grilles in front and
below the manifold areas have trays designed to prevent the ship deck and hull coming
into contact with any spillage. Water spray is maintained during cargo operations to
vaporize any liquid spill and further protect the ship deck.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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6
Passive fire protection
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• hydrocarbon;
• 120 minutes integrity/stability;
• 60 minutes temperature test limit.
HO
• hydrocarbon;
• 120 minutes integrity/stability;
• no insulation.
Rating terminology
Test Stability/
Temperature Integrity
Rating Curve (Mins) Temperature Limit °C(°F)
FACE SPOT
B Cellulosic 30 139 (282) ⫹ A 225 (437) ⫹ A
A Cellulosic 60 139 (282) ⫹ A 180 (356) ⫹ A
H Hydrocarbon 120 139 (282) ⫹ A 180 (356) ⫹ A
In the table above, A/B ratings refer to cellulosic material fires and are,
therefore, relevant to most building applications.
‘H’ ratings refer to hydrocarbon spill fires. (Hydrocarbon fire tests simulate the
more rapid temperature rise and higher end temperature that occurs with
hydrocarbon fires compared to cellulosic fires.)
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It should be remembered, however, that fire ratings are derived from standard
tests and so it is important to ensure that the test is relevant to the application.
For most building applications this is relatively straightforward as the usual
purpose is to allow safe exit and prevent passage of fire products until a
professional fire response from, for example, the local authority fire brigade is
available. As this is usually within minutes, the long-term performance of the
PFP is often not an issue.
However in the case of LNG facilities, the PFP will usually be subject to
the elements and may be required to perform over extended periods while a
controlled burn-out of fuel occurs.
For LNG, it may also require cryogenic splash or cryogenic liquid immersion
followed by a fire test, since this better reflects possible fire incidents at LNG
handling facilities.
One particular type of fire where ratings achieved in standard tests can be a
problem is the jet fire. In fact, because jet fires pose particular problems due to
extremely high heat flux levels, their erosive effect and their ‘heat shock’
loading, all of which can vary considerably according to actual fire conditions, it
has proved very difficult to get general acceptance of standard jet fire tests,
although tests developed mainly by oil companies have now been published
and are used for this purpose.
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The 1-metre (3 ft) high steel column at the top right hand corner of the LNG pit in this
photo has been coated with Chartek 7 passive fire protection. This intumescent based
PFP has withstood repeated burns, water and foam applications as well as dry chemical
applications during the BP LNG Fire School.
In this photo, the 1-metre (3 ft) high steel column coated with PFP in the fire area per-
formed as specified in terms of fire protection. In the same photo, to the left of the fire
area in front of the foam generator, can be seen another column with the same treat-
ment. It is visibly burning, which is another feature of its performance in order to obtain
charring for heat resistance. This burning should be noted by responders since if dry
chemical is to be used to extinguish an LNG fire, there may be a source of re-ignition via
this burning. Care should also be taken if using pressure sprays or jets for cooling where
Chartek is used, as this may reduce the charring effect, although additional thickness
may be applied to account for this effect, if necessary.
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Any PFP being considered for an LNG facility where this may be the scenario
should ensure that the PFP be tested against these conditions. Liquid nitrogen can
be specified as a replacement for the LNG as the cryogenic liquid side of the test,
followed by a hydrocarbon pool and/or jet fire test according to the fire scenario.
LNG facilities
• Protection of critical structural members in process areas.
• Protection of critical equipment (e.g. ESD valves and actuators).
• Protection of critical control cabling.
• Protection of process equipment.
• Protection of tanks.
• Protection of vessels and vessel supports.
• Containment pits.
• Run off channels.
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Potential advantages
• Epoxy based spray intumescents can be used for all configurations of steel
work. They can exhibit superior physical and mechanical properties leading
to a longer life span and lower repair requirements than other spray
materials.
• They are normally extremely weather resistant and less prone to water or
oil absorption than other types (although some types may require a
top coat).
• They can provide good corrosion protection to the substrate.
Potential disadvantages
• Intumescents can combust initially and burn as they char. Thus, if dry
powder is used to extinguish an LNG fire, intumescent PFP can act as a
re-ignition source.
• Intumescents may give off toxic smoke and fumes as they char.
• Erosion of the char can be caused by jet fire impingement.
• Erosion and degradation can occur by use of water streams for cooling
under fire conditions.
Special considerations
• Normally spray applied intumescent materials require a retention system.
Although the epoxy base material itself is inherently water resistant, the intu-
mescent materials may not be. Consequently, weatherproof top coats may
be required.
• Mixing of components in the correct proportion is critical to performance.
Considerable safety procedures are often required during application and
curing.
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Potential advantages
• Cementitious PFP can be applied to all configurations of steelworks
although sharp radii items may cause problems.
• Water pick-up post-fire can re-establish some capability (but structural
strength will be affected).
• Cementitious materials do not normally emit toxic fumes in fire situations
(although topcoats might).
Potential disadvantages
• Oxychloride and oxysulphate cements can cause corrosion to the steelwork
to which they are attached. Portland cement based cementitious coatings
do not normally directly cause corrosion, but may accelerate the process by
virtue of water retention unless the substrate is protected.
• Inspection of the substrate can be difficult.
• The coatings are porous and should be protected with a topcoat system which
must be carefully maintained over the life cycle of the product.
• The topcoat integrity needs to withstand water streams for cooling to mini-
mize degradation.
• The impact resistance of cementitious coatings tend to be lower than that
of the epoxy-based materials.
Special considerations
• Spray applied cementitious materials normally require retention system.
Potential advantages
• The flexible nature of these materials allows them to be used for relatively
complex shaped items.
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• Compared to spray coatings they can be more easily removed for inspec-
tion of the protected equipment although great care must be taken to
replace them correctly.
• Fire blankets normally provide a relatively lightweight protection method.
Potential disadvantages
• The binders used with the fibres may decompose in a fire situation and
release toxic fumes.
• Blankets should be protected against ingress of water which could lead
to corrosion of the protected equipment. It is normal practice to provide a
barrier—often an aluminium foil—to prevent water ingress and formation of
condensation on the substrate.
• The lower melting point of mineral wool means that it is not normally suit-
able for PFP application in hydrocarbon fires.
Special considerations
• Fibres may settle within a barrier with vibration thus reducing effectiveness
in some areas.
• Restrictions on fibre particle size may have to be imposed due to potential
health hazards.
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heat reduction offered benefits to the fire responders in that they could advance
closer to the fire than previously possible, unless using high-expansion foam.
Whilst these foamglass blocks are not yet considered as an alternative to high-
expansion foam for fire reduction in containment pits and run off channels, there is
obviously potential for heat reduction as an aid to emergency response and control
of contained LNG fires. However, this would have to be subject to further testing.
It should be noted that the blocks did not appear to significantly reduce
vaporization and their strength is therefore in their ability to reduce fire size
and radiant heat. The manufacturer of the blocks is Pittsburgh Corning
Corporation-International and the blocks are their Foamglass Insulation
Product.
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7
LNG, gas and fire
detection
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Catalytic detectors are not considered best practice for LNG facilities given the
availability and reliability of infra-red gas detection technology.
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In effect, the beam measures the ‘total’ amount of gas present along the beam,
as if a row of point detectors were placed end to end. In this way, the
‘significance’ of a gas release hazard can be estimated. This feature enables
open-path detectors to be used effectively as perimeter monitoring devices to
track the size and direction of releases, especially where identified ignition
sources are nearby to potential release areas or where facilities are adjacent to
public roads or public areas.
Further information on open path gas detection readings and data during the
BP LNG Fire School tests is included in Appendix A, particularly the outcomes
of tests conducted with the open path detection.
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This technology may have future specialist applications for the LNG and the oil
and gas industry in general but as yet there are no standards or guidance to
apply such technology.
Most leaks can be visually detected from ground level or at one or two metres
height. Gas imaging may be carried out up to 50 metres (164 ft) from the
target area.
The gas imaging technology shown above is now being becoming available
from companies including Leak Survey Inc (GasFindIR camera) and Heath
Consultants (remote methane leak detector).
Smoke detection
Smoke detectors are widely used to detect smouldering or flaming fires
capable of generating quantities of smoke as a consequence of combustion
and may be ‘point’ type or ‘volumetric’. Point detectors may be of the ‘ionization’
or optical (‘photo-electric’) type. Volumetric smoke detectors may include
‘beam’ type detectors or ‘incipient’ units.
(a) Ionization smoke detector
The ionization smoke detector utilizes the phenomenon that ions are attracted to
smoke particles. A small sampling chamber containing air is ionized by a weak
radioactive source. When combustion products enter the chamber the particle
charge pattern is modified and the air conductivity is reduced, producing a change
in the ionization current flowing between two electrodes. In this way, a change in
potential difference can be measured and an alarm can be generated.
(b) Optical smoke detector
Smoke particles entering the detection chamber affect the propagation of a
beam of light, either by obscuring its intensity or by scattering of the beam path.
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UV flame detectors
UV detectors are sensitive to most fires, including hydrocarbon (liquids, gases
and solids), metals, sulphur, hydrogen and ammonia. However, the presence of
large quantities of smoke, contaminants and UV absorbing gases or vapours in
the detection area may attenuate radiant energy, decreasing detection efficiency.
For this reason, the area must be surveyed carefully to ensure that these
effects are reduced.
IR flame detectors
Most IR sensors are broadband detectors responding to a wide range of
wavelengths and require optical filters to narrow the response to wavelengths
of interest.
A common type utilizes the 4.4 micron wavelength, chosen to detect the
emission of carbon dioxide, which is given off by burning carbonaceous
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In the example of flame imaging detection above, the CCTV cameras have picked up jet
fire on the test vessel and appear on the computer VDU in red colour with alarm. The
flame imaging detection has been tried and tested at the BP LNG Workshop in Texas
and has proved effective and reliable for LNG fires. (Picture courtesy Micropack.)
Flame imaging is the preferred flame detection for LNG handling facilities and
plant. Utilizing data from three years of tests, the algorithms of the flame
imaging system have been remodelled to increase accuracy and speed of
detection.
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8
Spill and fire control
measures
The volatility of LNG liquid is such that when spills occur in depth or liquid
spillage is diverted to containment or impounding pits, the vapours cannot be
completely suppressed as is possible with most, though not all, flammable
liquids.
The recommended methods for dealing with unignited and contained LNG
spillage include:
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Previously, the evidence for this vapour reduction was limited and whilst the
industry recognized this reduction, the quantification of the reduction was not a
simple affair.
However, the 2004 and 2005 tests at the BP LNG Fire School have clearly
demonstrated and quantified reduction by showing up to 60% vapour reduction
(see Appendix A). This obviously reduces the distance to LFL of the vapour cloud.
It is also now clear that unaspirated foams and low expansion foams do not
significantly reduce LNG spill vaporization.
This is due to their high water content whereby the water drains off rapidly to
increase the LNG vaporization and therefore these foams do not contribute to
significant vapour reduction and should not be used.
To assist project engineers develop effective specifications, extensive test work
has been carried out at the Emergency Services Training Institute of the Texas
A&M University System, as part of the BP LNG Live Fire Training Workshop.
While previously only historical data with national standards and codes would
have been available as the only reference point for this important work, the BP
LNG Fire School, held at the Texas A&M University Fire Ground has enabled
modern solutions to be developed through realistic scenario testing.
These tests have given validation to those national codes and standards
but they have also raised a number of anomalies, for which solutions have
been found.
The BP sponsored LNG Fireground at Texas A&M was constructed partly to
carry out medium and long term testing of foam concentrate and foam making
equipment under realistically onerous conditions.
It was also developed to determine the precise parametres that will ensure
maximum effectiveness and efficiency in both fire control and vapour dispersion
of LNG for implementation in new build and upgrade of existing facilities.
A set of three containment pits have been constructed and used for vapour
and fire control as follows:
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sides in order to determine minimum foam application rates, which often gave
very slow control times, even under ideal test conditions.
These previous typical test conditions did not represent an effective basis for
operational conditions, where the commonly used modern containment pit
design standard has vertical sides of reinforced concrete.
Some historical test work has used low test application rates (typically below
5 litres/min/m2 (0.12 US gal/ft2/min)) but these have generally been conducted
in ideal weather conditions with wet sand or earthen pits, usually moistened so
the side walls are also iced down to ⫺164° C (–263°F) as the LNG arrives.
These types of pits do not generate the much higher radiant heat levels of
reinforced concrete pits installed on the BP LNG Texas A&M fire ground. Nor
are these types of pits to be found on most operational LNG sites.
Also, they do not take account of rain storms, wind effects or any peripheral
deluge water from exposure protections that may inadvertently drain into the
LNG pool, which makes for a significantly more challenging problem to control.
Such practicalities require considerably higher application rates for operational
use than during tests, a factor beginning to be acknowledged by recent editions
of system design standards.
Unlike most fire applications, there have as yet been no major LNG incidents to
prove the inadequacy of low application rates on LNG.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Given the extremely high level of radiant heat from an LNG pit fire, it is vital that
the shortest possible time for control is achieved. Therefore every minute and,
in some situations where heat exposures are nearby, every second becomes
important for fire control.
The test work at BP LNG Fire School at Texas A&M shows that only
the relatively high rate of 10 litres/min/m2 (0.25 US gal/ft2/min) foam solution
flow achieves the required fast levels of fire control, which has consistently
been shown to be effective.
This rate is to be used for LNG containment/retention pits where they are
adjacent or close to manned areas, plant or jetty ship manifold areas.
Recognizing that plant design may allow for greater spacing where land
permits, for small impoundment pits which can be located well away from plant
or personnel, a reduced rate of 7 litres/min/m2 (0.17 US gal/ft2/min) may be
appropriate, but only if this concurs with the site risk assessment.
It is further recognized that since higher foam application rates and expansion
rates are in use, the foam system costs will be more.
However, higher rates are much quicker to control (either in vapour or fire
phases), and they also require less frequent ‘top-ups’ during LNG presence.
This is due to less heat production and therefore less foam used.
This standard requirement should ensure that all LNG sites are providing the
most appropriate, fully tested and proven and therefore the most effective fire
suppression for their identified contained LNG fire scenarios.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Lesser requirements can lead to an inferior system that will not provide the level
of protection that has been proved effective, possible and practical to achieve.
This will avoid potential failures through delays under emergency conditions.
Equipment used continuously and without failures during the test work
included:
• Angus Fire LNG Turbex high expansion foam generator skids and
hoods;
• Angus Fire Expandol high expansion foam concentrate.
Other similar equipment that has been tried and tested in real time scenarios at
the BP LNG fireground would be acceptable provided the same level of active
vapour and fire control is achieved without failures (reliability) in order to meet
BP’s stringent requirements.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
For contained LNG spills or fires, portable high expansion foam units should
not be considered due to the need to approach extremely closely to attempt
foam application from high expansion foam portable generators.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
There should be no ignition sources in the areas where vapour migration from
the pit may occur. Obviously, vehicles and personnel should remain outside
the hazard area. Therefore, at the design stage, whilst foam systems should be
considered, especially for common bunds containing more than one tank, their
need should be subject to thermal radiation assessments impact on adjacent or
nearby facilities and equipment.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Where foam systems are provided, the application of foam on an LNG spill will
lead to icing over some of the LNG liquid surface with the formation of ‘ice
tubes’ through which vaporization continues.
Foam does not appear to completely ‘seal’ vapours at the edge of an
impounding/containment pit, although a top sloping wall appears to offer the
best opportunity to limit vaporization at the pit edges, rather than a fully vertical
containment pit.
The water content in the produced foam forms an ice layer on top of the LNG and
the foam above this freezes to a few centimetres depth. The LNG vapours tend to then
create ‘ice tubes’ up to the surface of the foam/LNG area with the vapour releasing
above the top of the non-freezing foam layer. (Diagram courtesy Angus Fire.)
Example of high expansion foam discharge into an LNG containment pit. It is necessary
for the foam to build up and flow over the pit top to achieve best vapour reduction results.
Vertical wall pits do not appear to be as effective in allowing the foam to seal the vapours
as a top sloping pit. Hoods to direct the foam into the pit and minimize the impact of wind
are also recommended. (Picture courtesy of Angus Fire.)
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
As with any foam application, once a foam blanket has been applied, it will
need refreshing ‘top-ups’ in the form of re-application to ensure ongoing vapour
suppression. Applied foam gradually degrades with the water in the foam
bubbles draining out. Although a foam blanket may seem intact, with the water
drained, there is little resistance to vapours.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
the LNG fire and therefore the ice tube ‘outlets’ will continue to burn as
shown below.
85
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
In the live fire test shown above, high expansion foam is applied onto a burning LNG
contained pit fire. The fire intensity is clearly reduced as is the radiant heat level. The
fire will continue to burn as it is not possible to extinguish an LNG fire with foam of any
type (dry chemical powder could be used). However, the ice tube principles shown
above mean that the ongoing fire is dramatically reduced in size. Thus, high expansion
foam can be effectively used to limit heat input to adjacent tanks or plant and equipment.
(Picture courtesy Resource Protection International.)
For LNG spills outside of contained areas, it may be possible to use medium
expansion foam application as part of a portable response. The actual spill
conditions will dictate whether this approach is safe and practical and it may be
that limited spills will vaporize before such a portable response is ready.
Applied foam gradually degrades as water in the foam bubbles slowly
drains out. This in combination with foam losses through direct flame
impingement and radiant heat (evaporation) means there will be ongoing foam
blanket losses. For LNG fire control/reduction, foam will need to be re-applied
regularly until all the LNG has been burnt off. It should be obvious
to responders when the foam blanket needs re-application due to the increase
in fire size.
86
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
LNG spill fires can be extinguished using dry chemical in the same way as
other flammable liquid fires can be extinguished. If anything, LNG contained
fires are less difficult to extinguish than typical hydrocarbon contained fires,
using dry chemical.
However, the same principles of limited post fire security and high potential for
re-ignition must be recognized and understood.
There is also the question of vapour migration once the fire is extinguished. It
is therefore necessary to carefully consider the impact of extinguishing an
LNG fire.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Trailer dry chemical units up to 1500 kg (3,300 lbs) and more are possible but
these must consider means of transport and access as well as manpower to
deploy.
One important aspect of large output dry chemical nozzles is that the powder
cloud created can easily block the unit operator’s vision of the fire area, making
it difficult to get the aim and sweep correct for extinguishments.
It may therefore be necessary to have one person at right angles to the fire and
dry chemical unit to assist in the powder stream direction, to be fully effective.
This is certainly true for large fires.
88
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
89
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Fixed water curtains, as shown above, may be used as a barrier against radiant
heat and act as a protected escape route for personnel. These may be used on
jetty heads or approach roads.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
In the test shown below, the water curtain on the left of the LNG vapour cloud
to the right acts as a barrier with the water acting to increase vaporization and
dilute the vapour. One aspect of this curtain is that mainly methane gas tends
to rise up the water curtain and continue to rise thereafter.
Water spray/deluge
Water spray systems
Water spray systems are systems designed to apply water at a predetermined
application rate to protect specific equipment or areas. Water has high heat
absorption capability in terms of its specific heat and latent heat of vaporization.
The major cooling effect is brought about by the vaporization of water.
Water spray systems can be used for effective cooling of structures, plant and
equipment. Application rates are listed in NFPA and EI (Energy Institute) Codes
(EI was formerly the Institute of Petroleum) according to the cooling objectives—
either for radiant heat protection or for flame impingement protection.
Energy Institute Model Code of Safe Practice: Part 19 - Fire Precautions at
Petroleum Refineries & Bulk Storage Installations.
Part 9 - Bulk Pressure Storage and refrigerated LPG.
NFPA 15 - Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection
Care has to be exercised when designing a water spray system. The spray
nozzles can become blocked by corrosion particles or poor water quality.
Corrosion resistant materials and good quality nozzles are necessary.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Use of small diameter holes drilled in water piping for cooling spray systems
shall be avoided. The small outlets easily become blocked.
A very important design point to note is that if the water is near to a burning
LNG pool, the fallout water droplets getting into the LNG will cause a higher
rate of vaporization and the fire will obviously increase in size.
Water monitors
Water monitors, both fixed and portable, may be used for cooling structures,
plant and equipment to protect against radiant heat or flame impingement.
Fixed monitors may be of the manually operated and directed type that
requires personnel to actuate and operate. There is also the option of using
oscillating monitors which, once actuated, can apply a water stream over a pre-
determined area according to the settings of the oscillation pattern.
Wherever possible, the water supply requirements for, and actuation of
monitors should be determined through site-specific scenario analysis.
Portable monitors are also an option for cooling but the number of monitors to
be used must consider the available manpower to deploy, actuate and direct
such monitors. It is possible to use portable oscillating monitors where
manpower is limited.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Firewater systems
Terminal onshore firewater systems should be designed in accordance with
Companies Engineering Technical Practices requirements and firewater pumps
and systems should conform to NFPA 20.
The need for manual fire intervention where responders would connect to fire
trucks from fire hydrants, or where a site fire team or trained operators would
use hose and nozzles directly from site fire hydrants should be carefully
considered for LNG facilities.
For an import facility, whilst a mobile and portable response to an LNG spill or
a release incident is feasible, this would normally only be considered where the
spill or fire was relatively small, possibly only several metres diameter and
contained by kerbing or bunding. LNG spills or fires above this size should be
drained and diverted to retention/containment pits and if necessary, perhaps as
a code requirement or due to close proximity of structural or fixed assets or
ships etc, a high-expansion foam system should be provided.
Therefore, fire hydrant numbers and locations should consider possible
scenarios as the basis for requirements. Note that buildings, diesel and
odourizer facilities will require hydrants.
For liquefaction facilities, where other hydrocarbons may be in use as
refrigerants, the need for hydrants and a mobile/portable response will
obviously be necessary, but again, their needs should be assessed via possible
scenarios.
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9
Emergency response plans
94
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
95
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• Contact ship master and confirm jetty head/ship conditions and gas cloud
conditions.
• Strategy generally the same for LNG gas cloud response strategy.
Ship actions
• Halt cargo operations and actuate water spray system for gas cloud
control/dilution.
• Ensure ship fire pump is running.
• Monitor gas detection for gas migration on ship.
• Leaking LNG loading line isolated and drained down.
• Prepare ship dry powder system in case of ignition.
• Prepare ship-cooling monitors ready in case of ignition.
• (Manifold incidents should be short-lived due to isolation valves and
emergency shutdown capability.)
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• Contact ship master and confirm jetty head/ship conditions and gas cloud
conditions.
• Strategy generally the same for LNG pool fire response strategy.
Ship actions
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
10
Personal protective
equipment (PPE)
98
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
99
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
NFPA 1971 (2000) standards, yet is also significantly lighter for wearing in hot
weather climates where the traditionally heavy gear causes stress to the
wearer over time.
Splash protection and anti-penetration barriers are part of the LNG specific
bunker gear considerations, including resistance to icing of fibres when
exposed to limited splashes. However, such PPE can only ever give limited
protection and even then only against accidental minor splashing.
For further reference, consult your company specific guidance.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
11
Codes and standards
US regulations
• 49CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 193 Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities: Federal Safety Standards
The first federal code was prepared and adopted in July 1976 as a result of a
mandate from Congress to regulate the safety of the LNG industry. The basis of
the original DOT code was essentially the already published NFPA 59A.
Although the structure and format are different, the requirements are similar. In
March 2000, the federal code adopted large portions of NFPA 59A, but there
are areas the regulators felt were lacking that have additional requirements in
the code. The code anticipated large land-based LNG facilities, specifically the
peakshaving industry and import terminals. Smaller plants and temporary
facilities were not envisioned, and therefore, many of the provisions are not
easily applied to remote satellites or other small facilities. 49CFR Part 193
covers siting requirements, design, construction, equipment, operations,
maintenance, personnel qualifications and training, fire protection, and security.
• 33CFR Part 127 Waterfront Facilities Handling Liquefied Natural Gas and
Liquefied Hazardous Gas
This federal regulation governs import and export LNG facilities or other
waterfront facilities handling LNG. Its jurisdiction runs from the unloading arms
to the first flange outside the LNG tank.
33CFR Part 127 has the following major headings: General; Waterfront
facilities handling liquefied natural gas; and Waterfront facilities handling
liquefied hazardous gas.
• NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage and Handling of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG)
The NFPA standards are developed by volunteer committees and have no
legal standing. They are not laws or regulations. The standards are widely
used and are often adopted by cities or states by reference. The standards
carry the weight of law only if incorporated by reference by jurisdictional
authorities.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
NFPA 59A has the following major headings: Introduction; General plant
considerations; Process systems; Stationary LNG storage containers;
Vaporization facilities, Piping systems and components; Instrumentation and
electrical services; Transfer of NG and refrigerants; Fire protection; Safety and
security; Alternative requirements for vehicle fuelling for industrial and
commercial facilities using ASME containers; Referenced publications;
Appendices; and Indices.
• NFPA 57 Standard for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Vehicular Fuel Systems
This standard’s first edition was in 1996, and it developed in response to the
growth of the natural gas vehicle industry in the early 90s.
The regulation covers systems on-board vehicles and infrastructure storing
70,000 gallons of LNG or less. The major headings are: Introduction; Vehicle
fuel systems; LNG fuelling facilities; Installation requirements for ASME tanks;
Fire protection; Safety and security; Referenced publications; and Explanatory
material.
US regulators
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC);
• Department of Transportation (DoT);
• State Agencies and Public Utility Commissions;
• Local Jurisdictions, i.e., city and county agencies (may include air pollution
boards, water and sewer departments, and the local fire department).
International regulations
• BS7777 and EN1473 – The European Norm standard EN1473 Installation
and equipment for liquefied natural gas—Design of onshore installations.
The EN evolved out of the British Standard 7777 in 1996. The standard is
very different from the US standards in that extensive risk assessments are
required for the design of the facility. The standard is much more detailed
and prescriptive. The major sections of the standards include: Foreword;
Introduction; Scope; Normative references; Terms and definitions; Safety
and environment; Liquefaction plants; Storage and retention systems; LNG
pumps; Vaporization of LNG; Pipework; Reception/send out of natural gas;
Boil off recovery and treatment plants; Auxiliary circuits and buildings; Fixed
protection equipment; Control systems; Construction; Commissioning and
turnaround; Painting; Fire proofing and Embrittlement protection.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• BS7777:1993
This applies to flat bottomed, vertical, cylindrical storage tanks for low
temperature service. This code is applicable to aboveground single, double
and full containment designs with inner containers of 9% nickel steel. It does
not apply to designs where both containers are of pre-stressed concrete.
Partial height hydro-testing is replaced by full height testing. The maximum
plate thickness is 40 mm (1.6”).
• PD-7777:2000
This is a supplement to BS7777, which allows partial height hydro testing.
There is no plate thickness limit as far as the authors are aware. It requires
expensive, high strength, very high nickel (Hastelloy type) weld filler metal to
meet the toughness test requirements on the weld metal.
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Acronyms and
abbreviations
106
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107
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN REFINERIES
Acknowledgements
The co-operation of the following in providing data and illustrations for this
edition is gratefully acknowledged:
• Ansul Incorporated
• CAFCO International
• Hale
• Knowsley
• MEDC
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
12
References
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
105
LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Appendix A:
Gas detection test
work analysis
Using gas-imaging technology, it has been possible during the BP LNG Fire
School tests to chart gas detectors’ response to LNG vapours from the
retention pits. The following coarse data is available at this time.
The following graph is a one-second view across the grid of 18 point IR
detectors that were placed along the open path detectors on the east side of
the LNG Marine Pit (slop tank side).
With almost 3,000 US gallons (11,355 litres) of LNG in the 65 m2 pit (700 ft2),
this graph shows that in this particular case, the open path IR gas detector has
peaked, but only one of the point gas detectors is showing a ‘low level’ alarm.
Had this been a real time LNG release event, with the way industry typically
places point detectors and sets the alarm levels, this particular release could
have been completely missed if reliance was on point detection only.
10/6/2005 11:12
29.3018
30
22.4915
22.1692
25
20
13.94
5
0.608599
0.143053 0.00696194
0.267263
0 -0.006199
-5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Detectors
10/6/2005 11:12
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Usually with point detection, there are two or three detectors placed and voting
as an alarm. Two out of three would be an alarm, but here, the outcome was 1
out of 18.
This test and the following graph certainly shows that open path is the way
forward for LNG facilities.
In the graph on page 110, foam was applied to the same pit and measurements
taken from the gas detection.
LNG was applied and then allowed to reach steady state vaporization.
High expansion foam was then applied at 500:1 ratio and at 10 litres/min/m2
(0.25 US/gal/ft2/min).
The graph should be considered as a 60 second clock and each detector with
a serial number. Note that 1 to 18 are point IR gas detectors and 19 is the open
path IR gas detector.
It will be noted that the applied foam, although slightly increasing the gas levels
initially, settles over the LNG and subsequently reduces by over 60% the LFL,
and therefore LNG, vaporization on all detectors.
This is independent confirmation that a good quality high expansion foam
can reduce vaporization by up to 60% and thereby reduce vapour cloud
distance to LFL.
Previously, such quantification has been difficult to provide. The tests here
demonstrate the theory adequately.
10/6/2005 14:56
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-20
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-40
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 FOAM APPLICATION
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series2
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series3
Series4
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Series5
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Series6
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Series7
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Series8
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Series9
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Series10
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Series11
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10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series12
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series13
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series14
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
Series15
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series16
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series17
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56 Series18
10/6/2005 14:57 10/6/2005 14:56
10/6/2005 14:57
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14:56 Series19
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14:56
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109
GD18
110
120
100
80
60
40 GD18
20
Appendix B:
Foam system design
considerations
The following has been produced as a result of the extensive testing of foam
expansion ratios, foam application rates, and foam application hardware at the
BP LNG Fire School, Texas A&M University. The document is produced in
collaboration between BP, Resource Protection International, Texas A & M Fire
School, Angus Fire, Zellweger Analytics, Micropack and Flameout.
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NFPA 59A Section 9.1 states that such protection shall be based on sound fire
protection engineering principles and determined by an evaluation of local
conditions, hazards and property exposure. Other sections of NFPA 59A note
that ‘new technology may be applied and tests directly related to the fire risk
shall be duplicated’ and in this respect the BP LNG Fireground at Texas A & M
fulfils these requirements. Multiple real time fire tests with LNG liquid have
been carried out in duplicate containment basins and repeatedly the depth of
foam required to effectively cover the LNG, mitigate the flames, reduce the
radiated heat by 90% or more, is a minimum of 1.2 m (4 ft).
It is now clear that many of the frequently quoted low application rates of the
past are inadequate for a more typical operational LNG fire, where speed of
control becomes a vital factor. An application rate of 10 litres/min/m2 has
proved to be the minimum requirement in the BP LNG fireground test work at
Texas A&M under the most stringent and realistic operational conditions, and
shall now be used in LNG facilities.
This proven rate will inevitably be more expensive than some of the lower rates
since more equipment will be required to provide effective rate of foam
production and sufficiently rapid speed of coverage.
This has been shown to be necessary to provide quick, effective and reliable
protection. Lower levels of protection may do little to adequately protect personnel
and plant in a real LNG fire scenario and should be considered false economy.
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The expansion ratio and stability of the foam bubbles produced can be
adversely affected with a sudden delivery of a very wet foam directly into the
LNG pool which could lead to sudden flare ups and fire intensification, with
associated danger to personnel and unexpected exposure hazards.
Electric motors even when flameproofed should not be used to power such
foam generators for LNG applications as they cannot be relied upon to operate
correctly across the full operating temperature range of ⫺164°C (–263°F) up to
around 1,200°C (2,192°F).
It is therefore imperative that only specially modified fan driven water powered
high expansion generators should be used in LNG facilities, which are proven
to be effective on LNG pool fires of at least 6” (150 mm) LNG depth over a
65 m2 ( 700 ft2) (or greater) concrete impounded area.
• When deciding on minimum foam depth and taking all the relevant factors
into account as recommended in the NFPA documentation, then a minimum
of 1.2 metres (4 ft) depth of foam is necessary within containment basins.
This minimum depth should be specified in future LNG projects as well as
current LNG facilities, and the foam shall be held in place by a permanent
containment basin structure.
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• The hardware specified must be capable of 500:1 foam expansion ratio, pro-
vided with hood and fan drive powered by the water supply to give uniform
bubble production. It must be capable of working under LNG vapour and fire
conditions where ⫺164°C to ⫹1,200°C (–263°F to ⫹2,192°F) is possible
from cold LNG liquid/vapours, to direct flame impingement with the associ-
ated radiated heat. Foam generators must be proven under LNG fire condi-
tions. The high expansion type foam shall also be shown to be effective on
LNG fires of at least 60 m2 (645 ft2) area with the chosen generator.
Equipment, such as:
• Angus Fire LNG Turbex high expansion foam generator skids and hoods;
• Angus Fire Expandol high expansion foam concentrate;
• Micropak and Zellweger flame and gas detection and;
• Ansul Dry Chemical powder,
have been shown to be robust and reliable through frequent use during the
bi-annual BP LNG Fire Schools, being subjected to live fire conditions repeatedly.
Other similar equipment that has been tried and tested in the real time live fire
scenarios of the BP LNG Fire School would be acceptable, so long as they
demonstrate the same level of active, robust and reliable fire protection that will
meet BP’s stringent requirements.
Way forward
LNG facilities should now insist that a specific foam solution application rate
(10 l/min/m2 (0.25 US/gal/ft2/min)), reduction in radiated heat (90%) within 60
seconds, and minimum depth of foam (1.2 m (4 ft)) is stated in all tender
documents to ensure a level and fair bid process. Otherwise there may be a
temptation to provide an inferior system that will not provide the level of
protection that has been proved effective, possible and practical to achieve.
This will avoid potential failures under emergency conditions.
The overriding objective of BP investing so heavily in and in carrying out the
test work at Texas A&M was to clearly define the type and applications for fire
protection that will work effectively when required on live LNG fires, spills and
vapour releases.
This test work has also defined what is not suitable and likely to put personnel
and plant safety at considerable and possibly unacceptable risks.
Work is ongoing to make formal approaches to the various international foam
standards committees to have both LNG application rates raised and the time
to achieve fire control reduced respectively.
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Appendix C: Historical foam application data
Summary of historical and latest LNG test data
Date Location Containment Appl. Rate L/min/m2 Control (90% radiant
pit area m2 (ft2) (US Gall/min) reduction unless specified)
Notes:
1. Wet sand and earth pits may significantly affect the results compared to
reinforced concrete, and may help to explain why some of the historical
tests have provided faster levels of control at lower application rates. They
have often had sloping sides which makes the foam easier to seal against
the sides as vaporizing gas is less likely to follow along the pit wall, it wants
to move vertically upwards as it is warmed by the foam. Wet sand and
earth has a water content which freezes as the LNG arrives to –164°C
(–263°F), which absorbs heat from the fire reducing the heat build up in the
pit walls before the foam arrives, reducing the attack on the foam blanket
as it is applied. The pit is still quite cool when the foam arrives and the full
intensity of the fire has therefore not been attacking the foam bubbles
during initial application.
This ‘cooling effect’ does not occur with reinforced concrete pits, requiring
a higher application rate to compensate. It was also noticeable how more
vapour escapes along the vertical concrete pit walls where the gas finds it
easier to force between foam and concrete than between the overlapping
foam bubbles in the main blanket.
2. Raised walls make harder test
From the limited test results, the deeper pit seems more difficult to control
than the shallower pit, partly because there is more surface area of
concrete to get hot in the pre-burn which breaks down the foam on arrival
and reduces its effectiveness on the fire. This requires a higher application
rate to compensate. Wind effects around the raised walls also force a
‘chimney effect’ to draw more air which fans the flames increasing the
radiant heat breakdown effect on the protective foam blanket, also
requiring a yet higher application rate to compensate.
3. Historical tests
Measurements often to 90% radiation reduction have been taken historically
to define fire control but this does not translate into a specified control time.
The recent Sandia report exemplified this in its thermal damage and
consequence considerations (Section 3.3.3) where two thermal hazard
criteria were considered, firstly reductions below 5kW/m2 (272 BTU/min/ft2)
radiation levels to prevent 2nd degree skin burns within 30 seconds while
structures might be able to withstand higher incident heat flux. Radiation
levels approaching 35kW/m2 (1900 BTU/min/ft2) will cause significant
damage to structures, equipment and machinery within ten minutes. It is
therefore important to calculate the primary objective as adequate
protection for personnel in the facility, hence rapid fire control is essential.
4. Final design application rates generally three to five times test rates
NFPA 11 Annex A8.20.3 states that ‘Application rates are generally
established by specific tests such as that in G4 where the equipment,
water supply, fuel and physical and chemical makeup of the candidate
foam concentrate are carefully controlled. While these tests can be useful
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
for comparing various foams, they often give minimum application rates
because they are conducted under ideal weather conditions with no
obstructions or barriers to fire control. The final design rates are generally
three to five times the test rates. Thus the rates can vary significantly from
one foam agent to another.’
5. BP/Angus Fire/Texas A&M tests
With these tests there has been a specific effort to mirror realistic
conditions in an LNG terminal with realistically sized reinforced concrete
vertical-sided containment pits located in a hot environment. Hence it is
not surprising that in aiming to provide faster and more effective fire
control, we have found higher application rates than those historically
recorded are essential. Whilst wind has not been a severe hindrance, it
was clearly a contributory factor along with water entering the LNG pool to
make the April 2005 45 m2 (485 ft2) pit test particularly difficult to control.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Appendix D:
LNG incidents
Today, LNG is transported and stored as safely as any other liquid fuel. Before
the storage of cryogenic liquids was fully understood, however, there was a
serious incident involving LNG in Cleveland, Ohio in 1944.
This incident virtually stopped all development of the LNG industry for around
20 years.
The space race, starting in the early 1960s, led to a much better understanding
of cryogenics and cryogenic storage with the expanded use of liquid hydrogen
(⫺252°C/⫺423°F) and liquid oxygen (⫺182°C/⫺296°F).
LNG technology has improved since the 1960s, developed partly from NASA’s
advancement.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Both the three spherical tanks and the fourth tank were fabricated from 3-1/2%
nickel steel. The first three tanks were put into service without incident. Early in
the initial filling of the fourth tank in June 1943, a crack occurred in the inner
tank bottom. This crack was repaired and the tank was cooled down slowly
and put in service. Sometime after the leak episode from tank #4, provision
was made to control potential leakage from the tank. It consisted of concrete
dikes around the spherical tanks and a dike around the cylindrical tank.
The incident
On 20 October 1944, the #4 cylindrical tank failed with a large release from the
vertical portion of the tank, followed by an apparent collapse of the tank. The
tank height was 15m (51 feet) as compared with a 2m (7 foot) high dike located
just 2.6m (8 feet 6 inches) from the outer wall of the tank. The impounding
volume inside the dike was less than 53% of the tank contents. Thus, either
dike overflow, trajectory over the top, or both allowed the LNG to escape
outside the dikes and flow freely according to the slope of the terrain.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The vapour cloud extended into the residential area and some of the LNG
entered into the sewer system.
There were numerous ignition sources within 60m (200 feet) of the tank and
ignition of the vapour cloud occurred almost immediately. The elevated legs of
the spherical tank adjacent to the cylindrical tank failed about 20 minutes after
the failure of the cylindrical tank. This resulted in a muffled sound indicating the
ignition of a large amount of gas. The two remaining spherical tanks were
damaged, but remained intact.
The result of the disaster was that most buildings within 90m (300 feet) of the
cylindrical tank were destroyed with 133 known deaths. Eighty-two dwellings
were destroyed. Significant explosions were limited to confined spaces within
the sewer systems as far as five blocks from the plant.
Causes
The five primary causes of the failure and ensuing disaster can be evaluated
against current code requirements and are presented below:
• Inappropriate material for the inner tank. The 3-1/2% nickel steel at low
temperatures. Present codes require specific material properties, testing of
both materials and weld procedures and radiographic examination.
• The impounding volume was less than the tank contents. The impoundment
requirements for LNG storage are now not less than 110% to 150% of tank
contents.
• The LNG release probably passed over the impounding dikes. Current
regulations require a dike height which will prevent an elevated release from
the tank passing over the dike.
• The vapour cloud from the release entered the adjacent residential area.
Current codes require that a plant be sited such that there is essentially no
public exposure within the calculated maximum excursion of a gas
concentration equivalent to one half of the lower flammable limit.
• There were many secondary fires and injuries due to the radiant heat of the
burning LNG. Current regulations require containment of the LNG within the
impoundment area. Siting requirements set the maximum thermal radiation
allowable assuming a pool fire of the entire tank contents.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• There may have been an outer tank bottom failure due to low temperature
embrittlement which contributed to the inner tank failure. Current codes
require protection of the outer tank from low temperatures including heating
of the outer tank floor.
In summary, had the Cleveland tank been built to current codes, it is highly
improbable that there would have been a failure. LNG tanks constructed of 9%
nickel steel have never, in their 35-year history, had a crack failure. Current
siting requirements would have prevented siting an LNG plant that would
expose the public to the vapour cloud hazard or the thermal radiation hazard.
Given current technology and regulations, a repeat of the Cleveland accident is
an unlikely event.
The incident
In February 1972, the operators, suspecting a possible leak in the tank, took
the facility out of service. Once the LNG tank was emptied, tears were found in
the mylar (polyurethane) lining. During the repairs the mylar liner was ignited.
The resulting fire caused the temperature in the tank to rise, generating enough
pressure to dislodge a 150 mm (6 inch) thick concrete roof, which then fell on
the workers in the tank, killing 40 people.
The Fire Department of the City of New York report of July 1973 determined
that the incident was clearly a construction incident and not an ‘LNG incident’.
In 1998, the New York Planning Board, while re-evaluating a moratorium on
LNG facilities, concluded the following: ‘The government regulations and
industry operating practices now in place would prevent a replication of this
incident. The fire involved combustible construction materials and a tank design
that are now prohibited. Although the exact causes may never be known, it is
certain that LNG was not involved in the incident and the surrounding areas
outside the facility were not exposed to risk’.
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1944 East Ohio Gas Cleveland NA 128 deaths NA NA Tank failure and no earthern
LNG Tank berm. Vapour cloud
formed and filled the
surrounding streets and storm
sewer system. Natural gas in
the vaporizing LNG pool
ignited.
1965 Jules Vernet Loading No Yes Yes Overfilling. Tank cover and
deck fractures.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
1979 Columbia Gas Cove Point, NA 1 killed Yes Yes An explosion occurred within
LNG Terminal Maryland 1 injured an electrical substation. LNG
seriously leaked through LNG pump
electrical penetration seal,
vaporized, passed through
200 feet (60 m) of underground
electrical conduit, and entered
the substation. Since
natural gas was never
expected in this building, there
were no gas detectors
installed in the building. The
normal arcing contacts of a
circuit breaker ignited the
natural gas-air mixture,
resulting in an explosion.
1979 Mostefa Ben- ? Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures.
Boulaied Ship
1979 Pollenger Ship ? Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Tank cover
plate fractures.
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2002 LNG ship East of the At sea No Yes No Collision with a U.S. Navy
Norman Strait of nuclear-powered attack
Lady Gibraltar submarine, the U.S.S
Oklahoma City. In ballast
condition. Ship suffered a
leakage of seawater into the
double bottom drytank area.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The design of US LNG road tankers has an inner and outer tank with a perlite
insulation between the tanks as shown below. The inner tank is typically aluminium.
Not all countries follow the same design.
The table below indicates US LNG road tanker incident events during
transportation activities.
US Highway Transportation
Incidents (1971–2005)
No LNG Spill or LNG Fire 8
LNG Leak with Fire 1
Vapour Leaks with No Fire 1
LNG Spills with No Fire 5
Fires Not Involving LNG 2
Tanker Rollover 11
Involved Fatalities (Non LNG) 1
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One witness who was located initially at a distance of 70 m (230 ft) said that the
initial flames were blue and very high (this was not confirmed by the other two
witnesses). Moments later, the tyres started to burn, producing small
explosions and black smoke. According to the witnesses, the flames then
increased in size, becoming very large (see photograph taken approximately
two minutes after the road accident).
The flames could be fed by the diesel oil from the truck tank or by the LNG (a
broken pipe connecting the tank to the safety valve?) or, more probably, by
both. The photograph shows the existence of white smoke, which could be
vapour originated from a liquid release from the safety valve.
Approximately 20 minutes after the road accident, the tank exploded. There
was a small explosion, then a strong hiss and then the large explosion.
Immediately after the explosion, the fire disappeared and a white cloud
appeared. This ignited immediately giving rise to a fireball.
The driver died, and two persons located approximately 200 m (655 ft) away
were injured (burned).
Tanker construction
The tanker, built 28 months earlier (AISI-304 stainless steel), was cylindrical,
with a diameter of 2.33 m (7.6 ft) and an approximate length of 13.5 m (45 ft). It
was made of stainless steel (4 mm (0.15”) thick at the wall and 6 mm (0.24”)
thick at the ends). It had internal baffles (each one 7.5 m3 (265 ft3)) that were
3 mm (0.12”) thick.
It was protected with an expanded polyurethane external insulation (130 mm
(5.1”) thick, self-extinguishing, and covered by a 2 mm (0.08”) aluminium plate).
It was designed for a working pressure of 7 bar (101.5 psi) , the hydraulic test
being performed at 9.1 bar (132 psi) . With a volume of 56 m3 (1,980 ft3), 85%
of it was filled with liquid (this implies approximately 47.6 m3 (1,680 ft3) of liquid
and 8.4 m3 (296 ft3) of gas). The temperature of the LNG was slightly
below ⫺160° C (–265°F) and the pressure slightly below 1 bar (14.5 psi). There
were five safety valves: two 1 in. (25 mm) valves set to 7 bar (101.5 psi) and
one 3/4 in. (19 mm) valve set to 9 bar (131 psi), located at the top of the vessel
(in the vapour zone); and two 1/2 in. (13 mm) valves set to 10 (145 psi) bar
located on the unloading pipes (under the vessel); all these valves were
connected to a discharge pipe located at the top of the vessel. There was no
manhole.
The truck had a 0.5 m3 (18 ft3) aluminium diesel oil tank.
The existence of a first explosion, then a strong hiss and afterwards the large
explosion, seems to confirm the two-step mode for the failure of the vessel–the
formation of an initiating crack by thermal stress at a very hot location of the
wall, arrested in a cooler and stronger zone (in the vapour zone, metal wall
temperatures are extremely variable under the action of fire), followed by a
discharge (probably two-phase flow); then, the restart of the crack due to
further thermal stress at the crack tip originated by the cooling effect of the
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The road tanker two minutes after the road accident and approximately 18 minutes
before the explosion. The car was left by one of the witnesses who fled
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
two-phase release through the crack, leading to the catastrophic failure of the
vessel.
The effects of the road tanker explosion were overpressure, thermal radiation
and missile ejection.
E.3 Wales, UK
During a journey in Wales, a fully loaded LNG road tanker rolled over at a
roundabout near Aberystwyth, damaging street lighting before coming to rest
on its side. The company concerned responded and were on scene after 45
minutes. The complete LNG load was safely transferred without any releases.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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• Agree when the hard arms and ESD cable can be brought aboard the LNG
carrier and connected.
• Agree to primary and secondary communication means and verify that they
are working.
• Method, if available, of providing the LNG carrier information concerning the
mooring lines.
• Inerting and leak testing vapour and liquid hard arms.
• ESD tests from LNG carrier and the terminal.
• Opening custody transfer for the LNG carrier.
• Opening of the LNG carriers vapour valve.
• Cooling down of liquid hard arms and LNG carrier liquid arms.
• Rating up the LNG transfer and agreeing maximum rate of transfer.
• Rating up the vapour return between the LNG carrier and terminal.
• Periodic communication of the LNG transfer rate, tank pressures and other
agreed information.
• Notice of rating down LNG transfer and the securing of transfer pumps until
transfer is completed.
• Draining and purging of LNG hard arms.
• Closing custody transfer of the LNG carrier.
• Purging of the vapour hard arm.
• Disconnecting of LNG and vapour hard arms.
• Installing blinds on LNG carrier and terminal LNG and vapour connections.
• Manoeuvring of LNG and vapour hard arms to the stowed position.
• Unmooring of the LNG carrier.
In addition to the above, the LNG carrier and terminal will agree to actions to
take in the case of an emergency or if conditions threaten the safe transfer of
LNG.
A ship/shore safety checklist will also be completed during the pre-loading or
discharge meeting. Where the terminal is unable to provide a checklist that
meets the Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operator (SIGTTO)
standards the Ship/Shore safety checklist in Appendix G should be used.
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Appendix G:
LNG ship/shore safety
checklist
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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LNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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Declaration
We the undersigned, have checked, where appropriate jointly, the items on this
checklist and have satisfied ourselves that the entries we have made are
correct to the best of our knowledge.
We have also made arrangements to carry out the repetitive checks as necessary
and agreed that those items with the letter ‘R’ in the column ‘Code’ should be
re-checked at intervals not exceeding . . .. . .. . . hours (not to exceed 6 hours).
Revalidation
We have conducted a routine inspection and can confirm the repeat questions
in the checklist continue to be answered in the affirmative.
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144
TIME
1. Is the ship securely moored?
2. Are emergency towing off wires correctly positioned?
3. Is there safe access between ship and shore?
4. Is the ship ready to move under its’ own power?
5. Is there an effective deck watch in attendance on
board and adequate supervision on the terminal
and on the ship?
6. Is the agreed ship/shore communication system
operative?
7. Have the procedures for cargo, bunker and ballast
handling been agreed?
8. Are scuppers effectively plugged and drip trays in
position, both onboard and ashore?
9. Are all external doors and ports in the accommodation
closed?