Labor Law Nitura vs. Ecc

TOPIC: Compensable Injury or Sickness in Employees Compensation Law
PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:
1. As an official agent charged by the law to implement social justice
guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability
especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work
connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and
substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of
the New Labor Code which states that “all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.” The policy then is
to extend the applicability of the decree (P.D. 626) to as many employees
who can avail of the benefits thereunder, which includes protection to
employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours
and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the work
premises.
2. To be entitled to disability or death benefits under the Employees

Compensation Law, there must be:
1. Loss on impairment of a physical or mental function which has
resulted from injury arising out of or in the course of employment, or from
any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC.
2. Illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk
contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Hatta Hataie VS.
ECC, 1991 195 SCRA 580, 7583 citing Art. 167 (n), (K) of the LC)
3. Grounds for Compensability

For the injury and the resulting disability on death to be compensable,
the injury must be the result of an employment accident, satisfying all of the
ff. conditions:
(1.) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
require him to be;
(2.) The employee must have been performing his official functions;
(3.) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer (NITURA VS. ECC)
CASE TITLE: NITURA VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
CITATION: GR. NO. 89217 201 SCRA 278
DATE: September 4, 1991
FACTS:
The deceased Pfc. Regino S.Nitura, 681349 P.A., started his military service
on October 5, 1978 when he was called for military training in the Philippine
Army. At the time of his death on March 3, 1986, he was assigned to the “D”
Coy 44th Inf. Bn., 1st Inf., (TABAK) Division, stationed at Basagan,
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Barangay San

Jose, Dipolog City, which is more or less one (1) kilometer from the
Command Post of his Company, to check on several personnel of the
Command who were then attending a dance party. This instruction was
attested to by his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto M. Deus, 0-90573 Inf.,
(GSC) PA, in his affidavit dated July 8, 1986 (Annex “A” of the Petition,
Rollo, p. 15). On his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from
a hanging wooden bridge connecting Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City and
Barangay Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, his head hitting the
stony portion of the ground. His death certificate (Annex “B” of the Petition,
Rollo, p. 16) shows that he died of “cardio-respiratory arrest, shock,
traumatic due to hemorrhage, intracranial due to severe concussion of the
brain due to accidentalfall.”
Herein petitioner Juanita Nitura filed a death claim for compensation benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. In a letter
dated October 27, 1986 signed by Oscar R. Marcelino, Manager, Employees’
Compensation Department (Annex “C” of the Petition, Rollo, p.17),
petitioner’s claim was denied on the ground that the condition for
compensability, that the injury and the resulting disability or death must be
the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,
has not been satisfied. Her request for reconsideration was likewise denied
on the ground that her son was not at his place of work nor performing his
official function as a PA soldier when the accident occurred (Annex “D” of the
Petition, Rollo,p.18).
On July 15, 1987, petitioner’s claim was elevated to the respondent ECC for
review and docketed as ECC Case No. 3470.
As aforementioned, respondent ECC affirmed the denial of petitioner’s claim
by the GSIS. Respondent ECC reasoned out that:
“The deceased was not at his place of work nor was he performing his
official function as member of the Philippine Army when the incident
occurred. He was, as appellant admits, coming from a dance party. Despite
appellant’s contention, recreation is no longer an employee’s duty nor is it
connected to the performance of an employee’s official function. For to rule
otherwise, would negate Rule III, Section 1.
Furthermore, even assuming that attending a dance party is still a
work-connected activity, we believe that the deceased acted with notorious
negligence, for although he was already intoxicated, he still proceeded to
attend the dance at a nearby barrio with full knowledge that it would be
dangerous to cross the hanging bridge in the dark.” (ECC Decision, Rollo, p.
23). Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura is compensable pursuant
to the applicable statutes and regulations.
Held:
(1.) In resolving this issue in a similar case, this Court ruled that the
Employees’ Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to
afford relief to the working men and women in our society. While the
presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New
Labor Code, it is significant that the liberalities of the law in general in favor
of the working man still subsists. As an official agent charged by law to
implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the
ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts
for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation
gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor
of labor.” The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (P.D.
626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder, which
includes protection to employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or
after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after
leaving the work premises (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 574-575 [1990]).
Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
provides that:
“Section 1. Grounds-(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
require him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions;
and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order of the employer.”
(2.) The concept of a “work place” referred to cannot always be literally

applied to a soldier in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or
a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed
office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed (Hinoguin v. ECC,
172 SCRA 350 [1990]). In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura’s station was at
Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site
of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been
directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said
directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two
places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have
secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking
from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer.
(3.) As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official

function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active
duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to
military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and
to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week,
except, of course, when he is on vocation leave status. Thus, a soldier
should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly
and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on
an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leaves may, it must be
remembered, be preterminated by superior orders (Hinoguin v. ECC,
supra.). In the instant case, the deceased was neither on vacation leave nor
on an overnight pass when the incident occurred. In fact, he was directed by
his superior to check on several personnel of the command then attending
the dance party, as attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence, since
Pfc. Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did not effectively cease
performing “official functions”. More than that, it was correctly pointed out
by petitioner Juanita Nitura that the contention of the GSIS and the ECC that
the deceased did not sustain the injury while performing the instructions of
his superior would put to naught an actual fact-finding and evaluation
undertaken by the military that the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura was in line
of duty.
(4.) With regard respondents’ contention that the claim is precluded by the
fact that the deceased was drunk and acted with notorious negligence, it has
been held that even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating
liquor it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to
show that said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person
may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor
and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus,
intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from following his
occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although
intoxication may be a contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown that
the intoxication was the proximate cause of death or injury and the burden
of proof lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense (Vda. De Yohanan
v. Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348 [1977]). While it may be admitted that
the deceased drank intoxicating liquor at the dance party, respondents ECC
and GSIS have not established that the state of drunkenness of the
deceased is the proximate cause of his death. On the other hand, notorious
negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple
negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the
employee to disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules,
orders, and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious negligence,
if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life (Luzon
Stevedoring Corp. vs. WCC, 105 SCRA 675 (1981), reiterating Paez vs.
WCC, 7 SCRA 588 (1963). As stressed by the petitioner, it was not shown
that the deceased had any intention to end his life. Crossing a hanging
bridge may seem dangerous to an ordinary man but the deceased was a
soldier who had been trained and prepared for this kind of work. As
explained by his mother, petitioner herein, the deceased had seen the worse
and was not afraid or intimidated by the fact that he had to pass through a
hanging bridge. Facing a danger had become second nature to him (Rollo,
pp.98-99).
Premises considered, the petition is granted, the decision of respondent ECC
dated May 24, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner and
the illegitimate minor children of the deceased, namely Regina and Rogian,
are AWARDED the full benefits pursuant to the provisions of PD No. 626, as
amended. SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Petition granted. Decision reversed and set aside.

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TOPIC: Compensable Injury or Sickness in Employees Compensation Law

2. To be entitled to disability or death benefits under the Employees

3. Grounds for Compensability

In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Barangay San

(2.) The concept of a “work place” referred to cannot always be literally

(3.) As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Petition granted. Decision reversed and set aside.

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