System Reset Use With Caution
System Reset Use With Caution
System Reset Use With Caution
with Caution
A system reset is not always the quick fix that it may seem.
Performing an inappropriate manual system reset in flight can
seriously impair the safety of the flight. Multiple system resets
on the ground without performing the necessary
troubleshooting actions can also have serious
consequences.
This article addresses when system resets are applicable
and how to perform them correctly.
At engine start of an A320, the BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT ECAM alert
triggered. The flight crew set the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch to OFF and then
back to ON (fig.1). This action cleared the alert.
The BRAKES A/SKID N/WS FAULT ECAM alert triggered during the takeoff roll
prior to the inhibition phase. After the aircraft became airborne, the flight crew
cleared the alert by setting the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch to OFF then ON.
The BRAKES A/SKID N/WS FAULT ECAM alert triggered again on approach.
The flight crew set the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch to OFF and ON for a third
time and this action cleared the alert.
(fig.1) A/SKID & N/W
Main landing gear tires burst at landing STRG switch
The flight crew noticed unusual braking behavior immediately after touchdown.
They applied full reverse thrust and manual braking. The aircraft came to a stop,
but the flight crew was unable to begin taxiing. The four main landing gear tires
had burst during landing.
Event Analysis
Similar faults were observed during the previous flights
There were seven occurrences of BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT and two
occurrences of BRAKES A/SKID N/WS FAULT recorded on this aircraft over the
two months prior to the event. System resets and testing the BSCU were the only
maintenance actions carried out each time.
There is no reset procedure associated with BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT and
BRAKES A/SKID N/WS FAULT ECAM alerts in the A320 QRH. The use of the
A/SKID & N/W STRG switch to reset the braking and steering functions in flight is
mentioned in the System Reset table of the QRH, but it is only authorized with
the BRAKES SYS 1(2) FAULT and BRAKES BSCU CH 1(2) FAULT ECAM
alerts. The unauthorized resets that the flight crew performed during the flight hid
the deteriorating condition of the braking system.
A dual tachometer failure was at the origin of the delay in the braking system
activation. The unauthorized in-flight reset prevented the BSCU from detecting
the failure of the tachometers and this led to the BSCU considering that 0 kt was
the actual wheel speed. After 15 seconds, the braking function was recovered
with a default deceleration speed. At the same time, the BSCU was unable to
compute the anti-skid order and sent full hydraulic pressure to the brakes and
caused the four tires to burst.
Maintenance resets must only be performed when requested by a specific task in the A220 Fault
Isolation Manual or in the Aircraft Maintenance Publication (AMP).
*EICAS: Engine-Indication and Crew-Alerting System on A220 is the equivalent of the ECAM on other
Airbus aircraft.
(fig.4) Example of a
SEC 1 FAULT ECAM
alert on A330 aircraft
Before the review of the status of the aircraft on the STATUS page, if the PF
considers that it is necessary to perform a system reset to recover the operation
of the affected system, it is the responsibility of the flight crew to first check if
such reset is authorized in the System Reset table of the FCOM/QRH.
If there is no reset procedure available in the System Reset table of the FCOM/QRH associated with
the malfunction or ECAM alert encountered, the flight crew must not attempt a reset.
For A320 family aircraft, on the ground only, the flight crew can still perform a reset that is not listed in the
A320 System Reset table as described in Case 3 below.
The System Reset table lists the specific conditions necessary for the reset
procedure
The reset procedures are the result of in-depth analysis to define the authorized
resets and their associated conditions, such as the maximum number of resets
possible, if they are authorized on the ground only, or also in flight. These
conditions must be respected.
A reset procedure must be performed in “read and do” mode. The flight crew
must not apply the system reset procedure from memory and they must always
follow the relevant procedure (ECAM/OEB/QRH/FCOM), or refer to the System
Reset table in the QRH/FCOM.
If the affected system is listed in the QRH System Reset table, the associated
reset procedure and conditions must be applied, but only for the corresponding
ECAM alerts or system malfunctions listed in the reset table. For other ECAM
alerts or malfunctions of the affected system not specifically listed in the System
Reset table, a system reset is not authorized.
The affected system is not listed in the QRH System Reset table
If the affected system is not listed in the QRH System Reset table, the system
can be reset on the ground only by applying the general guidelines provided in
the General part of the System Reset section of the A320 QRH.
As for any reset, a crosscheck must be done when using a guarded cockpit
control, a C/B, or a reset button and the reset must be reported in the aircraft
technical logbook.
(fig.6) Flow
diagram for flight
crew system
resets on A320
family aircraft on
the ground
Maintenance personnel can perform system resets only in the two cases listed
below.
Performing a system reset on the ground must always be part of a troubleshooting procedure.
Performing unauthorized “quick fix” resets on the ground to dispatch an aircraft can affect the conditions of
the next flights. The ECAM alert may be cleared for dispatch, but the underlying issue is not fixed and this
can hide a deteriorating condition in the system.
As already described in Case 3 for flight crew resets, A320 family aircraft
operations can be affected by electrical transients at power-on. That is why it is
allowable to perform resets on A320 family aircraft that are not part of a
dedicated TSM task.
The A320 TSM contains a list of authorized resets with their associated
conditions in the “System Reset Guidelines” task of the ATA 24 chapter. These
authorized resets are the same as the authorized resets on the ground in the
System Reset table of the A320 QRH.
If the fault is not obviously due to electrical transients and is present in the fault
history (repeated intermittent failure), then the application of the appropriate TSM
procedure(s) is required.
Repetitive failures can occur despite maintenance actions, but they may not
necessarily reappear over consecutive flights. Operators shall have a dedicated
management system for repetitive failures to comply with continued airworthiness
regulations.
Capt. Vincent SIBELLE Maintenance system resets are only performed in accordance with
Training and Flight specific TSM/AFI tasks. Troubleshooting can start with resets but
Operations Pilot Instructor should not end there. The appropriate troubleshooting actions or at
Flight Operations Support
and Training Standards least recording actions should always follow.
With thanks to For A320 aircraft only, the same on-ground resets from the System
Denis CADOUX and
Ian GOODWIN from
Reset table of the QRH are available in the A320 TSM and can be
Product Safety, used to manage intermittent faults and ease the aircraft dispatch. In
Fabien ARNE and this case, it is possible to perform system resets that are not
Laurent COUTURET from
Braking and Steering
specifically listed in the TSM.
System Engineering
Support, Marc LE-LOUER Manual system resets performed by flight crew or maintenance
from A300/A310 Flight
Operations Support and personnel are not a way to fix repetitive faults. Multiple and
Capt. Xavier LESCEU from unreported resets can hide degraded system conditions. The fault
Airbus Canada. could reappear later and have significant consequences during a
flight. An efficient system for reporting and managing system resets
is crucial for monitoring the health of all aircraft systems, which is
key to maintaining safe aircraft operations.
20192534. Reference: Safety first is published by the Product Safety department. It is a source
X00D16031905. of specialist safety information for the use of airlines who fly and
maintain Airbus aircraft. It is also distributed to other selected
Photos by Airbus.
organizations and is available on digital devices.
© Airbus S.A.S. 2021 – All rights
reserved. Proprietary Material for publication is obtained from multiple sources and includes
documents. selected information from the Airbus Flight Safety Confidential Reporting
By taking delivery of this Brochure System, incident and accident investigation reports, system tests and
(hereafter “Brochure”), you accept fight tests. Material is also obtained from sources within the airline
on behalf of your company to industry, studies and reports from government agencies and other
comply with the following
aviation sources.
guidelines:
● No other intellectual All articles in Safety first are presented for information only and are not
property rights are granted by the intended to replace ICAO guidelines, standards or recommended
delivery of this Brochure than the practices, operator-mandated requirements or technical orders. The
right to read it, for the sole
purpose of information.
contents do not supersede any requirements mandated by the State of
Registry of the Operator’s aircraft or supersede or amend any Airbus
● This Brochure and its type-specific AFM, AMM, FCOM, MMEL documentation or any other
content shall not be modified and
its illustrations and photos shall
approved documentation.
not be reproduced without prior
written consent of Airbus. Articles may be reprinted without permission, except where copyright
source is indicated, but with acknowledgement to Airbus. Where Airbus
● This Brochure and the
is not the author, the contents of the article do not necessarily reflect the
materials it contains shall not, in
whole or in part, be sold, rented, or views of Airbus, nor do they indicate Company policy.
licensed to any third party subject
to payment. Contributions, comments and feedback are welcome. Enquiries related
to this publication should be addressed to:
This Brochure contains sensitive
information that is correct at the
time of going to press.
Airbus - Product Safety department (W)
1, rond point Maurice Bellonte
This information involves a 31707 Blagnac Cedex - France
number of factors that could
change over time, effecting the
[email protected]
true public representation. Airbus
assumes no obligation to update Visit us at safetyfirst.airbus.com or install the Safety first app:
any information contained in this
document or with respect to the
information described herein.