Kaduna Nzeogwu Victim of Unknown Conspir
Kaduna Nzeogwu Victim of Unknown Conspir
Kaduna Nzeogwu Victim of Unknown Conspir
D’ETAT
By Abdulrazaq O. Hamzat
[email protected]
1.0 INTRODUCTION
General Benjamin Adekunle, the civil war time hero popularly called black scorpion passed
away few days ago and argument over the civil war as well as the military coup that led to the
war raised its ugly head again.
The social media is now littered with e-argument or e-war as some people describe it by
many young people who where not yet human when the civil war occurred and also by some
older people who mostly speak from their sentimental point of view.
As a result of sentiments adopted by elders in narrating the civil war story, many young
Nigerians who have no means of confirming what they were told by these elders or story
writers had hold unto such fallacies and continue to promote the sentiments without
questioning its logicality from basic human reasoning..
Some had even gone beyond promoting the sentiment to outright falsehood, concocting their
own false tale to back up myth in justification of any view they hold or promote in public
discuss regarding the civil war or the 1966 coup..
In view of the heat generated by such argument, I present this piece, ‘’victim of unknown
conspiracy’’ to dissect the first coup détat in Nigeria. It is an effort to gather facts based on
various narrations by the different writers.
2.0 BACKGROUND
In January 1966, a bloody coup took place in Nigeria which claimed the lives of several
important personalities.
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu is the visible leader of the bloody coup which led to the death
of several Nigerian leaders particularly in the northern Nigeria.
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-
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Nzeogwu and others who were mostly from the eastern part of the country planned and
executed the coup which led to unrest in the country. The perceived tribal consideration of
the new military head of state subsequently led to a counter coup and also the Nigerian civil
war popularly known as the Biafran war.
Late literal icon, Prof Chinua Achebe in his book titled, ‘’there was a country’’ wrote about
the Biafran war. The book generated a lot of controversy with the perceived sentimental
account narrated by the revered writer, bringing back the tensed atmosphere of the civil war
itself. Many prominent Nigerian countered the narration of the late writer and termed his
book, igbo narration which contained sentiments rather than truth.
Another book, ‘’Half of a yellow sun’’ written by Chimamanda Ngozie Adichie was another
prominent narration of the civil war story from an igbo perspective which most Nigerian
regarded as a sectional account of the reality of war. Both books depict igbo as victims,
which many Nigerians feel otherwise, accusing the writers of false narration.
According to the history as written on Wikipedia, In the early hours of January 15, 1966,
Nzeogwu led a group of officers on a supposedly military exercise and led them to attack the
official residence of the premier of the north Sir. Amadu Bello in a bloody Coup that saw the
murder of the Premiers of Northern and Western Nigeria. The Prime Minister, a federal
minister, two regional premiers, and top Army officers from the Northern and Western
regions of the nation were brutally murdered. The premier of the Eastern region (where most
of the plotters came from), the Igbo President of federation and the Igbo Army Chief were the
only notable individuals spared . The coup failed, and he was later arrestedin Lagoson
January 18, 1966.
Reliable account have it that, Nzeogwu could not have been responsible for sparing the
Eastern politicians during the coup because he was in charge of the North, while fellow
coupists who were equally from the east were in charge of the Eastern region.
The coup failed, as one of those marked for execution in the coupist plan ( G.O.C. Ironsi)
seems to be awaren of the plot and was prepared to suppress it after a partial execution.
Nzeogwu eventually surrender to Ironsi, but instead of restoring order to the appropriate
political leadership, Ironsi at gun point forced the deputies of the civilian murdered leaders to
hand over power to him which they did. He became the head of state and made some
appointments.
Nzeogwu and other plotters were arrested and transferred to prison In eastern part of the
country where they hail.
The leniency with which the new leader, General Aguiyi Ironsi (also an Igbo), handled the
coup plotters led to the dissatisfaction of northern officers and subsequently resulted in a
counter- coup on the 29th of July, 1966.
In Nzeogwu’s wikipedia profile, it was reported this way, the coup d'état itself failed, as
Ironsi rallied the military against the plotters. But Ironsi did not bring the failed plotters to
trial as requested by military law and as advised by most northern and western officers. Ironsi
then instituted military rule by subverting the constitutional succession and alleging that the
democratic institutions had failed and that, while he was defending them, they clearly needed
revision and clean-up before reversion back to democratic rule.
It was established according Wikipedia that, Nzeogwu was initially detained at the Kirikiri
maximumsecurity prisonin Lagos, before later being transferred to the East. He and other
January 15 mutinydetainees were subsequently released from jail by governor of the eastern
region Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu (also an Igbo) at the end of the first quarter of 1967, following
demonstrations by Igbo students of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
On May 30, 1967, The nation of Biafradeclared its independence from Nigeria. Nzeogwu was
released from close observation, and asked to go into battle on the side of the Biafrans.
Some say it was a poorly executed national exercise,while others see it as a grand plot by a
section of the country to seize power, but in the opinion of this writer, the coup seems to be
carried out by two (2) ideological blocs which is unknown to some of the plotters,
particularly Nzeogwu who was known as the visible leader of the coup.
The first ideological bloc include those who genuinely believe in the coup as a national
exercise and are patriotic enough to want to lay their lives for the prosperity of the country.
These group consist of Nzeogwu and few others.
The second ideological bloc was those coupists that were tribalistic in motive, but displayed
patriotic outlook to convince others of their dedication to the national exercise. These group
is represented primarily by those who were suppose to execute the coup in the eastern part of
the country and probably some from among those who are to execute it in the western region.
According to revelations that emerge from police investigation, it was revealed that the coup
was initiated by the second ideological bloc before Nzeogwu was recruited, the coup
planning started in August 1965, Nzeogwu was said be recruited in September that year.
In August 1965, three officers, Major Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and Captain Oji who were
already dissatisfied with political developments in the Federation and the impact of these
developments on the Army, held series of discussions between them about the matter and set
about the task of searching for other officers who held views similar to their own and who
could, eventually, be trusted to join them in the enterprise of staging a military coup d'etat.
By early November, the recruiting activities of the group were completed and an inner circle
of conspirators emerged.
We must note here that, the three (3) officers, Major Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and Captain Oji
who initiated the coup were just the actual executors of the coup, there might be shadow
parties involved that may have given these young officers the motivation and secret backing
to go ahead with the coup before they recruited other members including Nzeogwu.
It is a well known fact that Nzeogwu resent the way the country was being governed at that
time.This can be seen in his speech after he successfully executed the plan in northern
Nigeria.
According to Nzeogwu, “Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in
high and low places that seek and take bribes and demand 10 percent (from contracts), those
that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as
minister or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for
nothing before international circle, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian
political calendar back by their words and deeds.”— Kaduna Nzeogwu, January 1966
He never hides his resentment. It was also a well known fact that the only person capable of
successfully eliminating the Northern leaders was a man like Nzeogwu who was well
respected in the north despite being from the east.
Knowing how much he was ready to get rid of all enemies of his beloved nation, it was easy
to get him on board.
Max stated that, Nzeogwu’s boss at the Nigerian Military Training College, Colonel Ralph
Shodeinde, had in the past reported Nzeogwu to Army Headquarters for allegedly
disseminating anti-government rhetoric to junior officers. Shodeinde’s report claimed that
Nzeogwu had been attempting to poison junior officers’ minds against the Government (see
Obasanjo: “An intimate portrait of Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu”). Nzeogwu was so
disillusioned with the farcical vote rigging that he exclaimed, “It is impossible to vote out a
Nigerian minister.”
Explaining how Nzeogwu recruited his team to execute the plot, Nigeria’s former Defence
Secretary, Lt-Gen Theophilus Danjuma who gave insight into how Nzeogwu’s coup
recruitment policy worked said. “Nzeogwu was a very charming person. He had his method,
he would start by criticizing government and then watch your reaction…..if you joined him in
criticising the government…..then he would say well, we would (sic) fix them one day.
That’s how he recruited.” Danjuma said.
Max Siollun had stated that, Some claim that Nzeogwu’s participation in the January 1966
coup was part of a grand Igbo agenda to “dominate” the country. He argues that this
argument overlooks the fact that Nzeogwu was an Igbo in name only. Nzeogwu was born in
the Northern Region’s capital of Kaduna to Igbo immigrant parents from the Mid-West
Region. Such was his family’s affinity to the city of Nzeogwu’s birth that they and his
military colleagues called him “Kaduna.” When not in his army uniform he wore northern
mufti and frequently referred to himself as “a northerner.” Nzeogwu spoke fluent Hausa (the
lingua franca of the Northern Region) “like a native” (Forsyth). In fact Nzeogwu’s command
of Hausa was better than his command of Igbo. It is a mark of Nzeogwu’s popularity that
when his body was discovered during the Nigeria-Biafra War by federal soldiers, they took
his body away for burial with full military honours (but not before his eyes had been plucked
out). said Max.
In my opinion, the above argument by Max even gave further reason why Nzeogwu was
recruited.
For such a coup to take place succesfully, there must be competent hand in all region to
adequately take care of the identified enemies, but there was no way the initial plotters could
convince nothern officcers close enough to the targets to join the plot. They needed someone
with credibility enough to gain confidence of junior officers in the north, someone who could
convince them to join in the implementation of the perceived national exercise. May be, just
may be, Nzeogwu was recruited to fill such a strategic vacuum.
Here, we must understand the nature of the igbo reasoning even in the present day Nigeria.
According to an igbo associate of mine, Henry Chukwuma who felt frustrated about his effort
to be an igbo as well as Nigerian faithfully, he stated that, ‘’tribalism for our people (igbo) is
the order, while nationalism is an exception. Chukwuma noted that, our people know we are
tribal and they are proud about it, in fact, we igbo’s are exposed to ethnocentric ideas from
childhood. Chukwuma said.
He further added that, any igbo man or woman not egocentric in nature is considered a
bastard, adding that, any nationalistic igbo person may have been brought up outside igbo
land or at least, must have traveled far and wide to balance his or her reasoning. If such
individual actually grows up and live in the east, they are very rare and should be considered
as special igbo, adding that, it would be difficult for such individuals to rally much support
for any political engagement.
Chukwuma further added that,nationalistic igbo person is likely not to be trusted by most
people in the east because they see them as likely saboteur against the igbo interest. To our
people, it is either you are for igbo or against it. Henry said.
Chukwuma didn’t stop there, he went further to say, we igbo are not just tribal to other tribes
like Yoruba,Hausa and the rest, even among ourselves (igbo), our people are discriminatory
against other igbo whom they consider as less igbo.
For example, people from Anambra are considered as the original igbo, while people from
Imo are considered less igbo. Our Anambra igbo surely discriminate against Imo igbo. In any
political or social engagement, hardly will Anambra igbo support Imo or others considered as
less igbo to take leadership Chukwuma concluded.
From the above, it could be said that, to some igbo’s, igbo superiority against other tribes is a
right that must be upheld by all igbo. If you consider other tribes like you consider igbo, you
are likely to be regarded as untrusted or a likely saboteour to igbo interest. That may be the
reason why Nzeogwu was unaware of the motives of other coupists from unset. He Nzeogwu
later confessed, ‘’it was tribal in the south’’.
Nzeeogwu was known to be nationalistic in view, and someone who may never consider
participating in any sectional agenda.
Recently, in an open electioneering campaign, an igbo man (Chris Ngige) who is merely in a
political party other than known igbo dominated party (apga) was publicly declared an enemy
by some igbo leadership in Anambra state. He was accused of contesting the election under
Awolowo, Muslim or hausa party (APC). To them, it is a crime to belong to none igbo
controlled party.
Another example can be seen in the Imo state Governor, Rochas Okorocha who is a
nationalistic leader and a member of none igbo dominated party. He his mostly condemned
by some igbo’s for what they described as anti igbo (whatever that means).
Although, not all igbo subscribe to such reasoning, but there are considerable number that
does and such people stop at nothing to advance such interest through politics.
So, Nzeogwu may not have known about the plan of the eastern officers to betray the national
exercise for sectional loyalty, a national exercise which may likely not exist in the heart of
eastern coupist in the first place.
It may be deduced here sthat, while Nzeogwu is an igbo man by nature, the fact that he has
different ideology from most igbo’s cast him aside as a mere tool in the hand of the other
plotters to achieve an earlier designed agenda before his recruitment. ex-Senate President
Nwafor Orizu told Alhaji Shehu Shagari that Major Nzeogwu was "an unknown entity among
the Ibos (sic) in the Eastern region."
Major Abubakar A. Atofarati: CSC 1992 stated that, the aim of the coup is as follows:
To establish a strong, unified and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife.
The outcome of the half-hearted and ill-fated coup was a change of political balance in the
country.
Here, it can be argued that, while Nzeogwu’s interest and desire of officers in the first bloc lie
in the aim, the interest and desire of the second bloc lie in the outcome as it was said, nothing
ever happens in world politics without people planing it.
Many have also faulted how Aguinyi Ironsi took over power from the civilian administration.
It was expected that, after the coup plotters were apprehended, power was suppose to be
restored back to the civilian administration, but ironsi who seems to have other ideas took it
for himself.
While Ironsi said the civilian administration voluntarily handed power to him to restore order,
that view was countered by various narrations of those who took active part in the process.
According to Nowa Omoigui, In July 2000, at a public book launching ceremony in Nigeria,
Chief Richard Akinjide stated:
"Talking on the first coup, when Balewa got missing, we knew Okotie-Eboh had been held,
we knew Akintola had been killed. We, the members of the Balewa cabinet started meeting.
But how can you have a cabinet meeting without the Prime Minister acting or Prime Minister
presiding. So, unanimously, we nominated acting Prime Minister amongst us. Then we
continued holding our meetings. Then we got a message that we should all assemble at the
Cabinet office. All the Ministers were requested by the G.O.C. of the Nigerian Army,
General Ironsi to assemble. What was amazing at that time was that Ironsi was going all over
Lagos unarmed. We assembled there. Having nominated ZANA Diphcharima as our acting
Prime Minister in the absence of the Prime Minister, whose whereabout we didn't know, we
approached the acting President, Nwafor Orizu (igbo) to swear him in because he cannot
legitimately act as the Prime Minister except he is sworn- in. Nwafor Orizu refused. He said
he needed to contact Zik who was then in West Indies.
Under the law, that is, the Interpretation Act, as acting President, Nwazor Orizu had all the
powers of the President. The GOC said he wanted to see all the cabinet ministers. And so we
assembled at the cabinet office.
Well, I have read in many books saying that we handed over to the military. We did not hand-
over.
Ironsi told us that "you either hand over as gentlemen or you hand-over by force". Those
were his words. Is that voluntary hand-over? So we did not hand-over. We wanted an Acting
Prime Minister to be in place but Ironsi forced us, and I use the word force advisedly, to
handover to him. He was controlling the soldiers.
The acting President, Nwafor Orizu, who did not cooperate with us, cooperated with the
GOC. Dr. Orizu and the GOC prepared speeches which Nwafor Orizu broadcast handing
over the government of the country to the army. I here state again categorically as a member
of that cabinet that we did not hand-over voluntarily. It was a coup. " Akinjide said.
Corroborating Akinjide's account, Shehu Shagari in his Book "Beckoned to Serve" wrote,
"…....….At about 7.00 am, I returned to Dipcharima's residence to meet with some NPC
ministers who had gathered there. Dipcharima was then the most senior NPC minister
available. We received the latest reports on the situation, first from Alhaji Maitama Sule,
Minister of Mines and Power, who had visited the PM's residence by bicycle! We then heard
from Alhaji Ibrahim Tako Galadima, the acting Minister of Defence, who had brought along
with him Chief Fani-Kayode.
Chief Fani-Kayode said he had been fetched from Ibadan early that morning by rebels and
locked up at the Federal Guard Officers Mess in Dodan Barracks, where the mutineers
initially made their headquarters. Disguised in army uniform, loyal troops handed him over to
Alhaji Galadima, who had called in at the barracks, which was a stone's throw of his
residence…………….The acting Minister of Defence assured us that Major-General Ironsi
was doing his best to arrest the situation.
Maitama Sule and I were separately detailed to explore with our absent NPC and NCNC
colleagues the possibility of naming someone to stand in for the PM. I was consulting with
NCNC ministers at Dr. Mbadiwe's residence when we heard that the Northern and Western
premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola respectively, had been assassinated. Hence I
rushed back to Dipcharima's residence, where I found my colleagues in a state of shock and
desperation.
However, we decided to recognize Dipcharima, a Kanuri from Bornu, as our interim leader;
and to ask the acting President, Dr. Orizu (President Azikiwe was away on leave), to appoint
Dipcharima acting Prime Minister. We also summoned Major General Ironsi and gave him
full authority to use every force at his disposal to suppress the rebellion. He moved his
headquarters temporarily to the police headquarters at moloney street to facilitate easy
communication with army units in the regions.
While at Dipcharima's residence, we contacted the British High Commission and requested
for military assistancein the event that our loyal troops should require any. The response was
positive, but the British insisted that the request must be written by the PM; or, in his
absence, by a properly appointed deputy. We, therefore, drove to the residence of Dr. Orizu,
and requested him to appoint Dipcharima acting prime minister. Dr. Orizu requested to see
our NCNC colleagues to confirm whether they supported our proposition, and they joined us
soon afterwards. They had apparently been caucusing at Dr. Mbadiwe's residence. He
(Mbadiwe) was their choice of acting Prime Minister. This was naturally unacceptable to us
since the NPC was the major governing party.
While we were at Orizu's residence, Major-General Ironsi, who had seemingly secured
Lagos, came in with some armed escorts. He requested for a tete-a-tete with Orizu. The two
had a 40 minutes discussion in another room, while we waited anxiously in the sitting room,
with the armed soldiers standing and staring at us. When Major-General Ironsi finally
emerged, he talked to Dipcharima sotto voce; and then drove off with his troops. Dr. Orizu
then joined us, regretted his inability in the circumstances to oblige our request. He suggested
we all return to our homes and wait until we were required. All efforts to get any clarification
failed, and we left in utter desperation.
I was about to break the Ramadan fast on Sunday 16th January, when all ministers were
asked to report to the Cabinet Office at 6.30 pm. The whole premises was surrounded by
soldiers in battle order that some of us initially hesitated to enter. In the Cabinet chamber
were Major General Ironsi, Bukar Dipcharima and Ibrahim Tako Galadima. There were no
officials present.
Major General Ironsi admitted to us that he had been unable to suppress the rebellion, which
he said was getting out of hand. He stated that the mutineers were in control of Kaduna, Kano
and Ibadan, and had killed two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola.
They had also murdered a number of his best officers, including Brigadiers Maimalari and
Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun, the Commander 1st Brigade Headquarters in Kaduna. Ironsi
was full of emotion and even shed some tears. When we asked him about the whereabouts of
Sir ABubakar and Chief Okotie-Eboh, he said he still did not know but averred efforts were
being made to locate them. At this stage Mbadiwe broke down and kept crying: "Please
where is the Prime Minister?"
When we reminded Major-General Ironsi if he needed to avail himself of the British pledge
of assistance, he replied it was too late as the army was pressing him to assume power.
Indeed, he confessed his personal reluctance to take over because of his ignorance of
government; but insisted the boys were adamant and anxiously waiting outside. He advised it
would be in our interest, and that of the country, to temporarily cede power to him to avert
disaster. Accordingly, we acceded to his request since we had no better alternative. Ironsi
then insisted that the understanding be written.
Surprisingly, there was no stationery to write the agreement; and all the offices were locked
while no official was around. Alhaji AGF Abdulrazaq the Minister of State for the Railways
(former NPC legal adviser), managed to secure a scrap paper on which he drafted a
statement, which we endorsed. That was the so called voluntary hand-over of power by the
Balewa Government to Major General Ironsi! It was agreed that the statement would be typed
and Dipcharima would sign it on our behalf. We were then advised to return home and await
further instructions. I only got to break my Ramadan fast around 9:30 pm.
Later at 11.50 pm, Dr. Orizu made a terse nationwide broadcast, announcing the cabinet's
voluntary decision to transfer power to the armed forces. Major General Ironsi then made his
own broadcast, accepting the "invitation". He suspended certain parts of the constitution; set
up a national military government, with the office of military governors in each region; and
briefly outlined the policy intentions of his regime. Nigeria's first democratic experiment was
effectively over. And although the mutiny had by then practically collapsed, military rule had
arrived. It was a fact.
The following morning, 17 January, Alhaji Kam Salem, the Deputy Inspector-General of
Police (then also doubling for the Inspector-General, Mr. Louis Orok Edet, while on
vacation), called at my residence to confide that both the PM and Chief Okotie-Eboh had
been confirmed killed. He then hinted that Major General Ironsi was still negotiating with the
rebels in Kaduna, led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu"
Then Lt. Col. (later General) Gowon, who was not physically present when the rump cabinet
was handing over, says he was later told by Ironsi and other officers (who were outside the
cabinet office chambers, and thus did not themselves witness the event) that it was voluntary.
He recalls asking three separate times to be certain, but now says that had he known it was
not, he would have acted differently on that day as the Commander of the 2nd Battalion at
Ikeja which supported Ironsi in putting down the Ifeajuna-Nzeogwu revolt.
The substantive President, Nnamdi Azikiwe, also of eastern origin, had left the country in late
1965 first for Europe, then on a health cruise to the caribbean, after allegedly being tipped off
by his cousin, Major Ifeajuna, one of the masterminds of the coup and, some say, overall
leader. Interestingly, (assuming reports that he had foreknowledge are true) Azikiwe did not
notify his alliance partner, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, with whom he had
clashed over control of the armed forces during the Constitutional crisis of January 1965,
following the controversial December 1964 federal elections.
In fact President Azikiwe's personal physician, Dr. Humphrey Idemudia Idehen, abandoned
him abroad when he got tired of the "health trip", having run out of his personal estacode
allowance, unaware that there may have been a good reason why Azikiwe did not want to
return to Nigeria, after their original planned return date in December 1965 passed. Not even
the Commonwealth Leaders' Conference hosted for the first time by the country in early
January was incentive enough for the President to return, for obvious reasons of protocol.
However, after the coup, in a statement to the Press in England on January 16, among other
things, Azikiwe did not condemn the coup per se, but said:
"Violence has never been an instrument used by us, as founding fathers of the Nigerian
Republic, to solve political problems. ….I consider it most unfortunate that our 'Young Turks'
decided to introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian politics. No matter how
they and our general public might have been provoked by obstinate and perhaps grasping
politicians, it is an unwise policy……..As far as I am concerned, I regard the killings of our
political and military leaders as a national calamity….
Major Ifeajuna was later to be accused by Major Patrick Nzeogwu, leader of northern
operations, of bungling or ignoring an apparent understanding to assassinate General Ironsi in
Lagos - an oversight, or "misguided consideration" (to use Nzeogwu's words) that caused the
failure of the coup. Indeed, Nzeogwu bluntly declared publicly that the execution of the coup
in the South was tribalistic. Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd), leader of operations in the
Western region, has since corroborated the view that operations in Lagos were compromised
by nepotism. For this and other reasons, over the years, some analysts have come to view
Nzeogwu, who was recruited two full months after the plot was already in progress, as a tool
in a plot he never fully understood. Indeed, in offering condolences for the death of the
Sardauna of Sokoto, ex-Senate President Nwafor Orizu told Alhaji Shehu Shagari that Major
Nzeogwu was "an unknown entity among the Ibos (sic) in the Eastern region."
When the eastern region Governor, Emeka Ojukwu after the counter coup declared the
secession of Biafra, the only igbo military voice heard against such secession was from
Nzeogwu. Other coupist went mute.
Where are the other patriotic national officers ready to lay their lives in a military coup for
Nigeria? Their much beloved Nigeria is on the verge of civil war and their voice were no
where to be heard. What was the reaction of Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and Captain Oji who
initiated the coup when the war almost broke out? Nothing.
On the eve of the civil war, Nzeogwu whose eastern region was about to go into a civil war
with the rest of the country publicly expressed his opposition to the Biafran declaration in an
interview despite knowing the consequence of such expression.
Hear him:
In the first place, secession will be ill-advised, indeed impossible. Even if the east fights a
war of secession and wins, it still cannot secede.
Nzeogwu stated further that, personally, I don’t like secession and if this country
disintegrates,I shall pack up my things and go. In the present circumstances, confederation is
the best answer as a temporary measure. In time, we shall have complete unity. Nzeogwu
said.
To further establish the nationalistic nature of this patriotic fellow called Nzeogwu, MAX
SIOLLUN quoted Nzeogwu’s letter before the war to his friend Olusegun Obasanjo In June
17, 1967 where Nzeogwu confessed:
“You have no doubt heard a lot of rumours about my relations with Ojukwu. We obviously
see things quite differently after what he did to my supporters in January 1966. He is also
worried about my popularity among his own people. I was to be put back in prison, but he
was afraid of repercussions. Right now I am not allowed contact with troops nor am I
permitted to operate on the staff. One gentleman’s agreement we have is that I can carry on
with what ever pleases me.”
From the tone in this letter, we could see that Nzeogwu see’s himself less of an igbo, but
more of a Nigerian.
“I will create a new Nigerian army inside Biafra!! With Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and all other
ethnic groups.” Nzeogwu wrote.
Even inside Biafra while the war was abut to begin, Nzeogwu was still committed to building
a great Nigeria. What a rare patriot we have lost to internal strife.
In an interview with Ejindu in 1967, Nzeogwu was asked that, alot has been talked and
written about the January coup. But how tribalistic was it really in conception and execution?
He responded thus:
He stated that,
‘’we were five in number, and initially we knew quite clearly what we wanted to do. We had
a short list of people who were either undesirable for the future progress of the country or
who by their positions at the time had to be sacrificed for peace and stability’’.
‘’Tribal considerations were completely out of our minds at this stage. But we had a set-back
in the execution. Both of us in the North did our best. But the other three who were stationed
in the South failed because of incompetence and misguided considerations in the eleventh
hour’’.
‘’ The most senior among them was in charge of a whole brigade and had all the excuse and
opportunity in the world to mobilize his troops anywhere, anyhow and any time. He did it
badly. In Lagos, even allowing for one or two genuine mistakes, the job was badly done’’.
This above submission by Nzeogwu clearly reveal the conspiracy of what truly happened in
the eastern part of the country during the first coup.
The explanation by Nzeogwu himself was clear, there was of course tribal consideration by
those in the east. In the words of Nzeogwu, ‘’they let us down, because nothing practically
was done’’.
In this text, Nzeogwu made it clear that in the west, it was probably due to incompetence or
misguided considerations, but in the east, certainly, it has nothing to do with incompetence,
but nothing was practically done to execute the coup.
While Nzeogwu may be committed to a national exercise, the other igbo co-plotters had other
ideas. Here we know, Nzeogwu was victim of unknwon conspiracy.
When Nzeogwue was further asked by Ejindu: It has been said that Gen. Ironsi set out to
complete your job for you. Was there anything you did not like in his administration?
Nzeogwu replied: Yes, everything. First he chose the wrong advisers for the work he
halfheartedly set out to do. Most of them were either mediocre or absolutely unintelligent.
Secondly, he was tribalistic in the appointment of his governors. Thirdly the Decree 34 was
unnecessary, even silly in fact.
With the above submission both by Nzeogwu and other events that followed the coup, it was
obvious that there was indeed a conspiracy, which Nzeogwu happens to be a victim.
The decree 34 gave Nigeria’s federal status a setback in 1966 when the then Military
government promulgated the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 34 of
1966. Section 1 of the Decree stated that, as from May 24th 1966, Nigeria would cease to be
a federation and would be known as the Republic of Nigeria.
The decree 34 made far-reaching changes in the political structure of the country and
converted it to a unitary sate. The government at the Centre was named the National Military
Government while regions were called groups of provinces.Professor Justus A. S,Dr. Ifidon
O,Mr. Ige A, and Miss Omotayo O ‘’Constitutional law 1’’.
Commenting on this Decree, the eminent jurist, Dr. T. O. Elias said: “It would seem that by
this Decree, a unitary form of government had been established for Nigeria. The Federation
itself was abolished as were the regions as such.”
Professor J.D. Ojo also said, “This Decree that was promulgated without taking into
consideration the heterogeneous nature of the society was to say the least, an exercise in
futility”.
When one take a look at the social media, particularly nairaland.com or facebook where
young people have access to interract with each other on a daily basis, you see how young
people as young as 20 years of age indulge in insulting each other in defence of certain views
or opinion particularly on the civil war. These youths who were not yet human when the war
took place now see themselves as experts on the civil issue and speak about what they were
told with confidence as if they actively participated in the war. Infact, some of them go as far
as seeing their fellow youths from across the divide as war enemy that must be annihilated.
They promote hate, illogicality and advance the course of sentimentalism that brought about
the war in the first place. These are people that i refer to as victims of ethnic sentiments.
While growing up, these young victims of ethnic sentiments grow up to hear what their
parents are saying about the civil war or read about what their ethnic people wrote about it. It
doesn’t matter if what they wrote was true or not, what mattered was that, those who they
look up to as mentors, parents, leaders and others have spoken and they cannot be wrong or
questioned since they fought and later surrendered to save future generations.
Some concerned observers of the ugly trend have been wondering how these young people
develop such negative attitudes towards issues of national concern, but we must not forget the
effect of socialization and upbringing which tutor children and instill certain believe in them.
How can a child disbelieve what his parents say about a war in which they suffered greatly?
How can he or she disbelieve a story that corrobated what his parents had said about the war,
writen by his ethnic adored writer who articulated such story in a widely circulated book
outlet? How will he disbelieve a story told by people who nurtured, feed and educated him
from childhood? Ofcourse, he can hardly have a different view and even if he did, he his less
likely to express such to avoid being seen as opposite to the feelings of majority of his ethnic
people. Very few individual can summon the courage to think outside the box and open their
mind to the variety of facts to determine truth rather than hold unto myth.These young people
have been indoctrinated to hate from childhood,their mind had been shot to objectivity and
they hardly reason with logicality.
We have now getting to a stage that, instead of seeking to enlist the support of fellows youths
towards developmental accomplishments, youths focus on ethnic superiority. They ignorantly
create enemy from nowhere and focus on attacking each other for what none of them can
actually confirm its genuinity since they were not present during its occurrence.
We must make concerted effort to reverse this ugly situation to avoid future catastrophe.
After his death, the Nigerian soldiers that found his corpse cried most of whom were of
Northern origin. This lay credence that he was dragged to the battle front by the Biafrian
authorities.
Major General Yakubu Gowon, the then head of state referred to Nzeogwu as a detribalized
Nigeria and most Nigerians who know him share that view.
According to Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo ‘’Nzeogwu was "both a Nigerian & Pan-Africanist",
"a kind-hearted, open and generous man, who believed that there should be no dividing line
on any basis between Nigerians in one part of the country and those in other parts." "He
detested injustice and arrogance...
Chukwuma had a dream of a great Nigeria that is a force to be reckon with in the world, not
through ineffective political rhetoric but through purposeful & effective action...He had a
dream of an ordered and orderly nation, through a disciplined society. He also dreamt of a
country where national interest over-rides self, sectional or tribal interest... He had a dream of
a country free of graft and greed" Obasanjo said.
Maj-Gen. Olufemi Olutoye who was once Nzeogwu’s instructor also said, there was no doubt
he had traces of eccentricity but he was a very good person.
He was very kind and truthful. When he had a point and was convinced, he would stick to it.
That was one policy he had.
Olufemi said.
General Domkat Bali, one of the key participants in the civil war noted that, ‘’ we believed
that he (Nzeogwu) was a genuinely patriotic officer who organized the 1966 coup with the
best of intentions who was let down by his collaborators…if we had captured him alive, he
would not have been killed. I believe he probably would have been tried for his role in the
January 15 coup, jailed and probably freed after some time. His death was regrettable.”
Domkat Bali said.
6.0 CONCLUSSION
While it may not be completely proven that there indeed exist a conspiracy, I believe the time
line of events and actions of key players in the coup as clearly established in the above
submission shows the possibility of a conspiracy.
But irrespective of what happened during the early days of Nigeria, we must learn from the
past and move forward. Accusation and counter accusation is not the best way to heal past
wounds, it can never be a way to re-write the wrong of yesterday, rather, it fuels hatred and
suspicion. Therefore, all Nigerians irrespective of region or tribe must agree that, those who
represented us in the past had committed some error and we must never allow it to repeat
itself. 70% of people living today in each region have nothing to do with yesterday’s error,
greed and conspiracy. They have nothing to do with the mockery of northern region, neither
do they participate in the pogrom of the easterners.
If we all relate with each other with respect, truth and sincerity, there won’t be any reason to
remember past mistakes.
REFERENCE
Nigerian civil war history http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War
Though I begged Major Nzeogwu not to stage 1966 coup, he ignored me –Gen. Olutoye
http://www.punchng.com/feature/life-times/though-i-begged-major-nzeogwu-not-to-stage-
1966-coup-he-ignored-me-gen-olutoye/