DISINFODEMIC

Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

Policy brief 1
Authors: Julie Posetti and Kalina Bontcheva

Access to reliable and accurate

information is critical at the best
of times, but during a crisis such as
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it
can be a matter of life and death.
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

1. Introduction
In the words of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres,
“our enemy is also the growing surge of misinformation” during
the crisis. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has described
the disinformation swirling amidst the COVID-19 pandemic as a
“massive infodemic” - a major driver of the pandemic itself.

If information is
empowering, then
disinformation is
disempowering.
This policy brief - the first of two in a series - uses the term
disinformation to broadly refer to content that is false and has
potentially negative impacts. These impacts can have fatal
consequences during a pandemic.
The intent of the agent producing or sharing the inaccurate content
can differentiate disinformation from misinformation. The production
of content promising fake treatments for reasons of private
profit is an example of disinformation. But it can be described as
misinformation when the same content is believed to be true, and is
then shared with the intention of being helpful.
In the case of COVID-19, the responses may vary according to the
diverse motivations of those who are complicit in both disinformation
and misinformation. For example, education is a partial remedy for
misinformation, while stopping money-making from scams is one of
the ways to reduce the supply of disinformation. But the impact of the
false content, irrespective of intentions, is potentially the same. In
both cases, people are disempowered by being actively disinformed;
hence the gravely serious impacts that can result.
It is this focus on the damaging effects of fabricated and misleading
information, rather than the motivation for its creation and
dissemination, that explains the broad use of the term disinformation
in this policy brief, as well as its companion brief.
Disinformation long predates COVID-19. Falsehoods designed to
undermine the validity of science extend from the resurgence of the ‘flat
earth movement’ to those that dispute scientific consensus on climate
change, usually for narrow political or economic gain. The fabrications
that contaminate public health information today rely on the same
dissemination tools traditionally used to distribute disinformation.
What’s novel are the themes and the very direct impacts.
COVID-19 disinformation creates confusion about medical science
with immediate impact on every person on the planet, and upon whole
societies. It is more toxic and more deadly than disinformation about
other subjects. That is why this policy brief coins the term disinfodemic.
Using this frame, the brief helps to make sense of this new menace,
and of the many types of responses that are unfolding internationally.
To do this, it unpacks nine main themes and four dominant formats of
COVID-19 disinformation, and presents a typology that groups the range
of responses to the problem into 10 classes. This analysis draws on
research being conducted for the ITU-UNESCO Broadband Commission
and UNESCO, to be published later in 2020, which addresses a wider
range of disinformation subjects, types and responses.

2
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

Why Access to Quality

Information Matters
To make sense of the disinfodemic, consider its opposite –
information as a foundation for knowledge. It is access to
information, not disinformation, that makes the right to freedom of
expression meaningful and helpful to societies. Verifiable, reliable
information, such as that produced in science and professional
journalism, is key to building what UNESCO calls “Knowledge
Societies”. The disinfodemic works diametrically against this.
Today, the internet is the key distribution mechanism for both
disinformation and information. It underpins the transmission
function in the flow of messages, by means of which the production
of both disinformation and trustworthy information connects
through to the reception of this content and engagement with it.
The institutions enabling this transmission (internet companies and
the news media, for example) are not pure carriers nor platforms,
but have their own specific interests in gatekeeping and shaping
the flow of content. Their role in transmission increasingly goes
beyond the reception/consumption of content in a first cycle of
communication, and instead enables a hard-to-control spiral of
onward reproduction and elaboration of these messages.
In this context, two aspects of broadband internet access can be
noted: the positive and the negative.

+ High-speed digital connectivity is a lifeline helping us to cope

with the pandemic by:
• Allowing many people to learn, work and keep social ties from
home in times of shutdown,
• Carrying direct government-to-citizen public health information,
• Enabling credible journalism about COVID-19 to reach large
audiences,
• Connecting medical experts to one another (and to intermediaries
like journalists) in real-time.

- At the same time, mass connectivity brings with it the

dangers of false and misleading content being produced and
shared virally:
• In a growing number of cases, the consequences of the
disinfodemic have been fatal. Many citizens are being duped,
leaving them unable to understand and implement scientifically-
grounded preventive measures. People are dying as a result of
complacency, or resorting to false ‘cures’.
• Instrumentalised for political, racist, xenophobic, sexist, or
other reasons, online disinformation about COVID-19 can fan
polarisation and further hatreds - at a time when global unity is
more needed than ever.
• Journalists and medical personnel who expose disinformation
are finding themselves targets of disinformation-fuelled attacks.
• Some responses to the disinfodemic undermine the advantages
of using the internet for legitimate freedom of expression - which
is one of the best antidotes to false content.

3
Human Rights Context

It is every person’s right to seek, receive and impart

information. UNESCO and its partners work to protect and
strengthen this right by:
• Countering the contamination of disinformation,
• Supporting independent, quality journalism,
• Empowering people with Media and Information
Literacy, and
• Assisting Member States in meeting international
standards on freedom of expression.
All four lines of action are essential for the right to health,
one of the economic, social and cultural rights recognised
by the international community. They are all essential if
humanity is to achieve the UN Sustainable Development
Goal (SDG) 16.10 on “public access to information and
fundamental freedoms”. This SDG target helps power other
SDGs, and especially SDG 3 on “good health and wellbeing”
that is so critical in these times.

In publishing this policy brief, UNESCO aims to #ShareKnowledge

that can help people:
• Understand the big picture of disinformation around the
COVID-19 crisis, and
• Have insight into the types of responses being rolled out with the
ways these are being implemented.
To take the insights further, by assessing the challenges and
opportunities involved in the responses to the disinfodemic, UNESCO
has also published a companion policy brief.

Disinfodemic:
Dissecting the responses
to COVID-19 disinformation

4
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

2. The why, what and how of the COVID-19 disinfodemic

Disinformation connected to COVID-19 is The disinformation entailed can be shared by

already prolific, threatening not just individuals individuals, organised groups, some news media,
but societies as a whole. It leads to citizens and official channels – wittingly or unwittingly.
endangering themselves by ignoring scientific
advice; it amplifies distrust in policy makers and The disinfodemic often hides falsehoods among
governments; and it diverts journalists’ efforts true information, and conceals itself in the clothes
towards reactive disproving of falsehoods instead of familiar formats. It resorts to well-known
of proactive reporting of new information. It puts methods - ranging from false or misleading
everyone on the backfoot. memes and fake sources, through to trapping
people into clicking on links connected to criminal
The motivations for the disinformation are phishing expeditions. The result is that COVID-19
diverse. They may be to make money, score related disinformation affects content across the
political advantage, undermine confidence, board, including that about: the origin, spread
shift blame, polarise people, and to undermine and incidence of the disease; the symptoms and
responses to the pandemic. On the other hand, treatments; and the responses from governments
some drivers may be ignorance, individual egos, and other actors.
or a misguided intention to be helpful.

Four key disinfodemic format types

In contaminating public understanding of different aspects of the pandemic and its effects, COVID-19
disinformation has harnessed a wide range of formats. Many have been honed in the context of anti-
vaccination campaigns and political disinformation. They frequently smuggle falsehoods into people’s
consciousness by focusing on beliefs rather than reason, and feelings instead of deduction. They rely
on prejudices, polarisation and identity politics, as well as credulity, cynicism and individuals’ search
for simple sense-making in the face of great complexity and change. The contamination spreads in text,
images, video and sound. The main format types of the disinfodemic are:

1. Emotive narrative 3. Fraudulently

constructs and memes altered, fabricated, or
False claims and textual decontextualised images
narratives which often mix strong emotional and videos
language, lies and/or incomplete information, These are used to create confusion and
and personal opinions, along with elements of generalised distrust and/or evoke strong
truth. These formats are particularly hard to emotions through viral memes or false stories.
uncover on closed messaging apps.

2. Fabricated websites and 4. Disinformation infiltrators

authoritative identities and orchestrated campaigns
These include false sources, polluted datasets, These are aimed at: sowing discord in online
and fake government or company websites, communities; advancing nationalism and
and websites publishing seemingly plausible geopolitical agendas; illicit collection of
information in the genre of news stories e.g. personal health data and phishing; or monetary
reporting bogus cases of COVID-19. gain from spam and adverts for false cures.
These formats may also include artificial
amplification and antagonism by bots and trolls
as part of organised disinformation campaigns.

5
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

Nine key themes of the disinfodemic

This research has identified nine key themes present in content associated with the
disinfodemic. These themes frequently feature racism and xenophobia.

1. Origins and spread of the 5. Medical science: symptoms,

coronavirus/COVID-19 disease diagnosis and treatment.
While scientists first identified This theme includes dangerous
cases of novel coronavirus (the virus disinformation about immunity,
that causes the disease COVID-19) prevention, treatments and cures. For
connected to an animal market in the example, myriad ‘sticky’ memes claim
Chinese city of Wuhan, there are many that drinking or gargling cow urine, hot
conspiracy theories that blame other water, or salt water could prevent the
actors and causes. These extend from infection reaching lungs. They cannot.
blaming the 5G network through to
chemical weapons manufacturers.
Using a label like “Chinese virus”
instead of neutral terminology inflates
6. Impacts on society and the
location into an adjective, in an environment
historical echo of early pandemics that This theme in the disinfodemic ranges
gave a biased meaning to a noun. from panic buying triggers and false
information about lockdowns, through
to the supposed re-emergence of
dolphins in Venetian canals.
2. False and misleading
statistics
Often connected to the reported
incidence of the disease and mortality 7. Politicisation
rates. One-sided and positively-framed
information is presented in an effort
to negate the significance of facts that
3. Economic impacts. are inconvenient for certain actors in
This theme includes spreading false power. Other disinformation designed
information about the economic and to mislead for political advantage
health impacts of the pandemic, includes: equating COVID-19 with flu;
suggestions that social isolation is not making baseless claims about the
economically justified, and even claims likely length of the pandemic; and
that COVID-19 is overall creating jobs. assertions about the (un)availability
of medical testing and equipment.

4. Discrediting of journalists
and credible news outlets. 8. Content driven by
This is a theme often associated
fraudulent financial gain
with political disinformation, with
This includes scams designed to steal
unsupported accusations that certain
people’s private data.
news outlets are themselves
peddling in disinformation. This
behaviour includes abuse levelled
at journalists publicly, but it is also
9. Celebrity-focused
used by less visible disinformation
campaigns to undermine trust in disinformation
verified news produced in the public This theme includes false stories about
interest. Attacks on journalists in the actors being diagnosed with COVID-19.
time of COVID-19 have been associated
with crackdowns on critical coverage
of political actors and states.

6
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

3. Unpacking responses to
COVID-19 disinformation
Disinformation responses identified in this policy report, a hierarchical typology of disinformation
brief are categorised according to their aims, responses was developed. In the companion brief
rather than in terms of the actors behind them (e.g. to this one, available here , each response
internet communications companies, governments, category is evaluated in terms of its general
news media, NGOs). Some actors are involved in strengths and weaknesses, including in relation to
several of these responses. the fundamental right to freedom of expression.

Based on research conducted by the authors for a In total, 10 types of responses are identified
forthcoming UNESCO-ITU Broadband Commission below, and grouped into four umbrella categories:

3.1 Identifying 3.2 Producers and

disinformation distributors
a. Monitoring and fact-checking a. Legislative, pre-legislative, and
responses policy responses
b. Investigative responses b.National and international counter-
disinformation campaigns

3.3 Production and 3.4 Supporting the

distribution target audiences
a. Curatorial responses of disinformation
b. Technical and
algorithmic responses a. Ethical and normative responses
c. Economic responses b. Educational responses
c. Empowerment and credibility
labelling efforts

7
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

pledged donations to fact-checkers and journalism

organisations, to help expose disinformation.
Social media monitoring and fact-checking are
vital tools for measuring and understanding the
disinfodemic, as they uncover the continuously
changing topics of viral disinformation. For
3.1 Responses that focus example, between January and March 2020, over
1,500 COVID-19 related online falsehoods were
on identifying COVID-19 fact-checked and debunked by an International
Fact Checking Network (IFCN) initiative currently
disinformation spanning 70+ countries.
While making some use of software tools and
Identification responses pinpoint what content automation, fact-checking responses still rely
constitutes disinformation about COVID-19. This predominantly on the human judgements of highly
requires monitoring and analysis of information trained professionals, employed by independent
channels (e.g. social media, messaging apps, news organisations or news media. This generally
media, web sites). Some of the responses in this mitigates the risk of bias creep and infringement
category involve fact-checking which is usually of the right to freedom of expression (which right
followed by debunking. This means uncovering fake does not per se apply only to truthful information).
or decontextualised images or false claims, and Fact-checking is not applied to opinions, nor does its
then going on to prove them wrong and reveal the exercise contradict pluralism in the form of different
falsity to the public. A further type of response in this narratives which mobilise and interpret facts within
category is the unearthing of covert and coordinated particular frames of understanding. However, fact-
disinformation campaigns. checking more complex arguments, such as whether
3.1.a. Monitoring and face masks are a good general protection among
citizens, has highlighted the difficulty of this task,
fact-checking responses since some fact-checkers have labelled this claim as
Monitoring and fact-checking responses tend mostly false. At the same time, some scientists have
to be carried out by independent fact-checking argued that this contradicts evidence from Hong Kong
organisations, news organisations, platforms, that instituted universal mask wearing early in the
academics, and civil society organisations, as well as pandemic. There are also fears that wearing masks
partnerships between these. Such responses have may create a false sense of security, and reduce other
mobilised a large-scale effort involving fact-checking measures like social distancing. Another dimension
organisations in over 70 countries coordinated through of the controversy is that attempts to fact-check the
the International Fact Checking Network (IFCN), the claims around face-masks can reduce citizens’ trust
World Health Organisation, social media platforms, in official sources, and potentially fan racist attacks
NGOs, governments, and news media. WhatsApp, against persons of visible Asian descent who are
Facebook , Google, and Twitter have also recently perceived to be associated with wearing face masks.

organisations specialising in investigative responses

3.1.b. Investigative responses are beginning to publish first investigative insights.
Investigative responses go beyond the questions These include for example several NGOs, media
of whether a given piece of content is (at least outlets, think tanks, and joint investigations between
partially) false (fact-checking); whether an outlet academics and independent media.
is reliable and unbiased (credibility labelling); and
Topics being investigated include COVID-19
engaging in the subsequent exercise of debunking.
disinformation, campaigns launched by state-
These responses dig deeper into the role of
sponsored media, extremist movements, anti-
coordinated disinformation campaigns, including
migrant, and far-right networks. These operate
the originating actors, degree and means of spread,
across key social communications companies,
money involved, and affected communities.
including Twitter (open posts and direct messaging),
Due to their more in-depth and resource-intensive Facebook (including profiles, groups, pages,
nature, and the short timeline of the pandemic, Messenger), YouTube (videos and comments),
there are fewer published investigative responses WhatsApp, and Instagram (open posts and private
to COVID-19 compared to more straight-forward messaging), despite efforts of these companies to
fact-checking and verification efforts. Nevertheless, counter the disinfodemic.

8
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

states have been key actors here. Their responses

encompass introducing sanctions for certain cases,
incentives for others, and proactive initiatives in the
form of counter-disinformation. These efforts are
generally aimed at the production and distribution
of disinformation. They range from interventions
that criminalise COVID-19 disinformation at one end
3.2 Responses governing of the spectrum, through to increasing the supply
of public health information at the other, and less
the production and commonly, support for independent media. The
more restrictive responses have implications for
distribution of COVID-19 journalism and media freedom worldwide.

disinformation While the stated purpose in this category of

responses is to curtail falsehoods by addressing
This category of responses focuses on those creating it, some actors are themselves
using political power to deal with COVID-19 contributors to the disinfodemic, and others are using
disinformation, with the aim of shaping the wider the pandemic to justify crackdowns on legitimate
information and content ecosystem. Individual freedom of expression which could linger indefinitely.

3.2.a. Legislative, pre-legislative,

and policy responses
This category covers regulatory and law require that - even during crises - it is imperative
enforcement interventions by individual states. For to respect human rights, such as the right to
example, there has been a flurry of steps to prevent access information, and that any limitations have
and punish acts of COVID-19 disinformation. These to be fully justified, as well as legal, necessary and
include criminalising acts of producing or sharing proportionate to the purpose.
information deemed false, misleading and/or that Other kinds of policy responses have included
contradicts official government communications support for news media. Some examples:
about COVID-19. It also covers content takedown
instructions for internet communications companies. • In light of the negative impact of the crisis on
Other policy responses include material support for the media sector, along with recognition of the
news media as a bulwark against disinformation. corresponding social value of maintaining news
outlets, a number of countries are beginning to
Among the measures being taken are emergency take action. For example, Canada is fast-tracking
decrees giving political leaders sweeping new tax relief for media outlets, and putting money into
powers, and the application of existing emergency advertising specifically to be carried by the news
acts to COVID-19 disinformation to enable arrests, media. The World Association of Newspapers
fines and jail time for associated offences. (WAN-IFRA) has identified state aid packages or
Around the world, States have passed laws or tax exemptions that can support media and media
regulations enabling the prosecution of people for employers in Denmark, Belgium, Hungary and Italy.
producing or circulating disinformation, with custodial • There are mounting calls for this
sentences ranging up to five years. kind of policy response, qualified by
insistence on ensuring transparency,
These steps carry with them the risk of
impartiality and independence of any
catching legitimate journalism in the
The biggest mistake such support mechanisms. Assistance
net. In some countries, producers of
any (of) us can make in for public service media is also being
independent journalism have already
these situations is to advocated.
been arrested and detained, or deported
misinform • Cases exist where, with support from
under these laws in the context of - former US President
states responding to what they deem state donors, a number of NGOs have
Barack Obama dedicated funds for journalists at risk,
to be false information. They also risk
infringing freedom of expression rights and for COVID-19 coverage.
more broadly, due to the challenges • Some large internet
of introducing emergency measures in ways that communications companies are contributing
urgently address public health and safety threats. small amounts of funds for the media industry
However, international norms and standards do in some countries to help cover the crisis.

9
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

Examples include:
The World Health Organisation
(WHO) is actively responding • The UN Secretary General has launched a UN
to COVID-19 related Communications Response initiative “to flood the
internet with facts and science”, while countering
disinformation by publishing the growing scourge of misinformation, which he
lists of verified debunks. describes as “a poison that is putting even more
lives at risk”. The UN has also called on creatives
to produce content that includes “mythbusting”.
• UNESCO has produced content in local languages
3.2.b. National and international under the rubric of “misinformation shredder”.
counter-disinformation • The South African government has regulated
campaigns that all internet sites operating within zaDNA
top-level domain name must have a landing page
This type of response focuses on developing with a visible link to www.sacoronavirus.co.za
counter-narratives to challenge COVID-19 (national COVID-19 site).
disinformation, and seeks to mobilise online • The UK Government’s ‘counter disinformation
communities to help spread official public health cell’ comprises experts from across government
information, as well as debunk content deemed to and the tech sector. It includes a ‘rapid response
be false. Partnerships have been forged between unit’ which is designed to “stem the spread of
various internet communications companies and falsehoods and rumours which could cost lives”.
authorities to provide interactive channels for
official content. Measures in this category include • The Indian Government has launched a
campaigns and the creation of special units charged WhatsApp chatbot designed to counter COVID-19
with producing content to counter disinformation. related disinformation.

3.3 Responses to COVID-19 Strict implementation

disinformation within of internet communications
production and distribution companies’ policies and
the adoption of emergency
These responses focus on actions within the primary action: Several internet
institutions in the communications sphere - such as companies (Facebook, Google,
those in news media, social media, social messaging Linkedin, Microsoft, Reddit, and
and search. Far from being immune to disinformation, Twitter) have taken the step
these entities are all susceptible to becoming vectors of of collaborating on a common
‘disinformation infection’. Recognising this, many of them industry statement in an effort
are undertaking responses related to curation (i.e. editing
and moderating) of content. This changes the presence
to jointly combat fraud and
and prominence of different kinds of content, and in many disinformation on their sites.
cases technology is used to support policy and practice.
Sometimes, their responses are designed to reduce
economic incentives for those actors seeking to make
money out of COVID-19 disinformation.

10
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

3.3.a. Curatorial responses

These responses to the disinfodemic involve The curation of content by the internet
changes to curb the spread of COVID-19 communications companies can be assessed in
disinformation through the services of internet terms of the recommendations of the UN Special
companies, and to point users and audiences to Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression
authoritative sources of public health information. which call for safeguards to avoid the elimination
Examples of these measures include: of legitimate content in acts of ‘private censorship’.

• The NGO First Draft has compiled a list of how Curatorial responses are also a major plank of
11 major internet platforms are responding to news organisations’ strategies for combating the
what they frame as ‘mis- and disinformation’ disinfodemic. Examples include:
around the COVID-19 pandemic. Some major
actions identified include deregistering • Thematic newsletters that curate the best
obvious disinformation purveyors, while reporting, research and debunking on a
elevating credible sources through free scheduled basis.
advertising space and other mechanisms. • Podcasts that mythbust through the curation
• WhatsApp continues to experience difficulty of fact checks, interviews, data reviews, and
monitoring or moderating messages on credible public health information on COVID-19.
the encrypted platform, although it is • Live blogs, and regularly updated lists and
investigating potential for users to access databases of debunked disinformation from
fact-checking links. around the world.
• CrowdTangle - a Facebook-owned social • Specialised curations that centralise resources,
analytics company - has opened its guidelines, and explanatory reporting about
dashboards to the public on the theme of doing journalism safely, ethically, and
COVID-19. This applies to Facebook and effectively during the pandemic.
Instagram content and helps research and
reporting on the disinfodemic.

3.3.b. Technical and algorithmic

• Many other tools are listed in FirstDraft’s Basic
responses Toolkit, including, amongst others, utilities
These disinfodemic responses use automation for image and video verification, identifying
(e.g. browser plugins, mobile apps) and/or Artificial geolocation, advertising transparency tools,
Intelligence (AI) in order to detect and limit the and COVID-19 dashboards.
spread of disinformation, or to provide context and
The COVID-19 crisis, coupled with depleted
extra information on individual items and posts.
workforces, has also posed a challenge for internet
They can be implemented by social media sites, as
companies that moderate content. Consequently,
well as search engines and third party providers
they have resorted to greater reliance on
(e.g. browser plugins, mobile apps).
automated content moderation of COVID-19
Some news media and fact-checking organisations disinformation, with Facebook cautioning that they
are using automated tools to help speed up will “make more mistakes”, and that they can no
COVID-19 fact-checking and content verification. longer guarantee that users who appeal against
automatic removal will have recourse to a human-
• One tool is Agence France Presse’s (AFP) InVID/ based review process. Similar announcements
WeVerify browser plugin. It is helping debunk were made by Google, Twitter and YouTube. In
disinformation about COVID-19 in numerous cases where automation errs (e.g. a user post
countries (USA, France, India, Portugal, linking to a legitimate COVID-19 news or web sites
Netherlands, Colombia, Ecuador, Mauritius) is removed), the dilution of the right to appeal and
and languages (e.g. English, French, Spanish, the lack of a robust correction mechanism harms
Dutch, and Portuguese) by many fact-checkers the users’ freedom of expression. This contravenes
and news organizations (e.g. AFP, France24, one of the key corporate obligations highlighted by
The Quint, Boom, India Today, L’Express, Canal 1, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom
Volkskrant). of Opinion and Expression.

11
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

3.3.c. Economic responses

This response category is about steps to stop • Google and Twitter also instituted a blanket
people making money from disinformation, ban of all adverts that mention coronavirus and
to remove incentives for creating clickbait, COVID-19 except those placed by government
counterfeit news sites, and other kinds of for-profit entities or other authorised official sources.
disinformation. This led to the unwanted effect of preventing
other legitimate entities from launching helpful
There are two main kinds of economic responses
information campaigns through ads. As a result,
so far: advertising bans and demonetization of
Google lifted the ban in early April. Twitter’s
COVID-19 content.
position remained unchanged at the same point
• While Facebook does not ban disinformation in time: “Twitter prohibits all promoted content
in political adverts, in this case (alongside that refers to COVID-19. The only exceptions
Google), the company has taken proactive steps to this prohibition are approved Public Service
to limit COVID-19 disinformation in Facebook Announcements (PSA’s) from government
and Instagram ads, as well as reduce economic and supranational entities, news outlets that
profiteering from the pandemic. This is done currently hold a political content exemption
by excluding adverts for testing kits, sanitiser, certification, and some organisations who have a
masks and “cures” at inflated prices, often current partnership with the Twitter Policy team.”
promoted through click-bait disinformation
• Beyond advertising, YouTube has taken measures
claims. However, due to the automation-based
to ensure ethical monetization of content
method used for advert screening, rogue
mentioning or featuring COVID-19 by requesting
advertisers have found ways to get around
all content is fact-checked by its authors and
the ban through exploiting automation, use of
that its guidelines are followed. Where they
synonymous words and hijacking user accounts.
detect violations, the company will either
• Google and Bing’s de-monetisation efforts have remove the offending COVID-19-related content,
also been ‘gamed’ and their search technology limit its monetisation, or temporarily disable
still sometimes displays pages that sell dubious monetization on the channel.
COVID-19 related products.

3.4.a. Ethical and normative

responses
This group of responses includes public
condemnation of acts of disinformation, or
recommendations and resolutions aimed at
thwarting these acts. Such responses include
statements from UN special rapporteurs, WHO
officials, and political leaders. Additionally, there have
been examples of calls for reinforcing ethical conduct
within journalism, and for internet communications
3.4 Responses aimed companies to do more.

at supporting the These responses have often taken the form of

published statements, speeches or articles designed
target audiences of to move others to stop sharing disinformation, to
reinforce freedom of expression norms during the
COVID-19 disinformation crisis, and to adapt ethical standards to address new

campaigns
challenges in responses to the disinfodemic.

This category of responses to the COVID-19 Underlining the mission of the

disinfodemic includes recommendations, news media, a published appeal
resolutions, media and information literacy to journalists in India reads:
development, and content credibility labelling
initiatives. These are all responses that “A billion-plus people expect us to be
seek to address the targets and receivers of around, watching, reporting, editing,
disinformation, including online communities, the recording this for posterity, blowing the
news media and their audiences. whistle on injustices and state failures.”

12
 Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation

Examples include: • Calls from senior editors, journalists and

• A joint statement from International media academics to stop live broadcasting
experts including David Kaye, UN Special politicians who disseminate disinformation
Rapporteur on the right to Freedom of during speeches and press conferences,
Opinion and Expression; Harlem Désir, OSCE due to the difficulty of fact-checking and
Representative on Freedom of the Media, and debunking in realtime.
Edison Lanza, IACHR Special Rapporteur for • Unprecedented decisions by internet
Freedom of Expression: “Governments must communications companies to edit or remove
promote and protect access to and free flow recordings of political leaders deemed to be
of information during pandemic”. spreading disinformation about COVID-19.

The International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) has launched a Global Health Crisis
Reporting Forum which includes an interactive, multilingual hub for thousands of
journalists around the world to: aid informed, ethical reporting through direct access to
credible sources of scientific and medical expertise; facilitate knowledge sharing and
collaborative fact-checking/debunking in reference to COVID-19.

3.4.b. Educational responses • The African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME)
hosts a curated list of resources, tools, tips
These responses are aimed at promoting citizens’ and sources connected to reporting COVID-19,
media and information literacy, which includes including a fact-checking collection.
critical thinking and digital verification skills. There
are also responses aimed at journalistic education • Afghan NGO NAI has produced “Essentials of
and training, arising from journalists being journalism performances during COVID 19”.
targets of, as well as key responders to, COVID-19 • The Data and Society research group has
disinformation efforts. In the context of the produced a sheet of 10 tips for journalists
disinfodemic, many educational measures are being covering disinformation.
delivered digitally - often using the same online
environments where disinformation proliferates 3.4.c. Empowerment and
(e.g. social media). These responses are being rolled credibility labelling efforts
out especially by public service and information
Empowerment and credibility labelling responses
literacy projects around the world, media,
are complementary to educational responses. They
journalism-oriented civil society organisations and
focus specifically on content verification tools,
journalism schools, as well as governments.
and web content indicators, in order to empower
Examples of media and information literacy citizens and journalists to avoid falling prey to
projects include: COVID-19 disinformation. They also encourage
good practices in media companies when
• Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper has published
publishing information. A widely used response
a short citizens’ guide to surviving the
is ‘signposting’ which involves providing links to
disinfodemic as an act of digital media literacy.
trustworthy sources of information. For example:
• The London School of Economics (LSE) has
• The Harvard Medical School, which identifies
published a guide to helping children navigate
signals for reliable information sources and
COVID-19 disinformation for families forced by
provides information on ways to spot them.
the pandemic to homeschool their children.
This is complemented by website credibility
Educational interventions aimed at journalists
labelling efforts aimed at helping citizens to quickly
focus on verification, fact-checking, and ethical
judge unreliable websites. For example:
health reporting. Some examples:
• The NewsGuard company has set up a
• UNESCO has crowdsourced translations of
Coronavirus Misinformation Tracking Center
its handbook “Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and
which signals ‘news’ and ‘information’ sites in
Disinformation” into multiple new languages in
the U.S., the U.K., France, Italy, and Germany
response to the disinfodemic.
that have been identified by the company
• First Draft’s Coronavirus Information Resources as publishing COVID-19 disinformation. The
page includes a ‘debunk database’, a curated company has partnered with British Telecom
list of sources, educational webinars about and the UK Department of Culture, Media, and
reporting on the pandemic, and tools and guides Sports to help popularise this effort in the UK.
to aid COVID-19 verification and debunking.

13
4. Conclusion
This policy brief has presented two typologies for understanding the disinfodemic:
• Firstly, it has identified nine key themes and four
main format types prevalent in disinformation
about the COVID-19 crisis. These themes range
from false information about the origins of the
virus, and the incidence, symptoms and cures,
through to political attacks on journalists. The
formats in use include the familiar modes of:
highly emotive narrative constructs and memes;
fabricated, fraudulently altered, or decontexualised
images and videos; disinformation infiltrators and
orchestrated campaigns; and bogus websites, data
sets and sources.
• Secondly, to make sense of the range of responses
to the disinfodemic, the brief grouped these UNESCO’s mandated programme in
interventions into 10 classes. These, in turn, are Communication and Information is
located under four umbrella categories: increasingly relevant in relation to the
disinfodemic. The ongoing work involves:
»» Monitoring and investigative responses
(which contribute to identifying COVID-19 • Freedom of Expression and Safety
disinformation, debunking it, and exposing it) of Journalists – this advances free,
»» Law and policy, and state-based ‘counter- pluralistic, independent, and safe
disinfodemic’ responses (which together quality journalism, which is an antidote
represent governance of the ecosystem) to disinformation (and also to over-
»» Curation, technological, and economic reactions that can unjustifiably restrict
responses (that are relevant to the policies and expression).
practices of institutions mediating content) • Access to Information – this
»» Normative and ethical; educational; work promotes transparency and
empowerment and credibility responses proactive disclosure by governments,
(aimed especially at the audiences targeted which helps produce authoritative
by disinformation agents). information of official origin, as an
The purpose of this brief is to provide a structure for alternative to rumours and lies.
understanding the COVID-19 disinfodemic and the
• Digital Innovation and Technologies
responses to it, highlighting practices which have a
bearing on the UN Sustainable Development Goals
– this examines how technology
(SDGs), the right to health and the right to freedom produces, prioritises, shares
of expression. SDG 16.10 calls for “public access to and assesses information (and
information and fundamental freedoms”. disinformation).
For further analysis and assessment of the • Media Development and Society – work
disinformation types presented here, UNESCO has here promotes resilience through
produced a companion policy brief. Media and Information Literacy,
This second brief also suggests options for action by advancing gender equality in and
states, the news media, civil society, and researchers. through media, and community media
as essential to media pluralism.
Together, the two briefs are designed to assist
intergovernmental organisations, individual states,
civil society, news media and others to grapple with
the disinfodemic which is fuelling disease and disarray
around the world.

14
What UNESCO is doing
about the disinfodemic

In response to the crisis, UNESCO’s Communication and Information

Sector has stepped up its work in relation to the “supply”, “demand” and
“transmission” dimensions of the disinfodemic.

On the “supply side”, the Sector is working to point out that in order to
counter rumours, governments can step up official transparency, and
increase proactive disclosure and open data, in line with Right to Information
law and policy. This is because access to information which comes with
official provenance is key for credibility and communications in this crisis.

At the same time, this important area of “supply-side” action is not

a substitute for the information that is produced by the news media.
Therefore, the Sector seeks to persuade authorities to consider free and
professional journalism as an ally in the fight against disinformation. This
is especially because news media works openly in public space, whereas
much disinformation is under-the-radar on social messaging apps, and it is
not easy for those involved to be held accountable. The campaign for World
Press Freedom Day, 3 May, 2020 reinforces recognition that journalism
without fear or favour is especially vital during the pandemic.

As part of the campaign, UNESCO – as with other UN actors - urges

governments not to impose restrictions on freedom of expression that
might harm the essential role of independent journalism. Instead, states
are encouraged to recognise journalism as a power against disinformation
- even when it generates verified information and informed opinion that
may annoy some in power. The Organisation’s Communications-Information
Sector is also sharing good practices such as official recognition of media
as an essential service at this time, and as one that - with provisos for
independence and transparency - is also worthy of state support during
such turbulent economic times.

UNESCO works further to strengthen journalism professionalism in coverage

of this crisis. A call for co-operation through the International Association
of Media and Communications Research (IAMCR) has set in motion 20
translations of the publication Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation:
A Handbook for Journalism Education and Training. A Massive Open Online
Course to be rolled out in multiple languages is being developed with the
UNESCO Chair in Communication at the University of Austin, Texas.

As regards the “transmission” of disinformation, UNESCO works to promote

internet Universality as a means to align digital development to sustainable
development. This involves advancing norms based on the R.O.A.M
principles agreed by our Member States. Accordingly, we work with internet
companies, governments, civil society and others to ensure that the internet
respects human rights, is open, accessible to all, and governed through
multi-stakeholder processes. UNESCO’s publication series on internet
Freedom provides pointers on how digital networks can respect freedom of
expression and privacy, while avoiding hate-speech and radicalisation for
violent extremism which are found fused together with disinformation.

15
Catering to the “receiver” / “demand” side, UNESCO is circulating key public
health information messages, in partnership with agencies like WHO, in order
to provide authoritative facts which can contradict falsehoods with truthful
information. This activity is implemented through networks in the media,
including community radios and public broadcasters, and through UNESCO’s
own social media channels.

UNESCO is also building resilience among audiences by intensifying its online

Media and Information Literacy initiatives. These steps cultivate critical
thinking and mindful participation in communications. For example, through
many partners, the Organisation is ramping up its promotion of the hashtags
#ThinkBeforeSharing, #ThinkBeforeClicking, and #ShareKnowledge.

A “CodeTheCurve” global hackathon, in partnership with IBM and SAP,

has enlisted young people worldwide to propose technology solutions
to help counter the crisis. Documentary heritage institutions are being
mobilised to provide perspectives on how previous pandemics have been
addressed and the lessons that arose. Four special projects have been
approved by UNESCO’s International Programme for the Development of
Communications to support journalist responses to coronavirus in Eastern
Africa, Southern Africa, in India and through the Caribbean. Activities to
promote open science and open education resources, as well as innovation
in digital technologies through campaigns around #DontGoViral and
#ShareInformation, are also part of the picture.

The Sector also works in the Broadband Commission which has recognised
the importance of access to information in the response to the crisis, and
is overseeing research for the Commission’s Working Group on Freedom of
Expression and Disinformation.

In these many ways, UNESCO promotes the view that the rights to freedom
of expression and access to information are strong remedies to the dangers
of disinformation.

It is these rights that enable governments and the public to take evidence-
based decisions about policy and practice, and for implementing and
monitoring responses to the pandemic that are founded on both science
and human rights values. On this basis, UNESCO’s work in information and
communications can help to take humanity through the current challenges
in the most optimum manner.

16
Methodology
The findings presented here are the result of desk healthcare professionals, NGOs, think tanks, and
research carried out by the authors, with inputs academic publications. Keywords used included
provided by the following research collaborators: disinformation, misinformation, COVID-19,
Denis Teyssou (AFP), Clara Hanot (EU Disinfo coronavirus, epidemic and pandemic.
Lab), Trisha Meyer (Vrije Universiteit Brussel),
The research sought to include sources pertaining
Sam Gregory (Witness), and Diana Maynard
to countries on all continents, including where
(University of Sheffield).
possible (according to the language capabilities
The dataset on which the findings are based of the researchers), materials in languages other
consists of a sample of over 200 articles, policy than English. These collected sources have now
briefs, and research reports. This data set was been aggregated into a database that will be
identified by the researchers, who systematically continuously updated in coming months and
searched public databases curated by the Poynter which is publicly accessible here . While the
Institute’s International Fact Checking Network disinfodemic is fast-moving and vast in scale,
(IFCN), Index on Censorship, the International this policy brief represents findings based on a
Press Institute (IPI), and First Draft News, along snapshot of source materials contained in this
with the websites of news media, national database as of April 10th, 2020.
governments, intergovernmental organisations,

About the authors

Dr. Julie Posetti is the International Center for

Journalists’ (ICFJ) Global Director of Research.
Multi-Donor Programme She is also a senior researcher affiliated with the
on Freedom of Expression University of Sheffield’s Centre for Freedom of the
and Safety of Journalists Media (CFOM), and the Reuters Institute for the
United Nations Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford.
Cultural Organization

Professor Kalina Bontcheva is a Professor in

Computer Science at the University of Sheffield
and a member of the University’s Centre for
Freedom of the Media (CFOM).

Read Policy Brief #2

DISINFODEMIC:
Dissecting responses to
COVID-19 disinformation
This policy brief was supported by the
International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), which
is assisting journalists working on the frontlines
of the disinfodemic around the world, to ensure
accurate, trustworthy and verifiable public health
information reaches communities everywhere.

Published in 2020 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,7, place de Fontenoy,
75352 Paris 07 SP, France© UNESCO. This policy brief is available in Open Access under the Attribution-
ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC-BY-SA 3.0 IGO) license. By using the content of this publication, the users accept to
be bound by the terms of use of the UNESCO Open Access Repository. The designations employed and the
presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever
on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication
are those of the authors; they are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

17